2021-4412-AJSS
1 Empire, Hegemony, Hyperpower? Management of late- 2 Westphalian International Environment
3 Empire and Hegemony are among the crucial notions of science of interna- 4 tional relations. Many scholar were investigating those concepts, and at- 5 tempted to define them and estimate whether they retain explanatory value in 6 contemporary situation of accelerated evolution of international system. 7 Within the system governed by anarchy, those two prepositions were consid- 8 ered partial resolution to destructive tendencies generated within the inter- 9 national environment. Albeit those resolutions seems similar, their applica- 10 tion required different conditions in order to become effective. Every men- 11 tioned above system is a complex and adequate answer to challenge posed 12 by different set of features and variables generated by particular iteration of 13 international system. The question remains: preconditions to occurrence of 14 which system will be generated by late-Westphalian and subsequent genera- 15 tion of international environment? Contemporary iteration projects many 16 individual characteristics, with regards to complexity, globalization and his- 17 torical acceleration. One of the possible solution to this issue is recently in- 18 troduce concept of Hyperpower, which could be positioned as a system in 19 between those mentioned above. However its creation embraces new quality 20 of international relations not yet encounter during course of history. This 21 paper will be dedicated to investigating this concept and its usefulness for 22 scientific analysis of contemporary international relations. Hyperpower em- 23 braces geopolitics and transnational in equal measures. It is product of a so- 24 called ―virtualization of state‖ and encompass tools for effective interaction 25 in both spheres of international environment. It is generally much more pas- 26 sive system than mentioned above. Its activation consumes astounding 27 amount of resources. Therefore its primary application is in most cases pas- 28 sive, strictly limited to the shaping of the perception of remaining elements 29 of international system. 30 31 Keywords: Hyperpower, Hegemony, Empire, late-Westphalian International 32 Environment 33 34 35 Introduction 36 37 One of the fundamental tenets of Westphalian international environment is 38 the notion of sovereignty1. It is still unclear what exactly it could be, but
1M. Pietraś, Hybrydowość późnowestfalskiego ładu międzynarodowego [w:] Późnowestfalski ład międzynarodowy, M. Pietraś, K. Marzęda (eds), Lublin 2008, p. 57 – 74; D. Kondrakiewicz, Równowaga sił w późnowestfalskim ładzie międzynarodowym [w:] Późnowestfalski ład międzynarodowy, M. Pietraś, K. Marzęda (eds), Lublin 2008, p. 249 – 271;
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1 entirety of academic community associated with the international relations 2 agree, that this is inseparably connected with statehood, thus each international 3 Actor is equipped in similar quantity of similar quality of this asset. However, 4 as it was proven since the beginning on 20th Century, nation states tend to differ, 5 when it comes to their place and role within the framework. The differences 6 between the size and modes of operations within the community of nation 7 states drive to development of third debate on international relations, between 8 the neorealists and neoliberals2. Although both sides were basing on different 9 assumption, the role of surrounding environment, which was understood as a 10 dominant factor which shape and formed internal structures and its functions. 11 Therefore different strata of nation state were identified and examined. 12 However, the main research objective of this paper is the investigation the top 13 strata of the Actors, mostly derived from nation states category. During history, 14 in most cases this strata was occupied by singular entity, which was labeled 15 differently: Empire or Hegemony. The next question is aimed at identification 16 of differences between those terms, supplemented with the clarification of 17 conditions which promotes coalescence and development of certain forms of 18 political entity overarching entire international system. The final question will 19 be addressing the future of this structure: whether future, post-Westphalian 20 international will require similar institution. And if so, how it could look like. 21 One of the possibilities only recently developed concept of a hyperpower. 22 At first glance it strongly resemblance to the notion of superpower, relating 23 mainly to a specific category of the extremely potent state3. However, this idea 24 defines a new quality of international environment, introducing different set of 25 constructs and fulfilling different set of functions than classical, Westphalian 26 international institutions. The analysis will focus on three variables: national 27 component, transnational component and functions. First, it is the role of the 28 national component, which is the nation-state, one of the most potent examples 29 of category of superpower or world power. Nowadays, the role of the center of 30 a Hyperpower is strongly gripped by United States of America. Second, it is 31 the role of the transnational component in the form of a network of 32 transnational connections between the hyperpower's center and other elements 33 of the international environment. Third, it is also the function of the 34 hyperpower in the international environment, as well as its role and 35 contribution to the transformation of the Westphalian international environment 36 into the next-generation international environment. 37 Two research hypotheses will be subjected to verification. The first will 38 refer to the nature of a Hyperpower, which in its structure includes the 39 construction of a complete balance between the tools of shaping international 40 geopolitical reality and shaping transnational social reality. The second relates
E. Panas, Power of Transnational Organizations of Civil Society as a Post-Westphalian Type of Power, „Teka Commission of Political science and International affairs”, 2014, nr 9a, p. 51 – 68. 2J. S. Nye, Neorealism and neoliberalism, “World politics”, 1988, nr 40(2), p. 235 – 251. 3W. T. R. Fox, The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace, New York 1944.
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1 to the basic mechanism of the functioning of the Hyperpower in the 2 international reality. Unlike the previous forms, it is a clearly passive, shaping 3 the perception of other participants in international relations rather than 4 actively formatting actual international relations. To supplement this 5 hypotheses will be determination whether any of mentioned entities will be 6 attractive enough to be recreated within the framework of post-Westphalian 7 international environment. This assessment will be based on scenario method, 8 as their need to be based on relatively low level of certainty. 9 The structure of paper will be composed of four, connected parts. First part 10 will embrace the nature of the evolution of International Relations system 11 which could be labeled as late-Westphalian. Particularly important will be 12 issues of continuity and change, which are recreating and reforming paths for 13 the future development and modifying probablities of future recreation of 14 known forms of International System management hub. Second part will be 15 dedicated to the first period of development of International Relations, when 16 the highest authority in the global environment was labeled as an Empire. This 17 node was based on two-layered foundations: overwhelming military advantage 18 over remaining international Actors. Second is the universal and not-questioned 19 recognition for legitimacy of an Empire. Title may be confusing as it was used 20 several times during the history, with varied composition, which in turned 21 disrupted clear definitions. Third part will embrace the second period of 22 development of International Relations, when the highest authority was labeled 23 as a Hegemony. This concept was created in situation where there is not 24 possible to acquire military superiority over remaining elements of the system, 25 but the mantle of Hegemony is achieved only by set of skills and capabilities. 26 Those who excel among rivals, will be granted this post. In other words, this 27 place is given temporarily and conditionality, and Actor which starts to 28 decaying as a wielder of Hegemony, it will be tested and eventually replaced in 29 a contest known as Hegemonic War4. 30 31 32 International Environment: change and continuity 33 34 Since the last decade of the 20th Century, international relations scholars 35 are engaged in debates concerning the growing urgency of redefinition of the 36 scope, structures and functions of the international environment. This situation 37 was created mainly thanks to changes occurring within the deep undercurrents 38 of civilization – so called megatrends5. Observed change embraces transition
4R. Gilpin, The theory of hegemonic war, “The Journal of Interdisciplinary History”, 1988, nr 18(4), p. 591 – 613. 5The term was introduced to science of international relations by John Naisbitt. Currently, it is used to describe universal tendencies that shape the international order at the highest social level (civilization). Different researchers identify and name different megatrends: J. Naisbitt distinguishes 10 of them, P. Kennedy - 7, National Defense Council report (Global Trends 2015) - 7, H. McRae - 5; M. Perczyński - 4, and J. Pajestka - 2. On the other hand, B. Balcerowicz distinguished 6 megatrends: globalization, IT revolution, uneven demographic explosion, threats to the natural environment, systemic transformation - in the economic (capitalism) and
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1 from classical form of international environment known as Westphalian 6 , 2 existing since 1648. The predominant feature is dualism present in every aspect 3 of social relations, for instance between the national and international law7. As 4 the next generation of the international environment is taking shape, this 5 dualism is slowly modified to the point where both orders will overlap and 6 interpenetrate themselves. A manifestation of this phenomenon may be the 7 emergence of numerous, ephemeral forms of political and social organizations 8 functioning at the intersection of both spheres. Area of activity of those Actors 9 – formal and semi-formal – will be a number of mechanisms, legal, political 10 and social, enabling external interference in the national constitutional order8. 11 The classical Westphalian international environment is fixed on three basic 12 foundations. First is foremost in the structure of international community 13 stemming from the nation-state, as a single Actor9 category with undisputed 14 Power in two important dimensions. One is the undisputed supremacy within 15 the geopolitical sphere of International Relations, represented by skillful and 16 effective application of military assets. In fact, some commentators claim, that 17 nation state is army framed with the government10. It was used directly toward 18 the Kingdom of Prussia in 18th Century, but it could be extended toward all 19 nation-states. Representatives of this category whenever it was recognized by 20 other of its kind, predominantly due to force of arms. The other is social 21 legitimacy, basing not only on rational and politics association but also 22 emotional investments in forming bonds between the nation and individual 23 citizens. This process was greatly improved by French Revolution, especially 24 due to surging demands for manpower 11 . In consequence, connecting the 25 military power with social legitimacy created cornerstone for International 26 Relations, from which other forms on international community are stemming: 27 non-governemental organization, multinational corporations and international 28 organizations. However, their existence and well-being was completely 29 dependent on the collective will of nation-state. 30 Second issue is the split within the global entity due to omnipotence of 31 nation-state, which could be described as a dichotomy between what is within 32 the borders of nation-state and what is beyond them 12 . Former space is
political (democratization) domains - and also the clash of civilizations. More: B. Balcerowicz, Pokój i nie-pokój. Na progu XXI wieku, Warsaw 2002, p. 85 – 118. 6L. Gross, The Peace of Westphalia: 1648-1948, „The American Journal of International Law”, 1948, nr 42(1), p. 20 – 41. 7S. Beaulac, The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the Myth, „Australian Journal of Legal History”, 2004, nr 8(2), p. 181 – 213. 8 Praworządność w Polsce i na Węgrzech: sytuacja pogarsza się: komunikat prasowy, „Parlament Europejski: Aktualności”, 2020, January 16th,
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1 associated with pacification, order, hierarchy and non-violent modes of 2 communication. Latter on the other hand is associated with chaos, disorder, 3 anarchy, and modes of communication supplemented with violence, in a form 4 of wars and coercion. Between those spheres, there is a national border, sealed 5 and protected, carefully designed and constantly watched by government 6 agencies located on both sides. At the peak of Westphalian international 7 environment people, goods and information, were carefully examined and 8 permitted, by issuing various documents to access internal, national space. 9 Furthermore, quite frequently this permission was limited or canceled entirely13. 10 Third issue are the institutions responsible for managing and 11 maintaining cohesion of whole system. Those are embracing various set of 12 mechanisms, stretching form international law to the concert of Powers. The 13 most important of those is balance of Power, which could be understood as an 14 internal mechanism which require every rise of certain nations to be counter by 15 other entities or coalitions of thereof14. It was particularly visible during the 16 Napoleonic Wars, when sudden rise is prominence of French Empire trigger 17 creation of seven coalitions, which eventually arrest this ascendancy and 18 dispersed this excess of power between remaining Actors of European 19 International Subsystem. What those institution have in common, is the fact 20 that they are constructed according to three important principles. First and 21 foremost, they are dedicated only to support relations between nation-states. At 22 the core of every institution lies presumption that establishing fully developed 23 intrastate relations is extremely burdening, especially when it comes to mutual 24 distrust and cultural differences. Therefore, they were responsible to tackle 25 those obstacles, for instance with application of diplomacy15. Second, despite 26 limiting role of violence within their framework, violence in itself was also 27 considered to be viable institution for International System, particularly in form 28 of war, at least till 1945, when it was eventually banned16. And third, despite 29 beneficial impact on national performance, there is no compulsion to 30 participate within them. The sovereignty, the ultimate right of nation-state to 31 participate in any form of international cooperation was the most important 32 principle. And it allowed the nation state to opt-out every initiative that defy 33 their objectives. 34 This construction was slowly evolving since the second half of 20th 35 Century. Primary driver of this change was the complex network of mentioned 36 above civilizational megatrends. In this particular perspective, their could be 37 identified two separate megatrends: demographics and technology. Former 38 roughly shapes the quantitative parameters of International Environment, 39 primarily depending number of people present within the system. Latter – 40 designs the qualitative parameters of International Environment. Both of them
13Ch. Shaw, Friendship under lock and key: the Soviet Central Asian border, 1918–34, “Central Asian Survey”, 2011, nr 30(3-4), s. 331 – 348. 14M. Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory, London, New York 1996. 15G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, New York 2015. 16Article 2.4 UN Charter signed on June 26th, 1945, URL: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un- charter/full-text, [accesss: 31.07.2021].
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1 are to some extent intertwined, like for instance in the issue of literacy17, which 2 assess capacity of individuals and social groups to efficiently operate 3 contemporary technology. When it comes to change and continuity, which 4 stirred the debate about need to redesign International Relations, there could be 5 observed three fundamental changes which are being unfolded within the 6 human civilization, stemming from changes within those megatrends. First and 7 foremost is reversal of demographic explosion18. This means that influx of new 8 society members is getting severely limited. In the case of developed nations it 9 is limited only to immigration, which could be in time limited by spread of this 10 effect to entire world. Main consequence is developing by nation state 11 sensitivity to loses, especially connected with battle casualties and collateral 12 damages. Second, is the societal diversification on the scale of globe and on a 13 scale of individual nations. This phenomena occurred because of national 14 awakening identified and described be Zbigniew Brzeziński19, which is focused 15 primarily on activity of national and sub-national entities within the framework 16 of International Relations. This in turn makes mobilization of national assets 17 much more difficult and challenging. Third factor is drastic rise in accessibility 18 of advanced technologies of data processing and communication not only 19 among various national agencies, but also within the societies and individuals20. 20 Which means that geopolitical social space, dominated by nation states is 21 supplemented with transnational social space 21 , which empowers non-state 22 entities which became equal to nation states, at least to extent. 23 Those changes are causing and accelerating deterioration of institutions of 24 Westphalian International Environment. Question about what will replace them? 25 This paper limits the scope of its investigation only toward possible paths of 26 evolution of central hub of International Management, which stems between 27 Pre-Westphalian concept of Empire and Westphalian concept of Hegemony. 28 However due to uniqueness of constantly designed and constructed 29 International Environment in order is to offer possible solution of new quality – 30 combining features associated with both notions – Hyperpower. 31 32 33
17UIS Data Centre, UNESCO, Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years (both sexes, female, male), August 2015, URL: http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EDULIT_DS &popupcustomise=true&lang=en# [access: 1.02.2016]. 18United Nations Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. File POP/1-1: Total population (both sexes combined) by major area, region and country, annually for 1950-2100 (thousands), Low fertility variant, 2015 - 2100, New York 2015, URL: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/ Standard/Population/, [access: 15.07.2016]. 19Z. Brzeziński, Strategic Vision: America and Crisis of Global Power, New York 2012. 20 C. Cooper, Extraordinary circumstances. The Journey of a Corporate Whistlebower, Hoboken 2008. 21 Pietraś, Przestrzeń transnarodowa jako poziom analizy w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych [in:] Poziomy analizy stosunków międzynarodowych. Tom 1, E. Haliżak, M. Pietraś (eds), Warsaw 2013, p. 93 – 131.
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1 Pre-Westphalian: Empire: law and military 2 3 Chronologically first in those concepts is a concept of central management 4 hub for International Relations is the notion of the Empire. However, that is a 5 cause a challenge, because it was used for some many cases within the 6 framework of history and political sciences, the term is distorted and to some 7 extent biased. Therefore, before there could be conducted full analysis of the 8 term, there is a need to clarify the definitions. First of all, there need to be 9 made a clear, that during history of political institutions, empire was used 10 frequently to described various political entities. Stretching from Summer and 11 Assyrian Empire, through Roman, Chinese and Byzantine Empire, Aztec and 12 Inca Empire, Indian Empire, British, French, Spanish or Russian Empire to 13 recently investigated idea of American Empire. There need to be stated one 14 important feature: empire is used in at least three separate meanings. 15 First of those is understanding of Empire as a particularly strong entity of 16 political nature and expansive tendencies22. It may be observed primarily in the 17 opening phases of pre-Westphalian International Environment when proto- 18 political entities were longing for more assets and prestige. However lack of 19 management skills and uniquely recognized procedures usually prevented 20 establishing more coherent entities. Most visible and known could be Persian 21 Empire, Athenian Empire23 or Empire of Alexander the Great. 22 Second way to explain the term is application of socioeconomic context of 23 19th Century, when developed economies of Western Europe seek of new 24 markets and resources to feed industrial and military complex and they found 25 those commodities in colonies. This issue was particularly interesting for 26 followers of Marxism theory of International Relations 24 . Within this 27 subcategory, we can identify colonial empires of Great Britain (both of them)25, 28 France, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal. 29 Third possible application of Empire is in cultural or universal terms. This 30 entity was applied only twice in the history. One of those examples was Roman 31 Empire, which existed between 27 BC and 476 AD26 and Chinese Empire, 32 which existed between 2070 BC and 1911 AD27. Only this strand of Empires 33 will be subjected to analysis within this paper, mainly because only those 34 entities were functioning as a central management hub for international system. 35 Both entities, despite few obvious differences display three identical 36 features, when it comes to their internal mechanisms. First and foremost it is
22The greatest of them was Persian Empire ruled by Achamenid Dynasty. 23Officialy labeled as a Delian League. This organization was closest to transformation into unified Actor between 454 – 404 BC. 24J. Czaputowicz, Teorie Stosunków Międzynarodowych: Krytyka i Systematyzacja, Warsaw 2008, p. 140 – 176. 25First British Colonial Empire (1707 – 1783) was focused on North America. Second British Colonial Empire (1783 – 1945) was constructed in Asia and Africa. 26J. Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Succeed, London, New York 2011, p. 12 – 13. 27Li Xueqin, The Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronology Project: Methodology and Results, „Journal of East Asian Archaeology”, 2002, nr 4(1), p. 321 – 333.
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1 that they encompass whole known world. Beyond their limits lies only 2 territories deemed not worth of conquering. In most cases the imperial borders 3 were leaning on barren and inhospitable lands, with only scarce human 4 settlements, devoid of serious political structures. In most cases, those people 5 were called barbarians, which is term designated to determined lower social 6 and cultural status when compared to imperial subjects. But the primary 7 designate of Empire is that it politically embrace whole International System, 8 and do not leave any significant entity beyond its framework. This is also a 9 distinction from Aztec and Inca Empires of Latin America. Since their 10 establishment and constitution as a dominant political faction in their 11 respective International Relations Systems was coupled with arrival of 12 expeditions from Europe. Which meant, that albeit fragile and distant, 13 connection was coined to region of space beyond their military reach. Thus 14 conquering whole known world became purely impossible. And influence of 15 newly discovered part of the globe became their undoing28. 16 Second feature is closely connected with the former one. It is the fact, that 17 universal Empire has at its disposal overwhelming military advantage over 18 remaining political elements of the International Environment. However, 19 despite obvious connotations, this capabilities are not associated with skills and 20 technologies, but – what could be seen in history of Chinese Empire – 21 associated with the capacity to recreate military capabilities, suffering even 22 catastrophic damages in quantitative and qualitative dimensions. And still 23 being able to conduct military operations. That lies as a foundation for imperial 24 success in pre-Westphalian International Environment. The armed forces of the 25 pre-Westphalian Empire were makers of a long line of triumphs and victories, 26 defeating every enemy within as well as without. In fact, in too many cases 27 application of military force was primary and sole response of imperial 28 government. Even defeat on a battlefield, as happened to Rome in Teutoburg 29 Forest in 9 AD29 or Mongol conquest of China in 1279 AD30, which were 30 particularly humiliating, did not deplete Empires of their resources, allowing 31 them to resume daily operations within considerable schedule. 32 Third feature of Empire is it legitimacy. It was recognized by every 33 entity within its framework as a value in itself, not only entitled to undertake 34 certain activities, even against national interests of them but also beneficial 35 factor which need to be supported in existence. This legitimacy was clearly 36 visible in the years after its collapse in continuous attempts to revive it in some 37 form and shape. The primarily factor of legitimacy is acceptance of structures 38 and mechanisms of imperial provenience, particularly those engaged in 39 developing of communication network (postal institutions, universal
28P. Leon, The Discovery and Conquest of Peru, Chronicles of the New World Encounter (trans. A. P. Cook, N. D. Cook), Durnham 1998. 29J. Seidman, Remembering the Teutoburg Forest: Monventa in Annals, “Ramus”, 2014, nr 43(1), p. 94 – 114. 30J. Dardess, Ming T'ai-tsu on the Yüan: An Autocrat's Assessment of the Mongol Dynasty, “Bulletin of Sung and Yüan Studies”, 1978, nr 14, p. 6 – 11.
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1 language) 31 , law: internal and international and institutions responsible for 2 conflict management and prevention32. What is particularly evident, level of 3 integration of both Empires enabled application of physical violence, in most 4 cases in a form of armed forces incursions, such as quelling the rebellions. 5 The notion of Empire was so popular, that idea of reviving Empire 6 shined throughout history. It was undertaken in every historical epoch, mainly 7 in Europe, but recently also on other continents, such as Latin America 33. 8 However, none of them successful, mainly due to the reasons which will be 9 mentioned in next paragraph. What need to be addressed in this place is the 10 chance of successful reintroduction of Empire to post-Westphalian 11 International Environment, especially, that from time to time scholar tend to 12 associate term Empire with particular nation states, such as United States34. 13 However, the direct recreation of classical Empire even in refurbished state is 14 hardly likely. It is due to three features of contemporary International Relations. 15 First of all, there is very little probability of create so overwhelming military 16 advantage, as it is necessary to the existence of Empire proper, particularly in a 17 dimension of vulnerability of losses35. In fact, classical Empires were able to 18 recreate themselves on a brink of complete collapse, regaining operational 19 capabilities within brief period of time36. In case of United State, there could be 20 observed a developed vulnerability to losses, as well as within their own 21 manpower 37 as collateral damage to the opposition forces 38 and civilian 22 casualties. A vulnerability which could cause complete change of national 23 objectives and abandoning whole swaths of space of particular value to this 24 nation state. Second, the classical imperial structure of government does not 25 possess analytical capacity suited to manage contemporary issues, which are 26 much more diversified in any imaginable dimension and much more turmoiled, 27 especially when it comes to slow but steady joining two spaces of policy: 28 national and international, which creates new and ephemeral forms, which are 29 created in droves only for short period of time. The complexity of 30 contemporary International Environment is supplemented with growing
31A. M. Ramsay, The speed of the Roman imperial post, “The Journal of Roman Studies”, 1925, nr 15(1), p. 60 – 74. 32 T. Rajak, Roman intervention in a Seleucid siege of Jerusalem?, “Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies”, 1981, nr 22(1), p. 65 – 81. 33Empire of Brazil (1822 – 1889). 34G. Lundestad, Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952, “Journal of peace research”, 1986, nr 23(3), s. 263 – 277. 35A. Rohn, How Much Did The Vietnam War Cost?, „The Vietnam War”, 2016, 5 kwietnia, URL: http://thevietnamwar.info/how-much-vietnam-war-cost/, [dostęp: 8.03.2017]. 36It was particular evident during Punic War, when Rome between disaster in Battle of Cannae (216 BC) and decisive victory in Battle of Zama (202 BC). Complete recovery of military capabilities in 14 years. 37In Vietnam War United States deemed crippling losses at level of 58.281 military casualties and 303.644 wounded. 38P. Robinson, The CNN effect. The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention, London, New York 2006.
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1 transnational social space39 which provides classical statehood capacities to 2 smaller entities, even single individuals. And third feature is the collapse of 3 legitimacy within International Environment. It was caused by diversification 4 and fracturing of existing international structures and growing cacophony of 5 voices and actions, basing on different often contradicting cultures. Therefore 6 possibility of unison acceptance and compliance with universal authority is 7 insignificant. 8 Summarizing, Empire was very potent and durable management hub for 9 International Environment. It was the longest existing though, inspiring 10 constant attempts to reinstate some form of imperial rule. However none of 11 them were successful. Future, what could be projected in term of changes 12 within the International Environment, will not created conditions which should 13 be more favorable to this kind of Actor. Therefore this will not be the 14 construction which could be implemented. 15 16 17 Westphalian: Hegemony: functionality 18 19 Second construction which were designed and tested within the framework 20 of global International System was the Hegemony. It was associated with the 21 second generation of International Environment, which is labeled a 22 Westphalian, and as well has at least two separate meanings. First, which is 23 associated with Chinese School of International Relations, and is resembling 24 the Empire, in a manner of unifying brutal strength with cultural legitimacy. 25 What differentiate it form Empire is totalitarianism of the term. The Hegemony 26 is entitled and encouraged to enact complete control over any social activity, 27 and severely punishing the disobedience. Thus Hegemony resemble Western 28 notion for totalitarianism40. Articulation of this assumption was one of the 29 primary concerns within the negotiations between US and China in 1970s41. 30 Second understanding of the notion is stemming from research conducted by 31 George Modelski and long cycle theory. In this context, Hegemony may be 32 understood as a function of power distribution within the International System. 33 In this case, Hegemony is set of functions assigned to the Actor which 34 displayed greatest potential and skill of application those assets within the 35 International Relation. What was more important, in most cases, acquiring 36 mantle of Hegemony heavily relied on innovation, like for instance, in case of 37 Great Britain, their supremacy relied on creating a credible and extremely 38 effective financial system42.
39Başak Bilecen, Gül Çatır, Aslı Orhon, Turkish–German transnational social space: stitching across borders, “Population, Space and Place”, 2015, nr 21(3), p. 244 – 256. 40S. W. Mosher, Hegemon. China’s plan to dominate Asia and the world, San Francisco 2000. 41Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the enemy: US-China talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972, Bloomington, Indianapolis 2006. 42J. Rutterford, D. P. Sotiropoulos, Financial diversification before modern portfolio theory: UK financial advice documents in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, “The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought”, 2016, nr 23(6), p. 919 – 945.
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1 The Hegemony which will be analyzed within framework of this paper is 2 wrapped around the Modelski concept. It is very different from Empire, and 3 among Actors analyzed within this paper could be seen as opposition to the 4 Empire. It could be perceived within analyzing of particularly evident features 5 of Hegemony. First and foremost feature of Hegemony is that it is intricately 6 temporary. It is designated even within the Modelski theory, which embraces 7 idea of decay and collapse the Hegemony whenever distribution of power in 8 International Environment changes, mainly due to technological progress. 9 Therefore Hegemony is in most cases elusive and limited attribute of nation 10 state. Comparing: in a four centuries of existence of Roman Empire, there were 11 at least five cycles of Hegemony, which benefitted four states recognized as 12 Hegemony43. And accompanying the change is a Hegemonic War, which can 13 be defined as a particular war embracing significant portion of International 14 System, serving to achieve extended objectives, even aiming at internal 15 transfiguration of participants and was approaching the intensity described by 16 ideal of clausewitzean ideal war44. 17 Second feature of Hegemony was narrow margin of military supremacy. 18 There is a need to underline that it was created in a system of geopolitical 19 entities possessing similar capabilities to effectively resist external military 20 pressures. Therefore every edge the Hegemony may possess was not as 21 significant or permanent as Empire was. Furthermore, difference of Power 22 potential and resources were not significant, which meant that resiliance of 23 Hegemony was much less noticeable that during epoch of Empire. The more 24 cooperative stance of operation was adopted. Hegemony very rarely decided to 25 operate individually. Instead, its function was pronounced in igniting 26 cooperative activities, for instance in a form of multilateral conferences or 27 alliances. It was essential to acquire resources in order to boost Hegemony 28 capacities in order to obtain mutual goal. The best example is the series of anti- 29 french coalitions formed in year between 1789 – 1815 and Triple Entente (focused 30 around Hegemony)45 and Triple Alliance (focused around contender)46. 31 Third issue of Hegemony is that only legitimacy it possess is based on its 32 efficiency. When Empire was recognized legally as a central entity by 33 remaining participants of International System, the Hegemony is recognized 34 only because it is useful to remaining elements of International System. And 35 because of diversification of Actor structure means that meeting expectation of 36 all and every other nation state is extremely hard if possible. And without 37 military edge to quell discontent Actors, will means that there is significant 38 minority of nation states discontent with Hegemony and its performance. 39 Furthermore, this aggregation of contenders and dissidents it constantly
43 According to George Modelski and David Kondratieff, those nations were: Portugal, Netherlands, United Kingdom (twice) and United States. 44Burak Gülboy, Redefining the First World War within the context of Clausewitz's "absolute war" dystopia, “Perceptions”, 2015, nr 20(2/3), p. 7 – 22. 45J. A. C. Conybeare, T. Sandler, The triple entente and the triple alliance 1880–1914: A collective goods approach, “American Political Science Review”, 1990, nr 84(4), p. 1197 – 1206. 46Ibidem.
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1 fluctuating. For instance, during Napoleonic Wars, the France was primary 2 contender for Britains Hegemony, whereas a hundred years later, this place was 3 occupied by Germany. That means, Hegemony, contrary to Empire was forced 4 to manage rivals located within the system, not on the peripheries. 5 The notion of Hegemony was characteristic to Westphalian International 6 Environment, which originated in European International Subsystem. Not 7 surprisingly, there were no non-European nation state which acquired this title. 8 The last nation state bearing mantle of Hegemony is United States. The 9 question arises whether it will be last in the line of Hegemonies, or whether it 10 will be replace by next successor, for instance China 47 , after protracted 11 hegemonic war. This question is still open as for it addresses prospects and 12 forecasts for the future which is still to happen and being verified. However, 13 expanding evolutionary tendencies of continuity and change labeled as late- 14 Westphalian International Environment, and drawn into the post-Westphalian 15 International Environment, there need to be mentioned that despite probability 16 to repeat hegemonic cycle at least one more time are bigger than recreation of 17 Empire, but are low enough to justify seeking for new kind of institution to 18 replace Hegemony. There are three main reasons to justify this statement. First 19 and foremost is diversification and specialization of international Actors, which 20 limits in terms of quantity and quality of available resources. Despite absolute 21 gain in terms of national capabilities the sheer size and complexity of 22 International Relations, coupled with drastic rise of costs of application of 23 classical tools of Power (limitation of available manpower to be the most 24 important cause of this situation) meant that Hegemony will be more limited 25 that it was in past. Second feature is the rise of transnational social space, 26 which require completely different set of capacities to operate and manage 27 efficiently. And with translating additional sectors of social activity, means that 28 managing of International Relations will require serious redefinition of 29 managing hub. Third feature which limit probability of resurgence of this kind 30 of Actors effectiveness is resurgence of non-European entities. This means, that 31 unofficial community of interests and values shared by Europeans and 32 community of understanding of International System is effectively broken. 33 Therefore internal complexity of management hub need to be bolster beyond 34 capacity of singular Actor. 35 Summarizing, Hegemony was very flexible but temporarily management 36 hub for International Environment. It was subjected to constant cycles of decay 37 and renewal intersected with major crises labeled as Hegemonic War. But it 38 does not means that this post was attractive enough for international Actors to 39 compete for its occupation. Future, what could be projected in term of changes 40 within the International Environment, will not created conditions which should 41 be more favorable to this kind of Actor. Therefore this will not be the 42 construction which could be implemented. 43 44
47D. Roy, China won’t achieve regional hegemony, “The Washington Quarterly”, 2020, nr 43(1), s. 101 – 117.
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1 Post-Westphalian: Hyperpower: unification of geopolitical and transnational 2 space 3 4 Most scientists dealing with the issue of defining the term Hyperpower, 5 emphasize two dimensions of the phenomenon. First, it is its quantitative 6 nature. There is still debate in the scientific community as to whether the 7 United States meets the requirements for holding this position in the 8 international system48. Most of them are variables of quantitative nature, which 9 are visible mainly in the economic and military spheres. Second, it is also its 10 role in international relations, which is derivative of functions fulfilled by 11 United States for rest of global community. There could be identified at least 12 two opposing opinions. On the one hand, there is statement made by Andrew 13 Bacevich49, who sees the United States of America as a threat not only to 14 stability and world peace. On the other extreme, the concepts of Salvatore 15 Babones and George Friedmann can be pointed out, who emphasize the need to 16 play the role of a global power in order to effectively protect national interests 17 and a favorable balance of power in the international environment. 18 Most Western scholars seem to agree that Hyperpowership is based on the 19 conjunction of the three spheres of activity of the subject in the international 20 environment. First, there are military capabilities 50 . Paradoxically, what 21 distinguishes the military capabilities of the Hyperpower is not the extremely 22 effective ability to use military force, but a sufficiently developed potential in 23 this field that even defeat on the battlefield can contribute to the achievement 24 of political goals set in the government's strategy. Second, it is also an 25 economic position. In most cases, this dimension is understood as exercising 26 political control over a significant segment of the global economy, most often 27 expressed as a percentage of gross global production. However, as in the 28 previous point, the economic dimension of hyperpowerhood is visible above all 29 in qualitative participation in the world economy. And also by drawing on the 30 so-called hegemonic rent51, i. e. additional income generated from managing 31 the world economy. 32 Third, it is the realm of culture. The sphere of culture should be divided 33 into two sub-spheres. The first relates to the legitimacy of a superpower as a 34 norm-creating entity shaping the principles and mechanisms regulating 35 international reality. The second is undoubtedly the cultural mimicry of the 36 lifestyle of a hyperpower society. This mimicry covers three basic ranges. 37 Firstly, it is the sphere of values and philosophical and, to some extent,
48 D. Kondrakiewicz, Między porządkiem a chaosem. Faza nierównowagi systemu międzynarodowego, Lublin 2015, p. 219-241. 49A. J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, New York 2008. 50The entire operation was carried out between January 17th and February 28th, 1991. Operation Desert Storm officially ended on November 30th, 1995. 51 The concept is quite vague and defined differently by various scholars. In most cases hegemonic rent means additional profits obtained by exercising the function of a hegemony. Although in the scientific community there can be met various dimensions of the above rent, ranging from the political domination of the system, which means the possibility of initiation and implementation of complex political projects.
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1 religious systems, which are internationalized into the international and 2 transnational space, and thus recombined within individual political units, 3 partially resembling them, but in most cases leading to grotesque effects. 4 Secondly, it is the sphere of codes of higher culture, or rather the tools 5 necessary for their effective reading. In the case of a hyperpower, this 6 knowledge is more widely distributed, which makes it possible to read and 7 internalize the message on a much larger scale within the mimicry of lifestyle. 8 Third, it is also a question of popular culture, related to issues such as fashion, 9 entertainment and consumer behavior. It is an element of culture almost 10 completely devoid of a national context, it is extremely easy to decode and 11 mimicry, but in practice its reproduction is related to the perception of the 12 source of mass culture. 13 In the context of considerations on the subject of Hyperpower, the key 14 becomes the answer to the question about the nature of the subject 15 corresponding to the Hyperpower criterion, and more specifically with regard 16 to the continuity of the internal category of the state. Paradoxically, it can be 17 said that hyperpower is a category that is located above the state and between 18 Hegemony and Empire. As a result, it is deprived of a large part of mechanisms 19 supporting expansion to the limits of the known world, on the other hand, its 20 position and internal mechanisms distinguish a country belonging to this 21 category from others, even the largest. In essence, the Hyperpower is the whole 22 system in which the superpower is located, but it goes beyond its own borders 23 and reaches almost every corner of the Earth, using formal and informal 24 networks of transnational connections, supported by state and non-state 25 participants in international relations. Unlike an Empire, which is able to 26 operate in an active phase in an international environment, a Hyperpower is 27 mostly a passive entity, the activation of which consumes enormous amounts of 28 resources and, as a process, is rarely successful. In the case of the hyperpower 29 of the United States, its activation has happened twice in contemporary history. 30 For the first time, during the United Nations' intervention during the war in 31 Korea in 1950-195352. The second time happened during the First Gulf War in 32 1990-1991,with dual operations: Desert Shield53, and Desert Storm54. 33 As a result, existence of hyperpower made possible carrying out complex 34 and sophisticated political and military operations efficiently and effectively 35 without overburdening the nation – state located in the center of the 36 Hyperpower. Despite this, in most of the remaining cases, the United States did 37 not make efforts to mobilize majority, if not every connection of this system, as 38 was the case with point campaigns in Latin America, such as in Panama55. 39 Either their efforts ended in failure, a spectacular example of which was the
52 W. W. Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, Princeton 2002. 53This operation was a response to the occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi army (August 2nd - 4th, 1991). 54S. Tanner, Wojny Bushów. Ojciec i syn jako zwierzchnicy sił zbrojnych (tłum. J. Lang), Wrocław 2007, p. 81-106. 55Ibidem, p. 41-60.
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1 Second Gulf War, started in 200356, or they were unable to effectively use the 2 accumulated potential, which was the case with the Vietnam War in 1955- 3 197557. Thus hyperpower in most instances remains passive, as its activation 4 require additional portions of resources, skills of central government and 5 reception of other Actors of international community. 6 The potential of a Hyperpower can be projected within the contemporary 7 international environment in three major ways: sanction, coordination, and 8 indoctrination. The first feature is typical of historical systems. It assumes the 9 possibility of assessing the activity of other entities and taking action in the 10 event of their inadmissibility in order to compel those entities to adapt desired 11 course of action. However, unlike the previous ones, which were relying 12 predominantly on plain and obvious coercion, the application of sanctions 13 requires different strategies and tools, sometimes more tagret, and less obvious. 14 Hyperpower acts rather as a homeostat58, concerned with unending quest to 15 balance simultaneously deteriorating and developing system. In the context of 16 the application of sanctions by a hyperpower depends on the efficient 17 functioning of the network of transnational connections, which are the 18 bypassing classical tools available to a superpower. 19 The second level of Power projection is coordination of various activities 20 and initiatives which take place within the contemporary international system. 21 This is a derivative of the shift along the axis of authority that shapes the 22 quantum field of the manifestation of Power in the late-Westphalian 23 international environment. As a result, the role of the central Actor of the 24 Hyperpower is changing. From a center that gives orders - and forces 25 obedience - the Hyperpower becomes a center for harmonizing international 26 activities and initiatives. This function arises from the theory of “benign 27 hegemony” coined and developed by Bob Catley59. In its context, arising from 28 the theory of hegemony, the United States stands out from the historical powers 29 by two features: gentleness and self-limitation60, especially in the dimension of 30 the use of means of violence. However, most analysts of the phenomenon point
56Despite designating the international forces occupying Iraq after 2003 as a coalition, it was disproportionately smaller and therefore more asymmetric than the corresponding coalition formed in 1990. The largest nations, apart from the United States, are Great Britain (second-tier power) as well as Poland and Spain (medium-sized nations). 57H. G. Summers, On strategy: A critical analysis of the Vietnam War, New York 1995, as well as relating to historical and international meaning of those events: J. M. Rothgeb, Defining Power. Influence and Force in the contemporary international system, New York 1993. 58According to the dictionary a homeostat is: "a cybernetic machine constituting a system composed of a series of regulators imitating homeostasis". On the other hand, homeostasis is: "the ability of a living organism to maintain a relatively constant state of equilibrium, for example blood composition or temperature, through appropriate coordination and regulation of life processes". Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN. Tom 1: A-K, Warsaw 1983. 59B. Catley, Hegemonic America: The Benign Superpower?, „Contemporary Southeast Asia”, 1997, nr 18(4), p. 377 – 399. 60Ch. A. Kupchan, After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity, „International Security”, 1998, nr 23(2), p. 46.
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1 out that this feature of the United States appeared only in the last thirty years, 2 marked by a high degree of pacification of the international environment61. 3 The third feature of the hyperpower system is the indoctrination of the 4 subordinate participants of the system, which means virtually any other 5 international Actor. This mechanism is based predominantly on Ian Manners 6 idea of normative Power62. According to the theory of George Modelski63, the 7 Hegemony displays the possibility of binding norms and values of the entire 8 global system towards its own national interests and perspectives. As the 9 hegemonic system evolves into a Hyperpower, this capacity only gains in 10 importance and is consequently developed. This particular mechanism is 11 related to the evolution of the environment and a thorough reconfiguration and 12 expansion of the critical infrastructure network64, which is the main soft Power 13 projection channel and almost exclusively responsible for the application of 14 sanctions and shaping the preferences of the normative Power application. In 15 the current configuration, it utilizes extensive channels of expressing respect 16 and legitimacy, and is displayed with conjunction with a rather specific system 17 of sanctions, primarily in the social dimension, with particular emphasis on the 18 most effective of the entire range, i. e. name and shame, which assumes 19 ridiculing the trespasser65. 20 Summarizing, Hyperpower in relatively new and untested concept for a 21 management hub for International Environment. It reflects duality of 22 contemporary International System between geopolitical and transnational 23 social spaces. But it is not as active as both mention above, therefore it will be 24 more difficult to spot and analyze its activity. It will rather influence perception 25 of other participants and create opportunities rather than actively operate into 26 International Relations. 27 28 29 Conclusion 30 31 Summarizing the considerations about the nature of Hyperpower, there 32 need to be mentioned that this construction is derived from both former centers 33 for International System management: Empire and Hegemony. And this 34 communion is supplemented and altered with changes stemming from changes 35 within two civilization megatrends: demographic and technological. That
61Ibidem, p. 41. 62I. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, 2002, nr 40(2), p. 235 – 258. 63G. Modelski, G. W. Thompson, Leading sectors and world powers. The coevolution of global economics and politics, Columbia 1996. 64The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 - Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, „The White House. President Barrack Obama”, 2013, February 12th, URL: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov, [access: 30.03.2017]. 65 T. Lenz, EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits, „Cooperation and Conflict”, 2013, nr 48(2), p. 214-215; J. Braithwaite, P. Drahos, Zero tolerance, naming and shaming: is there a case for it with crimes of the powerful, „Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology”, 2002, nr 35(3), p. 269-288.
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1 means that Hyperpower is new quality in International Relations. However, 2 what is important, this system displays two serious challenges for researches. 3 First, it is not completed, despite the fact, that it was constructed since the 1945 4 – willingly and unwillingly. Its primary features still are fluent enough to be 5 reconstructed. Other parts are being constantly added to framework offering 6 new capabilities which must be analyzed, like Internet surveillance and big 7 data analysis. Second, it is predominantly passive especially compared to 8 Empire and Hegemony, thus empirical data to analyze it is scarce. The research 9 need to be done basing on indirect approach and diversified sources. 10 Having said that, the biggest novelty of Hyperpower is the fact, that is is 11 constructed with capacity to operate within the geopolitical space and 12 transnational social space. Therefore, despite association it with the United 13 States, it is extending in every direction beyond its borders. It is constructed 14 from various semi-independent entities such as transnational corporations and 15 non-governmental organization sharing objectives and responsibilities and 16 supplementing their function in International System. However only rarely they 17 are operating in unison to achieve clear and visible objectives. In most cases 18 this system is shaping perception of other members of international community. 19 Those are what is the main focus of three basic functions of Hyperpower: 20 sanction, coordination and indoctrination. Despite those flaws, among three 21 mentioned Actors – Empire, Hegemony and Hyperpower – the latter is the 22 most probable to manage the International System in the post-Westphalian 23 iteration. 24 25 26 Sources 27 28 Documents 29 30 Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21 - Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience; 31 Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN. Tom 1: A-K (eng. Polish Language Dictionary. 32 Volume 1: A – K), Warsaw 1983; 33 UIS Data Centre, UNESCO, Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years (both sexes, 34 female, male), August 2015; 35 UN Charter signed on June 26th, 1945; 36 United Nations Population Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 37 World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. File POP/1-1: Total population 38 (both sexes combined) by major area, region and country, annually for 1950- 39 2100 (thousands), Low fertility variant, 2015 – 2100, New York 2015. 40 41 Monographs 42 43 Bacevich A. J., The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, New York 44 2008; 45 Balcerowicz B., Pokój i nie-pokój. Na progu XXI wieku (eng. Peace and No-Peace. 46 On Treshold of 21st Century), Warsaw 2002; 47 Başak Bilecen, Gül Çatır, Aslı Orhon, Turkish–German transnational social space: 48 stitching across borders, “Population, Space and Place”, 2015, nr 21(3);
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1 Beaulac S., The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging the 2 Myth, „Australian Journal of Legal History”, 2004, nr 8(2); 3 Berridge G. R., Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, New York 2015; 4 Braithwaite J., Drahos P., Zero tolerance, naming and shaming: is there a case for it 5 with crimes of the powerful, „Australian and New Zealand Journal of 6 Criminology”, 2002, nr 35(3); 7 Brzeziński Z., Strategic Vision: America and Crisis of Global Power, New York 2012; 8 Burak Gülboy, Redefining the First World War within the context of Clausewitz's 9 "absolute war" dystopia, “Perceptions”, 2015, nr 20(2/3); 10 Catley B., Hegemonic America: The Benign Superpower?, „Contemporary Southeast 11 Asia”, 1997, nr 18(4); 12 Cerny Ph. G., Rethinking Word Politics. A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, 13 Oxford 2010 14 Conybeare J. A. C., Sandler T., The triple entente and the triple alliance 1880–1914: A 15 collective goods approach, “American Political Science Review”, 1990, nr 84(4); 16 Cooper C., Extraordinary circumstances. The Journey of a Corporate Whistlebower, 17 Hoboken 2008; 18 Czaputowicz J., Teorie Stosunków Międzynarodowych: Krytyka i Systematyzacja (eng. 19 Theories of International Relations: Critique and Systematization), Warsaw 2008; 20 Dardess J., Ming T'ai-tsu on the Yüan: An Autocrat's Assessment of the Mongol 21 Dynasty, “Bulletin of Sung and Yüan Studies”, 1978, nr 14; 22 Diamond J., Collapse: How Societies Choose to Succeed, London, New York 2011; 23 Forrest A., La patrie en danger: the French Revolution and the first Levée en Masse 24 [in:] The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the 25 French Revolution, D. Moran, A. Waldron (eds), Cambridge 2003; 26 Fox W. T. R., The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union— 27 Their Responsibility for Peace, New York 1944; 28 Giddens A., The nation-state and violence, “Capital and Class”, 1986, nr 10(2); 29 Gilpin R., The theory of hegemonic war, “The Journal of Interdisciplinary History”, 30 1988, nr 18(4); 31 Gross L., The Peace of Westphalia: 1648-1948, „The American Journal of 32 International Law”, 1948, nr 42(1); 33 Kondrakiewicz D., Między porządkiem a chaosem. Faza nierównowagi systemu 34 międzynarodowego (eng. Between Order and Chaos. Phase of Inbalance of 35 International System), Lublin 2015; 36 Kondrakiewicz D., Równowaga sił w późnowestfalskim ładzie międzynarodowym (eng. 37 Balance of Power in late-Westphalian International Order) [w:] Późnowestfalski 38 ład międzynarodowy (eng. late-Westphalian International Order), M. Pietraś, K. 39 Marzęda (eds), Lublin 2008; 40 Kupchan Ch. A., After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the 41 Sources of a Stable Multipolarity, „International Security”, 1998, nr 23(2); 42 Lenz T., EU normative power and regionalism: Ideational diffusion and its limits, 43 „Cooperation and Conflict”, 2013, nr 48(2); 44 Leon P., The Discovery and Conquest of Peru, Chronicles of the New World Encounter 45 (trans. A. P. Cook, N. D. Cook), Durnham 1998; 46 Li Xueqin, The Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronology Project: Methodology and Results, 47 „Journal of East Asian Archaeology”, 2002, nr 4(1); 48 Lundestad G., Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945- 49 1952, “Journal of peace research”, 1986, nr 23(3);
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1 Manners I., Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, „Journal of 2 Common Market Studies”, 2002, nr 40(2); 3 Modelski G., Thompson G. W., Leading sectors and world powers. The coevolution of 4 global economics and politics, Columbia 1996; 5 Mosher S. W., Hegemon. China’s plan to dominate Asia and the world, San Francisco 6 2000; 7 Nye J. S., Neorealism and neoliberalism, “World politics”, 1988, nr 40(2); 8 Panas E., Power of Transnational Organizations of Civil Society as a Post- 9 Westphalian Type of Power, „Teka Commission of Political science and 10 International affairs”, 2014, nr 9a; 11 Pietraś M., Hybrydowość późnowestfalskiego ładu międzynarodowego (eng. Hybridity 12 of late-Westphalian International Order) [w:] Późnowestfalski ład 13 międzynarodowy (eng. late-Westphalian International Order), M. Pietraś, K. 14 Marzęda (eds), Lublin 2008; 15 Pietraś M., Przestrzeń transnarodowa jako poziom analizy w nauce o stosunkach 16 międzynarodowych (eng. Transnational Space as Level of Analysis in Science on 17 International Relations) [in:] Poziomy analizy stosunków międzynarodowych. 18 Tom 1 (eng. Level of Analysis of International Relations. Volume 1), E. Haliżak, 19 M. Pietraś (eds), Warsaw 2013; 20 Rajak T., Roman intervention in a Seleucid siege of Jerusalem?, “Greek, Roman, and 21 Byzantine Studies”, 1981, nr 22(1); 22 Ramsay A. M., The speed of the Roman imperial post, “The Journal of Roman 23 Studies”, 1925, nr 15(1); 24 Robinson P., The CNN effect. The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention, 25 London, New York 2006; 26 Rothgeb J. M., Defining Power. Influence and Force in the contemporary 27 international system, New York 1993; 28 Roy D., China won’t achieve regional hegemony, “The Washington Quarterly”, 2020, 29 nr 43(1); 30 Rutterford J., Sotiropoulos D. P., Financial diversification before modern portfolio 31 theory: UK financial advice documents in the late nineteenth and the beginning 32 of the twentieth century, “The European Journal of the History of Economic 33 Thought”, 2016, nr 23(6); 34 Seidman J., Remembering the Teutoburg Forest: Monventa in Annals, “Ramus”, 2014, 35 nr 43(1); 36 Shaw Ch., Friendship under lock and key: the Soviet Central Asian border, 1918–34, 37 “Central Asian Survey”, 2011, nr 30(3-4); 38 Sheehan M., The Balance of Power: History and Theory, London, New York 1996; 39 Stueck W. W., Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History, 40 Princeton 2002; 41 Summers H. G., On strategy: A critical analysis of the Vietnam War, New York 1995; 42 Tanner S., Wojny Bushów. Ojciec i syn jako zwierzchnicy sił zbrojnych (tłum. J. Lang) 43 (eng. The wars of the Bushes : a father and son as military leaders), Wrocław 44 2007; 45 Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the enemy: US-China talks during the Cold War, 1949- 46 1972, Bloomington, Indianapolis 2006. 47 48 Internet Sources 49 50 Parlament Europejski: Aktualności (eng. European Parliament: Actualities);
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1 The Vietnam War; 2 The White House. President Barrack Obama. 3
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