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Rethinking Polarity for the Twenty-First Century: Perceptions of Order in International Society

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Rethinking Polarity for the Twenty-First Century: Perceptions of Order in International Society Rethinking Polarity for the Twenty-first Century: Perceptions of Order in International Society by Benjamin Zala A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science and International Studies College of Social Sciences The University of Birmingham January 2013 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract It has long been assumed that the distribution of power internationally – and in particular whether the world is dominated by one, two or many major powers – is likely to play an important role in world politics. The structural effect of what is known in the International Relations (IR) literature as the ‘polarity’ of any given moment has been a central theme in mainstream theories and across the discipline more widely. The language of uni, bi and multipolarity has also been common in public discourse for at least half a century. Yet there are at present competing perceptions of polarity across popular and scholarly discourse. Is the United States still a unipolar power? Are we currently in or about to enter a multipolar era? Or will the US-Sino relationship dominate world politics in the coming decades creating a new bipolarity? This thesis proposes a redefinition of the concept of polarity in order to be able to theoretically account for such competing visions of global order. It argues for the continued utility of the concept, particularly given its widespread use by practitioners and analysts alike, but that polarity analysis needs to be re-configured along more analytically eclectic lines than is the case in the existing literature. Using the English school of IR, the thesis builds a theoretical framework for redefining polarity, not as the distribution of material capabilities in the international system, but instead as the number of states that hold a particular status in international society. This allows for a theoretical discussion of the importance of perceptions of polarity and why this so-called ‘fact’ of world politics can be perceived differently by separate actors at the same time. This framework is then applied to the period of 1815-2012 in order to understand the difference this makes to a macro- historical analysis of changes in the inter-state order. The historical analysis is used to demonstrate both the need for a new definition of polarity but also to draw a number of conclusions regarding the sources of perceptions of polarity. Ideas about the ability of agents to shape global structures and historical legacies relating to international status emerge as particularly important, reinforcing the need for ways of understanding structural power that capture its social and historical complexity. i Acknowledgements Firstly I would like to thank my two supervisors in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Birmingham, Dr Edward Newman and Dr Marco Vieira. Both offered more dedication, support and encouragement than I could have ever wished for and helped make the PhD project a thoroughly rewarding experience. Ted joined the project early on and has been instrumental throughout in helping me to shape my arguments (and express them succinctly!) as well as to navigate the travails of PhD life. Marco provided crucial encouragement and feedback as I found my place in the academic debates about power in world politics. Ted and Marco’s patience and good humour throughout the process have been critical and I am extremely grateful for their help. I would also like to thank Professor Mark Beeson and Associate Professor Laura Shepherd who both took on supervision duties at various stages of the thesis’ development before seeking the sunnier shores of my native country. Mark supported the project from the beginning and not only helped immensely in shaping the initial research but also made the beginning of PhD life an enjoyable time with his good humour, hospitality and penchant for Australian slang. Laura engaged with my work at a crucial stage for which it was greatly improved and particularly helped me find my inner IR theorist! I am also very grateful to the POLSIS department for awarding me a teaching scholarship and for supporting my successful application for a UK-government ORSAS Award. I would like to thank my fellow PhD students in the department for their friendship and support and in particular would like to thank Dr Andrew Futter for his sage advice on the PhD process (usually over a cleansing ale!) and helpful comments on the first chapter. Other members of the department including André Broome, Luis Cabrera, Cerwyn Moore, Adam Quinn and Asaf Siniver all offered welcome encouragement and advice at different stages. Professor Joseph Camilleri of La Trobe University offered advice, assistance and friendship from the outset of this project for which I will always be grateful. A number of parts of the thesis were presented at conferences and seminars including the 2010 Oceanic Conference on International Studies in Auckland, the 2012 International Studies Association Annual Convention in San Diego and the 2012 joint British International Studies Association-International Studies Association Conference in Edinburgh. I would like to thank all fellow panellists and participants in those sessions for their feedback. Somewhat unusually, despite being a full-time PhD student and Graduate Teaching Assistant in POLSIS, I have worked part-time, first at Chatham House and then at the Oxford Research Group, for the duration of this research project. I would like to thank all my colleagues from both organisations and in particular Bernice Lee, Antony Froggatt, Gemma Green and Felix Preston at Chatham House and Paul Rogers, Oliver Ramsbotham, John Sloboda and Chris Langdon at ORG, for their support and encouragement throughout. In particular Bernice Lee’s understanding and enthusiasm when her full-time employee announced that he’d won a scholarship to do a PhD, and her encouragement in the years since, are greatly appreciated. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family for their support and gentle questions about ‘when will it be done?’ In particular Cath, Peter and James Zala have been enormously supportive from the start across both Northern and Southern hemispheres. My biggest debt of gratitude is owed to Gen Morley who from the initial PhD application to the final days of writing has provided love, support and understanding on which I have relied heavily. Her patience, enthusiasm, feedback and probing but well-timed questions about the thesis itself made this project possible. ii Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. i Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. ii List of Figures .................................................................................................................................. v Part I: Polarity in International Society: Analysing the ‘Essential Skeleton’ of World Politics 1 Chapter One: Introduction ............................................................................................................... 2 Rationale .......................................................................................................................................... 6 The Importance of Perception ........................................................................................................ 18 Existing Literature .......................................................................................................................... 20 Redefining Polarity ........................................................................................................................ 29 Case Studies ................................................................................................................................... 32 Organisation ................................................................................................................................... 34 Chapter Two: Polarity in Theory and History .............................................................................. 36 Polarity in Theory .......................................................................................................................... 37 Polarity and Stability ...................................................................................................................... 40 Forms of Polarity ............................................................................................................................ 42 Measuring Polarity ......................................................................................................................... 46 Polarity in History .......................................................................................................................... 53
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