The Unipolar Moment Revisited Charles Krauthammer
multipolarity. The declinist school, led by It has been assumed that the old bipolar Paul Kennedy, held that America, suffering world would beget a multipolar world with from “imperial overstretch”, was already in power dispersed to new centers in Japan, relative decline. The Asian enthusiasm, Germany (and/or “Europe”), China and a popularized by (among others) James diminished Soviet Union/Russia. [This is] Fallows, saw the second coming of the mistaken. The immediate post-Cold War Rising Sun. The conventional wisdom was world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The best captured by Senator Paul Tsongas: center of world power is an unchallenged “The Cold War is over; Japan won.” superpower, the United States, attended by its They were wrong, and no one has Western allies. put it more forcefully than Paul “The Unipolar Moment”, 19901 Kennedy himself in a classic recantation published earlier this year. “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of N LATE 1990, shortly before the power; nothing”, he said of America’s collapse of the Soviet Union, it position today. “Charlemagne’s empire I was clear that the world we had was merely western European in its known for half a century was disappearing. reach. The Roman empire stretched The question was what would succeed it. I farther afield, but there was another suggested then that we had already great empire in Persia, and a larger one entered the “unipolar moment.” The gap in China. There is, therefore, no com- in power between the leading nation and parison.”2 Not everyone is convinced. all the others was so unprecedented as to Samuel Huntington argued in 1999 that yield an international structure unique to we had entered not a unipolar world but modern history: unipolarity. At the time, this thesis was generally 1Editor’s note: This quotation, and all subsequent seen as either wild optimism or simple boxed quotations in this essay, are from American arrogance. The conventional Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar wisdom was that with the demise of the Moment”, Foreign Affairs: America and the Soviet empire the bipolarity of the second World (1990/91), which introduced the idea of half of the 20th century would yield to American unipolarity. That essay was adapted from the first annual Henry M. Jackson Charles Krauthammer, winner of the Pulitzer Prize Memorial Lecture, September 18, 1990. for commentary, is a syndicated columnist for 2Kennedy, “The Eagle has Landed”, Financial the Washington Post and an essayist for Time. Times, February 2, 2002.
The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 5 a “uni-multipolar world.”3 Tony Judt the eve of history’s first war over weapons writes mockingly of the “loud boasts of of mass destruction. unipolarity and hegemony” heard in Washington today.4 But as Stephen The true geopolitical structure of the post- Brooks and William Wohlforth argue in Cold War world . . . [is] a single pole of world a recent review of the subject, those power that consists of the United States at the denying unipolarity can do so only by apex of the industrial West. Perhaps it is more applying a ridiculous standard: that accurate to say the United States and behind it America be able to achieve all its goals the West. everywhere all by itself. This is a stan- “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990 dard not for unipolarity but for divinity. Among mortals, and in the context of Unipolarity After September 11, 2001 the last half millennium of history, the current structure of the international HERE IS LITTLE need to system is clear: “If today’s American pri- rehearse the acceleration of macy does not constitute unipolarity, unipolarity in the 1990s. 5 T then nothing ever will.” Japan, whose claim to power rested exclu- A second feature of this new post- sively on economics, went into economic Cold War world, I ventured, would be a decline. Germany stagnated. The Soviet resurgent American isolationism. I was Union ceased to exist, contracting into a wrong. It turns out that the new norm for smaller, radically weakened Russia. The America is not post-World War I with- European Union turned inward toward drawal but post-World War II engage- the great project of integration and built a ment. In the 1990s, Pat Buchanan gave strong social infrastructure at the expense 1930s isolationism a run. He ended up of military capacity. Only China grew in carrying Palm Beach. strength, but coming from so far behind it Finally, I suggested that a third fea- will be decades before it can challenge ture of this new unipolar world would be American primacy—and that assumes that an increase rather than a decrease in the its current growth continues unabated. threat of war, and that it would come The result is the dominance of a single from a new source: weapons of mass power unlike anything ever seen. Even at destruction wielded by rogue states. This its height Britain could always be seriously would constitute a revolution in interna- challenged by the next greatest powers. tional relations, given that in the past it Britain had a smaller army than the land was great powers who presented the prin- powers of Europe and its navy was equaled cipal threats to world peace. Where are we twelve years later? The 3Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, Foreign two defining features of the new post- Affairs (March/April 1999). By uni-multipolar Cold War world remain: unipolarity and Huntington means a system with a pre-emi- rogue states with weapons of mass nent state whose sole participation is insuffi- destruction. Indeed, these characteristics cient for the resolution of international issues. have grown even more pronounced. The superpower can still serve as a veto player, Contrary to expectation, the United States but requires other powers to achieve its ends. has not regressed to the mean; rather, its 4Judt, “Its Own Worst Enemy”, New York Review of dominance has dramatically increased. Books, August 15, 2002. And during our holiday from history in 5Brooks and Wohlforth, “American Primacy in the 1990s, the rogue state/WMD problem Perspective”, Foreign Affairs (July/August grew more acute. Indeed, we are now on 2002).
6 The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 by the next two navies combined. Today, and pointed out the bin Laden issue to them. American military spending exceeds that of They wrung their hands so helplessly and the next twenty countries combined. Its said, ‘the Taliban are not turning him over, navy, air force and space power are unri- what can one do?’ I remember I was sur- valed. Its technology is irresistible. It is prised: If they are not turning him over, one dominant by every measure: military, eco- has to think and do something.6 nomic, technological, diplomatic, cultural, even linguistic, with a myriad of countries Nothing was done. President Clinton trying to fend off the inexorable march of and others in his administration have Internet-fueled MTV English. protested that nothing could have been American dominance has not gone done, that even the 1998 African unnoticed. During the 1990s, it was mainly embassy bombings were not enough to China and Russia that denounced unipo- mobilize the American people to strike larity in their occasional joint commu- back seriously against terrorism. The niqués. As the new century dawned it was new Bush Administration, too, did not on everyone’s lips. A French foreign minis- give the prospect of mass-casualty terror- ter dubbed the United States not a super- ism (and the recommendations of the power but a hyperpower. The dominant Hart-Rudman Commission) the priority concern of foreign policy establishments it deserved. Without September 11, the everywhere became understanding and liv- giant would surely have slept longer. The ing with the 800-pound American gorilla. world would have been aware of And then September 11 heightened the America’s size and potential, but not its asymmetry. It did so in three ways. First, ferocity or its full capacities. (Paul and most obviously, it led to a demonstra- Kennedy’s homage to American power, tion of heretofore latent American military for example, was offered in the wake of power. Kosovo, the first war ever fought the Afghan campaign.) and won exclusively from the air, had given Second, September 11 demonstrated a hint of America’s quantum leap in mili- a new form of American strength. The tary power (and the enormous gap that center of its economy was struck, its avia- had developed between American and tion shut down, Congress brought to a European military capabilities). But it took halt, the government sent underground, September 11 for the United States to the country paralyzed and fearful. Yet unleash with concentrated fury a fuller dis- within days the markets reopened, the play of its power in Afghanistan. Being a economy began its recovery, the president relatively pacific, commercial republic, the mobilized the nation, and a united United States does not go around looking Congress immediately underwrote a huge for demonstration wars. This one was new worldwide campaign against terror. thrust upon it. In response, America The Pentagon started planning the U.S. showed that at a range of 7,000 miles and military response even as its demolished with but a handful of losses, it could western façade still smoldered. destroy within weeks a hardened, fanatical America had long been perceived as regime favored by geography and climate invulnerable. That illusion was shattered in the “graveyard of empires.” on September 11, 2001. But with a Such power might have been demon- demonstration of its recuperative powers— strated earlier, but it was not. “I talked with the previous U.S. administration”, 6Interview with the German newspaper Bild, said Vladimir Putin shortly after translated and reported in the Interfax News September 11, Bulletin, September 21, 2001.
The Unipolar Moment Revisited 7 an economy and political system so deeply simply accentuates the historical anomaly rooted and fundamentally sound that it of American unipolarity. Our experience could spring back to life within days—that with hegemony historically is that it sense of invulnerability assumed a new inevitably creates a counterbalancing coali- character. It was transmuted from imper- tion of weaker powers, most recently meability to resilience, the product of unri- against Napoleonic France and Germany valed human, technological and political (twice) in the 20th century. Nature abhors a reserves. vacuum; history abhors hegemony. Yet The third effect of September 11 was during the first decade of American unipo- to accelerate the realignment of the cur- larity no such counterbalancing occurred. rent great powers, such as they are, On the contrary, the great powers lined up behind the United States. In 1990, behind the United States, all the more so America’s principal ally was NATO. A after September 11. decade later, its alliance base had grown to include former members of the The most crucial new element in the post- Warsaw Pact. Some of the major powers, Cold War world [is] the emergence of a new however, remained uncommitted. Russia strategic environment marked by the prolifer- and China flirted with the idea of an ation of weapons of mass destruction. . . . The “anti-hegemonic alliance.” Russian lead- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ers made ostentatious visits to pieces of and their means of delivery will constitute the the old Soviet empire such as Cuba and greatest single threat to world security for the North Korea. India and Pakistan, frozen rest of our lives. That is what makes a new out by the United States because of their international order not an imperial dream or nuclear testing, remained focused mainly a Wilsonian fantasy but a matter of the sheer- on one another. But after September 11, est prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West the bystanders came calling. Pakistan that there is a need to establish some new made an immediate strategic decision to regime to police these weapons and those who join the American camp. India enlisted brandish them. . . . Iraq . . . is the prototype of with equal alacrity, offering the United this new strategic threat. States basing, overflight rights and a level of cooperation unheard of during its half “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990 century of Nehruist genuflection to anti- American non-alignment. Russia’s Putin, HE AMERICAN hegemon seeing both a coincidence of interests in has no great power enemies, the fight against Islamic radicalism and an T an historical oddity of the opportunity to gain acceptance in the first order. Yet it does face a serious threat Western camp, dramatically realigned to its dominance, indeed to its essential Russian foreign policy toward the United security. It comes from a source even States. (Russia has already been rewarded more historically odd: an archipelago of with a larger role in NATO and tacit rogue states (some connected with American recognition of Russia’s interests transnational terrorists) wielding weapons in its “near abroad.”) China remains more of mass destruction. distant but, also having a coincidence of The threat is not trivial. It is the single interests with the United States in fight- greatest danger to the United States ing Islamic radicalism, it has cooperated because, for all of America’s dominance, with the war on terror and muted its and for all of its recently demonstrated competition with America in the Pacific. resilience, there is one thing it might not The realignment of the fence-sitters survive: decapitation. The detonation of a
8 The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 dozen nuclear weapons in major American protection from these weapons. The cities, or the spreading of smallpox or catalyst for this realization was again anthrax throughout the general popula- September 11. Throughout the 1990s, tion, is an existential threat. It is perhaps it had been assumed that WMD posed the only realistic threat to America as a no emergency because traditional con- functioning hegemon, perhaps even to cepts of deterrence would hold. America as a functioning modern society. September 11 revealed the possibility of future WMD-armed enemies both unde- It is of course banal to say that modern terrable and potentially undetectable. technology has shrunk the world. But the obvi- The 9/11 suicide bombers were unde- ous corollary, that in a shrunken world the terrable; the author of the subsequent divide between regional superpowers and great anthrax attacks has proven unde- powers is radically narrowed, is rarely drawn. tectable. The possible alliance of rogue Missiles shrink distance. Nuclear (or chemical states with such undeterrables and or biological) devices multiply power. Both can undetectables—and the possible trans- be bought at market. Consequently the geopo- fer to them of weapons of mass destruc- litical map is irrevocably altered. Fifty years tion—presents a new strategic situation ago, Germany—centrally located, highly that demands a new strategic doctrine. industrial and heavily populated—could pose a threat to world security and to the other great Any solution will have to include three powers. It was inconceivable that a relatively elements: denying, disarming, and defend- small Middle Eastern state with an almost ing. First, we will have to develop a new entirely imported industrial base could do any- regime, similar to COCOM (Coordinating thing more than threaten its neighbors. The Committee on Export Controls) to deny yet central truth of the coming era is that this is more high technology to such states. Second, no longer the case: relatively small, peripheral those states that acquire such weapons any- and backward states will be able to emerge way will have to submit to strict outside con- rapidly as threats not only to regional, but to trol or risk being physically disarmed. A world, security. final element must be the development of antiballistic missile and air defense systems “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990 to defend against those weapons that do escape Western control or preemption. . . . Like unipolarity, this is historically There is no alternative to confronting, unique. WMD are not new, nor are rogue deterring and, if necessary, disarming states states. Their conjunction is. We have had that brandish and use weapons of mass fifty years of experience with nuclear destruction. And there is no one to do that weapons—but in the context of bipolarity, but the United States, backed by as many which gave the system a predictable, if per- allies as will join the endeavor. ilous, stability. We have just now entered an era in which the capacity for inflicting “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990 mass death, and thus posing a threat both to world peace and to the dominant power, The Crisis of Unipolarity resides in small, peripheral states. What does this conjunction of CCORDINGLY, not one but unique circumstances—unipolarity and a host of new doctrines have the proliferation of terrible weapons— A come tumbling out since mean for American foreign policy? September 11. First came the with-us- That the first and most urgent task is or-against-us ultimatum to any state aid-
The Unipolar Moment Revisited 9 ing, abetting or harboring terrorists. Rumsfeld gave the classic formulation of Then, pre-emptive attack on any enemy unilateralism when he said (regarding state developing weapons of mass the Afghan war and the war on terror- destruction. And now, regime change in ism, but the principle is universal), “the any such state. mission determines the coalition.” We The boldness of these policies—or, as take our friends where we find them, but much of the world contends, their arro- only in order to help us in accomplishing gance—is breathtaking. The American the mission. The mission comes first, anti-terrorism ultimatum, it is said, is and we decide it. high-handed and permits the arbitrary Contrast this with the classic case application of American power every- study of multilateralism at work: the where. Pre-emption is said to violate tra- U.S. decision in February 1991 to ditional doctrines of just war. And regime conclude the Gulf War. As the Iraqi change, as Henry Kissinger has argued, army was fleeing, the first Bush threatens 350 years of post-Westphalian Administration had to decide its final international practice. Taken together, goal: the liberation of Kuwait or regime they amount to an unprecedented asser- change in Iraq. It stopped at Kuwait. tion of American freedom of action and a Why? Because, as Brent Scowcroft has definitive statement of a new American explained, going further would have unilateralism. fractured the coalition, gone against our To be sure, these are not the first promises to allies and violated the UN instances of American unilateralism. resolutions under which we were acting. Before September 11, the Bush Admin- “Had we added occupation of Iraq and istration had acted unilaterally, but on removal of Saddam Hussein to those more minor matters, such as the Kyoto objectives”, wrote Scowcroft in the Protocol and the Biological Weapons Washington Post on October 16, 2001, “ . . . Convention, and with less bluntness, as our Arab allies, refusing to countenance in its protracted negotiations with an invasion of an Arab colleague, would Russia over the ABM treaty. The “axis of have deserted us.” The coalition defined evil” speech of January 29, however, the mission. took unilateralism to a new level. Who should define American ends Latent resentments about American today? This is a question of agency but willfulness are latent no more. American it leads directly to a fundamental ques- dominance, which had been tolerated if tion of policy. If the coalition—whether not welcomed, is now producing such NATO, the wider Western alliance, ad irritation and hostility in once friendly hoc outfits such as the Gulf War quarters, such as Europe, that some sug- alliance, the UN, or the “international gest we have arrived at the end of the community”—defines America’s mis- opposition-free grace period that sion, we have one vision of America’s America had enjoyed during the unipo- role in the world. If, on the other hand, lar moment.7 the mission defines the coalition, we In short, post-9/11 U.S. unilateralism have an entirely different vision. has produced the first crisis of unipolarity. It revolves around the central question of 7A Sky News poll finds that even the British pub- the unipolar age: Who will define the lic considers George W. Bush a greater hegemon’s ends? threat to world peace than Saddam Hussein. The issue is not one of style but of The poll was conducted September 2–6, purpose. Secretary of Defense Donald 2002.
10 The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 rationally in pursuit of their own interests A large segment of American opinion in Iraq (largely oil and investment), confer doubts the legitimacy of unilateral American legitimacy on an invasion? action but accepts quite readily actions under- That question was beyond me twelve taken by the “world community” acting in years ago. It remains beyond me now. Yet concert. Why it should matter to Americans this kind of logic utterly dominated the that their actions get a Security Council nod intervening Clinton years. The 1990s were from, say, Deng Xiaoping and the butchers of marked by an obsession with “internation- Tiananmen Square is beyond me. But to al legality” as expressed by this or that many Americans it matters. It is largely for Security Council resolution. To take one domestic reasons, therefore, that American long forgotten example: After an Iraqi political leaders make sure to dress unilateral provocation in February 1998, President action in multilateral clothing. The danger, of Clinton gave a speech at the Pentagon lay- course, is that they might come to believe their ing the foundation for an attack on Iraq own pretense. (one of many that never came). He cited as “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990 justification for the use of force the need to enforce Iraqi promises made under post- Liberal Internationalism Gulf War ceasefire conditions that “the United Nations demanded—not the OR MANY Americans, multi- United States—the United Nations.” Note lateralism is no pretense. On the the formulation. Here is the president of F contrary: It has become the very the most powerful nation on earth stop- core of the liberal internationalist school of ping in mid-sentence to stress the primacy American foreign policy. In the October of commitments made to the UN over 2002 debate authorizing the use of force in those made to the United States. Iraq, the Democratic chairman of the This was not surprising from a presi- Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl dent whose first inaugural address pledged Levin, proposed authorizing the president American action when “the will and con- to act only with prior approval from the science of the international community is UN Security Council. Senator Edward defied.” Early in the Clinton years, Kennedy put it succinctly while addressing Madeleine Albright formulated the vision the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced of the liberal internationalist school then International Studies on September 27: in power as “assertive multilateralism.” Its “I’m waiting for the final recommendation principal diplomatic activity was the pur- of the Security Council before I’m going suit of a dizzying array of universal treaties to say how I’m going to vote.” on chemical weapons, biological weapons, This logic is deeply puzzling. How nuclear testing, global environment, land exactly does the Security Council confer mines and the like. Its trademark was con- moral authority on American action? The sultation: Clinton was famous for sending Security Council is a committee of great Secretary of State Warren Christopher on powers, heirs to the victors in the Second long trips (for example, through Europe World War. They manage the world in on Balkan policy) or endless shuttles their own interest. The Security Council (uncountable pilgrimages to Damascus) to is, on the very rare occasions when it actu- consult; he invariably returned home ally works, realpolitik by committee. But empty-handed and diminished. And its by what logic is it a repository of interna- principal objective was good international tional morality? How does the approval of citizenship: It was argued on myriad for- France and Russia, acting clearly and eign policy issues that we could not do X
The Unipolar Moment Revisited 11 because it would leave us “isolated.” Thus international system in the image of in 1997 the Senate passed a chemical domestic civil society. The multilateralist weapons convention that even some of its imperative seeks to establish an interna- proponents admitted was unenforceable, tional order based not on sovereignty and largely because of the argument that power but on interdependence—a new everyone else had signed it and that failure order that, as Secretary of State Cordell to ratify would leave us isolated. Isolation, Hull said upon returning from the in and of itself, was seen as a diminished Moscow Conference of 1943, abolishes the and even morally suspect condition. “need for spheres of influence, for A lesson in isolation occurred during alliances, for balance of power.” the 1997 negotiations in Oslo over the Liberal internationalism seeks through land mine treaty. One of the rare hold- multilateralism to transcend power poli- outs, interestingly enough, was Finland. tics, narrow national interest and, ulti- Finding himself scolded by his neighbors mately, the nation-state itself. The nation- for opposing the land mine ban, the state is seen as some kind of archaic Finnish prime minister noted tartly that residue of an anarchic past, an affront to this was a “very convenient” pose for the the vision of a domesticated international “other Nordic countries” who “want arena. This is why liberal thinkers embrace Finland to be their land mine.” the erosion of sovereignty promised by the In many parts of the world, a thin line new information technologies and the easy of American GIs is the land mine. The movement of capital across borders. They main reason we oppose the land mine welcome the decline of sovereignty as the treaty is that we need them in the DMZ in road to the new globalism of a norm-dri- Korea. We man the lines there. Sweden ven, legally-bound international system and France and Canada do not have to broken to the mold of domestic society.8 worry about a North Korean invasion The greatest sovereign, of course, is killing thousands of their soldiers. As the the American superpower, which is why unipolar power and thus guarantor of liberal internationalists feel such acute peace in places where Swedes do not tread, discomfort with American dominance. To we need weapons that others do not. Being achieve their vision, America too— uniquely situated in the world, we cannot America especially—must be domesticat- afford the empty platitudes of allies not ed. Their project is thus to restrain quite candid enough to admit that they live America by building an entangling web of under the umbrella of American power. interdependence, tying down Gulliver That often leaves us “isolated.” with myriad strings that diminish his Multilateralism is the liberal interna- overweening power. Who, after all, was tionalist’s means of saving us from this the ABM treaty or a land mine treaty shameful condition. But the point of the going to restrain? North Korea? multilateralist imperative is not merely This liberal internationalist vision— psychological. It has a clear and coherent the multilateral handcuffing of American geopolitical objective. It is a means that power—is, as Robert Kagan has pointed defines the ends. Its means—international- out, the dominant view in Europe.9 That is ism (the moral, legal and strategic primacy of international institutions over national 8See my “A World Imagined”, The New Republic, interests) and legalism (the belief that the March 15, 1999, from which some of the fore- sinews of stability are laws, treaties and going discussion is drawn. binding international contracts)—are in 9Kagan, “Power and Weakness”, Policy Review (June service to a larger vision: remaking the 2002).
12 The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 to be expected, given Europe’s weakness lessly utopian. The history of paper and America’s power. But it is a mistake to treaties—from the prewar Kellogg-Briand see this as only a European view. The idea Pact and Munich to the post-Cold War of a new international community with Oslo accords and the 1994 Agreed self-governing institutions and self-enforc- Framework with North Korea—is a histo- ing norms—the vision that requires the ry of naiveté and cynicism, a combination domestication of American power—is the both toxic and volatile that invariably ends view of the Democratic Party in the badly. Trade agreements with Canada are United States and of a large part of the one thing. Pieces of parchment to which American foreign policy establishment. existential enemies affix a signature are They spent the last decade in power fash- quite another. They are worse than worth- ioning precisely those multilateral ties to less because they give a false sense of secu- restrain the American Gulliver and remake rity and breed complacency. For the real- him into a tame international citizen.10 ist, the ultimate determinant of the most The multilateralist project is to use— basic elements of international life—secu- indeed, to use up—current American dom- rity, stability and peace—is power. inance to create a new international system Which is why a realist would hardly in which new norms of legalism and inter- forfeit the current unipolarity for the vain dependence rule in America’s place—in promise of goo-goo one-worldism. Nor, short, a system that is no longer unipolar. however, should a realist want to forfeit unipolarity for the familiarity of tradition- There is much pious talk about a new al multipolarity. Multipolarity is inherent- multilateral world and the promise of the ly fluid and unpredictable. Europe prac- United Nations as guarantor of a new post- ticed multipolarity for centuries and Cold War order. But this is to mistake cause found it so unstable and bloody, culminat- and effect, the United States and the United ing in 1914 in the catastrophic collapse of Nations. The United Nations is guarantor of delicately balanced alliance systems, that nothing. Except in a formal sense, it can hardly Europe sought its permanent abolition in be said to exist. Collective security? In the Gulf, political and economic union. Having without the United States leading and prod- abjured multipolarity for the region, it is ding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would odd in the extreme to then prefer multi- have stirred. . . . The world would have written polarity for the world. off Kuwait the way the last body pledged to col- Less can be said about the destiny of lective security, the League of Nations, wrote off Abyssinia. 10In “A World Imagined”, I noted the oddity of an “The Unipolar Moment”, 1990 American governing elite adopting a goal—a constrained America—that is more logically Realism and the New Unilateralism the goal of foreigners: “The ultimate irony is that this is traditionally the vision of small HE BASIC division between nations. They wish to level the playing field the two major foreign policy with the big boys. For them, treaties, interna- T schools in America centers on tional institutions, and interdependence are the the question of what is, and what should great equalizers. Leveling is fine for them. But be, the fundamental basis of international for us? The greatest power in the world—the relations: paper or power. Liberal interna- most dominant power relative to its rivals that tionalism envisions a world order that, like the world has seen since the Roman empire— domestic society, is governed by laws and is led by people who seek to diminish that not men. Realists see this vision as hope- dominance and level the international arena.”
The Unipolar Moment Revisited 13 unipolarity. It is too new. Yet we do have remake human nature, to conquer for the the history of the last decade, our only extraction of natural resources, or to rule modern experience with unipolarity, and for the simple pleasure of dominion. it was a decade of unusual stability among Indeed, America is the first hegemonic all major powers. It would be foolish to power in history to be obsessed with “exit project from just a ten-year experience, strategies.” It could not wait to get out of but that experience does call into question Haiti and Somalia; it would get out of the basis for the claims that unipolarity is Kosovo and Bosnia today if it could. Its intrinsically unstable or impossible to sus- principal aim is to maintain the stability tain in a mass democracy. and relative tranquility of the current I would argue that unipolarity, man- international system by enforcing, main- aged benignly, is far more likely to keep taining and extending the current peace. the peace. Benignity is, of course, in the The form of realism that I am argu- eye of the beholder. But the American ing for—call it the new unilateralism—is claim to benignity is not mere self-con- clear in its determination to self-con- gratulation. We have a track record. sciously and confidently deploy American Consider one of history’s rare controlled power in pursuit of those global ends. experiments. In the 1940s, lines were Note: global ends. There is a form of drawn through three peoples—Germans, unilateralism that is devoted only to nar- Koreans and Chinese—one side closely row American self-interest and it has a bound to the United States, the other to name, too: It is called isolationism. its adversary. It turned into a controlled Critics of the new unilateralism often experiment because both states in the confuse it with isolationism because both divided lands shared a common culture. are prepared to unashamedly exercise Fifty years later the results are in. Does American power. But isolationists oppose anyone doubt the superiority, both moral America acting as a unipolar power not and material, of West Germany vs. East because they disagree with the unilateral Germany, South Korea vs. North Korea means, but because they deem the ends and Taiwan vs. China?11 Benignity is also manifest in the way 11This is not to claim, by any means, a perfect others welcome our power. It is the rea- record of benignity. America has often made son, for example, that the Pacific Rim and continues to make alliances with unpleas- countries are loath to see our military ant authoritarian regimes. As I argued recently presence diminished: They know that the in Time (“Dictatorships and Double Standards”, United States is not an imperial power September 23, 2002), such alliances are with a desire to rule other countries— nonetheless justified so long as they are instru- which is why they so readily accept it as a mental (meant to defeat the larger evil) and balancer. It is the reason, too, why temporary (expire with the emergency). When Europe, so seized with complaints about Hitler was defeated, we stopped coddling American high-handedness, nonetheless Stalin. Forty years later, as the Soviet threat reacts with alarm to the occasional sug- receded, the United States was instrumental in gestion that America might withdraw its easing Pinochet out of power and overthrowing military presence. America came, but it Marcos. We withdrew our support for these did not come to rule. Unlike other hege- dictators once the two conditions that justified mons and would-be hegemons, it does such alliances had disappeared: The global not entertain a grand vision of a new threat of Soviet communism had receded, and world. No Thousand Year Reich. No truly democratic domestic alternatives to these New Soviet Man. It has no great desire to dictators had emerged.
14 The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 far too broad. Isolationists would aban- would be acting nevertheless in the name don the larger world and use American of global interests—larger than narrow power exclusively for the narrowest of American self-interest and larger, too, than American interests: manning Fortress the narrowly perceived self-interest of America by defending the American smaller, weaker powers (even great powers) homeland and putting up barriers to that dare not confront the rising danger. trade and immigration. What is the essence of that larger The new unilateralism defines interest? Most broadly defined, it is American interests far beyond narrow maintaining a stable, open and function- self-defense. In particular, it identifies two ing unipolar system. Liberal internation- other major interests, both global: extend- alists disdain that goal as too selfish, as it ing the peace by advancing democracy makes paramount the preservation of and preserving the peace by acting as bal- both American power and indepen- ancer of last resort. Britain was the bal- dence. Isolationists reject the goal as too ancer in Europe, joining the weaker coali- selfless, for defining American interests tion against the stronger to create equilib- too globally and thus too generously. rium. America’s unique global power allows it to be the balancer in every THIRD critique comes from region. We balanced Iraq by supporting what might be called pragmat- its weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We A ic realists, who see the new balance China by supporting the ring of unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, smaller states at its periphery (from South and whose objections are practical. They Korea to Taiwan, even to Vietnam). Our are prepared to engage in a pragmatic role in the Balkans was essentially to cre- multilateralism. They value great power ate a microbalance: to support the weaker concert. They seek Security Council sup- Bosnian Muslims against their more dom- port not because it confers any moral inant neighbors, and subsequently to sup- authority, but because it spreads risk. In port the weaker Albanian Kosovars their view, a single hegemon risks far against the Serbs. more violent resentment than would a Of course, both of these tasks often power that consistently acts as primus advance American national interests as inter pares, sharing rule-making functions well. The promotion of democracy multi- with others.12 plies the number of nations likely to be I have my doubts. The United States friendly to the United States, and regional made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf equilibria produce stability that benefits a War to get UN support, share decision- commercial republic like the United making, assemble a coalition and, as we States. America’s (intended) exertions on have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory behalf of pre-emptive non-proliferation, in order to honor coalition goals. Did that too, are clearly in the interest of both the diminish the anti-American feeling in the United States and the international sys- region? Did it garner support for subse- tem as a whole. quent Iraq policy dictated by the original Critics find this paradoxical: acting acquiescence to the coalition? unilaterally but for global ends. Why para- The attacks of September 11 were doxical? One can hardly argue that depriv- ing Saddam (and potentially, terrorists) of 12This basic view is well-represented in The WMD is not a global end. Unilateralism National Interest’s Fall 2002 symposium, may be required to pursue this end. We “September 11th One Year On: Power, may be left isolated in so doing, but we Purpose and Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy.”
The Unipolar Moment Revisited 15 planned during the Clinton Administration, world supported it. The same case was an administration that made a fetish of made for the chemical and biological consultation and did its utmost to subor- weapons treaties—sure, they are useless or dinate American hegemony and smother worse, but why not give in there in order unipolarity. The resentments were hardly to build good will for future needs? But assuaged. Why? Because the extremist appeasing multilateralism does not assuage rage against the United States is engen- it; appeasement merely legitimizes it. dered by the very structure of the interna- Repeated acquiescence to provisions that tional system, not by the details of our America deems injurious reinforces the management of it. notion that legitimacy derives from inter- Pragmatic realists also value interna- national consensus, thus undermining tional support in the interest of sharing America’s future freedom of action—and burdens, on the theory that sharing deci- thus contradicting the pragmatic realists’ sion-making enlists others in our own own goals. hegemonic enterprise and makes things America must be guided by its inde- less costly. If you are too vigorous in pendent judgment, both about its own asserting yourself in the short-term, they interest and about the global interest. argue, you are likely to injure yourself in Especially on matters of national security, the long-term when you encounter prob- war-making and the deployment of power, lems that require the full cooperation of America should neither defer nor contract other partners, such as counter-terrorism. out decision-making, particularly when the As Brooks and Wohlforth put it, “Straining concessions involve permanent structural relationships now will lead only to a more constrictions such as those imposed by an challenging policy environment later International Criminal Court. Prudence, on.”13 yes. No need to act the superpower in East If the concern about the new unilater- Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do alism is that American assertiveness be so in Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to judiciously rationed, and that one needs to act the superpower on steel tariffs. But think long-term, it is hard to disagree. One there is a need to do so on missile defense. does not go it alone or dictate terms on The prudent exercise of power allows, every issue. On some issues such as mem- indeed calls for, occasional concessions on bership in and support of the WTO, where non-vital issues if only to maintain psycho- the long-term benefit both to the logical good will. Arrogance and gratuitous American national interest and global high-handedness are counterproductive. interests is demonstrable, one willingly But we should not delude ourselves as to constricts sovereignty. Trade agreements what psychological good will buys. are easy calls, however, free trade being Countries will cooperate with us, first, out perhaps the only mathematically provable of their own self-interest and, second, out political good. Others require great skepti- of the need and desire to cultivate good cism. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, relations with the world’s superpower. would have harmed the American econo- Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant my while doing nothing for the global third. Take counterterrorism. After the environment. (Increased emissions from attack on the U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did China, India and Third World countries everything it could to stymie the American exempt from its provisions would have investigation. It lifted not a finger to sup- more than made up for American cuts.) Kyoto failed on its merits, but was 13Brooks and Wohlforth, “American Primacy in nonetheless pushed because the rest of the Perspective.”
16 The National Interest—Winter 2002/03 press terrorism. This was under an tunities and that, if America did not wreck American administration that was obses- its economy, unipolarity could last thirty sively accommodating and multilateralist. or forty years. That seemed bold at the Today, under the most unilateralist of time. Today, it seems rather modest. The administrations, Yemen has decided to unipolar moment has become the unipo- assist in the war on terrorism. This was not lar era. It remains true, however, that its a result of a sudden attack of good will durability will be decided at home. It will toward America. It was a result of the war depend largely on whether it is welcomed in Afghanistan, which concentrated the by Americans or seen as a burden to be mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like shed—either because we are too good for Yemen on the costs of non-cooperation the world (the isolationist critique) or with the United States.14 Coalitions are because we are not worthy of it (the liber- not made by superpowers going begging al internationalist critique). hat in hand. They are made by asserting a The new unilateralism argues explicit- position and inviting others to join. What ly and unashamedly for maintaining “pragmatic” realists often fail to realize is unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unri- that unilateralism is the high road to mul- valed dominance for the foreseeable tilateralism. When George Bush senior future. It could be a long future, assuming said of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “this we successfully manage the single greatest will not stand”, and made it clear that he threat, namely, weapons of mass destruc- was prepared to act alone if necessary, that tion in the hands of rogue states. This in declaration—and the credibility of itself will require the aggressive and confi- American determination to act unilateral- dent application of unipolar power rather ly—in and of itself created a coalition. than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of good will. He joined because no one of the unipolar era hinges on whether wants to be left at the dock when the hege- America is governed by those who wish to mon is sailing. retain, augment and use unipolarity to Unilateralism does not mean seeking advance not just American but global ends, to act alone. One acts in concert with oth- or whether America is governed by those ers if possible. Unilateralism simply means who wish to give it up—either by allowing that one does not allow oneself to be unipolarity to decay as they retreat to hostage to others. No unilateralist would, Fortress America, or by passing on the say, reject Security Council support for an burden by gradually transferring power to attack on Iraq. The nontrivial question multilateral institutions as heirs to that separates unilateralism from multilat- American hegemony. The challenge to eralism—and that tests the “pragmatic unipolarity is not from the outside but realists”—is this: What do you do if, at the from the inside. The choice is ours. To end of the day, the Security Council refus- impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: es to back you? Do you allow yourself to History has given you an empire, if you be dictated to on issues of vital national— will keep it. ■ and international—security? 14The most recent and dramatic demonstration of HEN I FIRST proposed this newfound cooperation was the CIA killing the unipolar model in on November 4 of an Al-Qaeda leader in W 1990, I suggested that we Yemen using a remotely operated Predator should accept both its burdens and oppor- drone.
The Unipolar Moment Revisited 17