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International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism

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International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism Dartmouth College Dartmouth Digital Commons Dartmouth Scholarship Faculty Work 9-2005 International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism Stephen Brooks Dartmouth College William C. Wohlforth Dartmouth College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa Part of the International Relations Commons Dartmouth Digital Commons Citation Brooks, Stephen and Wohlforth, William C., "International Relations Theory and the Case Against Unilateralism" (2005). Dartmouth Scholarship. 2973. https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/facoa/2973 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Dartmouth Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dartmouth Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Dartmouth Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Articles International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth What are the general costs associated with a U.S. shift toward unilateralism? According to the overwhelming majority of inter- national relations (IR) scholars, the costs are very high. We evaluate the key arguments that underlie this assessment, namely that increased U.S. unilateralism will: (1) spur the formation of a coalition to check U.S. power; (2) reduce efficiency gains through lost opportunities for institutionalized cooperation; and (3) undermine the legitimacy of the American-led international order. We conclude that the theoretical arguments that IR scholars advance do not show that a shift toward unilateralism necessarily has high costs. Our analysis reveals the need to, first, distinguish clearly between criticisms of unilateral policies based on procedure and those based on substance and, second, to recognize the weakness of current procedural arguments. .S. policy makers have long been ambivalent about new foreign policy approach, which analysts dubbed the unilateralism. “The United States has been the great- “new unilateralism.”3 U est champion of multilateral institutions in the twen- The heightened salience of the debate over unilateral- tieth century,” observes G. John Ikenberry, but it has also ism among scholars, policy makers, and pundits shows “been reluctant to tie itself too closely to these multilateral every sign of becoming a permanent feature of the Amer- institutions and rules.”1 International relations (IR) schol- ican political scene. While the debate encompasses many ars, by contrast, have typically touted the benefits of different issues, it was the sagacity of going it alone in multilateralism in general and for the United States in security affairs that was most salient in the 2004 election particular, while stressing the heavy costs of unilateralism. and is now poised to become the defining foreign policy Scholarly concerns about the costs of unilateralism came distinction between the Democratic and Republican par- to the fore in 2003, when it appeared that President George ties. Important though it is, the distinction is one of degree. W. Bush had made a strategic decision to reduce the United Unilateralism and multilateralism are best understood as States’ general commitment to international institutions two ends of a continuum, and it is a mistake to view any in favor of assembling “coalitions of the willing” on an as politician or party as being at one end or the other. The needed, case-by-case basis.2 Cutting across issue areas and debate is not about a wholesale abandonment of all multi- individual cases, this seemed to represent a fundamentally lateral commitments, but rather about the wisdom of mov- ing to a more strategic approach to unilateralism. During the post–World War II period, American policy makers Stephen G. Brooks is assistant professor (Stephen.G.Brooks@ commonly saw unilateralism as a last resort, to be pursued Dartmouth.edu), and William C. Wohlforth is professor only when multilateralism carried great costs or was impos- ([email protected]) in the Depart- sible. The Bush administration, in contrast, advertised a ment of Government at Dartmouth. They are currently greater willingness to go it alone, seeming to view multi- writing a book entitled The Challenge of American Pri- lateralism much more instrumentally—as a strategy to be macy. The authors thank the three anonymous reviewers for followed when doing so is easy or especially advantageous, Perspectives on Politics and, especially, Erik Voeten for but never as an end in itself, and certainly not one whose detailed critical comments. They are also grateful to Mlada pursuit merits bearing high costs. Bukovansky, Ian Hurd, Martha Finnemore, Ben Valentino, This raises a fundamental question: What are the gen- Nina Tannenwald, Alex Wendt, and participants at semi- eral costs associated with a shift toward unilateralism? nars at the Dickey Center at Dartmouth College, the Olin President Bush escaped the most salient, short-term domes- Institute at Harvard University, the Mershon Center at tic downside—electoral defeat. John Kerry focused his Ohio State University, and the Norwegian Institute of critique of Bush’s foreign policy on the argument that International Affairs. Thanks also to Dartmouth’s Rock- American foreign policy had been insufficiently multilat- efeller and Dickey Centers for supporting research on which eral over the past four years. Bush not only emerged the this article draws. victor, but did so in large part because voters judged him September 2005 | Vol. 3/No. 3 509 Articles | International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism to be superior on foreign policy issues.4 This underscores question, current scholarship has no persuasive answer, the significance of unilateralism’s international costs, long although scholars routinely write as if it does. The same a preoccupation of international relations scholars. Our goes for the related issue of the benefits of multilateralism. purpose in this article is to determine what leverage IR Nothing in this article denies that there are areas, such as theory gives us on this crucial issue. the environment, where the United States should be more Notwithstanding their vigorous debates over theory, multilateral. Rather, the point is that the case for acting methodology, epistemology, ontology, not to mention other multilaterally rests on the substance of a given issue, not aspects of U.S. foreign policy, the overwhelming bulk of on the purported costs of not doing so. IR scholars who express views on the subject stress the high international costs of unilateralism, particularly for the United States today. Stanley Hoffman’s warning that Realism: Counterbalancing and the “nothing is more dangerous for a ‘hyperpower’ than the Costs of Unilateralism temptation of unilateralism” is typical of scholarly assess- The most pervasive argument against unilateralism is that ments.5 Significantly, recent criticisms of this kind come it will spark or hasten counterbalancing by other major not just from institutionalists and constructivists—whose powers. The argument is derived from balance-of-power scholarly writings highlight the importance of inter- theory, long a staple of realist thinking and practice. national institutions—but also from prominent represen- Realism’s focus on relative power does explain why the tatives of the realist theoretical tradition as well.6 To anyone United States has the opportunity to act unilaterally, and, familiar with this normally squabbling scholarly commu- moreover, some realists discount the importance of inter- nity, such widespread agreement is noteworthy. national institutions. Nevertheless, influential contempo- The sections that follow evaluate the key arguments rary formulations of the theory yield the argument that by that analysts have advanced, namely, that increased U.S. strongly demonstrating its multilateral credentials, the unilateralism will (1) spur the formation of a coalition United States can signal benign intent and thus forestall to check U.S. power; (2) reduce efficiency gains through counterbalancing. In making this argument, contempo- lost opportunities for institutionalized cooperation; and rary realists are in distinguished historical company, for (3) undermine the legitimacy of the American-led inter- anticipated counterbalancing has long been the strongest national order. These claims roughly correspond to the realist argument for restraint.9 More than any other intel- three major schools of IR theory: realism, institutional- lectual factor, this accounts for the similarity between many ism, and constructivism. Although we discuss analysts realists’ preferences regarding unilateralism and those of whose writings are emblematic of the arguments associ- their institutionalist and constructivist counterparts. ated with each theoretical school, our goal is not to clas- Balance-of-power theory posits that because states have sify and analyze individuals. Many scholars cross theoretical an interest in maximizing their long-term odds on sur- boundaries. Moreover, discussions of international rela- vival, they will coordinate to check dangerous concentra- tions theories have become common in the larger foreign tions of power.10 If the security threat to others inheres in policy debate among policy makers and nonacademic power potential alone, as Kenneth Waltz maintains, then public commentators,7 yet the respective theories are there is nothing Washington can do to affect the proba- often employed very
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