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University of

From the SelectedWorks of Cas Mudde

2010

The Rise (and Fall?) of American Cas Mudde, DePauw University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/cas_mudde/3/ REVIEW ESSAY

The Rise (And Fall?) of American Conservatism1

The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made phenomenon (with the notable exception of the Political History. By Donald T. Critchlow. (Harvard ). Hence, a broad variety of interest- University Press, 2007.) ing questions remain unanswered. What is the con- America at the Crossroads: , Power, and the servative movement and who belongs to it? How did Neoconservative Legacy. By . (Yale an ideology that was shunned by virtually all in- University Press, 2007.) tellectuals and politicians in the 1950s become practi- cally hegemonic within the public debate in the They Knew They Were Right. The Rise of The Neocons. By 1980s? And what effect does the recent rise (and . (Anchor, 2009.) fall?) of mean for the future of Upstream: The Ascendancy of American Conservatism. By American conservatism? Alfred S. Regnery. (Threshold, 2008.) Interestingly, it is mostly conservatives who publish The Death of Conservatism. By Sam Tanenhaus. (Random on American conservatism. All five books reviewed here House, 2009.) are written by conservatives, although of somewhat different types. While some are clearly favorable toward their topic of study (Critchow and Regnery), others are modestly to very critical (from least to most critical: Introduction Fukuyama, Heilbrunn, Tanenhaus). This essay will discuss the rise and alleged fall of American conserva- tism, as presented in conservative writings, focusing At the beginning of the twenty-first century, ‘‘neo- particularly on conceptual and ideological issues, which conservatism’’ was the buzzword in debates on are often ignored or understudied in the literature. American . Both on the left and the right commentators debated the alleged power grab of this group of , who were widely seen as the masterminds of President George W. Bush’s con- American Conservatism: troversial of . However, despite their Definition(s) and Typology proclaimed influence, American academics largely ignored neoconservatism. As far as neoconservatism Although conservative thought has a long in has been studied academically, it has been mostly in the , American conservatives have shied the subfield of (e.g., Erman away from the label until well into the 1950s. Various 1995; Halper and Clarke 2004). authors (including Critchow and Regnery) credit Similarly, the ascendance of conservatism into ’s The Conservative Mind (1953) with the mainstream of American politics, through the making conservatism acceptable to the American elite capture of the Republican Party, has become a and (through them) public. However, the accept- received wisdom in and outside of academia, yet ability of the term also created problems: ‘‘The word few political scientists have actually studied the ‘conservative’ became a label, and it applied to

1I want to thank Dave Campbell, Valerie Hoekstra and Joe Lowndes for providing valuable feedback on earlier versions of this review essay. The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2, April 2010, Pp. 588–594 doi:10.1017/S0022381609990995 Ó Southern Association, 2010 ISSN 0022-3816

588 review essay 589 virtually everybody who wasn’t a liberal’’ (Regnery, (Regnery, 35); ranging from , xv). Not that surprisingly, none of the authors key witness before the House Committee on provides a definition of conservatism; in fact, Un-American Activities (which launched the careers throughout his book, Critchow uses the terms of both Joseph McCarthy and ), to ‘‘Right’’ and ‘‘conservative’’ interchangeably. , the late godfather of neoconservatism. Although Regnery doesn’t define conservatism Most authors consider the combination of key explicitly, he does identify the key ideas behind the features of these three strands as the core of American conservative movement: ‘‘individual liberty, free mar- conservatism; although, at times, recognizing their kets, , and a strong national internal contradictions. Critchow and, particularly, defense’’ (xvi). It is doubtful that all American con- Regnery credit William F. Buckley, Jr., and his highly servatives would subscribe to this list. Less controver- influential journal , with bringing the sial is his distinction between three main strands of three groups together, both ideologically (through American conservatism, although some authors use review editor Frank Meyer’s ‘‘’’) and or- somewhat different terms and categorizations: libertar- ganizationally (by publishing authors from across the ians, traditionalist, and anticommunists. broad conservative specter). Because of his independ- The libertarian movement emerged largely as a ence, Buckley was also crucial in keeping the con- consequence of the influence of European emigrant- servative movement aligned with, but not fully intellectuals like , , dependent upon, the Republican Party. and in the 1950s. They substantiated the Unlike many other authors, Regnery (26) im- core values of and plicitly recognizes the neoconservatives, although within the broader conservative movement. However, with a slight (dis)qualification: ‘‘(a) fourth camp, in while their influence upon the broader a sense’’ (my italics). Although they also combine the movement has been significant, they have never been key features of the other three strands—in essence, able to mobilize beyond some think tanks (notably neoconservatism is a combination of economic lib- the Cato Institute). Moreover, they have often been eralism, social , and democratic inter- at odds with the other two main groups, notably over ventionalism—neoconservatives have always been social issues (traditionalists) and foreign met with reservation (and even outright hostility) (anticommunists). by the larger conservative movement. In addition to The traditionalists are the most ideologically prejudices because of their Jewish and Trotskyist complex of the three types, sharing a devotion to roots and urban intellectualism, it is the first gen- religious piety, tradition, and Western civilization. eration’s support for a ‘‘conservative ’’ While they support the free market, particularly in (Irving Kristol), even at the expensive of substantial the economic sphere, they have no problem with state budget deficits, and the second generation’s in involvement to protect and foster conservative insti- regime change that informs the suspicion towards tutions (notably the family and churches) and virtues these ‘‘big government conservatives’’ within the (e.g., honor, respect). The intellectual guru of broader movement (e.g., Regnery, 156–57). the traditionalists is Russell Kirk, whose book A fifth and final type, mentioned only in passing The Conservative Mind provided ‘‘a kind of historical in the five books, are the paleoconservatives. manifesto’’ to American conservatism (Regnery, 46). Although paleo derives from the Greek word for The traditionalists are the closest to the general ancient or old (palaeo), as they claim to subscribe ‘‘Burkean’’ understanding of conservatism, which is to an original form of (American) conservatism, predominant outside of the United States. the term has become widely used only after Pat The anticommunists, finally, might have had the Buchanan’s defection from the Republican Party least ideological sophistication, they were actually and his subsequent presidential bid for the Reform able to capture the masses. At least until the Christian Party in 2000. Unlike their nemesis, the neocons, the Right took over in the 1980s they constituted the paleocons have (so far) not been able to build an grassroots of the initial conservative movement. The important ideological or organization presence; jour- core idea was that ‘‘(a)ggressive on Commu- nals like The American Conservative and think tanks nism abroad should be complemented by aggressive like the Rockfort Institute are marginal within the policies against Communists at home’’ (Regnery, 37). conservative movement, let alone outside of it. Interestingly, at the elite level, ‘‘many of the most Although ideologically isolationalist, paleoconserva- effective anticommunists were former party mem- tives are the most internationally connected of all bers, fellow travelers, or undercover operatives’’ American conservatives. Their nativist struggle 590 review essay against (Latino) and Islam leads to Interest), think tanks (e.g., American Enterprise Insti- connections with and support for European radical tute and Heritage Foundation), and funders (e.g., the right parties (e.g., Vlaams Belang) and thinkers (e.g., Bradley and John M. Olin Foundations), while at the Alain DeBenoist). same time stressing their relative modest means compared to ‘‘liberal’’ counterparts (see, in partic- ular, Regnery, Chapter 8). Similarly, they describe the crucial role of the Christian Right, and its many The Rise of American Conservatism organizations (e.g., Religious Roundtable, ) and personalities (e.g., Jerry Falwell, Pat Donald T. Critchow is Professor of History at Saint Robertson), who, enraged by liberal-induced ‘‘moral Louis University and known for his biography of decay,’’ progressive (e.g., Equal Rights Amend- famed female Conservative activist, Phyllis Schlafly, ment) and court rulings (e.g., Roe v. Wade), provided who, not surprisingly, features prominently in this the foot soldiers and new electorate for the conservative book too. Alfred S. Regnery is the second generation ascendance. Of particular interest is their position on of a conservative publishing family; a former director the so-called of , whom they of and current publisher of the credit with the professionalization of conservative conservative monthly . De- campaigning and with mobilizing the evangelical spite their different positions, i.e., as scholar and Christians for the conservative cause. Regnery also activist respectively, they have written remarkably devotes a separate chapter to the importance of ‘‘the similar histories of the ascendance of American , the Courts, and the Constitution,’’ which high- conservatism. lights the ‘‘law and movement,’’ the Feder- Both are sympathetic to the conservative move- alist Society, and Reagan’s true legacy, i.e. the reshaping ment, even if Critchow expresses it less directly and of the courts ‘‘in a way not seen since the founding of openly. Also, Regnery is more interested in the the ’’ (250). conservative movement as a whole, while Critchow Critchow summarizes postwar American politics focuses overwhelmingly on the GOP. The latter as follows: ‘‘Whereas Democrats held fast to their focuses on the double-edged struggle of the conser- liberal and internationalist vision, Repub- vatives: first, against moderates within the Republican licans represented the fears of white middle-class and Party, and, only second, against liberals in the religious voters through a political platform of low Democratic Party. Despite their clear sympathy for taxes, national defense, preservation of , the ‘‘Right,’’ and their politicized inflation of the regulation of social morality, and opposition to influence of the ‘‘Left,’’ both books are well docu- policies that affirmed racial, gender, or sexual pref- mented and offer largely plausible accounts. Unfortu- erences in the public sphere’’ (4). In essence, he nately, they are also highly descriptive and provide argues that ‘‘(a)t different times the GOP Right very little systematic analysis and empirical evidence tottered on complete defeat, only to be revived for their claims (aside from some cherry-picked through political miscalculation on the part of its surveys). opponents or through good luck’’ (4). Roughly Critchow sees the success of American postwar speaking, the political miscalculations were the Dem- conservatism as a consequence of the emergence, in ocrat’s alleged left-wing policies and pandering to the 1950s, of right-wing intellectuals (from Friedrich (ethnic and radical) special interests, while the good Hayek and Ayn Rand to Russell Kirk and William F. luck remains a bit unclear—Carter’s ‘‘political in- Buckley, Jr.) and a popular grassroots anticommunist eptitude’’ (154), ’s unique qualities? movement, and their slow but steady convergence in Regnery’s account does not differ much, except the next decades, culminating in the heydays of for a (more) partisan position and a stronger em- American conservatism: the Reagan ‘‘Revolution.’’ phasis on . For example, he In this process the first generation of neoconserva- devotes excessive space to singing the praise of ‘‘Bill’’ tives played a crucial role, by providing the intellec- Buckley and his National Review as well as Barry tual power and institutional framework of a kind of Goldwater and his (ghost-authored) book The ‘‘managerial conservatism’’ that legitimized conser- Conscience of a Conservative (1960); about which vatism at the highest intellectual and policy circles Critchow somewhat dismissively writes that ‘‘it re- (Critchow, 105). mains unclear whether Goldwater read any of the Both authors describe the wealth of (neo)conser- manuscript’’ (49). Regnery’s account of the anticom- vative journals (e.g., National Review and The Public munist movement also differs somewhat from review essay 591

Critchow, as he openly and unapologetically ac- At the same time, it is interesting to note how knowledges the crucial role of groups often Critchow uses terms like ‘‘anxiety’’ and ‘‘fear’’ like the Society, without denying its anti- to explain the success of (Republican) conservatives. Semitic and conspiratorial ideology (see on this also The conservatives are able to profit from anxieties Tanenhaus, 56 ff). and fears over internal and external , Notably, Regnery concludes that ‘‘although the over moral decay, over race riots in the cities, etc. He is today usually dismissed as a implies that these anxieties and fears were logical and right-wing fringe group with little impact, it in fact spontaneous reactions to the increasingly left-wing played a much greater part in the conservative agenda of the Democratic Party. Even the possibility movement than is generally held, having organized of conservative actors whipping up these anxieties the grassroots nationally as never before’’ (80). In and fears is not mentioned. Fear mongering is almost contrast, Critchow claims already in his introduction the exclusive quality of the ‘‘left’’ (read: the Demo- that ‘‘(p)ostwar American conservatives quickly dis- crats), to unfairly disqualify honest, God-fearing tanced themselves from ( ... ) anti-Semitic cranks’’ conservatives; with the exception of some radical (Critchow, 7). At the same time, he does recognize right nuts, who are, of course, shunned by the that, despite some strategical denunciations by main- conservatives. stream Republicans, ‘‘the John Birch Society re- While Regnery rightly noted that the Reagan mained a strong presence in the conservative years constituted both a conclusion and a beginning movement’’ (Critchow, 59). He is able to square for conservatives, and that in the subsequent 25 years these two opposing views by taking some question- the movement ‘‘grew and gained influence previously able positions, including the description of Robert unimagined by the Founders [sic]’’ (3), his analysis of Welch, the founder of the Birchers, as particularly post-Reagan conservatism is rather limited. Both sensitive to prejudices (Critchow, 32). books end their thorough description with Newt Crucial to all accounts of the rise of American Gingrich and the ‘‘Contract for America’’ (1994), conservatism is the realignment of the South begin- the completion of the South’s transformation from ning in the . Both Critchow and Regnery spend Dixiecrat to conservative Republican. The most considerable time on this transformation, in which recent fifteen years, which have been at least as they see the Republican nomination of Barry Gold- relevant for American conservatism, are treated with water in 1964 as ‘‘(t)he defining moment in the less detail and insight. conservative movement’’ (Critchow, 285). In sharp contrast to recent scholarship, which emphasizes the crucial importance of race and racism in the ‘‘South- The Neoconservative Era ern Strategy’’ (e.g., Lowndes 2008), they argue that ‘‘economics, not race, won the South for the Repub- Political Jacub Heilbrunn, senior editor at licans’’ (Critchow, 181). Oddly enough, segregation- the (formerly neo)conservative National ist Governor of Alabama , a Southern Interest, provides the most complete history of neo- Democrat who ran for president for the American conservatism to date, describing both the first and Independent Party in 1968, is almost completely second generation. His premise is that ‘‘neoconserva- ignored by Regnery, while Critchow argues, without tism isn’t about ideology. ( ... ) It is about a mindset, any empirical evidence, that ‘‘Wallace was not a one that has been decisively shaped by the Jewish bridge candidate for white voters in the South into immigrant experience, by the Holocaust, and by the the Republican Party’’ (181).2 Not surprisingly, the twentieth-century struggle against ’’ accusation of racism is explicitly rejected, or better (10). While explicitly rejecting anti-Semitic con- reduced to a liberal strategy to taint the Right, as the spiracy theories of a neoconservative cabal, put conservative opposition against segregation and civil forward by radicals of the left and right alike, he rights legislation was ‘‘principled’’ and based on argues that ‘‘neoconservatism is in a decisive respect a ‘‘opposition on constitutional grounds and conser- Jewish phenomenon, reflecting a subset of Jewish vative resistance to radical social change’’ (Critchow, concerns’’ (11).3 73).

3This is certainly not without merit. Irving Kristol (1996) himself has argued that his Jewish faith was a key reason for the 2Interestingly, the importance of both race and Wallace are difference between (his) neoconservatism and British acknowledged by Tanenhaus, albeit implicitly. conservatism. 592 review essay

Despite the overemphasis on the Jewishness of yet ‘‘well-oiled family enterprise’’ (274), built around the movement, and an excessive focus on details and two Jewish dynasties, the Kristol and the Podhoretz individuals, Heilbrunn provides an at times fascinat- families. He explains their political success as a ing history of this complex and oft misunderstood consequence of a ‘‘peculiar mixture of prophetic movement, structured on the basis of an ancient bravado and savvy street-fighting skills’’ (70). While biblical narrative. In ‘‘Exodus’’ he chronicles in detail the book provides important new insights, it is badly the Trotkyist origins of the first generation of neo- structured and too simplistic in its argumentation. cons, a group of Jewish graduate students at City Causation is by and large assumed as a consequence College of (‘‘the poor man’s Harvard’’). In of personal connections. ‘‘Wilderness’’ he describes how the group of ‘‘liberals Formerneoconservativescholar Francis Fukuyama’s mugged by reality,’’ as Irving Kristol’s famous self- book is part attack on his former colleagues and definition goes, grows more and more unhappy ideology, without much self-criticism, and part call within the Democratic Party and, in the 1960s, for a virtually identical program. He sees (second increasingly emphasizes two positions: ‘‘a trenchant generation) neoconservatism as one of four ap- social and political critique of the and a proaches to American foreign policy, built upon vigorous, -centered anticommunist foreign concepts such as ‘‘regime change, benevolent hegem- policy’’ (69). In ‘‘Redemption’’ he details how most ony, unipolarity, preemption, and Americn exception- neocons make the long-prepared move into the Re- alism’’ (3). His main critique is that the neocons made publican Party under Reagan. Heilbrunn labels them, three key mistakes with regard to Iraq: (1) exaggeration somewhat dismissively, ‘‘the court theologians of the of the threat; (2) underestimation of international right’’ (165) and ‘‘Reagan’s intellectual shock troops’’ opposition to American ; and (3) under- (168). But while Reagan implemented various neo- estimation of the difficulty of building democracy in conservative policies (notably supply-side economics), the . he appointed very few neocons to important positions. Despite his critique of the second generation In the end, most neconservatives would grow increas- neocons ‘‘Fukuyama is trying to rescue neoconserva- ingly critical of and disappointed with Reagan. ism from the neoconservatives’’ (Heilbrunn, 273). After a short stint outside the halls of power, Fukuyama has concluded that ‘‘Neoconservatism has which is mistaken for the death of neoconservatism now become irreversibly identified with the policies by friends and foes alike, a second generation of of the administration of George W. Bush in its first neoconservatives emerges in the 1990s, to a large term, and any effort to reclaim the label at this point extent the sons of the first generation, who had served is likely to be futile’’ (xxxi). Hence, he no longer in the second tier of the Reagan administration. This defends neoconservatism, but ‘‘realistic Wilsonian- second generation is from the beginning openly ism.’’ In reality, the two differ mainly in means, not partisan and party political, despite its problematic in goals. Fukuyama himself acknowledges as much: relationship with much of the elite of both the ‘‘Realistic differs from neoconserva- conservative movement and the Republican Party tism ( ... ) insofar as it takes international institu- (particularly under George H. W. Bush). Moreover, tions serious’’ (10). He labels this rather awkwardly as ‘‘(t)he skepticism and sense of detachment that char- ‘‘multi-multilateralism,’’ i.e., ‘‘a world populated by a acterized the elder Kristol were absent from the large number of overlapping and sometimes com- younger generation’’ (226). Somewhat counterintui- petitive international institutions’’ (158). However, tively, Heilbrunn discusses the George W. Bush admin- this multi-multilateralism should mainly allow the istration under the heading ‘‘Return to Exile.’’ He United States more opportunities for international subscribes to the now mainstream view that the second recognition by choosing to collaborate with those generation of neoconservatives was at the right place at international institutions that support its policies. I the right time, i.e., that 9/11 propelled them, with key seriously doubt or would support of vice-president , from the disagree. margins into the center of the Bush administration. Not unlike Fukuyama, he claims that ‘‘(t)he longer his presidency went on, the more of a neoconservative Bush became—and the less power the neoconservatives The End of American Conservatism? themselves exercised directly’’ (267). Heilbrunn’s picture of the neoconservatives is At least since the end of the Bush presidency a broad one of an arrogant, incestuous, insular, traumatized, variety of commentators have proclaimed the end of review essay 593 neoconservatism. The mainstream thesis holds that Journal). They have merely retreated to their well- the highly unpopular in Iraq has shown that funded (e.g., ) and neoconservatism never had a popular base, invoking think tanks (e.g., American Enterprise Institute, various degrees of conspiracy theories about their Institute), similar to the 1990s, when they influence within the Bush administration, and has were also declared dead by in- and outsiders. At best, tainted neoconservatism forever. While these kinds of they have dropped the term neoconservatism, under- analyses were to be expected from the many ideo- standing that it is still stained by the . That logical foes, on both the left and right (paleocons in said, their ideas have changed little (see Fukuyama). particular), they have come from deep within the As neoconservatives retreated to their plush seats movement itself. One of the most prominent neo- in the shadows of power, other conservatives hit the cons, , the ‘‘Prince of Darkness’’ many streets with a vengeance. While there certainly is an have identified as one of the key instigators of the elite-led organized element to the Tea Party and Iraq War, denied the very existence of neoconserva- Town Hall movement(s), such as FreedomWorks tism in a bizarre interview with Vanity Fair. (led by former Republican House Majority leader While the end of neoconservatism seems received ) and Fox Channel (notably Glenn wisdom in the Obama era, reformed neoconservative Beck), there is no denying its strong grassroots Sam Tanenhaus goes even one (big) step further. His support. In fact, in many ways the movement proclamation that ‘‘Conservatism is Dead,’’ in The resembles the initial Christian Right. New Republic (18 February 2009), caused quite a stir However, this movement is much less centrally among (internet) conservatives. Hence, several organized and, thus, controlled than previous con- months later he declares roughly the same in a well- servative grassroots groups. While it is vehemently marketed book/pamphlet entitled The Death of Con- anti-Democrat, it is only loosely aligned to the GOP. servatism. Unfortunately, Tanenhaus uses the extra And though its calls for small government might space of the booklet mainly to restate his position over overlap with the current priorities of the moderate and over again, rather than substantiating it with conservative GOP leadership, the movement’s strong empirical or even just logical evidence. His main thesis underlying currents of and isolationism are that ‘‘movement conservatism is not simply in retreat; much closer to the paleoconservatives. And, as Pat it is outmoded’’ (4) is not really an empirical claim, but Buchanan has showed, paleocons have a very tenuous rather a normative one. A more accurate title for his relationship to mainstream conservatism, and are not pamphlet would therefore be ‘‘The Death of My afraid to mobilize outside of the GOP. Conservatism.’’ Although it is not always clear what In short, American conservatism is far from dead. Tanenhaus’ preferred strand of conservatism is, he In fact, it is very much alive and increasingly kicking. seems to move between early neoconservatism (before Surveys show widespread support for key conserva- Irving Kristol betrayed it by embracing the market) and tive positions, while extraparliamentary politics are Disreali’s pragmatic ‘‘conservatism’’ (which, in essence, completely dominated by conservatives. However, was devoid of any particular value except of pleasing while the neoconservatives dominated the first dec- the people). What is clear is that Tanenhaus despises ade of the twenty-first century, no strand is truly most American conservatives with at least as much predominant within the larger movement today. fervor as many on the left, though his rejection is at Most likely, the second decade of this century will least as much personal as it is ideological. bring an increasingly heated struggle between the That conservatism is not really dead can be moderate conservatism of the GOP (leadership) and observed at all levels. If the first months under the of the grassroots movement. Obama showed anything, it was the enduring power of conservatives within the GOP. Think only of the stand-off between GOP chairman and conservative king , which The Academic Study of American led to a humiliating public apology of the former. In Conservatism fact, despite all obituaries, not even neoconservatism is dead. Various neocons served in campaign teams of This review article was intended to discuss only leading Republican presidential candidates in 2008, contemporary neoconservatism, but was broadened and they still feature daily as commentators on Fox because of a lack of academic scholarship. It is odd News (e.g., Bill Kristol and ) that one of the most debated issues in American and in other mainstream media (e.g., Wall Street politics is hardly studied by American political 594 review essay scientists. In fact, the broader political ascendance of should be integrated into the empirical study of American conservatism has been studied almost exclu- American politics. sively by historians (e.g., Phillips-Fein 2009), and not The rise of the Right is one of the most significant by political scientists. This is in part a reflection of developments in recent American politics. So far, broader blind spots in political science research. I’ll political scientists have studied this development only finish this article by suggesting some routes for the sparsely and vaguely. Let’s hope future research will further study of American conservatism. go beyond economic and social determinisms, and First, political science has a tendency to treat explain the central role of American conservatism in political parties as unitary actors. This is particularly contemporary politics through a mix of established problematic in two party systems, where political and innovative concepts and theories that do justice parties tend to be more like broad coalitions spread- to the complexities of politics and the public rele- ing one whole side of the political specter. Hence, vance of our discipline. there should be more work which looks at internal party struggle (e.g., between Fundis and Realos), and more scholars should pay attention to the insights Cas Mudde, University of /University of from that work. Notre Dame Second, and related, parties are part of a wider , which they influence and that influences them. The relationship between party factions and broader movements, such as movement conserva- References tism, is crucial in understanding the internal power struggle of political parties. Here, the literature on (new) social movements could provide important Erman, John (1995) The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellec- insights, despite its blind eye for right-wing move- tuals and Foreign Affairs 1945–1994, New Haven, CT: ments. So far, political scientists have predominantly Yale University Press. focused on the Christian Right, which is but a part of Halper, Stefan and Jonathan Clarke (2004) : the broader conservative movement. The Neo-Conservatives and the World Order. Cam- Third, at least since ’s famous ‘‘end of bridge: Cambridge University Press. ideology’’ argument in the 1960s, political scientists Kristol, Irving (1996) ‘‘America’s ‘Exceptional Conserva- have shown little interest in the role of ideology. tisms’.’’ In Conservative Realism: New Essays in Conserva- Politics is supposed to be a pragmatic (even oppor- tism, ed. Kenneth Minogue. London: HarperCollins, tunistic) struggle between various factions (including 9–22. lobbyists) with different material interests. Political power is based upon money or votes. Clearly, this is Lowndes, Joseph E. (2008) From the New Deal to the New not always true. The neoconservatives had relatively Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Con- little of either, yet have had a phenomenal impact on servatism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. postwar American politics. To study their Gramscian Phillips-Fein, Kim (2009) ‘‘Right On.’’ . 28 struggle for hegemony insights from political theory September.