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Limits of American Power Author(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Reviewed work(s): Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 4 (Winter, 2002-2003), pp. 545-559 Published by: The Academy of Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/798134 . Accessed: 03/01/2012 13:26 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The Academy of Political Science is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Science Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org Limitsof AmericanPower JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others. In the words of The Economist,"the United States bestridesthe globe like a colossus.It dominatesbusiness, commerce and communications;its economyis the world'smost successful,its militarymight second to none."'French foreign ministerHubert Vedrine argued in 1999 that the United States had gone be- yond its superpowerstatus of the twentieth century. "U.S. supremacytoday extends to the economy, currency,military areas, lifestyle, language and the productsof mass culturethat inundatethe world,forming thought and fascinat- ing even the enemies of the United States."2Or as two Americantriumphalists put it, "Today'sinternational system is built not arounda balanceof power but aroundAmerican hegemony."3 As globalinterdependence has increased,many have argued that globalizationis simply a disguise for Americanimperialism. The German newsmagazineDer Spiegel reported that "Americanidols and icons are shapingthe world from Katmanduto Kinshasa,from Cairo to Cara- cas. Globalizationwears a 'Made in USA' label."4 The United States is undoubtedlythe world'snumber one power, but how long can this situationlast, and what should we do with it? Some punditsand I "America's World," The Economist, 23 October 1999. 2 Lara Marlowe, "FrenchMinister Urges Greater UN Role to Counter US Hyperpower,"The Irish Times,4 November 1999. In 1998,Vedrine coined the term "hyperpower"to describe the United States because "the word 'superpower'seems to me too closely linked to the cold war and militaryissues." Hubert Vedrine with Dominique Moisi, France in an Age of Globalization (Washington,DC: Brook- ings Institution Press, 2001), 2. 3 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Present Danger," The National Interest(Spring 2000). 4 William Drozdiak, "Even Allies Resent U.S. Dominance," WashingtonPost, 4 November 1997. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., is dean of the Kennedy School of Government at HarvardUniversity and was chairmanof the National Intelligence Council and an assistantsecretary of defense in the Clinton ad- ministration.A frequent contributorto the New York Times,Washington Post, and WallStreet Journal, he is the authorof several books, includingGovernance in a Globalizing Worldand Bound to Lead: The ChangingNature of AmericanPower. This articleis adaptedfrom his most recent book, TheParadox of American Power. Political Science Quarterly Volume 117 Number 4 2002-03 545 546 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY scholars argue that U.S. preeminence is simply the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and that this "unipolar moment" will be brief.5American strategy should be to husband strength and engage the world only selectively. Others argue that America's power is so great that it will last for decades, and the uni- polar moment can become a unipolar era.6 Charles Krauthammer argued in early 2001 that "after a decade of Prometheus playing pygmy, the first task of the new administration is to reassert American freedom of action." We should refuse to play "the docile international citizen.... The new unilateralism recog- nizes the uniqueness of the unipolar world we now inhabit and thus marks the real beginning of American post-Cold War foreign policy."7 Even before September 2001, this prescription was challenged by many, both liberals and conservatives, who consider themselves realists and consider it almost a law of nature in international politics that if one nation becomes too strong, others will team up to balance its power. In their eyes, America's cur- rent predominance is ephemeral.8 As evidence, they might cite an Indian jour- nalist who urges a strategic triangle linking Russia, India, and China "to provide a counterweight in what now looks like a dangerously unipolar world,"9or the president of Venezuela telling a conference of oil producers that "the 21st cen- tury should be multipolar, and we all ought to push for the development of such a world."'0Even friendly sources such as The Economist agree that "the one- superpower world will not last. Within the next couple of decades a China with up to 11/2billion people, a strongly growing economy and probably a still author- itarian government will almost certainly be trying to push its interests. ... Sooner or later some strong and honest man will pull post-Yeltsin Russia to- gether, and another contender for global influence will have reappeared."11In my view, terrorism notwithstanding, American preponderance will last well into this century-but only if the United States learns to use power wisely. Predicting the rise and fall of nations is notoriously difficult. In February 1941, publishing magnate Henry Luce boldly proclaimed the "American cen- 5 See CharlesKrauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment,"Foreign Affairs (Winter 1990-1991):23-33; ChristopherLane, "The Unipolar Illusion:Why New Great Powers Will Arise," InternationalSecurity (Spring 1993): 5-51; Charles Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity,"International Security (Fall 1998). 6 WilliamWohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World"in Michael Brown et al., America'sStrate- gic Choices, rev. ed. (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 2000), 305, 309; also from a liberal perspective, G. John Ikenberry,"Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," InternationalSecurity (Winter 1998-99): 43-78. 7 Charles Krauthammer,"The New Unilateralism,"Washington Post, 8 June 2001. 8Kenneth Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," Political Science and Politics (December 1999): 700. 9Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "Will Dream PartnershipBecome Reality?" The Straits Times (Singa- pore), 25 December 1998. 10 Hugo Chavez quoted in Larry Rohter, "A Man with Big Ideas, a Small Country ... and Oil," New York Times,24 September 2000. n "When the Snarling'sOver," The Economist, 13 March 1999. LIMITSOF AMERICANPOWER I 547 tury."Yet by the 1980s,many analyststhought Luce's vision had run its course, the victim of such culprits as Vietnam, a slowing economy, and imperial overstretch.In 1985, economist Lester Thurow asked why, when Rome had lasted a thousandyears as a republicand an empire,we were slippingafter only fifty.12Polls showed that half the public agreed that the nation was contracting in power and prestige.13 The declinistswho filled American bestseller lists a decade ago were not the firstto go wrong.After Britainlost its Americancolonies in the eighteenth century,Horace Walpole lamentedBritain's reduction to "a miserablelittle is- land" as insignificantas Denmarkor Sardinia.14His predictionwas colored by the then currentview of colonial commerce and failed to foresee the coming industrialrevolution that would give Britaina second centurywith even greater preeminence. Similarly,the American declinists failed to understandthat a "thirdindustrial revolution" was aboutto give the United States a "secondcen- tury."15The United States has certainlybeen the leader in the global informa- tion revolution. On the other hand, nothing lasts forever in world politics. A centuryago, economic globalizationwas as high by some measuresas it is today. World fi- nance rested on a gold standard,immigration was at unparalleledlevels, trade was increasing,and Britainhad an empireon whichthe sun never set. As author William Pfaff put it, "Responsible political and economic scholars in 1900 would undoubtedlyhave describedthe twentieth-centuryprospect as continu- ing imperialrivalries within a Europe-dominatedworld, lasting paternalistic tu- telage by Europeansof their Asian and African colonies, solid constitutional governmentin WesternEurope, steadilygrowing prosperity, increasing scien- tific knowledge turned to human benefit, etc. All would have been wrong."16 Whatfollowed, of course,were two worldwars, the greatsocial disease of total- itarianfascism and communism,the end of Europeanempires, and the end of Europe as the arbiter of world power. Economic globalizationwas reversed and did not again reach its 1914 levels until the 1970s. Conceivably,it could happen again. Can we do better as we enter the twenty-firstcentury? The apocryphaof Yogi Berrawarns us not to make predictions,particularly about the future.Yet we have no choice. We walk aroundwith picturesof the futurein our heads as 12 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and MilitaryConflict from 1500-2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Lester Thurow, The Zero Sum Solution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). 13Martilla and Kiley, Inc. (Boston, MA), Americans Talk Security,no. 6, May 1988, and
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