Impacts of Hegemonic Decline in Southeast Asia: the Case of ASEAN Cooperation Amidst an Outpaced U.S

Impacts of Hegemonic Decline in Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN cooperation amidst an outpaced U.S. Foreign Policy

Anthony T. Reyes POS 4970, Senior Thesis Honors Thesis Candidate Spring 2016 Professor Selden University of Florida

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INTRODUCTION

I first had the opportunity to visit the Philippines at the age of nine for my grandfather’s funeral. While I was largely oblivious to the deep cultural, familial, and moral obligation I had to be there I did recognize early on that I was no longer in the

United States. I vividly remember arriving in Cebu on a rainy day and seeing the streets filled with families coming out of their makeshift shelters to bathe in the rainwater and bottling it for future consumption. My favorite place to visit had always been the local shopping mall where only upper-class Filipinos and foreigners could enter, and where store employees largely outnumbered visiting shoppers. To a younger and more innocent version of myself, the favoritism was a result of it feeling comfortable and familiar to my home stateside. On my most recent visit there, however, the experience was much more different. There were now three shopping centers within a ten-mile radius, and they were crowded. Filled with individuals regardless of income level or economic stratum, I even lost my traveling companion in the sea of people on a busy Saturday morning. When I would arrive at my grandmother’s home, I noticed my cousins were playing with the same Nintendo gaming console I was; with even newer games.

This small personal anecdote is used to illustrate the growth of the Southeast

Asian sub-region. Economic growth in the region has occurred at unprecedented levels, even impacting my own family there. Individuals each day are increasingly escaping the cycle of poverty, transforming into global-minded consumers and responsible stakeholders in the world. While the growth of Southeast Asia’s relevance and influence on the international stage is undeniable and unlikely to end abruptly, what remains

Reyes uncertain is its future. More specifically, the future of how the sub-region relates to the rest of the world is uncertain and needs to be examined.

The anecdote captures another trend aside from the remarkable progress occurring in the Southeast Asian domestic condition. Equally as important, it captures the relative progress globally that the region has made towards closing the gap between a developing and developed region. Something as simple as video games can be demonstrative as to how the usual reliance and envy of the developing world upon the United States has decreased. This has allowed international observers to portend that these countries amongst one another are playing an increasingly significant role in the world. While moderating a panel with Southeast Asian business and governmental leaders at the 2014

Annual World Economic Forum, political commentator Fareed Zakaria was right to notice:

“If you look at international relations, and you say to yourself: when was the last time you saw a group of countries that were close to one another growing very fast? All growing at three, four, five percent. That had different kinds of political regimes. That had historical problems with one another. That had histories of conflict with one another. Some unresolved border issues or sovereignty issues. But very vigorous economic growth. That place would have been Europe in the nineteenth century. And what you had was 150 years of war.” (World Economic Forum, 2014)

Noteworthy caveats to this are that Southeast Asia is decidedly distinct from

Europe, the qualities of the world today are fundamentally different from those which characterized the history of the nineteenth century, and the international context in which the sub region is developing in is different as well. But the realization of similar shifts, integrating behaviors, and trends of growth provide an insight into a tension present in the region: higher rewards breed higher risks. As the sub region’s countries continue to prosper alongside one another, realist theory would crudely argue that these countries will follow history and conflict with one another. Growth will translate into having more 3

Reyes to lose, establishing a sense of insecurity and self-driven interests that run diametrically opposed to one another.

While the anarchy of realpolitik still shapes state decision making in many ways, an analysis of the present-day Southeast Asian condition by this realist approach forecasts a pessimistic and conflict-riddled future (Keohane, 2005, 67). The liberal institutionalist counter to this gloomy picture understands international institutions, which regional organizations are a subset of, as a valuable tool which increases the likelihood of cooperation and shifts the focus beyond state survival and towards state welfare

(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995). The benefits of information includes the promotion of trust and confidence, lowering transaction costs, issue linkage, and the reduction of uncertainty (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

Mentioning these perspectives is noteworthy in understanding how large scale power conflict has not happened between ASEAN states in the twentieth century and is unlikely to occur in the twenty-first century. The primary reason for this lack of conflict is found in analyses of how these Southeast Asian nations relate to one another; such as through ASEAN. The reasoning also factors into the narratives of American relative decline in the region alongside growth of Southeast Asia, and how the two may be related. The countries in the region: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, and Thailand; are ethnically diverse, culturally unique, and have large gaps in development levels. Despite these differences, the two most meaningful characteristics they all share is that they have experienced general economic growth and that they share membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As a regional organization, ASEAN has largely defined how

Reyes these nations relate to one another and manage the world around them collectively. It has helped the growth of the region remain stable and peaceful concurrently increasing interdependence in the region independent of the United States.

Aside from the enhancement of ASEAN cooperation, one of the even more historically sustained trends is the immense amount of influence that the United States has in Southeast Asia to the point of hegemony. After World War Two and the defeat of the Japanese, American primacy in the region dwarfed the states living there, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union this was even more pronounced. In the present-day, it is important to reassess what role the United States has. How powerful is the role of the

United States in the region, given that ASEAN members are looking towards one another within the region for political and economic growth? Do these two trends contradict one another, or are they reliant upon one another?

The debate on America’s decline as a global superpower and sole hegemon has been contentious and left incomplete by many international relations scholars. However, a useful way of observing how the role of the United States has changed on the world stage is by viewing it in relative terms. As the twentieth and twenty-first century has seen what Fareed Zakaria has described as the rise of the rest, it suggests that America’s ability to dictate international decision making and define common international interests has been curtailed. It is not as much a failure in American power, as it is an increase in the share of power from other actors. This decrease in relative power by the United States has left states that once looked to America as a security, political, and economic guarantor to look to elsewhere for legitimacy and leadership. The evolution of ASEAN is a meaningful demonstration of this.

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Therefore, the argument of this paper is that in an international system with a hegemon present, regional organizations are likely to increase levels of cooperation when said hegemon seems to be in decline. ASEAN has increased levels of cooperation as a result of the relative decline by the United States. They are increasingly looking towards one another, rather than the United States, to carry out their interests. While the actual merits of an America in decline have been contested, the perception of decline has played a powerful role in Southeast Asia. In recognizing the United States’ loss of influence in the Asia region, the ten members of ASEAN have focused efforts on fostering solidarity and creating a common purpose towards dealing with the challenges of the current global system.

Brief History of ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations officially began in 1967 with five members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The foreign ministers of these states became signatories to the Bangkok Declaration in August of that year, establishing ASEAN as a regional organization. The document outlined the aims of enhancing political, economic, social, and cultural cooperation to “ensure the survival of its members by promoting regional stability and limiting competition between them”

(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1967). Nations saw the shortcomings of previous regional ambitions such as the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO),

Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and the Greater Malayan Federation

(MAPHILINDO) as learning experiences to create a stronger and more useful regional organization.

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While these diverse nations came into ASEAN under different circumstances and with different intentions, one common interest at the time brought them together. They were all firmly anti-communist and the shared fear of an internal indigenous uprising was a source for early cooperation between the original members. The institutional structure was non-binding and intended to avoid a strong security orientation. The only mention of security action in the Bangkok Declaration focused on defining foreign bases as temporary establishments and decreasing the influence of external interference in the interest of national identity among members. Even to this day members have

“consistently rejected the idea of forming a military pact” (Narine 1998, 97). Instead, the hope was that enhanced interaction among neighbors would help address national development needs and economic growth. However, their intentions began modestly to avoid deep economic integration. In its infancy ASEAN did not hold the objective of even establishing a free trade area, the lowest form of economic integration.

The early years of ASEAN’s development began with the recognition that fostering political amity was a basic requirement for cooperation amongst the founding five. Doing away with political tensions, or at least putting them aside, captured the early

ASEAN characteristic of conflict avoidance. Members began to work as a singular entity under ASEAN’s Special Coordinating Committee or SCCAN by 1972. Furthermore, the formulation of common negotiating postures with external actors like the European

Economic Community, paired with intra-regional cooperation such as the 1971 ZOPFAN

Declaration, made the necessity of political cooperation more pronounced (Narine, 1998).

By the First ASEAN Summit in 1976, the formal acceptance of political cooperation by all five members was tendered. It created “the framework for ASEAN co-operation and

Reyes the conduct for inter-state relations” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1976) through the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Co-Operation or ASEAN TAC.

It is important to note the political developments of ASEAN because these, paired with historical considerations, have been strong determinants for ASEAN membership.

The five original states had shared the ambition of obtaining full membership of all of

South East Asia, a goal not reached until 1999 and still excluding East Timor. Brunei

Darussalam needed to first gain full independence from the United Kingdom in 1984, eventually joining ASEAN three years later after sufficient development. By 1995, the admittance of Vietnam into the organization was made more likely by the end of the Cold

War and thus easing tensions for rapprochement between states. Both Laos and Myanmar joined ASEAN by 1997, ascending from observer status after showing the willingness and capacity to obtain full membership. This included the acceptance of all past agreements made by the association up to that point, as well as a strong enough economy to join the Asian Free Trade Agreement. Cambodia joined as the tenth member in 1999 after receiving observer status in 1995. The primary considerations were the eventual end of the Khmer Rouge’s internal violence and brutality and the signing of the 1991 Paris

Peace Accords which ended the Cambodian-Vietnamese War, both which presented prospects for Southeast Asian instability. The enlargement of ASEAN was imminent, and the political considerations adapted to accommodate new members.

Rather than simply renewing previous political co-operation, summits have historically been largely characterized by incremental transformations in ASEAN’s political approach. However, the focus by members has always been to maintain ASEAN

Reyes as an international entity. Members have consistently been wary of submitting power and individual decision-making to the point of supra-nationalism. The fundamental principles of respect for state sovereignty, denouncement of use of force in dispute settlement, and nonintervention have created the ASEAN Way. Both consultation and consensus have been paramount in the conduct of its members during multilateral negotiations. The modus operandi of non-interference and conflict avoidance over conflict resolution were founding principles of ASEAN political arrangement that have persisted. The economic successes have allowed some observers to praise the organization as “a model” for other

Third World regional organizations (Blomqvist, 53). This is due to the fact that the organization allows for countries to focus on common interests rather than disputes while also respecting the individual states’ internal development.

Economic cooperation was also an early and modest purpose for the organization.

By the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992, individual member states were experiencing new levels of domestic development that had the capacity to transform their own countries and the sub-region more broadly. Being members of the developing world, low labor standards, cheap and accessible resources, and an abundance of untapped raw materials invited foreign investment. In fact, many attribute the development of the nineteen nineties, in part, to Japanese investment among other countries (Narine, 1998). A number of critics characterized foreign direct investments during this period as a continuance of foreign exploitation, promoting protectionist policies. However in hindsight, the investments created the economic, technological, and industrial infrastructure that has become highly useful in the present.

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Historically, ASEAN has been on a path of increased legitimacy and institutional ambition. While it is still distinct from European Union-style integration, the organization has evolved in its scope and purpose since 1967. One constant has been that members have always accepted the calculation that the benefits of being a member of ASEAN decisively outweigh the costs. Complaints by member states of excessive external commitments and national self-interests are mostly in the minority and these concerns have been masterfully quelled by ASEAN’s accommodating nature and loose institutionalization.

ASEAN in the Present and Challenges Ahead

The realist line of thought which argues that states become more self-interested when their capacity to shape the international system grows seems reasonable in many occasions and is relevant to Southeast Asian countries. The proliferation of wealth in

Southeast Asia has placed this argument in greater focus. Offensive realists such as John

Mearsheimer would suggest that there would be a positive correlation between wealth and military might (60), as economic expansion serves as a foundational tool for a strong defense. However, the defensive realist reply would put a limit to this expansion, in preference towards status quo preservation. Despite this disagreement, consistent with these suggestions Fareed Zakaria notes how a state’s “very aims, its perception of its needs and goals, all tended to expand with rising resources” (1999, 5).

A broad examination of Southeast Asia’s challenges demonstrates the validity of this reasoning. Singapore has been deemed as one of the four ‘Asian Tigers’ due to its highly developed economy, Indonesia is number sixteen in Global GDP (World Bank,

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2014), and together the ASEAN economies as a single unit would be the seventh-largest economy in the world. While realists would predict that this would embolden each member to test these newly developed capabilities at the world stage individually, present circumstance has been the opposite. Members still have accepted ASEAN as a necessary tool for foreign policy and relating to the world outside of Southeast Asia. They still favor speaking as one voice on the global level and disagreements between members are resolved effectively and expeditiously either bilaterally or multilaterally. This does not necessarily contradict the realist reasoning above, but rather goes beyond it. ASEAN states finds themselves with both growing wealth and expanding interests, with the pursuit of those interests occurring through the regional organization. This increasingly cooperative behavior by ASEAN states is better situated in neoliberal institutionalist theory. Scholars who favorably view the role international institutions generally accept the basic assumption “that states construct and shape institutions to advance their goals.”

(Koremenos et al., 762). Cooperation is not solely a product of external forces, but also a rational and self-conscious decision within and between states. They accept the rationalist appeals of realism, while going further by recognizing the vital role institutions in the world in the present.

Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have also expanded their institutional arms since early conception. The ASEAN Regional Forum was established in 1994 to increase security-specific dialogue with ASEAN and other Asian actors,

European Countries, and North American partners. Also, the ASEAN plus-three and the

Asia-Europe meeting have grown with ASEAN in leadership positions at the global level.

While membership has included all the major powers in Southeast Asia, both East Timor

Reyes and Papua New Guinea currently maintain observer status having made positive strides towards eventual membership.

While the organization has raced towards deeper cooperation and an enlargement of influence, there are common challenges that members have focused their gaze on collaboratively. One would be the scathing development gaps between nations. As members with high levels of development such as Singapore and Indonesia press forward, their growth is in stark contrast to the more moderate growth of Laos and

Cambodia. As all these nations have collectively experienced economic growth, the deepened wealth inequality within these states have accentuated the possibility for instability and anti-globalization sentiment among populaces.

In addition, security concerns have begun to gain more traction in Asia. For example, North Korea has been present at many of the annual ARF meetings due to

ASEAN’s shared worries with nuclear proliferation in the region. Also, many members have voiced their worries about a rising China that have begun territorial disputes in the

South China Sea since the nineties with several ASEAN members including Vietnam, the

Philippines, and Malaysia. Philippine President Benigno Aquino III likened the ordeal to

Nazi Germany’s expansionism in Western Europe, questioning: “If somebody said stop to Hitler at that point in time, or to Germany at that time, could we have avoided World

War Two?” (Takenaka, 2015). While most of the rhetoric is not nearly as extreme or animated, others generally express growing anxieties that need to be addressed sooner rather than later.

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Plan of the paper

The aforementioned South China Sea issue captures a wider complication that this work hopes to address. At that same event, Aquino further mentioned: "if there was a vacuum, if the United States, which is the superpower, says 'We are not interested', perhaps there is no brake to ambitions of other countries” (Takenaka). The purpose of this paper is to understand why the ten members of ASEAN have continued to cooperate with one another through ASEAN and why they seem to be increasing levels of cooperation now. In a world that is becoming more and more unpredictable and globalized, members have continued to rely on one another through ASEAN. The answer may lie in the power structures of the region

The plan of this paper is to systematically examine the relationship between

ASEAN’s regional cooperation and the relative power of the United States as a hegemon.

Most scholarship on this topic focuses on strictly theoretical debates, lacking data-driven empirical investigation. Regional cooperation as a dependent variable will be measured by a content analysis of ASEAN agreements per year, and how substantive those agreements were by looking at the official multilateral agreements they produced. The relative decline of the United States in global influence, as the independent variable, will be assessed by measuring American GDP as a percentage of global GDP. This will demonstrate the share of global economic power that the United States has in relation to other countries.

The relationship between the two variables will be expanded on through process- tracing of historical points in American relative decline in the Asia region within the interest of ASEAN and the leadership of its members. Although correlation between the

Reyes two variables does not equate to causation, the relationship between these indicators may suggest a powerful trend occurring within the region. The findings will then be placed within the appropriate theoretical frameworks for international relations to help explain and predict future behavior from regional organizations. The conclusion will provide policy implications for ASEAN and the United States, discuss the limitations of the research, and express the need for more scholarship on the topic.

Why it matters

More generally, this thesis project can create an insightful contribution to international relations theory. In examining the relationship of a regional organization against the trend of a hegemonic decline considers an uncommon perspective on institution building from one that is not commonly under scrutiny relative to others.

Examinations of regional organizations revolve around the assumption that the European

Union provides an ideal model for the rest of the world as one of the longest enduring regional organizations. Cameron (2010) suggests that aside from the EU, others “have all failed to achieve anything resembling the progress of the EU” and that “no other regional body is anywhere near the EU in terms of political or economic cooperation, let alone integration”. However, organizations in the developing world such as ASEAN, the South

Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the African Union, and the Union of South

American Nations, are challenging the infallibility of that ideal. More intellectual curiosity needs to be channeled towards non-EU regional organizations as they are becoming more prevalent and thus more interesting.

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Furthermore, while the ramifications of this can possibly extend to other hegemons in the future, it can provide perceptive and significant policy implications for the current global power under examination: the United States. More specifically, it can suggest valuable understandings of what role it should play in the Asia region. The research can produce a better placement of ASEAN within its global context. It can allow for a deeper focus towards the integral role of regional organization in the developing world, as more countries are transitioning away from deep poverty and becoming more meaningful stakeholders in the world system. The developing world is being transformed, and this has a continuously developing effect on the already developed world. While this

U.S.-ASEAN focus is highly specific, it is a contribution to this larger realization occurring in the present and beyond.

RELEVANT LITERATURE

This thesis project hopes to provide a systematic examination of ASEAN within the theoretical understandings of cooperative state behavior more broadly. Many have been puzzled by ASEAN since it was first created under unique circumstances with a diverse group of state actors. These understandings are becoming increasingly magnified given the growing role

ASEAN has in the world today. Some works have suggested that cooperation is best simplified as a tool in which the member states have used the organization to pursue individual interests. In reference to the growing economic influence of Southeast Asia, there is a strong preference for national development over forms of economic cooperation which would impede it (Soon, 1990).

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It is reasonable to suggest that while a hegemon may work as a guarantor for some state interests, it is difficult for any sort of preponderance of power to be exhaustive for others This argument, however, is incomplete in addressing other avenues of ASEAN cooperation, specifically security, in which the value of ASEAN has become greater than the sum of its parts.

Perhaps a more insightful way of understanding the cooperation within the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations is to place it within the broader context of the international structure.

Understanding the regional organization within the power structures of the region and globe is equally as complex and divided. Hegemonic studies are focused on the balance of power in the global structure when a single state’s preponderance of power has meaningful effects across the world. One of the most powerful trends in world politics has been American hegemony after the end of the Cold War. While the existence and persistence of it will be discussed in a later section, the role of this hegemony in conceptualizing Southeast Asian power dynamics is valuable in understanding the region’s growth of influence in the world. Less powerful states would not have the need to organize amongst one another because it is less costly for them to instead coalesce around a great power to fulfill the basic necessity of state survival (Liska, 1973). Whether hegemony is a favorable condition for the world or not represents the academic disagreement that exists as to how states behave under hegemonic conditions. In an assessment of Western interaction with ASEAN, Emerson’s considers that hegemony has been manifested best as a provider of stability within the multistate region. With the absence of any sort of hegemon within

Southeast Asia (i.e. Indonesia), he contends that the United States has been the dominant power present (13). However in contrast to this understanding, Sheldon Smith has attempted to situate the newer realization of American hegemonic decline within the region. He contends that

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Southeast Asian security in light of this decline is moving away from purist power politics towards “self-help and collaboration” (7) most notably through ASEAN.

However, characterizing ASEAN cooperation as a balancing act performance has its shortcomings as well. As Evelyn Goh (2007) notes, a rigid dichotomy between Southeast Asian regional strategies has emerged within international relations theory. The first is realist balancing, taking into account the realpolitik power calculations that countries are making either in favor of or against the United States’ role in the region. The second is liberal institutionalism which focuses on the possibility of ASEAN, and others institutions like it, as indicators of newly independent regional structures for changing global affairs. However as she notes neither of the two are “sufficient to account for the security thinking and practices in this region.” Realism’s explanation of small state behaviors are typically indeterminate, and dismisses cooperation with one another as products of balance of power calculation. This ignores the serious factors that states face in cooperation and in coping with changing power dynamics within a region.

While the liberal institutionalist approach would seem more appropriate in understanding

ASEAN as an international institution in it of itself, Goh notes that the indeterminacy is just as severe if not more (118). Keohane and Martin (1995) point out that the value of institutionalism at the most basic level is the ability to produce an anticipation of state relations, reduce transaction costs, enhance commitment credibility, and create points of coordination. While all of these are relevant in describing the purpose of ASEAN as a regional organization, they fail to address the sustained relationship and interaction that the organization and its members have with the United States and other external powers. Furthermore, while the result of collective security from international institutions is a valuable one, neither ASEAN nor states in the region have demonstrated the capacity or willingness to achieve this exclusively. Although they may

Reyes have become effective in this capacity in terms of internal stability as Buzan and Segal (1994) note, the same cannot be said of external challenges.

As a whole, they all provide a wide array of valuable insights. Their contributions of knowledge on ASEAN are diverse in approach and prescription, greater enhancing scholarship on the topic. However the shortcoming that much of the literature on ASEAN share, is that the relative power of the United States is unaccounted for. While the decline of American hegemony has been noted, understanding regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in its current state remains largely absent. The most concerning void in previous scholarship on this topic is the lack of empirical measurement in ASEAN cooperation. Most prior work acknowledges the theoretical discourse on regional organizations and then attempts to fit ASEAN into this discourse absent of data. This perhaps may be largely attributed to the fact that the politically oriented decision making in ASEAN is more akin to qualitative study. Despite this, a quantitative methodology can provide tangible and empirical support for these arguments. Bringing ASEAN cooperation to a more practical approach will provide an insightful understanding, which, as of now, resides primarily at the theoretical level. A quantitative approach may help remedy one of the most significant critiques of scholarship on the region: the incompatibility of Western theoretical approaches to Eastern institutions. As Kang notes “Asia is empirically rich and, in many ways, different from the West” (59). While, an area study runs the risk of producing orientalist research not generalizable outside the region, balancing these two is equally difficult as it is important.

This can be done by applying theoretical concepts with empirical thoroughness which takes into account meaningful definitions and paradigms from the region.

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THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY

In interpreting the Southeast Asian worldview, Donald Emerson describes American hegemony to be “the stability of a multistate system…enhanced by the participation of a member state so powerful that it can afford to be generous to its lesser partners” (7). In effect, this has given rise to a more stable world with an international system largely structured by the United

States since the end of the Cold War. However, the relative decline of the United States is one which interferes with this hegemonic structure and thus modifies the behavior of state actors who heavily depended on it. To better understand the effects of this hegemonic decline, it is first helpful to better develop what an international system ought to look like under American hegemony. Next, I will describe American hegemony to the current global environment and its subsequent decline. Finally, hegemonic decline will be discussed in order understand how it may affect the international structure.

Hegemonic stability theory has been valuable in understanding American leadership, as it proposes that American hegemony provides a stable international system in which prosperity and peace are best pursued. Specifically, the United States has been a historical oddity in that it has served as a remarkably benevolent hegemon (Norrloff, 2010). As Kindleberger (1973) describes, hegemonic stability is provided by a benevolent despot which serves as the provider of international order which functions as a sort of public good in economics. It is favorable in that the hegemon allows its manufactured and self-interested world view to be realized, and non- hegemonic states benefit by collectively accepting it and adapting to it. In the American experience, the creation of international free trade is a clear example (Snidal 581). That influence has spread dramatically in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the world has become

Reyes largely modernized and industrialized in the American sense. American interests have been supported most especially by American capability.

Despite enjoying this astonishing preponderance of power, many observers have noted that the great hegemon has met its breaking point. As Gilpin evaluates hegemonic stability, he notes that there comes a point in hegemonic growth where the costs of propagating the system so widely outweighs the benefits, with one of the indicators being the loss of economic and technological comparative advantage (156). While it is farfetched to suggested that we are on the precipice of hegemonic war, a deep redistribution of global power has led to heightened discord and uncertainty where “disequilibrium replaces equilibrium”(210).Understanding American decline in relative terms requires two separate perspectives. The internal dynamics and decision making of American foreign policy make up the first perspective. The arguments are founded on specific missteps that America has made as a global leader. While this viewpoint is an important one, it is out of the scope of this research project.

Despite this limitation, the second perspective which focuses on fundamental changes in the international power structure is just as valuable. That is, the rest of the world has changed dramatically and resulted in a spread of influence from one power, the United States, to several others. The context of American hegemony has evolved. America’s “uni-polar moment”

(Krauthammer, 1990) has passed on in the way it was originally conceived after the Cold War’s end. This is best illustrated by commentator Fareed Zakaria (2008) who has coined concept of

“the rise of the rest” (2008). While acknowledging that America in the twenty-first century is not the same as it was a decade earlier, the concept describes the America’s decline in global status as a relative one. Due to a variety of factors such as globalization, development, and global political awakening (Brzezinski, 2008), more and more states are becoming responsible global

Reyes players in their own right (Zakaria, 3). It is important to note that the United States still possesses a highly impressive global role politically and militarily head and shoulder above most.

However, as the global portfolio of issues has diversified, so have the strengths of other nations in factors such as education, finance, and industry.

The most alarming relative decline of the United States has existed in economic terms.

As Kishore Mahbubani argues “the relative material superiority the material West has enjoyed will gradually diminish…(and) in another key area: power” (102). Historically, the United States has enjoyed dominance over the global economy. The country has shaped the international system in many ways, through the establishment highly consequential institutions such as the

International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. Consequentially, the share of global gross domestic product has been disproportionate to a relatively small American population. In essence, compared to the rest of the world the United States has had a large piece of the pie with only a few eaters never experiencing the hunger others have. Many would assert that capturing the fast-paced economic changes should not come at the cost of political and military pre-eminence and coercive power. Acknowledging that, however, Zakaria notes

“American military power is the consequence, not cause, of American strength” (2008, 182).

Accepting American decline, in relative terms, hegemonic stability theorists would assume this decrease would lead to greater instability. In accordance with Gilpin’s logic, this decline would lead to returned anarchy and with it instability as states lose a hegemonic provider.

However, Snidal (1985) assesses that this traditional concept of hegemonic stability is far too limiting and only applies to specific conditions. The world has not fallen into great power warfare despite America’s relative fall. Applying the prisoner’s dilemma to non-hegemonic state decision making, he concludes that disorder as a result of hegemonic decline is not as likely

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Gilpin suggests. Rather, the rationality of actors may demonstrate “that cooperation not only can be sustained in the face of declining hegemony but may even be enhanced” (579). While hegemonic leadership is still important in creating structures for cooperation to begin with, once the framework is in place, cooperation can exist independent of hegemonic existence in the region. Understanding this specific iteration of hegemonic stability theory is important in relation to the Southeast Asia because in many ways American’s devolution as a hegemon decline has paved the way for the region to grow in what Mahbubani describes as “an enormous renaissance of Asian societies” (9). One of the microcosms of this renaissance is ASEAN, which he suggests

“has made a major contribution toward enabling the peaceful emergence of new Asian powers

(84). But before this, expanding on the nature of cooperation under the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations in necessary.

THE UNIQUE MODEL OF ASEAN COOPERATION

Cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been considered an anomaly by most international relations observers. With a fast changing and more uncertain global environment, however, it can be interpreted as a new and more efficient avenue in which

ASEAN members work to realize their interests. While the sources for cooperation are various, the nature of it is more homogenous. This can be best understood through three aspects found in the ASEAN Charter which have sustained themselves and the entity writ large as the scope of the organization has expanded (Narine, 80). The first is the low level of rules-based legalization within the organization, which have avoided obligation and legally binding commitments. The other two are founded on normative trends which have persisted. Expectations of consensus and consultation, specifically in light of other alternatives, has produced a level of equality with all

Reyes member states. The third principle of non-interference has worked to ensure that equality is practiced in the region despite the domestic condition. This all amounts to what is branded as the

‘ASEAN Way’ of organizational cooperation. It is keenly focused on the preservation, rather than the submission, of state sovereignty.

ASEAN’s avoidance of strong rules-based legalization within declarations, charters, and other formal agreements has been characterized by many as soft law. Abbott et al. (2000) recognizes soft law as being measured along three international legal dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Soft law would be low on all three of these dimensions. In terms of obligation, while states are expected normatively to follow through with certain agreements they are not legally committed to do so and are not severely penalized from this deviation. Precision largely refers to how rules dictate behavioral expectations, and ambiguity and vagueness generally characterize soft law. Delegation describes the entity with the autonomy to apply law to participating parties. A low level of delegation would lack a supranational third-party body with the capacity to see that laws are followed and enforced.

While this explanation of soft law may seem more valid in what it is not (hard law) than what it is, Abbot and Snidal (2000) assess that institutions which have adopted a soft law structure have done so deliberately. There are certain benefits for states to prefer informality, such as overcoming national obstacles on cooperation, producing close-ended timelines, and providing states with the ability to manage expectations and a flexibility for defection (Lipson,

1991). In fact, Shaun Narine (1998) acknowledges that the ASEAN way outright “rejects rigid, legalistic institutions, preferring informal mechanisms for governing their relations” (134).

Furthermore, the nearest body to enforcement in terms of delegation is the ASEAN Legal

Services and Agreements Directorate. However, enforcement modestly deals with multinational

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(Hsieh, 2013). There is no body of arbitration which monitors and enforces legal agreements.

As Hedley Bull (1977) points out, consultation and consensus are typically found in international organization during their beginnings. When charters and rules are being established during an organization’s formation, the behavior within institutions does not always reflect that consensus. An obvious example would be found within the United Nations. The general UN body was founded on a ‘one state, one vote’ principle which intended consensus to be produced through deliberation. However, the UN Security Council’s structure and historical behavior have deliberately functioned contradictory to this. The most obvious example being the fear and exercise of the veto power, primarily by UNSC permanent members.

This institutional limitation is not the case in ASEAN, which was founded on those principles and has maintained them over time. Henderson notes that since its conception

“decision making was based on consultation and consensus” (17). When creating policy through

ASEAN, nations are expected to consult one another, examine their domestic capabilities to follow through, and reach a level of consensus. While consensus does not equate to unanimity, it is important to note that it maintains an equality of states and prohibits one state, regardless of individual capacities, to influence the process unilaterally (Acharya, 1997). While this is directly an appraisal of procedural regularity, it also dictates the areas of cooperation that ASEAN engages in. In the pursuit of consensus, members of ASEAN are unlikely to confront issues that are divisive amongst themselves. Avoiding deeply conflicting interests among members at the institutional level and instead relegating them to bilateral resolution, in many ways, has fostered the survival of ASEAN and regional stability more generally (Narine, 220).

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Finally, the principle of non-interference has been one that has placed a significant restraint on the abilities of the organization to address meaningful challenges and crises faced by its members. In fact, critics of this principle have gone as far to say that it diminishes the very purpose of ASEAN to establish a stable Southeast-Asian order (Henderson). Limiting the capacity of one ASEAN state to intervene into the affairs of another seems to disable the conditions needed for cooperation in the first place. However it has persisted in ASEAN, and no great conflict between members has broken out since 1967. The fear of conflict between states was perhaps more meaningful than the fear of conflicts within them. It was placed within the foundational framework of the association in order to maintain state sovereignty amongst members.

This was largely a result of the founding members’ history with colonialism, imperialism, and subsequently external intervention in domestic state affairs. The weariness of that past challenged the institution to follow a principle it wanted the rest of the world to respect (Soon).

Preservation of internal affairs, decision making, and independence was crucial in defining this

ASEAN inward orientation and focus on “national resilience” (DeWitt, 70). Robin Ramcharan points out that despite this explicit assumption, states informally attempt to resolve tensions (60).

Human rights abuses in Myanmar and Cambodia are clear instances which have challenged this principle. However, they were met with very low levels of engagement and rhetoric from leadership, eventually accepting both countries as full members after these issues were resolved independently (68-69). It has allowed ASEAN in its present form to tolerate the diverse political, religious, ethnic, and economic identities of its members.

These three concepts, while not exhaustive, contributes to the broader notion of cooperation within the organization. It is best characterized as modest and not overly ambitious.

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It respects the fundamental rules and norms initiated early on. Although the international climate has surely changed, these have endured and adapted without being dismissed or significantly altered. Therefore, when attempting to understand ASEAN cooperation, indicators should not stray away from these conditions. Searching for signs of ASEAN transforming into a more authoritative body with more formalized and integrated characteristics is a more common way of understanding cooperation. Most international relation theorists contend that the more sovereignty states yield, the more meaningful the institution becomes. However, the theoretical literature and broader historical experience in South East Asia seems to disagree. Instead, more unassuming forms of cooperation within the aforementioned parameters seems to be more effective in Southeast Asia.

PERCEIVING AMERICAN HEGEMONIC DECLINE FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

The idea that levels of cooperation in an organization may increase in light of perceived hegemonic decline is founded on recognizing that state interests are dynamic (Gilpin).

Historically, most ASEAN countries were preoccupied with basic state provisions. Avoiding armed conflict, ensuring state security, and reaching modest levels of economic stability were necessary before any more progress could be made. Hegemons thrive when ensuring basic and constant provisions to other states in the system, such as the ones that the United States has traditionally supplied to developing countries in ASEAN. However as they have grown in modern times, their concerns have evolved as well. The ASEAN 2020 Vision updated in 2012 seems emboldened by the vast economic growth of the region stating:

“We resolve to build upon these achievements. Now as we approach the 21st century, thirty years after the birth of ASEAN, we gather to chart a vision for ASEAN on the basis of today’s realities and prospects in the decades leading to the Year 2020.”

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The document includes commentary on nuclear proliferation, preventive diplomacy, sustainability, trafficking, regional standards of living, environmental pollution, and other concepts which are outside of ASEAN’s original scope and purpose. Members can reasonably conclude that as their own capacities to pursue these ASEAN-inspired interests are increasing,

American omnipotence is no longer as necessary.

Even in basic provisions for statehood such as security, the United States’ grasp in the region has diminished. One of the most persistent issues that ASEAN members have faced largely independently has been in confronting Chinese assertiveness. Maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands are prime examples of this. The issue has seemingly escalated as the Philippines and others have asked an independent tribunal to invalidate Chinese claims (inquirer article). While the issue may be partially a result of inter-

ASEAN disagreement, the absence of American leadership on the issue is duly noted. Hegemony seems to not be as omnipresent as it was once considered. As Acharya (1992) notes, in a more uncertain world the security guarantees by hegemons are becoming increasingly devalued. Their faith in external guarantees, largely authored by the United States, has declined. Regional autonomy has become more favorable to hegemonic dependence.

Furthermore, the perception of American decline has factored into the Southeast Asian world view. A 2014 survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project studied the claim that the United

States has been replaced or will inevitably be replaced as the global superpower. Overall, in

2014 the aggregate attitude for countries surveyed supported the idea that China will replace the

U.S. as superpower was 50% in agreement versus 32% in disagreement. While Vietnam and the

Philippines maintain America as the present and future superpower by wide margins, Thailand,

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Malaysia, and Indonesia see China being the inevitable usurper of global hegemony.

Furthermore, the aggregate global attitude recognizing the United States as the leading economic power has declined from 49% in 2008 to 40% in 2014. Additionally, a 2014 Chatham House report (Wickett et. al) on Elite Perceptions of the United States abroad produced complimentary findings. The Asian elite analysis, which included two ASEAN members (Burma and Indonesia), found that the perceptions are formed largely by attention to choices in U.S. foreign policy and hard power. In Asia, they discovered that “the American declinist argument is far stronger (than in Europe)” which in part was “a phenomenon independent of China’s rise.”

These are all contributing factors to understanding how the interests of ASEAN have changed in response to the perception of American decline. It seems as though members can perhaps no longer rely solely on America as the guarantor of political and military security, in the same manner, they have historically. This may allow for the creation of new avenues for

Southeast Asian countries to pursue their strategic interests, namely through ASEAN. Therefore, in an international system with American hegemony perceived as in decline, the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations is likely to experience increased levels of cooperation.

METHODOLOGY

In hypothesizing that ASEAN cooperation increases with the decrease in American power, an examination comparing the two would first require examining measurements of each variable separately. The independent variable is the decline of American influence at the global level. Economic influence and economic power are used interchangeably when discussing the

United States. American power is being measured in economic terms because it is considered the causal factor behind American hegemony. This is in contrast to political and military power,

Reyes which can be relied on more heavily as consequential factors of America hegemony. A simple narrative of America’s experience in international relations finds that the United States grew to global prominence originally in isolation. Geographic distance from the great powers in Europe and hemispheric dominance allowed the American experience to be a fruitful and independent one. Heavy industrialization and development allowed for the United States to grow, in economic terms, rapidly. By 1916, that economic supremacy was realized globally during the

Great War. As Tooze notes “the Entente’s battle with the Central Powers…abruptly shifted the center of global financial leadership across the Atlantic” which in turn changed the identity and substance of global leadership entirely. (4) While the ongoing debate between international relations scholars on whether or not economic power translates to political power continues, this examination assumes it as fact.

With this in mind, American gross domestic product as a percentage total of the global output is being analyzed. Alone, gross domestic product, or GDP, is a reliable variable in measuring the economic output and capability of a country. GDP takes into account a nation’s production and spending power, being a reliable measurement for economists in assessing a country’s economic robustness. American GDP becomes more useful for this research as a percentage of Global GDP. Calculating this as a fraction of the total global GDP allows the analysis to be placed into a global context. This research is concerned with the role of the United

States globally. Therefore producing this variable creates insight as to the share of American economic influence with respect to all other countries, including ASEAN members. Data has been retrieved from the World Bank, an policy driven international organization that has been at the forefront of research and data collection on the global economy. Gross domestic product from the World Bank database is measured in real 2015 U.S. dollar values. While this measure

Reyes of production is not at all an exhaustive measure and has its own limitations, it is the best measure available for the purposes of this research.

The dependent variable of ASEAN cooperation is measured through the amount of

ASEAN agreements documented. While the nature of these agreements is out of the scope of this research paper, the amount of them is at the very least indicative of cooperation. Meeting with one another allows heightened interaction and demonstrates a willingness by these member states to shape their own interests within a regional and institutional mindset rather than an independent one. Agreements are a result of these meetings being successful ones. The impetus on agreements is best captured through neoliberal institutionalist Robert Keohane stating: “Strategic interaction, in a situation involving collective goods…can foster cooperation” (2005, 73).

Members of the regional organization engage with one another in a meaningful way, attempting not to concede power to the institution, but instead to insert their own interest with respect to their counterparts. Rather than going against their own interests, they search for mutual and shared interests. With that in mind, resulting agreements are what gives interactions between

ASEAN members a both substantive and strategic character.

Finding data on ASEAN agreements has been less successful due to the fact that the institution is largely under-examined in international relations scholarship. Data on the regional organization is scarce, relative to more studied international organizations such as the European

Union and the United Nations. Given this limitation, there were two specific sources which documented the organizational activities of ASEAN well. The first is the ASEAN official website’s “Legal Instruments” section. This covers the legal documents produced by ASEAN which hold specific obligations to signing parties that have been agreed upon based on consensus. It covers all documentation of this nature since the organization’s formation in 1967,

Reyes encompassing the three different “pillars” of ASEAN community: socio-cultural, political, and economic. The second source was the National University of Singapore’s Centre for

International Law website. The documents database was filtered to include all ASEAN-related documents. Both sources include all different forms of agreements coming from ASEAN including: declarations, agreements, protocols, arrangements, and charters. A content analysis comparing both data sources was done in order to delete any duplicates. While the first source specifically disregards statements and communiques from ASEAN, the NUS website’s database includes them as substantive indicators of ASEAN’s cooperative framework despite their non- obligatory nature. Both are combined to create a robust collection of cooperative agreements from the regional organization. They are particularly valuable because they derive from the primary source, ASEAN itself, and a secondary source from Singapore which has a strong community of scholars who have demonstrated a deep concentration on the topic. They are sensitive to the perspective of Southeast Asia, while having a meaningful notion of what cooperation is within ASEAN and what member states value as such.

Developing both these trends and comparing them to one another historically will bring the hypothesis regarding hegemonic stability and regional cooperation a more empirical character. The unit of analysis is the year, as both the amount of agreements and the U.S. share of global GDP will be measured. In controlling for a possible spurious relationship, the variable of regional terrorism is introduced as well as the Chinese share of global GDP. Both issues are relevant in Southeast Asia and may contribute to the behavior of ASEAN as an organization.

Data for regional terrorism was gathered from the RAND Corporation’s Database of Worldwide

Terrorism Incidents, or the RDWTI. The RDWTI includes all recorded incidents of terrorism around the globe, so the data was refined to specifically include terrorism in ASEAN countries:

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Singapore, the Philippines, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam. The frequencies of terrorism in Southeast Asia, per year, is measured.

Chinese GDP was collected from the same source as the independent variable, the World Bank pegged to the 2015 U.S. dollar value.

RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Figure 1 US Share as a Percent 50 40 30 20 10 0 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 US/ US/ World Total GDP as % Year

The aggregate data on the dependent, independent, and control variables are displayed in,

Table 1.1 Empty cells in the Rand Database on World Terrorism Incidents in 1967, 1968, and

2010-2014 are not well accounted for by the source, and it seems difficult to suggest that no incidents occurred in Southeast Asia from 2010-2014.

Therefore, it is assumed that they either have not or did not collect data for those years entirely. Despite this, there is still available data for the other three variables from 1967 to 2014.

______

1. All tables are located in the appendix section.

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For the amount of new ASEAN agreements graphed in Figure 2, the trend line suggests that there was a general increase over time as ASEAN aged. Figure 1, which shows the share of U.S.

GDP out of total World GDP, shows a general decrease in percent share over this period of time.

Therefore, the independent and dependent variables share a negative association: as new ASEAN agreements increased per year, U.S. GDP Share decreased.

Figure 2: ASEAN Cooperation 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 Year

Amount New of Agreements

To gain a more insightful understanding of this relationship between the independent and dependent variable, first, a simple linear regression was performed on the two variables. The statistical analysis shows that the relationship is a significant one. This is due to the 0.002 p- value being less than 0.05 and thus rejecting the null hypothesis However, the R-square value bolded in Table 2.1 is .200, meaning that 20.0% of the variance in ASEAN cooperation is explained through the independent variable of U.S. Gross Domestic Product share. In statistical terms, this suggests that only a small amount of the variance in the amount of ASEAN agreements can be explained by the decreasing American share of World GDP.

Furthermore, the control variables of regional terrorism incidents and Chinese GDP share of World GDP were introduced for a multivariate analysis summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

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Again, a linear regression was conducted now including the effects of the control variable. The

R-squared value is greater than from the bivariate analysis, as shown in Table 3.1 now being

0.583, indicating that 58.3 of the dependent variable can be explained with the two control and the independent variable. Most important to note is that through the introduction of the two other variables, the p-value is at 0.132, which is bolded in Table 3.2. This no longer meets the level of statistical significance that it did prior. Therefore, it can be concluded that the relationship is possibly a spurious one.

The null hypothesis between the dependent and independent variable suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between the amount of new ASEAN agreements and the US share of World GDP. Given the results of the multivariate analysis, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in a meaningful way. All statistical testing was performed through the IBM

SPSS Statistical Software Program.

CONCLUSION

It seems as though the hypothesis may not hold as much explanatory power as first thought. The idea that within an international system with a hegemon present, regional organizations are likely to increase levels of cooperation in response to perceived hegemonic decline seems not as powerful a relationship as originally perceived . Despite these findings, there are specific theoretical explanations that can be used to further grasp why this happened.

As aforementioned, international relations theory suggests that enhanced cooperation for

ASEAN is a result of an increasing willingness to expand the organization’s interests and mission. While the linkage between ASEAN cooperation and American hegemonic decline is not significant within this research design, the introduction of the other two variables for multivariate

Reyes analysis reveals the possibility of other issues factoring in. One of the persistent issues in

Southeast Asian regionalism has been security. While this was discussed in a previous section, as

Sino-ASEAN relations on territorial and maritime disputes have soured, the theoretical approaches to this was not.

Strategic hedging, as Jackson explains (333), is a method that states pursue in international relations to cope with uncertainty by “pursuing opposing or contradictory actions as a means of minimizing or mitigating downside risks associated with one or the action.” Given the perception of America’s relative decline, uncertainty in the region is rampant. By extension, hedging can be seen from ASEAN members who have concluded that American decline will perhaps be followed by a regional power transition in favor of China. As China is poised to grow its influence both globally and regionally, ASEAN seems to be desirous of hedging’s benefits which Ruland describes a “particularly apt to capture the less normative and more pragmatic behavior of many non-Western regional organizations including ASEAN” (84). As opposed to binding to one side, ASEAN members through ASEAN have avoided this and seem partial to remaining equidistant to both the United States and China. This is particularly important given that remaining nearer to the United States may not yield the same benefits it once did.

While understanding the Sino-ASEAN relationship is out of the scope of this paper, which has instead focused on the American perspective, more scholarship on Chinese influence on ASEAN cooperation is well warranted. Although strategic hedging was not a part of the theoretical appraisal earlier, it does play a powerful role in understanding American influence in the region. It seems as though, given that the United States has been perceived as less reliable than in previous years, American decline can contribute to the ASEAN preference for hedging.

Although both hedging and the results of the multivariate analysis suggest that interests have

Reyes expanded and diversified beyond American political and military guarantees, they both remain as factors into this larger picture. The other limitation exists in regards to using American GDP as a measure of hegemonic decline. While the limitations of the economic measuring power of gross domestic product are duly noted, the limitations facing the research at hand is in regards to its theoretical weaknesses. Despite the claim that American GDP is a helpful indicator of American decline, there are other areas where the United States has maintained dominance. Political positioning is unparalleled, military expenditure far outperforms the rest of the world (Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, 2014), American higher education is still coveted by international students and academics, and a great deal of multi-national corporations are

American created.

The research did face a number of limitations which may challenge the reliability of its findings. The first is simply the unavailability of data on ASEAN. Much of Western academia discusses the regional organization in theoretical terms; applying European and American authored theories to an Eastern phenomenon. There is little consensus on how to evaluate

ASEAN as an institution as well. This has made the search for data on ASEAN difficult. While there was a consorted effort to create a dataset that was robust and wide-reaching in line with

Southeast Asian understandings of cooperation, it may not be the most appropriate reflection organizational cooperation. The ambiguity and uniqueness of ASEAN’s institutional framework and behavior forged this a fundamental complication in the first place.

It would be ill-advised to ignore the role the United States has in Southeast Asia, notwithstanding the specific shortcomings of this research. The perception of American decline from the Southeast Asian viewpoint is deeply consequential. American foreign policy needs to adapt to this reality, rather than ignore it. It should work to embolden Southeast Asian partners

Reyes empowered to become more self-reliant and regionally involved. Under the Obama administration has made note of this with the announcement of America rebalance to Asia, or the

“Asia Pivot.” Former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon championed it as “a strategic win- win for the United States and Asian countries” (2015). However, due to an American inability to deal expediently with other international challenges elsewhere, there is a serious concern that the policy overpromises and under delivers. For example, the deep commitments in the Middle East and the War on Terror have continued to rear their ugly heads time and time again during the current administration, despite great effort to overcome them.

Policy towards Southeast Asia, in particular, needs to do more than observe and approve of the obvious economic growth that is propelling the region to global prominence. It should instead be as multidimensional as the ideas and interests which lie within ASEAN and its members. There needs to be a more coherent and decisive stance towards acts of Chinese assertiveness in the region. As the ASEAN agenda has grown into other institutions, such as the

ASEAN Regional Forum, the United States needs to be present and attentive at those new diplomatic conferences as well. In recognizing their value, ASEAN and its extensions can be used by the United States to voice their own concerns in the region and express support regarding challenges the ten members face. While the United States has had a general weariness towards becoming bogged down by institutions which produce legal obligations, it may be beneficial to notice that much of the impetus in ASEAN diplomatic behavior occurs absent legalization and obligation. This may prove them more attractive to the US than others.

Preservation of old alliances with nations such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore must also be signals of common support and an enduring American commitment to the region.

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Overall, the general intention of this research paper was to discover more about which factors influence the behavior of institutions in Southeast Asia. This is because the role of international institutions has grown tremendously over the last century, despite it being a relatively young concept compared to the traditional Westphalian system born in the seventeenth century. ASEAN is clearly not the only example of an international organization which has demonstrated an increase in global activity and influence. Although the research at hand was limited to only ASEAN as a regional organization, the insights can be used to understand the behavior of other organizations as well. What has been intriguing about ASEAN is that it was conceived in the developing world. As its members begin to reach enviable new heights in development, the role of the regional organizations seems to be as undeniable as ever. This may be a model for other developing nations to follow as the institution has been successful in producing stability between its member states since 1967 given the absence of armed conflict between them. As more and more states are considering the benefits of organizing and cooperating with one another, learning from the positive experience of ASEAN can promote institutional growth and success elsewhere. While many have criticized ASEAN for being a regional organization second to the European Union, it seems that this model for healthy relations and amity in Southeast Asia in reality may prove the opposite.

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APPENDIX

Table 1 Year Amount of US Share as a RDWTI China Share Agreements Percent as a Percent 1967 2 38.03876 3.180875 1968 0 38.574 2.864647 1969 4 37.90611 2 2.925703 1970 0 36.42466 7 3.098006 1971 0 35.79559 10 3.021217 1972 3 34.09506 4 2.981867 1973 3 31.16893 1 2.984145 1974 2 29.31055 2 2.692091 1975 1 28.70034 6 2.738684 1976 2 29.32689 5 2.368338 1977 10 28.81068 3 2.380446 1978 17 27.63649 4 1.740139 1979 4 26.56453 0 1.784901 1980 7 25.65872 5 1.699968 1981 6 28.04753 1 1.697807 1982 8 29.4822 0 1.794054 1983 6 31.3608 4 1.973553 1984 9 33.56576 2 2.143872 1985 6 34.33707 4 2.428935 1986 9 30.63718 6 1.994394 1987 8 28.56289 20 1.591413 1988 15 27.50589 15 1.627126 1989 4 28.22269 11 1.725763 1990 3 26.52086 36 1.592132 1991 2 26.08369 7 1.611543 1992 3 25.80525 12 1.676866 1993 11 26.68745 17 1.718228 1994 3 26.40577 10 2.031392 1995 7 25.02076 3 2.389856 1996 26 25.88805 13 2.751238 1997 12 27.59347 11 3.071255 1998 35 29.2446 29 3.298851

Reyes

Table 1 (continued) 1999 31 29.9709 29 3.379876 2000 15 30.9073 74 3.621989 2001 19 32.11072 122 4.027479 2002 17 31.94959 99 4.254839 2003 29 29.83137 30 4.275981 2004 26 28.24121 47 4.467419 2005 63 27.83902 75 4.823336 2006 41 27.18361 48 5.355514 2007 27 25.19944 62 6.132216 2008 63 23.3692 141 7.237578 2009 11 24.1501 1 8.474074 2010 88 22.85014 9.222373 2011 66 21.38273 10.3241 2012 28 21.82984 11.4282 2013 23 22.0273 12.4673 2014 5 22.36969 13.30457

Table 2.1 Model R R Square Adjusted Std. Error R Square of the Estimate 1 .447a .200 .182 17.7379

Table 2.2 Model Unstandardized Standardized t Sig. Coefficients Coefficients

B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) 76.234 17.960 4.245 .000

US Share as a -2.085 .621 -.447 -3.356 .002 Percent

Table 3.1 Model R R Square Adjusted Std. Error R Square of the Estimate 1 .764a .583 .549 10.2842

Reyes

Table 3.2 Model Unstandardized Standardized t Sig. Coefficients Coefficients

B Std. Error Beta 1 (Constant) 23.004 15.967 1.441 .158

US Share -.798 .518 -.169 -1.541 .132 as a Percent RDWTI .218 .059 .490 3.713 .001 China 2.990 1.278 .312 2.341 .025 Share as a Percent