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Russia Intelligence Has Written Time and Again

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Russia Intelligence Has Written Time and Again RIA58 28/06/07 15:19 Page 1 N°58 - June 28 2007 Published every two weeks / International Edition CONTENTS KREMLIN c P. 1-4 Politics & Government The New Temptation of the Balkans KREMLIN While the member countries of the European Union are managing – not without difficulty – to c The New Temptation reach agreement on a minimum content for the Constitutional Treaty, ratified by some countries of the Balkans and rejected by others, (France and the Netherlands) the energy strategy of the Kremlin and SUCCESSION Gazprom in Europe has again made significant progress. Even if these two subjects are not con- c Governors on the up nected (the functioning of the EU’s institutions on the one hand and its energy supply on the ALERT other), one can only be struck by the lack of cohesion of the major European countries with re- c Life presidency gard to the supply of natural gas over the next few years. The most symbolic example has just been for Ramzan Kadyrov? provided by the signature on 24 June of a memorandum between Gazprom and the Italian group PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE ENI to build a gas pipeline linking Russia and Bulgaria via the Black Sea and its extension to Aus- c Vladimir Putin ensures tria and Italy (See Page 5). If this project gets off the ground, Italy will therefore be directly linked his support to Russia via a fixed link, thus putting it into a similar position as Germany with the North Euro- ALERTS pean pipeline, the construction of which has already begun and which will link Russia and Ger- c When Sport and Politics many through the Baltic Sea. Gazprom is thus deploying its efforts over two converging axes: one go Hand in Hand going towards the north - not only to supply Germany but also Great Britain and the Netherlands and the other towards the south, supplying the Balkans, Italy, Austria and Hungary. c The Russian-speaking community in Good Hands In fact, it is now a race between Gazprom and the European Union concerning Russia’s control of gas supply to Europe. The Nabucco project, which will carry gas from Azerbaijan and even Iran P. 5-7 Business & Networks to Europe, avoiding Russia (and of which the new Italian-Russian gas pipeline is a direct competi- BALKANS AND SIBERIA tor), is enduring major delays in its implementation, is not yet assured of financing and is seeing c Gazprom achieves some of the countries involved- such as Austria and Hungary - undertaking separate talks with its line-Up Gazprom, as Russia Intelligence has written time and again. Russia is getting an obvious advan- INDUSTRY tage from the European Union’s internal wrangling on these questions while Turkey, which is be- c Sergey Chemezov’s coming an almost unavoidable passage for gas from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Russia, will triumphal march forward use this state of affairs in its negotiations with Brussels. c Vladimir Yukunin’s advisors Gazprom’s energy strategy is also at the service of the Kremlin’s diplomacy towards the Balkans. AEROSPACE During the summit of the Black Sea economic cooperation organization, an event about which lit- c Waiting for MAKS tle is reported but which nevertheless brings together Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine, an obviously proud Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was “back in the Balkans”. One does not have to go back P. 8 Regions & CIS to 1914 to certify that Moscow has always considered this region as its “back garden in Europe” URAL and the rowdy discussions presently underway with regard to the independence of Kosovo are proof c Oligarchs’ power push of this. Incidentally, this interest of course is not just about Serbia. Of interest are the increas- FAR EAST ingly close ties between Greece and Bulgaria (members of the European Union) and Russia – of c Sergey Borisenko, which the energy question is just one aspect. man of the moment Gradually, and behind Gazprom’s mantle, Russia is engaged in exploring the weakness of the European Union and its geographical and cultural disparities. This is a relatively novel approach SUBSCRIPTION and questions of energy supply provide the ideal pretext for this strategy. d Print Edition (23 issues, airmailed overseas) €770 TTC BEHIND THE SCENES The Web Pack (Print Edition As if fixed pipelines were not enough, Gazprom has just announced that discussions are underway with + PDF + archives acess) RosUkrEnergo – 50% controlled by the Russian energy giant alongside Ukrainian businessman Dmitry € 880 TTC Firtash and his associates – to enable the purchase of four billion m3 of Ukrainian gas to be resold on the The Premium spot market in west Europe. It is a question of gas stocked in Ukraine that could have originated in Russia or Subscription Turkmenistan. RosUkrEnergo, which holds the monopoly of Ukraine’s gas supply, purchased this gas at (Print Edition + PDF + access between $95 and $160 while the experts anticipate that spot prices will be in the order of $280 per 1,000m3 to all the website contents) before the end of the year. Gazprom therefore is selling gas to Ukraine and is going to buy it from itself in € 1200 TTC order to sell it again to Europe, meanwhile amassing profits all along the line. d www.russia-intelligence.fr RIA58 28/06/07 15:19 Page 2 RUSSIA INTELLIGENCE Politics & Government SUCCESSION c Governors on the up Since they are no longer members of the Council of the Fed- Zelenin decided to re-direct his career to politics. In autumn eration by right and, especially since they are no longer elected 2002, Mikhail Kassyanov, who at the time was prime minister, by direct suffrage, it is indisputable that governors have lost appointed him deputy-managing director of Goskomsport, the political influence at the national level. The quasi-monopoly State Committee for Sport and Physical Culture. In charge of in federal bodies of Saint Petersburg-based politicians has in- investment, he managed to obtain for the committee the right deed closed the door to the prospects of the elites of other re- to grant the permits necessary to operate casinos and other gions of the country. games establishments. Taking umbrage at his ambitious deputy, Vyacheslav Fetisov, the all-powerful Goskomsport boss, went It is nevertheless true that most governors – although for- in quest of new horizons. And this was to be Tver. The con- mally established in the “power vertical” established by the quest of the region was carried out in tandem with Oleg Lebe- Kremlin – to a large extent remain masters in their own re- dev, a young businessman and citizen of Tver who in the sum- gions. In particular, it is absolutely necessary for the increas- mer of 2003 won the city hall. In December, Dmitry Zelenin, ing number of foreign investors becoming established in the was elected governor with the support of United Russia, sev- Russian provinces to have a privileged relationship with them. eral of whose leaders, including Sergey Shoygu and Boris Gry- Vladimir Putin’s guide, Igor Shuvalov should not necessarily zlov, went in person to Tver. be taken at his word when he indicates that the next presi- dent could be a governor, but over the next few years some of Dmitry Zelenin’s trump cards are far from negligible. In ad- them – like Sergey Sobyanin, who went from Tyumen to head dition to a personal fortune, he has been able to strike close the presidential administration – will be called upon to exer- relationships with the region’s major industrial groupings. First cise important posts in Moscow. and foremost this concerns Transmashholding, whose man- aging director Dmitry Komisarov (see page 6) was for a long time director of a Tver production facility. Dmitry Zelenin also drew close to the Rosatom federal agency and its chief, Sergey Dmitry Zelenin: Moscow at the tip of his fingers. Kirienko. Since the victory of the Muscovite princes at end of the 14th century, Tver has lived These were logical choices as his region accommodates a in the shadow of the Russian capital. Its major nuclear power station. Dmitry Zelenin in addition boosts governor, Dmitry Zelenin, aged 44, in- his public relations side, every year welcoming participants to tends to make this proximity with Moscow the Valday Forum. A horse lover, he has also established a a trump card both for his region’s eco- “Governor’s Prize” race which takes place at the very select nomic development as well as for his own Zavidovo racecourse. Dmitry Zelenin recently undertook or political career. Elected chairman of the supported several initiatives of a kind that attract the good- Association of Russian Managers at the Dmitry Zelenin will of the Kremin. At the end of 2006, he launched a pilot end of 2003 with 57% of the vote and a (Tver) scheme seeking to reconvert former army officers as agricul- member of the United Russia national committee, he embod- tural managers. Dmitry Zelenin has also declared war on cor- ies the new generation of regional leaders that emerged from ruption, an announcement that coincided with massive accu- the world of business during the Yelstin era. sations both at the Tver City Hall and the regional council. As major manoeuvers have begun in the Kremlin with a view to Just after his graduation from the prestigious Moscow in- Valdimir Putin’s succession, various sources agree that Dmitry stitute of technical physics, in 1986 he joined the NIIAS com- Zelenin is backing Dmitry Medvedev, with whom he has a num- puter science research center, within which he established ber of affinities.
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