PAKISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE & PRACTICE IN SWAT (2007- 2015) By Shahid Ahmed Afridi DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN SESSION 2012-2013 DECLARATION I hereby affirm that this dissertation is the result of my individual research and that it has not been submitted to any other University for the award of a degree. January 2018 SHAHID AHMED AFRIDI DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR Peshawar ______2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS S. No Topic Page No. Abstract Acknowledgements Acronyms Glossary List of Tables and Maps CHAPTER – I INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Statement of the Problem 5 1.3 Objectives of the Study 6 1.4 Research Questions 6 1.5 Significance of the Study 6 1.6 Literature Review 7 1.7 Theoretical Framework: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (CI) 15 1.7.1 Insurgency 15 1.7.2 Relative Deprivation and True Believer Theories 17 1.7.3 Counterinsurgency 21 1.7.4 Galula’s Counterinsurgency Operational Model 27 1.8 Methodology 29 1.9 Chapterization 31 CHAPTER – II Counterinsurgency Models in South Asia and its Relevance to 32 Pakistan 2.1 Introduction 32 2.3.1 United States’ Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 33 2.3.2 Indian Counterinsurgency Model 37 2.3.3 The Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Approach 40 2.3.4 Analysis of South Asian Models 42 2.5 Conclusion 44 CHAPTER – III Swat: Demographic Profile & Historical Resistance Patterns 46 3.1 Introduction 46 3.2 Geographical Profile 48 3.3 Social Demography 49 3.4 Class Division and Land Ownership 49 3.4.1 Class Composition 49 3.4.2 Wesh System 51 3.4.2.3 Abolishment of Wesh System 52 3.5 History of Invasion and Resistance in Swat 53 3.5.1 Yousafzai’s Intrusion in Swat 54 3.5.2 Mughal Experience in Swat 55 3.5.3 Epoch of Swat Resistance –The British Experience 57 3.5.3.1 1897 Uprising in Swat 58 3.5.3.2 Causes of Uprising in 1897 59 3.5.3.3 Reasons for Failure in 1897 60 3.6 Genesis of Swat State- Post 1915 era 61 3.6.1 The Peasant Movements 63 3.7 Religious Dimension 65 3.8 Judicial Crises from Pre-Merger era until PATA Regulations 67 3.8.1 Complex Legal Regulations 68 3.8.2 Nifaz-e-Adl Regulations from 1994 until 1999 70 3.8.3 Nizam-e-Adl Regulations 2009 70 3.9 Conclusion 71 CHAPTER – IV Swat’s Insurgency Paradigm- Post 1989 74 4.1 Introduction 74 4.2 Part 1: From Afghan Jihad to 9/11 76 4.2.1 Era of Afghan Jihad 76 4.3 Sufi’s Black Turbaned Brigade 77 4.4 Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) Organizational 79 Structure 4.5 Sufi’s Theological Vision 81 4.6 Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and 82 Democracy 4.7 Sufi’s Support Base 84 4.8 Sufi’s Agitation Campaign 86 Part 2: Swat’s Insurgency in Post 9/11 Era 90 4.4 External Dimensions of Insurgency 90 4.5 Sufi Mohammad’s Downfall 92 4.6 Fazlullah’s Rise to Pre-eminence 93 4.7 Conflation of Fazlullah and Baitullah 97 Part 3: Fazlullah’s Strategic Design 99 4.8 Theological Narrative 99 4.9 Militant’s Psychological Operations 100 4.9.1 Propaganda and Indoctrination 102 4.9.2 Mode of Themes’ Transmission 105 4.10 Fazlullah’s Support Base 106 4.10.1 Grievances 106 4.10.2 Social Expansion: Radicalization 109 4.11 Coercion and Intimidation 109 4.12 Conclusion 111 CHAPTER – V Counterinsurgency: Peace Agreements and Rah-e-Haq 113 Operations 5.1 Introduction 113 5.2 State Patronage of Insurgency 114 5.4 Peace Agreements in Swat 118 5.4.1 The Peace Agreement 2007 118 5.4.2 The Peace Accord of 2008 120 5.5.3 The ‘Peace Deal’ of 2009 122 5.5.4 Ramifications of Peace Agreements 127 5.6 Law Enforcement Agencies response to the Insurgency 132 5.7 The Military Operation- Rah-e-Haq (First Battle of Swat) 136 5.8 Dialogue, Deterrence and Development 147 5.9 Conclusion 150 CHAPTER – VI Counterinsurgency: Military Operation Rah-e-Rast 153 6.1 Introduction 153 6.2 Pre -Operation Environment 154 6.3 The Military Operation Rah-e-Rast 155 6.3.1 Shaping the Environment 155 6.3.2 Strategic Framework- ‘Draining the pond’ 156 6.3.3 Operational design and Force Structure 161 6.3.4 Conduct of Operation Rah-e-Rast 163 6.4 From Conventional to Unconventional 168 6.4.1 Training for Rah-e-Rast 168 6.4.2 Post Rah-e-Rast Training 171 6.5 Aman Committees- Village Defense Committees and Lashkar 174 6.6 Afghan Sanctuaries and post 2010 Law and Order Situation 177 6.7 Analysis through Galula’s Operational Theory 178 6.8 Conclusion 188 CHAPTER - VII De-Radicalization as a Counterinsurgency Approach in Swat 190 7.1 Introduction 190 7.2 Institutionalized Radicalization in Pakistan 191 7.2.1 Deprivation Dimension 192 7.2.2 Religious/ Educational Dimension 194 7.3 De-radicalization 196 7.4 Modules of De-radicalization 198 7.5 Swat’s De-Radicalization Camps 200 7.5.1 Sabaoon 202 7.5.2 Mashal 211 7.5.3 Reintegration- Recidivism/Re-Engagement 213 7.6 National Counterterrorism Authority, National Internal Security 216 Policy and National Action Plan 7.6.1 De-radicalization of the Fourth Schedule 218 7.6.2 Countering Radicalization through Education 221 7.6.3 Radicalization and Madrassa Nexus 225 7.7 Conclusion 231 CHAPTER – VIII Conclusions 234 References 247 Appendix A 287 ABSTRACT The insurgency in Swat (2007 onwards) tested the ideological will of Pakistan and took a heavy toll of human life, both of civilian population and law enforcement personnel alike. The ranging course of hard way to peace in Swat is seen as natural consequence of the state’s failure in the form of bad governance, worsening social justice and deteriorating rule of law. The inability of government to devise a suitable legislation according to the needs of people led to the legal vacuum that was effectively exploited by reactionary forces. After the USSR’s eviction from Afghanistan, the Jihadists under Sufi Mohammad turned their attention towards Shariatization of Pakistan’s Swat region. In order to address the grievances of the people, the Nizam-e-Adl Regulations was imposed in 1994 and then, with some amendments, in 1999 but it failed being cosmetic in nature. The study attempts to explore the rise of insurgency in Swat in post 9/11 and Pakistan Counterinsurgency campaign which included both the kinetic operations (military approach) and non-kinetic operations (peace agreements, psychological and de-radicalization operations). The outcomes of this thesis reveal that Sharia’s cause may not have been a main driver of conflict in Swat, but the underdeveloped and outlandish judicial system and ineffective governance certainly led to the rise of Sufi Mohammad and Fazlullah as political force in the region. Taking advantage of the situation, the lower class such as peasants and tenants being socially and economically deprived joined the insurgency. Moreover, the peace agreements of 2007 and 2008 brought forth detrimental consequences, nonetheless, the 2009 peace deal in the form of Nizam-e-Adl Regulations was meaningful in nature, since it exposed the true face of militants before the people that their demand for Sharia enforcement was just an excuse to gain power. As far Pakistan Army was concerned, it was more inclined to remain a conventional Army capable of meeting any threat from India rather than to be seen as a counterinsurgency force. Military operations such as Rah-e-Haq I, II and III which were conducted from 2007 until 2009 failed due to various factors such as President Musharraf’s double standards, weak internal security policies, feeble political will, General Kayani’s indecisive military approach and lack of military training for Counterinsurgency operations. From tactical perspective, the major shortcoming of Rah-e-Haq I, II, III was military’s inability to launch successful ground operation inside Peochar valley. The findings of this thesis suggest that post April 2009 era, Pakistan military transformed its strategic culture from conventional into Counterinsurgency warfare as evident from various indicators: Massive training for guerilla operations, small mobile units operating within the population centers; settlement of the millions of displaced population, mobilization of community security through village defense committees, Lashkar and Aman committees. Over and above, Pakistan Military conducted the most challenging non-kinetic aspects of counterinsurgency; the de-radicalization. In Swat, Sabaoon is first de-radicalization center in the world for the children who had been plagued with extremists’ ideology, including those who were trained to become suicide bombers. In a nutshell, the research deconstructs Pakistan’s approach of countering the insurgency by probing both its military response as well as civilian response in the broader framework of integrated counterinsurgency approach. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The accomplishment of this thesis would not have been possible without the continuous support of various individuals and institutions and they all deserve a note of appreciation. I am especially grateful to my supervisor, Assistant Professor Dr. Shahida Aman under whose direction, supervision and guidance, this thesis brought forth itself in a comprehensive shape. My Professors in the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, have been invaluable in their support and assistance, especially Professor Dr Ijaz Khan and Professor Dr Nasreen Ghufran. There were friends who supported me a great deal during the course of my field research such as Major Nadir, Professor Dr Sultan-e-Rome, Mr Raziq Afridi, Shirin Zada and Naik Clerk Arif.