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The Innate Insurgent Advantage Can Training and Planning Bridge the Gap?

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The Innate Insurgent Advantage Can Training and Planning Bridge the Gap? AIR UNIVERSITY AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE The Innate Insurgent Advantage Can Training and Planning Bridge the Gap? GARY W. BOYD Department of the Air Force Civilian Wright Flyer Paper No. 57 Air University Press Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Project Editor Published by Air University Press in January 2016 Ernest Allan Rockwell, PhD Copy Editor Tammi K. Dacus Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations L. Susan Fair Composition and Prepress Production Nedra O. Looney Print Preparation and Distribution Diane Clark AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE AIR UNIVERSITY PRESS Director and Publisher Allen G. Peck Editor in Chief Oreste M. Johnson Managing Editor Ernest Allan Rockwell, PhD Design and Production Manager Cheryl King Air University Press 155 N. Twining St., Bldg. 693 Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6026 [email protected]/ http://aupress.au.af.mil http://afri.au.af.mil/ Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Command and Staff College, the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. This Wright Flyer Paper and others in the series are AFRI available electronically at the AU Press website: Air Force Research Institute http://aupress.au.af.mil/ ii Contents Foreword v About the Author vii Abstract ix Casualties and Chaos 1 Analysis of Change Impact 11 Examining the Data 20 Conclusion 23 Abbreviations 33 Bibliography 35 iii Foreword It is my great pleasure to present another issue of The Wright Flyer Papers. Through thisseries, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) presents a sampling of exemplary research produced by our residence and distance- learning students. This series has long showcased the kindof visionary thinking that drove the aspirations and activities of the earliest aviation pioneers. This year’s selection of essays admirably extends that tradition. As the series title indicates, these papers aim to present cutting-edge, ac- tionable knowledge—research that addresses some of the most complex security and defense challenges facing us today. Recently, The Wright Flyer Papers transitioned to an exclusively elec- tronic publication format. It is our hope that our migration from print editions to an electronic-only format will fireeven greater intellectual debate among Airmen and fellow members of the profession of arms as the series reaches a growing global audience. By publishing these papers via the Air University Press website, ACSC hopes not only to reach more readers but also to support Air Force–wide efforts to conserve resources. In this spirit, we invite you to peruse past and current issues of The Wright Flyer Papersat http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/papers_all .asp?cat=wright. Thank you for supporting The Wright Flyer Papers and our efforts to disseminate outstanding ACSC student research for the benefit of our Air Force and war fighters everywhere. We trust that what follows will stimulate thinking, invite debate, and further encourage today ’s air, space, and cyber war fighters in their continuing search for innovative and improved ways to defend our nation and way of life. THOMAS H. DEALE Brigadier General, USAF Commandant v About the Author I was assigned as senior historian to the Combined Air Operations Center in Saudi Arabia during the early phase of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As such I witnessed the operation unfold from the com- bined forces air component commander historical perspective. While there was a generalized sense of accomplishment by the end of Operation Anaconda in March 2002, there was also a sense of frustration with re- gard to joint planning and the US Air Force’s (USAF) role in Afghanistan; special operations forces dominated all aspects of the campaign. The USAF had not even been included within the execution plans for Opera- tion Anaconda until almost too late. Airlift and support for OEF had been brokered on-the-fly with the expectation that OEF was but a transi- tory battle in a new war on terror. By June 2002, US Central Command told Airmen to prepare for a “rolling start” on a whole new chapter, the invasion of Iraq in what would become Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). I returned to home station in July 2002 and had less than a year before I deployed again—this time to US European Command (USEUCOM) in April 2003 as historian for the vanguard of USAF units assigned to the Phase IV rebuilding of post-invasion Iraq. I never made it to Iraq, as the security situation and insurgency evolved into generalized instability, and instead I set about capturing data for USEUCOM’s support of OIF from Stuttgart, Germany. The overarching feeling within the command at that time was one of confusion. The planning, training, doctrine, and equipment of that era had been designed for massive force-on-force con- flicts, and not much thought had been given to training Airmen for ex- tended missions in post-war environments; nation building was es- chewed. The strategic lapses embodied by the Beirut barracks bombing in 1983 and the Somalia relief crisis a decade later reinforced a message that the mistakes made in those events were not readiness-related so much as they were fool’s errands to have sent forces there in the first place. Rather than patch the deficits in the asymmetrical side of doctrine and training, military members continued as before, training for large fights while neglecting insurgencies in the main. The ability-to-survive- and-operate training and gear were focused on a generalized war involv- ing chemical weapons and large forces. It took years for training and equipment to catch up with the realities of modern insurgencies. Even after the end of the large occupation in Iraq, there remained a significant argument regarding whether or not the surge in Iraq “worked.” The argu- ment permeated not only military scholarship but also military-friendly research centers. The question of what caused the shift in fortunes in Iraq is one of the key questions of modern military scholarship. My central vii discovery in examining the issue is that there were many fortuitous changes that took place in consonance with the surge of troop levels in Iraq in 2007. Many positive shifts in American fortunes in OIF and later OEF were facilitated by having enough boots on the ground and on-de- mand logistics and airpower to help secure critical cities and towns. The fact that the surge’s utility is debated is a positive argument of its rele- vance, because success breeds many authors and failure is an orphan. The surge in troops was helpful—but not alone decisive. The surge provided space so that training, equipment, doctrinal, and planning enhancements could have maximum impact. The surge and these enhancements coex- isted, and ultimately each part remained an important cohesive part of the whole picture. viii Abstract This study examines the role of training, planning, and technological changes in helping turn around coalition and American efforts in Opera- tion Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United States rushed headlong into protracted stabilization, security, transition, and rebuilding (SSTR) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the wealth of historical, doctrinal, and experiential knowledge available to help mitigate casualties and restore security in such opera- tions, the United States and its coalition partners failed to adequately plan, train, or equip their individual forces until years after the start of the conflict. The objective of this research was to determine if training, planning, doctrine, and concomitant technological advances helped turn the tide in OIF and later OEF as the United States and its forces institutionalized new doctrines and embraced the lessons of history. The United States and its coalition partners made great strides in reversing what had been vir- tual lost causes and reshaping planning, training, strategy, and tactics to affect meaningful successes and gradual withdrawal throughout the re- gion. This brief study examines the methods, training, and decisions that helped make moderate successes possible after particularly dark days from 2004 through 2006. The evidence suggests that dedicated planning and training were in- deed decisive in bridging the advantages enjoyed by insurgents fighting in their homeland with ample outside and local support—even if a little late to the need in the concentrations required for moderate success. It is hoped this paper will contribute to a permanent knowledge storehouse on effective end-state operations after so high a price was paid for the knowledge by this generation of warriors. The author retains copies of all documents used to compile this work. ix Casualties and Chaos A study of the American military tradition was warranted with regard to insurgencies. Indeed, insurgency was a near constant in the American way of war. America’s War of Independence was an insurgency with rela- tively low casualties—4,435 killed in action during eight years, with roughly five times as many wounded. In the two Seminole Wars, which were true counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, the United States suf- fered more than 1,500 killed in action among its regular troops, plus at least an equal number among the state militia, against a much smaller and more confined enemy. Later planners largely viewed those wars as disastrous. Much of the nineteenth century saw the United States in COIN operations against Native Americans and enclaves of insurgents prior to and during the Civil War. The United States showed a definite military facility against insurgencies during its early history but used ruthless and near-genocidal tactics to achieve local superiority, destroy- ing whole villages and hunting areas while employing crude, but effec- tive, biological agents such as smallpox blankets in a barely restrained onslaught against native peoples.1 In the modern era, the Vietnam War represented the critical litmus test for American COIN operations prior to the start of Operations En- during Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
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