From NDU Press Issue 61, 2d Quarter 2011

PRISM❖ Vol. 2, no. 2 03/2011 PRISM A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM JFQ PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011) offers the most content ever, including the following Feature articles: Professor Mary Kaldor on “human security” in complex operations; Ambassador Nancy Soderberg on enhancing U.S. support for UN peacekeeping; Colonel Eric Jorgensen on the “Interagency”; Dr. Vol. 2, no. 2 ❖ James Orton and Dr. Christopher Lamb on interagency national security teams; Admiral James

03/2011 Stavridis on the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan; Rear Admiral Brian Losey on conflict prevention in East Africa; Dr. Roger Myerson on state-building; Major General (Ret.) Michael Smith www.ndu.edu A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS and Rebecca Shrimpton on an Australian perspective of nation-building; Major Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson on changing CERP practices; and General Norton Schwartz on airpower in counterinsurgency and stability operations. From the Field articles include Dr. James Schear, Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, and Frank DiGiovanni on ministerial advisors; and David Becker and Robert Grossman-Vermaas on measuring Haiti stabilization. Operational Cyber Lessons Learned articles include Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell on civil-military operations in Kenya and Lieutenant General Ranier Glatz on a German perspective of ISAF. Finally, there is an interview with General William Ward on U.S. Africa Command.

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in Expeditionary Economics order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. CENTER FOR Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range COMPLEX OPERATIONS of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be between An Islamic Way of War? DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to [email protected]. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Last Call for Entries for the 2011 Secretary of Defense National Security Strategy Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Defense and Military Strategy Essay Competition Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) When: Colleges are responsible for running their own student? Imagine your winning essay in the pages of a internal competitions to select nominees and must meet future issue of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, imagine these deadlines:

a chance to catch the ear of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an important April 27, 2011: Colleges submit nominated essays to national security issue. Recognition by peers and mon- NDU Press for first-round judging etary prizes await the winners. May 17–18, 2011: Final-round judging and selection of winners Who’s Eligible: Students at JPME colleges, schools, and other educational programs. Students must submit essay entries through their respective colleges. For complete information on the competitions, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay in one (or more) categories. http://www.ndu.edu/press/essayCompetitions.html ISSUE si x ty - one , 2 d quarter 2011

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC

Joint Force Quarterly Inside NEW Issue 61, 2d Quarter 2011 from NDU Press

Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Now available in e-book format! Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 2 From the Chairman Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz Letters to the Editor Strategy and U.S. Southern Command Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. 6 Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Forum by James G. Stavridis Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick Tara J. Parekh Executive Summary Visual Design Editor 8 Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, reflects on his tenure as Commander of United Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A Ten Propositions Regarding Cyberspace Operations States Southern Command. Upon taking command, Admiral Stavridis discarded Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich 10 By Brett T. Williams the customary military model and created an innovative organization designed not Design Amy Ellis, John Mitrione, Jessica Reynolds, solely to subdue adversaries, but to build durable partnerships with friends. From U.S. Government Printing Office 18 Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense his unique perspective as commander, Stavridis uses his engagingly personal style By Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow to describe his vision for the Americas. Printed in St. Louis, Missouri by Digital Gunnery: It’s About Time 24 Partnership for the Americas is available in an e-book format. This new format makes By John A. Macdonald and Martin K. Schlacter the book readable not only on desktop and laptop computers, but also on Apple’s 27 Principles of (Information?) War iPad, Sony’s Reader, the Barnes & Noble Nook, and Android-based phones. NDU Press is the National Defense University’s By Francis Hsu cross-component, professional military and Find it online at: academic publishing house. It publishes books, Special Feature http://www.ndu.edu/press/stavridis.html journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and special reports on national Institutionalizing Economic Analysis in the U.S. Military: security strategy, defense policy, interagency 32 cooperation, national military strategy, regional The Basis for Preventive Defense By Carl J. Schramm Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays lutEs Toward a Theory of security affairs, and global strategic problems. and hays 39 Expeditionary Business in the 21st Century Spacepower Toward of a Theory this volume is a product of the efforts of the institute for national strategic edited by Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays, with Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, This is the official U.S. Department of Defense By Robert E. Love and Steve R. Geary studies spacepower theory Project team, which was tasked by the Selected Essays department of defense to create a theoretical framework for examining edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this spacepower and its relationship to the achievement of national objectives. and M. Elaine Bunn the team was charged with considering the space domain in a broad and Savings and the Defense Logistics Enterprise holistic way, incorporating a wide range of perspectives from u.s. and EditE d by CharlE s d . l utE s and PE t E r l . h a y s journal may not be reproduced or extracted without 43 international space actors engaged in scientific, commercial, intelligence, with VinCEnt a . Manzo, l isa M. y a M briC k, and M. ElainE b unn and military enterprises.

permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint By C.V. Christianson

Spacepower This volume is a product of the Institute for National Strategic Studies Spacepower this collection of papers commissioned by the team serves as a starting Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever point for continued discourse on ways to extend, modify, refine, and integrate a broad range of viewpoints about human-initiated space Theory Project Team, which was tasked by the Department of Defense to cre- material is quoted from or based on its content. activity, its relationship to our globalized society, and its economic, political, Commentary and security interactions. it will equip practitioners, scholars, students, and citizens with the historical background and conceptual framework ate a theoretical framework for examining spacepower and its relationship to the to navigate through and assess the challenges and opportunities of an Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management increasingly complex space environment. achievement of national objectives. The team considered the space domain in a 47 Edited by Charles d. lutes and Peter l. hays with Vincent a. Manzo, lisa M. yambrick, and M. Elaine bunn, with contributions from: COMMUNICATIONS By William E. Ward broad and holistic way, incorporating a wide range of perspectives from U.S. and henry F. Cooper, Jr. Michael katz-hyman scott Pace Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Everett C. dolman Michael krepon robert l. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. international space actors engaged in scientific, commercial, intelligence, and Martin E.b. France benjamin s. lambeth Jerry Jon sellers Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more A Smarter Force for Less Time and Money Colin s. Gray roger d. launius John b. sheldon 53 henry r. hertzfeld John M. logsdon harold r. winton military enterprises. This collection of essays serves as a starting point for contin- on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of theresa hitchens Michael E. o’hanlon simon P. worden By Stephen D. Pomper ued discourse on ways to extend, modify, refine, and integrate a broad range of JFQ articles, and access to many other useful viewpoints about human-initiated space activity, its relationship to our globalized NDU Press publications. Constructive com- Building Credible Voices: Traditional Communication in Afghanistan ments and contributions are important to us. 56 society, and its economic, political, and security interactions. The volume should By Robert M. Hill Institute for National Strategic Studies Please direct editorial communications to the National Defense University help to equip practitioners, scholars, students, and citizens with the historical back- link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: The Future of National Security, By the Numbers ground and a conceptual framework to navigate through and assess the challenges Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 64 National Defense University Press By P.W. Singer and opportunities of an increasingly complex space environment. 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Features Washington, DC 20319 Transformation Achieved? Revisiting the 1997 National Defense Panel Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 72 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 By Ricardo A. Marquez Email: [email protected] Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu 81 An Islamic Way of War? By Adam Oler ndupress.ndu.edu Why Unmanned By Paul Scharre 2d Quarter, April 2011 89 ISSN 1070-0692 Features PUBLISHER ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Building 94 President, NDU Partner Capacity: Enhancing Interagency Collaboration VADM Ann E. Rondeau, USN By Sharif Calfee, Joseph Lee, Peter Crandall, and Young Rock An Advisory Committee 100 Preventing War in the Middle East: A Role for NATO? Maj Gen Joseph D. Brown IV, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces By Kenneth Weisbrode Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC The Joint Staff LTG Robert L. Caslen, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Recall LtGen George J. Flynn, USMC USMC Combat Development Command VADM William E. Gortney, USN The Joint Staff 103 Decisiveness in War By Phillip S. Meilinger Maj Gen Robert C. Kane, USAF Air War College RADM Douglas J. McAneny National War College Book Reviews John A. Nagl Center for a New American Security Maj Gen Robert B. Neller, USMC Marine Corps War College The Gulf Wars and the United States VADM Daniel T. Oliver, USN (Ret.) Naval Postgraduate School 109 LtGen John M. Paxton, Jr., USMC The Joint Staff Reviewed by Stephen A. Bourque Brig Gen Anthony J. Rock, Jr., USAF Air Command and Staff College Brig Gen Marvin T. Smoot, USAF Joint Forces Staff College 110 Deciphering the Rising Sun ADM James G. Stavridis, USN U.S. European Command Reviewed by Robert J. Hanyok RADM James P. Wisecup, USN Naval War College 111 Better Safe than Sorry Editorial Board Reviewed by Francesco N. Moro Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies War Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University 112 COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Reviewed by James P. Terry Col Mark J. Conversino, USAF (Ret.) Air War College Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University 113 Death by Moderation Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses Reviewed by David M. Oaks Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Joint Doctrine Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College CAPT John F. Kirby, USN The Joint Staff Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Education and Doctrine Division 114 Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation By George E. Katsos Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Col Mark Pizzo USMC (Ret.) National War College 115 Defining Asymmetric Warfare: A Losing Proposition James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense By Jesse G. Chace LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) CONTRIBUTIONS Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. From NDU Press issue 61, 2d Quarter 2011 About the covers

PRISM❖ Vol. 2, no. 2 03/2011 PRISM Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM JFQ PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011) offers the most content ever, including the following Feature articles:

Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Professor Mary Kaldor on “human security” in complex operations; Ambassador Nancy Soderberg on enhancing U.S. support for UN peacekeeping; Colonel Eric Jorgensen on the “Interagency”; Dr. Vol. 2, no. 2 ❖ James Orton and Dr. Christopher Lamb on interagency national security teams; Admiral James

03/2011 Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal Stavridis on the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan; Rear Admiral Brian Losey on conflict Table of contents (left to right): MQ–1 Predator crewmembers prevention in East Africa; Dr. Roger Myerson on state-building; Major General (Ret.) Michael Smith www.ndu.edu A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS and Rebecca Shrimpton on an Australian perspective of nation-building; Major Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson on changing CERP practices; and General Norton Schwartz on airpower in designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and counterinsurgency and stability operations. From the Field articles include Dr. James Schear, Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, and Frank DiGiovanni on ministerial advisors; and David Becker and Robert Grossman-Vermaas on measuring Haiti stabilization. Operational Cyber Lessons Learned articles include Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell on civil-military operations in Kenya and Lieutenant General Ranier inspect sensor (U.S. Air Force/Larry E. Reid, Jr.); Sailors and Afghan Glatz on a German perspective of ISAF. Finally, there is an interview with General William Ward on U.S. Africa Command. other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in Expeditionary Economics order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; CENTER FOR Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range COMPLEX OPERATIONS An Islamic Way of War? contractors build helicopter landing pads at Forward Operating of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be between DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to [email protected]. and developments in training and joint professional military JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Last Call for Entries for the Base Khilaguy, Afghanistan (U.S. Navy/Michael B. Watkins); Navy education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to 2011 Secretary of Defense National Security Strategy Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Defense and Military meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. Strategy Essay Competition demonstrates autonomous unmanned surface vehicle (U.S. Navy/ Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) When: Colleges are responsible for running their own student? Imagine your winning essay in the pages of a internal competitions to select nominees and must meet future issue of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, imagine these deadlines:

a chance to catch the ear of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an important April 27, 2011: Colleges submit nominated essays to national security issue. Recognition by peers and mon- NDU Press for first-round judging Joshua Adam Nuzzo); and team unloads CH–53E on flight line (Fleet etary prizes await the winners. May 17–18, 2011: Final-round judging and selection of winners Who’s Eligible: Students at JPME colleges, schools, and other educational programs. Students must submit essay entries through their respective colleges. For complete information on the competitions, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay Readiness Center–East/Dykie Whitfield). in one (or more) categories. http://www.ndu.edu/press/essayCompetitions.html The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ISSUE SI x

TY expressed or implied within are those of the - ONE , 2 d QUARTER 2011 contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Joint Force Quarterly Federal Government. ndupress.ndu.edu From the Chairman

Leadership and the 2011 National Military Strategy

Chairman reviews area of operations with Marine at Camp Hanson, Helmand Province, Afghanistan

U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)

2 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu he Nation is at a strategic inflec- tion point and must continue to adjust to a redistribution of power T in the international order. The United States and its allies and partners will find themselves competing for influence in an environment in which persistent tension is the norm. We—the joint force—seek to prevent this tension from escalating into conflict. Troyer) U.S. Marine Corps (Matthew P. Above all, however, we must remain capable of fighting and winning the Nation’s wars. Earlier this year, I published The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership. In consultation with the combat- ant commanders and Joint Chiefs of Staff, I prepared this document to articulate the ways and means by which the joint force will advance the Nation’s enduring interests and support its strategic objectives.

Marines with IED detector dog patrol in Kajaki, Afghanistan the emerging security environment demands that we pursue wider and more as the military capabilities we provide. As much as ever, there is a profound need constructive partnerships Second, the emerging security environment and desire for America’s continued military demands that we pursue wider and more leadership. At the same time, changes in the constructive partnerships—public and global environment suggest that we must rede- Guided by the National Security Strat- private, bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral. fine how we lead. Leadership is about more egy and Quadrennial Defense Review, the And third, we must adapt full-spectrum than power; it is about our approach to exercis- U.S. military strategy advances three broad joint force capabilities and attributes to the ing power. Our strategy calls for employing themes. First, in defending and advancing emerging threat environment to ensure a spectrum of leadership roles—facilitator, the Nation’s interests, the joint force leader- that we can continue to deter and defeat enabler, convener, and guarantor—sometimes ship approach will often be as important aggression. simultaneously. And in all these roles, we will emphasize mutual responsibility and respect. In many ways, this has been the key to our success over the last 9 years of sustained combat operations. In Iraq, for example, the military supported whole-of-nation efforts to

Soldiers support Iraqi army during cordon and search outside Joint Security Station Basra Operations Command

U.S. Army (Joshua E. Powell)

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 3 U.S. Air Force (Brian Ferguson) U.S. Air Force

F–22 Raptor drops back from KC–135 after refueling

create conditions for a sustainable and stable when our interests or those of our allies and tics. Cyber and space, which are simultane- political environment. In turn, we are creat- partners are threatened. ously enabling and warfighting domains, ing an unprecedented partnership to enable While this strategy is informed by insti- deserve special attention to ensure that we Iraq’s fledgling security forces to partner tutional lessons and constraints from nearly can operate effectively. in combating extremism and contribute a decade of conflict, it also focuses on areas Finally, we must reconcile U.S. national to greater security in the Middle East. Our of forward and innovative thinking. First, we interests with the emerging strategic environ- approach is similar in Afghanistan, and we must embrace our role in developing a strategic, ment to help inform global force posture are starting to see progress there. whole-of-nation approach to combating violent decisions. The National Military Strategy extremism. Second, we must provide deter- points to an increased geographic emphasis rence against a full spectrum of threats—strate- on Asia, delineates the capabilities required leadership is about more gic, conventional, and 21st-century threats such to succeed in this theater, and argues that we than power; it is about our as cyber aggression and violent extremism. need to leverage expanded and more effective approach to exercising power Third, we must employ a compre- hensive approach to defeating aggression. Since warfighting domains are becoming we must embrace our role As an institution with profound conven- increasingly interdependent, assured access in developing a strategic, ing power, from the halls of our war colleges for the joint force to the global commons will whole-of-nation approach to to the largest multinational exercises in the remain critical to defeating aggression and combating violent extremism world, our values, relationships, and military countering emerging antiaccess and area- capabilities are bringing others together to denial strategies. In turn, the joint force must help deepen security relationships and address develop new capabilities to fight through relationships to enhance regional stability. It is common security challenges. Lastly, our degraded domain environments and place my hope that these topics will inspire new and unmatched core military capabilities to deter increased emphasis on our enabling capabili- creative thinking that will fill the pages of this and defeat acts of aggression allow us to act ties—from cyber and space, to intelligence, journal and others in the months and years as a guarantor that can underwrite security surveillance, and reconnaissance, and logis- ahead. The need is certainly there.

4 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu The key to implementing this strategy Our mission set has evolved, but our will remain, as it has in the past, our people core objectives have not. The National Mili- NEW and their families. The all-volunteer force tary Strategy provides a road map for the way from NDU Press will remain the military’s greatest strategic the military will deter, fight, and win the for the asset. We must continue to recruit, train, Nation’s wars in a dynamic and uncertain Africa Center for Strategic Studies grow, and nurture leaders who can truly world. If the past is prologue, there will be out-think and out-innovate our adversaries challenges in this century that we have yet while gaining the trust, understanding, and to imagine, but I am confident that they will cooperation of an expanding set be met by the leadership, partnership, and of partners. creativity of the men and women of the U.S. military. This strategy aims to provide them a way ahead that is every bit as good as they are, the all-volunteer force will and I encourage every leader to read it, discuss remain the military’s it, debate it, and if needed, refine it. greatest strategic asset I look forward to hearing from all of you as we implement this strategy together. JFQ

The Africa Security Briefs series presents In addition, we must think about our research and analysis by Africa Center civil-military continuum more broadly to for Strategic Studies (ACSS) experts and ensure that we are not only retaining the MICHAEL G. MULLEN outside scholars with the aim of advancing highest quality joint force possible, but also understanding of African security issues. Admiral, U.S. Navy setting the conditions for our veterans’ success Published for ACSS by National Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they make the difficult transitions from University Press, each issue is produced in war to back home and then eventually to English, French, and Portuguese editions civilian life. Successful veterans are power- (Portuguese edition available only online). ful advocates in our communities for the military and critical enablers to sustaining the Africa Security Brief 11 all-volunteer force through the inspirational West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: model of their example. Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy

Africa Security Brief 10 Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges U.S. Navy (Ja’lon A. Rhinehart)

Forging Partnerships for Africa’s Future The Africa Center offers a variety of resources that keep readers abreast of the Africa-related news and research published on this site. http://africacenter.org/

To subscribe to Africa Center’s Daily Media Review and/or Africa Security Briefs, go to http://africacenter.org/subscribe/, enter email address, check the box next to the name of the newsletter(s) desired, and click the “Submit” button.

Sailors and Coastguardsmen stop skiff suspected of participating in pirate activity in Gulf of Aden Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 5 LETTERS

To the Editor— I was confused by part of Kilcullen are proposing is arguably already in Act of 1998. The Office of Management and Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen’s article place and has been for some considerable time. Budget (OMB) in Circular A–76 provides “An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understand- I agree with the authors that the nature specific guidance for competitive sourcing. ing the Difference Between COIN and Coun- of the entire discussion has been woeful, but In the United States, there is a huge emphasis terinsurgency” (JFQ 60, 1st Quarter 2011). The I would add that this has been somewhat on contracting, including in conflict zones, authors “propose that a theory of war based obvious for the past 7 years, and many people and I see few indications that the reliance on on who is using violence against us makes have remarked on it. To that end, I cannot contractors will diminish during the current much more sense today than theories based on see how an “actor-centric theory of war” in administration. The emphasis on contracting, putative generational changes in warfare or the any way advances us past the point where we including national security and defense, is asymmetry of combatants” (p. 15). have been for some time, even if it were an ingrained in American political culture and First, this seems to be a theory of warfare original idea. The same level of debate is likely supported in extensive legislation. and not war, a distinction I think we can all to continue regardless of a supposedly new The emphasis on improving or reform- agree is critical. It certainly was to Carl von taxonomy of warfare. ing the bad aspects that Dr. Hammes identifies Clausewitz. I further observe that what is being The problem with the debate as a whole has come mainly from Congress, which has proposed is not theory but rather taxonomy. I is the lack of any intellectual rigor, which leads conducted extensive hearings on private con- again submit that the distinction is critical. some to think that irregular warfare is defined tracting, directed the Government Account- Moreover, are not “actor-centric” taxono- by something other than one of the partici- ability Office (GAO) to investigate all aspects mies the norm in describing warfare? Irregular pants. I do agree that “war is war” (“and not of contracting, created the Special Inspector warfare is warfare conducted by or against popularity seeking,” to complete the passage), General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in irregulars. There is no really useful or defin- which I think most of us would have attrib- 2003 and the Special Inspector General for able “irregular” or even “guerrilla” style of uted to William Tecumseh Sherman, rather Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in warfare, despite what some may claim. Guer- than Carlos Ospina. 2008, and provided guidance in the National rilla warfare is that conducted by guerrillas, a Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year word that has its origin in the Spanish diminu- —William F. Owen 2008 to the Department of Defense regard- tive of war—thus, small war. The popular and Tel Aviv ing “contractors performing private security useful description small wars refers to warfare functions in areas of combat operations.” conducted by “irregulars.” Indeed, this was the Although Dr. Hammes notes the existence of definition that C.E. Callwell, author of Small To the Editor—I am pleased to see JFQ the Commission on Wartime Contracting, Wars, used. Insurgencies are, after all, conflicts publish an article on private contractors (T.X. which was created by Congress in 2008, he conducted by insurgents. I submit that this is Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict neither acknowledges the role of Congress common, enduring, and useful. Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic nor cites SIGIR or SIGAR, although both have Thus, when the authors state that Impact,” JFQ 60, 1st Quarter 2011). Having Web sites rich in reports and audits. Virtually “irregular warfare is, therefore, more regular recently completed a book manuscript on the all of the bad aspects identified in the article or conventional than our strategic lenses topic of private security contractors (Patriots have been extensively documented in GAO, would propose” (p. 17), they completely miss for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. SIGIR, and SIGAR reports and audits. The fact both the original and the useful meaning of National Security [Stanford University Press, that serious reform has yet to be implemented the term irregular warfare. Frequency is not forthcoming]), I am not optimistic that Dr. is not due to a lack of information, but rather a qualifier and never has been. At the risk Hammes’s recommendations for reform could to political and bureaucratic realities. of pushing this to an absurd degree, I would be implemented or, if they were, that they Two of these realities must be noted even go so far as to point out that “armored would make much difference in remedying if only to put some perspective on the dif- warfare” is that conducted by armored forces. the many bad aspects he accurately identifies ficulty of implementing reforms. First, private All in all, I am struggling to think of any arising from the U.S. Government’s use of contractors, including private security con- useful description of warfare “based on puta- contractors in conflict zones. tractors, constitute a profit-making industry. tive generational changes in warfare or the When Dr. Hammes writes about the Thus, while Dr. Hammes apparently puts asymmetry of combatants” that is in common “[George W. Bush] administration’s faith in some faith in the Commission on Wartime use. The descriptions that employed “fourth the efficiency and effectiveness of private busi- Contracting to reform “inherently govern- generation” and “asymmetry” were never ness compared to governmental organization” mental functions,” congressional guidance widely used and are very much in an extreme (p. 27), an uninformed reader might think he to OMB to define “inherently governmental minority. AirLand Battle was never a descrip- is suggesting that the use of contractors began functions” by October 2009 did not result tion of warfare; it was an operational concept with that administration. In fact, the emphasis in much. The interim definition by OMB or doctrine associated with Field Manual on contracting goes back at least to the Presi- on March 31, 2010, is still vague enough to 100–5, Operations, during the 1980s. dency of Ronald Reagan and took on extra allow private security contractors to engage in For some years, many writers, and momentum during the 8 years of the Clinton what most objective outsiders would consider notably Professor Colin Gray, have been using administration. inherently governmental functions. the enduring description of regular and irreg- Federal contracting policy is governed Second, contractors in conflict zones ular warfare based on the actors involved— by the Federal Acquisition Regulation and will only be under control and effective if thus, my contention that what Gorka and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform there are U.S. Government employees, in

6 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu uniform or not, in sufficient numbers with Fact: KC–135Es have never been predicted to adequate training and guidance to oversee be more structurally viable than KC–135Rs, NEW them. Dr. Hammes acknowledges this point, and all the KC–135Es were retired by 2009. from NDU Press which is extensively documented in the An example of missing information for the Gansler Report (“Urgent Reform Required: includes a spring 2001 Air Force letter to Con- Institute for National Strategic Studies Army Expeditionary Contracting,” Report gress requesting an analysis of alternatives of the Commission on Army Acquisition (AoA) for a KC–135 replacement—Congress and Program Management in Expeditionary did not approve. Had the Air Force conducted Strategic Forum 265 Operations, October 31, 2007). From what I an AoA in 2001 or after the fiscal year 2002 Finland, Sweden, and can determine by meeting with faculty and appropriations bill, the tanker imbroglio most NATO: From “Virtual” students in the Contracting Management likely would not have emerged. Additionally, curriculum here at the Naval Postgraduate it seems incredible that Colonel Hollister only to Formal Allies? School, the Services are slow to respond. And casually mentioned Senator John McCain, the Leo Michel examines the pos- the temptations to leave the Services and join driving force behind most of the tanker inves- sibility of Finland and Sweden industry, with its higher salaries and fewer tigations; when Senator McCain was men- formally joining NATO. Since bureaucratic headaches, are hard to resist. tioned, it was only related to the “split buy” the early 1990s, the two countries have trans- Based on my research with secondary issue that is peripheral to the overall saga. formed their security policies and defense structures literature and government documents that Several critical issues missed were Senator in ways that improve their ability to work closely finally entailed six 1-week-long research trips McCain’s concern of how the congressional with America. Both favor close cooperation with to Washington, DC, I am not at all confident appropriations process usurped the defense the Alliance, despite their official stance of “military that we will soon see any significant improve- authorizing committees’ authority, and the non-alignment.” The author discusses the pros and ment in the stark picture that Hammes so cost-benefit analysis of the lease—illustrating cons of possible accession, noting that Finland is accurately describes. a very bad deal for taxpayers. The author addressed two defense better positioned politically than Sweden to seek —Thomas C. Bruneau industry practices: front-loading and politi- membership. He advises NATO to be patient, to stay Distinguished Professor of cal engineering. What he missed, however, the course chartered by its Strategic Concept, and to National Security Affairs were Air Force recommendations during the demonstrate solidarity and effectiveness—thereby Naval Postgraduate School 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review to modify remaining the essential force for Euro-Atlantic commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) aircraft as stability and security that has attracted countries to tankers (a significant change in acquisition join its ranks. To the Editor—Lieutenant Colonel Eric A. strategy) largely from the commercial indus- Hollister’s article, “Ike Warned Us About This: trial base that would substantially mitigate Strategic Forum 264 The MICC Stranglehold on Responsible Pro- concerns of front-loading and political engi- European Energy curement” (JFQ 59, 4th Quarter 2010), portrays neering (with significant savings). Addition- Security: Reducing a rather misleading and incomplete analysis ally, modified COTS aircraft move us closer to of widespread open source information, while the Packard Commission Acquisition Reform Volatility of Ukraine- missing key studies that a thorough literature (1986) recommendations: “fly-before-you-buy” Russia Gas Pricing review would have uncovered. The article has acquisition instead of building from “rivet one” Disputes critical errors and leaves out vital information. with multiple billions of research and develop- Despite recent agreements Additionally, it conveys a one-sided critique of ment dollars before anything flies or is tested. between Russia and Ukraine over major weapons system acquisitions, focusing Building from rivet one is an acquisition strat- natural gas pricing, the basic issues that caused a gas almost exclusively on Air Force programs. As a egy that fosters much more front-loading and shutoff in 2009 remain unresolved. Why should the result, his analysis largely reflects an emotional political engineering pathologies. United States be concerned about the annual gas- and parochial view. An objective review of the The topics covered by Colonel Hollister pricing brinkmanship played by the two countries? military-industrial-congressional complex are extremely important and worthy of thor- Richard B. Andres and Michael Kofman explain why, (MICC) literature leaves no Service, and no ough and comprehensive study. Tragically, the noting that when such talks break down, our Euro- part of the MICC, unscathed from acquisition need for and importance of tankers are even scandals or major criticism. more critical to national security than the pean allies suffer; and, equally important, the prob- The author should have interviewed author conveyed—especially in light of recent lem’s resolution will have important implications for several knowledgeable tanker, acquisition, emerging threats. The uncertainty surround- power politics in the region. As Russia positions itself or congressional experts to verify and ing the service life of KC–135s (and problems for a takeover of Ukrainian pipeline infrastructure, critically analyze his information. Also, with the KC–10s), the associated cost growth the authors urge the European Union to consider a he should have looked beyond the easy and availability of tankers of the future, and serious investment in Ukraine to prevent complete open source information. That lack of due the time to recapitalize these aircraft drive Russian control over its energy security. diligence could lead readers to a number of unacceptable strategic risk that is exacerbated erroneous conclusions. For example, there by extended efforts to identify its replacement. is a clear misunderstanding of the different tanker models: “Repeated studies . . . have —Dr. Carl D. Rehberg determined that KC–135Es were ‘structur- (Colonel, USAF, Ret.) ally viable until 2040,’ and the KC–135R Chief, Air Force Long Range Plans Visit the NDU Press Web site variants could be flown until 2030” (p. 91). (2004–2008) for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 7 Executive Summary

s an Airman, I have long report on the successful achievement of a to national security and regional objectives. heeded the words of Giulio decades-long effort to achieve fully inte- Lieutenant Colonel Steven Pomper suggests Douhet on anticipating the grated, combined digital exercises. As has changing public law to allow Reserve Officer changes in war, even in the been the case in every new area of warfare, Training Corps Cadets and Midshipmen to A figuring out how it fit into existing concepts, take part in 5-year advanced degree programs, battle of everyday life. Each of us has experi- enced the impact of a dramatic moment and doctrine, and operations required a great which would provide a superior quality of often wondered why we did so little to antici- deal of prevailing thought to be “rethunk.” junior officer to the Services. In recommend- pate it and then turned to thoughts of what Toward this end, we add Francis Hsu’s very ing traditional communication, a local culture- we could have done. A series of such events challenging thinker’s article that asks you to based means of sending strategic messages, is unfolding in the Middle East as this issue consider just where cyber fits into our view Dr. Robert Hill leverages his recent experience goes to press. While we cannot quite make of the principles of war. in Afghanistan, where he served as a public out how the strategic landscape will evolve, Long a part of any strategic consid- affairs officer and advisor to the International we all will make adjustments in how to think erations in dealing with the aftermath of Security Assistance Force Deputy Chief of and operate in the new reality that emerges. conflict, economics is too often left for others Staff for Communication. Dr. Hill believes This is what Douhet had in mind. Toward to sort out when military planners look at using a local population’s normal means of that end, this issue of Joint Force Quarterly future operations. Warfighters normally are passing messages seems an obvious method focuses on two topics that will figure promi- not business school graduates, but as our but was one that had not been well used prior nently in that future strategic landscape: experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have to his tour. As the final Commentary article cyber and economics. played out, creating markets in a war zone has tees up some interesting views on the need In the Forum, thinking about cyber become a part of the Provincial Reconstruc- for serious adjustments in the Federal budget, takes center stage. Major General Brett Wil- tion Team or infantry company commander’s liams, a career Air Force fighter pilot who task list. This shift in military operations has recently completed a tour as U.S. Pacific given rise to discussion of “Expeditionary Command’s communications director, leads Economics,” and our Special Feature section off with an interesting and important update adds to the conversation on this emerging to Colonel Phil Meilinger’s 10 Propositions theme. Carl Schramm calls for the military Regarding Air Power, with the general’s to institutionalize economic analysis as an insights on how to operationalize cyber for essential process to better prepare the Nation the joint fight. Independently from the Gen- for success in future operations. Operational- eral’s work, three well-known cyber experts, izing business engagement on the ground in Professors Robert Miller and Dan Kuehl of a conflict area is the theme of Robert Love National Defense University’s (NDU’s) iCol- and Steven Geary’s article. On the support lege and Dr. Irving Lachow of MITRE offer side of the military, Lieutenant General 10 requirements the Nation must accomplish C.V. Christianson suggests a framework of to prepare to defend and, if necessary, go improvements to our approach to the Defense on the offense in a cyber war. Given the Logistics Enterprise, including education for constant requirement for readiness and vigi- logistics professionals. lance of our combined force on the Korean In Commentary, authors explore a range Peninsula, Major General John MacDonald, of ideas. Reflecting on his experiences as the Assistant Chief of Staff, C3/J3, United first commander of U.S. Africa Command, Nations Command/Combined Forces General Kip Ward offers recommenda- Command (CFC)/United States Forces tions for revamping Foreign Area Officer Wikipedia Korea (USFK), and Lieutenant Colonel management policies in all Services to better General Giulio Douhet, the Father of Airpower, Martin Schlacter, Chief of Combined Data serve individual officers’ career paths while advocated strategic bombing and military Network Operations for CFC and USFK, significantly improving their contributions superiority of air forces

8 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu ELIASON U.S. Air Force (Adrian Cadiz) U.S. Air Force

Airman tears down panels used to mark landing zone for C−130 at Forward Operating Base Lagman, Afghanistan

Dr. Peter Singer takes us through his review features Dr. Phil Meilinger’s latest work on is power and JFQ has knowledge that you of the “new math” confronting the Defense military decisionmaking in war. The issue is believe is worth passing on, take up the chal- Department and the Government. Given the rounded out with four excellent book reviews lenge to pass it on. I am absolutely convinced continuing global economic situation, Dr. and a challenge to efforts to doctrinally define the key strength of our modern military is our Singer underscores the need to make realistic asymmetric warfare, along with the Joint willingness to learn and adapt. JFQ should be assessments of what should be done balanced Doctrine Update. a part of that process. Finally, I seek the same with what can be done. On a more personal note, the reality of type of honest and well-considered feedback The Features section delivers on the stepping up to a new challenge as the Editor that I expected in the classroom, the mission Chairman’s tasking to me to seek out good of JFQ requires a different kind of strategic debrief, or on the line. Whether you are in writing and thinking from Professional Mili- foresight, planning the content of forthcoming uniform or not, have served in combat or not, tary Education students. The first article, an issues at least 3 months in advance. Whether we will provide you with a platform for open individual effort from National War College in print or online, JFQ continues to gain and informed debate on the issues related to student Lieutenant Colonel Adam Oler, offers readers each month, which keeps the NDU the Joint Force. an important historical view, if one counter to Press team focused on producing a quality Found something you liked (or some- popular opinion, of the relationship of Islam product. As Editor, I need three things from thing you didn’t) or have a valuable contribu- to war. The second student paper is an excel- our readers to make sure we succeed. First, tion to make? By all means, connect with us lent group project from four Joint Forces Staff I look forward to a constant stream of high- at [email protected], and together we can better College students with a new take on enhanc- quality contributions from every corner of prepare ourselves to anticipate the changes in ing interagency partnership in three impor- the joint force that will serve to engage and the world ahead. JFQ tant precrisis missions. Other selections look educate our readers. If your contribution —William T. Eliason back at the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review passes this simple test, then I will work hard Editor as it plays out today; discuss the requirement to find room for you to be published. Second, for unmanned military vehicles of all kinds; I need you to pass the word to your “battle and take a new view of how the North Atlantic buddies,” no matter where you are. If you Treaty Organization can be used to keep the can access the Internet or a mailbox, you can peace in the Middle East. The Recall section receive JFQ and send it to others. If knowledge ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 9 Soldier checks functionality of GPS units for Afghan National Police training U.S. Air Force (Jason Smith) U.S. Air Force

10 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Ten Propositions Regarding Cyberspace Operations

By Brett T. Williams

In trying to defend everything, he defended nothing.

—Frederick the Great

have been the Director for Command, needs of the joint force commander (JFC), it similar way, the following 10 cyber proposi- Control, Communications, and Com- is obvious that treating cyber like space is a tions are intended to stimulate debate and puters (J6) at U.S. Pacific Command for mistake. This thinking produces a global discussion concerning command and control almost 2 years. I came into this position command and control model that is accept- of cyberspace operations.1 I able for peacetime “enterprise” efficiency but with 28 years of warfighting experience as a A note on terms. Domain refers to the fighter pilot and operational commander. The is suboptimal for wartime. Global control five warfighting domains of land, maritime, commander charged me with “operational- does not provide the integration, responsive- air, space, and cyber. Physical domains are izing” the J6. I have focused most of my effort ness, and agility necessary for cyberspace the four that exist in the physical world, and on cyberspace operations and have been chal- operations at the theater level. the virtual domain is cyberspace. Terrestrial lenged by the general unwillingness to apply domains are land, maritime, and air. accepted concepts of operational art to the 1. Cyberspace is a warfighting domain. cyber domain. The Prussian’s axiom in the if the discussion is focused At the operational level of war, cyberspace epigraph on defense is a perfect example. In at the operational level of operations are most similar to those in land, cyberspace, we attempt to defend everything. war, we find that cyberspace maritime, and air. We attempt to protect the entire Department operations are actually quite In 2008, DOD defined cyberspace as a of Defense (DOD) Global Information Grid similar to those in other warfighting domain. This declaration was (GIG) against thousands of intrusion attempts domains an acknowledgment of cyberspace’s critical every day. While there are many successes, role in national security. A prevailing argu- we tolerate the fact that even a single failure ment is that as a domain, cyber is unique and could have significant impact. We need to stop This article acknowledges the global therefore requires an entirely new warfighting trying to defend everything and instead find nature of the virtual domain, but argues for approach. Cyber is indeed unique, but it is not ways to compartmentalize risk and prioritize equal emphasis at the regional level. The any “more unique” than land, maritime, air, efforts against those components of cyberspace challenge is making the cognitive connec- and space. Each of the four physical domains most critical for operational warfighting. tion between the virtual and physical worlds. has distinctive characteristics that require Our approach to cyberspace operations Warfighters who have already made that con- application of specialized doctrine, policy, must change. Currently, the focus is primarily nection understand that cyber operations at resourcing, and expertise for mission success. global with secondary regard for the specific the operational level of war are actually quite In this regard, cyberspace is no different. priorities of combatant commanders. Cyber similar to air, land, and maritime operations. Cyber appears to be “more unique” due to the “experts” argue for the global approach This article explains that connection and complex technology that defines the domain because they see a direct analogy between the allows us to apply the time-tested maxims compounded by our inability to understand cyber domain and space. As I consider the of Frederick the Great and other warriors to a virtual environment. In fact, cyberspace is ever-increasing scale, scope, and tempo of cyberspace operations. hard to understand, but if the discussion is cyber activity compared to the warfighting In 1995, Phillip Meilinger published a focused at the operational level of war, we find short book entitled 10 Propositions Regard- that cyberspace operations are actually quite Major General Brett T. Williams, USAF, is Director, ing Airpower, in which he offered 10 simple similar to those in other domains. Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, statements, each describing a characteristic In Analogies at War, Yuen Foong Khong Plans, and Requirements, Headquarters U.S. of airpower. A short, persuasive narrative argues there are compelling cognitive reasons Air Force. He previously served as the Director, provided context to each proposition. The 10 for using analogies to aid in comprehension. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer propositions affected how we taught, thought The danger is that the analogy process is Systems, U.S. Pacific Command. about, and developed airpower doctrine. In a subject to systematic biases that may lead ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 11 FORUM | Ten Propositions to simplistic and mistaken interpretations. cyberspace to provide the JFC with the ability Cyberspace is a manmade domain, and with Selecting the best comparison and using a to make decisions, direct actions, and manage existing technology cyberspace can be altered sound analytic framework can help overcome risk in cyber. This dynamic will never exist for so commanders can choose from a variety of C2 these pitfalls. Many in the defense com- space operations. options tailored to the mission objectives and munity find space an effective analogy for Given just this short list of similarities, forces assigned. cyber because both have a global dimension. it is clear that starting from scratch is not In an effort to capitalize on proven At the operational level of war, however, the required. We should apply existing capstone operational tenets, we should consider global nature of the two domains is the only, doctrinal tenets regarding strategy, opera- applying existing C2 models to cyberspace and arguably the least important, similarity, tional art, and C2 relationships to cyberspace operations. The goal is to provide the JFC as there are technical solutions available to operations, and our analogy should be the with direct operational C2 for theater-specific mitigate the warfighting limitations that arise terrestrial domains. missions and at the same time allow for global from the lack of boundaries in cyberspace. On 2. The JFC must have C2 of cyberspace, execution of other missions. The Theater the other hand, the terrestrial domains share just as he does of the terrestrial domains. Special Operations Command (TSOC) several key characteristics with cyberspace. JFCs are charged with exercising C2 construct does this and provides an excel- The existence of these shared attributes sug- over the terrestrial domains. The JFC should lent model for developing the Theater Cyber gests that the best analogy for understanding exercise the same level of C2 over cyberspace. Operations Command (TCOC). The TCOC cyberspace operations is not space. Instead, In the terrestrial domains, JFCs organize the would provide the geographic combatant we should use our experience in the terrestrial battlespace and implement control measures. commander with cyber capabilities in much domains as the basis for advancing an under- They sense the environment, develop plans, the same way that TSOCs deliver special standing of cyber as a warfighting domain. make decisions, and direct actions. They operations capability today. The TCOC would The first characteristic shared between understand the operational characteristics be under the combatant command of the cyberspace operations and terrestrial ones is in of forces that operate in each domain and geographic combatant commander, and forces the area of effects. In cyberspace, the potential are charged with managing risk within the would be assigned or attached as appropriate. exists to achieve tactical, operational, and stra- context of achieving mission objectives. The On a daily basis, the TCOC would be tegic effects with cyber alone. This is rarely, if JFC has all of these responsibilities in the ter- responsible for providing, operating, and ever, true in space. The second shared compo- restrial domains, and he should have the same defending the regional cyberspace architec- nent is constant and direct human interaction authority and accountability in cyberspace. ture and would be capable of planning and with the cyber domain, which is absent in The major challenge in giving the JFC C2 integrating full-spectrum cyberspace opera- space. Domestic and international actors from of cyberspace operations is the GIG structure. tions in support of contingency planning and the civilian, commercial, and governmental Its global nature has led to C2 relationships that crisis response. When required, the TCOC sectors routinely and directly influence DOD give all cyberspace authority to U.S. Strategic would accept additional forces and provide operations in cyberspace. Concurrently, those Command, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBER- functional component command support actors are vulnerable to the effects of military COM), and the military Services. This para- to subordinate joint task forces. At the same cyber operations. So just like the terrestrial digm must change so there is a balance time, the TCOC would respond to USCYBER- domains, we must be concerned with issues between global and regional responsibilities in COM direction as the combatant command such as fratricide, the role of noncombatants, cyber. Doctrine, policy, and resources must be responsible for planning, synchronizing, and executing global cyber operations. In cyberspace is a manmade domain, and with existing addition, there would be an administrative technology cyberspace can be altered so commanders can command relationship with USCYBERCOM 2 for synchronization and standardization. choose from a variety of C options tailored to the mission Depending on future decisions, there may be objectives and forces assigned a funding relationship between the TCOCs and USCYBERCOM. TCOCs could be estab- proportional use of force, and rules of engage- directed to changing the GIG to provide the lished now with personnel already assigned ment. The third key similarity is the degree of JFC unity of command and unity of effort for to the theaters. The most challenging aspect flexibility and responsiveness that exists in the cyber operations. The commander must have of establishing TCOCs would be determining cyber and terrestrial domains compared with visibility and authority over those components the C2 relationship among the TCOC and space. In the terrestrial domains, warfighters of cyberspace that are critical to mission Service components. can introduce new capabilities, tactics, tech- success and must be able to assume cyber risk A final concern is that today’s JFC is niques, and procedures much more quickly without passing that risk on to the rest of the not adequately prepared to assume C2 of than in space, and in cyberspace, reaction time GIG. The only way to achieve these objectives is cyberspace operations. Years of practical is exponentially faster than in any other to technically alter cyberspace to allow delinea- experience and military education have made domain. Finally, assuming we evolve cyber tion of virtual joint operations areas (JOAs) and joint commanders comfortable with and com- architecture as we should, the JFC can areas of interest (AOIs). The JFC must then be petent in employing joint forces. This is not command and control (C2) cyberspace opera- assigned cyber forces that provide the domain yet the case for operations in cyberspace. As tions just as he does operations in the terres- expertise necessary to integrate cyber opera- a result, JFCs tend to delegate responsibility trial domains. The capability exists to shape tions with operations in the other domains. for cyber to the communications, space, and

12 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WILLIAMS intelligence career fields. These professionals Airmen are instructed on defending Air Force network play a key role in cyberspace operations, but cyberspace during basic training the JFC is ultimately responsible for mission success, and with this responsibility comes the requirement for a thorough understanding of cyberspace operations. 3. C2 of cyberspace is the key enabler for U.S. Air Force (Robbin Cresswell) U.S. Air Force exercising operational command and control. The exercise of C2 is the JFC’s primary contribution to the fight; C2 is what the com- mander does. His ability to execute C2 relies on his understanding of the complex technol- ogy that makes up his C2 system of systems. Admiral Robert Willard coined the term C2 of C2 to describe the operational neces- sity of having command and control of the command and control architecture. If the JFC does not understand his C2 systems, he cannot effectively control them—and control of the architecture is a basic requirement for exercis- ing command and control. The C2 architecture can be thought of as having five components: get the most attention because they employ air operations destroy the enemy’s airplanes some of the most sensitive capabilities and on the ground, deny him the use of airfields, ■■ sensors that deliver intelligence, sur- require significant legal and operational blind him to our intentions, and degrade veillance, and reconnaissance considerations. However, it is the ability to his ability to execute command and control. ■■ telecommunications infrastructure provide, operate, and defend cyberspace that Offensive air operations provide friendly consisting of wired and wireless links forces with the freedom to maneuver in the ■■ networks that organize and distribute for now, we must rely on a air, and they deny the same to the enemy. information This may someday be true for cyberspace, but ■■ protection layer for identification, robust, diverse, defendable we do not yet have the capability to gain and authorization, access control, and physical/ architecture that can absorb maintain cyber domain superiority through virtual security the strongest enemy assault offensive actions. Attribution, access, authori- ■■ knowledge management tools and deci- and still allow the JFC to ties, approval processes, and capability are all sion aids that help organize and display infor- execute his operational limiting factors. For now, we must rely on a mation in ways that facilitate decisionmaking. C2 mission robust, diverse, defendable architecture that can absorb the strongest enemy assault and The commander’s C2 system is critical still allow the JFC to execute his operational for mission success, so he must be responsible should be the JFC’s top priority because these C2 mission. and accountable for its operation. Since most activities enable all other cyberspace opera- Another reason defense requires priority of the C2 architecture lies within or is substan- tions. Providing and operating the networks is that in cyber, the offender enjoys some inher- tially enabled by cyberspace operations, the are largely a Title 10 function executed by ent advantages over the defender. For example, JFC must have C2 of cyberspace if he is to have the Services and the Defense Information the offender is not disadvantaged by the C2 of C2. Currently, the JFC has little authority Systems Agency. The JFC requires a voice in concept of a culminating point. In land warfare, over his C2 architecture, particularly the com- the cyberspace Title 10 missions; but at the for instance, the attacker typically finds that ponents that are part of cyberspace. Defining operational level of war, the JFC must devote the farther he penetrates defenses, the more the JFC’s operating areas in cyberspace and his attention to computer network defense difficult it is to sustain the attack. The attacker establishing appropriate cyber C2 structures (CND). Because adversaries will attempt to is on the move and expending resources, and are foundational requirements for C2 of C2. position themselves within friendly cyber- his lines of communication become difficult to 4. Defense is the main effort in cyber at space in preparation for follow-on actions in sustain and protect. If the defense is sufficiently the operational level of war. the physical domains, CND must be a daily strong, the attacker will culminate prior to Cyber discussions in DOD tend to priority for combatant commands. achieving his objective. In cyberspace, the narrowly focus on computer network attack Defense as the main effort is a key concept of a culminating point does not apply, and computer network exploitation. Not difference between cyber and the terrestrial and in fact, the offender may get stronger as he enough attention is given to providing, domains. For example, the most effective penetrates defenses. Consider the rapid spread operating, and defending the networks that way to gain and maintain air superiority is of highly effective computer malware within a define cyberspace. Attack and exploitation through offensive actions. Offensive counter– network. Once the malware is established in the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 13 FORUM | Ten Propositions network, it can be difficult to detect and tends The cognitive barrier that must be overcome that they would be nested. For example, a geo- to become more dangerous as it spreads. The is that the cyber JOA cannot be defined by graphic combatant commander may have a malware does not culminate; it must be tracked lines on a map. In all other respects, however, theater JOA within which are established one down and destroyed by the defenders. the cyber JOA is a parallel concept to a geo- or more JTF cyber JOAs. Civilian, commercial, and governmental graphic JOA. As opposed to a geographic JOA, which entities are daily victims of intrusion, exploita- Most experts immediately dismiss the usually includes some enemy territory, adver- tion, and low-level computer attack. Currently, concept of a cyber JOA. Naysayers in the tech- sary cyberspace lies primarily in the JFC this activity does not directly threaten U.S. nical community typically do not understand area of interest. As defined by joint doctrine national security, but it does demonstrate that the operational imperative for a cyber JOA specifically, the AOI contains forces or other potential. To some, it appears that defense is and therefore do not envision engineering the factors that could jeopardize friendly mission impossible, and this assumption leads to over- GIG to facilitate it. Experts in the operational accomplishment. The nature of cyber warfare emphasis on the offensive mission. Offensive community cannot grasp how we could pos- is such that the adversary can attack from cyber capability will increase at a rapid pace, sibly implement control measures in cyber- anywhere in cyberspace to include the United but for now, the JFC’s critical requirement is an space that mirror control measures routinely States or even from within the DOD GIG. adaptive, dynamic defense that allows him to established in the terrestrial domains, which Therefore, it is impractical to include adver- counter the attacks and continue to operate. establish tiered authorities, define command sary cyberspace within the JFC cyber JOA, so 5. Cyber is the only manmade domain. relationships, and provide flexibility at the enemy cyberspace is best defined using the We built it; we can change it. Creating a cyber tactical, operational, and strategic levels. concept of AOI. The JFC has a requirement JOA is the first requirement. Control measures can be incorporated in for effects in his cyber AOI. By using the The single greatest barrier to giving cyberspace to accomplish the same objectives concept of AOI, it becomes easier to define the JFC C2 for cyberspace operations is the while preserving access to the wider GIG as the supporting-supported relationships that open nature of the GIG. Cyberspace is a required for mission execution. the JFC requires to generate effects in “red” virtual world without boundaries, where a The JFC cyber JOA is defined by those cyberspace. risk assumed by one is a risk assumed by all. friendly systems and networks that the JFC With mostly existing technology and In other words, it is all one big GIG. This is relies on in order to execute C2 of the joint infrastructure, we can create a cyber JOA. A largely true, but it does not have to be. We force. At a minimum, the primary coalition C2 set of controlled interfaces define the cyber have no control over the nature of the physical network and associated applications are in the JOA boundaries and make it possible for the domains, so we develop forces, doctrine, and cyber JOA. The JFC should have operational JFC to sense the environment, make decisions, tactics acclimated to each. Using this model for control over the coalition C2 network for the direct operations, and, most importantly, cyber has been challenging because we have provide, operate, and defend missions. Using assume a risk posture that is different from failed to take advantage of a key distinction his command authority, the JFC decides the rest of the GIG. At the same time, the con- between cyberspace and the physical domains: where to extend the coalition C2 network, who trolled interfaces allow and, in fact, require we can change the structure of cyberspace. If has access, what operations have priority on USCYBERCOM and the Services to execute we change the domain to better accommodate the network, and how best to defend the JOA. their GIG-wide missions in substantially the operational mission requirements, we can USCYBERCOM and the Services have signifi- same way they do now. Fully debating the more easily develop tools, tactics, techniques, cant responsibilities in these mission areas, technical feasibility of the cyber JOA concept and procedures that enable mission success. and they provide support under the direc- is beyond the scope of this article; however, it Enabling the equivalent of operational control tion of the JFC. Other systems and networks is hard to imagine providing C2 of cyberspace measures in cyber is the first requirement. could be in the JOA based on specific mission operations to the JFC without implementing According to joint doctrine, a JOA is requirements. Examples include enclaves of something similar to a cyber JOA. an area defined by a geographic combatant commander in which a JFC conducts military the JFC should have operational control over the coalition C2 operations to accomplish a specific mission. Geographic combatant commanders establish network for the provide, operate, and defend missions JOAs to delineate the JFC maneuver space and implement C2 constructs that define authority, U.S. classified and nonclassified networks, Failure to acknowledge the fact that responsibility, and accountability. The cyber bilateral coalition networks, and networks cyber is a domain that we can change is a JOA is established for the same purpose. Most that support other U.S. Government agencies. mistake. Accepting the one-big-GIG dilemma people cannot grasp the concept of a cyber It is critical to understand that the cyber JOA unnecessarily limits C2 options and focuses JOA because they are stuck on the idea of boundaries do not mirror the geographic JOA command relationships at the national level. drawing lines on a map. A JOA is not about boundaries. Some components of the physical The operational requirements of the JFC must the lines on a map; it is about establishing architecture that define the cyber JOA will drive the design of cyberspace, and we cannot control measures. In the physical domains, lie within the physical JOA, but significant continue to let the current design of the GIG this is done with lines on a map. In cyber- portions will not. This is another critical limit the JFC warfighting ability. space, control measures are implemented by distinction between the virtual and terrestrial 6. Cyberspace operations must be fully applying existing technologies in a way that application of the JOA concept. Optimally, integrated with missions in the physical allows implementation of control measures. cyber JOAs would not overlap, but it is likely domains.

14 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WILLIAMS

Early airpower advocates envisioned The JFC is responsible for defense of The U.S. military must be prepared to a day when attacks from the air would be so the cyber JOA, and he can only defend it if he engage a variety of adversaries. Some are near- precise and effective that there would be little can see it. The JFC needs complete situational peer competitors with parity in equipment need for operations in any other domain to awareness over his cyber JOA via a common and technology. Others are nonstate actors achieve mission success. Today, we can attack operational picture that is integrated with the who are not technological peers but who still from the air with “pickle barrel” accuracy as other domains. In addition, the JFC must have pose a significant threat through insurgency predicted by the early airpower proponents. visibility on both “red” and “blue” compo- and terrorism. The one advantage the United What has not been realized is the ability to nents of cyber that exist outside his JOA but States currently enjoys against both groups is achieve military victory with airpower alone. within his cyber AOI. It is important to note its ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate As with forces in the other domains, airpower that significant portions of the infrastructure data in a way that gets the right information is most effective when used in a combination exist in the civilian and commercial sectors. to the right decisionmaker in a format that of land, maritime, air, and space operations Developing cyber situational awareness is a allows accurate, timely decisionmaking. We and in synchronization with the other instru- high priority for DOD. The challenge is pro- do most of that work in cyberspace. There are ments of national power. Cyberspace opera- viding a complete picture of the domain that those who argue that we should learn how to tions are no different. The ability to achieve is consistent, accurate, current, and customiz- operate without cyber. That is simply not pos- effects in cyberspace will rapidly increase, but able for commanders at all levels. sible. We must acknowledge the fact that we rarely should we rely solely on cyber. Attempt- Gaining visibility and situational aware- will experience degraded cyber capability, but ing to achieve effects in any single domain ness in cyberspace is challenging, but it is even we cannot go back to semaphore and grease limits the commander’s flexibility and agility, more challenging to understand the domain. pencils. Our advantage depends on having denies him the ability to present the enemy freedom to operate in cyberspace—and that is with a synchronized set of symmetric and except for the most limited a critical capability we must protect. asymmetric problems, and tends to create cyber attacks, we cannot with If networks are essential across the single points of failure. spectrum of conflict and defense is the main Integrating cyber effects requires high confidence predict the effort, how can the JFC guarantee the adver- a complete understanding of cyberspace full range of desirable and sary never penetrates his cyber defenses? operations gained through experience and undesirable effects Unfortunately, no commander can create an education as well as a clear delineation of impregnable cyber defense and still execute command relationships and authorities. In The interactions are complex, responsibilities operational command and control. Thou- the land, maritime, and air domains, the and authorities overlap, and our understand- sands of years of warfare have taught us that Services organize, train, and equip forces. At ing of virtual operations is not well developed. for every new defensive capability, there will execution, the JFC typically assumes C2 of A way to approach understanding the cyber appear a credible offensive threat. Similarly, terrestrial forces under operational or tacti- domain as it applies to warfighting is to new offensive weapons have always given cal control. This is not the case with cyber. make sure cyberspace is part of the center rise to an improved defense. This cycle is USCYBERCOM and the Services currently of gravity analysis, which allows the JFC to endless, and the only difference in cyberspace retain command authority over cyberspace identify critical capabilities, requirements, is the pace of technical evolution. Moves and operations, and the JFC has limited directive and vulnerabilities for cyber just as he does in countermoves in cyberspace are limited only authority as the supported commander. This the terrestrial domains. This work will help by the time it takes for us to conceive a new dynamic must change. Without command the JFC define the equivalent of key avenues idea. This means that no matter what we do to authority, the JFC cannot integrate the full of approach and key terrain to focus defensive defend our networks, we will eventually find spectrum of cyberspace capabilities with efforts. If he does not do this, the JFC will the adversary inside our perimeter. operations in the other domains. The JFC find himself defending everything and in the Disconnecting from the GIG is the can do this in the terrestrial domains, and end perhaps defending nothing. Consider our only way to keep the adversary out of our there is no reason he should not be able to do current operations on the nonclassified net- cyberspace. But disconnecting is not an option. the same in cyberspace. JFC authority over works. Studies suggest that perhaps 20 percent This course of action would constitute a self- friendly systems and networks should be of nonclassified network traffic is official busi- imposed denial of service that would deliver through a direct C2 authority, and his ability ness, and even less of it might be considered victory to the attacker. The JFC must have to direct actions in the AOI is most appro- critical for mission success. Yet our defenses the capability to fight through the attack and priately handled via a supporting-supported for the most part are equally distributed continue to operate. Demonstrating that we relationship with USCYBERCOM. Effects in across the entire nonclassified infrastructure. can continue to operate in the face of the most the AOI must be planned and executed in a We are effectively trying to defend everything. determined adversary is an excellent form sufficiently responsive manner if the JFC is At both the global and regional levels, our of deterrence that may result in the enemy going to integrate full-spectrum cyber opera- defense must be prioritized to protect the looking for a different avenue than cyber to tions with his operations in the terrestrial most critical C2 systems, and JFCs should have achieve his goals. Alternatively, the adversary domains. a significant role in defining those systems. may become so absorbed in conquering our 7. The JFC must see and understand 8. Networks are critical and will always cyber defenses that he expends energy and cyberspace to defend it—and he cannot defend be vulnerable—disconnecting is not an option. resources to the detriment of generating it all. We must fight through the attack. effects in the physical domains. In either case, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 15 FORUM | Ten Propositions a robust, dynamic defense complicates the in predicting human reaction. Rarely will task of understanding effects becomes more enemy’s plan and sets the conditions for effec- we conduct operations with the intent of difficult and more risky when “nonrational” tive cyberspace operations. demanding unconditional surrender. Instead, actors with access to weapons of mass destruc- 9. Our understanding of nonkinetic when we attack an adversary, our goal is to tion are the target. By definition, irrational effects in cyberspace is immature. compel the enemy decisionmaker to change behavior is hard to predict, and cyber attacks In the terrestrial domains, we model his behavior in a way favorable to us. We have the potential to generate irrational physical effects with high confidence. For have been kinetically attacking each other for responses from even the most rational leaders. example, if we drop a 500-pound bomb on a centuries, and we can predict human reac- 10. Understanding operational impact is building, we can guarantee that it will hit the tion to a kinetic attack with some confidence. the critical measure of cyberspace engagements. building in a specific spot. With high fidelity, Since there has yet to be a successful cyber If an adversary gains access to the JFC’s we can predict structural damage, number of attack that threatened a nation’s core interests, cyberspace, the most important information killed and wounded, and collateral damage. we have little experience to rely on when we for the commander is the operational impact In cyberspace, our understanding of effects is attack in cyberspace. Our estimate of the of the intrusion. Unfortunately, operational much less mature. Except for the most limited opposing leader’s reaction will be imprecise, impact is not always the focus of the staff. cyber attacks, we cannot with high confidence and the spectrum of possible reactions may be Frequently, the first area of attention is predict the full range of desirable and unde- wide, especially if the attack threatens to col- attribution. While attribution will eventually sirable effects. Moreover, while these effects lapse the financial system or degrade strategic be relevant, especially if a counterattack is occur in the virtual domain, their ultimate level command and control. Predicting the planned, the immediate effort should be to impact is real in the physical world. The fact leader’s behavior will be further complicated assess operational impact and appropriate that many of the undesired effects could sig- because the targeted state will have difficulty countermeasures to stop the attack. nificantly affect the civilian and commercial assessing the full impact of a cyber attack. To determine operational impact, we sectors makes it critical that we acknowledge Cyberspace is complex, so figuring out what must first understand that an attack has our shortcomings in predicting nonkinetic is happening in the middle of a crisis would occurred, is in progress, or, preferably, is cyber effects. be difficult and could introduce unnecessary about to be launched. Then we must assess the Estimating direct effects of an action urgency, even panic, into the targeted leader’s impact or potential impact on our mission. is actually the easy part in both the physi- decisionmaking process. By the way, we face The simplest attack to understand is one that cal and virtual domains. The real art comes the same situation in the United States. The completely and clearly disrupts a friendly U.S. Air Force (Jeremy Burns) (Jeremy U.S. Air Force

International forces prepare C4 systems for multinational operations during exercise Combined Endeavor in Grafenwoehr, Germany

16 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WILLIAMS system. In this case, the attack is obvious, such a unique warfighting domain that we and determining operational impact and cannot apply operational tenets that have NEW mitigating measures should be relatively proven successful in the land, maritime, and from NDU Press easy. A more problematic attack is one that air domains. In fact, we can and we should. for the manipulates data such as position reports to a It is important to note that there is both a Institute for National Strategic Studies common operating picture or delivery details global and a regional aspect to cyberspace for a logistics movement. This type of attack operations, and they are equally important. is particularly troublesome because it may be Currently, too little attention is paid to the Strategic Forum 263 difficult to detect and would likely cast doubt vital role of geographic combatant command- Conventional Prompt on the integrity of the entire system. The third ers in cyberspace. These 10 propositions Global Strike: Strategic type, data exploitation, is the most common. offer an analytic framework for approaching Asset or Unusable Liability? The tendency with this type of attack is for cyber from the perspective of the joint force As the world changes and the staff to report the number of documents commander as opposed to the business threats evolve, has the time obtained or megabytes of data exfiltrated by requirements of the DOD enterprise. Finally, come for the United States to the enemy. Without any operational assess- accepting the limitations of “one big GIG” is develop and deploy the so-called Conven- ment, these raw numbers are useless. The shortsighted. Cyber is a manmade domain tional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) capability? This analysis needs to consider type of information that should be shaped to align with the is the basic question explored by M. Elaine Bunn and captured, its relevance to the current opera- operational chain of command. In the end, Vincent A. Manzo in this in-depth analysis. Accord- tions, and the likelihood that the adversary this will all happen if joint force commanders ing to the CPGS concept, the United States would be can exploit the data within an operationally take personal responsibility and accountabil- able to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the relevant decision cycle. Armed with this type ity for command and control of cyberspace world in about 1 hour. After examining the pros and of operational assessment, the JFC can make and demand the same unity of command in cons of CPGS, especially the potential for ambiguity an appropriate risk assessment and determine cyberspace that they have in the terrestrial and misinterpretation, the authors conclude that the best mitigating course of action. domains. JFQ such a capability would be a valuable strategic asset. In these three representative cases, the Although CPGS would not be the optimal strike JFC may determine that the cost of discon- Note option in all circumstances, it might provide the best necting from the GIG in order to expel the available means for achieving U.S. objectives in some 1 I would like to acknowledge two other papers intruder may be more detrimental than plausible, high-risk scenarios. based on the 10 propositions construct. One is fighting through the attack—the self-denial Major Jordon T. Cochran’s thesis, Ten Propositions Strategic Forum 262 of service. In that case, he may accept the risk Regarding Cyberpower, presented to the faculty of for at least a period of time. Or the JFC may the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Small Nuclear Reactors decide to tolerate the intrusion in order to use Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, in June for Military Installations: the adversary access as a means to counter- 2008. The second is a working paper also entitled Capabilities, Costs, attack. Another option may be to manipulate Ten Propositions Regarding Cyberpower, written and Technological the intrusion to support friendly intelligence by Dr. Kamal Jabbour and Colonel Fred Wieners, Implications operations or military deception. In any USAF (Ret.), dated April 11, 2010. I was not aware In recent years, the Depart- event, the risk assessment belongs to the JFC, of either work when I originally wrote this article ment of Defense (DOD) has and he needs access to the right informa- and with the exception of the title, there are no become increasingly interested in the possibilities similarities between them and my work. tion and expertise to make the mission-risk of small (less than 300 megawatts) nuclear reactors I had a lot of help thinking through these 10 decision. Again, the JFC requires a JOA in for military use. This technology has the potential propositions and would like to specifically acknowl- cyberspace so he can assume the level of risk edge Colonel Daniel Baltrusaitis, USAF, and Colonel to solve two serious energy-related problems for the necessary to meet his mission objectives Harry Foster, USAF (Ret.), for their inputs. U.S. military: its dependence on the fragile civilian without impacting the rest of the GIG. In the power grid and the vulnerability of fuel convoys end, the JFC must be as comfortable assessing supplying forward bases. Although the technology and assuming risk in the cyber domain as he has a number of uncertainties and is still develop- is in the terrestrial domains. This will happen ing, Richard B. Andres and Hanna L. Breetz assess only with the right education, experience, and that DOD should consider taking a leadership role technical architecture. in this area. If DOD does not support the U.S. small Cyberspace is a collection of systems, reactor industry, it could be dominated by foreign networks, and software that nobody com- countries, eroding U.S. commercial power capabili- pletely understands, yet we rely on it for ties and damaging U.S. control over nuclear energy our most critical national security mis- proliferation. sions. Because of this reliance, we have an urgent requirement for doctrine, policy, and resources that support cyberspace opera- Visit the NDU Press Web site tions. Unfortunately, the complex nature of for more information on publications cyberspace has led some to believe that it is at ndupress.ndu.edu ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 17 Cyber War Issues in Attack and Defense

By Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow

Dr. Robert A. Miller and Dr. Daniel T. Kuehl are Professors in the Information Resources Management College (iCollege) at the National Defense University. Dr. Irving Lachow is a Principal Information Security Engineer at the MITRE Corporation.

vidence of the magnitude of and in particular their growing importance as be reduced. The specific concern with respect the changes brought by the command and control mechanisms, has sig- to these threats is the targeting of multiple information age is all around us. nificantly altered the traditional 20th-century key nodes on the system that, if damaged, E Networked computers link us battlespace. destroyed, or interrupted in a coordinated together and control more and more of our The concept of cyber war has been in fashion, could bring the system outside the infrastructures. By and large, this change has the news recently, with much commentary protection provided by traditional planning enabled significant increases in productiv- concerning what such a thing could look like, and operating criteria. Such an attack would ity and prosperity. Just-in-time operations what its limits and limitations would be, what behave very differently than traditional risks have allowed us to streamline production, our national policies should be on the vexing to the system in that an intelligent attacker reduce warehoused inventory, and cut costs questions of who should control American could mount an adaptive attack that would in many areas. Networked communications efforts in this area, and how the United manipulate assets and potentially provide have slashed delays and improved our ability States should respond to an attack on critical misleading information to system operators to control and predict all kinds of operations. national infrastructures. attempting to address the issue.1 It is difficult if not impossible to imagine life Experts in different fields are becoming without ATMs, cell phones, or email, yet all of increasingly worried about the risks of cyber The U.S. military brings together its these are only a few decades old. war. To take one example, the flat bureau- cyber activities under the umbrella term of This is all good news, but it is mixed cratic prose of the following report does little computer network operations, which consists with new and worrisome problems. One of the to disguise the sense of concern: of three elements: defense, attack, and exploi- major issues involves national security. tation. Computer network defense, as its name We are still struggling to come to grips The risk of a coordinated cyber, physical, or suggests, focuses on keeping others from sub- with the impact of the information age on blended attack against the North American verting our networks. Computer network warfare. For most of the 20th century, war bulk [electric] power system has become attack is the obverse: breaking into the other meant developing better ways to destroy more acute over the past 15 years as digital side’s networks and systems in order to create the other side. Generally, this involved communicating equipment has introduced useful havoc—or, as the government puts it, actual physical devastation (through what cyber vulnerability to the system, and resource to take actions that disrupt, deny, degrade, or the military refers to as kinetic operations). optimization trends have allowed some inher- destroy information.2 Then there is computer However, the advent of computer networks, ent physical redundancy within the system to network exploitation, a rather confusing term

18 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MILLER, KUEHL, and LACHOW

Air Force technician performs preventive maintenance on base email servers at network operations and security center

U.S. Air Force (Rich McFadden)

that stands for taking actions that exploit data tures as well as national security command mass destruction, although they could have gathered from the other’s systems and and control. In this sense, the term cyber war destructive secondary effects; they are more networks. is a misnomer, since computer-based attacks paralytic in nature—and are thus weapons of Obviously, there is a wavy and indeter- are merely one means to achieve the desired both mass and precision disruption. minate line between exploiting and attacking, effect of crippling the other side’s critical 3. Different adversaries will have dif- but the terms reflect a basic bureaucratic infrastructures.5 The true objective of such ferent objectives and constraints. A major distinction: exploitation is the province of attacks will be to disrupt the adversary’s civil nation-state not only has many advantages the Intelligence Community, especially the society and inhibit its military action as a in waging information war, but it also has a National Security Agency, while attack is the means of achieving the conflict’s ultimate substantial stake in keeping its own systems business of the military.3 political objectives. So we are really talking and networks up and running. This need to about what could be called information prevent blowback damage may inhibit hostile Ten Assumptions and infrastructure war, or more precisely actions. Nonstate actors (and, for that matter, This article tries to go beyond these dif- smaller and poorer countries) have fewer ficult issues and consider some operational capabilities but much less to lose. But all sides problems in both cyber defense and cyber exploitation is the province of will realize that there are risks as well as ben- attack. The article starts with a simple set of the Intelligence Community, efits to cyber conflicts, and this fact may limit 10 assumptions intended to spur debate and especially the National Security the scope of cyber operations—assuming (a discussion: Agency, while attack is the large assumption indeed) that rational calcu- business of the military lations of self-interest prevail. 1. Some sort of cyber war will be an 4. Attribution problems are difficult inevitable component of most future military to resolve and almost impossible to resolve conflicts and future warfare.4 Cyber space is information and infrastructure operations quickly. This is important. Adroit attackers now and will remain a battlespace. (I2Os), which we think is a more inclusive can find ways to disguise what they are doing, 2. The shape of any future cyber war and therefore better term. The purpose of an who is doing it, and how much they have will be different in important ways from what I2O would be to disrupt, confuse, demoralize, done. Planned confusion may inhibit effective we now confidently expect, but its primary distract, and ultimately diminish the capabil- responses but will also tempt potential victims targets will likely include civilian infrastruc- ity of the other side. These are not weapons of to preempt. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 19 FORUM | Cyber War

5. There is a significant first-mover enemy’s information content, and, in some variants: direct attacks and indirect attacks. advantage. In an I2O conflict, offense has a cases, infrastructure collapse.6 Direct attacks would most likely involve considerable edge over defense. Given suf- 9. History offers some relevant examples the use of cyber capabilities in a blitzkrieg ficient time and opportunity, well-trained of infrastructure-focused strategies in the pre- designed to gain strategic surprise and/or to hacker units will often get through computer cyber period. Some of these infrastructures produce effects that would impede the ability network defenses and may be able to inhibit were functional, such as the entire British of the victim to take rapid and effective action. counterstrikes. For this reason, both launch global supply chain attacked by German sub- One could imagine this occurring via a large- on warning and reflexive reactions (“use or marine warfare in both world wars. And some scale distributed denial-of-service attack or by lose”) can be expected, which may override of the infrastructures were industrial, such as the activation of malware implanted across a the limitations mentioned above and lead to the German industrial web targeted by Ameri- large number of critical hosts in a target (or set rapid escalation. can strategic bombing in 1943–1945. However, of targets). This is the prototypical scenario 6. Even aside from the first-mover analogies to previous periods and conflicts can often described when one considers how problem, uncontrolled escalation may take be misleading. Cyberspace is now a battlespace, China might use cyber attacks to delay a U.S. place. While in theory I2O conflicts can be but it has its own characteristics. In particular, response to a Taiwan crisis.8 carefully controlled, in practice it would be dif- talk about dominating or controlling the cyber But less straightforward actions are ficult to keep such operations within bounds sphere is unhelpful, since the real touchstone also possible. Such indirect attacks would because of the possibilities for intervention by of success is effective use rather than physical be actions not easily recognizable either as so-called patriotic hackers—ordinary citizens control.7 The former is possible, and the latter is “military” or as state-sponsored activities.9 and others who have the requisite technical probably not—which, of course, is exactly the The goal would be to create desired effects by knowledge—plus the difficulty in knowing way that the Air Force and Navy describe air using techniques that would not raise suspi- what the other side’s capabilities really are, and and maritime superiority. cions or cross the threshold into use of force also because of the attribution problem. 10. The cyber battlespace is rapidly or armed attack. For example, adversaries 7. The likely confused nature of the changing. Both tactical and organizational could conduct a series of attacks that appear cyber battlefields, unfortunately, may be a agility will be necessary to achieve and main- to be classic cyber crimes directed at critical destabilizing rather than a stabilizing factor; tain success. infrastructure (for example, the financial victims who do not know where attacks are sector). Each attack would appear to be crimi- coming from, or what further attacks will nal activity and would fall under the purview follow, might be tempted to raise the stakes the real touchstone of success of law enforcement organizations. However, in any counteraction in order to deter more is effective use rather than a large number of such attacks over a long damaging second wave attacks. physical control period could produce a sense of anxiety or 8. There are many ways to prosecute an instability in the target country, which could I2O conflict, and not all of them are limited in turn have a strategic effect on the security to cyber attacks. Both classic information Approaches posture of that nation. In some sense, such a operations and physical attacks could and One can imagine myriad ways that series of attacks could be thought of as a type probably would play a role. The goals of cyber attacks could be used to achieve of blockade in that they would impede eco- attacks may include the denial of services, national security objectives. However, most nomic (and potentially military) activity that exfiltration of data, corruption of the scenarios can be grouped into two major would weaken a country over time.

DOD (Cherie Cullen) U.S. Navy (Ryan G. Wilber)

Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III speaks at NATO North Sailor sets up tactical data network on ruggedized laptops during Atlantic Council cyber presentation in Brussels command post exercise

20 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MILLER, KUEHL, and LACHOW

Asymmetric Advantages U.S. Navy (Tyler J. Wilson) In many ways, I2O represents a classic example of an asymmetric opportunity. Compared to the cost of developing and maintaining robust and effective conven- tional or strategic forces, I2O capabilities cost relatively little in either money or skilled personnel. They are by definition stealthy. Mission-capable units can be created fairly quickly and often in secret. Capabilities can be masked or hidden before action is joined. And I2O can turn one of the main advantages of a conventionally armed force and highly developed society such as the United States into a disadvantage. During the past few decades, the developed world and its military forces have become increasingly dependent on a sophisticated array of networked ser- vices. If these were to become unreliable— even for a short time—the result might well be a decisive defeat, or at the very least partial paralysis. Furthermore, it is a truism of cyber war that defense is much more expensive—in money, trained personnel, and effort—than Infrastructure cyber attack could disrupt ships’ ability to pass through Panama Canal attack. As attack vectors continue to multiply and network operations continue to become more complex, this gap will likely widen. will be useful after the conflict. This is not as which many states and nonstate actors do rou- That said, attackers and defenders alike face easy as it sounds. tinely, and full-blooded attacks is often hazy challenges in the realm of I2O. The following ■■ Not widening or deepening the con- and cannot be discerned until after damage sections explore those challenges. flict. I2O wars are likely to have limited objec- is done. Even then, there is the attribution Problems for the Attacker. While the tives (at least at first), and it will be important problem: attacks can be masked and attack asymmetries of I2O clearly favor the attacker, to control escalation and maintain exit strate- routes can be muddled, so it is hard, even in the actual conduct of sophisticated operations gies that allow for a comparatively peaceful retrospect, to determine who is doing what to is not easy. Here are just a few of the chal- postwar settlement. However, the difficulties whom, and attackers can expect to get away lenges facing those who wish to conduct such noted above illustrate the challenges involved with plausible deniability for a considerable operations: in escalation control. As Carl von Clausewitz period. Attacks delivered at cyber speed give noted, war has not only its own grammar but little or no time for human reaction, especially ■■ Target selection. We live in an open also its own logic, meaning that once it is initi- if such reactions involve several layers of world, and a surprising amount of informa- ated, it becomes a tiger that both sides may decisionmaking.10 Furthermore, determining tion is readily available through open sources. have difficulty taming. what has been damaged may pose significant However, selecting the profitable targets for ■■ Tying means (I2O) to ends (what is problems. At first glance, this would seem I2O attacks and understanding the second- and “victory”?), avoiding “unlimited war,” and pro- to be relatively easy. If networks or infra- third-order effects of targeted attacks will still viding deescalation paths are all difficult prob- structures are taken down, and if services are require a long-term, systematic endeavor, and lems, especially under wartime conditions. denied or disrupted, the actions (if not the this intelligence-gathering and analysis effort perpetrators) will soon be obvious. But this is will require the kinds of resources that only a Problems for the Defender. The dif- not necessarily the case with attacks designed nation-state or equivalent can provide. ficulties facing the defense in an I2O situation to change information content. ■■ Not fouling your own nest. Attack are far greater than those confronting the Choosing the Opponent’s Bureaucracy. vectors may have undesirable (and perhaps attacker. As noted, cyber war offers significant As discussed above, separating the true unforeseen) effects on the attackers’ own asymmetric advantages to the attacker. To beginning of an attack from the “noise” of networks, systems, and infrastructures. There- begin with, it is relatively cheap—certainly constant exploitation and random hacker fore, attackers need to avoid collateral damage when compared to the cost and difficulty of attacks and the like is difficult, especially if to critical infrastructures (notably including developing significant conventional or strategic the attacker has taken prudent precautions the Internet) that they need to preserve rela- weapons. Second, it is fairly easy to ramp to disguise his intentions and methods. One tively undamaged for their own purposes, and up one’s activities without creating obvious problem for defenders in the “indirect” attack steer clear of devastating the global assets that signatures. The line between exploitation, scenario would be discerning between actual ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 21 FORUM | Cyber War cyber crime activity and apparent cyber crime many actions that under peacetime law would “second-strike” capability that can survive an activity that may in fact be part of a strategic be criminal would become the legitimate attack and allow retaliation and/or creating campaign designed to achieve national goals. wartime acts of one belligerent state against robust response capabilities that can mitigate Determining the difference would require another. In either case, it is likely that close potential damage so the gains from an attack the extended melding of law enforcement coordination among law enforcement, home- are less than the risks to the attacker. This information with intelligence information land security, the Intelligence Community, issue has been examined in detail by numer- in a coordinated fashion and the ability to and the military would be warranted. ous scholars and government officials, so detect subtle patterns in a large dataset. This On a related point, because of diverse we will not go into specifics here other than is quite a challenge both technically and jurisdictions in the United States and elsewhere, to point out that deterring cyber attacks is a organizationally. adversaries can determine, to some extent, challenging proposition, and one should not It would also be difficult to determine which type of agency they wish to confront. For assume that such a strategy will be successful. how best to respond to such a campaign. First example, take the case of cyber-based attacks on On the other hand, the difficulties of all, there is likely to be much ambiguity in the United States. If these attacks are launched involved in deterrence and preemption (or any attempt to ascertain the strategic goal of from within U.S. borders (using proxy servers any type of defense) may well increase the such an operation. Even if one can determine and other tools), the matter will fall to the temptation for and urgency of early actions with some confidence that a given nation is Federal Bureau of Investigation. If they come by a nation that believes it is under attack behind a series of cyber crime activities, it from outside the United States, they will likely and needs to act while it still can—even if the may not be clear if the goal of those attacks have to face off with the Department of Defense precise parameters of who is doing what to is to steal information, gain intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command and/or the National whom and why are not yet fully understood. prepare for an attack, or cause harm in some Security Agency. In this way, the current struc- In other words, cyber operations are inher- other way. Secondly, there is the challenge of ture of U.S. authorities allows adversaries some ently destabilizing. determining who should be in charge of any ability to both select their opponents and exploit Resilience. The ability to withstand a response. Cyber crime is clearly the domain the “virtual seams” between agencies. cyber attack and continue operating is criti- of law enforcement. However, if a nation-state cal both as part of a deterrence strategy and is attempting to cause harm to the United Implications if a deterrence strategy fails. This leads to the States, for example, the matter may come If the assumptions and observations in obvious conclusion that the development of a under the purview of several Federal agen- this article are valid, they lead to a number of resilient and robust cyber infrastructure is nec- cies. And if the governing legal code under operational, policy, and legal implications, the essary for any nation that is a potential cyber which events are occurring is the law of most critical of which are discussed below. target. Resilience can be achieved in a number armed conflict—that is, if war is under way— First Strike, Preemption, and Deterrence. of ways, each of which has its own benefits The outcome of an I2O “war” may well be and costs. For example, one approach is to rely decided before the first shot is fired or air- on redundant capabilities, such as alternative plane is launched. For this reason, preemption sites, that can be turned to in an emergency. and deterrence are both important strategies The benefit of this approach is that it can lead for dealing with I2O threats. However, both to high levels of resilience because one can, in of these strategies are difficult to implement theory, switch from one site to another with in the cyber realm. Preemption depends on little interruption in service. However, there are detecting early moves (or even intentions) and several problems with this approach: because forestalling attacks by moving first (the equiv- of their expense, redundant sites are neces- alent of launch on warning). While kinetic sarily limited in number, they are difficult to attacks can easily be detected and there is seldom any doubt about their origins (espe- there is a significant cially if they are strategic in nature), neither of these realities applies to cyber attacks. A “first mover advantage” 2 preemption strategy in the cyber domain is for combatants in an I O prone to misattribution of actors and inten- campaign tions, overreactions, and miscalculations. The nature of cyber attacks, especially the conver- use appropriately in nonemergency situations gence of attribution problems (which delay (and therefore look wasteful), and they protect response) and the speed of execution (which only a limited number of facilities and are makes instant decisions necessary), appears to almost impossible to field for entire critical limit the availability of preemptive strategies. infrastructures.

U.S. Army (Michael A. Simmons) Similar challenges apply to a strategy It is evident that a number of policy of deterrence. Deterrence is based on either decisions will have to be made about the level Rhode Island Air National Guard Network Warfare reducing the benefits or increasing the costs of of funding to spend on improving resilience squadron members monitor computer network for attack so it is not launched in the first place. A and on prioritizing infrastructures that require malicious activity during communications exercise key aspect of deterrence is creating a credible attention. Making those decisions will involve

22 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MILLER, KUEHL, and LACHOW

complex tradeoffs, but if these tradeoffs are ously is a mistake. The United States needs to 5 See Robert A. Miller and Daniel T. Kuehl, st not made and nations do not move forward consider the implications of information and Cyberspace and the “First Battle” in 21 -century with some improvements in resilience, they infrastructure operations and decide explicitly War, Defense Horizons 68 (Washington, DC: National Defense University [NDU] Press, Sep- will be leaving themselves open to attacks that what it wishes to do about them. To not decide tember 2009), available at . Public-Private Cooperation. Civilian 6 On this point, see Robert A. Miller and Notes infrastructures would likely be involved in an Irving Lachow, Strategic Fragility: Infrastructure 2 I O war and would probably be the front line. Protection and National Security in the Information 1 North American Electric Reliability Cor- Effective preparation for such a war would Age, Defense Horizons 59 (Washington, DC: NDU poration (NERC) and U.S. Department of Energy demand close cooperation between private Press, January 2008), available at . sector infrastructure holders and the public the North American Bulk Power System (Washing- 7 By effective use we mean the ability to use sector. While there has been a great deal of ton, DC: NERC/DOE, June 2010), 10, available at cyberspace to carry out meaningful I2O actions, attention focused on public-private informa- . maintain one’s own command, control, communi- tion-sharing, certainly a necessary activity, 2 The official (unclassified) U.S. Govern- cations, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and insufficient attention has been paid to the gov- ment doctrine on computer network operations reconnaissance and logistics/mobility capabilities, ernment’s role in strengthening the resilience is found in Joint Publication 3–13, Joint Doctrine and prevent others from denying the same. for Information Operations (Washington, DC: of critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/ 8 For example, see James C. Mulvenon, “The The Joint Staff, 2006), available at Information Warfare,” in The People’s 2 doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf>. Recently, some of about I O are correct, the creation of workable Liberation Army in the Information Age, ed. James C. the individual Services have added formal doctrinal cyber response and resilience structures has Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: approaches as well: U.S. Air Force Doctrine Docu- become a strategic imperative for the Nation. RAND, 1999), 175–186, available at . Also see Bryan Krekel, Capability to be determined after careful consideration July 2010), available at ; U.S. Train- Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation, Report The list of options provided below is by no ing and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525–7–8, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security means exhaustive but gives a feel for the types “Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan Review Commission (McLean, VA: Northrop- of ideas that need to be examined: 2016–2028,” February 2010; and the U.S. Marine Grumman, October 9, 2009), available at . 3 Although there are obvious practical and ■■ penalizing CI/KR owners who fail to 9 This discussion of indirect attacks is partly legal differences between spying (computer network invest in resilience-enhancing solutions based on Susan W. Brenner, Cyberthreats: The exploitation) and going to war (computer network ■■ Emerging Fault Lines of the Nation State (Oxford: creating a Federal Emergency Manage- attack), the issue of what differentiates computer Oxford University Press, 2009). ment Agency–like capability for responding to network exploitation from computer network attack 10 This is a problem that the democracies’ cyber incidents might not matter to the same extent to all nations or bureaucracies may have a particularly difficult ■■ leveraging Guard and Reserve units military forces. Nowhere in the literature on Chinese time solving. If part of a coalition of democratic to augment private sector capabilities during cyber war concepts, for example, does this issue seem bureaucracies (for example, the North Atlantic cyber incidents to appear. But it does matter in the United States Treaty Organization), this problem may become ■■ because of our unique legal and organizational struc- determining whether existing laws perniciously extended. appropriately balance civil liberties with the ture. The capabilities and operations of U.S. forces ability of the government to work coopera- are governed by the segment of U.S. law code known as Title 10, and congressional oversight of those tively with the private sector in cases where forces and activities is conducted by the two Armed national security is at stake. Services Committees, one in the Senate and the other in the House of Representatives. But the capabilities To Not Decide Is to Decide and operations of the Intelligence Community—the Some would argue that it is a mistake Central Intelligence Agency and National Security to weaponize the cyber realm and prepare for Agency, especially—are governed by Title 50 of the cyber war. If the United States had the only law code, and congressional oversight is conducted vote, this argument would carry a great deal by the two Intelligence Oversight Committees. Thus, of force. Unfortunately, others have votes as the three fundamental cyber activities shaping war well. Weaponizing cyberspace is not necessar- and national security—attack, defense, and intel- ily, or even primarily, an American decision. ligence—are legally, organizationally, and operation- ally fragmented. Our only decision is whether or not to take 4 Furthermore, information operations will the problem seriously enough to prepare become an increasingly important part of foreign for it. Time will tell if the assumptions and policy and operations other than war. However, the conclusions outlined above are correct, but broader construct is beyond the scope of this article. one thing is clear: not taking the issue seri- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 23 Digital Gunnery It’s About Time

U.S., Japanese, and Korean naval officers discuss operational requirements aboard USS George By John A. Macdonald Washington during exercise Invincible Spirit and Martin K. Schlacter U.S. Navy (Rachel N. Hatch)

he annual gunnery is complete, for coalition and joint forces. The solution was edge that we strive to achieve with today’s and we are feeling pretty good as the same one that has made us so successful in systems and processes. a command. Ninety percent of kinetic gunnery: basic skills, turret and gun Fast-forwarding over 2,000 years since T the Bradleys and tanks qualified system checks, electronics testing, and low- Sun Tzu, military forces have continued the during first run—not bad, since we have been level tasks followed by platoon and company long march to improve the timeliness and off them for a year while downrange. But are live fires. In the cyber-based world of common accuracy of their common operating picture we really ready? How about the cyber domain? operating pictures (COPs), we’ve used that (COP), a lineage unbroken in today’s COP Is it qualified and certified like our Bradley/ same approach—a deliberate and disciplined and command and control (C2) systems. As tank/F–16/AH–64/DDG crews? regimen of system checks, certification, and the pace of technology continues to accelerate, In Combined Forces Command (CFC)/ field exercises. We call it Digital Gunnery. the COP and C2 systems that we field, while U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), we knew we had doctrinally distinct, become more interde- some issues when we did exercises, but we had Cornerstone pendent. In our operational battle rhythm, we no idea how complex, compounding, and con- Situational knowledge (that is, the next see this synergy clearly in the COP systems fusing the issues were for stitching together a step beyond mere situational awareness) is that enable the first half of John Boyd’s OODA reliable and accurate common tactical picture one of the most critical advantages we have loop (observe and orient) and the C2 systems over an opposing force; it represents the that enable the second (decide and act). Major General John A. Macdonald, USA, is Assistant foundational cornerstone of military decision- Chief of Staff, C3/J3, United Nations Command/ making. Sun Tzu’s basic message of “know Why So Difficult? Combined Forces Command (CFC)/U.S. Forces Korea the enemy and know yourself” is augmented While modern COP systems function (USFK). Lieutenant Colonel Martin K. Schlacter, USA, with specific guidance to use spies as a means almost perfectly in tightly controlled and is Chief of Combined Data Network Operations for to improve the commander’s foreknowledge, homogeneous/unilateral environments, their CFC and USFK. which is one component of situational knowl- effectiveness dwindles rapidly in the face of

24 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu mACDONALD and Schlacter modern coalition/alliance warfare where dif- under the harsh light of field exercises with number of fielded forces. As a result, years of ferent systems, messaging standards, security real-world forces. If no one can remember the simulation data (while technically accurate) classifications, and languages or character sets last time it was tested under field conditions, produced assumptions and a false sense of are the norm, not the exception. The simple we are in for a surprise. As a result, without a security about system interoperability under task of sharing information in coalition envi- deliberate effort to continually test the system, actual field conditions. ronments—whether in Afghanistan or the end-to-end, with real-world data, even the To address this, the Digital Gunnery Republic of Korea (ROK)—is not so simple. best COP systems are at risk of merely serving program mandates two COP exercises per In today’s national security environ- as a “cylinder of excellence” within their own component per year (a total of 12 annual ment, the heterogeneous environment of national- or component-level stovepipes. exercises) using actual data from fielded forces coalition/alliance warfare is so much a fact going through our real-world architecture. of life that it is an assumption in almost any Digital Gunnery Prior planned component-level field exercises national security discussion. Despite this The Digital Gunnery exercise program is are used; we do not add extra events to the reality, our COP systems (or at least the way in the CFC/USFK response to this problem. The training calendar (we are busy enough). which most of them are implemented) have a program was created in 2009 because of the The data is real from end to end—nothing decidedly U.S.-only feel, favoring direct data- sinking realization that our COP systems were is simulated. For example, real-world Blue base synchronization that is either proprietary not providing the accurate and timely situ- Force Tracker data are synchronized from the or not releasable to foreign governments (the ational awareness that U.S. and ROK leadership United States to South Korea, and Position same coalition partners we are fighting with). needed for operational planning. While we had Reporting Equipment data are synchronized

Hard Lessons for the first time, ROK leadership can see U.S. Blue Force We found this out the hard way in Tracker tracks in its COP—something that was considered Korea. Even if we momentarily set aside the broader interoperability issues with United impossible only 12 months ago Nations Command sending states, achiev- ing comprehensive, accurate, and timely been using the COP for years, major theater from South Korea to the United States—start- situational awareness is difficult—even in a exercises did not “load test” the real-world COP ing at the vehicle/tank level, then through the bilateral U.S.–Republic of Korea environment. architecture—and in Korea, the exercise and entire command, control, communications, Each nation has its own COP and C2 systems real-world COP architectures are different. computers, and intelligence architecture, and designed by different vendors to comply with For obvious reasons, we cannot field finally into the COP. The same goes for tracks different standards. In a cultural context, tens of thousands of soldiers, hundreds of jets, from other systems that portray the friendly mirror-imaging leads to failures in the and equally as many ships in a major theater and enemy orders of battle. decisionmaking process. In a technological exercise without unintended second-order For this to succeed, the Digital Gunnery context, it leads to failed assumptions about effects at a strategic level. Tension, escalation, program specifically focuses on ROK–U.S. interoperability. and diplomatic reactions occur even in small interoperability, testing all data feeds in every Language and/or character sets pose exercises, let alone one with 10 times the format and ensuring that battlespace situational hidden issues that are only exposed through routine bilateral or coalition use. While the effects quickly become obvious if data “fails to display,” it is far more difficult for system functions that are “hidden” from the average user, such as data exchange. Falling back to the lowest common denominator does not guar- antee success, either. Has anyone ever seen a U.S. Message Text Format (USMTF) message written in Hangul, or a Korean Message Text Format message written in English? Acquisition and life cycle sustainment philosophies vary significantly. Assum- ing that something can be fixed during the next “dot release” can quickly give way to the sobering realization that a 2- to 3-year funding and procurement process lies ahead. Most importantly, failing to test systems Soldier enters mission data into Blue Force Tracker system outside of simulation or command post aboard Light Armored Vehicle prior to patrol in Afghanistan environments naturally perpetuates assump- tions on interoperability and operator profi- U.S. Air Force (Michele A. Desrochers) ciency—assumptions that tend to evaporate ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 25 FORUM | Digital Gunnery awareness for one side of the alliance is the information. The quality and fidelity of data saw that process demonstrated, end-to-end, same as for the other. If different operational are also greatly improved, with brand new with real-world data? decisions are reached during the second half system patches developed just for Korea. For Forcing everyone to “follow the of the OODA loop (decide and act), at least we example, the Army’s Command Post of the electrons” across three components is an know it is not because of technical problems Future system now supports Unit Identifica- eye-opening process—from the SOF Joint in the first half (observe and orient). tion Codes, and the Global Command and Automated Deep Operations Coordination Control System (GCCS)–Army system now System (where the SOF order of battle is Successes supports the ability to import MIL–STD 2525 entered) to the Air Force Theater Battle Man- With over a year of experience in the combat effectiveness values from specially agement Core Systems (where no-fire areas Digital Gunnery program, the benefits have formatted (and USMTF-compliant) fields are established) to the Army Advanced Field far exceeded expectations. Improvements to in S507 messages. For the joint community, Artillery Tactical Data System (where artillery the COP are disproportionately higher than GCCS–J now supports additional fields in its fires are deconflicted with fire support control the amount of effort invested. For the first JUnit broadcasts—enhancing the fidelity of measures). Doing it across three components time, ROK leadership can see U.S. Blue Force the order of battle exchanged not only between and two nations is even more eye-opening. Tracker tracks in its COP—something that alliance partners and the United States, but was considered impossible only 12 months also among U.S. systems themselves. From Assuming to Proving ago. Synchronizing friendly orders of battle If all this sounds like “geek speak,” think From improving the accuracy, timeli- for U.S. and ROK forces at all echelons is now about how a master gunner, fighter weapons ness, and reliability of the COP to optimizing a reality, 24/7, in both armistice and crisis, as instructor, or naval gunnery instructor the integration of our C2 systems, the Digital well as for major theater exercises. speaks. To be digitally competent, we must Gunnery program is an ambitious concept Interoperability has been greatly understand all of this. that is long overdue. In fact, it serves as the improved not just for track accuracy and missing link in joint and coalition doctrine latency, but also for accountability. For What’s Next? for ensuring that friendly and enemy orders example, differences in how U.S. and ROK As the Digital Gunnery program heads of battle (for all components) is 100 percent software designers interpreted Military Stan- into its second year at CFC/USFK, we are now accurate for all alliance partners. It is the type dard (MIL–STD) 6040 for USMTF messages expanding its focus beyond its COP “roots” to of exercise program that we all talk about previously forced all U.S. operational tracks include the integration of C2 systems and data. doing, but almost no one actually does it. into the ROK exercise database, increasing the For example, we all know that the presence of If/when it is ever done, it is too late. risk of “data fratricide” with real-world impli- special operations forces (SOF) behind enemy In the high-tech world of systems, no one cations. Through Digital Gunnery, that is no lines generates fire support control measures deliberately tries to make COP and C2 nonin- longer an issue. and air control measures (for example, no-fire teroperable. Within each component or func- Operator proficiency is greatly improved, areas) to ensure our own forces are not inadver- tional community, systems work as designed with monthly opportunities for COP opera- tently struck by friendly airpower or artillery. and as advertised. The unforgiving reality of tors to group, filter, and display tracks along That is doctrine. But when was the last time coalition/alliance operations, however, cares with corresponding overlays and amplifying outside of crisis or war that any of us actually less about rigid compliance with one nation’s standards, message specifications, languages, or character sets. What matters more are flex- F–16s participate in U.S.–South Korean air force coalition flight over Kunsan Air Base ibility and a demonstrated commitment to make interoperability happen, especially if the underlying systems were designed for English- only operators in a U.S. joint environment. Simply put, a strong Digital Gunnery program changes our coalition COP and C2 culture from one that is assumed to work to one that is proven to work. It has applicability anywhere coalition forces operate—from Korea to Afghanistan and beyond. Most importantly, it benefits everyone—from commanders at echelon, all the way down to fielded forces. On the Korean Peninsula, as in Afghani- stan and any area of responsibility where men and women serve in uniform, we simply can never have enough situational awareness or end-to-end command and control when

U.S. Air Force (Jason Wilkerson) people’s lives are at risk. JFQ

26 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu U–2 Dragon Lady surveillance aircraft remains critical source of information- gathering for U.S. Central Command operational commanders

U.S. Air Force (Scott T. Sturkol)

Principles of (Information?)

War Fortune favors the brave. —Virgil, The Aeneid

By Francis Hsu f God did not favor America, fortune certainly did. In the two-plus centuries since 1776, just as the forces of globalization, industri- alization, technical innovations, democratic politics, and media I propaganda spread worldwide, America moved onto center stage. In history’s most competitive environment, winning wars and maintaining leadership in peace, America orchestrated those forces better than anyone. But what next? Another force—the spread of information in all varieties—is changing the landscape. How will America respond? Will America still be favored? In parks, towns, and cities all across the United States, weapons from past wars are displayed: armored personnel carriers, tanks, air- craft, and most often artillery pieces with cannon balls stacked in a pyramid pile close by. Despite the current wars in Southwest Asia, no one seriously considers putting these old weapons back into use. This is an advantage of hardware; it is physical and obeys natural laws. When it is obsolete, it is obvious. Francis Hsu is an independent researcher on At the onset of World War II, Major General John Kerr, the Army strategic issues. His work centers on the impact of Chief of Cavalry, still wanted to ride horses into combat. Army Chief information technology on society. He served in the of Staff General George C. Marshall knew that would not do. Of his U.S. Army in Vietnam with the 1st Infantry Division generation of Army officers, Marshall loved horses as much as anyone. and the Military Assistance Command–Vietnam He rode them often during the war as a form of exercise and relaxation. Headquarters. In short, he had nothing against riding horses, but he greatly opposed ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 27 FORUM | Principles of (Information?) War cavalry charges against mechanized enemies. contrast to the opening paragraph of Sun Tzu’s Boyd’s analysis is important for two Horses and cavalry are also forms of hardware, Art of War: “War is a matter of vital impor- reasons: air combat (in air-to-ground, ground- though few would think of them as such. But tance to the State; the province of life or death; to-air, and air-to-air modes) extended war they too are physical and obey natural laws. the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory into the third dimension for the first time in It is much more difficult to determine that it be thoroughly studied.”2 No equivoca- history; and despite its novelty, air combat—in the value of “software”—strategy, operational tion here—life or death, survival or ruin. its air-to-air mode—shows in a clean, simple art, tactics, doctrine, and principles of war— The next paragraph is the clincher. Sun form exactly how natural laws shape what is than of hardware. One reason is because such Tzu identifies the inherent property of all possible to do and how to win or lose. information-based assets are intangible and wars: they involve morality—that is, wars are What Boyd managed to do was to presumably never wear out. For example, human problems. This, of course, means the ground the mechanical maneuvering of air- “surprise” was useful in past wars, and it is perception of the just is vitally important—no craft in precise patterns to determine winners difficult to imagine a future when it will not obfuscation there. He continues with four and losers. What Carl von Clausewitz identi- be useful. However, not all software is of equal other factors: weather, terrain, command, and fied as friction for ground combat, Boyd did for value. It is time to reconsider which software doctrine. He explains the command factor air combat. But Boyd had several advantages is vital and why. Consider the principles of war as listed in U.S. Army Field Manual 3–0, Operations:1 humans operate in the world of the physical, in which everything must obey natural laws, and in the world of data, ■■ economy of force: allocate minimum in which natural laws do not apply essential combat power to secondary efforts ■■ maneuver: place the enemy in a posi- tion of disadvantage through the flexible appli- thus: “By command I mean the general’s over Clausewitz. Being ground-based, Clause- cation of combat power qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, witz had to deal with the thousands of moving ■■ mass: concentrate combat power at the courage and strictness.”3 Again, the emphasis parts of armies: individual soldiers, units, decisive place and time is on human-ness in war. commanders’ quirks, soldiers’ equipment, ■■ objective: direct every military opera- The nine principles of war as enunciated large cannons, bridges, mud, chokepoints, tion toward a clearly defined, decisive, and clearly lack coverage in important areas of war. missed communications, and wrongly inter- attainable objective So what is missing? The wider scope is quite preted commands. No wonder he had to invent ■■ offensive: seize, retain, and exploit the simple: humans operate in two vastly different the concept of friction to describe what can initiative domains. First, there is the world of the physical throw any army off course. It is not for nothing ■■ security: never permit the enemy to (hardware), in which everything must obey that an aphorism such as “for want of a nail, acquire an unexpected advantage natural laws; and second, there is the world of the battle was lost” came to be. ■■ simplicity: prepare clear, uncompli- data (software), in which natural laws do not Being air-based, Boyd had to deal with cated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure apply. Since these domains are different, how we only two objects: the dueling fighters. The thorough understanding use resources in either or both of them deter- physics of motion were well understood. He ■■ surprise: strike the enemy at a time, mines the outcome of production and destruc- had equations to describe how potential and at a place, or in a manner for which he is tion in society. Without this wider scope, infor- kinetic energies were gained and lost as the unprepared mation warfare, information operations, and fighters maneuvered in Earth’s gravity. Boyd ■■ unity of command: for every objective, cyber war are impossible to understand, much understood air combat physically because he ensure unity of effort under one responsible less execute, with any chance of success. felt it in flight during the Korean War. But he commander. was not satisfied with that. He learned physics Foundation Laying from entropy and beyond to know intellectu- Wars Ignore Boundaries In the physical domain, Colonel John ally why what he felt was the correct way to These nine principles reflect a strong Boyd explicitly tied fighter aircraft tactics to war act. In this way, he was one of the few true streak of American experience: war as capital- principles. That is, he recognized how impor- scientists of war. Boyd confirms for us that intensive industrial machinery for getting tant it was to exploit the energy-mass trans- even in the most modern form of warfare, air from A to Z. Except for the principles of sim- formations occurring during fighter combat: combat, the laws of nature must be obeyed. plicity, surprise, and unity of command, there fighter pilots, like gladiators, must know natural Boyd’s contribution was the end point is little hint that people are involved. Machines laws or face the consequences. In the principles of the trajectory of the American way of do simple things, but they do not command, of war, mass means to “concentrate combat war: philosophically mechanistic, industrial, lead, or manage thousands of items (people, power at the decisive place and time.” Boyd’s and capital-intensive. Both West Point and processes, and devices) with simplicity. We tactical maneuvers certainly do that. But Boyd Annapolis were started as engineering schools. know machines cannot impose or be affected loved dialectics and dual-use-ism; to him, the So technical competence, while initially not by surprise; neither can they practice unity of term also means how the physical mass of the always highly prized, was the bedrock of command. There is no doubt, however, that aircraft gains and loses energy potential during their founding. When the Industrial Revolu- machines can enact all the other principles, maneuvering. Mass embodies the concepts of tion that started in England jumped across perhaps even flawlessly. Consider this in both concentration and energy potential. the Atlantic, America was eagerly receptive

28 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HSU to the new technologies: steam engines, mass-produced automobiles, telephone, radio, Natural laws constrain humans physi- steel-making, railroads, mass-produced inter- road networks, air transport, radar, and other cally just as they do animals. However, once changeable parts, the telegraph. These formed innovations in the early 20th century. we started thinking and acquiring technology, the beginning of the American trajectory to This transformation was purely practi- that huge space called the unknown became greatness. Late in the 19th century, even as cal: that which survived was deemed good and the beachhead with an infinite horizon. Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany built battleships worthy. However, it leaves a large gap—that As our thinking and technology to compete with British battleships, America which is unknown or outside of one’s experi- expanded into the unknown, it also enlarged seemingly kept a low profile. But even then, ence. And with technological innovation, our physical reach. The spear, slingshot, and the great steel, railroad, and oil industries there is always a huge void in which no one has bow and arrow expanded the range of what an were spreading across the continent. By the any experience. In this transforming tsunami, individual could strike. By increasing striking early 20th century, Henry Ford perfected mass the principles of war found a home. After all, distance, it also provided some safety—at least mechanization. It barely helped in World War the principles were about a practical matter: until the victim learned to strike back. I, but it would prove to be the ultimate arbiter how to win. And in no practice can natural Technology was not the only scale that of victory in World War II. laws be violated. was expanding. Local populations that were

Air-to-air combat clearly shows how natural laws shape what is possible and how to win or lose U.S. Air Force (James L. Harper, Jr.) (James L. Harper, U.S. Air Force

Mobilizing for War Winning or losing, as the animal once isolated from others began growing, des- With perspective, we can see how all the kingdom shows, is a physical matter. The tined to eventually bump up against strangers tides of history rose to become the American outcome is bounded by scale, agility, strength, and often enemies. Though uneven, the expan- tsunami: the shelter of two oceans, unfettered timing, chance, and the unknown. Since sion of population and technology ensures that capitalism, labor mobility, valuing individu- World War II, scientists have documented clashes will occur. What defines these clashes? als, abundant resources, entrepreneurship, animals’ ability to coordinate group actions. How can we identify where they might occur? technological innovation, and minimal public Whereas we once marveled at how ants and While this short article cannot list all such pos- oversight. In such an unconstrained, free-for- bees managed their colonies, we now know sibilities, one is clearly identifiable: the FEBA. all environment, everything—people, ideas, about the group actions of dolphins, killer institutions, or technologies—seemingly had whales, hyenas, lions, penguins, and many A Boundary Defined . . . a chance to succeed. Such turmoil did destroy other species. Their group actions are all phys- FEBA is an old Army term for forward as much as it created. But that which it created ical. They are always immediate in space and edge of the battle area. Prior to the Vietnam and which survived transformed society: the time. The energy expended is muscle. Little or War, FEBA lines clearly separated friends railroad and telegraph in the 19th century; no thinking or technology is involved. from foes on battle maps. The term seems to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 29 FORUM | Principles of (Information?) War have faded from use in U.S. war experiences of simplicity: TFs 16–17 were hiding (security) over there; and second, the United States could since Vietnam and guerrilla wars in general. at Point Luck, massed to pounce (offensive) on transport its forces over there. The latter power The clarity that the term provides for today’s 1AF. TFs 16–17 also applied the economy of converged with the former situation to keep conflicts is much less certain. force principle. Nimitz’s force had much better America untouched for most of its history. Let us dissect FEBA: area asserts that unity of command than Nagumo’s and than This is America’s “managerial style of this is about land or geography of undeter- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s, which was war.” We do not take scalps or count enemies mined shape or size. Battle identifies this as a about 1,000 kilometers behind Nagumo at the killed (with the exception of the Vietnam War), dangerous and contested space. Edge says only start of the battle. enemy territory taken, capitals occupied, or part of this area is designated. And forward Admiral Yamamoto’s Midway operation treasures confiscated. Instead, we measure further restricts this area. FEBA has never was flawed from the start in several respects. people moved, tons shipped, distance traversed, been defined as 100 meters, 3.5 kilometers, or First, his plan was complex; it scattered his ammunition expended, and meals served. Note 10,000 kilometers deep. The size of a FEBA cor- many fleets across millions of square kilometers how every single metric measures some physi- relates with its significance. A FEBA between in the northern Pacific. Given the technologies cal, concrete thing governed by natural laws. two enemy squads or platoons is important available to him, this violation of the simplicity These were what America applied to the members but is not likely to determine principle destroyed his unity of command; his the principles of war on: economy of force, the outcome of a war. By contrast, the Battle of forces were scattered from the Aleutian Islands maneuver, mass, objective, offensive, and

understanding FEBA goes a long way toward understanding how America prefers to fight its wars: far away and over there

in the northeast to Saipan in the southwest—a others. These played to the strengths of distance of 5,946 kilometers. Five other prin- America: trucks, ships, aircraft, infrastruc- ciples—economy of force, maneuver, mass, ture, and organizational and managerial abili- objective, and offensive—fell into disarray in ties to get from A to Z. one fell swoop. For how could such scattered The American century was a triumph of forces maneuver economically to mass to a both war and peace. America reached that pin- single objective offensively? They could not. nacle not only because it could destroy better U.S. Air Force Second, though unknown to him, Yamamoto’s but, more importantly, because it produced F–117A stealth fighter bomber’s ability to elude element of surprise and security were gone better. America did not willfully set out to radar detection embodied principle of surprise in when Commander Joseph Rochefort4 broke the dominate the world. It managed to do so by Operation Desert Storm code that revealed his plan. Third, Nagumo was understanding and exploiting nature’s bounties assigned two objectives: support the Midway to produce for society at peace, knowledge that Kursk (July–August 1943) between the German invasion force, and sink whatever forces the U.S. was easily channeled to produce for war. This and Soviet armies occupied a frontage of a Navy sent to intercept him. This was a dilemma was dual-use long before the term was coined. few hundred kilometers and occupied tens of that confounded Nagumo. And finally, Yama- The most apt phrase is force multiplier: thousands of square kilometers. As large as that moto let his emotions dictate his strategy. Like we used science and technology for global was, it still does not compare with the Battle of all samurai warriors, Yamamoto was proud leverage before anyone else did. This type of Midway (June 1942), when the U.S. Navy sank to protect his Emperor. The Doolittle raid on global historical leadership is, by definition, four aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Tokyo, while causing negligible damage, morti- a passing phenomenon. When the Boeing Navy. In 4 days of maneuvering, that FEBA fied army and navy alike, and Yamamoto’s 747 began flying in 1970, it democratized air easily occupied several hundred thousand Midway plan got prompt approval.5 That is, travel to such an extent that it reshaped our square kilometers of ground space, not count- the Doolittle raid determined that the Battle of image of the world. After its debut, even the ing the 4,000 to 5,000 meters of vertical space Midway would take place. other side of the world was only half a day where aircraft flew. away. One did not have to be an American to The larger the FEBA, the more easily we Leverage Lost fly the plane—one had only to pay the fare can identify which principles of war played a Understanding FEBA goes a long way and go. Then, Intel microprocessors democ- role in its outcome. Doubtless, Vice Admiral toward understanding how America prefers ratized computing power and fiber optics; Chuichi Nagumo’s First Air Fleet (1AF) was to fight its wars: far away and over there. This, the Internet democratized communications; surprised to find Rear Admiral Frank Fletch- of course, is exactly the type of fortune that microchips made cell phones so cheap that er’s Task Forces (TFs) 16–17 on its left flank no one in the old world of Africa, Asia, and even the poor could afford high-tech prod- on the morning of June 4, 1942. That surprise Europe had. For them, it was literally every- ucts. The world landscape is changing. What reflected Admiral Chester Nimitz’s maneuver thing and their kitchen sink. For them, the once enabled America to fight over there can to put TFs 16–17 at Point Luck about 600 margins of error had greater consequences. now be reversed by adversaries to bring the kilometers northeast of Midway, waiting for America’s fortune of fighting over there fight over here. What was once far away and Nagumo. Nimitz’s maneuver was the essence was based on two facts: first, the conflict was difficult to reach can now be reached much

30 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HSU more cheaply and easily. What was once the build and maintain an expensive industrial America much more than it is costing al purview of the wealthy and powerful is now infrastructure. Recent cyber attacks show how Qaeda and Muslim extremists. Such strategic commonplace. this is being done. The principles of war that imbalance is imprudent. The 9/11 Commission recognized a served the United States so well during the The Greeks leveraged the triremes to dangerous truth: al Qaeda spent about $500,000 American century are showing their age. A good effect for generations. The Romans and 2 years to plan and execute its attacks.6 retooling is overdue. leveraged the legion to dominate for centuries. America has spent many billions of dollars for History does not sleep. Time keeps The British leveraged their fleets for almost almost 10 years to defend itself. This cost ratio moving on. During the American century, 200 years. The American century seems to be of attack versus defense cannot be sustained no we saw how specialized capabilities available peaking already. The American experience— matter how wealthy a society is. This form of only to the few enabled the West to dominate and ours—is different in this respect. The asymmetry is well understood by al Qaeda and the world. What globalization has done is to Romans did not supplant the Greeks because its followers worldwide. Their recent announce- generalize those capabilities and make them they built better triremes. The Barbarians did ment on their Web site confirms they know how cheaply available anywhere to anyone. This not supplant the Romans because they made to exploit this imbalance to our detriment.7 has upended some of the principles of war. better legions. The Americans did not supplant So the cost equations of war shifted What the FEBA defined with such clarity has the British merely because of better fleets, hugely in favor of the attack over the defense. again been blurred. The easy distinction of though America surely had them. America is Merely throwing money (or capital) at the “war” and “peace” has itself been called into being supplanted by tools and methods that it problem cannot solve it. We need to rethink question. Since 9/11, the U.S. Government provided. But more importantly, those tools the basis of strategy: the principles of war prac- has maintained that we are at war. Yes, but as and methods no longer impart dominance to ticed in the past. This will be tough, disruptive, a society, America is not fully mobilized for their employers. The situations in the Korean and unsettling for strategists everywhere. these wars. And more to the point, globalized Peninsula, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Get used to it; we either do it voluntarily, or trade and development—the historical signs elsewhere testify to the impotence of nuclear- because we are forced to (like after 9/11). of peace—have not abated. Kipling’s “savage armed nations to tame primitive tribalism. Washington’s recent creation of the U.S. wars of peace” are more apt than ever. There has been a tectonic shift in the Cyber Command makes clear that a whole nature of strategies because controlling physi- new domain of warfare has opened up. From . . . a Boundary Globalized cal means confers less advantage than in the what is publicly available, no doctrine, theory, The fortunes that favored America are recent past. Whatever new abstract means or principles have yet been established to historically unique. Vast untamed lands, exist are not yet known or ready to be used. govern this domain. rich resources, industrialization, democracy, The urgency is real. In the past 500 years, the West extended markets, innovations, and isolation from the What now? What next? Are the nine its reach globally both physically, with old world combined as an incubator for a new principles of war still relevant? Can they be hardware, and intellectually, with software. and different type of society. Through both retooled for the 21st century? Or do new prin- This two-front attack devastated the world war and peace, America spread the fruits of ciples need to be discovered? Who will fortune (including huge parts of the European West its production worldwide. In applying the favor next? JFQ itself). What the hardware conquests could principles of war through much of that time, not do, the software did do. America entered America exploited nearly all of the physical Notes the last half of this period mastering those endowments that Nature provided. That era 1 Field Manual 3–0, Operations (Washington, forces to dominate a world still uncomfortable is now over; those tangible physical means are DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June with Western ideas, values, and technologies. now the norm worldwide, thanks in no small 2001), 4–11. This forceful impact on “the Rest,” as the part to American proselytizing. 2 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. non-West has been called, has at least been In creating this new environment, what Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 63. absorbed by many Asian and South American once worked for America now works for 3 Ibid., 65. nations. They have taken the blows and are anyone. That competitive edge that America 4 Frederick D. Parker, A Priceless Advantage: now readjusting themselves to this new world. developed is now a commodity. The famous U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Today, whether the Rest like it or not, the dictum that “amateurs talk strategy, profes- Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutian West’s hardware has flooded the world. They sionals talk logistics” is now false. Today, Islands, Series IV, World War II, Vol. 5 (Washing- drink Coke, eat fast food, talk on cell phones, logistics management is an outsourced ton, DC: National Security Agency, 1993), 53. 5 compute on Wintel machines, surf the Inter- service that private companies such as Federal Matsuo Fuchida and Okumiya Masatake, Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan, The net, and fly in Boeing and Airbus aircraft. By Express and UPS do expertly. Do not mis- Japanese Navy’s Story (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval and large, they do not complain about using understand: logistics remains a complex and Institute Press, 1955), 71. these riches of a consumer society. difficult task, but as 9/11 and information 6 The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, But resistance remains to Western and, warfare show, moving tangible things is no DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), in particular, American “software” of the longer a prerequisite to having a huge impact. 172, available at . In this domain, the fight continues. The lack “boots on the ground” footprint is a liability. 7 Scott Shane, “Qaeda Branch Aimed for of clear boundaries is a plus for the defend- Dollar for dollar, life for life, our strategic Broad Damage at Low Cost,” The New York Times, ers: they can fight back without needing to efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are costing November 21, 2010, A16. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 31 Institutionalizing Economic Analysis in the U.S. Military The Basis for Preventive

Defense By Carl J. Schramm

Carl J. Schramm is President and Chief Executive Officer of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation.

Development agencies must approach efforts through eyes of local entrepreneurs, such as these vendors in Kabul, Afghanistan

U.S. Army (Teddy Wade)

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he United States has reached the as civilian agencies take on a greater share of simply a matter of a dearth of monetary and point of exhaustion in rebuilding this activity. intellectual resources. war-torn countries. At the same On a longer time horizon, however, we Instead, part of the problem is that the time the country downgraded should fully expect that the United States and U.S. military has been asked, and will again T its military forces will engage in economic operations in Iraq from combat to advisory be asked, to play a leading role in economy- status in 2010, the effort in Afghanistan reconstruction again and again, notwith- building, whether by default or express des- escalated on both the kinetic and nonkinetic standing the present level of weariness and ignation. Yet in matters related to economic fronts. Despite the strategy review undertaken calls for the military to pull back to its core development, the military has had to defer by the Obama administration last December function: warfighting. Reports on the future to the expertise of its partner agencies and and promises that the July 11, 2011, timeline operating environment and emergent threats contractors. To some extent, this is under- is really just a marker for assessment, there is facing the United States and its allies—such standable. The military has little economic a growing sense among policymakers and the as the Joint Operating Environment 2010 expertise of its own and, moreover, is expected public that the United States should get out of and the 2008 National Intelligence Council to fall in step with the mantra of interagency the nation-building business. Such sentiment is perfectly under- standable; we have heard over and over the at the core of Expeditionary Economics is the idea that the refrain that the United States should not people of any given country must own the economy engage in economy-building in places such as Afghanistan when we cannot even get our own economy in order. Concerns over govern- report Global Trends 2025—make clear that cooperation. But unfortunately, an inconve- ment debt also complicate matters. With debt economic growth across the world is never far nient truth has been overlooked: the expertise posing a threat to American economic health, from considerations of national security and one would hope to find in other agencies and can we really afford to keep spending money strategy.1 Whether the topic is intensifying contractors does not exist. on trying to jumpstart overseas economies? nation-state rivalry, resource competition, or Many in the military are acutely aware This is an especially serious argument in failing states, economic growth must be seen of this and are searching for alternatives. light of the coming struggles over how to as central to how we think about defense. Working with many within the military over reduce the Federal deficit—defense spending Consider, for example, a scenario in which the past year, the Kauffman Foundation has has already become a target because it is the North Korea collapses. There will clearly be an developed the emerging field of Expeditionary largest discretionary item in the budget. In economic dimension to the ensuing turmoil, Economics to help meet this demand.2 At the this light, moreover, the current balance of whether or not there is actual combat. Over core of Expeditionary Economics is the idea reconstruction resource allocation—tilted as the past decade, economic reconstruction that the people of any given country must own it is toward democracy promotion—should has come to be seen by some as merely a part the economy. Rather than a rehash of Marxist come under increased scrutiny and opportu- of counterinsurgency, but the North Korean political economy, this is an explicit recogni- nity cost analysis. economy would be a leading area of concern tion that part of America’s difficulties in Iraq Paradoxically, however, and perhaps for the United States and other countries in and Afghanistan stemmed from a focus on somewhat disappointingly to many observ- the event of utter collapse or even conven- large-scale reconstruction projects that made ers, this is precisely the moment at which the tional warfare. little connection with local populations and United States, particularly the military, needs aggravated underlying issues around power to engage in deep thinking about its approach The Need and corruption. In particular, for people to to postconflict economic reconstruction. In The proverbial observation is that the own their own economy means the forma- particular, the military should establish a new three Ds—defense, diplomacy, development— tion of indigenous commercial ventures. The institution, independent of political and bud- comprise the three-legged stool of foreign military and civilian development agencies getary cycles, for economic analysis related to policy but that development has consistently must approach their efforts through the eyes national security and strategy. been the short leg. This imbalance is some- of local entrepreneurs. While every country’s For one thing, in the immediate future, times ascribed to fewer resources allocated path to economic success is different, one the United States still has operational room in to civilian development. Secretary of Defense common thread running through economic Afghanistan and even Iraq to make a differ- Robert Gates has even gone so far as to request history—whether pertaining to the United ence in those countries’ emerging economic that monies allocated for foreign assistance States, China, Taiwan, India, or Brazil—is the trajectories. After nearly a decade in Afghani- to the Pentagon be redirected to the Depart- overriding importance of entrepreneurship to stan, economic development has come to be ment of State. Skeptical commentators in economic growth.3 seen as integral to any notion of sustainable the world of development economics would The centrality of new business forma- success. It now appears as if the United States say that there is good reason to shortchange tion has not been lost on the U.S. military. will maintain some level of force presence civilian development—that we generally have “Enterprise creation” is emphasized by coun- in Afghanistan for the next several years— little idea about fostering economic growth terinsurgency and stability operations field which means the U.S. military will continue in poor countries and that foreign aid can do manuals (FMs).4 FM 3–07, Stability Opera- to engage in economic reconstruction even more harm than good. But the problem is not tions, states:

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Host-nation enterprise creation is an essential and Development counts 26 Federal agencies a prominent think tank several months ago, activity whereby the local people organize in the United States that contribute in some one of its scholars asked us: “Which org chart themselves to provide valuable goods and ser- capacity to foreign aid and reconstruction. box does Expeditionary Economics go in?” vices. . . . Host-nation enterprises may provide Whole of government thus gives rise, almost How can the military expect to tap innovative various goods and services, including essential inevitably, to the interagency solution: with thinking when the expectation for any new services such as small-scale sewerage, water, so many actors involved, collaboration across idea is that it will simply be grafted onto the electricity, transportation, health care, and agencies becomes necessary to get anything existing bureaucratic structure as the new communications. The availability of financing done. Federal agencies like the State and “Bureau of” or “Office of”? through banking or microfinance institutions Defense Departments end up signing formal Part of the problem is something the is essential to enterprise creation.5 memoranda of agreement to resolve barri- military can do little about: the time cycles ers to cooperation. Yet when the problem is of policy and politics that in Washington, at Yet the efforts to promote such private defined solely in terms of “low collaborative least, operate almost to the exclusion of time sector development have consistently fallen capacity” across government agencies, it for deep thinking. For the military to circum- short in Iraq and Afghanistan and even in the operates as an intellectual constraint on any vent this, it must establish a new institution Balkans in the 1990s. Because the American proffered solutions. If only this or that agency devoted to the study and crafting of Expedi- military will face economic reconstruction could work together, the thinking runs, they tionary Economics and that will help push the tasks in the future, the United States needs could really get something done. The constant military and civilian development agencies to engender an independent capacity for eco- appeal to the interagency eventually turns into to engage in entrepreneurial thinking about nomic analysis within the military. an extreme example of bureaucratic navel- economic growth. gazing, and the interagency becomes the end Reforming the Development Apparatus in itself. When I visited Iraq in the spring of If-Then vs. What if In our work with a wide range of offi- 2010, one officer giving a briefing carried on Expeditionary Economics is one part cers and institutions in the military, we have about the interagency so much that several practical (what are the concrete objectives sensed that many parties wish to break out members of the audience were tempted to ask that can be achieved, and how do we get of the conventional box of consultants and for the address of this mythical organization. there?) and one part intellectual. Even as it contractors. This box has always defined the Likewise, the impulse to turn to estab- places indigenous entrepreneurship at the contours of debate, advice, and new ideas on lished experts engages yet another limiting forefront of postconflict reconstruction, economic reconstruction. For example, the factor if the goal is to have innovative solu- it demands that the military and civilian idea of a “whole-of-government” approach tions to problems that often have never arisen agencies approach the task not through the and talismanic references to “the interagency” before. The carefully calibrated dialogue that usual “if-then” framework but through the have dominated this box. Whole of govern- entrepreneurial lens of “what if.” A useful ment refers to the notion that, when engaging nonmilitary way to think about this distinc- in the reconstruction of a country such as time cycles of policy and tion is by considering the genesis of innova- Iraq, the effort should not be left solely to politics in Washington operate tions. Historically, in the U.S. economy and the Departments of Defense and State or the almost to the exclusion of elsewhere, breakthrough innovations are typi- U.S. Agency for International Development time for deep thinking cally achieved by entrepreneurs—outsiders to (USAID). Because American aid programs the establishment—while more incremental cover agriculture, education, health, and advances are the province of existing organi- business, it has seemed sensible to involve the government contractors sustain with their zations. Consider the automobile. There is a corresponding Federal agencies in foreign sponsoring agencies has been observed many good reason why tinkering machinists such assistance. So the Departments of Agriculture times to be inherently unimaginative. This as Ransom Olds and Henry Ford rather than and Commerce have come to have a say in is apparent in the case of many private sector horse-carriage companies were pioneers in reconstruction. This is not necessarily wrong, consulting firms, among them those with the commercializing and developing automobiles. but the very phrase whole of government most prestigious reputations for independent The same is true of the personal computer implies two things. First, it conceptually pre- thinking. When it comes to government, revolution. The innovation of the personal cludes any contribution from the American advice is inevitably tailored to make indi- desktop computer upset an entire established private sector, and, when such involvement vidual sponsors confirm thinking that might, industry, mainframe computers, and accord- does occur, it is mediated through the Federal among other things, help career advancement. ingly did not originate in that industry. Government. Second, the United States has Even think tanks, which are purportedly more Existing organizations whose success quite literally applied the whole of government independent, often have clear institutional and perpetuation are premised on established in Iraq and Afghanistan, bringing the full constraints (many times political) that are ways of operating usually approach problems force of the Federal bureaucracy and “counter- seldom mentioned. and solutions through the lens of what has bureaucracy,” as Andrew Natsios has written, Time and again, the Kauffman Founda- come before and rely on an inductive if-then to bear on reconstruction and development.6 tion and its collaborators on Expeditionary mode of innovating. By contrast, break- What inevitably occurs is a “too- Economics have run up against the default through innovations usually emerge from a many-cooks-in-the-kitchen” syndrome: the impulse of this established community of much more open what-if process of thinking. Organisation for Economic Co-operation thinkers. During a phone conversation with IBM looked at computing and said: If main-

34 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu sCHRAMM U.S. Air Force (Brian Wagner) U.S. Air Force

PRT engineer discusses erosion control project with Afghan contractors near Qalat frame computers are the dominant product, organizational innovation as well. The found- or another. The Defense Advanced Research then we will build those. Microsoft and Apple ers of the Mayo Clinic did not perceive that a Projects Agency is the most well-known ignored the logical lines of development world-class medical center was “needed” on example, but this would also include the adap- and asked: What if computing was radically the plains of Minnesota; they envisioned and tations made by individual soldiers and units reduced to the desktop level? It should be quite created it there. The founders of Habitat for on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan that apparent that if-then thinking, as presented Humanity saw an ever-present need for low- perhaps kept things from getting worse. The here, is a perfectly reasonable and indeed cost housing for the less affluent, but there official history of the Iraq War, On Point, is natural approach to innovating. What-if was no demand for providing it in the creative filled with examples of such adaptations. The thinking can only succeed sometimes because way they envisioned (that is, not until they Commander’s Emergency Response Program it originates outside of the establishment. brought that method to fruition; then it was is probably the best-known example of this, If-then thinking is also pervasive across wanted everywhere). Astute and imaginative but tactical units all over Iraq and Afghani- the military, and for a good reason: strategists military thinkers—especially those who have stan devised reconstruction strategies and and planners must inductively conceive of a been on the ground in occupied countries— action for their areas of responsibility: “All wide range of possible futures from present have special knowledge that few others in the Soldiers had to become [Civil Affairs] officers scenarios and what the responses would be. world have, and they have the opportunity to and many became engineers. Most were not Yet it might not be appropriate for situations apply that knowledge in ways beyond imagin- trained to manage even the smallest recon- when soldiers and officers and aid workers ing for the rest of us. struction project. Yet they often embraced face the daunting task of rebuilding a shat- their new role as nation-builders.”7 tered economy. Instead, we must think like The Military Is Innovative The challenge now is to institutionalize entrepreneurs and ask the sort of questions It may strike many as contradictory that the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan they would ask. What if this was true? What the U.S. military should want to seek out new (as well as from prior reconstruction episodes if we imagined this trajectory? What if we did and innovative ideas. Many associate the mili- that perhaps have not been adequately studied such and such? tary with rigid hierarchy rather than fertile or absorbed by the military). The word insti- Entrepreneurial thinking entails an ground for innovation. Yet, as mentioned, the tutionalize, of course, immediately suggests approach that is not only more proactive, military has borne the burden of an unde- something bureaucratic, but we have in mind but also much more imaginative. The most veloped capacity for economic development something more fundamental: building an transformative entrepreneurs in business and is determined to be better prepared for independent economic analytic capacity for envision or create market needs rather than the next assignment. And it does possess a the military. Importantly, such a capacity “filling” them, something we see in terms of history of supporting innovation in one way requires a strong role to be played by civilians, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 35 SPECIAL FEATURE | Institutionalizing Economic Analysis particularly those with expertise and experi- likely should not be located in Washington, military becoming the driving force for a new ence in economic development and recon- which is not a small matter. There is a reason realism in economic science. struction. This should be approached as a way that General David Petraeus was able to So what would such an entity look to help not only the military but also our aid successfully develop a new doctrine of coun- like? Titles are such that no organization’s agencies to break out of the bureaucratic con- terinsurgency at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. name can capture the full scope of its raison fines within which they are trapped. As noted above, Washington time cycles can d’être, especially as its work shapes its very militate against reflective thinking, and this nature over time. But a name such as the Military Economic Analysis Institute Armed Forces Institute on the Economics of What is envisioned is not the construc- Security and Strategy would be broad enough tion of another task force or unit that takes the military’s pragmatic to include a variety of programs under its “off the shelf” economics and applies them culture and its quest for what auspices and would sufficiently convey its to military issues. Rather, it begins from the really works could force the intended methodological approach—that assumption that an entirely independent emergence of Expeditionary is to say, economic analysis. As suggested organization should exist to conduct analysis Economics by the predicates laid down thus far, the and speculative theorizing around the what-if institute’s focus would be on developing questions that are particular to military effective approaches to economic develop- planning. There are few parallels, in terms institution would need to be separate from the ment in instances of American intervention, of analytical substance, to the experiences of daily and weekly give-and-take of policy and including preconflict (preventive defense), line officers of the 10th Mountain Division in politics in Washington. during conflict, and following conflict. Its the field. Such an organization, devoted to specu- purview should also include the study of and Elsewhere, researchers at the Kauffman lative economics in the realm of geopolitical preparation for economic development in Foundation have proposed the recreation of power relationships independent of the Penta- postdisaster scenarios, such as the January a School of Military Government along the gon but existing solely to support U.S. military 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the floods in lines of the school that was established in 1940 thinking, might provide the imaginative Pakistan last summer. at the outset of World War II. The analytic challenges to both military policy and devel- The institute’s principal discipline institution proposed here could conceivably opment economics. In the end, the military’s would be economic analysis. In this regard, be connected with such a school. This institu- pragmatic culture and its quest for what really its name would align it with the military’s tion would not be a contracting agency but works could force the emergence of a new unique capacity to advance other disciplines rather a permanent entity that has the capacity kind of economics, Expeditionary Econom- because of its singular experience. The to provide completely independent economic ics. Not only would development economics Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and analysis to military theorists and planners. benefit from the pressure of testing theory the Armed Forces Institute of Regenerative Ideally, it would have the capacity to follow a in rapid succession in real circumstances, Medicine were created because the medical speculative chain wherever it might lead and but the whole arena of future international needs that arose in combat had such limited present the findings to American military contests, which could change the concept of parallels in civilian sector medicine (or so it leadership whether asked for or not. And it warfare itself, might result from the American was thought) that there was little practical medicine that could be applied in the par- ticular conditions of warfare. As it has turned out, by creating its own capacity to discover and elaborate medical knowledge in the worlds of trauma, communicable diseases, and rehabilitation, military medicine has

U.S. Navy (Rufus Hucks) been able to make enormous contributions to medical knowledge and practice as applied throughout the civilian world. The Armed Forces Institute on the Economics of Security and Strategy might hold the similar promise of expanding the discipline of economics. The questions posed in the context of being able to bring about significant growth in various stagnant econo- mies and establish economic ecosystems that are sustainable and that lead to expanding human rights and the coming of democratic institutions are ones not well developed in Microgrants, designed to stimulate local economies from bottom up, conventional economic theory. In graduate are distributed at Joint Service Station Tal Abtha, Iraq schools of economics, it is rare to hear the question: How do you start an economy over,

36 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu sCHRAMM or restart one destroyed by conflict? Indeed, produce strategies that may in the long run from the beginning, skeptical of conventional the American record of being unable to point prevent conflict by establishing job-creating economic doctrine, especially as it relates to to instances of real economic development in regimes and in the near term produce action- development theory. While it would be good countries where our aid policies have been at able plans that have a demonstrably greater to have staff members who are military offi- work over decades supports this observation. capability of bringing about growth in post- cers, it must be appreciated that the culture of The institute, driven as it must be by crafting conflict and disaster settings than prevailing the institute would require long-term stays so a theory of economic practice that can guide development practice. the collective work of the team of researchers action that brings forth undeniable economic Third, it must develop its own ways continuously expands. For military analysts, expansion, could work as an enormous force of thinking and its own vocabulary. The appointment to the institute staff might be for clarifying domestic economic policy. institute must appreciate that like the other seen as a career capstone, much as a senior In order for the needed practical alterna- disciplinary-based institutes, it should absorb faculty position at one of the military acad- tive to received development theory to emerge economic theory that applies to the questions emies might be. The institute might be guided within the institute, there are obvious orga- at hand, but it must also test and develop by a civilian head, but not out of necessity. It nizational considerations that must operate. new theory that is required to solve practical would be a particular achievement if a mili- At least five predicates must be in place for it problems. Its method should be to assert that tary professional could be found who would to be successful. First, it must be independent theory always precedes the development of be uniquely suited to manage the institute in its financing and operations. While com- practical solutions but that a high degree of over a prolonged period. Again, the career risk plete independence from the Pentagon may skepticism exists for all theoretical postulates. is such that appointment to this post would be not be feasible, its resource needs should be In this regard, the institute’s intellectual seen as a career capstone. arranged outside of normal budget cycles and culture must be self-referential; its standard of Finally, as noted, the institute should be constraints. Ideally, a private, public, or mixed excellence is shaped from within, not accord- physically removed from Washington, DC. endowment–type funding base would be ing to what the leading graduate programs Because it is a joint force asset, it might be established, much like an independent foun- are doing. Its staff must not care what “real” located on neutral ground. Just as in the past dation. This is required to ensure as much as economists might think of this work. The certain research-intensive assets have been possible the freedom to follow various lines of institute’s task, namely economic expansion, located proximate to university campuses, inquiry wherever they might lead. Relating to its operations, while the institute is housed within the military and is the institute must absorb economic theory that applies to the respectful of that culture, the military must questions at hand, but it must also test and develop new theory regard it as having the objective credibility that attaches to medicine: it deals with reality in a way not influenced by political judgment is an area where civilian economists have little given the central role that new firm formation or prevailing military or civilian doctrine. It is record on which to stand—or from which to plays in any emerging theory of development, a place purposely set up to be independent and resist new insight from institute scholars. it might be well advised to place it in the is chartered to develop new theory—ideas that The institute should set out to develop middle of a business incubation campus. when put into practice really work to bring an approach whereby its engagement with the Of course, while the institute is decid- about economic development. Because of the Defense Department and other agencies is edly an asset of the military, it should nev- nature of its funding and its capacity to deliver managed using the vocabulary and rhetori- ertheless be founded as a bridge that plays a new insight that might be unconventional cal conventions that it devises, appropriate particularly important role in changing the and easily dismissed, the organization must to leveraging its insights into doctrine that theory and doctrine of the State Department be free to militate for doctrine and policy that governs actions on the ground. The military relating to overseas development work as well reflect its understanding of economic matters did just this as it invented what it called the as the approach to economic growth that as it has established them. This is the only way field of trauma medicine and the ways in animates USAID. In fact, its presence might the institute can make a difference in doctrine which it described its theory and practice. One be welcomed by USAID as an institution over the long run. benefit of this approach was that, as it was independent of Federal budget cycles that per- Second, it should be seen as an asset that applied, it required physicians and nurses to petually operate as a constraint on the ability informs, but does not operationally report conceive of the conditions of traumatic chal- of USAID to develop a substantive in-house to, the Secretary of Defense or Joint Chiefs of lenges to the body and their treatment in ways economic development capacity. Staff. As in all military resources, it is legally other than the expected or received ones. within the custodianship of the Joint Chiefs; Fourth, the institute should be staffed Current Development operationally, it functions without seeking with particularly curious individuals whose At a much larger level, of course, serious primary direction from the Secretary or Joint formal training equips them for the rigors of thought needs to be given to how the United Chiefs, neither does it take its near-term pri- scholarship that is different from that which States overhauls or reorients its civilian devel- orities from them. The institute is a long-ball they would perform in a university or think opment capabilities for the coming decades. organization focused on how economic analy- tank setting. The work and culture of the This, obviously, cannot be the concern of sis, coupled with complementary analytic institute compel joint efforts as the métier of the Defense Department, but the creation resources (for example, demography), can the organization. Those recruited must be, of a capacity for strategic economic analysis ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 37 SPECIAL FEATURE | Institutionalizing Economic Analysis

within the U.S. military is an unavoidable 4 U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3–24/Marine NEW part of this larger conversation. There will Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3–33.5, The U.S. from NDU Press continue to be numerous instances in which Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field the instigation of economic growth in certain Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, for the Institute for 2007); FM 3–07, The U.S. Army Stability Operations countries furthers international security, but National Strategic Studies Field Manual (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan in which an American military intervention Press, 2009). is neither necessary nor feasible. In those 5 FM 3–07. cases, U.S. civilian capabilities must be up to 6 See Andrew S. Natsios, “The Clash of the challenge; ideally, this proposed institute the Counter-Bureaucracy and Development,” would inform those efforts as well. Center for Global Development, July 2010, avail- The approach advocated here and else- able at . See also Todd Moss, “Too Big to rhetorical argument for what is pejoratively Succeed? Why (W)Hole-of-Government Cannot called nation-building. There should be Work for U.S. Development Policy,” available at serious doubt concerning the ability of the . U.S. Government—military or civilian—to 7 Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, transform entire societies. What is beyond On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The doubt is that economic growth elsewhere in United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the world will be critical to national security May 2003–January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: st and strategy in the 21 century, and the Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008). United States must prepare accordingly. The establishment of the Armed Forces Institute INSS Strategic Perspectives 3 on the Economics of Security and Strategy, Russia’s Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, dedicated to rigorous thinking about the and Opportunities for the United States abilities and limitations of the United States to by John W. Parker foster such growth, would be a positive force for the shaping of strategy. JFQ Nearly three decades since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia has high ambitions Notes for a return to great power status. With 1 abundant resources, its nuclear power U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), status, and United Nations veto power, The Joint Operating Environment 2010 (Suffolk, VA: Russia will retain the ability to project USJFCOM, 2010); National Intelligence Council power beyond its own borders across a (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World large swath of former Soviet territory. Such (Washington, DC: NIC, 2008). 2 aspirations, however, are tempered by the See Carl J. Schramm, “Expeditionary realities of its social, economic, and military Economics: Spurring Growth after Conflicts shortcomings and vulnerabilities. Russia and Disasters,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2010); likely is facing the prospect of decades of Rebecca Patterson and Dane Stangler, Building decline relative to other global powers. As Expeditionary Economics: Understanding the Field a result, Moscow sees the West as crucial and Setting Forth a Research Agenda, Kauffman to Russian modernization and seeks to Foundation Research Series on Expeditionary Eco- strengthen ties with Europe and the United nomics No. 1, November 2010, available at . For for U.S. diplomacy and strategy to move a record of the proceedings at the inaugural confer- Russia toward positive change. ence on “Entrepreneurship and Expeditionary Eco- nomics,” held in conjunction with the Command and General Staff College Foundation in May 2009, see . 3 See David S. Landes, Joel Mokyr, and William J. Baumol, eds., The Invention of Enter- prise: Entrepreneurship from Ancient Mesopotamia to Modern Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Carl J. Schramm, “Building Entrepre- neurial Economies,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 2004); Tarun Khanna, Billions of Entrepreneurs: How China and India are Reshaping their Futures— Visit the NDU Press Web site and Yours (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2007). for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

38 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Geological Survey personnel perform site survey to find minerals LOVE and Geary that may result in mining jobs for Afghans

U.S. Marine Corps (Sarah Furrer)

Expeditionary Business IN THE 21ST CENTURY

By robert e. love and steve r. geary

Conditions change. Objectives change. Strategies change. And we must change. If we don’t, we will lose.1

e live in a dangerous Fortunately, a number of countries have in failed and failing states need hope, and world. The unfortunate made progress (Rwanda, Ghana, Liberia, hope requires the belief in a better tomorrow truth is that when one Uganda, the Balkan nations, and Northern for all of our children. But hope alone is not danger fades, another Ireland, to name a few). There have been enough. It must be accompanied by real and W credible action. appears. And nobody has yet come up with a numerous cases of government transfers of reliable crystal ball to predict what the next power without the threat of violence or civil Indeed, peace and prosperity walk danger will look like. unrest. But in terms of a “return on invest- hand in hand, but prosperity—delivered by a For too many years, the governments ment” (over $1 trillion by the United States healthy and growing economy—is the prov- of the developed world have poured their alone in the last few decades), the results have ince of business. hearts, souls, and national treasures into been marginal. Citizens of Sudan, Somalia, fractured or failed states in an effort to East Timor, and many other countries A New World Order establish or restore functioning societies, continue to live below the poverty level and Author Rita Mae Brown wrote, “Insan- improve quality of life, and integrate the without the benefit of reliable, credible, and ity is when you keep doing the same things states into the global family of nations. Much compassionate civil government. expecting different results.” The world is a has been written on the benefits and perils So what is to be done, and by whom? Is it different place than it was during the colo- of unrestrained aid packages, soft loans, and solely the province of governments to improve nial and Cold War timeframe. The time has government-sponsored attempts at rehabili- economies and reduce violence? On the arrived for a new and focused approach to tating these impoverished nations. ground, where reality defeats rhetoric, people supporting a stable world. The 21st-century

Robert E. Love is Director, Strategic Initiatives, Systems Engineering Solutions, BAE Systems, Inc. Steve R. Geary is President of Supply Chain Visions, Inc. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 39 SPECIAL FEATURE | Expeditionary Business environment can be characterized as having organizations (NGOs), international gov- reducing corruption, and facilitating cultur- a dynamic security threat—including the ernmental organizations, and the business ally acceptable best business practices is both rising tide of radical and violent pan-national community. Campaign plans for stability socially responsible and good for business. religious fundamentalism, interdependent operations are complex strategies spanning This approach allows for the opening of new mutually supporting international economies civil security, civil control, essential services, markets while creating a viable, honorable (abhorrent to the type of radical religious governance, economic development, and alternative employment option to those who might otherwise be drawn to terrorist cells. Hiring local nationals (versus third country peace and prosperity walk hand in hand, but prosperity— nationals) is good for business, good for the delivered by a healthy and growing economy— local economy, and good for civil society. is the province of business Terrorists prey on the unfortunate to do their bidding. They breed instability and destroy market opportunities. fundamentalism espoused by the Taliban), infrastructure development, wrapped within Governments and the private sector and colossal global environmental challenges. offensive and defensive operations. Within must work together in an environment of As Tom Friedman so eloquently posits in his this complexity, there is a consistent thread: trust to combat radicals and thugs who bestseller of the same name, the world is flat. while many things are required, it is always threaten human security. What is required is Today, in the hallways of power around true that stability operations inherently controlling and directing “the spend”—that is, Washington, it has become fashionable to include some element of business solutions— converting business operations into a tool that talk about “whole-of-government” efforts, the policies, processes, data, technology, and can be used to mitigate threats. bringing together the elements of defense, people—available forward in the expedition- On the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, diplomacy, and development to craft sustain- ary operations environment to win the battle Africa, or anywhere in the developed and able solutions. Unfortunately, this line of for hearts and minds and thereby secure the developing world, there is a need to push thinking often does not go far enough. Private peace. Generating business, creating and business solutions forward, linking together industry and commercial enterprise are often sustaining legitimate jobs, and improving capabilities from a variety of sources. The the critical and overlooked link in a truly the quality of life will go a long way toward business community cannot sit idly by while comprehensive solution set. The private sector eradicating terrorism. Putting a pair of government forces combat terrorism. Ter- has a valuable role to play in responding to wingtip shoes on the ground, in addition to rorism affects all of us; it restricts freedom of this new world order, but it is as a catalyst, a or in lieu of boots on the ground, can be an movement, impedes free trade, increases costs, collaborator, and an integrator. By using inno- important part of creating sustainable prog- threatens employees, and limits the market. vative approaches to opening new markets, ress in failing states. It is about creating unity of effort improving capacity in developing nations, and The role of multinational corporations without unity of command. Governments can leveraging legitimate and acceptable business (MNCs) in supporting good governance, and must establish and enforce the law, set standards tailored to fit with local customs, the private sector can fulfill its responsibility and improve the quality of life for impover- Admiral Mullen, then–Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, and Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer Tina Jonas testify at House Appropriations ished people while concurrently generating Subcommittee hearing revenues that will sustain the momentum. Practical economic initiatives, both DOD (Cherie A. Thurlby) macro and micro, are required to support the evolution of capabilities throughout the developing world. No longer can we reach back behind the line for business solutions and capabilities to capitalize on soft power. Business solutions, as well as complementary essential capabilities such as rule of law exper- tise, must be pulled forward as an instrument for stability operations and as a component of smart power. Security and economic stability precede an effective and stable government. They go hand in hand—not sequentially. The Cold War is over. In pre- and postconflict situations, stability operations are emphasized. Stability operations must use a broad array of nonki- netic capabilities resident in the U.S. Govern- ment, coalition partners, nongovernmental

40 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu LOVE and Geary U.S. Army (Jeanita C. Pisachubbe)

Election officials and Afghan National Police in Baghlan Province deliver ballots to CH–47 Chinook helicopter

standards, and encourage investment. Busi- behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most Sometimes insurgents foster the conditions nesses must have the freedom to establish rela- importantly, the people in between.’” The keeping the economy stagnant in order to tionships, develop investment and business likelihood of a successful outcome is increased create discontent and foster antigovernment opportunities, and bring or add legitimacy by the influence provided by traditionally opposition. Opponents attempt to exploit by leveraging their accepted and recognized nonmilitary activities such as economic a lack of employment or job opportunities business practices to developed nations. development, infrastructure reconstruction, to gain active and passive support for their employment generation, and humanitarian cause and ultimately to undermine the gov- Expeditionary Business interventions. Frequently, needed business ernment’s legitimacy. Unemployed males of The emerging 21st-century security envi- capabilities reside outside of the government. military age may take up arms to provide for ronment of soft power projection and highly Some call this a collaboration challenge, but in their families.2 visible collaboration outside of traditional truth it is a partnership opportunity, a chance One of the key obstacles to establish- military operations will continue to require to bring the full suite of capabilities to bear to ing stability in Iraq was the inability to get new visibility tools, collaboration technolo- overcome the forces of tyranny while spurring the economy going. A senior military leader gies, information flows, economic expertise, economic growth. asking for a business solution in a country and support processes in the capability set, Economic development in pre- and emerging from the depths of instability adapted to bring peace to a developing nation postconflict situations includes both short- observed, “A relatively small decrease in in a multinational, austere, and forward expe- and long-term aspects. The short-term aspect unemployment would have a very serious ditionary operations context. concerns immediate problems, such as large- effect on the level of sectarian killing going At the Senate Budget Committee scale unemployment and reestablishing an on.”3 According to Keith Mines, Governance hearing of February 12, 2008, Deputy Sec- economy at all levels. The long-term aspect Coordinator for Anbar Province in Iraq, retary of Defense Gordon England testified involves stimulating indigenous, robust, and “If economic tools will not compensate for that “the challenges we confront today defy broad economic activity. The stability a nation the lack of a viable political and security an exclusively military solution and demand enjoys is often related to its people’s economic framework, they can nonetheless be a major an integrated approach. Secretary [of Defense situation. Without a viable economy and support to counterinsurgency efforts in Robert] Gates has said that, in the future, employment opportunities, the public is likely support of a well-crafted strategy, especially at ‘Success will be less a matter of imposing to pursue the false promises of those seeking the local level. To be effective, they should be one’s will and more a function of shaping to undermine freedom and democracy. short-term, focused on people, and flexible.”4 ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 41 SPECIAL FEATURE | Expeditionary Business

Indeed, MNCs are large, monolithic enter- of enterprise capabilities in a new context. paid to ensure that required business skill sets prises that tend to follow long-term strategic For this reason, business capabilities must are embedded into the expeditionary business plans and may not consistently demonstrate continue to grow to secure the peace, just as environment. the attribute of flexibility. Nonetheless, they military capabilities evolve to meet the threats Welcome to the 21st century, the era of can play a vital role in counterinsurgency of the future. business savvy and interagency collaboration operations by adapting their modus operandi The challenge facing the private sector as a necessary instrument for world peace. JFQ to the expeditionary environment. is in how to make a business case to engage The government needs access to entre- actively and support the effort, sooner rather Notes preneurial savvy. But where will the business than later. For stability operations to succeed, 1 G. Terry Madonna and Michael Young, savvy come from? According to Theresa hard and soft power activities must take “Fighting the Last War,” June 4, 2002, available Whelan, former Deputy Assistant Secretary place concurrently. Yet too often, Western at . in a vacuum. Stability and security are to investment, but without business activity, a 2 Selected points from Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquar- ters Department of the Army, December 2006), U.S. troops are still fighting the war, and the Chinese 5-46, 5-48. have already moved on to the business of developing the peace 3 Josh White and Griff Witte, “To Stem Iraqi Violence, U.S. Aims to Create Jobs,” The Washing- ton Post, December 12, 2006. 4 Keith W. Mines, “Economic Tools in interlinked with other elements such as good more secure environment cannot develop. An Counterinsurgency and Postconflict Stabilization: governance, the rule of law, and economic overly developed sensitivity to risk puts the Lessons Learned (and Relearned) in al Anbar, 5 opportunity.” By having interagency person- private sector into an irresolvable Catch-22 Iraq, 2003–04,” Foreign Policy Research Institute nel with different areas of expertise integrated and precludes the opportunity to capitalize on E-Notes, September 28, 2006, available at . fulfill its duty. “This does not represent an Western business community cannot sit idly 5 Steven Donald Smith, “Africa Command acquisition by the command of authority,” by while government forces combat terror- Poised to Help Continent’s Security, Stability,” Secretary Whelan stated. “It represents simply ism, a more fundamental issue is in play. If American Forces Press Service, September 21, 2007. 6 an acquisition of knowledge.” To be sure, the the business community does not collaborate James Risen, “U.S. Identifies Vast Riches of U.S. Agency for International Development and participate in stability operations before a Minerals in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, June 14, 2010, A1. and Department of State, as well as NGOs, the secure environment emerges, it is in fact doing World Bank, private sector, and other stake- a disservice to stockholders. In the world of holders, bring subject matter expertise. venture capital, early participation is called Economic stabilization consists, in part, first-mover advantage. of the restoration of employment opportuni- The United States has discovered nearly ties and the regeneration of market activity. $1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in This is a challenge, a requirement for business Afghanistan. It includes huge veins of iron, solutions that often extends into the diplo- copper, cobalt, gold, and critical industrial matic, information, and economic arenas. metals such as lithium. Today, the largest developer of minerals in Afghanistan is Different Results China, the winner of the development rights The challenges facing the private sector to the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province.6 are many, but the opportunities are infinite. China, a nation with ostensibly a communist Corporate leaders must have the vision to: economy, is outmaneuvering the capitalist economies of the West in high-risk environ- ■■ identify strategic business cases (tai- ments. U.S. troops are still fighting the war, lored to developing nations) and the Chinese have already moved on to the ■■ mitigate risk (to employees, shareholders, business of developing the peace. and indigenous populations) in innovative ways The diversity of needs at the tip of the ■■ team with nontraditional partners spear means that monolithic enterprise solu- (such as NGOs) tions conceived thousands of miles out of ■■ create and sustain capacity (while harm’s way to address strategic requirements maintaining revenue streams). may not readily link to reality on the ground. Care must be taken to weave and integrate The use of private sector capabilities in the needs of the forward environment into developing nations is simply the application stability operations, and attention must be

42 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SAVINGS and the Defense Logistics Enterprise

By C.V. CHRISTIANSON

I am directing the military services, the joint staff, the major functional and regional commands, and the civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing look at how they operate—in substance and style alike.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates U.S. Navy (Kelly Chastain)

Floating causeway delivers relief aid from Military Sealift Command ships in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, USA (Ret.), is the Director of the Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics at the National Defense University. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 43 SPECIAL FEATURE | Savings and Defense Logistics

want to take this opportunity to voice my strong support for Department of Defense (DOD) efficiency initiatives I and to encourage further thought and discourse about whether these initiatives will be enough to deliver the kind of savings neces- sary to produce affordable, sustained defense (Margo Wright) U.S. Air Force capabilities for the long-term support of our national security requirements. Global uncer- tainty, regional volatility, and the growing complexity of our security environment are combining to challenge us like never before. Add to this potent mix the clear and present need to reduce and reshape defense expen- ditures, and we find ourselves confronting a gauntlet of difficult and risky decisions that will shape our security capabilities for years to come. In this ambiguous environment, Tinker Air Force Base personnel celebrate kickoff of $2.9 billion computer and ground systems defense logistics has necessarily become an upgrade to Air Force E–3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft area of focus for those who are determined to make a difference. to help transform defense logistics in ways cant long-term costs. I do not mean to imply that would not only reduce resource require- that the current initiatives are not needed; The Challenge ments, but also enhance the effectiveness of these actions are absolutely essential. Rather, Secretary Gates, in his May 8, 2010, the outcomes the community is responsible I am proposing that a longer-term view is just Eisenhower Library speech in Abilene, to deliver. Thus, phrased as a question, are we as critical—maybe even more so—to meet the Kansas, laid the foundation for savings in the looking deep enough to deliver the sustain- imperative of reducing the defense logistics defense “business” by directing a series of able savings needed? costs that deliver operational capabilities. wide-ranging efficiencies designed to deliver Logistics is arguably the largest con- more than $100 billion in overhead savings sumer in the defense budget. Therefore, if A Framework over the next 5 fiscal years, starting in fiscal we are to achieve realistic savings over time, I see three fundamental areas where year 2012: logistics will have to play a predominant role the defense logistics community can generate in generating those savings. At the same time, significant long-term savings while improv- The goal is to cut our overhead costs and logistics is also the common thread linking ing outcomes to the operating force. The to transfer those savings to force structure the operational ends of our national security first area is best described as supply chain and modernization within the programmed with the resources of the Nation. As a result, operations and management, the network of budget. In other words, to convert sufficient there are risks involved in generating signifi- “tail” to “tooth” to provide the equivalent of cant savings across the logistics enterprise. the roughly two to three percent real growth— Probably the greatest paradox in gener- the most meaningful and resources needed to sustain our combat power ating savings is time—the natural tendency to relevant savings in the defense at a time of war and make investments to focus on delivering near-term results is often logistics community may not prepare for an uncertain future. Simply taking at odds with achieving long-term savings. provide immediate return on a few percent off the top of everything on a Current initiatives are focused on delivering our investments one-time basis will not do. results over the next 5 years—the length of the DOD programming horizon—but I believe The last sentence of the statement is that the most meaningful and relevant savings organizations, information, and processes fundamental to the thesis of this article: We in the defense logistics community may not responsible for responding effectively to cannot achieve the wide-ranging improve- provide immediate return on our investments. the changing requirements of the operat- ments he envisioned if we remain focused on Focusing on short-term savings could lead to ing forces. The second area exists within a delivering “one-time” savings. I would like to a vision and strategy concentrated on targets philosophy and culture of life-cycle systems propose a view of how we might reach beyond of opportunity while continuing many of management, a framework responsible for the the current initiatives and realize even the expensive and inefficient practices that design, development, production, sustain- deeper, longer-term systemic savings in the increase enterprise costs. Just extinguishing ment, and disposal of the systems/capabilities defense logistics enterprise without creating the “fires at our feet” could create long-term needed by the operating forces. The third unmanageable risk to the operating forces. risk by imparting a sense of accomplishment area is related to resourcing national security This idea is offered as a starting point—to based on near-term savings while avoiding the strategy, the ability of senior logistics leaders encourage the serious dialogue necessary downside impacts of cumbersome processes to manage national resources with business to promote change and, in a perfect world, and bureaucratic structures that drive signifi- discipline and to develop alternatives in the

44 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CHristianson context of cost, operating results, and return will not have the resources to give support Increasing efficiency and productivity on investment. at any cost; therefore, we have to optimize separately from the processes that drive how These three areas of emphasis represent activities so the supply chain delivers what we buy and sustain systems investments a high-level framework within which we can address long-term improvements to the way the separation of execution from budgeting will not facilitate the defense logistics enterprise does its busi- ness. These areas will help us focus on the the synergy between acquisition and sustainment necessary quality of leader decisions, the efficiency of to reduce systems’ life-cycle costs logistics processes, and the effectiveness of relationships that are fundamental to driving the operational force requires—at a price our does not support LCSM. A pervasive culture sustainable change and continuous improve- nation can afford. of life-cycle systems management would ment in the defense logistics enterprise. Life-cycle Systems Management. We certainly generate significant gains in produc- Supply Chain Operations and Manage- must effectively merge acquisition and sus- tivity, drive down system sustainment costs, ment. We must optimize defense logistics tainment to ensure that we deliver required improve partnerships with industry, and force players, policies, and processes against systems’ life-cycle availability at best value to the acquisition and sustainment communities common outcomes as defined by the customer. the Nation. to optimize their collective efforts against Previous generations of logisticians The philosophy of life-cycle systems common operational requirements. were able to deliver success by finding ways management (LCSM) demands policies, Over the life of a system, a more holistic to interoperate within a linear defense supply structures, and processes that deliver deci- approach to acquisition and sustainment chain that most viewed as unique to our busi- sions that balance operational outcomes would offer the most potent method to ness and was comprised of several distinct against fully burdened life-cycle costs. This improve both execution/outcomes and opti- activities. There is no question that in the implies a fusion of acquisition and sustain- mize the processes behind those outcomes. future we will be required to view our supply ment to a degree few realize and requires that However, we have a long, challenging road chain not as a chain per se, but as a network we build in a culture of the “long view” with ahead in this area. Congressional language (military, interagency, multinational, and regard to systems support. with respect to both life-cycle systems man- commercial) of suppliers, distributors, manu- This philosophy argues for initiatives agement and weapons systems acquisition facturers, and customers linked in a complex that are, at the core, elemental to acquisition reform, although reflected in recent DOD global federation. reform. The separation of execution from actions, has not yet changed the distinc- Today’s organizations and processes budgeting will not facilitate the synergy tive organizational cultures attached to the were not designed to work in harmony. between acquisition and sustainment nec- acquisition and sustainment communities. Tomorrow’s world demands that we under- essary to reduce systems’ life-cycle costs. In this case, LCSM would fully embrace the stand the interactions, relationships, and interdependencies among various organiza- tions, processes, and data across the entire defense logistics enterprise. This is the U.S. Army essence of systems thinking and is essential to enabling future logistics leaders to make better decisions with regard to supply “chain” outcomes. Tomorrow, we must have a supply network that is flexible and resilient enough to support rapid changes in strategies—and we require leaders who will thrive in a self- organizing environment. One could argue that today there is no single outcome metric to drive optimization across our global supply chain. Tomorrow’s environment will demand that we find ways to deliver unity of effort across this global network without having unity of command over all the elements executing actions within that network. Throughout most of our nation’s history and in the current environment, we have been committed to delivering supply chain Army Tactical Missile System is recertified by member of team responsible outcomes at almost any cost and are, in most for environment, safety, and occupational health facets of Army aviation and cases, unable to determine the fully burdened missile acquisition, sustainment, and disposal cost to deliver those outcomes. Tomorrow we ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 45 SPECIAL FEATURE | Savings and Defense Logistics congressional language on weapons systems that ensure the defense outcomes required in edge and attributes of systems thinking will acquisition reform and program support support of our national security are fully sus- give tomorrow’s logistics leaders the greatest assessment by merging those initiatives tainable and delivered at best value. Signifi- opportunities for quality decisions and, ulti- within a common framework for processes, cantly reducing costs in the defense logistics mately, success. information, and decisionmaking. LCSM can enterprise without unacceptable risk requires Second, how can we offer the most effectively link acquisition and sustainment leaders who can effectively analyze the com- effective learning environment for tomor- by enabling support decisions based on total ponents of the industrial base and evaluate row’s logisticians? Establishing a learning life-cycle costs, where all costs are fully visible them as potential resources to apply against environment grounded in the principles of to the enterprise. As a result of having clear our national security challenges. cognition and using student-led learning as representation of the fully burdened costs to its core will foster learning for tomorrow’s deliver availability, the quality of tomorrow’s Education as the Ultimate Efficiency logistics leaders. Moreover, establishing an decisions would be exponentially better than We must establish a developmental interactive culture in our classrooms will today’s. The investment in making better framework that gives logisticians the right further facilitate student-led learning, and, decisions to reduce life-cycle costs would knowledge, skills, and attributes to succeed in when integrated with case study methodology easily pay for itself several times over the life an uncertain, complex, and volatile environ- and serious gaming, will create a learning of a system, producing massive savings across ment. We cannot be certain that decisions environment that looks and feels like the the many systems in the defense portfolio. made today will be valid for years to come. In complex, uncertain world in which we expect Resourcing National Security Strategy. an ambiguous environment, we should expect our logistics leaders to excel. We must develop a much deeper understand- that our senior leaders be able to continuously The most important element to creating ing of the confluence of resource planning reassess their environment and understand an effective and dynamic learning environ- ment is our logistics faculty. If we expect tomorrow’s logistics leaders must be able to understand tomorrow’s logistics leaders to benefit from a learning environment that is rapidly adapt- relationships among processes, organizations, ing to changing operating conditions and and information in ways few can imagine today reflecting the most critical learning outcomes for the enterprise, how can we better prepare and execution, systems readiness, and opera- the problems they face in the context in which the faculty to provide that environment? tional outcomes. those problems are presented. Furthermore, Developing logistics leaders who will succeed Optimizing our national resources we should expect that those same leaders in an uncertain future requires an investment against prioritized operational outcomes and be able to develop approaches to managing in our logistics faculty. This may be the most maintaining a constant awareness of the total problems that deliver the best outcomes for critical investment of all. costs to deliver required outcomes are at the our nation. In that regard, I believe the most heart of this focus area. Today, this business critical area related to improving efficiency in What Stands in Our Way? area is underserved in our logistics develop- the defense logistics enterprise lies in educat- As mentioned earlier, the natural mental continuum; it is not a “knowledge” ing its leaders. tendency to zero in on close targets can sap requirement clearly identified for our senior The most crucial element to driving resources needed to focus on longer-term leaders. The understanding, knowledge, and down costs in the defense logistics enterprise strategies. Our culture does not make address- skills needed to fuse human resources, raw will be the quality of our defense logistics ing long-term solutions easy; the resistance to materials, finance, acquisition, and sustain- leaders’ decisions. We will not achieve sus- change is deeply embedded when outcomes ment in support of our national security tained, long-term savings without a sustained, cannot be realized during the tenure of those objectives must become fundamental to long-term investment in the leadership currently in leadership positions. However, tomorrow’s logistics leaders. responsible for directing actions toward those delivering systemic, long-term, meaning- This focus area also lies at the heart of ends. We have a community of institutions, ful improvements in the defense logistics relationships between the defense logistics curriculum, and knowledge responsible for enterprise mandates that we look beyond our community and our industrial base and is shaping the thinking of tomorrow’s logistics respective tenures. essential to developing the type of partner- leaders, and it is there that our investments The approach I have offered may not ships that can deliver value to the Nation can have the highest return. deliver short-term gains, but I believe it is while offering reasonable profits to industry. Our venture into this critical area should within this type of framework that the defense It is imperative that we develop logistics resolve to answer three fundamental issues logistics community can achieve the most sig- leaders who not only understand but also about learning. First, can we agree on what nificant long-term returns in both effective- can synthesize issues related to defense and tomorrow’s logistics leaders need to be? Even ness and efficiency. Delivering a 2 to 3 percent industry acquisition, sustainment, and finan- though there is a strong consensus that we improvement in efficiency over the next 4 to cial processes, and who are able to develop need to develop critical thinkers, I offer that 5 years is mandatory, but driving longer-term business case–based assessments of defense tomorrow’s logistics leaders must be able to improvements in how we manage the business and industry partnerships and relationships. understand relationships among processes, of defense logistics requires a more holistic An in-depth understanding of the business organizations, and information in ways few view of logistics itself and of those who lead of defense logistics will result in decisions can imagine today. Developing the knowl- that community. JFQ

46 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Air Force officer instructs Afghan National Army Air Force pilots on mission-planning techniques

U.S. Air Force (Eric Harris)

Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management

By WILLIAM E. WARD

ttachés, security assistance part of an integrated interagency effort that However, we have seen numerous occa- officers, and other U.S. addresses diplomatic, developmental, and sions where these vital functions are being military personnel stationed security needs in support of U.S. foreign performed by personnel without the requisite at Embassies abroad perform policy objectives. Their presence fosters unity training or experience, and the results can A negatively impact the mission. The following vital functions in support of advancing the of action across the joint, interagency, inter- Nation’s security interests. They establish governmental, and multinational spectrum. examples come from Africa, but similar situa- important links with host nation militaries. These are specialized assignments tions occur elsewhere. They articulate requirements for military pro- normally reserved for the Services’ Foreign One critical Central African partner grams, activities, and exercises that help build Area Officer (FAO) corps. Many join these nation had an extensive security assistance partner nation security capacity. They serve as communities as new majors and lieutenant account of $40 million, which included $35 the forward “eyes and ears” of the parent geo- commanders who were exceptional perform- million for a training and equipping package. graphic combatant command, the Services, ers within their Services at junior tactical However, the security assistance officer posi- and our military intelligence community. assignments. Upon accession, they receive tion at the U.S. Embassy was gapped for an As military representatives to our Embassies specialized education in regional studies extended time, causing U.S. Africa Command and Chiefs of Mission, they are key sources and cultural awareness, develop advanced to rotate personnel out of hide on short tem- of information about security environments, language proficiency, and improve their porary duty stints to usher the portfolio along. threats to stability and security, and civil- ability to operate independently (often alone) Meanwhile, the only enduring presence was military relations. in austere environments. Their training and As members of Country Teams, these education are extensive and necessary to General William E. Ward, USA, is former Commander personnel are accustomed to operating as ensure they are effective. of U.S. Africa Command. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 47 COMMENTARY | Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management an administrative sergeant who lacked secu- career progression are outmoded. There is procured capacities against evolving security rity assistance training or Africa experience. also insufficient ability for the FAO commu- threats. But because these particular pro- A key Western African partner was nity to feed their critical skills back among grams are used as the basis for justifying FAO serviced for over 2 years by an Army Reserve the general purpose forces in ways that facili- personnel, many Embassies in Africa find logistics officer with no FAO or language tate military activities with new or emerging the defense attaché dual-hatted in a security training because of shortages in available partners. The FAO community and the joint assistance capacity, which often disadvan- personnel. Due to the officer’s lack of French doctrine of security assistance require a size- tages both positions. language skills, the Embassy’s political- able transformation effort. Moreover, because this is a demand- military officer had to perform escort duties This article first focuses on two common driven process, the manpower follows the to all meetings with the host nation military. functions that FAOs perform overseas, Secu- program. Once an FMF or FMS case is estab- This arrangement was rightly criticized by the rity Assistance Officer (SAO) and Defense or lished, DSCA determines and sources the FAO Ambassador as unsustainable. Service attaché, to show how requirements requirements over time based on when the Some U.S. Embassies in key partner have evolved while doctrine has not kept up. program is executed. This is fine for partners nations have experienced significant gaps in Then it presents necessary and appropriate with established Offices of Security Coopera- Department of Defense (DOD) presence. In functions for the FAO community, such as tion (OSCs)2 who already have FAOs on hand one nation, an Air Force attaché billet that cultural intelligence and knowledge serving as requirements developers, planners, and implementers, in addition to performing the doctrine associated with the FAO community is liaison functions with the Country Team and back to the combatant command. But partners out of date, and the models of accessions, utilization, and where no OSC is established are disadvan- career progression are outmoded taged. The requirements development process among new and emerging partners is method- opened in 1999 was only filled for a total of development, which are presently missing ical and deliberate, based on mutual trust and 24 months during the period of 1999 to 2005. in action. The current state of the joint FAO confidence built over time. FAOs are ideally In two other nations, the rapid ramp-up of community is then presented, followed by suited to performing this task, but establishing military programs and activities exposed the recommendations for improvements. new OSCs or growing existing ones is too slow problems of longstanding gaps in FAO billets. and unresponsive a process in an environment To meet the immediate needs, these slots were The Security Assistance Function of limited joint growth. This additionally filled with motivated officers who wanted to The management practice within DOD undermines efforts to establish relations with help but lacked the formal skills and experi- aligned the role of SAO with well-defined countries where none have existed in the past. ence to do the job effectively. security assistance programs exercised by a Simply put, we need more FAOs forward. These examples are symptoms of a partner nation. In particular, these programs greater problem. The joint FAO community’s were Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign The Defense Attaché Function accession patterns and doctrinal utilization Military Financing (FMF), and International The defined roles that U.S. military have not sufficiently kept up with the evolv- Military Education and Training (IMET). attachés perform for the Ambassador have ing needs of the Country Teams. Demand This created a demand-driven approach in changed little since the U.S. Defense Attaché is already exceeding supply, and the call for which the establishment of FMS/FMF cases or System was centralized under the Defense FAOs is increasing further as the United States the recruitment of partner members to attend Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1965. The broadens its global engagement to encompass IMET in U.S. military schools drove the size current arrangement was established with the more nations. and scope of an SAO within the Embassy. The intent of standardizing the observance and Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted management of the joint manpower allocated reporting of politico-military issues regarding this in his February 2010 address to the Nixon to these offices was given to the Defense the host country. In addition, attachés serve Center and his Foreign Affairs article in May Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). protocol functions and represent their respec- 2010,1 in which he stated that security force Subsequently, the Services have generally tive Services at official functions. Attachés assistance was a key U.S. military function defined the roles of these FAOs in terms of the from different Services were grouped into requiring higher priority, that cultural aware- requirements of these programs. Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs) under a ness and sociopolitical acuity were important This method clearly disadvantages senior attaché and assigned to Embassies. in establishing trusted relationships with part- those partner nations whose security In the 20th century, attaché activities ners, and that such relationships enhanced capacity-building requirements do not were still largely defined in terms of ongoing the ability to prevent conflict and ultimately centrally involve FMF, FMS, or IMET. Such or potential military operations against reduced the overall need to commit U.S. forces is the case in Africa, where FMF and FMS Communist influence. DAO presence was to military operations. cases are comparatively small or limited, or generally more robust in a well-defined But as this article shows, simply the partner nations are acquiring equipment set of countries that were either developed increasing the number of FAOs is not the elsewhere but are looking to the United States strategic partners or areas of contention such complete answer. The doctrine associated for training and leader development. FAOs as around the Korean Peninsula, Eastern with the FAO community is out of date, and find themselves serving integrative functions, Europe, or Southeast Asia. In locations with the models of accessions, utilization, and helping partners to align existing or newly lesser priority, DAOs had limited presence.

48 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WARD U.S. Army (Terence Ewings) U.S. Army (Terence

Soldier helps Iraqi troops identify map terrain features during training exercise to improve target-locating skills

The scope and complexity of those The Knowledge Development Function During phase zero, intelligence- roles, however, have increased with globaliza- Another vital function FAOs perform— gathering ultimately seeks to differentiate tion. With today’s transnational threats, such which is not documented or established actual and potential adversarial, friendly, and as violent extremist groups working in under- in doctrine—is the development and dis- neutral elements along with their tactics and governed areas and safe havens, the politico- semination of cultural intelligence. It is not decisionmaking processes in order to facili- military landscape is far more complex, and a true intelligence function in the traditional tate effective U.S. and coalition military oper- no nation can be ignored. Furthermore, the military sense because it does not involve ations. KD’s holistic understanding provides speed of information flow in our globalized espionage and its primary purpose is not a modeling of the sociocultural systems as a society puts increased pressure on the atta- the provision of specific critical information whole, especially noncombatant behaviors, to chés to keep up. for military plans and operations. Rather, better illustrate how U.S. military posture or Complicating the matter is the short- it is the result of gathering information age of SAOs. In countries where there is no and understanding the total sociocultural security assistance presence, those functions environment, of which the military is but a the speed of information flow are added to the attachés’ already full plates. component, so the effects and risks of U.S. in our globalized society puts In many cases, the SAO functions over- military activities on that environment, increased pressure on the whelm the attachés at the expense of their including security force assistance efforts, attachés to keep up ordinary duties and therefore of the Ambas- can be better understood. sadors they support. Since cultural intelligence can be a con- It should be noted that the recent initia- fusing term, this article instead refers to its activities could be perceived. They overlap, tive to create a Senior Defense Official in U.S. collection process, known as knowledge devel- and ultimately both serve to provide informa- Embassies has no impact on the respective opment (KD). KD is an enduring function that tion that can help influence these elements roles and functions of either the SAO or DAO. seeks to capture and model the sociocultural in order to avoid conflict altogether and seek This initiative is mainly to simplify the rela- and political processes that are active at steady peaceful resolution of disputes, to disadvan- tionship between the Ambassador and DOD state and how they respond to various stimuli tage adversarial forces should conflict occur, presence in country by identifying the most or crises. The differences between KD and and to enhance force protection. senior military officer as responsible for all intelligence are easily demonstrated using the Knowledge development has tremendous DOD matters. phases of joint campaign plans. added utility in the development and conduct ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 49 COMMENTARY | Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management of civil-military operations and activities that There is a precedent for creating a KD victory—gets so little priority. The state of our directly reach the populace. One example is function within a combatant command. FAO community is not what it should be, and the Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP) During the planning for the creation of U.S. that needs to be fixed. that provides U.S. military doctors to treat Africa Command, it was recognized that the Realign FAO Roles in Security Assis- patients from partner countries. MEDCAPs overall joint corporate knowledge base for tance. The demand-driven, program-based have great immediate impact both in training Africa was lacking. The remedy was to create approach has caused SAOs to concentrate for the doctors and in improving the health of a Knowledge Development Division (KDD) primarily on the training and materiel ele- the patients. However, the long-term results in the headquarters staff. The KDD seeks out ments of the doctrine, organization, training, can be counterproductive if the program is information on the sociocultural environ- materiel, leadership and education, personnel, conducted in ways that cause dependence on ment to help support the command’s efforts at and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. True care not available after the doctors leave or if partner capacity-building demands an equal it encourages unhealthy behaviors. KD helps concentration across all elements, just as it explain the underlying sociocultural influ- knowledge development does in fielding new weapons systems or con- ences so such risks can be mitigated. Similarly, is not declared in any ducting organizational structure changes in it is helpful in addressing the impacts of FAO’s duty description, but it the U.S. military. More than ever, DOTMLPF humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. It also is an inherent part of his or analysis is a function performed at forward provides a lens through which the nondefense her responsibilities locations on a continual basis, and FAOs are aspects of security—police forces, customs the primary practitioners. offices, border patrols, and judiciaries—can be Increase FAO Accessions. Even against included in the total operating context. building and sustaining long-term military- the original program-driven requirements, Knowledge development is a more to-military relationships, identify and formal- the FAO community is underresourced and suitable process for understanding the roles ize security force assistance requirements of has been for some time, yet we, the joint com- played by nontraditional partners, such as partner nations, and develop effective and munity, are in denial. While highlighting humanitarian assistance organizations and tailored programs to serve partner needs a number of Service initiatives that sought nongovernmental organizations. These while adding to our understanding of the to increase FAO accessions and improve groups often operate among remote popula- engagement environment and supporting U.S. their use, the most recent DOD 2009 Annual tions and have important insights that might foreign policy objectives. Foreign Area Officer Report still noted two not be available through traditional intel- Some elements contributing to the KDD fundamental problems: too few qualified ligence means. Often, these groups eschew have been the Socio-Cultural Research and FAOs to satisfy the demand, and inability to contact with militaries or intelligence agen- Analysis Teams (SCRATs), consisting primar- meet language proficiency requirements.3 Yet cies, so working with them is generally a ily of Africa experts from academia. SCRATs the tone of the report is positive and appears sensitive process. routinely travel around the continent to gather to promote the Service initiatives as the path As operations are conducted during a comprehensive understanding of the socio- to ultimate success. phase one through phase three and intelligence cultural environment. They have considerable But these initiatives will not be enough. processes focus on fixing and defeating the ground to cover and should best be used as The overall FAO fill rate in combatant enemy, KD helps us understand the impacts on targeted complements to FAOs who are already command headquarters and the Joint Staff the civilian population and the conditions that knowledgeable on an area. Africa is broad, decreased from 92 percent in fiscal year (FY) need to be set for postconflict stabilization. dynamic, and complex, comprising 53 nations 2008 to 87 percent in FY 2009, and that was Once operations are concluded, KD is vital in with unique histories, 800 ethnic groups speak- against validated positions programmed the development, implementation, and assess- ing over 1,000 languages, and a population of through the Services and DSCA in accor- ment of phase four activities, which include a billion, which some expect to double over dance with a program-driven requirements peacekeeping and ensuring conditions that the next 40 years. Many of Africa’s security model. These do not account for all articu- prevent the resumption of hostilities. challenges, such as violent extremist organiza- lated requirements of the commands, nor Knowledge development is not a joint tions, trafficking, insurgencies, and piracy, are do they account for the functions that FAOs doctrinal concept and is not declared in any elusive, and its infrastructure and information- currently perform. FAO’s duty description, but it is an inher- gathering and -sharing capabilities are limited. For example, U.S. Africa Command has ent part of his or her responsibilities. The Equally important is understanding the inter- an identified requirement for new OSCs in modern joint security environment simply relationships of the various groups in country, several partner nations, but due to program- no longer recognizes a distinction between so the second- and third-order effects of U.S. matic limits, these have been spread out over defense and nondefense aspects, and combat- security force assistance are understood, and several years and thus are not counted in the ants and noncombatants will continue to be we can ensure they are conducted in ways com- total number of FY09 requirements. Further- intertwined. As winning the war is increas- fortable to partner nations. more, there are several cases in Africa where ingly about winning the peace, insights from the situation may dictate the need to surge a FAOs—as DOD’s only boots on the ground in Current State and Recommendations security assistance presence to a nation with many countries—become more vital, particu- It is unfortunate that this community of which U.S. policy shifts may cause the issuance larly in places where the United States has a practitioners—so vital to our ability to prevent of direction for the military to engage imme- limited history. conflict and, if needed, set conditions for diately. This has occurred in instances where a

50 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WARD coup or other political situation was resolved in ways that caused U.S. policymakers to initiate or renew bilateral relations, with military engage- ment as a core element. Surging people with no experience in Africa may be counterproductive, thus necessitating a readily deployable pool of experienced FAOs within the Services. Accessions into the FAO program U.S. Marine Corps (Alicia R. Giron) should not be a problem. Indeed, the DOD report highlights the fact that far more can- didates apply than there are positions. While some might screen out regardless because of mismatches in skills and aptitude, there would be no shortage of work for those officers. Extend FAO-like Program to the Non- commissioned Officer Corps. There is a legiti- mate question as to why the domain of practi- tioners is limited to the officer corps, mainly in the field grades. While field-grade officers are well suited to cultivating relationships with midgrade and senior partner nation Colombian marines line up for nonlethal weapons class as part of subject matter military leaders, they might not always be the expert exchange with U.S. military best for conducting KD or managing security force assistance at the tactical and operational undergoing professionalization efforts. A in particular is highly sought for helping train levels. Beginning with our supporting efforts potential short-term avenue of approach is to deploying forces, and few outside of the FAO in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold employ current Civil Affairs NCOs in FAL community receive as much practical experi- War, we found that relationships among capacities, which would increase their knowl- ence in interagency integration, which is vital noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were effec- edge and ease coordination. However, the goal in postconflict stabilization operations. tive at bringing about attitudes and behavior would be to recruit high-quality NCOs from Too many FAOs are merely shuttled leading to a more capable partner force. The all Military Occupational Specialties, espe- between jobs in Embassies. Others alternate relationships bring perspectives, and therefore cially combat and combat support, where the assignments as staff officers in geographic sometimes intelligence, that might not ordi- narily be made available to officers. Unfortunately, NCOs currently working there is nothing inherent in the FAO education in Embassies perform mainly administrative program to suggest that NCOs could not participate, and budget work and rarely interact with graduate, and use similar skills partner nation militaries. This is a missed opportunity. Today’s U.S. NCO corps is rife with fresh experience in partnership and ability to interact with partner NCOs would combatant commands, joint staffs, or other engagement activities in operational theaters be enhanced. DSCA and Service response to higher headquarters but do not get to utilize and would excel at performing roles and func- the idea was encouraging, and steps to develop their FAO skills for the betterment of the tions that are appropriately aligned with those the idea further are being taken, but this needs Service. Instead, the FAO time is looked upon of SAOs and DAOs. There is certainly nothing to be accelerated as the requirements for FALs as an aberration to be discounted. The DOD inherent in the FAO education program to are present today and will only increase. report demonstrates this with promotion rates suggest that NCOs could not participate, Fix the FAO Career Path and Utiliza- to lieutenant colonel and commander, as well graduate, and use similar skills to further U.S. tion. Although the FAO community draws as colonel and captain, consistently below security interests. the best and the brightest from the Services, the Service averages over the past 4 years. In One attractive proposal is to create a too many wind up being overworked and particular, the Navy’s FAO promotion rate to Foreign Area Leader (FAL) program that underappreciated. FAO communities are seg- these ranks was about half of the overall selec- provides similar FAO training and educa- regated too far from the mainstream of their tion rates, with the Air Force and Army rates tion opportunities to selected senior NCOs respective Services. While their contributions remaining generally low. for future service in Country Teams and to making strategy and informing policy are Notably, FAO communities do not command headquarters. The advantages of well known, the skills and experience they feed the Services’ flag officer corps, which is incorporating FALs is the long-term expan- bring have tremendous utility and relevance to surprising given that two-star flag officers sion of the pool of cultural talent in the joint the Services as a whole through assignments serve as chiefs of OSCs to important strategic force and the increased ability for NCOs to with troops, serving as military instructors, or partners such as Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, relate to partner NCO corps, particular those preparing doctrine. Knowledge development Russia, and now the Middle East and Central ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 51 COMMENTARY | Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management

Asia. Instead, with limited opportunities For their contributions to this NEW before them, a number of highly intelligent, article, the author thanks Colonel Thomas from NDU Press motivated, and superbly performing FAOs P. Galvin, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Varhola, USAR; Lieutenant are forced to retire earlier than necessary, at a for the Institute for Colonel Laura Varhola, USA; and Command time when the demands for experienced FAOs National Strategic Studies Sergeant Major Mark S. Ripka, USA. are increasing. Fixing these problems should require Notes only minor adjustments as long as the accession problem is also addressed. Given 1 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend widespread recognition of the requirements Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assis- that FAOs are well suited to satisfy, it should tance,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2010), 2–6. be straightforward to expand the slate of posi- 2 Also known as Offices of Defense Coopera- tions within the professional military educa- tion in Europe and Offices of Military Cooperation tion, doctrine, and general purpose forces in Kuwait and Egypt. 3 Department of Defense (DOD), DOD 2009 where FAO skills can be listed as required or Annual Foreign Area Officer Report (Washington, desired. Broader exposure and opportuni- DC: DOD, August 2, 2010), 2. ties to demonstrate value added beyond the current limited FAO utilization path also bring about improvements in promotion rates. Additionally, promotion boards should be encouraged to recognize and promote catego- ries of FAOs such as those who have already INSS Strategic Perspectives 2 been assessed as high performers operating in Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for difficult environments. National Security Integration Improve Sustainment Training for by Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks FAOs. From an educational standpoint, FAOs are too often treated as “fire and forget.” They The U.S. Government lacks the ability rarely receive any sustainment or follow- to effectively integrate the efforts of its on education after their 2-year accession departments and agencies—civilian and program. The Naval Postgraduate School rec- military—on priority missions, such ognized this situation and began instituting a as the operations in Afghanistan. To 2-week pilot program to give FAOs a chance to achieve this unity of effort, Presidents get together, reflect on their experiences, and have tried various approaches such as give back to the schoolhouse. Initiatives such National Security Council committees, as these need to be encouraged more widely. “lead agencies,” and “czars,” but none Ultimately, it falls upon the FAO com- has been effective. The authors examine one precedent of a relatively successful munity to serve as an important conduit cross-agency executive authority that between the Department of State, through its already exists: the Chief of Mission U.S. missions abroad, and the Department of authority delegated to U.S. resident Defense. FAOs perform a great service that Ambassadors. Building on this precedent, adds value to unified action in support of U.S. the authors make a case in favor of foreign policy objectives and national security legislation giving the President authority interests alike. We must stop channeling them to delegate his integration authority to so narrowly that we miss opportunities to “Mission Managers.” They examine in bring their special talents to bear for the U.S. detail how to implement this authority, military as a whole. The doctrine, education, concluding that while such reform would and utilization of FAOs performing the roles be politically challenging, there are no insuperable legal or organizational of security assistance officer, military attaché, obstacles to it. and especially knowledge developer must be reviewed and updated. FAO requirements need to reflect this doctrine and be accessed and utilized according to where their skills and education can add value anywhere in the U.S. military, and not be channeled within a Visit the NDU Press Web site narrow set of positions that ultimately insu- for more information on publications lates them from the force. JFQ at ndupress.ndu.edu

52 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu A SMARTER FORCE

for Less Time and Money U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley)

By STEPHEN D. POMPER

Admiral Mullen poses with Navy ROTC students after speaking at Harvard University

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 53 COMMENTARY | A Smarter Force

The U.S. Code is what needs to be changed if we truly want a smarter force for less time and money. The proposed educational advantage DOD (Cherie Cullen) is also exponential. With an available and larger pool of advanced degree holders, those selected for Advanced Civil Education (ACE)2 can use that period to gain doctoral degrees. Some would argue against this (it is true), but our profession is more than worthy. At least that is what we tell ourselves. And one would not need to wait to be a colonel, captain, or flag officer to use this expert knowledge. There is no reason for ACE or other Service equivalents to go away. These programs also tend to direct the education at some specific Service need (for example, the academies need teaching-certified officers), whereas this idea would increase education and have a broad effect. The second advantage is simply a better Secretary Gates speaks to students, faculty, and ROTC cadets on use of an officer’s career timeline, and the achievements of all-volunteer military force entire DOD benefits from it. The upfront time saving is obviously the year less that it takes to gain a degree (most of them). Then, consider he last good idea I had was a dents complete their matriculation (first) and that the precommissioned person has never duffle bag that opens on both then “locking” them in for at least another been part of the operational side and therefore ends—that was 23 years ago year. Since students can apply to any advanced is not missed (versus 2 years in school and the when I was a Cadet. Maybe I program after graduation, this allows the uni- associated and potential utilization assign- T versity some additional assurance of people should have capitalized on the thought, but ments). Accessions forecasting and diligence then I might not have found myself back and tuition. Still, it is a good deal financially, would ensure that they are not missed as in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps and DOD should capitalize on it. second lieutenants or ensigns. (ROTC) and U.S. Army Cadet Command Great idea: Allow ROTC Cadets/Mid- as a professor of military science, which led shipmen to participate in 5-year advanced me to another great idea. This one would degree programs. The precedent is already set it is not inexpensive to send an educate our officer corps and save money in educational delay programs for doctors, officer to graduate programs, and time for the Department of Defense lawyers, and clergy. There already exist provi- and hence we do not do it (DOD), and will likely be received by Cadets sions that allow for certain undergraduate nearly as often as we should and Midshipmen as a lucrative incentive (and programs that take 5 years as well. A more even promote enrollment). educated force today and tomorrow is the As we know, conditions change rapidly greatest advantage of this proposal. We gain a Until the personnel gurus can deliver an on the battlefield, in the air, and at sea, but second lieutenant or ensign with an advanced alternative to the 20-year retirement Catch-22, not so rapidly in academia. In the past several degree. That means something everywhere this idea could act as a partial bridge on the years, more and more colleges and universi- else; it should for the U.S. military as well. officer education front. A hurdle would be the ties are offering 5-year master’s degree pro- Knowledge is a force multiplier, and we sheer amount of time that doctoral candidates grams. The students are accepted late in their already ask so much of our junior officers; need (although some of this “need” is actually sophomore or early in their junior year; they the result would equate to improved mission “want”). Then there is the caliber of officers complete the associated undergraduate degree accomplishment and expanded officer selected. This program would be merit based, work, simultaneously begin master’s work education. There is no need to wait for DOD and therefore only the brightest would be in the fourth year, and are conferred with a Directive 1322.10, whose goal is to “[d]evelop selected. This begins at the institution, which graduate degree in the fifth (sometimes both or enhance the capacity of the Department of we should rightly assume is best qualified to on the same day). Defense to fulfill a present need, anticipated make this determination (from among sopho- I am not certain of the motivation for requirement, or future capability.”1 Still, DOD mores or juniors). such programs, and they differ greatly; but directives such as this are derived from law. neither am I convinced that it is solely based on providing students with a “good deal.” The Lieutenant Colonel Stephen D. Pomper, USA, is a U.S. Cavalryman in the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps benefit to the university is ensuring select stu- and is the Professor of Military Science at The Johns Hopkins University.

54 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu POMPER

Then there is advantage three: money. professional judgment and, of course, their that we educate Cadets and Midshipmen must I am not saving the best for last, since I led directed mission to produce qualified offi- begin with the law establishing ROTC. Then with that, but at a time when the Secretary cers for their Service, and on time. In some a larger and more holistic approach to pre- of Defense is calling for billions in savings, exceptional cases, students even complete commissioning education, both military and every bit counts. It is not inexpensive to send their undergraduate work early. (I know academic, could be championed. Still, ROTC an officer to graduate programs, and hence one brilliant young man who could get his “ain’t broke,” but there are certainly more we do not do it nearly as often as we should. undergraduate and master’s degrees in only efficiencies and good ideas that could be born There are the moving costs, the tuition 4 years.) Does this create some “have” and from a more progressive law. The alternative is and fees, and the officer’s salary (the most “have not” schism? Yes, and one clearly in line literally ignorance. JFQ expensive part even if he or she attended the with existing merit-based lists used by every Massachusetts Institute of Technology or an Service. Students who qualify for this should Notes Ivy League school). I am sure an economist already be considered for unique positions in 1 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel could calculate the financial loss of officers’ the Services. Currently, they are lumped in a and Readiness, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive No. 1322.10, “Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers,” April 29, 2008, a change to the law would demonstrate the importance of available at . some (incorrect) perceptions of a knuckle-dragging military 2 Formally known as Advanced Civilian Schooling and the Air Force Institute of Technology Civilian Institution Programs. “un-utilization” while they are learning as cohort of “qualified,” and years might go by 3 DOD Directive 1322.10. well as the gain when they return (the idea until they can prove their academic prowess proposed here is all gain). Again, that is 2-plus (if they are still in the Service). A change to years away from the fight. Whole operational the law would demonstrate the importance of fronts change in this time, and we are consis- education in the military and would go a long tently reminded of the persistent nature of our way in reversing some (incorrect) perceptions enemy and mission. of a knuckle-dragging military. Allowing A short but dedicated study could deter- our future leaders the opportunity to excel mine the best means to calculate some duty in these programs would say a lot, even if the Service obligation—if one is needed at all. number would be small. The fifth year could be paid for by DOD, or I am not certain how to change DOD not. Based on my experience, students would policy or what discretion the Services have gladly incur this expense for the lifelong in executing it. Any modifications to the way benefit it provides. And if they cannot afford it, the military should be ready to offer schol- arships in return for some obligation. DOD Directive 1322.10 addresses serving officers only: “Raise professional and technical competency, and develop the

future capabilities of military officers to more U.S. Navy (Daniel J. Taylor) effectively perform their required duties and carry out their assigned responsibilities.”3 A good idea indeed, but a bit limited in scope. My idea is that ROTC Cadets and Midship- men be afforded a similar opportunity, with the notion that everything they do in their Service can benefit from “competency.” The results will surely “[p]rovide developmental incentives for military officers with the ability, dedication, and capacity for profes- sional growth.” Is this idea for every young precommis- sioned person? No. Institutions already limit enrollment in such programs for obvious Midshipman mans simulated bridge of reasons. Professors of military and naval USS Freedom during summer training science and aerospace studies can further on navigating harbors discriminate eligible students based on their ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 55 U.S. Marine Corps (Artur Shvartsberg)

Marine talks with village elders during jirga in Helmand Province

Building Credible Voices Traditional Communication in Afghanistan

By ROBERT M. HILL

respected Afghan religious not conducive to the practicalities of Islamic decided to pray despite his own trepidations. and legal scholar who was prayer. He scanned the gate area and noticed He made his way to the corner of the air ter- partnering with the Inter- a small space in a corner, not far from a televi- minal and went about the ritual of salat. A national Security Assistance sion monitor broadcasting the news. He spoke What happened next surprised him. Force (ISAF) related why he had decided to to his colleagues and reminded them of their He expected strange or disapproving stares, work alongside the force. He did so through a obligation, but they demurred, pointing out possibly even taunts. Instead, parents pulled story, which reinforced the power of narrative the crowded room and remarking that their back their children to give him more space, among Eastern cultures and demonstrated religious act might seem intrusive and unwel- someone moved to the television and turned why authentic “credible voices” such as his are come. Not unlike Christians who shy away down the volume, and the entire room grew among the most powerful channels to reach from saying grace in public, their excuses quiet in respect. Seeing this, his colleagues the Afghan people. masked fear and embarrassment at expressing overcame their fears and joined him. He had The scholar spoke of a recent trip to the their faith overtly. The storyteller understood come to the United States believing that it United States—his first—in the company of and left his colleagues alone. He, however, was intolerant of Muslims, particularly in the other colleagues from Afghanistan. While waiting for a delayed connecting flight at John Dr. Robert M. Hill is Deputy of Leader Development, Education, and Training in the U.S. Army Combined F. Kennedy International Airport, he realized Arms Center Information Proponent Office at Fort Leavenworth. He served on the Deputy Chief of Staff it was prayer time. The crowded terminal was Communication Staff, International Security Assistance Force, from July 2009 to July 2010.

56 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HILL aftermath of 9/11. He left with a deeper appre- ciation of American acceptance of others and a reaffirmation of the danger of uninformed perceptions and stereotypes. When he and his colleagues returned

to Afghanistan, each told this story to a wide (Daryl Knee) U.S. Air Force range of friends, colleagues, and acquain- tances, who in turn repeated it to others. Because of their stature in their communi- ties, their story and its message were deemed both credible and meaningful. When some of them subsequently chose to work with ISAF on its efforts to reach the Afghan people more effectively, their decision was respected by those who might earlier have questioned it. The event itself affected only a handful of Afghan religious scholars, but their recounting of it touched hundreds. Such is the power of what ISAF has come to term traditional communication. Traditional communication is organic. Muslims gather at worship site at Kandahar Airfield to pray before Eid al-Adha holiday The notion of formalizing it into a process risks losing that organic quality. Yet not employing it to reach local populaces is to Mortenson and David Oliver Relin make undertook the strategic assessment in the lose a potent tool in the communication clear in Three Cups of Tea—it must be culti- summer of 2009. Reviewing the international kitbag. The purpose of this article is to vated and formalized through a succession community’s efforts in Afghanistan over explain the ISAF Traditional Communication of interactions. Only then can formalized, the past 8 years, we came to the following (TRADCOM) program and the ways in which meaningful, and actionable communication conclusions: it has dramatically enhanced our ability to occur—because only then is the recipient reach the Afghan people with messages that willing to receive the message.2 ■■ we had previously reached out almost matter—to them and to us. exclusively to the Afghan elite or Afghan government Genesis in Eastern societies, the ■■ we focused on killing insurgents rather In some ways, TRADCOM is a mis- message becomes meaningful than protecting the people; the latter process, nomer because the term seems to be strictly after a relationship is by its nature, demands engagement with an about communication when, in fact, it is about established with the recipient open hand, not a clenched fist relationships. In Western societies, by and ■■ we defaulted to our own cultural mores large, there is an emphasis on effect, on ensur- and habits and projected them onto the ing that a message is conveyed, received, and In Afghan culture, the nexus of relation- Afghan people understood whether we have a relationship ship and communication is fundamentally ■■ we overrelied on technology and with the recipient or not (although we intui- rooted in the concepts of respect and honor. mass communication to reach a culture tively recognize that established relationships A transactional relationship is a matter of still rooted in face-to-face, word-of-mouth foster more effective communication). In business; a personal relationship is one of communication. Eastern societies, the message becomes mean- honor. Once a personal relationship is estab- ingful—that is, it achieves its effect—after a lished, guided as it will be by tradition, honor Perhaps, too, we considered traditional relationship is established with the recipient. demands full commitment to the relationship communication something the insurgency did More simply, the difference in approach may and the object of the relationship. When one (and well), which we had to counter with more be characterized as transactional (Western) side speaks to another and asks for something, sophisticated methods. In short, we failed versus relational (Eastern). These differences the other side is bound by honor to oblige. to view communication through the lens of are influenced by the degree to which East and While new technologies such as the Internet counterinsurgency (COIN), which doctrinally West value individualism versus collectivism.1 and text messaging are beginning to change forces us to immerse ourselves in and among In Eastern societies, given their empha- this dynamic, it remains largely intact in the population, all the while recognizing the sis on collective behavior, relationships are Afghan culture and will be for years to come. disadvantage our “otherness” creates. rarely informal. They are governed by culture A legitimate question arises: Why is Ironically enough, the Afghan govern- and tradition, such as the respect yielded ISAF only now tapping into traditional com- ment faced similar challenges. It was, and to tribal and religious elders. If no codified munication networks to reach the populace? remains, Kabul-centric and largely out of scheme of relationship exists, then—as Greg It is a question that we asked ourselves as we touch with the common citizen. An entirely ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 57 COMMENTARY | Building Credible Voices

Figure 1. Communication Channels Connecting the Afghan is predicated on the realization, sometimes Government to the People underappreciated, that all actions speak, while all speaking affects subsequent action. We often think of storytelling as an exercise of the creative imagination, but it is also fundamental to making sense of our existence. Put another way, we must use our imaginations to create narratives that struc- ture and give meaning to “equivocal inputs.”5 VILLAGES Tribal/Village Elders Meaning has to be forcibly hewn out of the “undifferentiated flux of raw experience and

Religious Leaders conceptually fixed and labeled so that [it] can MoBTA & Scholars become the common currency for communi- Traditional DISTRICTS 6 MoHRA Communication cational exchanges.” Provincial/District Channels Leaders The stories we create to make sense of MoIC things answer two basic questions: Provincial/District/ Village Youth Leaders COLLECTIVES In the context of everyday life, when people confront something unintelligible and ask, “what’s the story here?” their question has the force of bringing an event into existence.

Key: MoBTA = Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs; MoHRA = Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs; MoIC = Ministry of Information and Culture; ISAF = International When they then ask, “now what should I do?” Security and Assistance Force this added question has the force of bringing meaning into existence, and they hope that the meaning is stable enough for them to act into separate article could be written on Afghani- voices of credibility to amplify the “saying it is the future, to continue to act, and to have the stan’s realpolitik and the tension that exists so” step and, in due course, guide more posi- sense that they remain in touch with the con- between local and national instruments tive, productive, and enduring outcomes. tinuing flow of experience.7 of governance. Suffice it to say that most ISAF’s TRADCOM program works with Afghans do not view the national govern- three vital ministries: the Ministry of Border Sensemaking through narrative is both ment as worthy of their allegiance, often and Tribal Affairs (MoBTA), the Ministry of individual and collective, but since so much placing two COIN principles at odds: pro- Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoHRA), and the of our existence is spent in community, sen- tecting the people and putting the govern- Ministry of Information and Culture (MoIC), semaking, of necessity, is collaborative. There ment in the lead.3 which, with funding and administrative are pros and cons to both approaches. Singu- Overcoming this impasse necessitated support from ISAF and the international com- lar sensemaking provides only one frame of giving the Afghan government and ISAF munity, take the lead in organizing and con- reference with which to answer the two ques- access to and influence over credible voices ducting a series of shuras, jirgas, and religious tions posed above. Multifaceted sensemaking at the local level. Out of this realization grew seminars designed to encourage and cultivate has the potential not only for more inputs, the ISAF TRADCOM effort, the mission of credible and responsible voices that serve as a and thus a more probable picture of what is which is to “enable the [Afghan government], potent counterpoint to insurgent propaganda. going on and what it might mean, but also for through partnership, to empower credible In many ways, TRADCOM is a unique conflict and indecision. This is where sense- Afghan voices in promoting the benefits of kind of influence that is based primarily on giving can help. Sensegiving is “a sensemaking development, the legitimacy of [the govern- relationships rather than on radio broadcasts, variant undertaken to create meanings for a ment], the disadvantages of the insurgency, television commercials, leaflets, pamphlets, target audience.”8 The value of sensegiving is and community responsibility for a better and billboards. It seeks to influence people that it can ground and give direction to sense- Afghan future.” Figure 1 captures the essence through personal, trusted channels of com- makers in their struggle to shape meaning. of the program, which seeks to bridge the munication. These relationships make this The West’s fascination with i-everything Afghan government to the people. kind of influence powerful and lasting. (iPods, iPads, iPhones) has heightened the ISAF has been criticized for using terms challenge of sensemaking by dramatically or phrases such as partnership and put an Theoretical Roots increasing the amount of information to be Afghan face on it to characterize operations All human experience is fundamentally sorted through, while simultaneously provid- and activities that are only cursorily Afghan- rooted in narrative.4 Counterinsurgency ing high-tech tools to process, prioritize, visu- led. But in the complex environment that might just as readily be characterized as alize, and decipher this information. Afghani- is Afghanistan, with its nascent, immature, counternarrative, where success depends on stan, in stark contrast, is still deeply rooted and often dysfunctional central govern- offering the populace an alternative storyline in the oral/aural tradition of sensemaking ment, saying it is so is a necessary first step to to the one being promulgated by the insur- through one-on-one conversations and/or making it so. TRADCOM provides a way for gency. The notion of full-spectrum operations group dialogue and storytelling. Sensegiving

58 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HILL is primarily the task of tribal elders and reli- and trust.” TRADCOM’s goal is to link the where the program operates in order to know gious leaders, although there remains space Afghan government with the populace at all who the key influencers (sensegivers) are, for other and younger voices and narratives to levels by fostering trust among representa- both formal and informal. In Afghanistan impinge on the sensemaking process. In this tives of the MoBTA, MoHRA, MoIC, and or any other heterogeneous culture, what space, TRADCOM is gaining a foothold. tribal, religious, and youth leaders and/or works in Paktiya will not work in Kunduz Sensemaking “is not about truth and elders at both provincial and district levels. or Helmand. Most important of all, cultural getting it right. Instead, it is about continued At the same time, it seeks to empower local context recognizes that indigenous channels redrafting of an emerging story so that it and regional leaders so they believe they can are by far the most effective for conveying becomes more comprehensive, incorporates reach upward to their government and be messages. In the past, we developed the mes- more of the observed data, and is more heard. One disadvantage of trust-based com- sages from our own cultural perspective and resilient in the face of criticism.” Moreover, munication is that it can become myopic. This simply translated them from English into “people may get better stories, but they will potential pitfall is avoided or overcome by Pashto and/or Dari. Invariably, something got lost in translation. Today, we focus on the campaign and theme level, letting the success depends on offering the populance an alternative indigenous sensegivers frame the messages storyline to the one being promulgated by the insurgency through their own cultural lens and deliver them through their own means. Leverages Embedded Cultural Pro- never get the story.”9 Human nature makes us encouraging wider circles of trusted agents so cesses. The primary means by which the prone to think we have the full story, to settle local leaders feel comfortable being engaged by MoBTA, MoHRA, and MoIC connect with somewhere on the path to absolute truth and and engaging with the government and ISAF the populace are such venues as jirgas, shuras, accuracy or else feel the unease of indetermi- representatives. and religious seminars or events. Jirgas and nacy. John Milton, in Areopagitica, uses the Culturally Attuned. TRADCOM shuras are nearly synonymous. Jirgas come metaphor of “pitching our tent here” to signal works with and, in fact, leverages indigenous out of Pashtun culture and serve as a mecha- man’s tendency to think he has discerned the cultural traditions and, in so doing, gains nism for conflict resolution. Shuras also settle truth when in fact he is always far short of it.10 traction in ways that more modern, progres- disputes but often are more advisory in What TRADCOM seeks to ensure is that this sive, and Western strategies do not. Success function. Religious seminars are collective “tent pitching” is influenced by moderate and requires that those executing TRADCOM gatherings focused on achieving common responsible voices and is situated well away become immersed in local customs, beliefs, understanding of Koranic texts. All should from insurgent voices and toward that of the and ways of communicating so they optimize be viewed as instruments of governance that Afghan government. It achieves this aim by opportunities to build understanding and are deeply embedded in Afghanistan’s culture reaching out to and then through indigenous cooperation while mitigating insensitivities and history; they should be respected as such sensegivers, namely tribal elders and religious and mistrust. Success also relies on mapping and not viewed as simply another delivery leaders such as ulema (independent religious the human networks within each local area platform for our messaging. scholars) and mullahs. Muslims working with ISAF in Afghanistan Guiding Principles attend Eid al-Adha prayers at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand Province

While these guiding principles arise Royal Air Force from the specific and unique environment of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, they can just as readily apply to any region in which U.S. forces might find themselves. The key to success is discovering the underlying wisdom of the land and its people and to employ his- toric processes, practices, and cultural norms to reinforce and expand responsible rhetoric and behaviors. The outgrowth of this inside- out approach is enduring change. Centers on Relationships. TRADCOM is as much about relationships as it is about communication; one cannot be separated from the other. If sensemaking is a process of shared conversing and understanding, then relational sensemaking places premium value on the object or objects of these con- versations. It is as if to say, “I want to make meaning but only with those I truly know ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 59 COMMENTARY | Building Credible Voices U.S. Air Force (Brian Ferguson) U.S. Air Force

District governor speaks to village elders during shura in Zabul Province

Demonstrates Respect and Trust. We Being consultative means allowing relational were being detained on inaccurate or unsub- are prone to overuse the phrase “winning dynamics time to play out; invariably, those stantiated charges to a commitment on the hearts and minds.” Such phraseology con- we consult with will need to consult with their part of participants to act as messengers of notes a level of control we wish to avoid. The own circle before finalizing a decision. peace within their communities. The event value of TRADCOM is its inherent goal of Expects and Accepts Reasonable Risk. drew praise from the international com- mutually empowering the government and Developing trusted partners means that munity but some skeptics worried that the Afghan people while ISAF stays well in the sometimes we may interact with someone NCPJ would go the way of previous such background. The greatest respect we can who will prove untrustworthy. Small setbacks events, offering meaningful rhetoric and great demonstrate to our partners is to allow their are to be expected and even have the benefit promise but little substantive action. historic patterns of communication and griev- of making malign actors transparent so they The NCPJ framed national-level aspi- ance resolution to enact themselves with just can be marginalized or circumvented. And rations but no guaranteed mechanisms to enough of a nudge from us to gain traction. it is possible to mitigate this risk by leverag- convert these aspirations into either allegiance When we respect their traditions and actively ing the relational dynamics at the heart of or action at the regional and local level. cultivate their occurrence, we are perceived collectivist societies. Once we have identified Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams as genuine about our commitments to honor trusted partners, we can turn to them to iden- operating in Paktiya Province, in consulta- Afghan ways—political, social, and religious. tify other trusted partners and influencers, tion with the province’s subgovernor, saw an Consultative, Not Dictatorial. A direct and so on. opportunity to reinforce the outcomes of the consequence of respecting Afghan commu- NCPJ in their operational area by convening nicators and ways of communicating is the Vignette: The Tsamkani Jirga a jirga in the Tsamkani district on June 10, a ability to adopt a more consultative posture in In early June 2010, Afghanistan held week after the NCPJ. our relationships and transactions. The oppo- the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ) The ISAF TRADCOM cell, in concert site also proves true: the more consultative we to find consensus on ways to achieve lasting with the MoBTA, U.S. Embassy, Gardez are from the outset, the more we demonstrate peace in the country and region. Over 1,600 Provincial Reconstruction Team, and ODA, and therefore engender respect. A consultative delegates attended the 3-day event and devel- rapidly planned and executed the jirga, which approach takes time and patience. The advan- oped a 16-point resolution that articulated was attended by more than 1,500 local and tage of being dictatorial is that we can set both specific recommendations for achieving provincial elders and leaders. MoBTA Deputy the agenda and timeline for action to occur. peace, ranging from freeing prisoners who Minister Muhammad Yaqub Ahmadzai

60 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HILL represented the Afghan government at the police and to close the gap between the people vate, and strengthen the appeal and impact of jirga and made good on efforts to improve and the government. The Peace Shura is also credible and responsible voices. ties between the national government and coordinating directly with TRADCOM and Determine Key Communicators. Cred- province, especially through outreach to the local ISAF commanders to foster the comple- ible and responsible voices exist in every province’s deputy governor. tion of community projects to be announced community and at every level. In collectiv- The Tsamkani jirga resulted in the at each shura. Meanwhile, other provincial ist, relational cultures such as Afghanistan, release of a four-point resolution that ratified and district leaders continue to expand efforts discovering these voices involves asking the outcomes of the NCPJ and demonstrated a tangible commitment at the provincial and skeptics worried that the NCPJ would go the way of district levels to advance these outcomes. The four points were: previous such events, offering meaningful rhetoric and great promise but little substantive action ■■ support for the entirety of the NCPJ resolution to enact the decisions of the NCPJ and Tsam- questions and, more importantly, listening ■■ importance of protecting the territorial kani jirgas. Like other programs and initia- to answers. Over time, the same names get integrity of Afghanistan tives designed to connect the government to mentioned again and again, names of those ■■ readiness to sit down with the opposition communities, this one remains fragile and who are respected and honored, and these within the framework of the NCPJ dependent on a variety of factors. The value individuals are most often the ones to whom ■■ commitment to carry out the decisions of of TRADCOM, if nothing else, is to quietly others will listen. The process of uncovering the NCPJ. bolster government efforts to fulfill its role as and entrusting these credible voices takes provider and protector of the people. time but is well worth the investment. In the days that followed the jirga, Develop Relationships and Partner- 20 of the 60 most influential elders in the TRADCOM in Action ships. Enduring results require enduring province, including former mujahideen, The guiding principles of TRADCOM relationships and partnerships, whether one were elected members of a Peace Shura. apply to all cultures, no matter how sophisti- is operating within a society that values col- This consultative body asked its members cated or technologically enabled their com- lectivism or one that favors individualism. At to travel throughout the province to spread munication, although it remains particularly the end of the day, humans want to be valued the reintegration message. At the same time, relevant to COIN. The key is to study—with and belong to something that binds them to recorded messages from the jirga were being new eyes—the surrounding culture and pay a larger cause. The challenge is to provide broadcast. The upshot of these efforts was the close attention to how communication is both time and space for these relationships reintegration of four insurgents in the first few enacted to ensure that indigenous patterns and partnerships to grow while simultane- weeks following the event. More tellingly, the are mimicked and amplified in such a ously satisfying and tempering the demand to jirga and its follow-on activities resulted in a way as to produce more efficacious and achieve demonstrable results quickly. known improvised explosive device facilita- enduring results. “Nudge” Newly Cultivated Partners in tor turning himself in to the ODA, saying The game plan that TRADCOM has the Right Direction. Two words are operative he no longer desired to maim his country or employed consists of several tenets. here: nudge and right. Right is not, by default, countrymen. Within a few weeks, the Peace Determine Intent of Desired Dialogue. what we believe is best. Nor is it, by default, Shura reintegrated an influential mullah who The ultimate goal of TRADCOM is to link the what the host nation partner believes is best. is now working to recruit ulema and mullahs national government with its constituency, TRADCOM seeks to honor local traditions, for a future election to expand the Peace Shura the people, engendering greater trust and mores, mindsets, habits of practice, and chan- and extend its outreach via mosques, madras- confidence in the ability of the government nels of communication. However, ultimately, sas, and religious shuras. Additionally, he to protect and serve the population. Clearly, it is another tool to achieve operational regularly broadcasts Koran-based messages of such efforts would not be needed if that trust objectives and the commander’s intent and peace and reconciliation via radio that reach and confidence already existed. Nascent necessitates deliberate shaping activities to throughout Paktiya and into the surrounding governments are often understaffed, poorly bring about desired outcomes. Like any influ- provinces and Pakistan. Lastly, the elected trained and equipped, and overwhelmed; at ence activity, the goal is to shape or nudge president of the Peace Shura campaigned for their worst, they are beset with corruption our partner to do something and make him the Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan’s lower house and self-serving interests. Even with the best believe it was his idea. of parliament. Although he lost, his desire to intentions, they can struggle to say and do the Prepare to Step Outside of Comfort serve his country and his people is clear. He right thing when it comes to fulfilling their Zones. A contributor to this article was continues to work with the government to responsibilities. While honoring the govern- invited to attend a hastily held jirga with a advance the interests of northeastern Paktiya. ment’s inherent ability to know what is best suspected Taliban sympathizer in northwest Almost 6 months later, the elders of for its country, TRADCOM seeks to guide the Afghanistan. She was unarmed and wore no the Peace Shura continue to meet and travel themes and messages that arise from indig- protective clothing, instead wearing slacks, a across the province. They have procured enous channels of communication. Whether traditional blouse, and a scarf over her head. funding and intend to conduct numerous it facilitates a jirga, a town hall, or an online Despite the traditional attire, as a blond- district shuras to encourage formation of local forum, TRADCOM’s goal is to discover, culti- haired female she readily stood out among ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 61 COMMENTARY | Building Credible Voices the men assembled in the courtyard. When it means. Starting in October 2009, we stood up our partnership efforts have taken longer came time to eat, she squatted on the ground the effort with a staff of three (realigned from to implement, in large part because it has and noticed that the others were watching other duties). In the 9 months that followed, required lengthy socialization with the her intently to see what she would do. There this small team, assisted by one contractor international community, the North Atlantic were no utensils, and a prepared goat lay on and an Afghan company that specialized in Treaty Organization, and the U.S. Govern- the ground. She ripped off a piece of meat and planning and executing district-level shuras, ment. There is no question that in countries popped it in her mouth. From that moment was able to accomplish a significant amount, such as Afghanistan—in which religion forward, she was just another member of the most especially the mentoring of the MoBTA informs political, social, and legal institutions jirga. For many reading this article, participat- and MoHRA to plan and execute deliberate and processes—working with a ministry like ing in native customs is a no-brainer, but there outreach to tribal and religious elders across MoHRA is crucial to reaching the people always remains some local habit that takes us the country. in ways that resonate with their worldview, to the edge of our comfort zone, and we must Initial efforts focused primarily on ingrained customs, and community makeup. be ready to leap off that edge and demonstrate extending the reach of the MoBTA as it dealt One of the greatest challenges facing respect for our partners’ cultures. with issues that nested more readily with MoHRA is that a considerable number of Do Not Allow the Desire for “Effects” national-level efforts, such as the London religious leaders are naïve concerning many to Constrain the Process. TRADCOM Conference, NCPJ, and Kabul Conference. aspects of Islam. Many are illiterate and teach must resist the tendency of most military Also, funding support for MoBTA outreach, by rote what they have been taught. To help organizations to overplan. Success is less such as grants from the U.S. Embassy, was broaden their understanding, the MoHRA about planning and more about planting easier to obtain because it was not laden with plans to conduct a series of religious seminars ideas, being nimble within a cultural space, the religious overtones involved with support- over the coming year that will offer a stan- and keeping pace alongside our partners. ing MoHRA efforts. dardized curriculum of religious teaching. TRADCOM is consultative and coopera- From October 2009 until September The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has also tive. It is about taking time to listen and 2010, the MoBTA, with TRADCOM support, offered substantial support in this area and nourish friendships and shared ideas. An conducted 14 provincial jirgas across the hosted the first of five planned 2-week semi- overemphasis on changed mindsets and country. These events were no small under- nars in late September 2010. These seminars behaviors or on holding a specific number takings. They involved finding a suitable focus on Koran-based teachings of peace of events within a set time may short-change venue, sending invitations, offering stipend and tolerance and welcome up to 20 Afghan or prevent meaningful relationships, real support to elders to underwrite their travel mullahs per seminar. The next four seminars dialogue, and genuine progress. costs, and providing room and board during in the UAE, one of which will be dedicated Integrate TRADCOM into Larger the event. It also involved lining up speakers, exclusively to women, will be conducted once Efforts. The integration of civil-military com- framing presentation content, and preparing per quarter in 2011. munication efforts is critical to overcoming and printing handouts. On average, a provin- MoHRA will also undertake a signifi- duplication of effort, ensuring wise use of cial jirga can cost upward of $15,000. cant effort to establish and expand a national limited resources, and amplifying results. MoBTA’s program objectives for the religious leader (mullah) network by which In late 2009 through early 2010, the ISAF coming year seek to increase the number and through which moderate and responsible Communication Directorate (now Deputy and frequency of jirgas three- to four-fold. religious instruction and pronouncements Chief of Staff for Communication) worked They also seek to expand the network of can reach the people. This includes dramati- in partnership with the Communication and credible voices to more than 10,000 tribal cally increasing the registration of mosques Public Diplomacy Office of the U.S. Embassy, and/or village elders. One of the most as a means of accountability and mutual as well as the U.S. Agency for International valuable aspects of these events is the atmo- support. Registered mosques will eventu- Development Public Affairs Office, to develop spheric data they allow us to collect. Formal- ally be eligible for a range of government a comprehensive, integrated communica- ization of the TRADCOM program, along incentives that make their inclusion in the tion plan, titled the Blue Plan. TRADCOM with consequent funding and manning, will network worthwhile. fulfilled many of the plan’s objectives and thus enable enhanced data-gathering and data- TRADCOM’s newest line of effort is received cooperative support and funding. sharing. Finally, the coming year should outreach to Afghan youth through its partner- In fact, grants from the Embassy have been see the maturation of two complementary ship with the MoIC and its Deputy Minister crucial to the program’s early success. The key efforts: nationally planned and nationally of Youth Affairs (DMoYA). Youth in Afghani- will be to obtain sustained funding to build on led provincial jirgas and provincial office stan, defined by the Asian standard as males the gains made to date. capacity-building. The latter will facilitate and females between 14 and 30 years old, con- MoBTA’s ability to conduct district-level stitute more than 65 percent of the population. The Way Ahead shuras, with the aim of ensuring that local Unfortunately, this youth majority is routinely The ISAF TRADCOM effort arose from grievances are better addressed by GIRoA excluded from participation in Afghanistan’s the belated realization that we were ignoring and that national-level programs, policies, traditionally hierarchical decisionmaking the most potent channels of communication and initiatives are understood, welcomed, processes. The MoIC and DMoYA intend to within the country: face-to-face, word-of- and implemented at the local level. empower Afghan youth by publically recog- mouth, and communal channels that reached Because of the religious implications nizing their importance, establishing an envi- the populace more completely than any other involved with supporting the MoHRA, ronment that fosters the exchange of ideas,

62 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu HILL

Figure 2. ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication Structure is a fraction of other capabilities, its impact was sufficient to warrant making it a coequal pillar in the ISAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication structure (see figure 2). We believe that the all-important coming year will validate our thinking and prioritization of effort and resources to TRADCOM. Atmospherics Assessments Indigenous people everywhere are savvy people; they can read sincerity and Communication Effects authenticity well. We must get out of our skin and into theirs. We must help energize and enable credible and responsible voices, both within the government and among the people, to make sense of and then shape their destiny for the better. TRADCOM is like a

Info Ops pebble thrown into water; it only actually TRADCOM Public Affairs Engagements MISO (PSYOP) impacts a tiny space of the human ocean into which it is tossed. But the ripple effect it Expand Media Outreach creates, compounded by the effects of other Counter Extremist Voices selectively thrown pebbles, can be powerful Build Communications Capacity and enduring. JFQ Strengthen Personal Ties

Execution Planning For their contributions to this article, the author thanks Lieutenant Colonel Maria Metcalf, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Chad McGougan, USA; and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly Brown, USARNG. Key: MISO = Military Information Support to Operations; PSYOP = psychological operations; TRADCOM = traditional communications Notes and providing opportunities for the youth to resentation, address province-specific needs, 1 William B. Gudykunst and Yuko Matsu- serve as community leaders. and offer standardized training in the areas of moto, “Cross-Cultural Variability of Communica- On October 30, 2010, the MoIC/DMoYA governance, volunteerism, counternarcotics, tion in Personal Relationships,” in Communication hosted Afghanistan’s first National Youth and employment. in Personal Relationships Across Cultures, ed. High Council General Assembly in which The goals of these ministries for the William B. Gudykunst, Stella Ting-Toomey, and 106 elected male and female representatives coming year are aggressive, even lofty, but Tsukasa Nishida (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publi- from every province and Kabul City discussed demonstrate a genuine commitment to cations, 1996). 2 and ratified the General Assembly’s platform. achieve results. TRADCOM will be in the Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea (New York: Penguin Books, This platform codified the purpose and background, quietly but actively advising and 2006). responsibilities of the National High Council supporting with funding and logistics. 3 Sarah Chayes, Comprehensive Action Plan and its respective provincial, district, and In hindsight, TRADCOM seems for Afghanistan, January 2009. village youth councils across seven lines of utterly intuitive. The fact that it took 8 years 4 William Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, effort: coordinate youth policy and strategic to recognize its unique ability to address History, and Narrative,” The Journal of American plan, encourage sport and cultural activities, the multiple challenges that confronted us History 78, no. 4 (March 1992), 1347–1376. support local governance and community speaks to our tendency to overvalue our own 5 Karl E. Weick, Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, and development, encourage volunteerism, perspectives and then overengineer solutions David Obstfeld, “Organizing and the Process of strengthen democracy, promote youth leader- based on our notions of how things should Sensemaking,” Organization Science 16, no. 4 (July– ship, and promote gender mainstreaming. and ought to work. August 2005), 414. 6 TRADCOM is currently advising/ TRADCOM is a unique kind of influ- Robert Chia, “Discourse Analysis as Organi- zational Analysis,” Organization 7, no. 3 (2000), 517. assisting the DMoYA in the development and ence that leverages trusted and credible 7 Weick et al., 410. execution of a comprehensive follow-up shura channels of indigenous communication 8 Ibid., 416. plan to the General Assembly. The deputy to connect the government to the people. 9 Ibid., 415. minister intends to travel to each of Afghani- While not addressed specifically in doctrine, 10 John Milton, Areopagitica, ed. J.W. Hales stan’s 34 provinces to conduct provincial TRADCOM merits consideration as a distinct (London: Clarendon Press, 1894), 42–43. youth shuras that will serve as a foundation and essential component of a commander’s on which to establish district- and village-level arsenal of information/communication youth councils. Each provincial shura will capabilities. This is what we have done at strive to ensure equitable male and female rep- ISAF. Although resourcing for TRADCOM ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 63 The Future of National Security, By the Numbers

By P.W. SINGER

“Figures often beguile me,” Mark Twain wrote in his autobiography, “particularly when I have the arranging of them myself; in which case the remark attributed to Disraeli would often apply with justice and force: ‘There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.’”1

Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen brief press on efficiencies in DOD reform agenda

U.S. Air Force (Jerry Morrison)

64 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER

ost of those who work in off short-term currency and fiscal crises and a brought up the need for tightening a Pentagon the realm of international long-term economic security collapse. funding spigot that has been opened more and security would tend to agree While many commentators have more over the last decade. with Twain. We have all focused on what these cuts mean for the While Secretary Robert Gates has tried M to preempt such cuts with efficiency measures seen academics spit out statistics and models British military role in the world, the in a way that was of no actual use to those who numbers underlying the report illustrate the designed to wring $100 billion in savings cared about the real world. Similarly, we have type of tough decisions that are also likely across multiple years, two realities stand in the watched politicians run fast and loose with looming in American policy circles moving way. The first is that the current process is not all sorts of numeric data. The result is that forward. That is, a quick run of the numbers about actual cuts, but is instead an attempt to we often more agree with the witty Scottish shows that the British conservative govern- shift funds internally. The second is that these statesman who said, “You might prove any- ment felt obligated to act when facing a fiscal measures are unlikely to yield anywhere near thing by figures.” $100 billion. For example, the big talk about And yet, as much as those of us who closing U.S. Joint Forces Command should despised calculus back when we were in the British conservative save at most $250 million—and that is if the school hate to admit it, numbers do matter. government felt obligated entire shop were closed versus the likelihood The unadulterated cleanness of a number to act when facing a fiscal that many of the offices will emerge intact does have a certain way of driving home the environment that pales within other commands. Similarly, a substan- truth of a matter, most importantly in cutting in comparison to the U.S. tial portion of the claimed cuts in the new through the rhetoric and the often intentional predicament Department of Defense (DOD) budget offer confusion that surrounds complex matters. depends on a changed assumption on infla- Figures can show a cold, hard reality that tion figures. Shifting numbers across accounts we often want to ignore. As Aristotle wrote, environment that pales in comparison to did not work for Enron over the long term; “Numbers are intellectual witnesses.”2 the U.S. predicament. The United Kingdom nor will it work for the Pentagon. Today, we are entering a period in had a roughly $242 billion budget deficit and Defense hawks should take solace in national security that various strategic docu- (more useful for comparative purposes) was the fact that, much like what is likely to ments ranging from the Pentagon’s Quadren- running almost to a 60 percent debt-to-gross happen in the United States, the British nial Defense Review (QDR) to the new British domestic product (GDP) ratio. By compari- number-crunchers found savings but avoided Security Strategy have entitled “an age of son, the U.S. debt stands at $13.7 trillion and harming current operations. Moreover, the uncertainty.” We have been left grasping for an 89 percent debt ratio, with the Office of British defense cuts were far less severe (at some type of certainty in everything from Management and Budget showing the deficit only one-third of the scale) than those expe- threats to resources. So, if looking through coming in at another $1.3 trillion in fiscal rienced by other agencies of foreign policy, the mathematical lens offers “the poetry of year 2011. In essence, Britain’s nightmare such as the 25 percent level of cuts at the logical ideas,” as Albert Einstein claimed, scenario remains America’s blissful normal- Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (Indeed, what are the key numbers that we should be ity. If action is not taken to rein this in, the if the numbers in the British experience indi- paying attention to in trying to understand Congressional Budget Office estimated that cate tough times looming for the Pentagon, it where we might be headed next in the realm in 2050, the U.S. gross debt will have reached indicates cuts to the bone for agencies such as of national security? about 344 percent of GDP. the State Department.) At some point, these numbers’ growth The exact size of the potential cuts will $13.7 Trillion will become unsustainable for both U.S. certainly be a matter of much projection and In October 2010, Prime Minister David economic and national security, and thus debate in the coming years (my colleague Cameron issued a new British national secu- the British experience may well be looked Michael O’Hanlon, who tends to have a good rity strategy that entailed a wave of cutbacks, to for guidance by American policymakers, history at this sort of thing, predicts that DOD including 17,000 fewer soldiers and 25,000 either by fellow conservatives or liberals. As ultimately will be asked to find roughly $60 fewer civilians in the British military. Also left in the United Kingdom, most of the savings billion in savings), but what is clear is that on the cutting room floor were all its Harrier will have to come out of reduced government we are entering an era in which leaders will jets, several ships including an aircraft carrier, spending and dealing with unfunded social have to make some actual decisions in defense and 40 percent of the army’s tanks. Cameron’s welfare commitments (which in the United policy, not only in spending but also in fiscal government made this decision not because States are mainly driven by making social and strategic priority-setting. it wanted to (conservative governments in security promises that no longer reflect demo- the United Kingdom have traditionally been graphic reality), but no one should believe that $10,500 per American, $1.3 Billion per defense hawks when it comes to budgets), but the debate will spare the defense and foreign al Qaeda because it felt that it was the only way to stave policy world. As in Britain, there will likely be The U.S. military’s newspaper Stars an expectation that the pain of any cuts will and Stripes found that at $747 billion spent have to be spread out. Notably, this likelihood in direct funds, each American citizen has P.W. Singer is Senior Fellow and Director of the seems to be borne out by the various biparti- paid $2,435 for the Iraq War. If one includes 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings san debt and deficit reduction task forces that indirect spending and broader economic Institution. released various reports last fall, all of which consequences, it comes out to just over

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 65 COMMENTARY | National Security, By the Numbers

$9,000 per citizen. This does not include the attack had or might emanate, and the remak- nance, no one contemplated anything beyond roughly $500 billion that will have to be spent ing of the government there to ensure it was more unmanned strikes and a few covert in medical and disability compensation for no longer a terrorist organizing and recruiting action teams. Iraq War veterans over their lifetimes, which ground. These responses, initially framed as comes out to another $1,500, for a total of counterterrorism missions, gradually shifted 35 Bands, 1 Diplomat $10,500 per U.S. citizen. When it comes to into counterinsurgency missions in the midst This shift actually makes perfect sense dealing with nonstate actors, our investment of civil wars, and U.S. forces became bogged when one looks at the other key numbers that shape this space, establishing the parameters of not just what the United States these numbers are leading many to question whether can afford or not, but also who should carry an approach based on territorial seizure is the best manner them out and how. for defeating a global nonstate network While counterinsurgencies and nation- building efforts are certainly tough, they are not impossible tasks. Rather, they require a ratio is even more draining. Defense News down in local political and ethnic disputes. deep and enduring commitment. A RAND found that U.S. military spending on its As David Kilcullen noted in The Accidental study found, for example, that the average operation in Afghanistan was just over $1.3 Guerrilla, the irony was that such efforts to length of an insurgency is about 10 years; wars billion per suspected al Qaeda member. undermine recruiting by extremists may have won by the government side (what we are These numbers define the environment made it easier. fighting in Afghanistan) take an additional 2 of another key aspect emerging in national Seemingly unable to contemplate the years on average. security: not merely what to spend, but what costs for a new operation of such scale, the For the last decade there has been con- we can afford to do operationally. That is, if responses to recent plots of terrorism seem stant discussion of building up our capabilities we are entering an “era of persistent conflict,” to be moving to another model, or perhaps to deliver engagement, stability, aid, develop- as our strategy documents project, can we a “back to the future” model of the cruise ment, and justice programs on the ground, the persistently sustain such cost ratios against missile diplomacy of the late 1990s. Bob nonmilitary aspects so key to success in these our foes? Moreover, these numbers are leading Woodward’s Obama’s Wars outlines that types of operations. And yet for all the discus- many to question whether an approach based the planned U.S. response to a successful sion in leveraging agencies other than the on territorial seizure is the best manner for attack on American soil—tracked back to military, the numbers show something else: defeating a global nonstate network, and, in so Pakistan—is not to set large numbers of boots that nearly 10 years into such fights, Washing- doing, driving an evolution of how the United on the ground. Instead, the response is a ton still has not faced the deep and enduring States conducts counterterrorism. simple expansion of the number of unmanned commitment part of the battle. In the wake of 9/11, when it came to airstrikes already being conducted there. The State Department, for instance, responding to a real (in the case of Afghani- This is not particularly notable, given that the has roughly 6,500 Foreign Service Officers stan), or at least publicly claimed potential (in undeclared U.S. air war in Pakistan has so far and 5,000 Foreign Service Specialists. They the case of Iraq), terrorist attack, the rejoin- hit 202 targets with drones. Similarly, when a are spread across 265 diplomatic missions, ders were preemption and “regime change,” series of plots were tracked back to Yemen and with the Washington, DC, headquarters the seizure of the territory from which the Somalia in 2010, other black holes of gover- housing the bulk. When it comes to the actual

NARA M1A1 Main Battle Tank is Marine Corps’ USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Independence NARA leading combat armored vehicle (LCS 2) reflect Navy’s progress toward developing superior surface force

66 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER ability to deliver at the field level where it matters most, the numbers show a hard truth. Roughly 4 percent of the operational budget for Afghanistan goes toward civilian opera- tions. The entire U.S. Government has been Department of State able to generate only 13 Provincial Recon- struction Teams (PRTs) there, each of roughly 80 personnel. Moreover, the only way to staff these PRTs has been to draw primarily from the military Services (even though the PRTs do not have a traditionally military role), most often by bringing officers from other taskings (meaning that their background and training do not match the type of aid, development, and reform advisory work the teams conduct). The PRT in Farah, Afghanistan, for example (which was ably commanded for the past year by a Navy officer with a background in heli- copter operations), had one State Department civilian advisor for an area roughly twice the size of Maryland and containing 1 million Afghan citizens. To put this in a numeric comparison, PRT leaders meet with local officials in Diyala, Iraq the U.S. Army alone has 35 Regular Army bands, ranging in size from 50 to 250 members. In addition, there are 18 Army conferences and expressed an interest into in our own hemisphere. In 1994, the fear of a Reserve bands and 53 Army National Guard going into politics and policy. While not all failed state in Haiti led to the deployment of bands. The numbers are on a similar scale will achieve this goal, it is interesting that in more than 20,000 military personnel, with for the other Services. These numbers show this set of would-be future Barack Obamas a broad mandate to uphold democracy. By where we stand between the rhetoric of coun- and John McCains, 58 percent believed that comparison, after the 2010 earthquake created terinsurgency and interagency planning and the “United States is too involved in global an actual collapsed state in every sense of the the reality of executing it at DOD as well as affairs,” roughly twice that of older genera- term, the United States sent just over 4,000 non-DOD agencies. tions. The polling shows there is a strong troops, with a mandate to get aid in quickly emerging narrative of isolationism, shaped and then get out as rapidly as possible. 8 Percent of Voters by their formative experiences of 9/11, Iraq, The reason for this shift in operational and Katrina (comparable to the impact of 18 Months, 1 Billion Times as Powerful responses and the continued lack of capacity Pearl Harbor or the Kennedy assassination The prime numbers of national security’s may be found within another set of figures: and Vietnam for prior generations). Notably, future lie not only in dollars, voters, terrorists, the numbers that tell us about the underlying this is not a trend being driven by the new Tea or diplomats, but also in how we handle an political support for such expanded opera- Party movement, but rather one occurring emerging wave of “killer applications.” tions today, and their likely future. among young leaders who identify as Demo- It used to be that an entire generation Again, the important point here is crats or Independents, who are 20 percent would go by without one technologic break- not whether such operations are doable, but more likely to have such isolationist attitudes through that altered the way people fought, whether the intervening party has the long- than young Republicans. worked, communicated, or played. By the term will necessary for them. And here, too, These are just attitudes, which may so-called age of invention in the late 1800s, the numbers may be painting a different sort change or even reverse in the future; the these breakthroughs were coming once every of message about the American body politic, isolationist youth of the 1920s and 1930s, decade or so. Today, the ever-accelerating one that is increasingly becoming disengaged of course, ended up having to fight World pace of technological development is best from foreign policy issues. Indeed, in the last War II in part because of such attitudes. But illustrated by Moore’s Law, the finding that, election, less than 8 percent of voters told whether it is the strange coalition-building over the last 40 years, microchips—and CNN that their votes were determined by between the left and right wing on withdraw- related developments in computers—have foreign policy issues. ing from Afghanistan or declining new doubled in both power and capability every When we look at future trends, the commitments in Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, 18 months or so. The total amount of com- numbers grow worse. I recently completed or elsewhere, the American public and its puting power that the entire U.S. Air Force a survey of over 1,100 young American policy leaders seem to be steering away from had in 1960, for example, is now contained in leaders between the ages of 16 and 24 who any mission of scale. Indeed, the changing a single Hallmark greeting card that plays a have attended National Student Leader appetite is even illustrated by recent actions little song when you open it. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 67 COMMENTARY | National Security, By the Numbers

Moore’s Law predicts that such tech- 7 Degrees of Security and 1493 at which the sun’s rays strike the polar region, nologies will be one billion times more But new discoveries do not just affect and the faster rate at which retreating sea ice powerful within 25 years. While the historic the tools at our disposal and how we choose is turning into open water, which absorbs pace of change does not have to hold true (but to use them; they also can lead to entirely new far more solar radiation. Thus, the Arctic is note that even with a pace one-thousandth as realms of commerce and conflict that national seeing temperature increases in the 7-degree fast as it has historically been, we will still see security leaders must wrestle with. As one Air range rather than the 2- to 3-degree rises seen technologies one million times more power- Force general told me, “The greatest change elsewhere. As a result, this part of the globe ful within 25 years), it is inarguable that wave moving forward is the changing of domains.” is yielding new and valuable navigable trade after wave of new game-changing inventions Historically, whenever humans have routes, as well as potential drilling spots for are bursting onto the scene with an ever- discovered something of value, they often significant energy and mineral resources increasing pace. From robotic planes that have fought over it. For example, in past (some believe there may be as much oil and natural gas at stake as Saudi Arabia has). new discoveries can lead to entirely new realms of commerce But opening up a new part of the globe yields new security questions; indeed, there and conflict that national security leaders must wrestle with has not been such a geographically large area-of-sovereignty issue to solve since 1493, strike targets 7,000 miles away to “synthetic periods of political landscape shift in when Pope Alexander VI divided the New life,” manmade cells born out of laboratory European history, the discovery of gold and World between Spain and Portugal (which, chemicals, these astounding technologies silver in the New World in the 1500s and of course, prompted wars with powers left grab today’s headlines with such regularity the scramble for African gold and diamonds out of this deal for the next few centuries). that we have become almost numb to their in the late 1800s were greater catalysts for Thus today, while conflict is by no means historic importance. diplomatic and then armed conflict among inevitable, various players are preparing for Looking forward, the range of technolo- the rising and established powers than was a polar scramble. An advisor to Vladimir gies already at the point of prototyping is intracontinental behavior. Putin declared, “The Arctic is ours and we dazzling in potential impact. Directed energy Similarly, new technologies also shaped should manifest our presence,” while Canada, weapons, “smart” improvised explosive the very battlespaces where such powers Norway, the United States, and even noncon- devices, nanotech and microbotics, bio-agents contended. Through most of human history, tiguous states such as China have started to and genetic weaponry, chemical and hardware for example, we only fought on the land and build up their capabilities to operate in this enhancements to the human body, autono- on top of the sea. Then, at the turn of the last once forbidding space (the United States has mous armed robots, and electromagnetic century, technologies that had only recently no nuclear-powered icebreakers, while China pulse weaponry all may seem straight from been the stuff of science fiction (Jules Verne’s has two and plans for several more). the realm of science fiction but are on track to 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea and A.A. be deployable well before most of us have paid Milne’s “The Secret of the Army Aeroplane”) 947 Satellites, 80 Percent of off our mortgages. allowed powers to fight in entirely new Communications This raises two sets of questions: how domains, under the sea and in the air, which Outer space is another domain that has our national security structure changed required entirely new forces to be created to was once inaccessible but that is increasing in light of these massive changes in the tools carry out these battles and new laws to regu- in commercial and military value. Technol- at our disposal (answer: not enough), and late them. ogy has allowed us to turn this place of how will we deal with the massive changes Today, the numbers show how a series science fiction into a realm populated by 947 looming? What makes such technologies of 21st-century parallels are emerging. While operational satellites.3 Through these systems notable is not just the new possibilities they we are no longer filling in the blank spaces in now runs the lifeblood of global commerce open up, but also the difficult issues they the world’s map, we are discovering immense and communication, as well as (arguably) raise for policy. Even the first generation value in locales that previously either were U.S. military operations. About half of the of unmanned systems today (the Predator not accessible or did not exist, and, in turn, 175 dedicated military satellites orbiting the may seem advanced, but it is actually the gearing up to fight there. world are U.S. military systems. But this only Model T of the field, already obsolete) has For example, the white space on the map tells part of the story. Over 80 percent of U.S. raised deep military, political, moral, and of the Arctic region has always been a harsh, Government and military satellite communi- legal questions that touch on everything inaccessible area that no one particularly cations travel over commercial satellites. As from when our nation goes to war (the air cared about in policy circles—until today. As General Lance W. Lord, commander of Air war campaign in Pakistan that has achieved a result of the changes that our technologies Force Space Command, explains, “Space is the over 6 times the number of airstrikes as the have wrought upon the global climate itself, center of gravity now.” Kosovo war’s opening round) to the individ- the Arctic is warming up and opening up, To give an example of the importance ual experiences of soldiers themselves (many and thus creating new issues for global secu- of space, global positioning system (GPS) remote warrior units have levels of combat rity that cannot be ignored. Indeed, global satellites are used to direct the movement of stress and fatigue that are as high as their warming appears to be playing out far more 800,000 U.S. military receivers, located on counterparts physically deployed to dramatically in the Arctic than elsewhere due everything from aircraft carriers to individual the battlespace). to two key numeric factors: the sharper angle bombs and artillery shells. A “glitch” in GPS

68 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER in early 2010 left almost 10,000 of these receiv- ers unable to log in for days, rendering them useless and their systems directionless. The result is that starting with the 2001 Rumsfeld Space Commission, which served as the springboard for the former Secretary of Defense’s return to government, the Pentagon has conducted at least 21 studies of space warfare. Of course, as senior colonel Dr. Yao United Launch Alliance (Carleton Bailie) Yunzhu of the Chinese Army’s Academy of Military Science has warned, if the United States believes that it is going to be “a space superpower, it’s not going to be alone . . . it will have company.” The Chinese have aggressively moved into the satellite and launch sectors, with plans to add more than 100 civilian and military satellites in the next decade.4 They also have a manned program on pace to pass the United States, hoping to place a taikonaut on the Moon’s surface by 2020. More important to conflict scenarios is that China has demonstrated antisatellite capabilities repeatedly over the past 3 years, with Russia and India and even a few nonstate actors also at work in the field, indicating that the future of conflict back on Earth will not stop at the edge of the atmosphere for long.

90 Trillion Emails, 90,000 Cyberwarriors Unlike underwater, the air, the polar cold, or outer space, cyberspace is a domain that not only was inaccessible, but also liter- ally did not exist just a generation ago, which Air Force Global Positioning System IIR-21 satellite is launched perhaps explains why the current crop of aboard United Launch Alliance Delta II rocket senior leaders seems so flummoxed by it. The centrality of cyberspace to our But with so much value being located scenarios of “electronic Pearl Harbors” or entire global pattern of life is almost impos- in this new space, it is also becoming a locale “cyber Katrinas” (the vast majority of these sible to fathom, as the numbers involved are for crime, contestation, and even conflict. attacks on U.S. Government Web sites are so high as to sound imaginary. Almost 90 Symantec identified more than 240 million actually nuisance defacements, the equivalent trillion emails were sent in 2009, at a pace of distinct new malicious programs in 2009, of cybergraffiti), the numbers show how the roughly 47 billion a day. The Internet is made a 100 percent increase over 2008.7 Many of real national security danger may lie in the up of some 234 million Web sites, with the these are various types of spam and low-level gradual undermining of the U.S. economic number growing at a 25 percent annual rate.5 annoyances or criminality, but there is a and national security edge, especially in The military use is equally astounding. DOD serious undercurrent. More than 100 foreign innovation and intellectual property. It is esti- operates 15,000 computer networks across intelligence organizations have been reported mated that U.S. firms lose approximately $1 4,000 installations in 88 countries. While trying to break into U.S. systems, and known trillion a year in business, wasted research and a substantial portion are kept in their own cyber attacks against U.S. Government development investment, employee downtime, classified version of cyberspace, the Secret computers rose from 1,415 in 2000 to 71,661 and added spending due to cyber attacks. The Internet Protocol Router Network, DOD in 2009.8 Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Inves- Joint Strike Fighter program, for instance, lost computers access the broader Internet over 1 tigation described cybersecurity as the third several terabytes of data related to design and billion times a day.6 Indeed, former Director most important national security threat—a electronics systems to a cyber attack. To put of National Intelligence Admiral Michael notable designation, considering that its this amount of lost information into context, McConnell estimated that 98 percent of U.S. director did not even have a computer in his the overall size of the Internet did not reach Government communications, including clas- office until 2001. a single terabyte until around 1997. Such sified communications, travel over civilian- While the majority of the focus in public numbers represent not only lost bytes and owned and -operated networks. discussion has been on mostly overblown billions of investment dollars in research, but ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 69 COMMENTARY | National Security, By the Numbers also 10 to 20 years of lost technological edge in urban agglomeration of more than 10 million 3 Times the Size the battlefield and marketplace. people. Sixty years ago, there were only two: The final change lies within the very As a result, much as what happened New York and Tokyo. Today there are 22 such people who will increasingly staff the military in other new domains, security in the cyber megacities—the majority in the developing and will be making the decisions that shape domain is drawing a skyrocketing amount countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. how the United States and its allies react to of policy attention, organization, and budget By 2025, there will be another 30 or more. these changing numbers. dollars. Much as Marines consider November Most importantly, each of these cities From 1980 to 2005, the U.S. population 10, 1775 (the Corps’ birthdate), as the most is characterized less by its glittering skyline experienced a historic demographic shift. important day of the year, future cyberwar- than by its “megaslums,” the miles upon miles The generational cohort born in this period— riors may well celebrate May 21, 2010, the date of shantytowns and squatter communities known as the Millennials, Generation Y, or that U.S. Cyber Command stood up. Nonex- that house millions of young, urban poor, the the Facebook and 9/11 Generation—came in istent just a few years ago, this new entity now angry losers of globalization. As Mike Davis at slightly larger than the Baby Boomers in has 90,000 personnel and acts as the coordi- writes in Planet of Slums, the city that was numbers and three times the size of the pre- nator of over $3 billion in DOD spending on once the capstone of civilization and wealth ceding Generation X. Indeed, these compara- information security. creation is increasingly surrounded by “stink- tive ratios were what propelled Barack Obama What these numbers tell us is that war ing mountains of shit” that are “volcanoes into the White House. confined to the real world may be passé. waiting to erupt.” What this means is that This generation has already produced despite our understandable current focus on the young voters, soldiers, and diplomats 70 Percent Living in the Volcano how to deal with tribal elders in the moun- of today, who will in turn be the leaders of The shift in domains is not just a matter tains of Afghanistan, the numbers tell us that tomorrow (and given their numbers, at faster of the changes technology has wrought on the the future focus of global security will most rates and of greater power than the X-ers who world around us; it is also about where we are. likely be an urban one. now fill middle management roles). Thus, any And here, too, the numbers show a monu- This shift occurs not just because of national security policymaker (and, arguably, mental shift under way, with huge resonance the mass movement into the cities, but also boss, teacher, coach, or pastor) who wants to for the future of national security. because the city is increasingly where the succeed in this future will need to understand To many, the U.S. military has rounded anger that causes insurgency, terrorism, and this new generation. an intellectual corner in the last few years. war originates. Historically, rebellion and The numbers show how this emerg- From the writings of the QDR to the training conflict usually started in the rural regions ing generation brings different perspectives given to Army captains, there has been an and, only if successful, spread to the city. to everything from historic experiences to increased emphasis on the ability to navigate But as analyst Ralph Peters notes, the 21st political and strategic values. They grew up the complex geographic and social patterns century has seen the reversal of that trend: in a world in which there was no divided of simultaneously defeating a guerrilla army “Cities are now center[s] of rebellion . . . Germany, cameras lacked film, and the Inter- while winning tribal elders’ hearts and because the city is dehumanizing, breaking net is a primary news source. For instance, minds in the midst of perhaps the most rural, down traditional values and connections.”9 Vietnam has been a touchstone experience remote, and mountainous part of the world. And for the young citizens of this place, for American policymakers for the last few Yet the rest of the world seems to be going in a different direction than the type of villages we are training for, which remain despite our understandable current focus on how to essentially unchanged from the time of deal with tribal elders in the mountains of Afghanistan, Alexander the Great’s invasion to our own the numbers tell us that the future focus of global security operations in rural Afghanistan. Rather than will most likely be an urban one its rural history, the future of humanity lies in the cities. In 1800, only 3 percent of the world’s “Habituated to violence, with no stake in decades, creating a lens through which they population lived in urban zones. By 2008, it civic order . . . there is only rage.”10 view the world even today (Newsweek, The crossed the 50 percent mark and is on pace Moreover, these broken cities are their New York Times, and Washington Times have to reach the 70 percent mark within the next home turf, the more likely Sherwood Forest to all led with stories as to whether Afghanistan 25 to 30 years, the same period our strategies any future insurgent or terrorist than a village is “Obama’s Vietnam”). And yet to a Millen- claim to plan for. or forest itself. Describing a scene that could nial, the Vietnam War is as distant as World But as we add 3 billion new souls to the be straight out of Mogadishu, Fallujah, Free- War II is to the Obama White House. Polling planet, 99 percent of them in the developing town, Gaza, Grozny, or Sadr City, Peters notes has found that young leaders coming of age in world, it is not only a move to the cities that is that cities are where professional forces tend the post-9/11 world have far more mixed views afoot, but a move to cities of ever-increasing to face more problems, and thus the “future of of traditional allies such as Israel, Pakistan, or size and scale. More than 40 percent already warfare lies in the streets, the sewers, high-rise Saudi Arabia, while the shifting demograph- live in cities with populations of more than buildings, industrial parks, and the sprawl ics of America (becoming over 30 percent 1 million. These staggering statistical trends of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the Latino, for instance) may well bode changes are driving the evolution of the “megacity,” an broken cities of our world.”11 to the idea that the U.S. focus can be either

70 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SINGER transatlantic or transpacific only. Indeed, the is amazingly adept at multitasking; I once at . 4 142 million over the next four decades, but bank of computer screens at a Combined Air Peter Brookes, “The Not-So-Final Frontier,” Armed Forces Journal, June 2008. most of this growth would not be domestic. Operations Center in the Middle East simulta- 5 See “Internet 2009 in Numbers,” January Newly arriving immigrants would account neously working within 36 different Internet 22, 2010, available at . children and grandchildren would represent any parents who have had the experience of 6 Eric T. Jensen, “Cyber Warfare and Pre- another 35 percent. speaking with their children at dinner while cautions against the Effects of Attacks,” Texas Perhaps most importantly, the emerging they text under the table could attest, this Law Review (June 1, 2010), available at . example, nearly every business and govern- 7 “Symantec Report Shows no Slowdown in ment agency is now wrestling with the recruit- Cyber Attacks,” available at . 8 Jensen; Gary McAlum, “U.S.-China Eco- have different sets of career goals, who seem terms of ownership, but rather nomic and Security Review Commission, Hearing to be looking for shorter-term jobs rather than in accessibility, how easily it on China’s Proliferation Practices, and the Develop- long-term careers, and who are focusing more can be “pulled” and applied to ment of its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities,” on “finding their passion” than did previous rapidly changing problems hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Secu- generations. Has our 1950s-era personnel and rity Review Commission, 110th Congress, 2d sess., benefits system similarly changed? May 20, 2008; author telephone interview with Having grown up as “digital natives” Unfortunately, what psychologists are staff member, U.S. Strategic Command, August 28, in a world in which computers always calling this “continuous partial attention 2009; author email interview with staff member, existed and 97 percent regularly use them, syndrome” could describe not only our young U.S. Cyber Command, August 17, 2010. 9 this new generation brings vastly different men and women, but also perhaps our nation Author interview with Ralph Peters, Wash- expectations of the technologies that stress as a whole. We are getting very good at multi- ington, DC, March 29, 2007. 10 As quoted in Christopher Coker, Waging our systems and bureaucracies. Indeed, tasking, but it is hard to see much strategy in War Without Warriors? The Changing Culture of perhaps no organization has faced this in terms of directly facing the realities that the Military Conflict, IISS Studies in International tougher terms than the U.S. military, which above numbers raise. And for that our nation Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 10. has struggled with everything from whether could pay a tragic price. 11 Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” to allow social networking (the Pentagon One could draw differing lessons and Parameters (Spring 1996), 43. spokeperson set up Facebook and Twitter conclusions from the key numbers above of accounts at the very same time it was banned national security, and indeed how to face at many U.S. military bases) to the slow them should lie at the heart of any policy acquisitions system, which particularly debate moving forward. And they will surely annoys this young and very impatient gen- evolve and change. But as Stendhal once eration. A young Soldier in Afghanistan, for wrote, the beauty of numbers lies in the fact example, who has yet to get his Joint Tactical that they “allow for no hypocrisy and no Radio System (a multibillion-dollar defense vagueness.” No one seriously wrestling with contractor radio system first funded in 1997 understanding, planning, and preparing but still undelivered) can buy an application for the national security world of today and for his personal iPhone that tracks sniper tomorrow can afford to ignore the cold, hard bullet flights for 99 cents. reality that each of these statistics and figures This generation also brings in a different underscores about the deep challenges we face approach to how it uses, processes, and shares in our rapidly changing world. JFQ information itself. Prior generations had information pushed to them and were taught Notes to hoard it, whether they were students taking 1 Mark Twain, “Chapters from My Auto- a test or policymakers shaping a nation’s biography,” available at . have a “Google mindset.” Information’s value 2 Aristotle, The Metaphysics (10f–1045a). lies not in its limitation, but in its distribution. 3 Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Knowledge is valued not in terms of owner- Database, available at ; and ing problems. the United Nations Convention on Registration The outcome of this is different patterns of Objects Launched into Outer Space, available of thinking. As an example, this generation ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 71 DOD (Andy Dunaway)

Transformation Achieved? Revisiting the 1997 National Defense Panel

By RICARDO A. MARQUEZ

Secretary Rumsfeld briefs press on Operation Iraqi Freedom

t was going to be a journey. In the recol- day, and transformation would provide the be praised for its prescient conclusions, panel lection of one 1997 National Defense Nation with “options” in the future. members contend, in retrospect, that America Panel (NDP) member, transformation The report readily conceded that the remains unprepared for 2010–2020, primarily was supposed to be “evolutionary,” not journey to 2010–2020 would be arduous because transformation remains incomplete. I This article revisits the conclusions of the revolutionary upheaval advocated by some. because while tremendous capabilities existed The NDP report’s theme—transformation— in the Department of Defense (DOD), trans- the National Defense Panel, offers a brief signaled an audacious undertaking, but the only formation could only begin there. Under history of transformation at DOD, and urgency demanded by the panel was the need the rubric of transformation, DOD would examines the extent to which the United to act in the present if the United States were institutionalize change while the entire Federal States is prepared for the 2010–2020 period. to be transformed and prepared to meet the Government would reform its approach to As part of the review, the article includes the national security challenges of the 2010–2020 national security. As the United States enters perspectives of the original panel members period. Indeed, the principal conclusion of the the decade for which the NDP planned, the as to whether the conclusions and recom- 1997 NDP report was that transformation was a principal questions remaining are whether mendations submitted in 1997 remain valid priority only because the factors influencing the transformation has been achieved and whether and applicable in the current international 2010–2020 period were unfolding in the present the country is prepared. While the NDP is to security environment.1

Ricardo A. Marquez is a Senior Analyst for Defense Capabilities and Management at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

72 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MARQUEZ

Conceiving the NDP The Basis for Transformation multifaceted and overlapping vulnerabilities In 1995, the Commission on the Roles The panel concluded that transforma- and challenges. and Missions of the Armed Forces recom- tion was an immediate priority because the The panel declined to propose revisions mended establishing a “quadrennial strategy factors influencing the 2010–2020 period were to existing legacy organizations and structures review.”2 Congress embraced the proposal and already unfolding. Transformation would (that is, Army divisions), but instead urged the passed legislation mandating DOD to under- provide future options across a range of mili- Services to emphasize new attributes: stealth, take such a review. While considered the third tary capabilities, which would then provide speed, greater range, leaner logistics, smaller of six full-scale assessments of defense policy the Nation with the capacity either to dissuade footprints, and precision strike. Addition- since the end of the Cold War, the 1997 Quad­ potential competitors or, if dissuasion failed, ally, it observed that such future capabilities rennial Defense Review (QDR) was the first to exercise one or more of those options in would be enhanced if the military applied such examination subsequent to congressional order to prevail in a conflict. new systems architectures and information direction.3 At the same time, Congress autho- A transformation strategy, however, did technologies. In more audacious terms, the rized a separate, independent effort to conduct not stipulate a new mission for DOD. The NDP contended that such advances would a corresponding comprehensive review.4 panel readily acknowledged that the missions allow U.S. forces to “establish less manpower- intensive forces,” “see the battlespace in near real time,” and “dissipate the fog of war.” the panel concluded that transformation was an Applying this perspective to specific immediate priority because the factors influencing the acquisition plans, the panel’s assessment was 2010–2020 period were already unfolding blunt; it did not “follow the logic of several of the services’ procurements.” The panel ques- tioned planned acquisitions and essentially The subsequent National Defense enumerated by the report did not constitute counseled the Services go back and redo their Panel would be composed of nine “recog- a radical departure from existing missions; homework. It acknowledged that proposed nized experts” appointed by the Secretary indeed, DOD missions would remain largely systems had potential—and endorsed some of Defense, in consultation with the Senate unchanged. What would be different was the purchases as a risk-mitigation step—but advo- and House Armed Services committees. The increasing complexity involved in executing cated that each Service continue exploring final panel was chaired by Philip A. Odeen them and the corresponding need for greater new concepts and, above all, test them rigor- and composed of the following individuals integration with other governmental agencies ously before initiating new acquisitions. (in alphabetical order): Ambassador Richard and international partners. L. Armitage; General Richard D. Hearney, Before elaborating further on how DOD The Core of Transformation USMC (Ret.); Admiral David E. Jeremiah, missions would change, the panel addressed In broad terms, the twin focuses of USN (Ret.); Ambassador Robert M. a key QDR conclusion. The QDR report overall transformation would be institutional- Kimmitt; Andrew F. Krepinevich; General described the ability to conduct wars in two izing change and reforming the approach to James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.); Janne E. major theaters as a prerequisite construct; in national security. Nolan; and General Robert W. RisCassi, contrast, the NDP saw that construct as an Engineering change as an inherent func- USA (Ret.). The legislation required the impediment. From the panel’s perspective, it tion would be achieved only by establishing panel to submit the report to the Secretary left DOD postured too conservatively when entities that would undertake experimenta- of Defense and mandating committees by more risk could be assumed to undertake tion as an objective. To this end, the panel December 1997. From this mandate emerged transformation. Jettisoning the construct of proposed the establishment of U.S. Joint the premise of transformation. conducting wars in two major theaters would Forces Command (USJFCOM) with the When the panel previewed its find- allow DOD to adapt appropriately. resources, authorities, and forces necessary ings in the August 1997 issue of Joint Force The panel identified six missions requir- to examine and test operational concepts and Quarterly,5 the article characterized trans- ing attention: doctrinal innovations under realistic condi- formation as a challenge and concluded that tions. The panel warned that experimentation the need for “a transformation strategy . . . ■■ defending the homeland was absolutely critical because the advantage to get beyond today’s security structures” ■■ countering weapons of mass currently possessed by the Nation’s military was becoming “increasingly apparent.” destruction could not be sustained without it. When the panel released its report the fol- ■■ maintaining space superiority The existing approach, born of the lowing December, the context was no longer ■■ developing information capabilities 1947 National Security Act, was simply no just challenges, but also opportunities.6 ■■ projecting military power longer adequate. Establishing the foun- The military may have done a superb job ■■ preserving regional stability. dation for an integrated and responsive of protecting national interests in the past, interagency process would be imperative. but it might not be as able to in the future The panel acknowledged that the Decisionmakers needed to synchronize without significant change. Transformation American military had always performed the Defense and State Departments and would entail a “comprehensive reshaping of these missions, but the new era promised only to incorporate the perspectives of other the skills and capabilities” and would begin more complex tasks as the one-dimensional Cabinet departments. The government immediately. threat of the Cold War was succeeded by needed to cultivate an interagency cadre of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 73 FEATURES | Transformation Achieved? U.S. Navy (Michael Heckman)

Soldiers review mission details before departing in mine-resistant vehicles on route-clearing operation near Tikrit, Iraq

“national security professionals.” All facets Transformation on Hold United States was not an adversary overseas, of intelligence would have to be revitalized. The future of transformation turned but DOD bureaucratic processes.10 The date of The Unified Command Plan would have to on the outcome of the upcoming 2000 Presi- the speech was September 10, 2001; the very be updated to reflect new priorities such as dential election. While both Vice President next day, al Qaeda executed its massive ter- homeland defense and power projection by Al Gore and Texas governor George W. Bush rorist attack against the country. One month establishing an Americas Command and promoted “transformation,” Bush was a forth- later, American forces were in Afghanistan. Logistics Command, respectively. Regional right advocate. In a September 1999 speech, stability would be the overriding priority, Bush pledged to “[create] the military of the The Rumsfeld Era and alliances would remain vital, but the next century” and echoed the panel’s recom- The attacks and stunning victory ally would vary depending on the mission mendations.9 More fatefully, he promised to achieved by U.S. Special Forces on horseback or might even be a nongovernmental give his Secretary of Defense a broad mandate calling in precision-guided munitions against organization. “to challenge the status quo.” Taliban and al Qaeda formations afforded In the end, the National Defense Panel Bush won and selected Donald Rumsfeld Rumsfeld a second opportunity. He followed submitted 85 recommendations7 and had its to be his Defense Secretary. Rumsfeld had held his September 10 speech with an even more first opportunity to testify before Congress this position before from 1974 to 1977 and had audacious address on January 31, 2002, enti- less than 8 weeks later on January 28, 1998.8 helmed the 1998 Commission to Assess the tled “21st Century Transformation.”11 He laid Just the week prior, however, the Ballistic Missile Threat, but was not necessar- out six transformational goals for the United Monica Lewinsky scandal exploded, con- ily recognized as a proponent of transforma- States—homeland defense, power projection, vulsing the Clinton administration and tion as described by the panel. Rumsfeld’s denying sanctuary to enemies, protecting turning the American political environment priorities reflected his experience on the com- information networks, achieving enhanced upside down. National security matters mission—missile defense—and in the private jointness via information connectivity, and remained in the headlines, but the opportu- sector—improving management and under- achieving space superiority—all of which nity for a substantive examination of defense taking Bush’s mandate to reform DOD. evoked original NDP conclusions. transformation was lost. NDP members testi- Rumsfeld advocated change throughout On many fronts, Rumsfeld appeared to fied en masse again in March 1998, but they his first year and, in a memorable speech to endorse the panel’s transformation strategy. did not return to the Hill for the remainder assembled Pentagon employees, warned that He dismissed the two-major-theater construct of the year. the enemy posing a “serious threat” to the as a hindrance. He advocated improving mili-

74 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MARQUEZ tary capabilities by becoming more joint and risk. The consequences became painfully Iraq, President Bush replaced Rumsfeld with capitalizing on digital networks. He asserted apparent as the military scrambled to properly Robert Gates, former director of the Central that the development and possession of new armor their vehicles amidst an increasingly Intelligence Agency. Secretary Gates immedi- capabilities would dissuade aspiring competi- deadly Iraqi insurgency. At a December 2004 ately established himself as the “un-Rumsfeld” tors. Lastly, he promoted a “culture of creativ- town hall meeting with Servicemembers, and focused completely on implementing ity and intelligent risk taking.” Rumsfeld responded to comments about the Bush’s surge strategy in Iraq. Nearing the Between 2001 and 2006, Rumsfeld end of Bush’s term, Secretary Gates began emerged as the champion of the transforma- defining his priorities, railing against the tion the panel had advocated, and he imple- by the time Rumsfeld left “next-war-itis” rampant in the Pentagon, and mented a number of changes.12 He established the administration in 2006, signaled he would prepare more for present- the Office of Force Transformation and issued transformation as an objective day threats and less for hypothetical future the first ever Transformation Planning Guid- had been discredited adversaries. To this end, over initial Service ance in 2003. He accelerated missile defense objections he expedited the production of development and deployment and initiated a Mine-resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, comprehensive review of overseas posture. At lack of armor with the now infamous state- which were armored fighting transports his direction, the roles and responsibilities of ment, “You go to war with the Army you have. designed to survive roadside bomb attacks, functional commands increased vis-à-vis the They’re not the Army you might want or wish and cancelled several major weapons pro- geographic combatant commands, facilitating to have at a later time.”13 grams, including the F–22 fighter. global interoperability. Rumsfeld initiated With that statement, the future of President Barack Obama ended up the reorganization of the Army force struc- transformation was sealed. Rumsfeld per- retaining Secretary Gates. During the transi- ture. He created U.S. Northern Command sisted for 2 more years, whereupon dissatis- tion, Gates declared his intent to craft a “bal- (USNORTHCOM) to coordinate defense of faction with his leadership eventually lapsed anced” defense strategy.14 In February 2010, the homeland. Additionally, he established into opposition against his entire agenda, DOD released the 2010 QDR Report,15 which U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in rec- including transformation. echoed Gates’s call for focusing on the current ognition of that region’s growing importance. After the Republican Party lost Con- fight, rebalancing the force, and reforming Furthermore, he directed USAFRICOM gress in 2006, due in part to the stalemate in business practices. and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTH- COM), responsible for Latin America, to be Airmen conduct postattack reconnaissance prototype interagency commands in which sweep during operational readiness exercise, State Department and other key non-defense Osan Air Base, South Korea agency personnel are integrated into the command structure. Despite these accomplishments, by U.S. Air Force (Evelyn Chavez) U.S. Air Force the time Rumsfeld left the administration in 2006, transformation as an objective had been discredited. Why? While the obvious answer is frustration with difficulties in Iraq, Rumsfeld’s interpretation of transfor- mation was salient in terms of its fate for three key reasons. First, Rumsfeld asserted that transfor- mation could not wait, insisting that the Sep- tember 11 attacks and war on terror necessi- tated immediate action. In contrast, the NDP envisioned changes that would bear results in 2010. Second, Rumsfeld argued that his approach was necessary to prepare for conflict with future adversaries even if greater risk was being incurred in the present. The panel made a similar calculation, but not one countenanc- ing comprehensive change while fighting two wars simultaneously overseas. Third, Rumsfeld equated transformation with the revolution in military affairs. He promoted networked forces and advanced weaponry even in the face of a “long, hard slog” because, as noted, he was prepared to accept greater ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 75 FEATURES | Transformation Achieved?

Transformation in Retrospect Invariably, though, a panel member’s dum obtained by InsideDefense.com, the joint After a purposeful attempt at trans- assessment of America’s preparedness for the force training and experimentation functions formation and 9 years of war, America now next decade and the degree of transformation would be transferred to the Joint Staff, with enters the 2010–2020 period that the National depended on whether the report’s recom- support roles going to the Services and other Defense Panel hypothesized about and mendations had been implemented. Members components as appropriate.)17 planned for, and the principal question is expressed pride that the group’s efforts had Reform the Broader National Security whether the Nation is indeed prepared. Has succeeded in producing insights that have Approach. Panel members cited examples of America’s security posture changed for the generally been validated by ensuing events. progress, but they generally acknowledged better? Does the Nation possess sufficient However, this pride was tempered when that efforts to bolster interagency capacity are “options?” In discussing whether America is members conceded these insights remained still in their infancy. Several members stressed the need for longer-range planning at civilian agencies. General RisCassi singled out Secre- invariably, a panel member’s assessment of America’s tary of State Hillary Clinton for her leadership preparedness depended on whether the report’s on this front, but he and others recognized recommendations had been implemented that long-range planning remains a foreign concept. Moreover, panel members conceded that the government (and public) will remain prepared for the 2010–2020 period as a result valid only because the corresponding recom- predisposed to enlisting DOD resources of efforts taken to transform, only one panel mendations had not been implemented. The until interagency capabilities mature. Panel member responded yes. Four responded no, dearth of follow-through on the part of the members contended that enhancing civil- and the remainder characterized American Clinton and Bush administrations and Con- ian agency capabilities will require more preparedness for the next decade as mixed. gress frustrated a number of members. resources and appropriate authorities, which Nevertheless, panel members identified a This subtext is readily evident when in turn will require coordinated action from number of positive changes. the assessment turned to specific elements of the executive branch and Congress. A few For example, every member of the panel the report. panel members grimly expressed the fear praised the priority placed on homeland Institutionalize Change. Regarding that only another catastrophic terrorist attack defense as evidence of positive transforma- experimentation, panel members proudly would prompt decisionmakers to act. tion. Nearly every member applauded DOD pointed to the establishment of USJFCOM, Separately, other members blamed for naming homeland defense as a primary as per the NDP report’s recommendation, the lack of progress on bureaucratic inertia. mission and establishing USNORTHCOM to in 1999. While some expressed frustration General Hearney asserted that incoming coordinate defense support of civil authorities. that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had appointees and new hires have always been Furthermore, a number of panel members obligated the command (and the military receptive to interagency collaboration; the lauded steps taken to address information and in general) to focus somewhat exclusively resistance comes from lifelong employees. As cyber warfare, as well as critical infrastructure on counterinsurgency doctrine, they enthu- long as the bureaucratic workforce—unlike vulnerabilities. Furthermore, every panel siastically endorsed broader and deeper the military—does not face penalties for member agreed that the Armed Forces have experimentation. shirking such guidance, it will continue to adapted to new missions and are better pre- General Hearney commended the impede progress. Nolan agreed, blaming pared for the types of conflicts likely to occur leadership of the former USJFCOM com- “pernicious” incentives at civilian agencies, over the next decade. Janne Nolan noted that mander, Marine Corps General James Mattis, and lamented that the government does not the extent to which the military has evolved characterizing him as a “real change agent.” cultivate cross-disciplinary thinkers, “the can be inferred by recognizing how opera- When asked which was more important— George Marshalls of the world.” Ambassador tions other than war are now deemed equally experimentation or doctrinal innovation, Armitage agreed, asserting that the Office important. Panel members agreed that the as exemplified by current General David of Personnel Management could accelerate military now places stability operations on par Petraeus—General Hearney replied that the change by making promotion dependent on with combat operations, but also that substan- military should be stressing both. interagency service. (On September 30, 2010, tial work remains. Krepinevich articulated the need for former House Armed Services Committee Panel members conceded that technol- more realistic experimentation, citing the Chairman Ike Skelton and Representative ogy would not completely “dissipate the fog of shortcomings of Millennium Challenge 2002, Geoff Davis introduced the Interagency war”—especially when the battlefield includes where senior U.S. commanders overseeing National Security Professional Education, “human terrain”—but contended that the the exercise called for a “do-over” to validate Administration, and Development System Act employment of information technologies and preferred operational concepts.16 (On August of 2010. The measure is designed to provide architectures has inarguably improved overall 9, 2010, Secretary Gates announced he would incentives for national security professionals military capabilities. Precision munitions are eliminate USJFCOM. In follow-up communi- to undertake interagency training, education, now the norm, and space- and terrestrially cations, panel members generally declined to and rotational assignments.)18 based intelligence, surveillance, and recon- comment because DOD has not yet identified The Two-major-theater War Con- naissance capabilities provide increasingly how USJFCOM missions would be allocated. struct. DOD did not formally discard this persistent battlefield coverage. According to a September 1, 2010, memoran- construct until the 2010 QDR Report, and

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Marines offload from MV-22B Osprey at Camp Price, Helmand Province, in support of ISAF U.S. Marine Corps (Christopher Matt)

panel members agreed that its passing was force structure planning would have to be endorsement that will lapse once operations overdue. In revisiting this critique, a number informed by a wider range of scenarios—for end. Alternatively, if the future does entail of panel members admitted the construct example, the implosion of nuclear-armed Pak- “persistent conflict,” then DOD should be was less about strategic considerations than istan, a veritable “Pakistani Missile Crisis”— prepared to extend this sanction, especially about preserving existing budget alloca- far more complex than major theater war. tions. One member anecdotally recalled how Adaptability as an Organization. more than one panel member then–Secretary of Defense William Cohen While the report outlined how DOD could was typically receptive to the panel’s findings become a more flexible organization, more admitted DOD is capable of except when they concerned adjustments to than one panel member admitted DOD is only so much change the construct—underscoring the “sacrosanct” capable of only so much change. Members nature of the defense budget. acknowledged that Rumsfeld and Gates regarding acquisition, which Mr. Odeen char- Panel members acknowledged that force demonstrated DOD can change course, but acterized as “too cumbersome, too slow.” structure planning can be difficult in such asserted the static nature of Service budget When asked whether recent acquisition an environment. Admiral Jeremiah captured allocations remains a stark reminder of just reform would facilitate broader organizational the sentiment by noting that planners have how difficult it is to bring about greater orga- reform, Odeen responded only if it spurs less to contend with a security environment nizational flexibility. “rigidity” in requirements generation. He dominated by “lots of littles.” Nevertheless, Odeen praised the lead taken by the endorsed the recommendations contained the final report declined to outline a specific combatant commands in regard to innova- in the October 2008 Defense Business Board force structure for this reason: transformation tion, citing USSOUTHCOM for fashioning a report and strongly urged DOD to revise would instead provide future decisionmakers coordinated political-military approach and its requirement development process.19 He with options amidst strategic uncertainty. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for argued more oversight will not result in the General RisCassi recommended that successfully introducing new doctrine and responsiveness modern warfighters need, decisionmakers revisit the 2006 QDR Report pioneering the use of unmanned technologies. so they will instead continue looking for “quad chart” to understand the kind of However, he acknowledged the success and “workarounds.” options required for the next decade. Simi- influence achieved by the combatant com- Technology as Force Multiplier. Most larly, Admiral Jeremiah asserted that future mands (such as USCENTCOM) reflect an panel members remained proponents of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 77 FEATURES | Transformation Achieved? U.S. Navy (Kilho Park)

Aircraft director guides F/A-18C Hornet onto catapult aboard USS Harry S. Truman capitalizing on opportunities offered by tech- panel could have recommended a sub- dedicated attention, and asserted DHS is nology, even though recent operations against Cabinet agency dedicated to homeland simply too cumbersome to address the matter insurgents have demonstrated the limits of defense within DOD. effectively. Moreover, he argued the National a technologically enhanced revolution in In discussing the Department of Home- Guard is “ready-made” for the homeland military affairs. Panel members asserted the land Security (DHS), a number of members defense mission and has been “underutilized” salient risk lies in becoming overly reliant on asserted that every organization will endure on this front. technology. Digital connectivity may have “growing pains.” In general, integrating enti- Regional Stability. Every panel facilitated wider, more distributed operations, ties with similar objectives should generate member also stood by the report’s character- but greater emphasis should be placed on efficiencies, but the history of such mergers, ization of regional stability as an “overriding training units to operate when the network is especially within the government, should priority.” All members stressed that the degraded or nonexistent. Krepinevich asserted have induced caution. Ambassador Armitage United States needs to remain engaged glob- the Services are increasingly aware of this risk commented that any entity tasked with such ally and present in every region. Numerous and are taking steps to mitigate it, but General an enormous responsibility should not have members reiterated how access will remain a Hearney feared that the United States is been created overnight. Odeen and McCarthy challenge and, therefore, securing the global already too dependent on technology. If DOD considered the establishment of DHS an commons, maintaining a forward pres- fails to prepare units to operate without exist- unnecessarily accelerated attempt to combine ence, and developing sea-basing capabilities ing technological tethers, it runs the greater unlike organizations. McCarthy observed remain priorities. risk of units micromanaged by “tactical gener- that an entity like the Coast Guard remained In discussing regions aside from Asia, als” and incapable of exercising initiative.20 effective only because it retained its original Odeen criticized the Bush administration Homeland Defense. As already noted, culture and mission. for letting commitments in Afghanistan and every panel member considered the report’s Ambassador Armitage argued that Iraq undermine meaningful engagement with conclusions on the mark. However, when homeland security should have been distrib- Latin America. The dearth of American atten- asked whether the panel had considered uted across and made the principal mission tion has allowed Chinese influence and the recommending a Cabinet-level department, of multiple agencies. He characterized rising profile of anti-American Venezuelan virtually every member answered no. In challenges on the U.S. border with Mexico dictator Hugo Chavez to grow unchecked. retrospect, General RisCassi stated that the as a virtual “narco-insurgency” in need of He also contended that Africa would become

78 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MARQUEZ more critical to global economic and security Department.22 If diplomatic and military security affairs.24 Successive administrations considerations over the next 10 to 15 years. capabilities are to be wielded harmoniously, have missed opportunities to improve whole- Nolan commented that the focus on then their geographic perspectives should be of-government decisionmaking and prepared- regional stability and specific countries synchronized at a minimum. ness for the next decade and have suffered as a reflected a traditional state-centric view of Other members lamented the continu- consequence. affairs that precluded fully anticipating the ing emphasis on arbitrary (and sometimes The impetus for an enhanced inter- rise of transnational networks or substate inexplicable) geographic divisions. Homeland agency approach received renewed momen- actors such as al Qaeda and Hizballah. In defense and regional stability are valid objec- tum when the Project on National Security retrospect, the panel did not fully appreciate tives, but organizing according to functional Reform (PNSR) formed in 2006. Many hoped how such entities possessed an agility that missions will benefit the warfighter—as more that it would define how “jointness” could defies a strictly regional approach. The panel adversaries operate transnationally and in be achieved across the entire government. could not have predicted the speed with which these entities would accrue capabilities to prepare for and wage war—virtually compa- the proficiency with which the military now addresses rable to those once exclusively held by states, challenges other than war underscores the failure of diplomats but without the encumbrance of strictures or to initiate missions “other than diplomacy” norms that constrain sovereign governments. Importance of Diplomacy and Alli- ances. Panel members also unanimously cyberspace, the less effective geographically PNSR’s final report was well received, and reaffirmed the criticality of diplomacy and organized commands will be. Citing the old numerous stakeholders went on to prominent alliances. Odeen asserted the panel’s conclu- adage that “amateurs talk strategy, while positions in the current administration, but sion is “still valid” and “even more so” in the professionals talk logistics,” General Hearney its impact has been minimal.25 PNSR’s 28 present day; in his view, the experience in Iraq commented that “lines on a map” can be an recommendations constituted the basis for a underscore the perils of acting unilaterally. unfortunate distraction from focusing on redesign of the U.S. national security system, Krepinevich acknowledged an investment what should be military leadership’s foremost but the report cautioned against incremental in an alliance will “plateau” over time, but priorities—enhancing global projection and implementation, warning that compromises explained that diplomacy and alliances acting with agility and speed. would only delay the emergence of problems, remain fundamental components of the America remains unprepared for the would shift them from one place to another, Nation’s security portfolio. Going forward, next decade because transformation as or worse, would not even work. America should be exploring opportunities outlined by the panel remains incomplete, To recall, the National Defense Panel for bilateral and multilateral arrangements as DOD efforts to prepare for the upcoming saw the opportunity for transformation dif- in Asia and be prepared to employ nontradi- decade have not been matched by equivalent ferently. Instead of wholesale change, trans- tional cooperative arrangements. Ambassador transformation in the nondefense components formation constituted incremental change via Kimmitt echoed the point by urging the of the government. new missions, approaches, and experimenta- United States to capitalize on the opportuni- DOD has changed significantly over tion. If the opportunity for meaningful trans- ties presented by the Group of 20. Matters the past 13 years—while executing two major formation is minimal, then perhaps the more such as the global economy are best addressed wars for more than half that period. Indeed, practical approach would be to place greater through multilateral diplomatic forums, and the challenges arising from operations in attention on improving the frontline national success in this arena would enhance the pros- Afghanistan and Iraq are what have led DOD security practitioner, the likeliest engine for pects for diplomatic initiatives in other areas. to encourage and promote similar adapta- eventual reform. Observations from three Unified Command Plan. While most tion by nondefense government agencies. panel members stand out in this regard. panel members commended the establish- DOD guidance is replete with provisions General RisCassi declared that joint ment of USNORTHCOM and U.S. Cyber describing how it is ready (and prefers) to professional military education is the “soul” Command as belated validation of the work in conjunction with civilian “partners.” of the Armed Forces and that deployment report’s focus on defending the homeland Secretary Gates has even taken the unprec- policies practiced during the past decade have and information networks, some signaled edented step of advocating more resources “emasculated” it. He denounced steps such their dissatisfaction with the current Unified for State.23 Nonetheless, a comparable level as postponing educational enrollments and Command Plan. For example, Admiral Jer- of effort on the part of the civilian depart- reducing terms at Fort Leavenworth from 1 emiah and General RisCassi recommended ments to envision possible futures and adapt year to 6 months. He argued such disruptions that all national security agencies operate accordingly has not occurred until recently. would have long-term consequences and from a uniform map. Reviewing Defense and DOD just completed its fourth quadrennial asserted educational commitments should State Department “area of responsibility” review, while State and Homeland Security be upheld, even during times of war. If con- maps reveals that the Indian Ocean is under have just undertaken their first. The National structing a “balanced” force is a priority, a the jurisdiction of seven entities.21 Coordinat- Security and Homeland Security Councils Servicemember’s education would remain a ing across three combatant commands is only merged in the last year, and they still critical building block. difficult enough without having to coordinate lack representatives from Treasury and other Nolan posited if Soldiers and Marines with four additional stakeholders in the State agencies that have stakes in the conduct of can simultaneously wage war, enforce peace, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | Transformation Achieved? and oversee development, the time has come international organizations, and nongovern- 14 Robert M. Gates. “A Balanced Strategy: for State and related agencies to cultivate mental and private voluntary organizations Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” diplomats prepared to undertake similar mis- when possible. Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009), 28–40. 15 DOD, Report of the Quadrennial Defense sions and deploy overseas. More pointedly, The journey continues. JFQ Review (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010). the proficiency with which the military now 16 In 2009, Dr. Krepinevich published “Seven Notes addresses challenges other than war under- Deadly Scenarios,” in which he argued for revital- scores the failure on the part of diplomats 1 The author interviewed the nine members of izing USJFCOM. He recommended extending the to initiate missions “other than diplomacy.” the National Defense Panel (NDP) between Decem- USJFCOM commander’s tenure, requiring at least Nolan argued diplomacy in the future would ber 2009 and June 2010. one major joint field exercise a year, establishing not entail presiding over negotiations or tours 2 The Commission on the Roles and Missions a standing joint opposing force at each train- at Embassies, but serving in the field—super- of the Armed Forces of the United States, Direc- ing center, and granting USJFCOM major force vising agricultural production and evaluating tions for Defense (Washington, DC: Department of program budgetary authority. 17 local police forces—in the same fashion as Defense, May 1995). “OSD Memo on JFCOM Disestablishment Soldiers and Marines. Until diplomats meet 3 Department of Defense (DOD), Report of Working Group,” October 14, 2010, available at . approach to future challenges. 18 title B, sections 921–926. House Committee on Armed Services, Bolstering military education may not 5 NDP, “National Security in the 21st Century: “Skelton, Davis Introduce Groundbreaking inspire the same zeal as reforming America’s The Challenge of Transformation,” Joint Force Interagency Reform Legislation,” news release, national security structure, but making such Quarterly 16 (Summer 1997), 15–19. September 30, 2010, available at . 19 expeditionary stability corps may never Defense Panel,” December 2007, available at . Secretary of Defense, Capability Requirements 7 Identification and Development Processes Review, Airborne, but establishing one will probably Ibid., “Specific Recommendations,” available Report FY09–2, Recommendations to Improve Joint be just as critical in the next decade. at . 8 Capability Requirements Identification and Devel- According to General Hearney, the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on the National Defense Panel Report, opment Processes, Washington, DC, October 2008. last best opportunity to achieve meaningful 20 105th Cong., 2d sess., 1998. P.W. Singer, “Essay: The Rise of the change may be with the imminent close of 9 George W. Bush, “A Period of Conse- Tactical General,” Armed Forces Journal, June operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: “If we quences,” speech given at The Citadel, Charleston, 2009, available at . 21 asked would-be agents of change to hold fast edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html>. “Department of Defense–Department of and asserted that “we should . . . always be 10 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “DOD Acquisition State Areas of Responsibility,” Joint Force Quarterly d prepared to blow things up.” and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff—Bureau- 53 (2 Quarter 2009), 131. 22 In the final analysis, lasting change will cracy to Battlefield Remarks,” speech given at the R. Jordan Prescott, “Indian Ocean Command,” House of Marathon, July 27, 2009, avail- emerge from the souls of the Nation’s future Pentagon, Arlington, VA, September 10, 2001, able at . 23 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture,” Kansas Epilogue speech.aspx?speechid=430>. 11 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “21st Century Trans- State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, On July 29, 2010, a bipartisan panel led formation of U.S. Armed Forces,” speech given 2007, available at . 24 J. Hadley and former Secretary of Defense J. McNair, Washington, DC, January 31, 2002, Presidential Study Directive 1, “Organizing William J. Perry released a report entitled available at . irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf>. 25 featuring a congressionally mandated critique 12 Robert D. Kaplan, “What Rumsfeld Got Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Forging a New Shield (Washington, DC: PNSR, of DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Right: How Donald Rumsfeld Remade the U.S. December 2008), available at . about the state of the All-Volunteer Force and 26 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent recommended that the United States embrace theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2008/07/ what-rumsfeld-got-right/6870/>. Panel, Meeting America’s National Security Needs a whole-of-government approach that would st 13 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Town Hall Meeting in the 21 Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute rebalance civilian and military capabilities in Kuwait,” Camp Buehring, Kuwait, December 8, of Peace, July 29, 2010), available at . approach that would enhance the Nation’s item.aspx?print=http://www.defense.gov/speeches/ ability to collaborate with select partners, speech.aspx?speechid=183>.

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Supporters of radical Islam view Saladin as worthy of emulation because of his successful use of jihad Wikipedia (Gustave Dore)

An Islamic Way of War?

By Adam Oler University of Texas Library University of Texas

Great Islamic conquests occurred during reigns of Four Rightly Guided Caliphs

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Is one to assume that there is an effectively. If not, care must be taken to avoid erence works provided some coverage,13 for a 14 Islamic mode of war different, say, the invention of a false paradigm that could long time key details remained obscure. lead to flawed assumptions. Fortunately, by Fortunately, Islamic military events of from Christian warfare?1 analyzing key periods of Muslim military the pre-Crusader period are becoming more history, and by carefully considering each accessible, and it is possible to draw some —Edward Said side’s arguments, one can clearly discern conclusions about their character.15 The latest where the truth lies. Simply put, there is no histories reveal that the Muslim soldiers Well before Saddam’s final de- such thing as an Islamic way of war. who exploded out of the Arabian Peninsula feat, others, less stupid, began to For purposes of this article, the term conducted brilliant campaigns, capturing ter- way of war refers to an institutionalized ritory extending 7,000 kilometers.16 Although develop alternative means of what approach to warfare that is essentially unique, tremendous in scale, there is nothing excep- they called “resistance.” This new definable, and therefore recognizable. That tionally “Islamic” about why the early Muslim societies can possess such an approach to armies proved so successful. That is, their Islamic Way of War evolved over warfare is not a new concept. The late histo- achievements resulted from circumstances a period of decades not only in the rian Russell Weigley defined an “American and actions seen in similar periods of great 2 Way of War” 35 years ago, describing it as one conquest. First, the Muslim generals exploited Arab world but beyond. tending toward “annihilation” of the enemy.6 the fact that their two enemies, the Byzantines —Andrew J. Bacevich More infamously, the Nazis created their own and Sassanids, had just exhausted themselves17 distinct way of war premised on ultranation- in what proved to be the last great war of alist, racist principles carried out through antiquity.18 In the decades leading to Moham- I sincerely believe, and my belief is mass murder.7 med’s death in 632, the Sassanids conquered borne by historical facts, that just So where should one look for an Islamic most of the Levant, only to have it retaken 19 as there is no Christian Chemistry way of war? Three key periods in Muslim mil- by the great Byzantine general Heraclious. itary history—the early Islamic conquests, the During the war, the Byzantines and Sas- or Jewish Physics or Hindu Bal- Crusader and Mongol era, and the gunpowder sanids suffered tremendously from plague, 20 listics, there is no such thing as empires through the postcolonial age—lend exhausting them further still. Eventually, great insight to the question at hand. Scruti- the two superpowers’ borders returned to 3 Islamic Warfare. nizing arguments made by proponents of an the status quo ante,21 but when the great —Mehar Omar Kahn Islamic way of war definition further helps Islamic conquests began, the Muslims found resolve this important query. Finally, it is themselves filling a power vacuum much like

he trio of quotations in the there is nothing exceptionally “Islamic” about why epigraph reflects an important the early Muslim armies proved so successful debate over whether there is such a thing as “an Islamic way essential to examine why this issue is far more the Macedonians after the Peloponnesian T 22 of war.” The question surfaced 32 years ago than an academic exercise. Rather, it is a topic War. The Muslims likely knew of their when Edward Said published his celebrated of immense importance to U.S. strategists. enemies’ weakness, since Arab frontier forces and controversial book Orientalism. Several actively participated in the conflict along the years earlier, The Cambridge History of Islam The Great Conquests Byzantine-Sassanid border.23 The Muslims made reference to a “manner of warfare which When searching for evidence of an then exploited this weakness maximally. can be described, in a meaningful sense, as Islamic way of war, a fitting point of departure Although Muslim forces fought with Muslim.”4 Said took offense and added the is Islam’s first century. After the Koran and inspiration garnered from their new faith, the Cambridge History’s assertion to a long list of examples set by the Prophet (Sunnah)8 as role of religious zeal should not be overstated. what he considered ill-informed generaliza- recorded in the Hadith,9 the most important When the second Caliph, Umar, broke out of tions about the Islamic world.5 The matter source of moral guidance for Muslims comes Arabia, he did so without a perceived “divine remained largely dormant until 9/11 made from the “combined reigns” of the four mandate to conquer the world.”24 In fact, his topics regarding Islam critical to U.S. policy- Rightly Guided Caliphs (Rashudin).10 Ruling concerns were “pragmatic,” echoing his army’s makers. The question is certainly no longer between 632 and 661 CE, their accomplish- motivation, which hinged on financial and academic as the West struggles with Islamist ments proved instrumental to the foundation territorial gain.25 Success also stemmed from terrorists and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. of Sunni Islam.11 Because the great Islamic a number of other factors. For example, the If there is an Islamic way of war, the United conquests largely occurred during Rashudin Caliph’s highly mobile forces traveled without States needs to recognize it in order to plan rule, these campaigns are central to Islam’s a supply caravan, fought skillfully at night, earliest epoch. Until relatively recently, and selected leaders based on merit.26 Because Colonel Adam Oler, USAF, is a Student at the National however, early Islamic military history of their small size and awareness of their own War College and a Member of the Judge Advocate received minimal attention from Western managerial limits, they left the local govern- General’s Corps. authors.12 Although a few comprehensive ref- ment bureaucracies in place.27

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Additionally, they did not billet their forces among the conquered population,28 but chose to build garrison cities from which they could maintain order.29 Furthermore—and this point is key—they did not forcibly convert the local population to Islam.30 Instead, they afforded a type of protected (dhimmi)31 status to the conquered population, which had to pay a poll tax (jizya)32 and recognize Muslim authority over their territory in exchange for protection from external invaders and excusal ) Jami al-Tawarikh Wikipedia Rashid al-Din’s (from from military service.33 Because of contempo- rary schisms within the Christian segment, the conquered populations in the West frequently disdained Byzantine rule,34 resulting in a lack of support for Byzantine forces35 and, occasion- ally, outright support for the invaders.36 The Arabs’ comparatively enlightened approach toward conquered populaces proved instrumental to success as well, particularly the decision allowing Jews and Christians to keep their houses of worship.37 Massacres of defeated forces refusing to surrender occurred, but not wholesale slaughter of civilians.38 And although Western authori- ties once argued that Muslim operations at this time were “of an unsophisticated kind,”39 this conclusion is undermined by the work of more recent scholars.40 In fact, on close examination, little distinguishes early Arab armies from other medieval forces.41 Indeed, their applied use of archers, infantry, and cavalry approximated English tactics of the 14th century.42 What, then, does this review of the military events during Islam’s most forma- tive period reveal? In short, it shows nothing intrinsically “Islamic” about the great Muslim Mongol destruction of Baghdad in 1258 ended over 500 years of continuity under Abbasid Caliphate conquests from which one could discern a uniquely Islamic way of war. On the contrary, ably, Muslims view the great conquests as the Crusades by a number of Muslim leaders44 the remarkable achievements of the Muslim “miraculous proof of historic validation” for and Islamists.45 Jihadis in particular exhort armies resulted from the same combination their faith.43 Therefore, if a distinctly Islamic Muslims to see the Crusades as part of an of factors that other successful states have approach to warfare had developed during ongoing “cosmic war”46 pitting Christian- used throughout history. Astute leadership, this period, it may well have become part of ity against Islam.47 They view those wars, an ideologically (in this case religiously) Islamic culture. The next era, that of the Cru- which began in the 11th century, as a struggle motivated force, vastly weakened enemies, sades and Mongol invasions, is also impor- that will not end until Islam’s final victory.48 and clever interaction with conquered peoples tant, but for different reasons. During this Among supporters of radical Islam, Saladin brought Islam its tremendous victories. No period, three giant figures in Muslim history is seen as a figure most worthy of emulation doubt strategic lessons can be gleaned from emerged, each with his own relevance for because of his successful use of jihad,49 a view this period, but a unique, identifiable Islamic Islam today. The first, Saladin, is closely asso- unquestionably held by Osama bin Laden.50 approach to warfare cannot. ciated with the Crusades. The second, Abu By invoking jihad against the Crusaders, Hamid Al Ghazali, is Islam’s most important did Saladin create a uniquely Islamic approach Crusader and Mongol Periods philosopher. The third is Taqi al-Din Ibn to warfare? Although he instilled a heightened Searching for evidence of an Islamic Taymiyya, whose interpretation of jihad laid resolve in his forces by calling upon them to way of war during the era of early conquests the foundation for today’s radical Islamists. wage holy war, the notion of fighting for a is important because of the period’s seismic Saladin’s invocation of jihad merits religious purpose is hardly unique to Islam. meaning for Muslims everywhere. Undeni- examination given the significance placed on Consider, for instance, the early example of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 83 FEATURES | An Islamic Way of War?

Joshua’s capture of Canaan in the 13th century was already decaying. Today, Al Ghazali Unlike Al Ghazali, who predated the BCE. Israeli historian (and former President) is viewed as a leading agent of this decline, Mongol occupation, Ibn Taymiyya lived Chaim Herzog concludes that victory was and some blame him for what they call the through it.80 What Ibn Taymiyya witnessed ultimately “vouchsafed” because the ancient “closing of the Muslim mind.”63 Whether had a profound impact on him, and, during Israelites “were imbued with the belief that true or not, it would be hard to overstate Al his long life, he wrote hundreds of books on Canaan was theirs by injunction of their Ghazali’s importance to the Muslim world, Islamic jurisprudence.81 Most importantly for god.”51 For more corroboration, one need where his personal sobriquet has long been our purposes, he promulgated a revolution- only reflect on the European wars of religion “Reviver of the Faith.”64 Even his detractors ary philosophy that transformed the concept of jihad from a predominantly spiritual, Ibn Taymiyya promulgated a revolutionary philosophy reflective, and defensive concept into a meta- phorical sword aimed at the region’s Mongol that transformed the concept of jihad occupiers.82 Although the Mongols converted to Islam shortly after they arrived, and even during the 1618–1648 Thirty Years’ War, recognize him as a “titanic figure” and “the though they governed the region where he the most destructive war on that continent second most important person in Islam, next lived, Ibn Taymiyya nonetheless deemed them between the Mongol invasions and the Napo- only to Muhammad.”65 Because of the trauma apostates.83 Under his aggressive interpreta- leonic era.52 Clearly, the impact of Saladin’s that engulfed the Muslim world shortly after tion of jihad, he concluded that the population victories would be hard to exaggerate, espe- his death, Al Ghazali’s conservatism came to had an obligation to rebel against Mongol cially since the Ayyubid state that he created dominate Sunni Islam,66 a domination it has rule or risk being declared apostates (and stopped advancing Mongol forces before they yet to yield.67 thus killed) themselves.84 Nothing in Islamic could reach the Mediterranean and conquer Al Ghazali’s writings incorporated jurisprudence or philosophy to that time Egypt.53 That said, nothing Saladin did can be comments on military matters, including supported his position.85 On the contrary, his fairly described as a distinct, uniquely Islamic the role of the army in society. He envisioned notion of jihad was antithetical to virtually all method of warfare. a three-tier social caste, placing soldiers in interpretations that had gone before.86 Although Saladin and the Crusades the second, and believed they should be paid Ibn Taymiyya’s influence on radical Islam receive far more attention in the West,54 the by the state’s central treasury.68 He placed is unmistakable,87 and he is cited as its “favor- Mongol invasions had a greater impact on tremendous value on maintaining order69 and ite” philosopher—including by those who Islam. While World War II is often described described government service—to include sol- believe there is an Islamic way of war.88 He defi- as the most devastating in history,55 the diering—as the highest profession.70 Because nitely promulgated a concept of war that was destruction wrought upon the Muslim world avoidance of intra-social civil war (fitna)71 was unique, definable, and therefore distinguish- by the Mongols is comparable. A new Islamic paramount to him, he believed that so long as able, but it was only applicable within Islam history describes the Mongol invasions as a sultan controlled the army, he needed to be itself. At its root, his concept of jihad under- “genocide,” and with good reason.56 The obeyed no matter how “evil-doing and barba- mined a central tenet of Islam that forbade the Mongols razed countless cities, many never rous.”72 Al Ghazali also wrote on the subject killing of fellow Muslims, and thus many today to be rebuilt,57 and may have slaughtered as of military necessity, explaining that it was consider his teachings heretically un-Islamic.89 many as 18 million people.58 In 1258, they only legitimate to kill Muslims taken hostage By “plant[ing] a seed of revolutionary violence destroyed Baghdad and killed the last Abbasid if a matter was so vital that “all or nearly all in the heart of Islamic thought,”90 however, he Caliph, ending a period of continuity that Muslims [would otherwise face] extinction.”73 introduced a legal justification for rebellion had endured for 508 years.59 So total was He was far less concerned for non-Muslims; that Islam had been missing. Ibn Taymiyya’s the destruction that parts of the vanquished for example, he prescribed very poor, even teachings do not represent a concept of war area never completely recovered.60 From this abusive treatment for those with dhimmi that is unique to Islam. Rather, they represent terrible age emerged two key philosophers, status.74 Nonetheless, nothing exists in Al a fundamental incongruity with a key pillar of Abu Hamid Al Ghazali and Taqi al-Din Ibn Ghazali’s teachings that prescribes a uniquely Islamic jurisprudence. Taymiyya. Because of their tremendous influ- Islamic way of war. Perhaps the best evidence ence today, their teachings are well worth for this conclusion rests in the fact that he is Erosion of Distinctions considering when searching for an Islamic apparently without influence among modern The gunpowder empires that emerged way of war. Islamist extremists.75 At least in this sense, Ibn in Turkey, Persia, and India following the During the pre-invasion period, the Taymiyya is his complete opposite. Mongol cataclysm brought a renaissance to Muslim world experienced what is often Al Ghazali had a tremendous and unri- Islam’s ravaged lands. Each created astonish- called its Golden Age. Significantly, Muslim valled impact on Islam. By comparison, Ibn ing societies, perhaps represented best by the society preserved and largely adopted Taymiyya’s influence was marginal for centu- great edifices of Istanbul, Isfahan, and Agra.91 Hellenistic thought, to include rationalist ries.76 He was considered dangerous and was Arguably, the period’s most important legacy interpretations of the Koran.61 Islam’s contri- frequently jailed,77 and his teachings on jihad was Muslim expansion into East Asia, bring- butions to the world during this epoch range all but disappeared until the 20th century.78 ing Sunni Islam to Indonesia and beyond.92 from the invention of algebra to the creation Because of their recent resurgence in the Yet because this immense expansion occurred of musical notes.62 However, by the time the hands of Islamists, however, Ibn Taymiyya’s peacefully,93 it offers little to consider in terms Mongols appeared, this enlightened period thoughts warrant close consideration.79 of an Islamic way of war.

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Of course, wars did occur among these ism, far more than religion, motivated Arab nothing to do with terrorism, he argues there Muslim states and between Ottoman Turkey armies as they went into battle.106 By the end of is no such thing as moderate Islam and that, (in particular) and its Western neighbors. the 20th century, the militaries of the Middle at its core, “Islam is unique among the reli- Beginning in 1317, at least 29 major engage- East, including their overall approaches to gions of the world in having developed a doc- ments took place between Ottoman and warfare, had developed into near–mirror trine, theology, and legal system that man- Christian forces, culminating in the Otto- images (even if far less capable images) of their dates warfare against unbelievers.”117 He also mans’ 1683 high water mark at Vienna.94 An Western sponsors. It was only with the start of insists that under Islam’s tenets, there can be additional seven significant engagements a new century that some Islamic forces began no peace until Islam controls the world, and transpired between them prior to Napoleon’s to pursue an asymmetric approach, one that that once a place falls under Islamic control, invasion of Egypt in 179895 and the start of promoters of a definable Islamic way of war “peaceful coexistence as equals in a pluralis- the colonial era.96 Unlike the great Islamic think supports their position. tic society isn’t one of the choices.”118 Finally, conquests, military developments of these he argues the early Islamic conquests only periods customarily receive a great deal of Proponents succeeded because Muslim soldiers received attention. What is most remarkable is the Those who believe there is an Islamic a promise of forgiven sins and insists the extent to which the armies of the Muslim and way of war can be fairly placed into one of two notion that local populations welcomed the Europeans empires tended toward similarity categories. The first argues that Islam is by Muslims is “a PC myth.”119 and away from meaningful distinction. its very nature a religion of war. The second The problem with Spencer’s Islam-is- When the Ottomans first established focuses on Islamist radicalism, arguing that war theory is that it obfuscates inconvenient their standing army, Byzantine influence was the methods used present an approach to facts. For example, his arguments rely on already quite strong.97 After gunpowder and warfare that is sufficiently definable to be militaristic verses from the Koran without artillery made their way into the Ottoman labeled Islamic. The views of each school mentioning that religious scholars have innu- armies in the 14th century, the Europeans fol- merit scrutiny. merable disagreements about what they really lowed suit.98 Then, as the European powers mean.120 Spencer similarly fails to address strengthened, weaponry began to flow in the militaries of the evidence showing the great Islamic conquests the other direction. Indeed, Bernard Lewis Middle East developed into succeeded primarily due to enemy exhaustion, concludes that “[b]y far, the most important oppressive Byzantine rule, and the decision contribution of the West to life—and death— near–mirror images of their to leave existing bureaucracies in place.121 in the Islamic world” was in the form of Western sponsors Likewise, he overlooks Islam’s grand expan- weapons.99 Once the military fortunes of the sion into Indonesia, which occurred peace- gunpowder states declined, both the Ottoman One well-known representative of the fully.122 Nor does he examine the Andalusian Turks100 and the Qajar Persians101 strove to first group is Robert Spencer, author of the communities of Cordoba and Toledo, where emulate their Christian counterparts by mass media publication The Politically Incor- Muslims and Jews, coexisting under Islamic hiring advisors from across Europe. Although rect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades).107 His leadership, produced the likes of Averroes and they did not abandon Islamic symbols or book contains chapter headings such as “The Maimonides.123 Perhaps above all, his theory trappings, from the 18th century onward, Qur’an: Book of War”108 and “Islam: Religion disregards centuries of warfare similarly Muslim armies strove to recreate themselves of War.”109 Although Spencer has his detrac- waged by Christians and others in the name of exclusively on European models.102 As a result, tors,110 his Guide to Islam spent 15 weeks on their religions.124 Nowhere, for example, does during the gunpowder and colonial periods, the New York Times bestseller list111 and is Spencer contrast the spread of Islam with the there was a steady march away from a distinc- one of the best-selling books on Islam ever to brutal spread of Christianity in, for instance, tively Islamic way of war. Even The Cambridge appear in the United States.112 Central and South America.125 History of Islam that so offended Edward Said In making his argument, Spencer A second argument suggesting there is concluded, “[t]he manner of warfare which focuses on Koranic verses that promote war, an Islamic way of war depends less on sweep- can be described, in a meaningful sense, as and then argues that many Muslims today ing if flawed generalizations and focuses on Muslim” became obsolete and ceased to exist feel inherently bound to follow them.113 He events of the past several decades. Consider after this period.103 dismisses the obvious comparison of simi- Andrew Bacevich’s article “The Islamic The march toward symmetry con- larly “violent” verses from the Old Testament Way of War.”126 He argues that Muslims tinued beyond the colonial period and into by saying the latter were only directed at realize they cannot defeat the West with the modern era. Kenneth Pollack’s Arabs at distinct, long disappeared tribes.114 He also conventional means and instead have learned War is replete with examples of Soviet aid to dismisses established scholars of Islam such to fight asymmetrically. He describes this Muslim armies, which ran the gamut from as Bernard Lewis, whom he describes as Islamic way of war as: equipment to training to doctrine.104 Pollack “disingenuous about Islamic radicalism,”115 also provides numerous examples of like and Karen Armstrong, whom he considers a panoply of techniques employed to undercut support from the United States, and smaller a “Western apologist for Islam” and “[o]ne the apparent advantages of high-tech con- instances of assistance from Great Britain and of the people most responsible” for “the fog ventional forces. The methods employed do France.105 What is particularly telling about of misinformation that surrounds Islam and include terrorism—violence targeting civilians Pollack’s work is the apparent irrelevance of the Crusades today.”116 Although he concedes for purposes of intimidation—but they also Islamism for these forces. Instead, national- there are moderate Muslims who want incorporate propaganda, subversion, popular ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | An Islamic Way of War? agitation, economic warfare, and hit-and-run in suicide attacks between 1983 and 2008.140 Western thought has displayed a disturbing attacks on regular forces, either to induce However, as an indirect approach to warfare, willingness to brand Islam as “irrational” and an overreaction or to wear them down. The suicide attacks are hardly new. Japanese declare the Muslim mind “closed,”152 thereby common theme of those techniques, none Kamikaze pilots killed 4,900 Americans and further propagating Muslims as the other. of which are new, is this: avoid the enemy’s wounded 4,800 between the fall of 1944 and the Perhaps the second risk is subtler, but it strengths; exploit enemy vulnerabilities.127 following August.141 Many other organizations, is also dangerous. Defining an Islamic way of including the Marxist Kurdish Workers Party war generates a paradigm, a set of blinders. If In truth, what Bacevich brands as an and the Black Tigers of Sri Lanka (just to cite U.S. strategists believe there is an institution- Islamic way of war is simply an application of two), frequently used suicide bombers as well.142 alized Islamic approach to war that is unique, Sun Tzu’s indirect approach to warfare,128 and Terrorism is regrettably ubiquitous. It is not, definable, and recognizable, their assump- the methods he describes are indistinguish- however, an Islamic way of war. tions will be made accordingly. By adopting able from those used by resistance movements the arguments of Spencer and others, Ameri- around the world.129 Additionally, in his cri- Something eerily familiar permeates cans risk falling prey to an ideological “pathol- tique of Bacevich’s definition, David Kilcullen the debate over whether there is an Islamic ogy” capable of “blinding us irreversibly.”153 sagely notes that this supposedly Islamic way of war, and it can be found in historian In short, Americans must steadfastly avoid approach to warfare is wholly consistent with John Dower’s War without Mercy.143 Dower placing themselves in a nonexistent box. the “unrestricted warfare” theory promul- described how Hearst newspapers portrayed Unmistakably, an Islamic way of war gated by Chinese colonels Qiao Liang and the war against Japan as “cultural and reli- does not exist. Studying key periods of Islamic gious,” while warning that a victorious Japan military history, considering Islam’s most although terrorism is the would cause a “perpetual war between Orien- important philosophers, placing current tal ideals and Occidental.”144 He further noted events in their proper global context, and method chosen by al Qaeda, how popular writers of the day described questioning opposing views mandate this con- there is nothing inherently the war with Japan differently from the one clusion. Whenever the theory of an Islamic Islamic about terrorism itself in Europe because the former was seen as “a way of war surfaces, it must be rejected holy war, a racial war of greater significance unequivocally. Otherwise, the minds that end Wang Xiangsui a decade ago.130 Simply put, than any the world has heretofore seen.”145 For up being closed may well be our own. JFQ implying that these methods are somehow Dower, there was an underlying “Pan-Asian Islamic is erroneous. Perhaps Bacevich is unity myth” that it took the war to destroy.146 Notes simply trying to point out that some elements Ultimately, he showed how racism and the 1 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 1st ed. (New in the Muslim world are resorting to asym- creation of the less-human “other” helped York: Vintage Books, 1979), 304. metric warfare, but it is hard to imagine label- turn the war into one of unspeakable horror.147 2 Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Islamic Way of ing, for example, Jewish resistance movements The specter of Said’s Orientalism also War: Muslims Have Stopped Fighting on Western that fought asymmetrically in World War II as comes to the fore with the question of whether Terms—and Have Started Winning,” The American 131 waging a “Jewish way of war.” there is an Islamic way of war. Said indicted Conservative, September 11, 2006, available at . by al Qaeda to confront its enemies,132 there ing how it simultaneously was shaped by and 3 Mehar Omar Kahn, “Is There an Islamic is nothing inherently Islamic about terrorism promulgated imperialism.148 He described Way of War?” Small Wars Journal, March 8, 2010, itself. For example, high-profile terrorist attacks “Orientalism” as akin to anti-Semitism, but available at . 4 in the form of hijackings.133 Although he was an Islamic lands.149 Although assailed by some,150 Peter Malcolm Holt et al., The Cambridge History of Islam, 2B, Islamic Society and Civiliza- Arab, the pioneer of this method was George Orientalism germanely and poignantly tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Habash, the Christian founder of the Popular described how creation of the “lesser other” 1977), 847. 134 Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Islamists negatively shaped outlooks and perceptions of 5 Said, 304. 151 who attack civilians are hardly the first groups Middle Easterners for generations. 6 Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way to employ that approach. For example, the Irish Thus, defining an Islamic way of war of War: A History of United States Military Strategy Republican Army killed over 600 civilians would yield tangible risks. The first involves and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), xxii. through terror tactics;135 the Irgun, led by future the definition’s potential to dehumanize. 7 Michael Geyer, “German Strategy in the Prime Minister Menachem Began, deliberately Arguing that Muslims have an institutional- Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945,” in Makers of targeted British civilians in the years leading ized approach to war that is unique, definable, Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear up to Israeli independence;136 and today, radical and therefore recognizable as a stand-alone Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon Alexander Craig, and Israeli terrorist elements aim to prevent peace concept helps establish that Muslims are dif- Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 566. between Israel and the Palestinians.137 Although ferent from non-Muslims in the West; they 8 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 3d al Qaeda—a viciously anti-Shi’ite organiza- risk becoming the other. In an ideological ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 12. 138 tion —employs suicide bombers, Robin sense, what Robert Spencer does in Guide 9 Ibid., 13. Wright notes that Shi’ites, not Sunni Islamists, to Islam is paint Muslims as an apocalyptic 10 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A Brief 139 began the modern practice in the early 1980s. enemy, implying war or submission are the History of the Last 2,000 Years (New York: Scribner, Wright estimates that 3,400 Americans died only two options at hand. Unfortunately, 1995), 62.

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11 Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History 44 Geoffrey Hindley, A Brief History of the Cru- Ethics of Life: Abortion, War, and Euthanasia, ed. (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 21. sades (London: Robinson, 2004), 256. Jonathan E. Brockopp (Columbia: University of 12 See Jeremy Black, The Seventy Great Battles 45 Christopher Catherwood, A Brief History South Carolina Press, 2003), 147–148. in History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2005); of the Middle East: From Abraham to Arafat (New 74 Andrew G. Bostom, “Sufi Jihad,” American Elmer C. May, Gerald P. Stadler, and John F. Votaw, York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2006), 260. Thinker, May 15, 2005, available at Medieval Warfare (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Globalization, and the End of the War on Terror canthinker.com/2005/05/sufi_jihad.html>. Group, 1984); and Michael Lee Lanning, The Mili- (New York: Random House, 2009), 5–6, 11. 75 William F. McCants et al., “Militant Ideology tary 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Military 47 Catherwood, 106. Atlas Executive Report,” Combating Terrorism Leaders of All Time (Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing 48 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Center, available at . 13 One of the most comprehensive single 2006), 171. 76 Aslan, How to Win a Cosmic War, 110. volume military history compendiums, R. Ernest 49 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The 77 Ibid. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against 78 Ibid. Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present, 2d America (New York: Random House, 2003), 167. 79 According to Ansary, “Ibn Taymiyya reput- rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), includes 50 Bruce B. Lawrence, Messages to the World: edly wrote about four thousand pamphlets and five battle summaries from the entirety of recorded The Statements of Osama Bin Laden (London, New hundred books. With these, he planted a seed. The human history, those in the Near East included. In York: Verso, 2005), 213–214. seed didn’t flourish at once, but it never died out that work, however, much of the analysis is reserved 51 Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, either. It just lay there, under the surface of Islamic for events traditionally important to Western Battles of the Bible (New York: Random House, culture, ready to bud if circumstances should ever historians. 1978), 62. favor it. Four and half centuries later, circumstances 14 Perhaps one reason for this dearth of cover- 52 Dupuy and Dupuy, 533. did” (164). age represents a Western (possibly “Orientalist”) 53 Bertold Spuler, The Mongol Period: History of 80 Benjamin and Simon, 44. perspective on the value of studying Islamic history. the Muslim World, trans. F.R.C. Bagley (Princeton: 81 Ansary, 164. 15 Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: Markus Wiener, 1994), 20. 82 Catherwood, 114. How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live 54 Muhammad Mojlum Khan, Muslim 100: 83 Ibid. In (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2007), 12–33. The Lives, Thoughts and Achievements of the Most 84 Ansary, 162. 16 Ibid., 371. Influential Muslims in History (Markfield, Leices- 85 Benjamin and Simon, 48. 17 Ibid., 67–70. tershire, UK: Kube, 2008), 65. 86 Ibid., 50. 18 Ibid., 368. 55 See, for example, George Melloan, “World 87 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the 19 Ibid., 69. War II’s Do-good Offspring are Flagging,” The Wall Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 20 Ibid., 68. Street Journal, September 20, 2005, A17. 2002), 62. 21 Ibid. 56 Mir Tamim Ansary, Destiny Disrupted: A 88 Robert Spencer, The Politically Incorrect 22 Thomas R. Martin, Ancient Greece: From History of the World through Islamic Eyes (New Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) (Washington, Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times (New Haven: Yale York: PublicAffairs, 2009), 143–145. DC: Regnery Publishing, 2005), 39. University Press, 1996), 174. 57 Ibid. 89 Aslan, How to Win a Cosmic War, 110. 23 Malise Ruthven and Azim Nanji, Historical 58 Aslan, How to Win a Cosmic War, 106. 90 Benjamin and Simon, 50. Atlas of Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University 59 Ibid. 91 Bernard O’Kane, Treasures of Islam: Artistic Press, 2004), 24. 60 Michael Axworthy, A History of Iran: Empire Glories of the Muslim World (London: Duncan 24 Armstrong, 35. of the Mind (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 341. Baird, 2007), 138–147, 163–169, 200–203. 25 Ibid. 61 Robert R. Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim 92 Robert Day McAmis, Malay Muslims: 26 Kennedy, 372. Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in 27 Ibid., 97. Islamist Crisis (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2010), Southeast Asia (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans 28 Ibid., 373. 35–39, 233–234. Publishing Company, 2002), 24. 29 Lewis, The Middle East, 433. 62 Michael Hamilton Morgan, Lost History: The 93 Ibid., 24–25. 30 Ibid., 57. Enduring Legacy of Muslim Scientists, Thinkers, and 94 T.P. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror & Peace 31 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 38. Artists (Washington, DC: National Geographic, in the Qurán and in Islam: Insights for Military & 32 Lewis, The Middle East, 210–212; Esposito, 2007), 56–57, 241. Government Leaders (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War Islam: The Straight Path, 38. 63 Reilly, 119. College Foundation Press, 2004), 370–372. 33 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 38. 64 Lewis, The Middle East, 240. 95 Ibid., 372–374. 34 Kennedy, 369. 65 Reilly, 93. 96 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab 35 Ibid., 68. 66 Ansary, 115. Peoples (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 36 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 38. 67 Reilly, 119. University Press, 1991), 265. 37 Kennedy, 372. 68 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Politi- 97 David Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 38 Ibid., 373. cal Thought: From the Prophet to the Present (New 1300–1774 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1983). 39 Holt et al., 825. York: Routledge, 2001), 102. 98 Dupuy and Dupuy, 403. 40 David Nicolle, Yarmuk, 636 AD: The Muslim 69 Ibid., 104. 99 Lewis, The Middle East, 275. Conquest of Syria (London: Osprey, 1994). 70 Ibid., 102. 100 Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story 41 David Nicolle and Angus McBride, Armies of 71 Armstrong, 172. of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923 (New York: the Muslim Conquest (London: Osprey, 1993), 10. 72 Black, 102. Basic Books, 2006), 390–396. 42 Ibid. 73 Sohail H. Hashmi, “Saving and Taking Life 101 Axworthy, 195. 43 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 38. in War, Three Modern Muslim Views,” in Islamic

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102 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: 132 Terry McDermott, Perfect Soldiers: The Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914–1922 (New Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It (New NEW York: Holt, 1989), 109, 218–219. York: HarperCollins, 2005), 269. from NDU Press 103 Holt et al., 847. 133 “Habash Was No Role Model,” Jerusalem for the 104 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Post, March 2, 2008. Africa Center for Strategic Studies Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of 134 “For the Record,” The New York Times, July Nebraska Press, 2002). 17, 2007. 105 Ibid. 135 Malcolm Sutton, Bear in Mind These Dead: ACSS Research Paper No. 2 106 Ibid., 569. An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: 107 Spencer. 1969–1993 (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, A Pathway to Security 108 Ibid., 19. 1994). Statistics available at . The of rumor and misinformation. on the Authors—and Their Convictions—As They report estimates the IRA killed 650 civilians. Do on the Man Himself,” Financial Times, April 28, 136 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab- Against this backdrop, Steven Liv- 2007. Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents (Boston: ingston shows that the emergence of new information 111 This information is from Spencer’s publisher Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), 178–179. and communication technologies—together with new and can be found at . Embrace: The Impact of Israeli and Palestinian years, the annual growth rate for mobile telephones 112 Amazon lists The Politically Incorrect Guide Rejectionism on the Peace Process (Fairfax, VA: in Africa has been 65 percent—more than twice the to Islam as its 14th best selling book on Islam. University Press of America, 1997), 101–106. global average. Linked by these new technologies 113 Spencer, 45. 138 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Shia Revival: and geographical information systems, civil society 114 Ibid., 29. How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future networks in Africa now are able to monitor security, 115 Ibid., 221. (New York: Norton, 2006), 243–247. 116 139 provide health care information, create banking Ibid., xv. Robin B. Wright, Dreams and Shadows: 117 services, and provide marketing information to Ibid., 43. The Future of the Middle East (New York: Penguin 118 Ibid., 37. Press, 2008), 170. farmers. Mobile communications has helped to create 119 Ibid., 53–54. 140 Robin Wright, “Since 2001, a Dramatic new institutions that promote transparency, account- 120 Reza Aslan, No God but God: The Origins, Increase in Suicide Bombings,” The Washington ability, and security. This research paper traces the Evolution, and Future of Islam (New York: Random Post, April 18, 2008. remarkable development of these infosystems and House, 2005), 84–85. 141 Richard P. Hallion, “Precision Weapons, their effects in Africa. The paper recommends sup- 121 Kennedy, 366–375. Power Projection, and the Revolution in Military porting African innovation centers as well as basic 122 McAmis, 24. Affairs,” USAF Air Armament Summit, Air Arma- research on the political, economic, and security 123 David L. Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the ment Center, Eglin Air Force Base, FL, May 29, implications of local networks created by mobile tele- Making of Europe, 570 to 1215 (New York: Norton, 1999, available at . between the spread of Islam and the expansion of 142 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Christianity as misguided, illegitimate attempts at Daphna Canetti-Nisim, “The Social and Religious “moral equivalency.” Spencer, 116. Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and their 125 Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity Victims,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), 402. 3 (October 2003), 140, available at . as “an extraordinary mixture of force, cruelty, stu- 143 John W. Dower, War without Mercy: Race Forging Partnerships for Africa’s Future pidity and greed, redeemed by occasional flashes of and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon The Africa Center offers a variety of resources that imagination and charity.” Books, 1986). keep readers abreast of the Africa-related news and 126 Bacevich. 144 Ibid., 7. research published on this site. 127 Ibid. 145 Ibid. http://africacenter.org/ 128 Lawrence P. Phelps, East Meets West: A Com- 146 Ibid. bined Approach to Studying War and Strategy in the 147 Ibid., 77–93. st 148 To subscribe to Africa Center’s Daily Media 21 Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War Said, 12–15. College, 2006). 149 Ibid., 27–28. Review and/or Africa Security Briefs, go to 129 Ibid. 150 Robert Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge: http://africacenter.org/subscribe/, enter email 130 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Orientalism and its Discontents (Woodstock, NY: address, check the box next to the name Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One Overlook Press, 2006). of the newsletter(s) desired, and click the (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25. 151 Said, 12. “Submit” button. 131 Michael I. Karpin, The Bomb in the Base- 152 Reilly, 127. ment: How Israel Went Nuclear and What That 153 Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Visit the NDU Press Web site Means for the World (New York: Simon & Schuster, Logic for American Statecraft (New York: Cam- for more information on publications 2006), 9. bridge University Press, 2007), 118. at ndupress.ndu.edu

88 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Why Unmanned

By PAUL SCHARRE

t is almost a cliché these days to speak of Pitting manned and unmanned vehicles The result is that unmanned systems an unmanned revolution in war, and yet (UxVs) directly against one another for the offer the potential for a new paradigm for with literally thousands of unmanned same tasks misses the point of building such U.S. warfighting. Since the end of World War vehicles on the ground and in the air vehicles. The utility in UxVs is not that they II, the United States has generally fought from I a position of numerical inferiority and relied supporting U.S. troops overseas, it is clear that are cheaper or necessarily better than equiva- something special is happening. Ten years lent manned systems (compare, for instance, on superior quality weapons. Unmanned ago, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such the Global Hawk and U–2 aircraft), but that systems offer the potential to untether U.S. as the Predator were a niche capability that they can be designed to do things that manned forces from the relatively small personnel existed only in small numbers. Today, U.S. systems cannot do. Unmanned systems can base of a professional military. Instead, the forces overseas cannot get enough of them. be designed with performance characteristics United States could unleash large quanti- Wartime necessity has driven the deployment and risk profiles that, for some missions, ties of attritable unmanned weapons on the of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to simply would be not feasible or acceptable battlefield, leveraging both quality and quan- defuse bombs and UAVs to provide persistent for manned vehicles. Innovative unmanned tity. These weapons could provide a range overhead surveillance to track insurgents systems can be designed to operate on land, at of capabilities, including reconnaissance, and protect troops. The utility—and limita- sea, and in the air in larger quantities, taking decoy, jamming, and strike. As the computer tions—of unmanned versus manned systems greater risks, and with range, endurance, processing power that enables autonomy for future weapons, however, such as combat speed, and maneuverability not possible with increases exponentially, even more capable UAVs or robotic ground vehicles, is a continu- manned systems. systems will be possible in the future. ing source of debate.

United Kingdom’s Taranis prototype will test possibility of developing unmanned combat vehicle with long- range precision strike capabilities Paul Scharre is a former Infantryman in the 75th Ranger Regiment who has served in BAE Systems Iraq and Afghanistan. He currently works in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 89 FEATURES | Why Unmanned

Performance able assets. UxVs, provided they are cheap tage. UxVs can be used to flood an enemy’s Removing the person from the cockpit, enough, could be expendable, opening up new defenses. Combined with the performance driver’s seat, or tiller yields two immediate concepts of operation. advantages of greater speed, maneuverability, benefits: commanders can take more risk UxVs can enable radically new concepts range, and endurance, UxVs can enable power with the asset; and in some situations, perfor- for accomplishing missions by decoupling projection and persistence not possible with mance advantages are achieved. Performance force protection from combat performance. manned assets. (This is especially the case if advantages can include less weight, greater The proliferation of improvised explosive networked UxVs lead to significant coordina- payload, smaller size, longer endurance, more devices (IEDs) drives Soldiers and Marines tion and synchronization advantages, such as maneuverability, and greater speed, although into heavily armored vehicles such as the intelligent swarming.4) these advantages become less significant for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Because they are able to take more larger vehicles. vehicles, which are correspondingly cumber- risks in survivability, UxVs could be built The Predator UAV is a shining example some. Building a next-generation ground for special purposes. Mission tasks could be of exploiting the performance advantages combat vehicle that is fast, maneuverable, light disaggregated. By optimizing for a single task, of removing a person from the cockpit, enough to traverse unimproved roads and cheaper UxVs could be fielded in larger quan- thus enabling an aircraft that can loiter for bridges, well armed, and survivable against tities. The result would be a family of special 24 hours providing continuous overhead IEDs is a nearly impossible task. Unmanned purpose vehicles that together accomplish the surveillance. A manned aircraft with similar systems offer the potential to disaggregate the mission previously done by a single multimis- endurance would be hindered by both pilot fighting and surviving roles, however. Lightly sion platform. The resulting increased quan- weight and pilot fatigue. Smaller UAVs such armored reconnaissance UxVs could scout tity and diversity of U.S. assets complicates an as the Scan Eagle and Raven go even further ahead to discover enemy positions and relay adversary’s decisionmaking. by enabling concepts of operation that would literally be impossible with manned aircraft, concept surveillance aircraft and airships aim for such as an infantry squad carrying a hand- launched Raven UAV on foot patrol. To endurances of months and years, a scale clearly impossible achieve the same effect by stationing numer- with manned aircraft ous manned aircraft continuously over each and every infantry patrol would be prohibi- their data to troops safely ensconced in sur- For instance, the miniature air launch tively expensive and unfeasible. vivable platforms in the rear. Then, attritable decoy (MALD) offers the ability to confuse Even greater performance advantages in UxVs (such as smart missiles) could be sent an enemy’s integrated air defenses by flood- the areas of range and endurance are antici- forward to strike enemy positions. ing the skies with relatively cheap unmanned pated with future UxVs. The BAE Taranis, Next-generation unmanned tanks decoys. Clearly, this concept would not Northrop Grumman X–47B, and Boeing could be designed to emphasize speed and be possible with a manned asset. While a X–45 combat UAVs are expected to have maneuverability over survivability. Air- decoy is not even comparable to an actual greater endurance and longer ranges than mobile swarms of UxVs could leapfrog behind aircraft in terms of capability, the MALD is equivalent manned aircraft. Concept surveil- enemy lines and provide reconnaissance for relatively inexpensive compared to the asset lance aircraft and airships aim for endurances precision indirect fires. At sea, unmanned it is protecting, allowing the proliferation of months and years, a scale clearly impos- surface vehicles (USVs) could be used to help of a large number of decoys that multiplies sible with manned aircraft. Similarly, glider U.S. Navy warships defend against swarming the effectiveness of existing aircraft. Every unmanned underwater vehicles can stay at small boat attacks, providing a buffer between MALD in the skies drawing fire from enemy sea for months or years at a time, monitoring threatening surface vessels and U.S. ships. defenses enhances the survivability of U.S. critical areas or shadowing enemy subma- USVs and ship-launched UAVs could extend strike aircraft. Similarly, other MALD-like rines.1 Performance advantages diminish the range of a ship’s sensors, moving beyond attritable unmanned vehicles could perform and the weight and size of a person on board the crow’s nest to an over-the-horizon concept reconnaissance and surveillance, battle become negligible as a vehicle gets larger.2 for situational awareness.3 Using UxVs to damage assessment, electronic attack (like Significant gains might not be made by, for remove the person from the leading edge of the MALD–Jammer), or close-in strike such example, removing a person from a large the battlefront could not only reduce risk, but as traditional precision-guided munitions. As bomber or a warship. For a variety of applica- also enable faster, more maneuverable forces. autonomous capabilities grow, the difference tions, however, UxVs can fill roles manned between attritable unmanned vehicles and systems cannot. Numbers Matter loitering munitions will become increasingly Broadly speaking, the American way of hazy. The Tactical Tomahawk and Harpy Risk war since the end of World War II has been UAV, for example, blur this distinction. UGVs like the iRobot Packbot are used to focus on superior technology to counter Unmanned vehicles could also act for hazardous missions, such as defusing the numerical superiority of adversaries. The as force multipliers for offensive systems. bombs, where commanders would prefer not ability to send unmanned vehicles to the Unmanned floating weapons pods, for to put soldiers at risk. While war necessarily front means that the U.S. military’s smaller example, which would be little more than involves risk, the U.S. military does not (nor all-volunteer force may no longer be forced to remote-controlled barges loaded with mis- should it) treat its Servicemembers as expend- fight from a position of numerical disadvan- siles, could be used to deepen the magazine

90 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu SCHARRE of the destroyers that would control them. The result would be a dramatic multiply- ing of the offensive capability of a destroyer at relatively low cost. Moreover, because weapons pods distribute the fighting capabil- ity of a single ship across a wider area, an enemy’s targeting problem is significantly U.S. Army (Michael J. MacLeod) complicated compared to a hypothetical large, densely packed warship with the same offensive capability. With a distributed network, any single pod or group of weapons pods is attritable. Combat power may decline as pods are attrited, but provided that the command and control node (and sensors) at the center of the network survives, the U.S. battle network could continue to fight. The performance advantages of UxVs Soldier launches RQ-11 Raven UAV (speed, maneuverability, and endurance) near Taqqadum, Iraq could lead to offensive advantages, while the ability to take risks in a single asset could, paradoxically, enable a more robust system of The cost threshold for a given UxV to be would have been considered supercomputers weapons and sensors. A distributed network considered “expendable” is relative to the decades ago. Computing power can be pur- of UxVs operating as a reconnaissance-strike mission, the asset it is protecting, and the chased at low costs. swarm could project more survivable and marginal cost to the enemy of producing Affordable and effective UxVs can be more capable power further, faster, and with more of their own weapons to counter the built by focusing on specialization, “good- greater persistence than small numbers of UxV. 5 A $500,000 unmanned lead truck in enough” capabilities, and modular design. more costly multimission manned platforms. a convoy is expendable relative to the cost of The Predator is a perfect example of the cost Swarms that instantly communicated and the $1 million MRAP vehicle that it saves. In efficiency possible when a UxV aims to fill autonomously coordinated their actions other situations, such as in missile defense, the a specialized niche. While the Predator is without human input would be able to achieve cost-exchange ratio between U.S. and enemy nowhere near as capable as a multirole F–16 even greater speed of decisionmaking and weapons may be paramount. fighter for a whole host of missions, it is synchronization of fire and maneuver than To be affordable enough to be expend- preferable for long-duration surveillance in manned or remotely piloted systems. able, UxVs must be protected from the permissive environments. It is also cheaper for These advantages may be essential in Department of Defense (DOD) death spiral 24/7 surveillance than an equivalent manned the emerging antiaccess and precision strike of rising costs and production cuts that aircraft that might perform long-loitering air- regime. Other nations are investing in preci- can lead to small numbers of extremely borne surveillance, such as the Super Tucano sion strike capabilities designed to target expensive “baroque” weapons.6 While or MC–12 airplane. With endurances of 6 and traditional U.S. means of projecting power— performance advantages could translate 8 hours, respectively, both manned options aircraft carriers and land bases—necessitating into increased cost-effectiveness, there is would require more total aircraft on hand to both improvements in resiliency and defense no reason to believe that the simple act of support one airborne “orbit” on station 24/7 as well as new concepts for power projection. removing a person from a vehicle in and of than the Predator, with its 24-hour endurance. From global positioning system–guided itself saves significant costs. Many weapons Modularity can enable incremental mortars and precision antitank rockets, to programs, manned and unmanned alike, upgrades, employing affordable autonomy advanced antiship cruise missiles and DF–21 have fallen victim to the trap of rising costs that is good enough given existing technol- antiship ballistic missiles, the increasing and unaffordability. Unfortunately, one of ogy, rather than breaking the bank stretch- precision of munitions is altering the char- the drivers of cost increases in many acquisi- ing for experimental technology. Incremen- acter of warfare. Leveraging attritable UxVs tion programs is often the same high-end tal upgrades that leverage existing code can to reconnoiter deep into enemy territory and information technology that UxVs seek to reduce technology risk and lower costs. For then relay data back to standoff strike assets leverage. High-risk information technology example, while the robust autonomy needed may be a cost-effective strategy for competing projects can turn into nightmarish mon- to operate fully autonomous ground combat in an era where large quantities of precision strosities, with cost overruns, schedule slip- vehicles on unimproved roads, around civil- munitions are proliferated widely to state and page, and millions of lines of snarled code.7 ians, and against adaptable enemies is not nonstate actors alike. Autonomous systems need not be expensive, quite mature enough for 100-percent-reli- however. The price of raw computing power able, error-free operation, relatively modest Cost, Quantity, and Expendability is falling at an exponential rate. As a result, semiautonomous technology is currently In order for attritable UxVs to be truly greeting cards that play musical jingles available.8 “Robotic appliqué kits” can, for expendable, they must be relatively low cost. now carry throwaway microprocessors that a cost of tens of thousands of dollars rather ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 91 FEATURES | Why Unmanned than millions, convert existing Humvees UxVs must either rely on communi- leaders with the difficult choice of delegating and trucks to semi-autonomous or tele- cations links back to human operators or autonomy or risking losing an engagement. operated UGVs. These unmanned vehicles depend on autonomous programming to Delegating weapons use to autonomous could save lives by becoming “sacrificial carry out missions. Today’s UxVs are largely systems raises a host of difficult ethical, vehicles” that lead convoys in dangerous remote controlled, although some tasks use moral, legal, and policy questions. The fact areas, while the troops who control them human-automation teaming, such as UAVs that DOD has had automated systems for follow safely behind. As computer technol- flying point-to-point or taking off and landing decades that defensively engage aircraft and ogy improves, these vehicles can continue to autonomously. A spectrum exists between missiles—the ship-based Aegis and land- be upgraded incrementally for more autono- remote control and full autonomy, and as a based Patriot—belies the notion that it will mous operation. system moves further down this spectrum be easy to draw clear, stark lines on the use UxVs should be built with modularity toward greater autonomy, less bandwidth is of force. The track record of those systems, as a fundamental design concept, so that required for mission execution. The vulnera- on the other hand, suggests that additional they can harness the potential of accelerat- bility of remote-controlled UxVs to potentially policy guidance on autonomy is needed. ing computer technology while remaining crippling communications disruptions will Flaws in the Patriot’s autonomy played a role affordable. With a modular design, a range drive unmanned vehicles to greater autonomy, in the downing of two coalition aircraft— of stealthy and nonstealthy vehicles and particularly if U.S. adversaries continue to killing the pilots—and the targeting of a third munitions in various sizes could be upgraded invest in counter-communications abilities. aircraft in 2003.13 Similarly, although the and modified as needed by swapping out Even if reliable backup communications actual engagement decision was made by a payloads and sensors within the same vehicle could be assured, in a communications- person, human-machine interaction failures frame. Such an approach would save costs on degraded environment, autonomy could led to confusion within the USS Vincennes developing vehicle frames and propulsion, free up precious bandwidth for other tasks. command center that caused Iran Air Flight while leaving room to upgrade the “brains” Onboard automated video processing tech- 655 to be improperly identified as a hostile of the machine on a regular basis, so U.S. nology, for example, like the commercially Iranian F–14 fighter in the Persian Gulf in systems could remain at the leading edge of available Archerfish security camera that 1988. The Vincennes subsequently engaged computer development. monitors an area and alerts a human only the civilian airliner with two surface-to-air Computer processing power is doubling when a person or vehicle enters the frame, missiles, downing the aircraft and killing roughly every 18 months, meaning that a has the potential not only to free up humans all 290 passengers onboard.14 Clearly, exist- military system, just like a personal computer from having to watch thousands of hours of ing DOD operational testing and evalua- or cell phone, risks obsolescence within a video footage but also to significantly reduce tion procedures do not adequately ensure short time. Waiting decades for moderniza- satellite communications demands.10 The that autonomous weapons are sufficiently tion initiatives to bear fruit, which is the tra- bandwidth required for full motion streaming fault-tolerant and safe for use, including ditional timeline for new military hardware, video is roughly an order of magnitude more ensuring that human-automation interfaces is not a winning strategy for competing in the than the command and control functions provide digestible information for informed precision-weapons arms race fueled by the required of a UAV.11 Automated video process- decisionmaking. information revolution. Moreover, developing ing onboard a UxV would significantly reduce Restraints on autonomous weapons to custom DOD-unique solutions, while neces- the bandwidth demands that the UxV places ensure ethical engagements are essential, but sary in many cases, is orders of magnitude on the network, increasing resiliency in the building autonomous weapons that fail safely more expensive than modifying commercial event of degraded communications. is the harder task. The wartime environment solutions that allow piggy-backing off of pre- in which military systems operate is messy vious development. The information revolu- Autonomy and Use of Force and complicated, and autonomous systems tion is being driven by the private sector, and As UxVs shift from a remote-control must be capable of operating appropriately in U.S. adversaries are not shy about exploiting form of operations to a human-automation it. Enemy adaptation, degraded communica- commercial technologies. Hedging and flex- teaming concept of operations, defense tions, environmental hazards, civilians in ibility must be a significant part of U.S. strat- policymakers, military leaders, and weapons the battlespace, cyber attacks, malfunctions, egy for coping with the continued evolution of designers will need to determine what kinds and “friction” in war all introduce the pos- information technologies.9 of decisions are appropriate for automation sibility that autonomous systems will face and which require human input.12 Autonomy unanticipated situations and may act in an Degraded Communications in combat may be desirable in two situations: unintended fashion. Because they lack a broad In order for UxVs to be capable war­ if a UxV loses its communication link, and contextual intelligence, or common sense, on fighting assets on the battlefield, they must if the speed of engagements is too quick for par with humans, even relatively sophisticated be more than simply missile sponges. Large human reaction times. As computers become algorithms are subject to failure if they face numbers of dumb drones sent forward to soak more capable, more autonomy will be pos- situations outside of their intended design up enemy defenses are not nearly as innova- sible and defense leaders will have to consider parameters.15 The complexity of modern com- tive as intelligent, synchronized, swarming when it is appropriate. In some situations, puters complicates this problem by making it maneuverable UxVs. Communication links autonomy may be necessary to succeed in difficult to anticipate all possible glitches or are the Achilles’ heel of remote-controlled an engagement, such as defense against an emergent behavior that may occur in a system UxVs, however. incoming missile barrage, presenting defense when it is put into operation.16

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Safeguards and control measures will documents_pdf/READING_ROOM/Swarmng_ 15 Mary L. Cummings, “Automation and be necessary to ensure that autonomous and_the_Future_of_Conflict.pdf>. Accountability in Decision Support System Inter- 5 systems, in the event of failure, revert to Noah Shachtman, “Why Bomb-Proofing face Design,” Journal of Technology Studies 32, Robots Might Be a Bad Idea,” September 2, no. 1 (Winter 2006), available at . cide, civilian casualties, or unintentional be-a-bad-idea/#more-30222>. 16 Charles Fishman, “They Write the Right escalation. Rigorous operational testing and 6 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” Stuff,” Fast Company, December 31, 1996, available evaluation, including tests with dynamic Red Foreign Affairs (January–February 2009), avail- at ; Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: the potential weaknesses and failure points robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy>. Living with High-Risk Technologies (New York: of autonomous systems are fully understood 7 Alec Klein, “The Complex Crux of Wireless Basic Books, 1984); Robert N. Charette, “This Car before they are deployed to a real-world Warfare,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2008, Runs on Code,” IEEE Spectrum, February 2009, operation. Operators must be confident that available at cars/this-car-runs-on-code>. html>; Government Accountability Office (GAO), 17 “Harpy Air Defense Suppression System,” that systems are failsafe if they are to “trust” Significant Challenges Ahead in Developing and Defense Update, March 3, 2006, available at . and Software, GAO–08–409 (Washington, DC: 18 “Moore’s Law: Made Real by Intel Innova- The Future of UxVs GAO, March 2008), available at . mooreslaw/>; “Excerpts from A Conversation with of military leadership to embrace autonomy. 8 Autonomous vehicle technology is improv- Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law,” Intel, available at This will be challenged by the widespread ing by leaps and bounds, however. See John . 19 lead in UAV technology today, other nations New York Times, October 9, 2010, available at “Hezbollah Mirsad-1 UAV Penetrates Israeli are experimenting with novel concepts of ; and Elaine Kurtenbach, “Without Driver 2005, available at . Computer scientist Bob possess fully autonomous antiradiation ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_CHINA_EU_DRIV- Mottram argues that the application of robots UAVs that self-target enemy radar installa- ERLESS_VEHICLE?SITE=ORBEN&SECTION=H for terrorist or disruptive purposes is far more 17 tions. Moreover, the underlying technology OME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT>. likely than a “Terminator scenario”: “Unlike behind autonomy is driven not by the U.S. 9 P.W. Singer, “How the U.S. Military Can conventional fighter planes or tanks, telerobots defense industry, but by the exponentially Win the Robotics Revolution,” Popular Mechan- capable of delivering deadly force will not be advancing pace of computer processing ics, May 13, 2010, available at . may include criminal gangs and cults. As a near 10 low.18 Whether UxVs bring about a true “Archerfish: The Video Monitoring System term scenario, imagine a cult consisting of a few that Thinks,” available at . equipped with firearms, then driving them into a is clear that scores of countries—and even 11 Brien Alkire et al., Applications for Navy city center, under supervisory control similar to some nonstate actors—are racing ahead to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Santa Monica, CA: a real time strategy game. All of the technology 19 develop them. As computer technology RAND, 2010), 30–32, 38–39. needed for such a dastardly plan exists today, and continues to evolve, so too will the potential 12 For more on human-automation teaming, will only get cheaper and less complex with time.” of autonomous systems.20 The final chapter see M.L. Cummings, Andre Clare, and Christin See “POLL: Is a Terminator Scenario Possible?” on the capabilities and military utility Hart, “The Role of Human-Automation Consen- available at . remains to be written. JFQ Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors 20 Gordon Moore: “I can see the next two and Ergonomics 52, no. 1 (2010), draft version avail- to three generations of technology will be likely Notes able at . reach a fundamental limit, and even then that’s 1 Robert W. Button et al., A Survey of Missions 13 Rebecca Leung, “The Patriot Flawed? Failure not the end of the progress as by then engineers for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (Santa Monica, to Correct Problems Led to Friendly Fire Deaths,” will have a budget of literally millions of transis- CA: RAND, 2009). 60 Minutes, June 27, 2004, available at . Limit Is Reached,” available at . Doubling every ing and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: 156–165, available at . increase (2^(20/1.5) = 10,321.27).

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 93 USAFRICOM official addresses participants in exercise Flintlock 10, sponsored by the command to build relationships and develop capacity among trans-Saharan nation security forces

DOD (Jeremiah Erickson)

Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Building Partner Capacity Enhancing Interagency Collaboration

By Sharif Calfee, Joseph Lee, Peter Crandall, and Young Rock An

he United States has been in the business of Building Partner Capacity (BPC) of nations and allies for over 60 years, to include significant efforts during World War II, the Korean War, the T Vietnam War, and throughout the Cold War in Europe. Current I am a great believer that strength and Department of State United States Code (USC) Title 22 Security Assistance (SA) authorities, such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military diplomacy go together; it is never one or Sales (FMS), and International Military Education and Training (IMET), the other. Today foreign policy is a uni- eventually evolved from the initial forays into formalizing BPC efforts legisla- fied diplomatic, military, and intelligence tively in the 1960s. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration effort that must be tightly integrated—a determined gaps existed with traditional SA authorities that hindered U.S. team approach.1 ability to address certain counterterrorism and stability operations funding, capacity, and capability shortfalls of key partner nations. To address these —George P. Shultz shortfalls, a new set of Department of Defense (DOD) USC Title 10 BPC authorities, which eventually became known as Security Cooperation (SC) programs, were developed by DOD and State, enacted in legislation by Con- gress, and signed into law by the President starting in 2006.

94 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CALFEE et al.

Unlike their SA counterparts, SC pro- Secretary of Defense’s proposed BPC Shared critical partner nation counterterrorism grams were appropriated (that is, funded) Responsibility, Pooled Resources (SRPR) deficiencies that might suddenly arise within through and managed by DOD and designed fund and considers how this proposal could the traditional 3-year planning cycle. In to be more agile to support geographic com- establish a mutually beneficial architecture for the mid-2000s, DOD officials developed batant commanders in their responsibilities enhanced collaboration between Defense and a proposal for a “Global Train and Equip” to conduct BPC in pursuit of national security State in future SA and SC activities. authority to increase U.S. support for foreign objectives as directed initially in Security military and security forces in order to disrupt Cooperation Guidance and later in the Guid- Evolution terrorist networks, build the capacity of ance for the Employment of the Force.2 Some According to Secretary of Defense legitimate states to provide security within programs included legislative provisions, so- Robert Gates: their sovereign territory to prevent terrorists called dual-key, that required the Secretary of from establishing footholds, and strengthen State’s concurrence on military training and Helping other countries better defend them- the capacity of partner nations to participate equipping programs approved by DOD (typi- selves or fight beside us—by providing equip- in United Nations, regional, and U.S. coali- cally by the Secretary of Defense himself). ment, training, or other forms of support—is tion military missions.4 Under Secretary of The 2006 National Defense Authoriza- something the United States has been doing Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy discussed tion Act (NDAA), Section 1206 (Global Train in various ways for nearly three-quarters this concept in a June 2010 speech: “Nearly and Equip program) has become the flagship of a century. It dates back to the period five years ago, the Defense Department DOD authority for dual-key. From the outset before America entered World War II, when obtained authorities enabling the military to of their enactment, SC programs, epitomized Winston Churchill famously said, “give us the provide training and equipment to countries by Section 1206, have generated substantial tools, and we will finish the job.” 3 with urgent security needs. This expansion controversy within Congress, the executive of authority and funding was very helpful, branch, and various foreign relations and In the 1960s, these BPC activities were adding much-needed flexibility to a creaky Armed Forces academic institutions. Despite codified legislatively under the Foreign and slow-moving system.”5 notable counterterrorism successes in Yemen, Assistance Act (FAA), which provided for the The creation of the Section 1206 Global Pakistan, trans-Saharan Africa, and the Phil- creation of SA authorities. These authorities, Train and Equip Authority in the fiscal year ippines-Malaysia-Indonesia triborder region, which eventually evolved into FMF and IMET, 2006 (FY06) NDAA (subsequently revised Section 1206 and dual-key have become a were appropriated through the State Depart- in the FY07, FY09, and FY10 NDAAs) would source of friction between Defense and State ment budget. Following bilateral negotiations culminate several years of effort by the White within the overall debate over the “militariza- between the United States and partner nations, House and DOD to establish new SC authori- tion of foreign policy.” these authorities provided program budget ties that could meet the burgeoning need for Even with the rigorous debate that lines for training, educating, and equipping enhancing the counterterrorism and military Section 1206 and dual-key mechanisms have those partner militaries. They employed a stability operations capacity of partner nations.6 generated with regard to roles and missions model whereby State personnel assigned to between DOD and State, this article seeks to U.S. Embassies abroad proposed (with Chief of Section 1206 and Dual-Key demonstrate that they have produced sub- Mission approval) assistance programs/budgets Since its inception in 2006, the Section stantial benefits to the advancement of U.S. to improve the capabilities and capacity of these 1206 program has been evaluated several national security policy. First, it reviews the militaries, to include their professionalization. times. The combined DOD and State evolution of BPC activities from inception in DOD (specifically the combatant commands, Inspector General (IG) report (2009) and the 1940s to pre-9/11 so as to properly frame Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary Government Accountability Office (GAO) the context of the current situation. Next, it of Defense) then assessed and made recommen- report (2010) are the most recent and relevant examines the creation and implementation dations on those proposals, with State providing evaluations. They were conducted after the of Section 1206, along with the benefits it has the final decision on the program selections, to program had reached a level of operational achieved through the dual-key mechanism, include funding level and composition. Subse- maturity. The combined DOD and State team which underscores the necessity for its prudent quently, State forwarded the approved programs interviewed U.S. Government personnel at expansion into all aspects of security assistance to DOD for execution and implementation. Pro- all levels of DOD and State, both in the field and cooperation activities. Last, it reviews the posals, once approved by State during a current and in Washington, DC. The IG team’s assess- fiscal year, would typically not be implemented ment attained buy-in since both departments’ Lieutenant Commander Sharif Calfee, USN, is an for approximately another 3 fiscal years. IG offices jointly conducted the evaluation Action Officer on the Joint Staff, Strategic Plans Following the September 2001 terrorist and had equal input into drafting the final and Policies Directorate, Partnership and Strategy attacks, pursuing BPC activities designed to report. Considered a neutral and independent Deputy Directorate. Major Joseph Lee, USMC, is the directly enhance a partner nation’s military assessment organization, the GAO evaluation Operations Directorate Executive Officer for U.S. Joint Forces Command, Naples, Italy (North Atlantic Treaty counterterrorism and military stability team had similar inherent credibility. Both Organization). Major Peter Crandall, USA, is assigned operations capability and capacity assumed a reports issued generally positive evaluations to Special Operations Command–U.S. Joint Forces more urgent priority. However, the pre-9/11 on the Section 1206 program, to include Command. Major Young Rock An, ROKAF, is the SA architecture, which relied on a slower strong endorsements about the interagency Commanding Officer of Safety Flight in the Republic process, was reexamined with a view toward collaboration they engendered. The IG report of Korea Air Force 203d Flight Training Squadron. their not being sufficiently agile to address specifically highlighted: ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 95 FEATURES | Enhancing Interagency Collaboration

The synergy achieved by combining the geo- three key practices for interagency collabora- and interactions with the executive branch graphical perspectives and resources of country tion GAO had identified in a previous report.11 increased to the point where they began teams . . . in Section 1206 planning and imple- Congress weighed in directly on the coordinating/integrating their respective mentation is a unique strength. . . . The Under value of Section 1206 and dual-key when the legislative actions and even hosting joint Secretary of Defense (Policy), in coordination House Armed Services Committee (HASC) briefings on BPC issues with the executive with the Department of State, has developed a commented positively on the program. In branch. In other words, similar to the much well-structured project selection process that its FY10 NDAA report, the committee com- desired whole-of-government (that is, execu- includes vetting procedures. . . . Section 1206 mented that it “regards the historical execu- tive branch) objective, dual-key legislation projects evaluated were effective in building tion of this authority favorably and concludes produced a whole-of-Congress effect whereby partner nation capacity for counterterrorism that it is an important aspect of a combatant committee members and staffers, who previ- and military or stability operations. . . . Section commander’s theater engagement strategy. ously may have seldom interacted with their 1206 leverages the expertise of both Depart- The committee recognizes that it has become counterparts on other committees, now ments of Defense and State. As such, Section an important tool for building partner capac- worked more closely on BPC issues.13 This has 1206 is an excellent tool for providing corollary ity and security cooperation.”12 increased efficiency, improved the dialogue benefits to Chiefs of Mission.7 However, one other key, unnoticed, and understanding of executive and legislative unexpected, and unreported benefit has been points of view, and created better oversight In summary, the IG report concluded the increased collaboration, integration, and of BPC activities by the legislative branch, to that: coordination among the eight congressional include more responsive action/replies to their oversight committees. Prior to the implemen- inquiries. ■■ DOD and State conducted the Section tation of dual-key SC programs, BPC discus- From the outset of its enactment, Section 1206 program in compliance with the law sions with the committees were conducted 1206 generated substantial controversy ■■ cooperation between the departments in isolation from each other with authorizers within Congress, the executive branch, and was effective separated from appropriators, HASC staffers various foreign relations and Armed Services ■■ a strength of the program is the fragmented from foreign relations/affairs academic institutions. It has frequently been combination of perspectives and resources of Ambassadors and combatant commanders.8

The April 2010 GAO report provided additional positive endorsements of Section 1206 and the dual-key mechanism:

The Section 1206 program is generally distinct from other programs. . . . DOD has dem- Simonsen) (Richard U.S. Air Force onstrated that most approved Section 1206 projects address U.S. military priorities and urgent and emergent counterterrorism and sta- bilization needs identified by DOD combatant commanders. Further, Section 1206 projects have done so more quickly than other programs could have—sometimes within a year, whereas FMF projects can take up to 3 years to plan.9

Additionally, the report concluded that:

■■ Section 1206 has generally been con- sistent with U.S. strategic priorities relating to Nuristan PRT commander discusses potential agriculture improvement projects with State Department representatives in Nangaresh, Afghanistan combating terrorism and addressing instability ■■ the program has generally been in alignment with U.S. counterterrorism staffers, and Senate committees separated labeled the leading example of the “militariza- priorities from House committees. This resulted in a tion of foreign policy,” which has overridden ■■ most Section 1206 counterterrorism disjointedness that both hindered the inte- the DOD-State balance. Such views first resources have been directed to countries the gration of legislative action on BPC issues appeared in the Senate Foreign Relations U.S. Intelligence Community has identified as and exasperated the executive branch in its Committee report on combatant command priorities for the counterterrorism effort.10 attempts to propose BPC legislative solutions and Embassy activities, which was published and execute programs. in December 2006, less than a year after the Finally, the report positively endorsed the With the advent of dual-key, the com- Section 1206 authority was established by dual-key mechanism because it addressed mittees’ awareness of their peer BPC activities Congress. The following excerpt from the

96 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CALFEE et al. report highlights the concern that arose before this arrangement and moving to a “dual key” while ignoring practical questions such as any relevant SC activity had commenced: would undermine this balance. No amount of whether these security cooperation authori- consultation or even concurrence requirements ties are producing any success in obtaining Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities over- outweighs the influence that resources and national security objectives seas from civilian to military agencies risks personnel bring to policy debates.15 ■■ warned that Section 1206 reduces weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy congressional ability to execute its constitu- in setting the agenda for U.S. relations Other documents advance similar tional oversight duties, but are incorrect in with foreign countries and the Secretary of narratives,16 all of which make common argu- this regard since the authority’s legislation Defense’s focus on war fighting. . . . As the role ments in opposition to SC authorities such as mandates oversight by eight committees that of the military expands, particularly in the Section 1206 and the dual-key mechanism. in fact vigorously exercise their prerogative for area of foreign assistance, embassy officials in Unfortunately, they assert hypothetical disad- notification briefings for each train and equip some countries question whether the Depart- vantages for SC authorities but never provide program approved by the Secretary of Defense ment of Defense will chafe under the con- any concrete supporting details or examples ■■ claimed that Section 1206 programs straints of State Department leadership and of how their suppositions have come to (or endanger human rights efforts within those work for still more authority and funding.14 are coming to) fruition. However, in assess- partner nations, but failed to account for the ing fault with Section 1206, dual-key, and SC governing legislation that requires the author- These reactions continue today. As authorities, they must also carry the burden to ity to “observe and respect human rights, Laura A. Hill and Gordon Adams (a well- prove their case with facts. Instead, they: fundamental freedoms, and the legitimate respected professor in the U.S. Foreign Policy civilian authority within that country,”17 which Program at American University) asserted in ■■ relied on statements, not grounded is accomplished through DOD and State an article from May 2010: in any established facts, that served to evoke adherence to the Leahy Amendment,18 as well strong emotions about the accelerated demise as DOD implementation of human rights Providing some of the funding through DoD of State responsibilities and authorities in a and respect for civilian authority training to committees and with one key in the pocket manner that has not been proven every partner nation military unit receiving a Section 1206 assistance19 ■■ overlooked the outstanding inter- agency collaboration and coordination between DOD and State that has taken root and grown since the inception of SC authori- ties, the dual-key ones in particular.

the executive and legislative branches should expand the dual-key mechanism to other SA and SC authorities

Given the benefits of increased inter- agency collaboration highlighted in the reports, the executive and legislative branches should expand the dual-key mechanism to other SA and SC authorities. Although U.S. Air Force (Sarah Brown) a detailed discussion of which authorities should be recipients is beyond the scope of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy meets with commander of Kabul Military Training this article, as a starting point, DOD and State Center for Afghan National Army could limit the list of authorities to those that involve BPC of military forces since both of the Secretary of Defense would distort the ■■ ignored the positive, concrete successes departments have equity in these endeavors. decision making on when, where, and for what that SC authorities have produced Section 1206 authority has demon- purposes such funding should be applied. . . . ■■ failed to address/consider independent strated its uniqueness and utility to address Traditional train and equip missions, such as evaluations, such as those conducted by the critical counterterrorism and military those done through foreign military financing, GAO and DOD/State IG offices, which posi- stability operations capabilities gaps of our balance these two facts by being funded as tively endorsed Section 1206 and dual-key; partner nations. Furthermore, it has done it foreign assistance, overseen by the Department instead, they focused on the bureaucratic/ in a manner that has enhanced interagency of State, and implemented by the Depart- organizational disagreements that revolve collaboration from the field to Washington, ment of Defense. Creating funding outside around Beltway funding, authority, and status DC, and ensured that valuable State insight ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 97 FEATURES | Enhancing Interagency Collaboration U.S. Marine Corps (Joseph M. Peterson)

Marine demonstrates firing positions to Afghan Uniform Police personnel at Forward Operating Base Jackson, Helmand Province

is incorporated into DOD SC activities Last year, I sent Secretary Clinton one pro- only minor adjustments to implement.21 Each while promoting human rights and civil- posal I see as a starting point of discussion pool would have an executive agent called a ian leadership authority over the military for the way ahead. It would involve pooled “process secretariat” who would manage the within partner nations and preserving funds set up for security capacity building, function required for its operation (nominally congressional oversight and transparency at stabilization, and conflict prevention. Both DOD for Security Capacity Building, State for home. Consequently, Section 1206 and/or a the State and Defense Departments would Stabilization, and the U.S. Agency for Interna- follow-on program of similar type and scope contribute to these funds, and no project could tional Development [USAID] for Conflict Pre- should be made permanent authorities in move forward without the approval of both vention). The SRPR would retain the dual-key USC Title 10. agencies. What I found compelling about this feature in the three pools as it is considered approach is that it would actually incentivize one of the best aspects of SC programs. In Improving BPC Efforts collaboration between different agencies of addition to their planned funding amounts, In December 2009, Secretary Gates our government, unlike the existing structure the organizations could also contribute introduced a revolutionary proposal and processes left over from the Cold War, follow-on funding as needed. known as the Shared Responsibility, Pooled which often conspire to hinder true whole-of- The SRPR proposal is still under review Resources Fund to transform the future of government approaches.20 within the executive and legislative branches. BPC while maintaining the best aspects of the current SC authorities (namely the dual- key mechanism). Based on a British model, Secretary Gates introduced a revolutionary proposal known the SRPR would consist of three separate as the Shared Responsibility, Pooled Resources Fund pools of funds dedicated to specific activities: Security Capacity Building, Reconstruction and Stabilization, and Conflict Prevention. On the same topic, Under Secretary For this legislation to advance, Congress will In February 2010, Secretary Gates discussed Flournoy provided her thoughts on the goal have to incorporate it into the NDAA and the memorandum that he sent to Secretary of the SRPR where she explained that the Defense appropriations bills as well as the of State Hillary Clinton in December 2009 proposal was a creative way to break through State Foreign Operations authorization and outlining the SRPR proposal: the current BPC impasse, which required appropriations bills. Given the shared respon-

98 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu CALFEE et al.

sibilities, Congress would likely implement and their absence profoundly undermines laboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 legislation that maintains eight oversight com- those arguments. (Washington, DC: GAO, October 21, 2005). 12 mittees, similar to Section 1206. Section 1206 authority and dual-key U.S. House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010— Opponents of SRPR disagreed, using mechanisms have proven that they enhance Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House the same types of arguments they previously interagency collaboration in the pursuit of of Representatives on H.R. 2647 Together with Addi- employed against Section 1206 and dual-key. Security Cooperation activities. The Shared tional and Supplemental Views, 111th Cong., 1st sess., For example, Paul Clayman in Defense News Responsibility, Pooled Resources fund pro- 2009, Report 111-166, 411–412. wrote in April 2010: posal builds upon these successes and has 13 Robert M. Gates, Memorandum for Sec- tremendous potential to further incentivize retary of State: Options for Remodeling Security Though innovative, “pooled resources, shared and institutionalize interagency collaboration/ Sector Assistance Authorities, OSD 13826-09, responsibilities” is an inappropriate construct coordination between the Department of December 15, 2009, 6, available at . 14 Defense a veto over foreign policy decisions ment that has simmered between the two Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror made by the Secretary of State. That, in departments for years. JFQ Campaign—A Report to Members of the Committee turn, would misalign the roles of the Defense on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 109th Notes Department in policymaking and the con- Cong., 2d sess., 2006, S. Rep. 109-52, 2. tribution of security assistance to America’s 15 1 George P. Shultz, interviewed by Rickey L. Laura A. Hall and Gordon Adams, “Relying delicate diplomatic balance.22 Rife, April 13, 1998, Stanford University. on the Kindness of Others: A Risky Partner-Building 2 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Strategy,” May 13, 2010, available at . 16 [Secretary] Gates’ shared pools proposals 3 “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Stephen J. Morrison and Kathleen Hicks, st provide the mirage of easy money but would Defense Robert M. Gates, The Nixon Center, Integrating 21 Century Development and Secu- come with too many strings. The Secretary of Washington, D.C., Wednesday, February 24, 2010,” rity Assistance (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January State should remain the lead on foreign policy available at . 4 Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance Budget for the Future—Fixing the Crisis in ensures she, and her successors, can exercise Diplomatic Readiness (Washington, DC: The that authority. The larger problem with these Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional American Academy of Diplomacy, October proposals is the continued perception that the Research Service, 2010), 3. 2008), 4, 22–24; Adam Isacson, “The Pentagon’s role of diplomatic and development activities 5 “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Military Aid Role Grows,” January 26, 2010, 23 is supporting military operations. Speech at the Center for a New American Strategy available at . 17 These authors did not propose any novel Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, Center for a Serafino, 9. 18 and effective recommendations that took New American Strategy, Thursday, June 10, 2010,” Defense Institute of Security Assistance into account the significant improvements available at . 6 Public Law 109–163, National Defense Ohio: DISAM, October 2007), 16–9. forerunners, Section 1206 and dual-key, 19 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 109th Cong., Ibid., 5. produced. Instead, they appear to support 20 January 6, 2006, 322–324, Sec. 1206, available at Gates, “Remarks.” turning back the clock toward the BPC frame- 21 . Flournoy. work that existed from the Cold War to the 22 7 Inspectors General, U.S. Department of Paul Clayman, “Building State Department 1990s. Given the dramatic events that have Defense (DOD) and U.S. Department of State, Muscle: Link Security Assistance to Foreign Policy shaped the world since 9/11, it is implausible Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Priorities,” Defense News, April 5, 2010, available at and unfeasible to return to the “good old days” Train and Equip Program, DOD Report No. . 23 and, even if it were possible, such a course of IE-2009-007, Department of State Report No. ISP- Hall and Adams. action would undoubtedly undermine the I-09-69 (Washington, DC: Government Printing substantial interagency collaboration built Office, August 31, 2009), ii–iii. through the implementation of Section 1206 8 Ibid., 43–44. and dual-key. 9 U.S. Government Accountability Office Furthermore, after 5 years of opera- (GAO), DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment tion, given these authors’ arguments, there Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431 should be plenty of specific examples of how (Washington, DC: GAO, April 15, 2010), 3–6. Section 1206 and dual-key activities negatively 10 Ibid., 12–13. impacted U.S. national security objectives 11 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: for them to cite in support their assertions. Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Col- However, such examples were not provided,

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 99 Preventing War in the Middle East A Role for NATO?

By Kenneth Weisbrode

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presents new NATO Strategic Concept reconfirming Alliance commitment to defend Euro- Atlantic security

NATO

he North Atlantic Treaty Orga- Regional security arrangements and policies interests, and therefore the strategic posture, nization’s (NATO’s) long-awaited should reflect this reality. For that to happen, of NATO. Yet few Alliance members want to Strategic Concept, released last strategic discussions about the region in the think, let alone talk, about the subject. There November, glosses over an impor- NATO context must take place openly, with an may be valid reasons for keeping a discussion T (and, to the extent it exists, actual planning) tant topic: the collective interests of its members emphasis on overarching regional interests and in the Middle East. Historically and strategi- well before the members of the Alliance plan to quiet. But silence has a price. It may cause cally, the Middle East lies in Europe’s back yard. counter particular threats. some to conclude that NATO is giving priority Nearly every major security problem for Europe The proliferation of nuclear weapons to the wrong areas, or is not being as exhaus- has an important Middle Eastern dimension. technology is one of the region’s biggest chal- tive as it ought to be in the right ones. And the This is also true, albeit to a lesser extent, for lenges. It greatly heightens the costs of poten- silence has resulted already in mixed signals the United States. The security that the United tial conflict. Iran is widely believed to be on over policies such as missile defense, where States purportedly provides in the Middle East the verge of joining Israel as a de facto nuclear differences in identifying putative aggressors has not underwritten a stable regional order; weapons state. Should this occur, most ana- have strained relations between members. The politics within and among major regional states lysts claim, it is only a matter of time before Alliance has come to appear desperate for a are difficult and, in a few notable cases, hostile. other states—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, formula to make the necessary planning for Nevertheless, the security of Europe, the North Turkey, and possibly Algeria and Jordan— contingencies in this critical region possible. Atlantic, and the Middle East is indivisible. develop their own nuclear weapons capabili- NATO, of course, is only as viable as its ties. The alternative of a nuclear weapons–free members and their own deterrents; militarily, Dr. Kenneth Weisbrode is a historian and former zone for the Middle East shows little sign of the Alliance may not be much stronger than defense analyst. Research for this article was being adopted any time soon. the sum of its parts. Yet politically, it carries a conducted under the auspices of the Stiftung It is difficult to imagine a scenario in much greater weight than any single member Wissenschaft und Politik and the United States which a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race, does by itself. Accordingly, as the only mul- Institute of Peace. however gradual, would not affect the core tinational alliance that possesses a nuclear

100 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu WEISBRODE deterrent and is proximate to the Middle East, first includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Discussions about peace and security in NATO should consider at the earliest possible Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, while the the region, therefore, must operate somewhat moment the nature and implications of extend- second includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and surreally. Attempts to bridge the gap—such ing a security guarantee to the territory of the the United Arab Emirates. These programs are as the short-lived promotion of an alliance region. Such a guarantee—or better put, deter- quite different from one another. The Medi- between Israel and Turkey about a decade rent—must be nuclear because it is the spread terranean Dialogue features a multilateral ago—have done little to achieve overall of nuclear weapons throughout the region that policy agenda, whereas the Istanbul Initiative security. The vision of a peaceful, stable, and is the issue of greatest concern to NATO. provides practical and technical assistance on secure region that was put forth at Madrid in On the surface, a regional nuclear deter- a bilateral basis. In 2010, the Istanbul Initiative 1991 remains a distant prospect. rent would appear to fly in the face of the offered some 700 activities, mostly small scale, global effort to curtail and roll back nuclear like officer exchanges and training programs Deterrence Today arsenals. However, as this moves forward, in areas such as disaster relief operations. Both It is axiomatic that no credible security regional nuclear weapons–free zones, as well its efforts also include the participation of offi- guarantee can exist absent a strong deterrent. as global agreements among larger states, will cers at the NATO Defense College. Thinking in NATO about deterrence has not probably evolve simultaneously as important advanced very far since the end of the Cold means for managing a world without nuclear War, however. Rather than updating and weapons. If the nations of the Middle East the problem should be cast as refining deterrence as a forward posture, there succeed in negotiating a nuclear weapons–free one of regional security rather has been a shift, led by France and certain zone, their security would need to be guaran- than as one of preventing an quarters in the United States, toward thinking teed in some fashion by the Permanent Five arms race or coping with one more conventionally about regional military nuclear powers both during and after the after it emerges balances and the marginalization—and, ulti- process of implementation. NATO would be in mately, the elimination—of nuclear weapons a position to contribute support and resources as warfighting instruments—in other words, for this effort. Its declaratory policy, at a These efforts are useful to the extent a nuclear force in being or a more purely minimum, should include a statement of its that they build trust, familiarity, and good- existential deterrent (similar to what Japan willingness to offer such support. will. But they are limited by the nonparticipa- currently possesses). The problem is that there Besides the negotiation of a nuclear-free tion of several powers, notably Saudi Arabia is almost no evidence that such a view has a zone or, conversely, an all-out regional arms and Iran, as well as the persistent hostility following in the Middle East. By contrast, it race, there are only two other conceivable toward Israel, making the latter’s own par- appears that nuclear weapons are still seen as scenarios: the imposition of stability from ticipation in the Mediterranean Dialogue an instruments of military superiority. the outside in the form of a semipermanent obstacle to its formal collaboration with the If NATO were to apply a nuclear force American nuclear “umbrella” over the entire Istanbul Initiative. in being to the Middle East, it would probably region, or the emergence of an internal equi- Besides the limited scope of these efforts, do so in a manner that theorists call “pivotal librium or balance of power on its own. an important impediment to having a high- deterrence,” which is a form of extended deter- Neither scenario is desirable. The first level, multilateral strategic discussion in the rence, or “collective-actor deterrence” involving would place too heavy a burden on the United region is the gap between declaratory and multiple parties with the ultimate goal of trans- States and be complicated by the close U.S. actual policy as regards nuclear weapons. To forming a region into a security community relationship with Israel (whose leaders, for date, Israel has not publicly declared itself a whereby collective security replaces fluctuating their part, have said that they are unenthu- nuclear power. Iran continues to insist that its bilateral or multilateral power balances. siastic about a U.S. umbrella). The second, nuclear ambitions are entirely peaceful, a claim No deterrent is foolproof, of course. as already noted, seems unlikely in the near backed publicly by Turkey. Saudi Arabia and Deterrence will not succeed in every case. But future. The problem, therefore, should be cast the other regional powers state that they have this need not proscribe the value of the deter- more broadly as one of regional security—and no nuclear ambitions whatsoever. The global rent, which comes less from what it guarantees the need for a credible anchor of security in nuclear agenda has tended to avoid discussion operationally than from the political and stra- the form of a deterrent—rather than as simply of deterrence and nuclear force postures. Its tegic benefits that it can bring in the middle one of preventing an arms race or coping with emphasis has been on nuclear security, non- and long term. For example, it could happen one after it emerges. proliferation, and the march to zero. that Israel, should it launch a nuclear first Similarly, the U.S. Nuclear Posture strike on a neighboring state even if it were Regional Context Review, released in April 2010, noted a shift attacked first by conventional means, would The extent of relations between NATO toward a more modest posture resembling a see NATO come to the defense of that state. and the countries of the Middle East is modest minimum deterrent. It makes only a handful The likelihood of this ever happening in the at the present time. In addition to deployments of references to the Middle East and says real world is remote. The point of a deterrent, in Afghanistan and off the Horn of Africa, nothing about possible roles for NATO there. however, is that it makes such a choice even NATO operates two partnership programs Yet at the same time, former and current U.S. less likely while reassuring smaller powers that with regional governments: the Mediterranean officials have spoken out strongly in favor of they need not compete in order to forestall it. Dialogue, begun in 1994, and the Istanbul maintaining NATO’s nuclear deterrent for the Extending deterrence to third parties Cooperation Initiative, begun in 2004. The foreseeable future. whose instability poses an indirect threat to ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 101 FEATURES | Preventing War in the Middle East the members of the Alliance could very well which is a U.S. formulation combining missile the Middle East. Russian and, someday, even become one of the most important tasks for defense with a range of offensive and other Chinese collaboration could make for a more NATO in the coming years. defensive capabilities. broadly based deterrent. However, it would also Of course, deterrence is as much a politi- probably be less credible, and neither Russia nor Practical Considerations cal as a military strategy in any instance where China has shown any willingness to collaborate How might a Middle East deterrence an outside power or group of powers provides formally with the Alliance in the region. But regime come into effect? The members of guarantees that deter aggression while limit- both have incentives to do so and ultimately NATO could amend the treaty to extend an ing the independence of those under protec- would have to guarantee a nuclear weapons– Article V commitment to the entire region. tion. This is not easy, especially in parts of the free zone should it come into existence. This would mean, in effect, that NATO would world where any imposition of order from the At the very least, a generic territorial defend any country attacked with nuclear outside carries the tinge of imperialism. Fluc- deterrent ought to preclude talk of Alliance weapons. The nature of the prescribed attack tuating relationships within the Middle East enlargement in the region, or the likelihood of should apply in phases, although in keeping make such limitations exceedingly difficult particular Middle East states acquiring special with the spirit of the treaty, the precise to manage. Several governments, especially status vis-à-vis NATO unless the members response need not be specified. those of smaller states that would presumably of the Alliance reach a consensus that such Alternatively, NATO members could be the most eager for a NATO commitment, a relationship, as indicated above, is in their merely issue a communiqué along these lines, are keen to maintain good relations with mul- combined interest and is consistent with the or extend it only to particular countries. Or tiple parties. For example, most members of extended deterrent. they could follow a precedent set by former the Gulf Cooperation Council have preferred There are two final considerations to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who once to downplay concerns about Iran, letting the bear in mind. First, NATO planners should proclaimed (in reference to Yugoslavia) the United States take the lead in confronting it continue to improve their familiarity with the existence of a “gray area” where NATO might over its nuclear program. The reasons have strategic culture in this region and with the respond with armed force. to do not only with their dependence on the thinking of key regional actors about deter- rence and other basic doctrines. This could be no credible deterrent in the Middle East could exist absent furthered by a reinvigoration, perhaps under NATO auspices, of the long-dormant Arms a clearer set of strategic priorities for NATO itself Control and Regional Security working group. Similar mechanisms may also exist bilaterally, NATO would have to consider the U.S. military presence and their simultaneous following the model of the NATO–Russia effects of such a deterrent posture on deploy- efforts to gain favor (or to preserve options) Council; some Iranians, for example, have ments, and vice versa. The presence of NATO with Iran, but also with the need to maintain proposed something like it for their country. troops could serve as a kind of tripwire that a public posture against Israel and its own Second, no credible deterrent in the could complicate the Alliance’s own deter- nuclear status. Here, too, domestic politics Middle East could exist absent a clearer set of rent, not to mention its decisionmaking, in an matter insofar as sympathy exists in these strategic priorities for NATO itself. That it has unfavorable way. countries for Iran and its positions. moved from a defensive to a security alliance is With sufficient forethought and Insofar as NATO is identified closely with now repeated as a mantra, but it is still unclear preparation, however, a strong NATO nuclear the United States, some regional states may what this means outside Europe, especially deterrent need not necessarily be inconsistent desire to have a less conspicuous American when NATO insists on preserving its “core” with a readiness to deploy troops in specific umbrella, and for this reason an Alliance deter- mission of defending Alliance territory. Multi- contingencies. Current thinking in NATO rent could be a more palatable option. ple missions need not be incompatible, but some appears to be receptive to such a composite Under ideal circumstances, NATO clearer articulation of NATO’s defense and approach—that is, the so-called New Triad, would not be alone in extending deterrence to security roles a tous azimuts is a precondition to understanding its deterrent role and allocating

NATO the right balance of forces and deployments, particularly the dual-capable aircraft and other nuclear forces that remain in Europe. A NATO nuclear deterrent for the Middle East would help to provide the under- lying stability the region requires. It might also make a regional nuclear arms race less likely. Finally, it could have the added advan- tage of concentrating thinking at NATO about what exactly the role of the Alliance is meant to be toward its extended neighborhood. Sooner or later, it will need to have one. JFQ NATO’s first ever theater ballistic missile defense capability is turned over to Alliance military commanders, January 27, 2011

102 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu Decisiveness in War

By Phillip S. Meilinger ecisive victory has been sought by military commanders for millennia. It is the goal to which leaders aspire, for if they achieve such victories, it means the war ends more D quickly, reducing the cost in both blood and treasure. The list of decisive victories in the long history of war is relatively short, and decisiveness in war is often confused with a battle that is merely a turning point, or, worse, that has only tactical and therefore Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), served in transient impact on the course of a war. My purpose is to define the the U.S. Air Force for 30 years. He holds a Ph.D. in meaning of decisive victory and to give examples of such engagements, history from the University of Michigan. He is the while also distinguishing them from battles. A relevant question is author of 8 books and 90 articles on military affairs. whether such decisions can still be achieved in modern war.

Roman infantry encounters Carthaginian assault at Battle of Zama

Henri-Paul Motte

ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 103 RECALL | Decisiveness in War

Battles Won and Lost not surrender, and Hannibal was never strong the British, and neither side seemed close to Wars are fought for specific purposes, enough to besiege the Eternal City. victory, although, significantly, the French and these purposes should meet several cri- A brilliant young Roman general, joined the Americans in 1777. The following teria. They should be determined only after Publius Cornelius Scipio, then restructured year, the war shifted to the southern colonies, considerable thought by a nation’s recognized and retrained his legions and took the war to where the British captured the ports of Savan- leaders—not by private or moneyed interests. the enemy. He crossed the Mediterranean and nah and Charleston. A British army under The purposes for going to war should concern moved on Carthage itself. Hannibal was forced Charles Cornwallis moved into the interior and weighty issues of state—not matters of whim to return and defend his capital. In March 202 attempted to destroy colonial resistance. Wash- or personality. The goals for which the war BCE, the Romans under Scipio with approxi- ington then sent Nathanael Greene to take is to be fought should be achievable—even mately 35,000 men met Hannibal’s slightly command in the south. Cornwallis pushed for though those goals may change during the larger army near Zama, south of Carthage.1 a conclusive victory, but Greene cleverly refused course of the war. A belligerent can modify Hannibal attacked first, releasing to execute anything but delaying actions. his goals during a war based on a variety of elephants in the hope of disrupting the Roman Exasperated, in April 1781 Cornwallis elected factors, and that does not necessarily mean formation, but the flexible maniples instituted to abandon the Carolinas and move north into the original goals were ill advised or unattain- by Scipio simply parted to allow the animals to Virginia. Arriving at Yorktown in August, he able; circumstances change. Finally, leaders pass to the rear. The superior Roman cavalry intended to resupply and reinforce his troops should prepare the nation for war, both charged next, sweeping Hannibal’s horsemen by sea, but Yorktown turned into a trap. materially and psychologically. These criteria from the field. The two infantry contingents In a crucial engagement in the Chesa- appear to be straightforward and adhere to then clashed and fought desperately for the peake, the Royal Navy was driven off by the common sense, and most countries entering next several hours. When it appeared the French fleet, which then blockaded Yorktown a war believe they have fulfilled them. It is Carthaginians were gaining the upper hand, from the sea. Simultaneously, Washington only later, as a nation begins to taste defeat, the Roman cavalry returned after their rout of marched south with a large contingent of American and French troops to bolster great victories are often of a negative variety: rather than Greene’s forces, which had invested Cornwal- lis by land. Washington took command of the overthrowing an enemy, the result is the assurance that combined allied army of 17,000 men and laid the enemy cannot win siege to Yorktown. After an abortive attempt to break free, Cornwallis realized the hope- that it realizes the criteria were not followed the enemy cavalry and struck the Carthagin- lessness of his situation, and on October 19, he after all. At that point, it is usually too late. ian infantry in the rear. Most of Hannibal’s surrendered his 8,000 men.3 Kaiser Wilhelm II, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mus- army was destroyed or captured, although he The loss of a major army in the American solini, Hideki Tojo, and countless others over himself escaped. The war was over. Hence- colonies, combined with the active involve- the centuries thought they had fulfilled these forth, Scipio would be known as “Africanus.”2 ment of the French fleet, caused consternation requirements when deciding for war. The Zama ended Carthage as a military in London. The war had become increasingly majorities of their populations and militaries factor, while at the same time elevating Rome expensive and unpopular, and Britain sued for acquiesced to, if not agreed with, them—at to a world power—a status it held for the next peace. Yorktown had won independence for the first. It is in retrospect that the decisions look six centuries. United States of America. ill advised and rash. The next important goal that can serve Yet it is also true that great victories are Therefore, the first requirement of deci- as a basis for decisive victory is that of inde- often of a negative variety: rather than over- sive victory is that it achieves the goal of the pendence. The American colonies began to throwing an enemy, the result is the assurance belligerent. More to the point, that goal must be chafe under British rule after the French and that the enemy cannot win—the victor there- a matter of great importance, such as the con- Indian War. The core issue involved taxation. fore ensures his own survival. There have been clusive destruction of a dangerous enemy. For The late war had been expensive, and London several such “negative” decisions in history. example, in the third century BCE, two mighty felt justified in raising taxes to help pay the The Persians under Darius invaded empires arose in the Mediterranean area, bill. The colonies disagreed, and over the next Greece in 490 BCE. The army landed on Rome and Carthage. Both empires fronted the decade there were a series of demonstrations the beach at Marathon, about 20 miles from sea, and both viewed it with proprietary eyes, against the new taxes, such as the Boston Tea Athens, and was met by a Greek force led by thus bringing them into conflict. Party in December 1773. Miltiades. The Greeks defeated the Persians, The First Punic War lasted from 264 to The British tightened the screws, and in who then retreated to Asia. Ten years later, 242 BCE and saw Rome victorious. Tensions April 1775, a force of Redcoats marched out the Persians, now led by Xerxes, returned, remained, and in 219, the Carthaginian general of Boston to confront the colonials at Lex- determined to redress their previous defeat. Hannibal renewed hostilities. With an army of ington and to confiscate the military stores at Checked temporarily at Thermopylae, they 90,000 men, he secured Spain and then crossed Concord. Fighting broke out and blood was went on to occupy most of northern Greece, the Alps into Italy. For the next decade, Hanni- spilled: the American Revolution had begun. including Athens. bal shattered every Roman army sent against Over the next 3 years, George Washing- The Greeks did not surrender. They him: his most noted victories were at Trebia, ton, commander of the Continental Army, gathered a fleet of 350 ships with 60,000 men Lake Trasimene, and Cannae. But Rome would fought several inconclusive battles against under the command of Themistocles and

104 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MEILINGER John Trumbull

Lord Cornwallis’s forces surrender after siege of Yorktown

stationed them near the island of Salamis, With the Persian fleet destroyed, Xerxes 1936, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland; directly opposite Athens. In late September returned home in disgust, but left behind an in 1938, it annexed Austria and moved into 480 BCE, the Persian fleet, 700 strong, was army 70,000 strong to mop up the remains of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. When confident of victory, and Xerxes set up his the Greek armies. Without fleet support and Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939, golden throne atop a hill to watch the battle far from their supply base, however, the Per- France and Britain declared war. Poland fell, that would give him mastery of all of Greece. sians were in peril. In July 479 BCE, a Greek soon followed by Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Themistocles wisely selected the narrow army of 40,000 under the command of Pausa- and France in blitzkrieg strikes. By July 1940, channel between the mainland and Salamis. nias met the Persians at Plataea. The Persians Britain was alone. Greek ships were heavier than Persian vessels, attacked the Greek phalanx and were initially Hitler intended to invade Britain, and which were more maneuverable. The purpose successful, but the stoutness of the Greeks, Operation Sea Lion was the plan to mount an of trireme warfare was to ram the enemy ship especially the Spartan contingent, turned the amphibious assault. Before he could attempt and then back out quickly while the victim tide. By the end of the day the Persians, driven such an effort, however, he needed to ensure foundered. In confined waters, the agility back against a stream, were slaughtered.5 control of the English Channel, and for that, of the Persians was of no avail; instead, the Salamis and Plataea meant the end of he needed air superiority over the channel. heaviness of the Greek boats made them Persian plans for the subjugation of Greece. The German onslaught began on August superior as rammers. These battles did not break up the Persian 12, 1940, when the Luftwaffe sent over several The Greeks attacked at 7:00 in the Empire—it was far too massive and power- hundred bombers escorted by fighters. The morning, and the battle lasted 12 hours. The ful—but the victories ensured Greece would intent was to bomb targets so vital to Britain Persians, who had rowed all the previous night remain Greek. “Western Civilization” was that the Royal Air Force (RAF) would be to arrive at Salamis, were already fatigued and saved by the negative decisive victories at required to rise and defend them. The goal thus at a serious disadvantage from the outset. Salamis and Plataea. was to bring Fighter Command to battle and Throughout the day, the heavier Greek ships Another such negative victory occurred then destroy it. Initially, German targets battered the Persians, and as evening fell, the during World War II. The Treaty of Versailles focused on radar sites, whose loss would pose invaders broke and fled. Many Persian ships that ended World War I was merely a truce. a serious danger to the RAF. After only 3 days, were then caught from behind and sunk. When Adolf Hitler was appointed chancel- however, the Luftwaffe switched targets and Overall, the Persians lost over 200 ships and lor in 1933, rearmament, combined with a began concentrating on airfields. This, too, as many as 20,000 men.4 more bellicose foreign policy, accelerated. In was a major concern for Fighter Command, ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 105 RECALL | Decisiveness in War

National Archives and Records Administration National Archives and Records Administration

Firemen and members of London Auxiliary Fire Fighting Services St. Paul’s Cathedral in London survives fire raid train in July 1939

and over the next month “the few” found not achieve air superiority over the English token, Chancellorsville was one of Robert E. themselves “gasping on the ropes.” They were Channel, he knew an invasion was impossible. Lee’s masterpieces. Heavily outnumbered by saved when Hitler, angered over the RAF’s His attention now turned to the east—toward Federal forces, Lee won a crushing victory, but bombing of Berlin, directed his bombers to Russia—and Britain survived to become the the Civil War continued and went badly for the concentrate on British cities in retaliation. “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the Allied South. Chancellorsville was a transient tactical On September 15, a force of 200 bombers, reinvasion of the Continent in 1944. advantage for the Confederates, nothing more. heavily escorted, attacked London but suf- There is a time element involved in the This time element is important. If the fered 25 percent casualties in the process; notion of decisiveness. A smashing victory, defeated side uses the interlude as a truce so it these were unsustainable losses. This raid, regardless of the death toll, is not decisive if can rebuild its forces and resume the war, the which occurred on the date originally set for the enemy is able to raise another army and battle was not decisive at all. Most of Napo- the invasion, was the Luftwaffe’s last major continue the war. A victory should not be leon’s victories fall into this category; they daylight attack: the blitz moved to the safety reversible except in the long term—50 years merely ended hostilities temporarily while of night. This decision spelled the end of would seem to be a minimum. So, for example, both sides regrouped before going at each German attempts to gain air superiority for the iconic battle of Cannae where Hannibal other again. French triumphs over the Austri- an invasion.6 annihilated 16 Roman legions in 216 BCE was ans at Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805 broke the By the end of October, the Battle of a brilliant tactical victory, but the strategic Third Coalition, but Austria attacked again Britain was over. One of the great negative results were minimal. Rome formed more in 1809. After Napoleon’s victory at Wagram, decisive victories in history had saved the legions, the war lurched on for 14 more years, Austria once again sued for peace—only to island nation. When Hitler realized he could and Carthage eventually lost. By the same initiate hostilities in 1813. Similar Napoleonic battles that led to truces, not lasting peace, included Jena-Auerstadt over the Prussians in 1806 that shattered the Fourth Coalition, and the bloody decision over the Russians at Friedland, leading to Tilsit in 1807.7 Both Library of Congress Prussia and Russia rejoined the fight against Napoleon a few years later. Smashing victories often lead to sur- render and war’s end—they are the “last battle.” After the attack at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Japanese swept to victory throughout Asia. Much of China and Indo- china fell into their hands, as did Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, the Dutch East Indies, and a host of islands large and small. The great naval air battle of Midway Robert E. Lee surrenders to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House in June 1942—the opposing fleets never saw one another—was a turning point, but there

106 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu MEILINGER was still a long slog ahead. In August 1944, exhausted and depleted armies of Lee and people refused to admit defeat, and the war the Mariana Islands were recaptured, and Joseph Johnston simply gave up. Yet the war continued for 5 more months. Similarly, airbases were built there to house long-range was decisive in the truest sense of the word: Germany was never reconciled to its defeat B–29s, which then began to hit the Japanese the Confederacy would not rise again, and in 1918. Almost immediately following the home islands. Even so, invasions were planned the impact of the war on American society Armistice, it secretly began to prepare for and thought to be essential: the assault on and its mythos was profound.11 Similarly, a rematch. On the other hand, the United Kyushu was scheduled for November 1, 1945, World War II contained many huge battles, States suffered fewer than two dozen dead in and a larger one was slated for Honshu the but the decisive defeat of Germany—and the the 1993 battle of Mogadishu, but the deaths following March. A new weapon would make death of German/Prussian militarism—was of those relatively few Soldiers broke the will these operations unnecessary. due to grinding and inexorable pressure on of American leaders. The Nation pulled out Since early 1942, scientists had been multiple fronts—massive land armies east, and abandoned the Somalis to their fate. In studying the possibility of splitting the atom west, and south, a strangling naval blockade, sum, an enemy’s will may be broken without to release an astounding amount of energy. and strategic bombing. breaking his military forces, and forces can be A major scientific endeavor, the Manhattan It is necessary, however, to differentiate crushed without shattering the nation’s will. Project, built an atomic weapon, and the between the decisive victories noted above In this sense, decisive victory has a human, Army Air Forces formed a special B–29 unit and a turning point—a battle or campaign cultural dimension that must not be ignored.12 to deliver it. The 509th Bomb Group, com- that changes the momentum in a war. Usually The likelihood of achieving decisive manded by Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, moved identified in retrospect, it is a decision where victory seems to have decreased over the past to Tinian in the Marianas in May 1944 and the side that had been losing sees its fortunes few centuries. Russell Weigley argues this was trained to deliver the top-secret bomb.8 reversed and then moves with increasing due to the emergence of the nation in arms. On July 26, 1945, President Harry momentum toward the attainment of victory. Not only were armies substantially larger Truman sent Japan an ultimatum: surrender In modern history, such turning points than in the past—thereby making it more or suffer destruction. The Potsdam Declara- include Saratoga (1777), where American difficult to destroy them all at once—but tion was rejected, and orders were issued to colonial forces defeated a British army, thus also warfare became increasingly total. More prepare for a launch. On August 6, the Enola personnel, resources, and funds were devoted Gay, piloted by Tibbets, lifted off from Tinian to war, and this totality included a lack of and dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. a turning point is a decision concern for the impact of military operations Crewmembers would later recall the purple where the side that had on the civilian populace. The result was a cloud building upward for 10 miles, and the been losing sees its fortunes seemingly inexhaustible supply of men and cauldron below that resembled a “pot of bub- reversed and then moves with materiel combined with a heightened passion bling hot tar.”9 The center of Hiroshima was increasing momentum toward of the populace that generated a reluctance to destroyed, and over 60,000 died. the attainment of victory quit. A knockout blow was almost impossible. Japan still resisted, and a second atomic Nations lost hundreds of thousands of men bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9. on the Western Front in 1914 and 1915, but Six days later, Emperor Hirohito made a radio securing crucial French support; Gettysburg still drafted millions more to continue the address to his people citing “a new and most (1863), whose aftermath saw the South in fight.13 This situation changed after World cruel bomb” that contained a power to do constant decline; Midway (1942), the battle War II, when the deployment of thousands of “incalculable” damage. He was surrendering. that broke the back of the Japanese carrier nuclear weapons made nations less inclined The atomic strikes on Hiroshima and fleet; Stalingrad (1943), where Soviet troops to risk their survival in war. Limited war Nagasaki ended World War II, representing destroyed the chances of German victory in returned. Decisive victory has thus now one of the most decisive victories in history the east; and Tet (1968), when the Viet Cong, become even more elusive than in centuries and saving millions of Japanese and American although largely destroyed as an effective past. The overwhelming military triumph of lives.10 Sixty-five years later, Japan remains fighting force, broke the will of the American the coalition in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 one of our closest allies. people and their political leaders. All of these did not lead to a sound peace, as America’s Although one generally refers to deci- turning points were important battlefield continued involvement there attests. As sive battles, sometimes it is wars that are deci- decisions, but they were not decisive because always, the purpose of war must be a better sive. Some conflicts are attritional slugfests they were not conclusive—the wars continued, condition in its aftermath, and destroying that kill thousands yet fail to yield conclusive sometimes for several years. armies may have little or nothing to do with battlefield decisions. The American Civil Key to the understanding of decisive achieving a better peace. War was one such event. Although it was the victory is that the enemy must acknowledge Combining these considerations leads bloodiest war in U.S. history and witness to defeat. He must agree to give up the fight. us to a definition of decisive victory: achieving several tactical gems—the Chancellorsville Battlefield success may or may not have a role major, long-term political results in war that battle already noted as well as the Shenan- in that acknowledgment. Napoleon defeated include attaining grand strategic objectives. doah Valley campaign of Thomas Jackson the armies of Spain, but he did not defeat the These results can be negative; the enemy is and the persistent industriousness of U.S. Spanish people. In 1870, the French army was prevented from achieving his objectives as a Grant at Vicksburg—the conflict ended in crushed by the Prussians at Sedan and Metz, result of losing a key engagement, or the victor April 1865 with a whimper, not a bang. The and Paris was surrounded. Yet the French of a battle ensures he will not lose the war. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 107 RECALL | Decisiveness in War

Decisiveness Today to exactly what type of peace they wish to and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, DC: Center of Decisive battles have been sought by achieve—and for what results they are willing Military History, 1985). 9 commanders throughout history. The defeat to settle. In this regard, Michael Howard For his personal account, see Paul W. Tibbets, Return of the Enola Gay (Columbus, OH: of a powerful foe, the conquest of a rich and made the insightful comment that the Mid Coast Marketing, 1998). fertile region, the quest for freedom, and the “honor” of the defeated must be taken into 10 For an excellent discussion regarding casu- desire to spread ideas or beliefs to other areas consideration if true peace and reconciliation alty figures, see D.M. Giangreco, “Casualty Projec- 17 have all been impulses leading to conclusive are to occur. A defeated country, even when tions for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945–1946,” and long-lasting victories. Noted above are decisively defeated, must eventually rejoin Journal of Military History 61 (July 1997), 521–582. some of these engagements, both positive and the family of nations as an equal partner. Given the numbers of troops involved on both negative, that decided the outcome of major How can we ensure that occurs in Iraq and sides, and the casualty rates of the Pacific war up wars. These wars were in turn monumental Afghanistan? to that time, it is likely the invasions of the Home events in world history. Key to all of them was My definition of decisive victory focuses Islands would have resulted in well over 2 million the attainment of conclusive political objectives on results, and, critically, results are in the military dead on both sides—the civilian total and, ultimately, a better peace—at least for the eyes of the beholder. Because war is a cultural would have been horrendous. 11 In one of his oft-quoted one-liners, Clause- victor. That, after all, is the object of war. phenomenon as much as it is a political one, witz stated that “in war the result is never final.” But Should decisive victory remain our it is quite possible that decisiveness for one of course, wars are often very final indeed, as the goal, and is it still achievable? In my view, the side may be defined differently for the other, experience of the Confederacy, or Carthage, illus- answer to both questions is yes—if we adhere depending on what its culture is willing to trates. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and to the definition of achieving major, long-term accept. Nonetheless, the only sensible object trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: political results that are attainable given the of war is a better peace. Decisive victory is Princeton University Press, 1976), 80. resources we are willing to commit. That, usually an essential if not always sufficient 12 For the idea that war is a cultural phenom- as noted, does not mean we must crush our factor in achieving that result. More impor- enon more than it is political, see John Keegan, A opponent or destroy his military forces. Even tantly, we must think through in advance History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993); Victor Carl von Clausewitz, the foremost advocate of what the following state of peace should look Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: conclusive battle, admits an exception to his like—a difficult task that is too often ignored Doubleday, 2001); and Martin van Creveld, The rule: “It is possible to increase the likelihood of precisely because of that difficulty. How do Culture of War (New York: Ballantine, 2008). 13 Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The success without defeating the enemy’s forces. we defeat our foes while at the same time Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to I refer to operations that have direct political allowing them to preserve their honor? That Waterloo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 14 repercussions.” Although precisely what is the question now confronting us in the 1991), passim, but especially xi–xiii and 536–540. he meant by such alternative operations is Middle East. JFQ 14 Clausewitz, 92. Emphasis in original. unclear, their suggestion permits present-day Regrettably, Clausewitz gave little explanation of Notes strategists to consider ways of achieving deci- what such operations might be. Rather, he noted siveness without assuming a bloody force-on- that splitting an alliance, paralyzing it, or gaining 1 The estimates given for the numbers of troops allies are possibilities, but he then implies that such force engagement. B.H. Liddell Hart advanced participating in these ancient battles vary, but the activities are important merely because they make a possible solution several decades ago: “The totals listed are consistent with most sources. it more likely for a conclusive battle to take place. real target in war is the mind of the enemy 2 H.H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and He gives no other way, for example, how to split an command, not the bodies of his troops. If we Politician (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), alliance other than by destroying a nation’s army operate against his troops it is fundamentally chapters 6 and 7; and J.F. Lazenby, Hannibal’s War and thus forcing it out of the war. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), for the effect that action will produce on the 15 B.H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War 15 215–227. mind and will of the commander.” A more (London: Faber & Faber, 1944), 48. 3 Don Higginbotham, The War of American recent military theorist, John Boyd, echoed 16 For Boyd’s life and theories, see Grant T. Independence (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 352–388. this view. Boyd’s OODA Loop (observe, Hammond, John Boyd and American Security 4 Barry Strauss, The Battle of Salamis (New orient, decide, act) posits a strategy of operat- (Washington, DC: Smithsonian, 2004). York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), chapters 8–11. ing within an enemy’s decision cycle—to 17 Michael Howard, “When Are Wars Deci- 5 Hans Delbrück, Antiquity, vol. I of History sive?” Survival 41 (Spring 1999), 132. act more quickly than the enemy and thus of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political render his responses belated and irrelevant, to History, trans. 4 vols. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, fatally confuse the mind of the enemy leader.16 1975), book I, chapters 8 and 9. Liddell Hart and Boyd are alluding to a more 6 John Terraine, A Time for Courage: The Royal cultural approach to war that should inform Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945 (New our strategy. Regarding counterinsurgency, a York: Macmillan, 1985), 169–213; and Richard form of war even more politically driven than Overy, The Battle (London: Penguin, 2000). 7 most, this usually translates into winning the The best account of Napoleon’s military hearts and minds of the populace. career remains David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History’s Great- These ideas are relevant to our current est Soldier (New York: Macmillan, 1966). situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Decisive 8 For the development of the atomic bomb, victory may still be possible in both countries, see Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The U.S. Army but our leaders must give increased thought

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The first chapter, one of the consequences of our historic pro- related long-term stability to mil- book’s best, lays out the relation- pensity for embarking on mili- itary success. At the conclusion of ship between this long conflict tary operations without a firm the conflict, there was no and American foreign policy. understanding of the complexity regional conference to ensure that Central to Schwab’s thesis is the of the task at hand. Much of the the Security Council’s guidance concept of scripts, defined as current curriculum at the U.S. of resuming negotiations was fol- “powerful unconscious cognitive Army Command and General lowed. The military forces simply structures that control human Staff College’s School of ended the war without consulting behavior at all levels of interac- Advanced Military Studies the coalition or imposing its will tion” (p. 12). In his view, the focuses on the concept of design: on the enemy. Essentially alone in multiplicity and complexity of understanding the problem, the a tent near Safwan, Schwarzkopf these scripts have resulted in all environment, and the ways to a found himself making national FPO the key actors in this conflict, to solution. The author’s theme policy with little guidance and a include three Presidents, talking directly relates to what this school defiant Iraqi military. The results past themselves without arriv- is teaching our planners today. were catastrophic. Saddam would ing at a regional solution. This On specific issues, however, never admit defeat, no matter The Gulf Wars and the narrative provides each par- Schwab’s evidence is less than what Western commentators United States: Shaping the ticipant—such as states, tribes, convincing. His superficial dis- said. More important is the script Twenty-first Century bureaucratic organizations, cussion of Operation Desert that Schwab misses: the Shia By Orrin Schwab and religious groups—with its Storm using dated sources, such uprising in March 1991 and the Praeger Security International, own framework for interpret- as Michael Gordon and Bernard failure of the United States to 2009 ing current events. The author’s Trainor’s The General’s War support it, an event that would 180 pp. $75 fundamental argument is that (1995), and biased secondary become a major part of the ISBN: 978–0–275–99754–0 after defeating Saddam in 1991, sources, such as Robert Scales’s regional narrative and affect how the American script was flawed: Certain Victory: The U. S. Army in the Shia responded to the Ameri- Reviewed by “The powers of the American the Gulf War (1994), indicates he can invasion in 2003. STEPHEN A. BOURQUE state and the Western liberal sci- has not investigated this conflict Unfortunately, because of entific-industrial order could not too deeply. In some ways, he is the details missed in his analy- significant portion of the extinguish the tribal, Islamic, depending on his own script to sis of the first war, the author American population and anti-Western scripts of the evaluate this conflict. He ignores is unable to contribute to our A has never known a world indigenous groups that opposed the text of United Nations Secu- understanding of what followed. in which the United States was them” (p. 19). In essence, three rity Council Resolution 660 Rather than a focused discussion not militarily involved in some American administrations (August 2, 1990), which that convinces the reader of the way with Iraq. Many wonder how have failed in the Persian Gulf demanded not only that Iraq failure of the various players to the obvious military success of because they understood neither withdraw from Kuwait but also understand each other, Schwab Operation Desert Storm could themselves nor the complexity that it “begin immediately inten- essentially chronicles the many digress to years of sanctions of the Middle Eastern and Iraqi sive negotiations for the resolution events that took place between and deployments culminating environment and the competing of their differences.” From the 1991 and the end of combat oper- in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “ethnic, religious, economic, beginning, this conflict lacked the ations in 2003. The three main 2003 invasion ending Saddam and political differences” that political focus required to obtain chapters that follow his discus- Hussein’s regime but creating a resulted from these varying a stable regional peace. Both sion of Desert Storm regress into host of new problems. Misguided world perspectives. As “U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, an encyclopedic chronology of policy in 1991 and the coalition’s institutions have been paragons commander of the American events, with each chapter divided failure to achieve a satisfactory of innovation, they have also intervention, and Ambassador by 12 separate subheadings and political endstate wasted that been the epitome of bureaucratic Chas Freeman, senior State having little serious analysis. This superb operational victory. failure” (pp. 133–134). In effect, Department representative in the is unfortunate, since Schwab’s The title of Orrin Schwab’s the chaos of the last decade was region, complained to their message is fundamentally sound. book indicates that he under- almost preordained. Those who respective leaders that they were American planners and politi- stands this linkage and suggests plan our foreign and military fighting a war without clear polit- cians, in the years after 1991, that the book should provide policies need to understand ical objectives. Rather than the simply ignored the complexity an overarching narrative of this these narratives before they U.S. administration’s failure to of the interaction between their period. Schwab, who has written embark on military adventures understand scripts, it failed at the narrative and the one developed several books on the nature of in distant lands. most fundamental task of war by the Iraqi leadership, and other civil-military relations and taught In general terms, Schwab’s making. Ignoring Carl von players, living in a demanding at Purdue and the University of arguments are sound. The Clausewitz’s admonition that and difficult international neigh- Chicago, certainly joins these two current generation of American policy drives war, George H.W. borhood. The author needs to conflicts into one story. military leaders understands the Bush and his government never package his argument better. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 109 BOOK REVIEWS

Packaging is not solely the total number of those completing conventions. Those assigned to author’s responsibility, however. programs would be only a few codebreaking operations found A content editor should have score, hardly sufficient for the themselves mired in translat- challenged Schwab’s errors needs of any conflict. ing “the blatherings [sic] of . . . of substance, such as calling Like much else in the Japanese diplomats” (p. 102) or Clausewitz “Eric” rather than American war effort in 1941, a confounded by the mysterious Carl (p. 9). A knowledgeable major Japanese language training technical jargon of the Japanese editor also would have cautioned program had to be started from navy. Those sent to the frontlines him about using unreliable scratch, and it was difficult. As faced an ironic dilemma: the books, such as Scales’s Certain Dingman demonstrates in his paucity of Japanese prisoners of Victory, to define the conduct of readable Deciphering the Rising war in the early island-hopping the war and recommended more Sun, the Navy’s program was campaigns meant there were few recent and balanced resources. fraught with internal issues and human sources of intelligence. That editor might have pointed buffeted by external forces that Additionally, these officers had to out other areas where Schwab’s hampered its productivity. That convince combat commanders to content is fundamentally wrong, the program succeeded was due restrict the natural bent of Sailors such as linking Army planners Deciphering the Rising Sun: to the people who ran it, as well as and Marines to collect war “sou- Navy and Marine Corps to the U.S. Military Academy at those who graduated from it. venirs,” such as letters, notebooks, Codebreakers, Translators, and West Point (p. 92). A copyeditor The program began in late and equipment that might have Interpreters in the Pacific War should have helped the author 1941. The driving and sustain- intelligence value. present his argument in a more By Roger Dingman ing force behind the training As the Americans advanced readable format. Book chapters Naval Institute Press, 2009 was a language instructor newly west and north toward Japan, do not deserve to be broken 340 pp. $29.95 arrived at Berkeley, California, these linguists were in the midst up by as many as 12 boldface ISBN: 978–1–59114–211–9 named Florence Walne. Mostly of some of the toughest cam- subheadings disrupting the forgotten today, she organized the paigns—Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and narrative’s natural flow. Editors Reviewed by first program just before the war the Mariana Islands. The ferocity would also have caught the use ROBERT J. HANYOK began in the Pacific. Her faculty of Japanese defenders often left of passive voice such as “the was made up largely of Nisei, sec- American combat troops with war has been viewed” and “has hen the United States ond-generation Japanese-Amer- little desire to take prisoners. The been attributed” that dominates entered World War icans. Their presence became an linguists sometimes found them- much of the text and diminishes W II, it lacked nearly issue when the relocation of Jap- selves trying to coax Japanese the power of the arguments (p. everything it immediately needed anese-Americans started in early troops to surrender, but uncer- 77). Therefore, if readers of this to fight that war effectively. 1942. The military and political tain if accompanying American journal are trying to understand Programs to build ships and authorities would grant no troops would hold their fire when the connections of the American planes and to train men had only exception for the instructors. To the Japanese emerged from their long war with Iraq, this book recently begun to produce results; accommodate them, the program bunkers. Once they had the pris- will not provide the intellectual prevailing shortages would make moved to Boulder, Colorado, at oners, many linguists felt over- or substantial evidence they are the early Pacific battles near the University of Colorado. whelmed by the complexity of seeking. JFQ gambles. But one critical short- In Colorado, Walne’s prob- spoken Japanese. Unsure of their age in combat support was the lems continued: the never-ending abilities, they worried about face- Dr. Stephen A. Bourque is a Professor lack of sufficient U.S. Navy and distrust of the Nisei faculty, the to-face sessions and whether they of Military History in the School of Marine personnel trained in the gulf between the regular students could use their conversational Advanced Military Studies at the language of the Axis opponent in and the military, and the interfer- classroom Japanese on hardened U.S. Army Command and General the Pacific—Japan. ence of “regular” Navy officers enemy soldiers and sailors. Staff College. It was not that the Services who were intent on subjecting Dingman describes how a had been oblivious to the pos- the language students to a strict few Navy linguists got one of the sibility of war between the United military regimen. Then there was hardest jobs imaginable: inter- States and Japan. The Army and the intense course of study itself, rogating surviving Kamikaze Navy had instituted small lan- which was enough to challenge pilots. The first task was simply to guage training programs for future any student. convince these survivors that they intelligence officers that included Once in the field, the did not need to commit suicide tours in Japan. While some of raw linguists had to confront to assuage their shame at failing these naval officer–linguists would new challenges. Those sent to hit an American ship. In some perform outstanding service to intelligence assignments cases, these linguists won the trust during World War II—Joseph found themselves in the world of the pilots and gained valuable Rochefort, Edwin Layton, and Art of “spooks” and codebreakers, intelligence about Kamikaze McCollum come to mind—the each with their own jargon and staging bases and formations.

110 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS

Another area the linguists and for enacting preventive strategies. The first is the one had to master was civilian rela- policies that eventually made the followed by the Bush administra- tions. On Saipan and Okinawa, world less safe. This is connected tion: adopting preventive action the Americans had to deal with to the underlying thesis of the against unfriendly potential substantial refugee civilian book: that regime—reformed to nuclear states. The second is the populations. Winning the trust fit the needs of the new security creation of a series of compre- of the civilians was critical, but environment—is still the best hensive initiatives (such as those organizing the camps where they guarantee the world and its major proposed by Senators Sam Nunn had been resettled were tasks way stakeholder (the United States) and Richard Lugar in the early beyond what the linguists were have to avoid an unwanted nuclear 1990s) aimed at securing existing trained for. That they succeeded disaster. To show that, Krepon arsenals, preventing the spread at all was due to individual goes back to the first nuclear age of fissile materials, and pursuing initiative. Finally, after August and describes its main features. transparency and “best practices” 15, 1945, there were the numer- His firm support for arms control in management of nuclear facili- ous Japanese garrisons whose does not prevent him from seeing ties. It is a shame, Krepon insists, surrender these linguists had to the paradoxical aspects of nuclear that the interaction between negotiate, all the while knowing Better Safe than Sorry: The strategy and the nonuse of nuclear dominators and conciliators (a that a single slip in translation or Ironies of Living with the Bomb weapons. Rather, the author post–Cold War version of hawks cultural protocol could lead to argues, it was the hawks and and doves) does not seem to have bloodshed. Dingman successfully By Michael Krepon doves combined who guaranteed produced the good results of its recreates these small dramas Stanford University Press, 2009 the dynamic balance that made predecessor, as its hijacking by across the Pacific and China. 270 pp. $29.95 deterrence work; hardliners such dominators in the wake of 9/11 Dingman has woven a ISBN: 978–0–8047–6063–8 as President Ronald Reagan hap- has led to catastrophic adventures detailed and interesting tale from pened to be the figures who signed such as the Iraq War, the result of hundreds of individual stories Reviewed by the most important nuclear deals which has been to strengthen the of Navy and Marine linguists FRANCESCO N. MORO with the “evil empire.” will of American adversaries. (mostly men, but a few women The second nuclear era, From these premises, as well). The story he relates is lthough nuclear strategy starting after the demise of the Krepon ranks what he believes rich with telling anecdotes of the has arguably been one of Soviet Union, required adapta- are the nine most dangerous numerous people who made up Athe most widely treated tion to new challenges. Threats “negative drivers” and then the program. His “bottom-up” themes in military theory and to U.S. security arguably have builds five scenarios of likely approach makes concrete the political science, Michael Krepon’s become less vital (no arsenal nuclear futures. What should be many high-level issues they faced. Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies comparable to the Soviet one is in feared the most is that nuclear However, Dingman does of Living with the Bomb is both an sight), but they are more diverse weapons could be used in a con- leave some larger questions unan- innovative and timely contribution and scattered. There is an ironic ventional campaign: this would swered. For example, he refers to the academic and policy debate. aspect that Krepon brilliantly possibly lead to retaliation (if to the presence of Army Nisei The innovation lies not so much highlights: the United States possible) and would break the translators in the Pacific, often in the author’s espousing totally seems to consider the new threats now-strong “nuclear taboo,” a serving as noncommissioned new ideas, but rather in his ability apocalyptic because of the mil- tradition of nonuse of nuclear officers. Why did the Navy not to elucidate the major issues and lenarianism and megalomania of weapons. As for nuclear futures, take this route as well? Also, there likely developments in a realm— the new potential nuclear actors he looks with skepticism at a is little about the bureaucratic nuclear weapons—that is often (Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, U.S. attempt to build a world in infighting among the Services and esoteric and perplexing for those North Korea’s Kim Jong-il), which its nuclear primacy (the commands for the scarce number in the policy world who are sup- whereas during the “peaceful” scenario of “dominance”) allows of translators. These few questions posed to make key decisions and Cold War, much larger arsenals the country to achieve “strategic aside, Dingman has produced a for the informed public who want were in the hands of some of objectives in the worst cases” (p. valuable study about the Navy and to assess them. history’s largest mass murderers 172). This would have the result Marine linguists and their contri- Krepon begins by stress- (such as Joseph Stalin). Rather, of maintaining high readiness in bution to the Pacific war. JFQ ing the challenges to the system, the risk that nuclear weapons times of crisis and forcing Russia created with much effort since will be used would be now higher and China to keep their arsenals Robert J. Hanyok is a retired the 1960s, to prevent nuclear because of the complex calcula- on alert by so doing. As Krepon Department of Defense historian. proliferation. Besides prolifera- tions in existing (such as among states, Murphy’s law applies to His latest work, co-authored with tors themselves, we immediately China, India, and Pakistan) and nuclear weapons as well—even David P. Mowry, is West Wind Clear: discover the book’s culprit, the potential triangular relations more so if they are ready to use in Cryptology and the Winds Message George W. Bush administration, should proliferation continue. an environment in which there Controversy—A Documentary History (National Security Agency, 2008). responsible for dismantling the To prevent such an envi- is more than one adversary to U.S. commitment to such a regime ronment, there are two ideal figure into the equation. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 111 BOOK REVIEWS

There are, for sure, specific outposts that the 173d created on deny key terrain to the enemy, issues with which one could dis- the mountainsides to manage close infiltration and exfiltration agree. One is Krepon’s ranking the movement of insurgents routes, and preclude resupply of threats: Pakistan-related risks through the valley and to provide are as old as war itself, but they are ranked as third, nuclear protection from the constant are done with precision by Battle terrorism against a state by shelling. As described by Junger, Company. Through the discus- extremist groups is sixth. But the 30 men of the 2d Platoon sion of each of the operations that is probably the good thing could have been in any platoon in planned and executed, the char- about rankings, too: they solicit any war we have fought. Tough, acter and strength of the Ameri- immediate discussion based on confident, capable—each gains can Soldier are clearly evident. clear premises. The second debat- a sense of how to survive and to Just as I found as a Marine in able issue is the scant mention the efficiently accomplish the daily Vietnam, when young Americans book makes about the increasing missions of service in a stark are well trained and fight effec- weight of a nuclear China in the environment in preparation for tively to keep each other alive, the Pacific region and the conse- moments of chaos. This is not mission takes care of itself. quences for Japan’s security. More a war for the privileged. Young Section three, “Love,” por- space is given to North Korea, War men gain equality when provid- trays the deep commitment that but it is probably time that a more by Sebastian Junger ing covering fire for each other develops among Soldiers who systematic discussion of Japan’s Twelve, 2010 and compressing one another’s must depend upon each other uneasy reconsideration of its 287 pp. $26.99 wounds until a medevac flight totally to survive their tour and security in a more heavily “nucle- ISBN: 978–0–446–55624–8 can get in. Natural leaders return home. The emotional and arized” area takes off. A third emerge in this setting, and Junger irrational are explored as tours point is the absence of a more Reviewed by has an uncanny knack of making wind down and men realize their thorough discussion on how to JAMES P. TERRY readers feel as if they know each days could be numbered simply frame nuclear deterrence among of these men like a brother. Those by the sheer number of times regional powers. Most scholars or ebastian Junger, author killed or wounded are replaced by they have already been spared. practitioners—Krepon himself, of The Perfect Storm, A new and untested troops, who are The close relationships become arguably—would agree that once SDeath in Belmont, and Fire, designated as “cherries.” Interest- bonding that will last their nuclear weapons are acquired, a offers a remarkable look into the ing and comical descriptions of lifetimes. The emotional scar- careful look at the command and modern insurgent battlefield and older troops forcing “cherries” to ring takes its toll, however. The control and specific features of the young U.S. Soldiers who are fight each other to relieve firebase number of limbs lost, men killed, military organizations and pos- fighting there. In 2007 and 2008, boredom will bring back vivid and lives forever altered makes tures of those countries is needed, Junger and photojournalist Tim memories to many. all these men very different than together with including them in Hetherington took five extended Section two, “Killing,” is when they came into the Koren- comprehensive treaties banning trips into Konar Province in a tutorial on the operational gal. Then there are the concerns explosions and intensively con- eastern Afghanistan, where they science and tactical consider- of these men (and every person trolling fissile materials. were embedded with 2d Platoon ations one must carefully employ who has ever gone to war) of what As a whole, the reader of Battle Company, an element to win in this stark environment. going home will be like. In the should appreciate the witty of the 173d Infantry. The setting This section examines intel- Korengal, at least, every problem prose, the ability to condense is the Korengal Valley, a small ligence gathering, the use of could be solved by getting violent into 200 pages an intricate and but extraordinarily violent slit in overhead assets, and the use of faster than the other guy. And the eclectic bulk of notions and ideas, the foothills of the Hindu Kush local informants as the Soldiers of violence does continue until the and the balanced support the Mountains. Junger accurately Battle Company track a fluid and end of 2d Platoon’s deployment: author provides to his thesis on reports the nature of the violent agile enemy, search for weapons on the last day, a major attack is the importance of multilateral war, the lack of any accom- caches, or interdict infiltration foiled, and A–10s take out a key systems of control, rather than modation for the law of war or routes while carrying enormous Taliban force. unilateral preventive actions, as common decency on the part of loads on their backs. It was not War is the most realistic the only “safe passage” through the insurgents, and the extreme unusual for the platoon to have and absorbing account of combat the second nuclear age. This book physical rigors that troops contact with and engage the I have ever read, even exceed- is a must read, and not just for encounter in this mountain enemy several times each day. ing Jim Webb’s Fields of Fire for “nuclear professionals.” JFQ environment. The issue of friendly Afghan mesmerizing readers. This is In section one, “Fear,” casualties all too often seen not a book for the faint of heart, Francesco N. Moro is a Visiting Junger sets the scene for his in this war is a serious matter and the language is just what I Lecturer in Strategy and International story. He describes the physical that requires diplomacy and remember from Marines on the Politics at the Institute of Aeronautical makeup of the firebases (often compensation. The tactics used battlefield. The descriptions are Military Sciences, Italian Air Force. built from huge dumpster-like to hold the high ground, avoid raw, accurate, and insightful. containers filled with rocks) and exposure to enemy firing points, This is the story not only of the

112 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS operations, the sweat, the slog- U.S. forces have experienced the Law of Armed Conflict, the egy states that “the disciplined ging, the emotions, and the total this shift in the application of force basic tenets of which hold that application of force is consistent heartbreak when good men are in current operations. In Afghani- the use of force must be valid, with our values and international lost, but also of what a great com- stan, for example, airstrike tactics undertaken as a last resort, and law,” a point that is parallel to mitment those who serve this were modified to try to reduce proportional to the threat. This Koplow’s thesis, but similar paral- country have made, and what a the risk to civilians and secure last tenet of proportionality fits lels are harder to find in joint con- blessing it is to have men of this popular support. Such a reorienta- well with the development of cepts and doctrine. The Capstone caliber willing to serve. JFQ tion of military might denotes our useable weapons technology. Concept for Joint Operations does efforts to regain the advantage in These concepts of self- describe challenges in “shaping James P. Terry is Chairman of the an environment where the enemy deterrence and law are thor- the narrative” and warns that self- Board of Veterans Appeals. He is setting both the terms and oughly explored in five case imposed restrictions on the use is a retired Marine colonel and timing of engagements. studies: precision-guided muni- of lethal force by Western nations holds a doctorate from The George Koplow focuses on just this tions (the harbingers of smaller, could degrade combat readiness Washington University. problem in Death by Moderation. more useable weapons, but and lead to failure in battle. Joint He sets the stage by cataloging perhaps seductively so); low-yield Publication 3.0, Joint Operations, the long history of weapons nuclear weapons (even if capable, discusses lethality and restraint in designers increasing the destruc- not to be used for a first strike); the chapter on “Crisis Response tive effects of their products, smart antipersonnel landmines and Limited Contingency Opera- from ancient swords to nuclear (the ability to make them inert tions” but relegates a discussion weapons, and then pointing out after a fixed period will make of restraint and legitimacy to an how these increases conferred them more useable); antisatellite appendix. military advantage. The contem- weapons (the United States has As Koplow succinctly porary challenges of peacekeep- the most to gain from interna- writes, “If our weapons are more ing, counterinsurgency, and tional restraint in their develop- deft in this way, and if they can be counterterrorism have driven a ment); and nonlethal weapons wielded with greater effectiveness new interest in “useable” weapons (which can allow militaries and reduced collateral damage, that allow forces to “act without to use force more quickly and we will less often be inhibited— overreacting.” Koplow finds the effectively, but also perhaps with self-deterred—in applying them. source of this divergence in the less restraint). Koplow devotes Our enemies would then believe historical trends of deterrence a chapter to each, and together that we can and will exercise our- and international law. they represent a thoughtful and selves with discretion and preci- Civilized societies, he thorough selection of supporting sion, not artificially constrained notes, are constrained first by evidence. Of great value, too, are by worries about overdoing it.” Death by Moderation: The U.S. reasons of not employing wanton the detailed bibliographies that Koplow ends with two Military’s Quest for Useable force. (Here, the author adds an conclude each chapter. cautionary questions. If the devel- Weapons interesting observation about al An interesting case the opment of more useable weapons by David A. Koplow Qaeda terrorists “weaponizing” author chose not to include is leads to a real revolution in mili- Cambridge University our moral restraint.) Second, that of unmanned aerial systems tary affairs, will we lose too much Press, 2010 societies are self-deterred by (UAS). The use of UAS has self-deterrence; and, if others catch 263 pp. $29.99 practicality: a desire to win wars increased considerably over the up to our capabilities, will that be ISBN: 978–0–521–11951–1 at a lower cost to the enemy so as past 15 years, as has the pairing to our advantage or detriment? to avoid postwar recovery costs of UAS with on-board precision These are important questions Reviewed by and to steer clear of the appear- weapons. The quest for smaller that concept and doctrine writers DAVID M. OAKS ance of disproportionate use of effects (thus making weapons should continue to develop. A force that might call into question more useable) is playing out with broader audience, one beyond the eneral Rupert Smith, the justness of one’s cause. The UAS. For example, the Army has inquisitive military professional, is in The Utility of Force, third reason is the self-imposed modified the Brilliant Anti-Tank encouraged to add Koplow’s book Gcharacterizes the current constraint to model good behav- weapon from its role as a Cold to its reading list to understand state of global confrontation as ior; for example, other countries War tank killer into a precision, better the potential gains and risks “conflict among the peoples.” In might construe the precedent of limited-effect munition mounted of this trend in contemporary this environment, firepower and U.S. use of a low-yield nuclear on the Hunter UAS. weapons development. JFQ escalation of force—to date, the weapon as a rationale for their Koplow notes that each of mainstays of modern Western employment of a nuclear weapon. these programs has come about Colonel David M. Oaks, USAR, serves militaries—have less relevance; Koplow, a professor of independent of an overarching part-time on the Joint Staff, J7, and today, we are engaged more in law at Georgetown University, security philosophy or Depart- is a senior consultant at the Logistics Management Institute in McLean, a contest to win over the will of also discusses the constraints ment of Defense–wide program. Virginia. the people. imposed on civilized societies by The 2011 National Military Strat- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 113 Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Education and Doctrine Division

By George E. Katsos

n 1949, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs joint doctrine development process. This policy Over the next decade, the normal publi- of Staff (CJCS) established doctrine to established systematic procedures to develop cation timeline continued to be streamlined. inform the joint force commander and the process through the Director for Opera- Concerns emerged, however, that the doctrine staff on how to plan and conduct joint tional Plans and Interoperability, Joint Staff/J7. development process was too slow and not I The Joint Staff/J7 directorate’s responsibilities responsive enough to rapid changes. The JP military operations. Prior to congressionally mandated and directed actions to remove included deciding content of joint publications cycle stood at 21 months, while JTPs were institutional barriers to jointness, there was and managing the new joint doctrine develop- reduced to 27 to 33 months. The number of no single individual or agency responsible for ment process. Furthermore, the Joint Staff/ publications increased to well over 100. In joint doctrine development. Joint doctrine J7 would manage the process and monitor all 2000, JP 1–01 was renamed the Joint Doc- lacked a single standardized process, clear dif- milestones through a standardized timeline for trine Development System. In 2004, JP 1–01 ferentiation from multi-Service doctrine, and publication development. became a Chairman’s instruction (CJCSI consistency among joint, Service, and com- One of the first actions of the Joint 5120.02), which shortened the JTP process bined doctrine. Major shortcomings included Staff/J7 was an initiative known as the Joint to 20 to 26 months. Three years later, the logistics and command and control doctrinal Doctrine Master Plan. These new procedures amended instruction shortened the JP process gaps, as well as several joint doctrine issues for a joint doctrine development system set in to the existing timeline of 17.5 months, and requiring resolution (for example, impact on motion a 3-year development cycle. In Febru- the amount of publications was eventually command and control). ary 1988, the master plan materialized through reduced from 115 to 78 in 2010. By 1982, over 20 joint publications and a series of DOD meetings and conferences As of February 2011, there are 82 joint approximately a dozen multi-Service publica- addressing every aspect of the joint doctrine doctrine publications (33 publications written tions focused on joint operations. That year, development process. In April of the same by the combatant commands, 28 by the Ser- the Chairman initiated the Joint Doctrine year, the approved plan’s process became Joint vices, and 21 by the Joint Staff). This number Pilot Program, which directed the command- Publication (JP) 1–01, The Joint Publication includes two JTPs: JTP 3–12, “Cyberspace ers in chief (now combatant commanders) to System: Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Tech- Operations,” currently under evaluation, and develop Chairman-identified joint doctrine niques and Procedures Development Program, JTP 3–70, “Total Force Fitness.” projects. However, only one project became and outlined a new publication hierarchy, Still open to changes, all ideas and doctrine during the pilot project. terms of reference, and development process amendments are provided periodically through The Goldwater-Nichols Department of fundamentally still used today. the Joint Doctrine Development Community. Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 Under JP 1–01, existing joint publications As a result, we can acknowledge from the dust provided the statutory basis for changes in were assigned new numbers, with J7 establish- of processes past that the Joint Doctrine Master our military command structure. This law ing review cycles. All new publications were Plan survived first contact, continues to work, consolidated operational authority through placed into the test publication cycle and had and will be further validated through existing the Chairman instead of the Service chiefs for a 35- to 43-month timeline. In 1989, Change 1 authoritative documents. JFQ review of major personnel, materiel, and logis- to JP 1–01 included a revision timetable from 3 tics requirements of the Armed Forces. As a to 5 years. By 1991, 22 publications had entered For access to joint publications, go to result, the Chairman reorganized the Joint the test publication timeline. As a result of new the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Staff and created the Director for Operational publications flooding the doctrine develop- Electronic Information System Web portal Plans and Interoperability (J7). This new ment community, the Chairman removed at https://jdeis.js.mil (.mil users only). For directorate developed and established doc- the prerequisite that all new publications go those without access to .mil accounts, go trine for all aspects of the joint employment of through the existing process and instituted to the Joint Electronic Library Web portal the Services. instead that publications undergo the evalua- at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. In 1987, the Chairman released Joint tion as a test publication only when significant Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 190, differences of opinion existed. This dropped which provided specific guidance on the new the number of joint test publications (JTPs) to zero. Regardless of the decrease in test publica- George E. Katsos is a Joint Doctrine Planner in tions, the number of joint publications still the Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Education and reached 112 in 1993. Doctrine Division.

114 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu JPs Under Revision Defining Asymmetric JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States JP 1–0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations Warfare JP 1–04, Legal Support to Military Operations JP 1–06, Financial Management Support in Joint Operations A Losing Proposition JP 2–01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations By Jesse G. Chace JP 2–01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support in Joint Operations JP 2–03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations JP 3–0, Joint Operations JP 3–00.1, Strategic Communication If this work seems so threatening, this is because JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile Threats it isn’t simply eccentric or strange, but competent, JP 3–03, Joint Interdiction JP 3–05, Joint Special Operations rigorously argued, and carrying conviction. JP 3–07, Stability Operations —Jacques Derrida JP 3–07.3, Peace Operations JP 3–07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations JP 3–08, Interorganizational Coordination during Joint here is a new generation whose voices are only beginning to Operations pierce the thick granite walls of the conventional, institu- JP 3–13, Information Operations tional, and academic military fortress—walls wherein the JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare lingering residue of Cold War–era philosophy continues to JP 3–13.3, Operations Security T tarnish even the freshest concepts and ideas. Author Jack Kerouac coined JP 3–13.4, Military Deception the term Beat Generation in 1948 to describe a group of American writers JP 3–15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint who prompted a cultural phenomenon through a rejection of mainstream Operations values.1 While controversial, this subculture’s return to an appreciation of JP 3–15.1, Counter–Improvised Explosive Device Operations idiosyncrasy as opposed to state regimentation went on to effect immense JP 3–16, Multinational Operations change in the subjects of ecology, environmental preservation, social and JP 3–32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime cultural understanding, human rights, medicine, and the arts. Operations While achieving tactical success through imaginative and coura- JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters geous acts of nonconformity and spontaneous creativity on the battlefield, JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations characteristics reminiscent of the Beat Generation, this new Blink Genera- JP 3–35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations tion, inspired by Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink: The Power of Thinking without JP 3–41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Thinking, has struggled to influence strategic decisions.2 Why? Despite the High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management best efforts of a handful of senior leaders, military culture, unlike popular JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery culture, remains nonconducive to free thought and expression, forcing JP 3–60, Joint Targeting many talented, intelligent, and imaginative junior noncommissioned offi- JP 4–01, The Defense Transportation System cers and officers out of military service before their voices and ideas can JP 4–01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations be effective on a strategic level. Those who remain often find a home in JP 4–01.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the special operations community, from which few ever return to change Transportation Terminal Operations the culture of an operational force entrenched in a long, deep history of JP 4–01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore regimentation and inflexibility. JP 4–02, Health Service Support Forefathers of the Blink Generation existed in special operations JP 4–06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations long before Gladwell popularized the notion of combining rational JP 4–08, Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations analysis with instinctive judgment. Although the special operations com- JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning munities have dealt aptly with asymmetric warfare since their inceptions, JP 6–01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations thriving in perpetual states of chaotic and ambiguous situations, they never aspired to define the term. Within the past 10 years, however, as JPs Revised (within last 6 months) adversaries and missions traditionally reserved for special operations have JP 3–02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation crept into the forefront of conventional military engagements, there have JP 3–07.2, Antiterrorism been countless efforts on the conventional, institutional, and academic JP 3–09, Joint Fire Support side to provide a definition.3 While it is easy to understand a desire to JP 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense JP 3–61, Public Affairs Major Jesse G. Chace, USA, is a Military Intelligence Officer in the Army’s JP 3–68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Asymmetric Warfare Group, a Field Operating Agency under the Army Deputy Chief JP 4–03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 115 JOINT DOCTRINE | Defining Asymmetric Warfare define asymmetric warfare, there is a growing metric warfare, doctrine has the potential not irregular warfare and major combat opera- minority who disagree not only with elements only to acknowledge, but also to provide an tions—terms defined in joint doctrine—but a of proposed definitions, but also the funda- operational philosophy and understanding of warfighting methodology employed through- mental theory behind defining this/the term; the term.5 But that may require an unconven- out the full spectrum of conflict.11 However, to define the term defies its very meaning, tional approach. this effort reinforces several fallacies. purpose, and significance. 1. In attempting to make the phras- Why Existing Definitions Are Wrong ing all-encompassing, listing all potential The Challenge What Pentagon officials and researchers vulnerability areas that asymmetric warfare Subjective and ambiguous terms are part identify as “unrestrained use of an impres- can affect immediately gives the reader of any language (compare Plato’s Gorgias). sive sounding, melodic phrase to describe tunnel vision, stymieing any potential for Some, such as French philosopher Jacques any number of concepts or ideas” has incited imagination and open-mindedness. Similar Derrida, argued that language itself is “built” various campaigns to eliminate the confusion attempts to stifle independent judgment and upon ambiguity—the lack of true or foun- generated by the lack of a definition for asym- free thought have become commonplace in dational meaning is what gives language its metric warfare.6 While the term first appeared military doctrine and rules of engagement, meaning. A few such terms include art, justice, in policy statements in 1997 and has shown causing hesitation and costing lives. Michel beauty, brilliance, and asymmetric warfare. up in various National Security Strategies Foucault draws parallels to the Army’s over- Arthur Schopenhauer believed that great art is and doctrinal definitions ever since, doctrine doctrinalization of concepts and the power the product of an immediate insight in which has yet to define it.7 Assertions proclaiming of the Blink Generation to overcome this a (wo)man of genius grasps the true nature the term as so new to our lexicon that its vulnerability. He asserts that “those in power of things without the long process of rational ambiguity is not conducive to clear discussion, assume the self-appointed task of upholding analysis upon which scientific knowledge analysis, or operational use as a warfight- reason for and revealing truth to those who depends.4 While referring to creation, it does ing concept have prompted arguments as to they think are unable to see for themselves not take a genius to recognize that certain whether the term should be banned from use and who are not allowed to speak for them- ideas are better understood using immedi- in military doctrine and discussion.8 Often selves. Argument and reason can and have ate insight over well-calculated explication, inappropriately interchanged with “irregular been used to silence and control others, and particularly those concepts whose boundless warfare,” asymmetric warfare has a diluted an unyielding insistence on rational discourse scopes meet restriction only at the far reaches meaning in joint doctrine, fueling a perceived can silence or diminish those who think of imagination. need for a formal and unique definition.9 differently.”12 2. Use of the word innovative replaces ambiguity with ambiguity and fails to clarify implying that technology plays a critical if not obligatory role the term. An innovation—whether material in asymmetric warfare contradicts the outcomes of most or nonmaterial—that is considered brilliant conflicts in the last 40 years by one may be seen as outrageous and useless by others. Consider the recent introduction of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Defined in its literal state as simply “an In an effort to propose an official defini- (MRAP) class of vehicles, which received imbalance,” the nature of asymmetry is infi- tion for joint publication, one Pentagon office widespread acclaim in the press as a primary nite in infinite directions and planes, uncon- has recently framed the following: tool for executing asymmetric warfare.13 tainable in any way. Thus, with usage of the While it is innovative, many question which catchphrase asymmetric warfare—as exploited asymmetric warfare (n)—A war fighting meth- side the MRAP has actually aided in combat, and clichéd as it has become—coupled with odology that exploits vulnerabilities of organi- confirming that innovation does not always its lack of established definition, policy writers zation, function, culture, technology, behavior, equate to adaptation on the battlefield and are faced with three options: situation, or location by employing innovative making its inclusion in an official definition tactics and technologies to achieve surprise questionable at best.14 ■■ risk dissonance with fundamental and neutralize or stymie an opponent’s mili- 3. Implying that technology plays a philosophies of individual insight and the true tary capabilities and technological strengths. critical if not obligatory role in asymmetric nature of asymmetry in order to define the In contemporary practice, asymmetric warfare warfare contradicts the outcomes of most term is often used to achieve an information cam- conflicts in the last 40 years, where rudimen- ■■ abandon all effort of creating inade- paign objective of strategic impact.10 tary methods coupled with tactical patience quate definitions in favor of an artistic reliance have proven to overcome many technologi- on instinct and understanding to limit clichéd This definition combines several of the cally advanced systems.15 interpretation most sensible points of preceding definitions, 4. Despite an admission that asymmetric ■■ ignore the term completely and ban it making it a logical representation of past warfare can also be an effective means for from our lexicon. attempts and arguably the best definition the military superpower to (re)capitalize on of the term to date. The authors justify the its technological advantages in an offensive While an inherent tension exists notion that asymmetric warfare is not a new mode, the definition suggests decisive victory between doctrine and the nature of asym- form or category of war in the manner of through asymmetric warfare succumbs to its

116 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu chace defensive utilization. On the contrary, specific shown. The idea that modern communica- For this reason, coupled with its ability to be recent and historical events prove asymmetric tions is the first and only mechanism enabling shaped by lessons from the past and modern warfare can produce decisive tactical and tactical outcomes to reach a noncombatant scientific and technological advances alike, it strategic victories through both lethal and audience is a desperate and ethnocentric is imagination, not surprise, that is the linch- nonlethal offensive means. The Mongol army, attempt to classify asymmetric warfare as a pin of an asymmetric stratagem. Schopen- for instance, used such methodologies to modern, revolutionary event rather than one hauer identified this notion in 1818 when he defeat a host of larger opponent armies in the stage in a continuing evolution of such. In wrote, “Thus, imagination extends the mental 13th century. The American Revolution was an reality, the idea is no more modern than the horizon of the genius beyond the objects that exhibition of asymmetric warfare—not simply printing press, telegraphy, or harnessing the actually present themselves to his person, as through the success of skirmish tactics and electromagnetic spectrum were as each was regards both quality and quantity.”22 Asym- guerrilla warfare, but in the colonists’ precise first introduced into warfare. metric warfare embodies this unknown. and creative use of propaganda, partisan civil- Without rapidly and holistically fusing intel- ians, sea warfare, and terrain to target specific ligence, history, and cultural understanding vulnerabilities and defeat a superior British for years, our military has with imagination, we will never surpass the army.16 In 2008, Russia’s nonlethal assault on been sitting at an empty chess imaginative capacity of our enemies and the Georgian Internet proved paramount in table while our enemies play achieve surprise. Failure to make this con- a swift strategic victory, demonstrating that poker with our shadows nection speaks volumes to the very reason a superior force can offensively utilize asym- U.S. forces have often failed to anticipate and metric warfare to achieve victory.17 rapidly adapt to a clever enemy. Because our enemies’ use of asymmetric No doubt modern communications For years, our military has been sitting warfare seemingly increased after 1990 as the technologies such as satellite television and the at an empty chess table while our enemies United States evolved into the only remaining Internet have enabled warfare in all corners of play poker with our shadows. The difference? superpower, it has become strictly associated the Earth to instantaneously and strategically Their ability to bluff and, more importantly, with state and nonstate terrorist organizations affect global diplomacy, politics, and econom- to “cheat.” Asymmetric warfare is not a chess that are no match for the U.S. military in a ics, and are one of only several monumental match; it is a poker game.23 force-on-force engagement, spawning the stepping stones in the history of warfare, but misconception that the ultimate goal of any revolutionary mechanisms throughout history Argument Against Future Definition protagonist using asymmetric warfare is to have enabled intervillage, intertribe, intercity- Staff officers and commanders who work convince his opponent—through confusion, state, and transcontinental communication to under the umbrella of Headquarters Depart- loss of confidence, or a stymied ability to act— influence warfare in ways just as revolutionary ment of the Army quickly recognize and that victory is unattainable or too costly to as modern communications when compared appreciate the importance of the phrase words pursue.18 While insurgents’ reliance on impro- to the technology and strategic scope of their mean something, for when it comes to mission vised explosive devices in Iraq typified this eras. However, these once progressive catalysts statements and mission-essential tasks amid theory, the ability to achieve a decisive battle- are now as archaic as our current methods budgetary struggles, words truly do mean field victory through asymmetric warfare is may one day seem to our descendants. something. However, a rudimentary under- certainly possible, even in conflicts between All asymmetric stratagems share a standing of linguistic anthropology reveals similar (symmetric) forces where creative use common thread that binds them throughout that words actually do much more than “mean of intangible attributes such as will, patience, the ages while permitting the realities of something”; the language we use to internal- method, and morale plays a critical role in the modern world to shape and weave them ize and define sensory perceptions shapes the offsetting symmetry.19 Examples include in progressive directions with increasingly entire world we live in.24 The word asymmetric military use of children, noncombatants as widespread strategic results. Definitions itself produces a strong, unique response in human shields, use of sexual slaves for spread- such as that above identify surprise as that our language that simply does not translate ing disease, information operations, and linchpin, a basis founded upon the idea that well—literally, notionally, and perhaps emo- rapid development and employment of previ- although the impact of surprise and subse- tionally—into other languages and cultures. ously unfathomed technologies like nuclear quent denial of capabilities may only be tem- The U.S. military’s heavy reliance on weapons in World War II (for the United porary, it is enough to springboard a strategic definitions and acronyms harkens to the prin- States and Japan). information campaign.21 ciples of early cognitive anthropology, which The instantaneous global reach of While surprise may be a critical asserted that people classify by checking off a modern communications technologies that principle of war and the linchpin of many mental list of essential features. For example, enable a tactical event to produce a dispropor- conventional combat operations (ambush, air apple = red + round + no stem. Today, cogni- tionate strategic effect has led to the idea that assault, raid), asymmetric warfare is far from tive experts argue that people conceptualize asymmetry in war did not evolve into asym- conventional. Surprise in asymmetric warfare by reference to general mental prototypes metric warfare until the latter half of the 20th is merely a byproduct of innovative, adaptive, called schema. Psychologist George Mandler century.20 Because strategy follows time and and predictive action rendered through cre- describes schema in the following manner: culture, the mere possibility of enterprise does ative intelligence. Such attributes are synony- not necessarily elevate asymmetry to a more mous with traits more commonly identified in The schema that is developed as a result holistic approach to warfare than history has our enemies: cunning, creativity, and deceit. of prior experiences with a particular kind ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 117 JOINT DOCTRINE | Defining Asymmetric Warfare of event is not a carbon copy of that event; tive anthropological approach/explanation, military commander (Van Riper) who had schemas are abstract representations of envi- a child, upon seeing an apple, will systemati- broken away from his government and was ronmental regularities. We comprehend events cally go through a list of essential features (it threatening to engulf an entire region in war. in terms of the schemas they activate. Schemas is red, round, and has no stem—therefore, Friendly Forces (Blue Team) commanders are also processing mechanisms; they are it is an apple) in order to identify the object were afforded various revolutionary planning active in selecting evidence, parsing the data as such. Instead, what Mandler points out in tools, common operating systems, and infor- provided by our environment, and providing his description of schema is that a child will mation from every department of the U.S. appropriate general or specific hypothesis. identify an object that is green, round, and Government. Although described as the most Most, if not all, of the activation processes has no stem as an apple because of its “apple- comprehensive and rigorous infrastructure occur automatically and without awareness on ness,” rather than because it matches an exact ever designed to know and affect the adver- the part of the perceiver-comprehender.25 list of traits.27 This is how we recognize por- sary’s total environment, Red Team achieved a nography—not because what is seen matches decisive victory before Blue Team ever fired a This theory, commonly referred to as an exact list of traits, but because of its shot. Van Riper told Gladwell: Connectionism, suggests knowledge is linked, “pornographic-ness” as dictated by abstract networked, and distributed by “process- representations of prior experiences. There They had all these acronyms. The elements ing units” (schema) that work like neurons is no universal list of traits and therefore no of national power were diplomatic, informa- through which humans access and analyze clear-cut definition. In fact, the case Miller vs. tional, military and economic [DIME]. That information. Because schema are connected California prompted the U.S. Supreme Court gives you DIME. They would always talk and work simultaneously rather than in to establish a “basic legal standard” of por- about the Blue DIME. Then there was the sequence, humans can process information nography in 1973, taking careful precaution political, military, economic, social, infrastruc- faster than any computer.26 not to label it a definition.28 ture, and information instruments, PMESI. So Because our judgment defines the word they’d have these terrible conversations where asymmetric at its very utterance, the phrase it would be our DIME versus their PMESI. I asymmetric warfare instantaneously arouses asymmetric warfare may wanted to gag. What are you talking about? a particular meaning in our conscious- be likened to art, music, You get caught up in forms, matrixes, in ness through various subconscious steps, a and, oddly, pornography: computer programs, and it just draws you in. meaning that may not be accurately regener- hard to define, but certainly They were so focused on the mechanics and the ated, let alone taught or explained, through an recognized when seen process that they never looked at the problem alternate list of traits. In fact, widely accepted holistically. In the act of tearing something theories such as Connectionism suggest that apart, you lose its meaning.30 the habitual act of sequential trait analysis Although the process of recognizing commonplace among many military defini- asymmetry is instinctive, the ability to apply Van Riper’s comments echo elements of tions and processes runs counter to our asymmetric warfare and adapt to an enemy’s highly respected linguistic and philosophi- instinctive nature. Thus, any stance against application requires a level of intangible skills cal theories while emphasizing the danger defining asymmetric warfare stems not from not inherent to most individuals. of dissecting and restricting the meaning a naïve lack of understanding of doctrinal The Army’s recent Outcomes-based of asymmetric warfare. Jacques Derrida is language, but a deeper appreciation for the Training and Education (OBTE) philosophy credited with conceiving the highly uncon- power that a single word can generate within demonstrates the importance of combining ventional notion of deconstruction, which our consciousness. Efforts to break down such rational analysis and understanding with pursues the “meaning” of a text to the point abstract terms and confine them to a defini- instinctive judgment and other intangible of exposing the contradictions and internal tion by applying alternate language can cause attributes, and how that can be applied to oppositions upon which it is founded, reveal- devastatingly diminished effects. a myriad of fundamental military tasks ing those foundations as complex, unstable, Blink introduces readers to the notion to achieve a mastery of expected skills.29 or impossible. He writes, “Deconstructive of combining rational analysis with instinc- The result is adaptive problem-solvers who analysis deprives the present of its prestige tive judgment, and how our subconscious are more lethal, agile, versatile, proactive, and exposes it to something tout autre (wholly can instantaneously fish through mountains and confident in combat. Generated from other), beyond what is foreseeable from the of data, enabling us to make critical deci- the special operations community, OBTE present, beyond the horizon of the ‘same.’”31 sions in the blink of an eye. Recognizing contrasts the conventional military’s long Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the asymmetric warfare is not something one history of promoting habitual memorization structure of a text, but a demonstration that has to ponder upon exposure. The most of information in a manner unconnected to it has already dismantled itself—that its solid inexperienced Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, or related tasks. ground is no rock, but thin air.32 It aims to Airmen instantly know it, regardless of their In Blink, Gladwell describes the U.S. open and loosen interpretation, not to wax ability to think outside the box. In this way, Joint Forces Command pre-9/11 wargaming over at the thought of unchanging essences as previously suggested, asymmetric warfare scenario in which retired Lieutenant General or ageless traditions, but rather to advocate may be likened to art, music, and, oddly, Paul Van Riper played the part of the Enemy an “inventionalistic” outlook; to constantly pornography: hard to define, but certainly Forces (Red Team) commander. The scenario remain on the lookout for something unfore- recognized when seen. Using an early cogni- pitted a multinational force against a rogue seeable and new.33

118 JFQ / issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 ndupress.ndu.edu chace

Proponents of a definition maintain, guistic relativity and cognitive anthropology. very strict religious and cultural practices in “Previously voiced arguments against a Therefore, any basic understanding of asym- the name of jihad. Shaving his beard, failing to definition . . . have led to unrestrained use metric warfare must find harmony between preach, and even undergoing plastic surgery of an impressive sounding, melodic phrase explaining what is already known through are just a few examples. to describe any number of concepts or ideas. instinctive judgment, or “feeling,” and tearing Asymmetric warfare targets any real Clarity is needed to eliminate the confusion down the phrase so much that its meaning is or perceived vulnerability in order to gain generated by lack of a standard term of refer- lost. Asymmetric warfare, therefore, can be an advantage, often ideally done without ence.”34 This process will take years of groom- understood through three basic tenets: an adversary’s awareness. Dr. Blank writes, ing as the intangible traits promoted through “The idea of avoiding enemy strengths while OBTE spread throughout the force, enabling ■■ a warfighting methodology that can be probing for their weaknesses and maximizing the personalities who fail to see past a term to applied throughout the full spectrum of opera- our own advantages is hardly revolutionary,” move beyond their discomfort with abstract tions, aspects of national power, or actions by an idea that Stephen Metz acknowledges as regularities. hostile actors a “core logic” of all competitive endeavors, Authors of a recent Pentagon paper ■■ no rules; it is constrained only by the downplaying the need for a specified asym- state, “With a clear definition the intellectual imagination metric branding of threat-based warfare.38 process can begin to logically and methodi- ■■ targets any real or perceived vulner- Asymmetric warfare is surgical in its focus cally incorporate asymmetric warfare into ability in an adversary’s holistic environment on enemy vulnerabilities; it exists where the modern war fighting concepts, doctrine, and in order to gain an advantage. sole purpose of any action is to create and operational use.”35 Consider the possibility that exploit a real or perceived weakness. While it a “clear definition” not only impedes, but also Asymmetric warfare is not a new form goes without saying that any adversary prefers terminates the intellectual process and that or category of war, but a methodology appli- to avoid enemy strengths while probing for “logically and methodically” incorporating cable throughout full-spectrum operations weaknesses and maximizing advantages, no asymmetric warfare is a dangerous oxymoron. and one of many options available to a com- other brand of warfare targets vulnerabilities Analysts are encouraged to “think like the mander charged with planning and executing with such precision, focus, and purpose. enemy” in order to predict the next enemy a campaign. Its philosophy is also mirrored Rather than oppose doctrine, this argu- move. Although they study our manuals and in the political, economic, and scientific com- ment reveals that previous efforts to provide periodicals, the enemy does not use definitions munities, which often directly and indirectly a doctrinal definition of asymmetric warfare or acronyms; they use imagination driven affect defense strategy and combat operations. have failed not only to respect the nature of by intelligence, understanding, instinct, and asymmetry and independent rational cogni- deceit. To “define” asymmetric warfare sends zance, but also to adhere to several principles the wrong symbolism to an enemy that feeds the enemy does not use doctrine must provide. Doctrine must facili- off symbolism and an innate ability to exploit definitions or acronyms; they tate flexibility, not promote intransigence. weakness in culture and character. Doing so use imagination driven by Doctrine must embrace a philosophy of would mean we have already lost. intelligence, understanding, initiative and creative thinking to deal with an instinct, and deceit adaptive, cunning, and typically asymmetric Proposing a Common Understanding enemy, not create tunnel vision. Doctrine must While well intentioned, the reasons sup- recognize the elements of uncertainty and the porting a definition of asymmetric warfare A 1998 National Defense University unexpected, not fight them. Doctrine cannot apply a symmetric solution to, literally, an study defined asymmetric warfare as “a predict the nature and form of asymmetric asymmetric problem. Without a pure defini- version of not ‘fighting fair,’” a notion that conflicts and enemies, but it can forecast the tion, would use of the term run rampant, as carries a large ethnocentric burden avoided by necessary traits and body of conceptual knowl- many suggest? Maybe. But is there harm in the second tenet.37 Regardless of belief systems edge necessary to cope with and understand that, or just discomfort? or behavior, asymmetric warfare is con- a chaotic asymmetric warfare environment.39 In his foreword to Stephen Blank’s 2001 strained only by the imagination and, conse- Doctrine has become synonymous with defini- article, “Rethinking Asymmetric Threats,” quently, falls outside the realm of any rules of tion and often serves as a glossary for what Douglas Lovelace, director of the Strategic war (for example, The Hague or Geneva Con- to think rather than a philosophy for how to Studies Institute, writes, “A correct assessment ventions) or society. This does not mean that think, resulting in closed-minded approaches of the nature of the threat environment is the U.S. military’s use of asymmetric warfare to abstract and complex situations. The educa- essential to any sound defense doctrine for the falls outside the laws of war that we and many tion process that addresses the true problem U.S. Army and the military as a whole.”36 A others throughout the world subscribe to, and will eventually alter this mentality begins basic militaristic understanding of asymmet- but merely that the tactics and strategies of with OBTE and the grooming of the intangible ric warfare would indeed lessen confusion and others may not, as evidenced by countless attributes that will propagate among the Blink promote flexible doctrine—but not, as illus- vignettes from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Generation and ultimately change the culture trated by Miller vs. California, a definition. the Philippines, and beyond. The absence of of the military. Recognizing that definitions and acro- rules inherent in asymmetric warfare can also To those who believe that a definition nyms can sometimes only narrow scope, not apply to cultural taboos. For instance, a pious impedes not only our intellectual process but open it, we must understand the laws of lin- Muslim male may be permitted to stray from also our ability to adapt at the same level of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 61, 2 d quarter 2011 / JFQ 119 JOINT DOCTRINE | Defining Asymmetric Warfare our enemies, any attempt to force the concept 13 Jason Verdugo, “MRAP’s Growth, Matura- 26 Ibid. 27 of asymmetric warfare into a cookie-cutter tion and Transformation into the M–ATV,” Insti- Ibid. 28 template regimentally inserted into a catalogue tute for Defense and Government Advancement, Marvin Miller v. State of California, 413 U.S. September 8, 2009. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973). of associated situations only reinforces a weak 14 The MRAP was first used by the South 29 Asymmetric Warfare Group, “Outcome- and unsound approach to combating the over- African military and designed to survive under- Based Training and Education (OBTE) Integration arching methodology of rogue state and non- belly attacks from mines, improvised explosive Workshop—Final Report,” The Johns Hopkins Uni- state terrorists, providing our enemies with devices (IEDs), and other explosive hazards. versity Applied Physics Laboratory, May 2009, 1–6. the symbolism and reaffirmation that the U.S. While statistics favor its improvement in soldier 30 Gladwell, 102–111, 124–125. military is as inflexible, nonadaptive, and inca- survivability in the event of an IED attack, many 31 John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nut- pable of independent thought as ever before. believe that the MRAP has actually aided the shell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New The three tenets identified in this article illus- enemy, particularly in urban environments where York: Fordham University Press, 1997), 42. trate the schema that enable instantaneous rec- soldier mobility, situational/navigational aware- 32 Briankle G. Chang, Deconstructing Com- ognition of asymmetry, or “asymmetric-ness” ness, combat readiness (that is, ability to quickly munication (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota in warfare—something we do intrinsically and react with lethal or nonlethal means), and stealth Press, 1996), 119. are drastically reduced by the vehicle. Anonymous 33 Caputo, 42. without the need of a definition. sources argue that these factors may have con- 34 “Defining Asymmetric Warfare,” 28. Asymmetric warfare can be violent or tributed to as many, if not more, casualties than 35 Ibid. nonviolent, material or psychological, techno- the effects of increased armor against an already 36 See Douglas Lovelace, Jr., foreword to logical or primitive, criminal or judicial. It is depleting IED threat. Due to the ability of the Rethinking Asymmetric Threats, by Stephen Blank “black” warfare—unknown and limitless— enemy to rapidly change tactics, techniques, and (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, and will continue to transform. To ensure procedures and to adapt to expensive and time- Army War College, September 2003), iii. relevance, we must do likewise. The Armed consuming technological developments, many 37 Stephen Blank, Rethinking Asymmetric Forces need fewer chess players and more believe that the MRAP was much less “innovative” Threats (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies poker players. JFQ or “progressive” in its current operating environ- Institute, Army War College, September 2003), 16. ment than advertised, and that resources would 38 Ibid., 4. Notes have been much better spent toward alternate solu- 39 Ancker and Burke, 19–24. tions to the IED problem in Iraq. 1 John Clellon Holmes, “This is the Beat 15 Examples include the downing of two Generation,” New York Times Magazine, Novem- UH–60 helicopters in Mogadishu in 1993, bombing ber 16, 1952. of USS Cole in 2000, use of command wire and 2 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of victim-actuated IEDs to overcome electronic coun- Thinking without Thinking (New York: Little, termeasures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and employ- Brown, 2005). ment of improvised rocket-assisted mortars in Iraq. 3 See “Defining Asymmetric Warfare: A 16 Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War White Paper,” annex A, “Definitions of Asymmet- (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2007); Jeremy ric Warfare,” Army Asymmetric Warfare Office Black, War for America: The Fight for Independence, (AAWO) Plans Division, February 20, 2009, 37. 1775–1783 (London: Sutton Publishing, 2001); 4 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will Arthur Bernon Tourtellot, “Harold Murdock’s and Representation, vol. 2, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New ‘The Nineteenth of April 1775,’” American Heritage York: Dover, 1966). Magazine 10, no. 5 (August 1959). 5 Clinton J. Ancker III and Michael D. Burke, 17 Brian Krebs, “Georgian Web Sites under “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare,” Military Attack,” August 10, 2008, available at . 7 There is no entry for asymmetric warfare in 18 “Defining Asymmetric Warfare,” 6. Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, Department of Defense 19 Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Wash- Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, ington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 8, 2010). Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle Bar- 8 Steven Lambakis, James Kiras, and Kristin racks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army Kolet, “Understanding ‘Asymmetric’ Threats to War College, 2001), 6–12. the United States,” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 4 20 “Defining Asymmetric Warfare,” 3–4. (October 2002), 241–277. 21 Ibid. 9 DOD Joint Operating Concept (JOC), 22 Schopenhauer, 166. Irregular Warfare (IW), Version 1.0, September 11, 23 Russell Howard, “Winning the Campaign 2007, 5–6. against Terrorism—Howard’s Alternatives,” briefing 10 “Defining Asymmetric Warfare,” 3–4. to the Asymmetric Warfare Group, October, 19, 2009. 11 Ibid. 24 R. Jon McGee and Richard L. Warms, 12 Terry Barrett, Criticizing Art: Understand- Anthropological Theory: An Introductory History ing the Contemporary (New York: McGraw Hill, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2000), 369–372. 2000), 59. 25 Ibid.

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Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Now available in e-book format! Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. 2 From the Chairman Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz Letters to the Editor Strategy and U.S. Southern Command Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. 6 Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Forum by James G. Stavridis Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick Tara J. Parekh Executive Summary Visual Design Editor 8 Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, reflects on his tenure as Commander of United Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A Ten Propositions Regarding Cyberspace Operations States Southern Command. Upon taking command, Admiral Stavridis discarded Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich 10 By Brett T. Williams the customary military model and created an innovative organization designed not Design Amy Ellis, John Mitrione, Jessica Reynolds, solely to subdue adversaries, but to build durable partnerships with friends. From U.S. Government Printing Office 18 Cyber War: Issues in Attack and Defense his unique perspective as commander, Stavridis uses his engagingly personal style By Robert A. Miller, Daniel T. Kuehl, and Irving Lachow to describe his vision for the Americas. Printed in St. Louis, Missouri by Digital Gunnery: It’s About Time 24 Partnership for the Americas is available in an e-book format. This new format makes By John A. Macdonald and Martin K. Schlacter the book readable not only on desktop and laptop computers, but also on Apple’s 27 Principles of (Information?) War iPad, Sony’s Reader, the Barnes & Noble Nook, and Android-based phones. NDU Press is the National Defense University’s By Francis Hsu cross-component, professional military and Find it online at: academic publishing house. It publishes books, Special Feature http://www.ndu.edu/press/stavridis.html journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and special reports on national Institutionalizing Economic Analysis in the U.S. Military: security strategy, defense policy, interagency 32 cooperation, national military strategy, regional The Basis for Preventive Defense By Carl J. Schramm Toward a Theory of Spacepower: Selected Essays lutEs Toward a Theory of security affairs, and global strategic problems. and hays 39 Expeditionary Business in the 21st Century Spacepower Toward of a Theory this volume is a product of the efforts of the institute for national strategic edited by Charles D. Lutes and Peter L. Hays, with Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, This is the official U.S. Department of Defense By Robert E. Love and Steve R. Geary studies spacepower theory Project team, which was tasked by the Selected Essays department of defense to create a theoretical framework for examining edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this spacepower and its relationship to the achievement of national objectives. and M. Elaine Bunn the team was charged with considering the space domain in a broad and Savings and the Defense Logistics Enterprise holistic way, incorporating a wide range of perspectives from u.s. and EditE d by CharlE s d . l utE s and PE t E r l . h a y s journal may not be reproduced or extracted without 43 international space actors engaged in scientific, commercial, intelligence, with VinCEnt a . Manzo, l isa M. y a M briC k, and M. ElainE b unn and military enterprises.

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Spacepower This volume is a product of the Institute for National Strategic Studies Spacepower this collection of papers commissioned by the team serves as a starting Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever point for continued discourse on ways to extend, modify, refine, and integrate a broad range of viewpoints about human-initiated space Theory Project Team, which was tasked by the Department of Defense to cre- material is quoted from or based on its content. activity, its relationship to our globalized society, and its economic, political, Commentary and security interactions. it will equip practitioners, scholars, students, and citizens with the historical background and conceptual framework ate a theoretical framework for examining spacepower and its relationship to the to navigate through and assess the challenges and opportunities of an Rethinking Foreign Area Officer Management increasingly complex space environment. achievement of national objectives. The team considered the space domain in a 47 Edited by Charles d. lutes and Peter l. hays with Vincent a. Manzo, lisa M. yambrick, and M. Elaine bunn, with contributions from: COMMUNICATIONS By William E. Ward broad and holistic way, incorporating a wide range of perspectives from U.S. and henry F. Cooper, Jr. Michael katz-hyman scott Pace Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Everett C. dolman Michael krepon robert l. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. international space actors engaged in scientific, commercial, intelligence, and Martin E.b. France benjamin s. lambeth Jerry Jon sellers Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more A Smarter Force for Less Time and Money Colin s. Gray roger d. launius John b. sheldon 53 henry r. hertzfeld John M. logsdon harold r. winton military enterprises. This collection of essays serves as a starting point for contin- on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of theresa hitchens Michael E. o’hanlon simon P. worden By Stephen D. Pomper ued discourse on ways to extend, modify, refine, and integrate a broad range of JFQ articles, and access to many other useful viewpoints about human-initiated space activity, its relationship to our globalized NDU Press publications. Constructive com- Building Credible Voices: Traditional Communication in Afghanistan ments and contributions are important to us. 56 society, and its economic, political, and security interactions. The volume should By Robert M. Hill Institute for National Strategic Studies Please direct editorial communications to the National Defense University help to equip practitioners, scholars, students, and citizens with the historical back- link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: The Future of National Security, By the Numbers ground and a conceptual framework to navigate through and assess the challenges Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 64 National Defense University Press By P.W. Singer and opportunities of an increasingly complex space environment. 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Features Washington, DC 20319 Transformation Achieved? Revisiting the 1997 National Defense Panel Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 72 FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325 By Ricardo A. Marquez Email: [email protected] Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu 81 An Islamic Way of War? By Adam Oler ndupress.ndu.edu Why Unmanned By Paul Scharre 2d Quarter, April 2011 89 ISSN 1070-0692 From NDU Press Issue 61, 2d Quarter 2011

PRISM❖ Vol. 2, no. 2 03/2011 PRISM A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations PRISM JFQ PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011) offers the most content ever, including the following Feature articles: Professor Mary Kaldor on “human security” in complex operations; Ambassador Nancy Soderberg on enhancing U.S. support for UN peacekeeping; Colonel Eric Jorgensen on the “Interagency”; Dr. Vol. 2, no. 2 ❖ James Orton and Dr. Christopher Lamb on interagency national security teams; Admiral James

03/2011 Stavridis on the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan; Rear Admiral Brian Losey on conflict prevention in East Africa; Dr. Roger Myerson on state-building; Major General (Ret.) Michael Smith www.ndu.edu A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS and Rebecca Shrimpton on an Australian perspective of nation-building; Major Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson on changing CERP practices; and General Norton Schwartz on airpower in counterinsurgency and stability operations. From the Field articles include Dr. James Schear, Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, and Frank DiGiovanni on ministerial advisors; and David Becker and Robert Grossman-Vermaas on measuring Haiti stabilization. Operational Cyber Lessons Learned articles include Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell on civil-military operations in Kenya and Lieutenant General Ranier Glatz on a German perspective of ISAF. Finally, there is an interview with General William Ward on U.S. Africa Command.

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in Expeditionary Economics order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. CENTER FOR Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, PRISM welcomes articles on a broad range COMPLEX OPERATIONS of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be between An Islamic Way of War? DIPLOMACY • DEFENSE • DEVELOPMENT 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to [email protected]. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Last Call for Entries for the 2011 Secretary of Defense National Security Strategy Essay Competition and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Defense and Military Strategy Essay Competition Are you a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) When: Colleges are responsible for running their own student? Imagine your winning essay in the pages of a internal competitions to select nominees and must meet future issue of Joint Force Quarterly. In addition, imagine these deadlines:

a chance to catch the ear of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an important April 27, 2011: Colleges submit nominated essays to national security issue. Recognition by peers and mon- NDU Press for first-round judging etary prizes await the winners. May 17–18, 2011: Final-round judging and selection of winners Who’s Eligible: Students at JPME colleges, schools, and other educational programs. Students must submit essay entries through their respective colleges. For complete information on the competitions, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: What: Research and write an original, unclassified essay in one (or more) categories. http://www.ndu.edu/press/essayCompetitions.html ISSUE si x ty - one , 2 d quarter 2011

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC

Joint Force Quarterly