SYRIAN STABILITY and the BAATH a New Look at the Structure of Power in Syria
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SOUTHWEST ASIA SERIES Vol. XIV No. 1 (Syria) SYRIAN STABILITY AND THE BAATH A New Look at the Structure of Power in Syria by Alan W. Horton April 1965 An important change has occurred in Syria. Where once re- gime followed regime in tiresomely fickle fashion, a stable polity now exists. Syria-no longer the political joke of the Arab world-has be- come a country with a reasonably predictable future, and the political party popularly known as the Baath, which has provided the cadres for the new stability, seems likely to continue in power for some time. When the French departed after World War 11, they left in pow- er the nationalists who had led the anti-French agitations of the inter- war period. These were men of a landowning class that believed in in- dependence but not social change; but largely because the French had set it in motion, social change was under way, and new groups began to seek political influence-m~,rchants, shopkeepers, bureaucrats, pro- fes sional people, army officer s, and other s, whose common interest was a desire for "progress," a wish to be somehow modern. Some of these modern men were of upper-class origins, but more were the sons of lesser folk whose fir st social and educational opportunities had arisen during the mandate. Significantly, the officer corps was one of the best ways to advance socially, and of the possible careers open to ambitious men from Syria's depressed areas (such as the rural areas of Jebel Durze and south of Latakia), an officer' s career was preferred. Over the years since World War 11, there have been two power struggles. The fir st, which was largely decided by the time of union with Egypt in 1958, was a stuggle between a landowning class, whose principal weapons were elections and parliaments, and a group of mod- ern men, whose weapon was sometimes the army officer corps. In- deed, the initial expression of open dissatisfaction with the parliamen- tary regime, in which landowners obtained huge majorities by virtue of control of Syria's traditionalist electorate among the peasantry and Copyright 0 1965, Arncric.~nUniversities Field Staff. Inc [AWH- 1-'651 AWH- 1-'65 urban poor, came in 1949 in the form of a military --coup d'&at. Other coups and various parliaments followed and failed with embarrassing regularity. While the traditionalist parliamentary parties remained firmly right, the locus of power inside the army moved slowly left, and traditionalist control of the parliamentary system became less signifi- cant because parliament had a diminishing control of the machinery of government. Ministers, though their appointments were approved by parliament, were-as a matter of necessity-increasingly selected for their ability to please the officer corps and prevent military interven- tion. In the meantime, it was becoming clear to all that the officer corps, which reflected Syria's changing urban structure with consider- able accuracy, was-despite some traditionalist factions-gradually falling into the hands of officers who favored radical change. By 1957 public authority was in a state of near-chaos; interfering army factions were disputing among themselves; parliament was virtually powerless; and the Communist party was quickly strengthening its position both inside and outside the armed forces. Searching desperately for ways to preserve what remained to them, the traditionalist parties allied themselves with the Baath, one of the groupings of the modern sector, to seek union with Egypt-and thus, ironically, their remaining power was taken from them. Despite a last parliamentary gasp immediately after the separation of 196 1, the traditionalists never recovered effec- tive political influence. The other struggle of those years was, of course, the struggle within the modern sector over the Syrian future, and a major reason for the delay in ousting the landowning parties and their parliamentary system of control was the inability of the modern sector to agree. Dur- ing the early 19501s,the most powerful modernist grouping was the Syrian Social National party (S.S.N.P.), a cell-organized structure that believed in Syrian (as opposed to Arab) nationalism and concen- trated its almost fascist efforts on Lebanon as well. In 1954 a merger of two lesser parties produced a stronger rival: the Resurrection (Baath) party of Michel Aflaq and Salah- el-din Bitar joined the Arab Socialist party of Akram Hourani to form the Arab Socialist Resurrec- tion party, which was popularly called the Baath and advocated not only socialism but also Arab unity and neutralism. In 1955 the political as- sassination of a prominent Baath- sympathizing officer by a member of the S.S.N.P. provided an excuse for action, and with the co-opera- tion of traditionalists and Communists, the Baath organized the S.S.N.P.' s systematic destruction by adopting various tactics of terror and purge. As traditionalist power waned, the principal modernist groups remain- ing, the Baath and the Communists, fought for supremacy and, because it was clear that control of the army would be ultimately decisive, the AWH- 1-'65 officer corps was the chief battleground. The Communist party im- proved its position more speedily than the Baath, and in 1957 a Com- munist was appointed chief of staff; the Baath responded by leading the move toward union with Egypt-playing on the fears of traditionalists and on the general delight at the thought of Arab unity. With Egyptian help, the Communist party, like the S.S.N.P. before it, was reduced to negligible influence. This left the Baath in sole possession. 1 The union with Egypt lasted for something more than three years, and after it was over, in September 19 6 1, Syrian parties raised their heads to assess the suddenly fluid situation. During the union, all par - ties had been banned-eventually even the Baath, which had expected to be Nas ser ' s political representative in the Syrian Region; socialist laws, including a land reform law, had been promulgated; and three years of normal social evolution had considerably strengthened the modern sec - tor. Immediately after separation, in reaction to Nas ser' s one-party system, a parliament was elected along the liberal democratic lines that meant dominance by landowners, and, in almost Pavlovian fashion, the votes of Syrians went to the political names that represented an im- agined pre-Egyptian happiness-as well as a landowning and merchant desire to repeal Nasser's socialist laws. Such a parliament was out of tune with its times, however, and the traditionalists who controlled it soon antagonized the army by their bungling attempts to reproduce the status --quo ante and by gestures in the direction of closer relations with Iraq. The army, of which large segments remained pro- Egyptian, sensed the general revulsion and felt a revulsion of its own, and on March 28, 1962, some of the officers who had conspired against the union brought off another coup, de signed-according to many observers -to forestall an imminent coup by a group of Nasserite officers. Clearly, army factions had been busy maneuvering for power, and the Syrian polity seemed right on course for a return to pre-union instability. But this time was different. With the purge of the Commu- nist party in 1958, there had emerged within the modern sector a Baath- type consensus on Arabism, socialism, and neutralism, and the factional fissures that now appeared could be ascribed to disagreements over leadership rather than ideology. Indeed, the principal issue was Egyptian leadership. Despite many subtle gradations, three broad posi- 1 For pre-union Syria, see Gordon H. Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military 1945 - 1958 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964). See also the forthcoming book by Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Chatham House, 1965). tions came to be generally recognized-unionism, federalism, separa- ti sm-and all three revolved around the problem of relations with Nas- ser' s continuing United Arab Republic. Unionists were those who wished to return to full unionwithin the U.A.R., and-among the officers partic- ularly-unionist strength was not inconsiderable. The federalist fac- tions, on the other hand, wanted to reach some kind of new semiautono- mous arrangement with Nas ser: in this position stood the main body of the Baath, whose ideology coincided with that of the Egyptian revolution but who wished a chance to run things themselves. The separatist posi- tion was basically one of Syrian nationalism reinforced by the unhappy experiences of union, and some separatists claimed an interest in Arab unity of a non-Egyptian kind. A separatist sectionof the Baath led by Akram Hourani announced its anti- Egyptiannes s and broke away from the party. Of the three, the federalist position ultimately won out. The word "separatist" soon became a term of opprobrium; many who were separatists at heart did not dare to make such a non-Arab admission publicly, and Hourani's group increasingly became a political backwater. The unionists, or Nas serites, though initially well entrenched, did not play their cards with much skill-and the federalists had the advantage of having the Baath organization, an experienced political party, at the heart of their efforts, whereas the unionists were all but cut off from the Egyptian leadership they apparently needed. Within the officer corps, unionists kept identifying themselves by staging unsuccessful attempts to take control or achieve greater influence, and when it came time for purge, an accurate list of Nasserite names was available to feder- alists. Thus, Nasserite disorders broke out immediately after the coup of March 28, 1962, in army barracks of the Aleppo area; and after an officers' conference in Homs had failed to produce a sufficiently pro- Egyptian agreement, some die-hard unionists contrived a minor rebellion that had to be put down with the use of heavy armor.