The Fall of Democracy in

Katarzyna KRÓKOWSKA* Abstract

This paper analyses social, economic and challenges posed by late industrialization and political factors during the years between foreign competition. Particular importance is Syria’s independence (1946) and its unification attributed to the birth of a new middle class, with (1958) that led to the fall of radicalized by political parties directed against democracy. Despite the achievements of hard- oligarchy and imperialism. This paper assumes won sovereignty and the establishment of liberal that the democratic breakdown in Syria can institutions following 1946, the country faced be seen as a consequence of both internal numerous obstacles to democratic consolidation. developments and external pressures. Bitter social conflicts, aggravated by a deep sense of insecurity among the Syrian population, in combination with economic disparities and Key Words military intervention, led to the destabilization of the state. During its formative years, the Democratic breakdown, post-independence country was not immune to anti-colonial and Syria, , defensive social unrest and Cold War rivalries. As a means modernization, political legitimacy. to overcome these challenges, the young democracy embarked on a path of defensive modernization elevating the army to political power. Introduction In order to identify the reasons behind the fall of Syria’s democracy, this paper analyses In the late 1940s, Syria’s newly factors such as: social conflict, institutional gained independence showed that weakness, the rise of radical parties, the establishing a viable state is an enormous politicization of the military and the role of challenge. After centuries of colonial an unfavorable external environment. The domination, the government was essay draws attention to changes in class such expected to efficiently perform its as the weakening of Syria’s liberal elites whose legitimacy diminished as they failed to meet the function of providing territorial and social security. As Linz and Stepan point out:1 a democratic system, in order to be * The author holds an MA in International Relations and Advanced European Studies sustainable, has to provide a minimum from the Institut Européen des Hautes Études provision of economic resources. Foreign Internationales (IEHEI). economic competition, regional conflicts

81 PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2011, Volume XVI, Number 2, pp. 81-98. Katarzyna Krókowska

and Cold War rivalry added further strain sympathizing with either of the two to the already arduous task of forming a sides destroyed Syria’s chances for stable and responsive government. Bitter a stable democracy. Such focus on conflicts provoked by social disparities international conspiracies is criticized by led to the destabilization of the state. Heydemann.3 Heydemann contradicts Diverse concepts of the shape of the Moubayed in saying that the collapse of country caused rivalry among authority democracy in Syria was not caused “by representatives in Syria’s definition intrigues of foreign powers but by the process. Post-independence elites, pan- dynamics of Syria’s political economy”4 . , Nasserists and socialist parties – all Against this theoretical background, this competed to shape the pathway of Syrian paper reflects a dual preoccupation with political and economic development. both the endog enous and exogenous factors that caused Syria’s democratic Arab unity was seen as a way breakdown. It argues that a simultaneous calculus of external threats and internal to secure social and economic division brought the regime down. A development. combination of social factors and an unfavorable external environment had a determining role in the failure of Syria’s This paper will examine the factors democratic consolidation. that led to the undermining of Syria’s democratic system and caused the Its long history of colonialism, and transition to authoritarian rule. After the evidence of foreign meddling in a brief introduction to the question of its internal affairs, including support identity in the newly created state, the for military coups, shows that Syria’s paper will analyze the determinants that domestic policies were influenced not allowed the disintegration of democratic only by internal power struggles, but also structures, such as the crumbling of by inter-Arab relations and Cold War Syria’s liberal elites, social conflict, and competition. After the West supported the radicalization of a new class, the the formation of and the Suez war, rise of radical parties and the influence Syrian enmity towards the West became of external factors and defensive even stronger and the Soviet Union modernization. It will concentrate on gradually began to counter Western the external threat and intense social influence in Syria. Arms deals and conflict that preceded the United Arab other forms of economic cooperation Republic (UAR). strengthened Syria’s left-wing elements and violently brought social issues back There are various interpretations on the agenda. of the reasons behind the democratic breakdown in Syria. Moubayed2 In this paper I concentrate on the claims that attempts to overthrow the period before Syria’s union with Nasserist government led by Cold War rivals Egypt, which practically brought an end

82 The Fall of Democracy in Syria to the brief democratic interval, rather a burst of Pan-Arab euphoria, control than on the events directly preceding of liberal institutions was ceded to the 1963 Ba’th coup. Instead, I analyze authoritarian Egypt. Arab unity was seen the factors that allowed for the coup as a way to secure social and economic to occur and that led indirectly to development. The minorities in Syria authoritarianism. were particularly susceptible to the Pan- Arab ideology, as a way of safeguarding Question of Identity their status and security. They radicalised because of a “double vulnerability”: the threat of foreign invasion and danger to The particular historic context their domestic position from the Sunni is crucial to understanding Syria’s majority. democratic interlude. The birth of the Syrian state ensued as a result of the nationalist struggle against imperialism, Weakness of Liberal Elites which radicalised nationalist sentiments in Syria.5 An arbitrary delineation of In the 1940s, Syria was dominated borders by the colonial powers and the by a group of fifty prominent families of resulting territorial losses of historic landed aristocracy, who had unrivalled Syria - Palestine, Alexandretta, the Bequa power both in economic and political valley and parts of the Mediterranean terms derived from owning land in the coast - left ambitions for Greater Syria country and holding important public unfulfilled. The historic, cultural and offices in the cities. Nevertheless, the political bonds among the divided states aforementioned social tensions, lack of paved the way for radical movements; reforms and marginalization of some Pan-Arabist, Islamist and nationalist social groups led to the “explosive 7 ideologies were so deeply rooted in disintegration of the oligarchic order.” Syrian minds that public opinion would not tolerate divergence from Arab .6 Although since 1946 the For the most part absentee focus of Syrian political life has shifted landlords, they did not develop from the nationalist struggle to the a sense of social and political challenge of constructing a viable state, responsibility toward the nationalism has remained a dominant countryside. current in Syrian politics. The main objective of was to compensate for colonial humiliation The veteran nationalists lacked by reuniting divided Arab territories. popular support from the very beginning. This mindset provided ideological The leadership of the members of the support for the union with Egypt. In was questioned due to

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unsuccessful treaty negotiations with of whom it was composed had no overall the French which failed to prevent losses view; their ambition was restricted to their own political survival and a limited of Syria’s historic territory and left the degree of independence for the country. country with a currency still attached to They lagged a long way behind public the franc. opinion, particularly to the young, who had for several years been subject to In terms of Max Weber’s criteria Ba’th and Communist ideas. The Ba’th for political legitimacy,8 the notables gave the public wider ambitions, on lacked traditional authority for their both the social and national plan.10 position. They had acquired land in the The People’s Party represented no later phase of Ottoman rule and became real alternative to the National Bloc– it enriched through trade opportunities was compromised in the public eye by brought about by World War II. For the its link with and ties with feudal’ most part absentee landlords, they did interests. Public discourse focused on not develop a sense of social and political progress rather than democracy. Of responsibility toward the countryside. major concern was defense of class and The leading parties were elitist, had little national interests, and not the protection contact with the masses, and were not of a democratic regime. 11 representative of a nation composed of almost two thirds peasants. The Ba’thists and Communists The post-independence government began to succeed in gaining did not live up to various political more control over the National pressures, such as long term and unsuccessful involvement in regional Front and People’s Party. conflicts, the failure of a state-led economic development project, The divided parties were unable bureaucratic corruption, rising foreign to undertake the far-reaching reforms debt and high inflation, unemployment that were needed to improve Syria’s and high levels of domestic repression.9 social, economic, and political structure. Syria’s National Bloc was a broad, The National and People’s Party heterogeneous grouping united offered a vague political program that against a common enemy - the concentrated mostly on “reminding French. After fulfilling the task of the public of its patriotic achievements negotiating independence and drafting a under the Mandate”12. The common constitution, the divergence of opinions opponent shared a mutual interest in the and projects for the future of a Syrian maintenance of the old order and did not state within the bloc became apparent. encourage conservative minded notables In Michael Aflaq’s words: to cooperate to counter the radicals. To understand the bankruptcy of the The Ba’thists and Communists began Bloc one must appreciate that the men to succeed in gaining more control over

84 The Fall of Democracy in Syria the National Front and People’s Party. A six out of seven deputies from constitutional amendment, permitting were landlords, while at the election of Quwatli’s re-election for a second five- 1954, only one landowner won, with six year term, not only undermined their representatives coming from the peasant 14 ‘rational legal authority’ belief in the opposition. Despite the radical parties’ importance of democratic norms, which relative success, the People’s Party still could be amended just to keep someone managed to win the most votes and the in power, but also obstructed the reform scored 19 seats. process. Lack of reforms in due time A large number of independent conduced to the democratic breakdown Members of Parliament with unclear fourteen months later.13 political affinities decried the weakness of the political party system – family, religion, or place of birth were the decisive The elections of 1954, reformed factors in electing a representative, rather by the introduction of a secret than a common ideology.15 With only a ballot, represented Syria’s return loose party discipline and large numbers to parliamentary rule after a of independents, the parliament’s period of military dictatorship. decisions were prone to variations. It became obvious that numerous non- allied MPs could play a powerful, but The elections of 1954, reformed at the same time an unpredictable role by the introduction of a secret in the Parliament. The large number of ballot, represented Syria’s return to independent deputies is indicative of trust parliamentary rule after a period of not being put mainly in institutions or military dictatorship. A comparison of even groups, but in individuals, proving Syria’s free, democratic elections shows Huntington’s theory that the main the significance of the socio-political problem in democratic consolidations change. 1949 brought the success of lies not in introducing an electoral the conservatives: out of the 114 seats, process, but in advancing loyalty to the most seats were won by the People’s institutions. Party, but the National Party with far An analysis of the elections shows fewer deputies formed a coalition with that both in 1949 and 1954 the the independents. Very few seats were Chamber was weak, sharply divided allocated to radical parties. In 1954 and lacking leadership. There was no the balance began to swing in favor of clear majority or even a possibility of leftwing elements, notably the Ba’th achieving a workable coalition. Syria’s Party with 22 seats, compared to only divided parliament could not aspire one five years earlier. A shift in power was to presidential leadership. Quwatli, visible from a class perspective: in 1949 re-elected in 1955, was seen as a weak

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politician, unable to give the country often trigger democratic breakdown and a sense of direction, and he had been political transition.17 This was partly unpopular with the army since 1948. the case in Syria, where the advantages The multiparty cabinet of Sabri Al-Asali, of democracy and independence consisting of two Ba’thists, three Populists, were questioned in the absence of two members of the Liberal Democratic economic improvements, for lack of Bloc, two from the Constitutional Bloc which politicians and economists were and two Nationalists, failed to cooperate blamed.18 The Government was heavily and led to a yet another parliamentary criticized for poor economic conditions, crisis. Between 1946 and 1956 Syria had such as overcrowded villages lacking the twenty different cabinets and drafted four basic amenities of modern life and a separate constitutions which destabilized higher cost of living than in neighboring the democratic system. countries. And although Syria had considerable economic potential, praised Social Conflict by a World Bank report, its lack of improvements in working conditions Sharp social conflict can be regarded with frequent wage cuts and high as a major source of instability and a unemployment rates became a source of factor leading to regime change. In the a socio-political conflict. 19 period between 1946 and 1958 Syria was a country of vast disparities, with The main problem in democratic one of the lowest development levels in the region and a backward economy consolidations lies not in primarily based on agriculture. Its rural introducing an electoral process, and urban areas contrasted in extreme but in advancing loyalty to the terms. Post-war prosperity did not institutions. alleviate deep economic inequality. Only the upper and middle classes stood to The Government was seen as unable benefit from wider access to education, to provide neither protection from urbanization and modernization, which external threats nor even a minimum did not reach the workers or peasants, provision of social security. High taxation further widening the gap between the and exorbitant prices led to pervasive 16 rich and the poor. social discontent. Many investors Linz and Stepan draw attention to chose to conduct their enterprises in economy as a key factor in preserving , due to Syria’s administrative democracy, stating that tensions lag, high tariffs and poor infrastructure.20 associated with economic conditions Moreover, the Syrian leadership was such as unemployment, high inflation questioned about its spending. Ten large and lags in the reorganization of industry development projects that started out

86 The Fall of Democracy in Syria without expertise were overcapitalized ascent and political leverage. Only a and did not influence competitiveness of few representatives of the new class Syria’s nascent industry. 21 managed to gain a seat in parliament or other political institutions, overcoming The 1948 Arab-Israeli war had nepotism, corruption, and “a nearly serious repercussions for Syria’s internal invincible network of coalitions between affairs. It exposed the state’s weaknesses the notable families”25. As formal and lack of preparation, and the channels of influencing politics were disjuncture between a political discourse closed, the new middle class yearned promising early victory and the harsh for a revolution that would give them reality that ensued. The misled public access to power. In the landlord-peasant felt bitter disappointment with their conflict, the new middle class was the leaders. The war discredited Quwatli, force that tipped the balance in favor of who had shown himself indecisive in the latter. times of crisis and unable to form a strong Government. Voices of concern The new middle class consisted of were raised that the democratic system public sector workers, soldiers, teachers, was losing credibility, and the real cause technicians, journalists, lawyers and for the mobilization of the masses was others. Between the years of 1939 and not Palestine but rather ineffective 1947 the number of civil servants had governance.22 After the 1948 war, the increased threefold, making salaries domestic situation in Syria worsened, as the biggest area of state spending, prices shot up and finances based on an constituting more than a half of the 26 unstable currency still tied to the French budget. Mainly salaried by the state, franc passed into a disastrous condition. the new class was not self-reliant and needed a strong government as main broker.27 Heavy dependency on the state Radicalization of a New was assumed to hinder the functioning Class of stable democracy which requires a strong, independent civil society, Peasants politicized by the desire principally based on the middle class. to obtain land and disheartened by the lack of the landlord class’ authority Rise of Radical Parties: demanded broader and more radical reforms.23 They could not, however, Nationalism and produce lasting, radical change on their Pan-Arabism own. The main revolutionary force was an alliance between the middle class and A decline in the influence of the peasants who gave support to radical conservatives left the political scene open parties.24, Under the rule of the urban for progressive parties to emerge. From notables, other classes were denied social the beginning of the late forties, radical

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parties began to establish their influence Although the radical groups were across a wide spectrum of Syrian society. very active and increasingly influential, Ideological parties included the Ba’th they still could not gain power through Party, the democratic means. Even at the height (SCP), the People’s Party, the Syrian of its electoral success in 1955, the Ba’th Social National Party (SSNP), the party controlled only 19 of the 142 seats , and the Youth in the Parliament. Not finding any way Party. These parties found support to preserve its position through domestic among classes which contested the manipulation, the party turned to Egypt‘s oligarchic order and sought to restructure President Gamal Abdul Nasser for help. Syrian society. Radical parties mobilized peasants and workers, but it was the radicalization of the new middle classes Defensive Modernization that brought them to power. Ideological parties benefited from the conflicts Syria embraced modernization among diverse political elements of the mainly as a way of improving its military country, promising Syrian development position in the Middle East. The theory 30 through Arab political and economic of ‘defensive modernization’ is based unity. Radical change was seen as a way on economic, political and military of modernizing the country so that it competition between states for positions could compete with the West.28 The in the international arena. The shock Pan-Arab nationalist ideology adopted of a military defeat in the 1948 war by the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party fell on triggered a modernization process in fertile ground after the creation of the the military, as well as development in state of Israel. Moreover, condemnation economic policy in order to finance and of sectarian and confessional cleavages to organize the army. National defense made the Ba’th Party particularly popular went up in the Syrian budget and the among the minorities who hoped for number of military forces increased from 31 social ascent. Party supporters were 25,000 in 1949 to 60,000 in 1963. recruited through two cross-sectarian External threats urged intensified institutions: education and the military. military preparedness. Plans for building Most cadets from the ‘generation of high air-raid shelters, extending military expectations’ were completely politicized education and strengthening border by the time they entered the military defenses were ardently carried out. In academy.29 1956, a nationwide draft of civilians, including women, was announced. In the landlord-peasant conflict, This kind of nationalist modernization the new middle class was the favored stability over broad democratic participation. force that tipped the balance in favor of the latter. Defensive modernization encouraged a move towards the extreme centralization

88 The Fall of Democracy in Syria of Syrian state power.32 Such a including the killing of 76 Damascene creation of the infrastructure for state Jews, forced the civilian administration intervention facilitated the introduction to announce a state of emergency and of authoritarianism. Sadowski,33 seek the army’s help to maintain order. Chaitani34 and Seale35 prove that calls for Ironically, as the population revolted, the a more interventionist role for the state politicized military became the vehicle in Syria’s economy were universal in for transmitting deep dissatisfaction, Syrian society. Centralized, authoritative instead of repressing it. The army started government was seen as the only force presenting itself as the only body able to capable of generating capital, developing preserve nation’s independence. Given industry and protecting the borders. the weakness of the post-independence The strengthening of the state was civilian institutions, the army appeared as initially supported by liberal elites, who “the most organized, nationally-oriented maintained control of the institutions, social force with the largest stake in the and by entrepreneurs, whose actions state and the best equipped to impose would fail without state support. As order.”38 Troupes Spéciales and Sûrete Sadowski36 points out expansion of the Générale - military during the French state’s influence over the economy has mandate were the last directorates to been a prevailing trend in Syria since be transferred from the French under 1946 . Just after independence the state , exercised little leverage on the economy Syrian control and they rose to a symbol through its control on tariffs (roads, of national unity and strength. This schools and telecommunications), reinforced the link between the army but within twenty years the state had and independence, emphasizing the developed into the single most powerful role of the military as a guardian of 39 economic institution in the country. “In sovereignty. 1950, the state controlled about 8.3% of The Palestinian War brought the national income, which more than hostility between the Government and 37 tripled to 27. 9% by 1965. the military, each blaming the other for the defeat. While officers complained Radical change was seen as a about the poverty of provisions, and of defective and insufficient equipment, way of modernizing the country the Government accused the military so that it could compete with of bribery and poor command. The the West. cooking fat scandal, that charged Colonel Antoine Bustani, appointed by General As the 1948 crisis emerged, the Syrian Husni Al-Zaim, with profiteering at the government was neither able to guarantee army’s expense, turned the army against external security, nor internal safety for the politicians, who were accused of the civilians. Strikes and acts of violence, meddling in the army’s internal affairs

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and not holding their own corrupted was removed, but his political legacy of superiors accountable. The military, blurring the boundaries between military as well as the Syrian press, held Bey and civilian authorities remained. The and Quwatli responsible for the lost army held all the cards - no government war and demanded their resignation. could introduce a policy that the army Misgovernance and the humiliation of did not approve. The threat of military the defeat were used by colonel Al-Zaim intervention was a factor sufficiently as a moral justification for the coup. disruptive for the government to take Al-Zaim, secretly backed by the US,40 heed of the army’s opinion. The internal managed to convince the nationalist leverage of the military made it the most officers that a military rule could win powerful single force in Syrian politics.44 the war. The word ‘Palestine’ became In spite of all this, however, the the slogan that brought the army to strength of Syria’s army was quite 41 his side. On April 11, 1949, Al Zaim relative. First, the military forces were seized power, supported by urban masses not strong enough to defend Syria dissatisfied with high prices and an inept against her neighbors; second, they bureaucracy. The press approved of the were too divided to maintain domestic coup stating that, “there is no doubt power over a long period of time. The that Syria will lose a little of its freedom, rapid changes in military rule from but nascent states’ need for discipline is General Husni Al-Zaim to Colonel 42 greater than the need for freedom.” Sami Hinnawi to Colonel Fawzi Silu Although brief, Al Zaim’s rule to Colonel and the early was rich in consequences for Syria’s collapse of military power proved that 45 democracy. The first putsch in the the army could not rule on its own. Middle East dismantled the traditional system and provided the model for future Even the radical parties that coups. Successive military dictators accomplished turning the army into a claimed freedom from all foreign political instrument: Al Zaim reinforced influences came to terms with and re-equipped his troops and brought the necessity of defense treaties. the police and gendarmerie under their control. General Adib Shishakli built up Norton classifies Syria’s military the army’s numbers and political role by as a peasant and minority-dominated promoting young, nationalist officers military model, where control of into political functions. His ambition was the military becomes an existential that Syria become “the ‘Prussia of Arab imperative to minorities and socially states,’ ‘the fortress of steel’ from which unprivileged groups.46 The army the spark of liberation would fly to the becomes a springboard for social whole Arab world.”43 In 1954 Shishakli ascent and thus encourages the lower

90 The Fall of Democracy in Syria classes to join. But the disadvantage of 1958, the merger of Egypt and Syria this trend was that the army reflected into the United Arab Republic (UAR), society’s fragmentation based on family, with President Nasser as its head, was ethnicity and – increasingly – ideology, proclaimed at Cairo. The new UAR was and produced constant, internal power principally of a defensive nature. 47 struggles. The UAR showed the weakness of the Syrian government, too divided to External Factors form a coherent policy. Conservatives, although not approving of the merger, Post-war competition for regional did not object, because the union supremacy between Iraq and Egypt was was seen as the only way to eliminate intermingled in Syrian policy through communist influence. The merger was foreign support for various political regarded by the Ba’th party as a way to groups. As the 1948 war and the Syro- increase its leverage, by exporting its Egyptian union showed, Syria’s internal main Arab solidarity policy. Even though politics were entangled with inter-Arab all the Syrian party leaders claimed competition and the Great Powers to be in favor of the Union it was the struggle. A fight for domination in Syria Ba’th party that took serious steps to 50 was led not only by countries aspiring to implement it. The fragmentation of the the role of regional powers, but also by political system gave the army officers the Cold War rivals. the casting vote. The project of the union was seen positively by the officers as a The intensity of regional conflicts and way to establish their supremacy over the rivalries made Syria “prickly, defensive, political parties. ultra-nationalistic and intensely anti- French.”48 Hostile to Israel, unfriendly For a strategic country like Syria, the towards Turkey, alienated from neutrality proclaimed at the Bandung conference of 1955 became nearly Lebanon and from Iraq, it felt isolated impossible. The Cold War was not just and vulnerable.49 An effort to create a about fulfilling geopolitical ambitions; form of collective security failed, as the it was a conflict of two paths to Middle East Defense Organization was modernization: capitalist and socialist. considered to place Syria in the British Superpower rivalry negatively affected sphere of influence. the process of economic and political Syria’s perennial security problem modernization as the two camps tried created a dilemma in regard to external to impose their own model of socio- alignments. Even the radical parties economic and political development. that claimed freedom from all foreign According to Moubayed,51 the prerequisite influences came to terms with the of maintaining a democratic system necessity of defense treaties. In February was to accept a set of rules imposed by

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the West - accepting Israel, being more bloc. This does not mean, however, that responsive to American needs. the informed public welcomed Russian engagement. A fall into communism was Syria’s colonial past; the West’s equally threatening to the conservatives recognition of and financial, political, as to the Ba’ths who competed with the and military support for Israel; Secretary SCP for influence over the electorate. of State Dulles’ refusal to finance the They were concerned that an electoral Aswan Dam; the Suez crisis and the victory or a Communist-led coup would subsequent war created a climate of provoke right-wing counter-measures distrust towards the West. The Syrians and western backlash. had “no wish to fight side by side with their executioners”52. The West, in demanding active Arab support for Liberal democracy was not a their side in the Cold War conflict, common denominator for the made a strategic error of framing the post-war period, never ‘the only ‘either with or against us’ attitude. Syria’s game in town’. gradual rapprochement to the Soviets was not a result of shared ideology, but rather stemmed from public resentment Nevertheless, in addition to its towards the West. By ignoring the fierce military benefits, cooperation with anti-Communism of Nasser and the the Soviets seemed practical on purely Ba’th party, the Americans overestimated economic grounds as well. It provided the risk of Syria becoming a satellite of arms without restrictions and purchased Moscow. Russian diplomacy skillfully Syria’s surplus of agricultural produce. A used people’s increasing hostility towards turning point was the Czech arms deal ‘imperialist’ treaties and presented itself – due to its military purchases, Syria as an alternative that offers help with no found itself in opposition to the West, strings attached. In contrast to the West, together with Nasser. As late as the it recognized Syria’s strong sense of Arab autumn of 1957 President al-Quwatli nationalism. Since the overthrow of was still declaring: “Had it not been for Shishakli in February 1954, both Egypt Israel, we would not have felt the need and the USSR aimed at influencing for new weapons; and were it not for Syria. Both countries chose the right the unrelenting preferential treatment of Israel by the United States, we would not moment, when widespread apprehension 53 of an external threat from Israel sparked have been introduced to new Russians.“ demand for a powerful protector. A Security and stability turned out to pro-Soviet propaganda campaign in the be more important than democracy. An press, the Soviet Cultural Centre, trade, Israeli attack on Arab villages north-east but most of all military protection, of Lake Tiberias in December 1955, strengthened Syria’s ties with the Soviet and border clashes with Turkey during

92 The Fall of Democracy in Syria the Baghdad pact crisis, confirmed the by injecting an element of hysteria into seriousness of the threat of foreign attack Syrian public life, encouraged her to and accelerated Syria’s rapprochement run for safety to the arms of her new with the East. The Soviet Union voiced protectors”.55 military support for the Syrian side and Malki became a martyr for the values Syria, desperate for security, had no he stood for – Syrian independence, choice but to welcome its new, powerful neutralism, militant Arabism and pro- allies. The alliance with Egypt and the Egyptian sentiments. The Malki affair USSR had two serious repercussions: sharpened the internal divisions of the Syria was shifting into Egypt’s sphere army; following his death no officer of influence and joining the Cold War could establish supremacy. “The unity conflict. of the army was destroyed as each political party and each neighboring state scrambled for military allies: secret The nation was not able to cope subsidies flowed in from Iraq, Egypt, successfully with rapid social and , as well as from changes and was defenseless in Great Powers farther afield… thoroughly the face of external threats. politicized, with its own budget and secret funds, the army became a jungle of intrigue, sometimes matching civilian Another event, illustrative of Syria’s factionalism, sometimes rent by its conflicted socio-political scene, was own indigenous rivalries.”56 During the the ‘Malki affair.’ Adnan al-Malki, a turbulent period after Malki’s murder, charismatic officer and a supporter of both the Parliament and the army were Ba’th Party was assassinated by a sergeant fragmented so it was difficult to establish who belonged to the pro-Western Syrian who governed Syria. The competing Social National Party (SSNP). An official factions feared each other more than any investigation identified the US as a major outside force57 while the public found in financier of the SSNP and accused US Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser the leader they had officials of complicity in Malki’s murder. been hoping for. The Suez crisis elevated The consequences of the affair were far- him to a symbol of resistance to Western reaching. It was used to get rid of right- aggression and an ardent supporter of wing rivals and to advance Ba’th party the Pan-Arab cause. Nasser gained mass popularity by gaining public sympathy. popularity among Syrians through radio The media coverage of the murder broadcasts, press releases, inflammatory strengthened the position of the left and speeches and nationalist songs.58 Great of the army.54 It also “gave the Syrian public support of the idea of Arab unity public an insight into the magnitude and centering on the figure of a strong and the violence of the international leader ignored the nature of Nasser’s contest in which Syria was a pawn and, regime.59

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Conclusion Damascene government had little experience and lacked sufficient funds One of the most striking paradoxes to implement the necessary reforms of in the analysis of the 1946 -1958 state services. It was too weak to ensure period is that Syrians, who fiercely the survival of liberal institutions. fought to uphold their sovereignty, Divided parties could not keep the army ultimately handed it voluntarily to subordinate to civilian administration, Egypt. It shows the unprecedented scale nor provide efficient bureaucracy and of the pressures faced by the young accountability.62 democracy. The Syrian political scene was an interaction of complex social, After 1948, the potential military and foreign forces. Corruption and external pressures undermined the threats against the integrity values of Syria’s parliamentary system, and sovereignty of the Syrian and propaganda drove the public “to state became reality and Syria’s near hysteria by plots, coups d’état, and modernization took on a threats of invasion. These were not ideal defensive character. conditions for the flowering of civic virtues or the proper functioning of 60 elective democratic institutions.” The basic task assigned to the Syrian Liberal democracy was not a state was creating a ‘rich nation, strong common denominator for the post- army’ in order to meet the national war period, never ‘the only game in security challenge posed by foreign threat. town.’ Indeed, Syrian society was deeply After the disastrous defeat by Israel, divided in regard to their identity and the radical changes were made in order to shape the country should take. Neither speed recovery from the humiliation and independence nor liberal democracy to prevent its repetition by organizing offered a clear-cut solution to the problems a political system that would support that persisted in post-war Syria. These development most efficiently.63 There nascent institutions did not deal with was a general consensus regarding the the problems of distribution of wealth, need to strengthen the state, and stability the identity crisis, or foreign military and was more important than democracy. economic competition. The nation was After 1948, the potential threats against not able to cope successfully with rapid the integrity and sovereignty of the social changes and was defenseless in the Syrian state became reality and Syria’s face of external threats. modernization took on a defensive The weakness of Syria’s leaders character. Military coups and defensive and their corruption contributed to modernization came as a reaction against the collapse of Syria’s regime.61 The the foreign threat coming from various

94 The Fall of Democracy in Syria sources - Israel, Turkey, the , failures lead to governmental change in and the Cold War powers. The push some democracies, but result in the very towards advancing Syria’s economic and breakdown of democracy in others? The military power was supported by the theory of democratic breakdowns is one public as a way of introducing stability. of the subjects that could benefit from Overwhelming military influence further research. This in-depth single- was another reason for Syria’s democratic country analysis can serve as a starting breakdown. Because the army appeared point for a comparative study of the to be the only force strong enough to breakdown of liberal parliamentary protect Syria’s sovereignty, loyalty shifted systems. In the light of a new wave of from the civilian government to the democratization, it is pertinent to find the military. As the population revolted, answer to Juan J. Linz’s65 question about instead of upholding the existing system the existence of a common pattern in the of authority, a radicalized military changes of regime processes. The paper became the vehicle for transmitting the sheds light on the possible obstacles to population’s deep dissatisfaction with the democratic consolidation. Highlighting system. This paradox was defined by Peter the experience of democratic institutions Feaver: “The very institution created to between 1949 and 1958 is significant protect the polity [i.e. the military] is for modern civil society reformers in the given sufficient power to become a threat Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 64 to the polity.” region. It can contribute to a better The central questions tackled in understanding of causes and processes the paper are specific to the Syrian case that can lead democracies to collapse and but they simultaneously open a topic of to their replacement by highly illiberal a more general nature: why do policy regimes.

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Endnotes

1 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, No.2 (April 1996), pp.14 -33. 2 Sami Moubayed, Between Democracy and Dictatorship Maryland, University Press of America, 2000. 3 Steven Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell University Press, 1999. 4 Ibid., p.28 5 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, London, Routledge, 2002. p.3 6 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 71. 7 Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970, p.84. 8 Max Weber distingueshes three types of authority: charismatic, traditional and trational–legal authority. See, Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. 9 Heydemann, Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970, p. 4 10 Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, p.30. 11 Ibid., p.116. 12 Ibid., p.175 13 Ibid., p.33. 14 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989, p.43, 15 Radwan Ziadeh, “The Rise of Ideological Political Parties in Post-Independence Syria”, Unpublished Report, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy. 16 Youssef Chaitani, Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State, London, I.B. Tauris, 2007. P.55. 17 Linz and Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, pp.14 -33. 18 Chaitani, Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State, p. 58. 19 Ibid., pp.6-7. 20 Ibid., pp.69-72. 21 Ibid., p.121. 22 Ibid., pp.124-125. 23 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, p.30. 24 Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963.

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25 Christoph Schumann, “The Generation of Broad Expectations: Nationalism, Education, and Autobiography in Syria and Lebanon, 1930-1958”, Die Welt Des Islams, Vol. 41, No.2 (2001), p. 203. 26 Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, pp.251-280. 27 Ibid. 28 Schumann, “The Generation of Broad Expectations”, p.174. 29 Ibid., p.197. 30 Bill and Springbord term as a process of ‘defensive modernisation’ cited in Mohamad G. Alkadry, “Reciting Colonial Scripts: Colonialism, Globalization and Democracy in the Decolonized Middle East”, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 739-762. 31 The term ‘military forces’ includes army, navy and air force but not police forces which are often considerable, see Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, p.263. 32 Hans Joas, War and Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003. 33 Yahya Sadowski, Political Power and Economic Organization in Syria: The Course of State Intervention 1946 -1958, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, 1984, p.4. 34 Youssef Chaitani, Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon, p.55. 35 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p. 128. 36 Sadowski, Political Power and Economic Organization in Syria, p.4. 37 Ibid. 38 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, p.7. 39 Chaitani, Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon, p.55. 40 Moubayed, Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, pp.11-25 41 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p.61. 42 Ziadeh, The Rise of Ideological Political Parties in Post-Independence Syria. 43 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p. 124. 44 Ibid, p.304. 45 Halpern. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. p. 267. 46 Richard Norton and Ali Alfoneh, “The Study of Civil-Military Relations and Civil-Society in the Middle East and North Africa”, in Carsten Jensen (ed.), Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East, Copanhagen, Royal Danish Defence College, 2008, p.13. 47 Eyal Zisser, “Appearance and Reality: Syria’s Decisionmaking Structure”, Meria Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 1998), at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1998/issue2/jv2n2a5.html (Accessed: 18/11/2010). 48 Patrick Seale poised this argument in his introduction to Youssef Chaitani’s book, See, Chaitani, Post- Colonial Syria and Lebanon, p. XII. 49 Philip Hitti, Syria: A Short History, New York, Macmillan,1959, p.255. 50 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p. 314. 51 Moubayed, Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, p. VII. 52 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p.105 53 Hitti, Syria: A Short History, p.257.

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54 David Commins, Historical Dictionary of Syria, Lenham, Scarecrow Press, 2004, p.147. 55 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, p.250. 56 Ibid., p.244. 57 Ibid., 319. 58 Moubayed, Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, p.136. 59 Seale, The Struggle for Syria,p.324. 60 Ibid., p.307. 61 Ibid., p.170. 62 Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa,p.291. 63 Joas, War and Modernity, p.47. 64 Norton and Alfoneh, “The Study of Civil-Military Relations”, p.7. 65 Linz and Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, pp.14 -33.

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