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Sanctions Who Is Left? Hundreds of Entities Removed from Blacklists on Implementation Day

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Sanctions Who Is Left? Hundreds of Entities Removed from Blacklists on Implementation Day Sanctions Who is Left? Hundreds of entities removed from blacklists on Implementation Day Updated January 18, 2016 Iran and the P5+1 announced on January 16, 2016 that Iran had met its obligations under the terms of the nuclear agreement and would immediately receive a first round of sanctions relief. As a result, restrictions that had been imposed against Iran’s financial, transport, and energy sectors were lifted, and hundreds of entities – companies, individuals, banks, government organizations, and state-controlled ships and aircraft – were removed from blacklists maintained by the United Nations, European Union, and United States. However, hundreds of Iranian entities were not removed from blacklists on Implementation Day and remain subject to sanctions, particularly entities linked to Iran's ballistic missile program, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the IRGC-Qods Force. According to U.N. Security Council resolution 2231, restrictions on Iran's conventional arms program, including arms imports and exports, apply for a further five years, and restrictions on Iran's missile program apply for a further eight years. Additional entities may be added to U.N. and other lists in response to Iranian actions that are found to violate the nuclear agreement, or resolution 2231. The United States demonstrated this by announcing new missile sanctions on the day after Implementation Day. The entities still sanctioned by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States are listed below. Each entity’s name is linked to an Iran Watch profile of its activities, and the document related to the sanctions designation is linked as a "Referencing Document" available from the Iran Watch Library. A date indicates when the sanction originally occurred. This list can be filtered to display the entities sanctioned by only one party. Unfiltered, the list reveals who has (and has not) been sanctioned by whom. Filter by Authoring Agency: United Nations European Union United States All (no filter) Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions 7th of Tir Industrial Complex Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency U.N. Security Resolution 1737 (2006) Dec 23, 2006 Council Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 Concerning European Apr 19, 2007 Restrictive Measures Against Iran Union Department Press Release: Treasury Designates Iranian of the Jul 8, 2008 Proliferation Individuals and Entities Treasury Abdollah Solat Sana Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Decision Implementing Article 7(2) of European Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Apr 26, 2007 Union Measures Against Iran Abolghassem Mozaffari Shams Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No European 1245/2011 Implementing Regulation (EU) No Dec 1, 2011 Union 961/2010 on Restrictive Measures Against Iran Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency U.N. Security Resolution 1803 (2008) Mar 3, 2008 Council Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Commission Regulation (EC) No 219/2008 European Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 Mar 11, 2008 Union Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran Advanced Information and Communication Technology Center Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Department of Fact Sheet: Increasing Sanctions Against Iran Jul 12, 2012 the Treasury Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Executive Order 13382-Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and White House Jul 1, 2005 Their Supporters Council Decision Implementing Article 7(2) of European Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Apr 26, 2007 Union Measures Against Iran Ahmad Derakhshandeh Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency U.N. Security Resolution 1747 (2007) Mar 24, 2007 Council Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Ahmad Derakhshandeh Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Commission Regulation (EC) No 441/2007 European Amending Council Regulation (EC) 423/2007 Apr 20, 2007 Union Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency U.N. Security Resolution 1737 (2006) Dec 23, 2006 Council Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 Concerning European Apr 19, 2007 Restrictive Measures Against Iran Union Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Department Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support of the Oct 25, 2007 for Terrorism Treasury Ali Akbar Tabatabaei Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No European 1245/2011 Implementing Regulation (EU) No Dec 1, 2011 Union 961/2010 on Restrictive Measures Against Iran Department Treasury Targets Iranian Arms Shipments of the Mar 27, 2012 Treasury Security Council 1737 Committee Adds New Entries U.N. Security Apr 19, 2012 to Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Council Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Ali Ashraf Nouri Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 54/2012 European Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on Jan 23, 2012 Union Restrictive Measures Against Iran Ali Gholami Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Department Treasury Targets Networks Linked to Iran of the Aug 29, 2014 Treasury Ali Karimian Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No European 1245/2011 Implementing Regulation (EU) No Dec 1, 2011 Union 961/2010 on Restrictive Measures Against Iran Aluminat Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 Implementing Regulation (EU) No European Dec 22, 2012 267/2012 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Union Iran State Department Actions Targeting Iran's Nuclear Department May 9, 2013 Enrichment and Proliferation Program of State Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Amin Industrial Complex Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Department Treasury Department Designates Iranian of the Apr 7, 2009 Proliferation Network and Identifies New Aliases Treasury U.N. Security Resolution 1929 (2010) Jun 9, 2010 Council Commission Regulation (EU) No 532/2010 European Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 432/2007 Jun 18, 2010 Union Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran Amir Ali Hajizadeh Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 54/2012 European Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on Jan 23, 2012 Union Restrictive Measures Against Iran Amir Hossein Rahimyar Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Fact Sheet: Treasury and State Department Actions Department Target Iran's Nuclear Enrichment and Proliferation of the Dec 13, 2012 Program Treasury Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency U.N. Security Resolution 1747 (2007) Mar 24, 2007 Council Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Commission Regulation (EC) No 441/2007 European Amending Council Regulation (EC) 423/2007 Apr 20, 2007 Union Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran Department Press Release: Treasury Designates Iranian of the Jul 8, 2008 Proliferation Individuals and Entities Treasury Andisheh Zolal Co. Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Department Treasury Announces New Sanctions Against Iran of the May 23, 2013 Treasury Anis Naccache Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Decision Implementing Article 7(2) of European Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Jun 23, 2008 Union Measures Against Iran Ansar Bank Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Department Fact Sheet: Treasury Designates Iranian Entities of the Dec 21, 2010 Tied to the IRGC and IRISL Treasury Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Ansar Bank Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2011 European Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on May 23, 2011 Union Restrictive Measures Against Iran Aran Modern Devices Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2011 European Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on May 23, 2011 Union Restrictive Measures Against Iran Aras Farayande Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2011 European Implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on May 23, 2011 Union Restrictive Measures Against Iran Arfa Paint Company Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2010 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No European Jul 26, 2010 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Union Iran Department Recent OFAC Actions: Specially Designated of the Nov 21, 2011 Nationals Update Treasury Source: http://www.iranwatch.org/sanctions Arfeh Company Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2010 Implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No European Jul 26, 2010 423/2007 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Union Iran Department Recent OFAC Actions: Specially Designated of the Nov 21, 2011 Nationals Update Treasury Aria Nikan Authoring Referencing Document Date Agency Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No European 1245/2011 Implementing Regulation (EU) No Dec 1, 2011 Union 961/2010 on Restrictive Measures Against Iran Fact Sheet: Treasury and State Department Actions Department Target Iran's Nuclear Enrichment and Proliferation
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