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Iran Case File (April 2019)
IRAN CASE FILE March 2020 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 The Executive Summary .............................................................4 Internal Affairs .........................................................................7 The Ideological File ......................................................................... 8 I. Closing Shrines and Tombs ................................................................ 8 II. Opposition to the Decision Taken by Some People ............................. 8 III. Reaction of Clerics ........................................................................... 9 IV. Affiliations of Protesters .................................................................. 11 The Political File ............................................................................12 I. Khamenei Politicizes the Epidemic and Accuses Enemies of Creating the Virus to Target the Iranian Genome ..............................12 II. President Hassan Rouhani’s Slow Response in Taking Precautions to Face the Crisis ..................................................................................13 The Economic File ..........................................................................16 I. Forcible Passage of the Budget ...........................................................16 II. Exceptional Financial Measures to Combat the Coronavirus ............. 17 III. The -
The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’S Revolutionary Guard
The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi: Decision-Making and Factionalism in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard SAEID GOLKAR AUGUST 2021 KASRA AARABI Contents Executive Summary 4 The Raisi Administration, the IRGC and the Creation of a New Islamic Government 6 The IRGC as the Foundation of Raisi’s Islamic Government The Clergy and the Guard: An Inseparable Bond 16 No Coup in Sight Upholding Clerical Superiority and Preserving Religious Legitimacy The Importance of Understanding the Guard 21 Shortcomings of Existing Approaches to the IRGC A New Model for Understanding the IRGC’s Intra-elite Factionalism 25 The Economic Vertex The Political Vertex The Security-Intelligence Vertex Charting IRGC Commanders’ Positions on the New Model Shades of Islamism: The Ideological Spectrum in the IRGC Conclusion 32 About the Authors 33 Saeid Golkar Kasra Aarabi Endnotes 34 4 The IRGC in the Age of Ebrahim Raisi Executive Summary “The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] has excelled in every field it has entered both internationally and domestically, including security, defence, service provision and construction,” declared Ayatollah Ebrahim Raisi, then chief justice of Iran, in a speech to IRGC commanders on 17 March 2021.1 Four months on, Raisi, who assumes Iran’s presidency on 5 August after the country’s June 2021 election, has set his eyes on further empowering the IRGC with key ministerial and bureaucratic positions likely to be awarded to guardsmen under his new government. There is a clear reason for this ambition. Expanding the power of the IRGC serves the interests of both Raisi and his 82-year-old mentor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. -
Policy Notes the Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ 2019 ■ Pn58
POLICY NOTES THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ 2019 ■ PN58 SAEID GOLKAR THE SUPREME LEADER AND THE GUARD Civil-Military Relations and Regime Survival in Iran As the Islamic Republic concludes its fourth decade, the country faces three converging threats. The first involves its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who turns eighty this year and is, according to some reports, in poor health. The succession process could create a severe political struggle, possibly unsettling the entire regime. The second challenge is growing dissatisfaction among the population, evidenced by a rising incidence of strikes and protests throughout the country. These now occur daily. And the third has to do with economic hardships associated with the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, a development that could potentially exacerbate ongoing protests and further destabilize the regime. © 2019 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. SAEID GOLKAR To neutralize these threats, the Islamic Republic This study is divided into four sections. The first and the Supreme Leader are increasingly relying on examines the IRGC’s position and structure within their security and coercive mechanisms, foremost the Iran’s military. The second looks at the mechanisms Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its and strategies Ayatollah Khamenei uses to control civilian militia force, known as the Basij. Indeed, the the Guard, especially indoctrination, which is carried most important factor in the survival and transition out through entities known as ideological-political of political regimes is the loyalty of the armed forces. organizations (IPOs) across Iran’s military. This sec- Dictators cannot stay in power if they lose support tion outlines, in particular, the internal structure of the from their national military. -
Iran Case File (April 2021)
IRAN CASE FILE April 2021 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 Executive Summary .....................................................................................4 Internal Affairs ........................................................................................... 7 The Ideological File .............................................................................................8 1. Women and the “Political Man” ............................................................................... 8 2. Khatami and the Position of Women ......................................................................10 The Political File ............................................................................................... 12 1. The Most Notable Highlights of the Leaked Interview .............................................12 2. Consequences and Reactions .................................................................................13 3. The Position of the Iranian President and Foreign Ministry on the Interview ..........14 4. The Implications of Leaking the Interview at This Time..........................................15 The Economic File ............................................................................................. 16 1. Bitcoin’s Genesis Globally and the Start of Its Use in Iran ........................................16 2. The Importance of Bitcoin for Iran -
Us-Iran Tensions
U.S.-IRAN TENSIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JANUARY 15, 2020 Serial No. 116–57 Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 41–269 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020 VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:27 Sep 02, 2020 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 H:\116TH\20FL0115\20FL0115 HEATH Congress.#13 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island PETER T. KING, New York CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey JOHN KATKO, New York KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York MARK WALKER, North Carolina J. LUIS CORREA, California CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico DEBBIE LESKO, Arizona MAX ROSE, New York MARK GREEN, Tennessee LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois VAN TAYLOR, Texas ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri DAN CRENSHAW, Texas AL GREEN, Texas MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York DAN BISHOP, North Carolina DINA TITUS, Nevada BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA´ N, California VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida HOPE GOINS, Staff Director CHRIS VIESON, Minority Staff Director (II) VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:27 Sep 02, 2020 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 H:\116TH\20FL0115\20FL0115 HEATH C O N T E N T S Page STATEMENTS The Honorable Bennie G. -
Iran's Transnational Terrorist Networks
כרמ ז ע ז ר י רקחל א י אר ן ץרפומה ירספה ﺰﮐﺮﻣ یرﺰﻋ ﺑ ﺮ یا ﺎﻄﻣ ﻟ ﻌ تﺎ ا ﯾ ﺮ نا ﻠﺧو ﺞﯿ ﭘ رسﺎ The Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies The Persian Gulf Observer Perspectives on Iran and the Persian Gulf à à à Iran’s Transnational Terrorist Networks Issue No. 37 (January, 2020) Attached please find the 37th issue of Persian Gulf Observer, titled " Iran’s Transnational Terrorist Networks" by The Ezri Center's research fellow, Dr. Yossi Mansharof. The Persian Gulf Observer: Perspectives on Iran and the Persian Gulf is published periodically by The Ezri Center for Iran & Persian Gulf Studies at the University of Haifa, expressing the views and analysis of the Ezri center's researchers on various issues concerning the Persian Gulf region and the countries which lay by its shores. You are most welcome to follow the Ezri Center's tweets at: https://twitter.com/EzriCenter , be our friend on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-Ezri-Center-for-Iran-and- Persian-Gulf-Studies/141080069242626 Watch and listen to conferences and lecturers at the Center's YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCZdzvlhv7a8nxLjYZdaz68Q and visit our site: http://gulfc.haifa.ac.il/ להל ן גה י ל י ו ן ה- 37 לש Persian Gulf Observer ובו מאמר כש ו תרת ו " ךרעמ רטה ו ר רטה נ ס - אל ו מ י רפה ו - נאריא י : ילכ קשנ קשנ ילכ : י נאריא טרסאט ג י ל י ו ם קפ ו הד " אמת "דר ףמוישריס ונ ,תעמ רמקחי מ זכרב .ירזע The Persian Gulf Observer: Perspectives on Iran and the Persian Gulf פתמ ר םס דתב י ר ו ת קת ו תפ י ת "ע י י" זכרמ ירזע רקחל ןאריא ץרפמהו סרפה י אב ו נ י סרב י תט ח י הפ , ו וב גצומ םי מאמר י העד , רפ י - טעם לש ירקוח זכרמה לע גמ ו ו ן מל זרה רו ש ע מםיונאש המרוזא הץרפ יסרפ הדשוהמת וניו ונכת יפוחל ו . -
IRGC Navy Leadership Change May Not Signal Imminent Behavior Change | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 3011 IRGC Navy Leadership Change May Not Signal Imminent Behavior Change by Farzin Nadimi Sep 5, 2018 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Farzin Nadimi Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with The Washington Institute, is a Washington-based analyst specializing in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region. Brief Analysis Despite the appointment of a radical anti-American commander, Iran’s naval forces are unlikely to resume frequent provocations without a strategic shift at the very top of the regime. n August 23, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei promoted the acting commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary O Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), Alireza Tangsiri, to full commander, replacing Ali Fadavi, who was appointed as the wider IRGC’s deputy commander for coordination. In his appointment letter, Tangsiri was instructed to build an “agile and growing naval arm on par with [the demands of the] Islamic Republic” by carrying out three main objectives: making use of “religious manpower,” improving the navy’s “training, skills, intelligence dominance, and interoperability with other IRGC branches,” and “expanding its arsenal even further.” Yet his promotion does not necessarily signal a shift back to tense naval provocations in Persian Gulf waters, depending on how Khamenei decides to respond to forthcoming oil sanctions. WHO IS TANGSIRI? A naval brigade commander during the Iran-Iraq War, Tangsiri headed the IRGCN’s 1st Naval District in Bandar Abbas before becoming Fadavi’s deputy in 2010. He is known for his staunchly anti-American views and his vocal support for detaining Western naval personnel whose vessels stray into Iranian waters. -
The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC: a Major Iranian Intelligence Apparatus Dr
רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו רטל ( למ ו מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו רטל ו ר The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC: A Major Iranian Intelligence Apparatus Dr. Raz Zimmt November 5, 2020 Main Argument The Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has become a major intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Republic, having increased its influence and broadened its authorities. Iran’s intelligence apparatus, similar to other control and governance apparatuses in the Islamic Republic, is characterized by power plays, rivalries and redundancy. The Intelligence Organization of the IRGC, which answers to the supreme leader, operates alongside the Ministry of Intelligence, which was established in 1984 and answers to the president. The redundancy and overlap in the authorities of the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization have created disagreements and competition over prestige between the two bodies. In recent years, senior regime officials and officials within the two organizations have attempted to downplay the extent of disagreements between the organizations, and strove to present to domestic and foreign audience a visage of unity. The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (ILNA, July 16, 2020) The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, in its current form, was established in 2009. The Organization’s origin is in the Intelligence Unit of the IRGC, established shortly after the Islamic Revolution (1979). -
Major General Hossein Salami: Commander-In-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps October 2020
Major General Hossein Salami: Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps October 2020 1 Table of Contents Salami’s Early Years and the Iran-Iraq War ................................................................................................... 3 Salami’s Path to Power ................................................................................................................................. 4 Commander of the IRGC’s Air Force and Deputy Commander-in-Chief ....................................................... 5 Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC.................................................................................................................. 9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 11 2 Major General Hossein Salami Major General Hossein Salami has risen through the ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) since its inception after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. He served on the battlefield during the Iran-Iraq War, spent part of his career in the IRGC’s academic establishment, commanded its Air Force, served as its second-in-command, and finally was promoted to the top position as commander-in-chief in 2019. Salami, in addition to being an IRGC insider, is known for his speeches, which are full of fire and fury. It’s this bellicosity coupled with his devotion to Iran’s supreme leader that has fueled his rise. Salami’s Early Years and the Iran-Iraq War Hossein -
Com(2010)459 En.Pdf
EN EN EN EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 31.8.2010 COM(2010) 459 final 2010/0240 (NLE) Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No …/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 (presented jointly by the Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) EN EN EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (1) On 26 July 2010, the Council approved Decision 2010/413/CFSP confirming the restrictive measures taken since 2007 and providing for additional restrictive measures against Iran in order to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) and accompanying measures as requested by the European Council in its Declaration of 17 June 2010. (2) These restrictive measures comprise in particular additional restrictions on trade in dual-use goods and technology and equipment which might be used for internal repression, restrictions on trade in key equipment for, and on investment in, the Iranian oil and gas industry, restrictions on Iranian investment in the uranium mining and nuclear industry, restrictions on transfers of funds to and from Iran, restrictions concerning the Iranian banking sector, restrictions on Iran’s access to the insurance and bonds markets of the Union and restrictions on providing certain services to Iranian ships and cargo aircraft. (3) The Council also provided for additional categories of persons to be made subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and certain other, technical amendments to existing measures. (4) The restrictive measures concerning dual-use goods should be broadened to cover all goods and technology of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 428/2009, with the exception of certain items in its Category 5. -
Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................ -
Spotlight on Iran (April 18, 2021 – May 2, 2021)
רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ו רטל ו ר Spotlight on Iran April 18, 2021` – May 2, 2021 Author: Dr. Raz Zimmt Overview Iranian threats toward Israel: the chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces threatened with Iranian retaliation if Israel persists in striking Iranian interests in Syria and at sea. In addition, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) threatened that Iran will respond to any “evil action” by the “Zionists” against it, with a force equal to the blow it is dealt, or even with greater force. The Russian news agency Sputnik reported that Iran, Russia, and Syria reached an agreement that Russian warships will accompany Iranian tankers ferrying oil and natural gas to Syria through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea. In late April, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived for a two-day visit in Iraq, during which he met with senior Iraqi government officials, the head of the Shia political blocs and senior officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq. Throughout the visit, Zarif discussed bilateral ties and developments in the region with the senior Iraqi officials. A few days prior to Zarif’s visit in Baghdad, the Iranian deputy minister of defense also visited Baghdad and met with the Iraqi minister of interior and with the commander of the Popular Mobilization Units (al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the umbrella force of the Shia militias operating in Iraq).