רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ( למ מ" ) רמה כרמ כ ז ז מל מה ו י תשר עד מל מה ו ד ו י ד ע י י ע ן י ן ו ל ( רט למ ו מ" )מ" ר ) כרמ ז מה י עד מל ו ד י ע י ן ול רט ו ר Iran’s Conduct in Recent Months Indicates a Shift to Direct Military Action over Use of Proxies Dr. Raz Zimmt October 10, 2019 Executive Summary Since abandoning its “strategic patience” policy in May 2019, which Iran adopted following the announcement by U.S. President, Donald Trump, in May 2018, to withdraw from the JCPOA and re-impose sanctions against it, Tehran initiated a number of offensive operations in the Persian Gulf region. The steps taken by Iran in recent months are intended to exact a price from the United States and its allies for their “maximum pressure” strategy. These steps also aim to drive up the price of oil through sabotage of oil tankers and oil-related infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, in an effort to reduce the economic pressure brought to bear on Iran. In our assessment, Tehran wishes to gain bargaining leverage it can use in future negotiations with the United States. Iran’s patterns of behavior indicate growing preference for direct action (even if one with deniability) over deployment of proxy organizations to achieve Iran’s current strategic goals. This does not mean that Iran stopped utilizing proxies in the ongoing escalation in the Gulf. However, most military actions attributed to Iran in recent months were carried out by Iranian military units or led by them, including: the attack on oil tankers in the Gulf (May and June 2019), the downing of the American unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (June 2019); the takeover of the oil tankers of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and UK (June and July 2019); the attack on Saudi oil facilities using cruise missiles and UAVs (September 2019). To the best of our knowledge, these attacks were carried out without significant involvement of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headed by Qasem Soleimani, which is responsible for overseeing Iran’s regional campaign utilizing proxy organization. In the Syrian arena too in the past two years, a change has been occurring in the patterns of Iranian activities against Israel, with Tehran showing increasing willingness to carry out direct offensive actions, using UAVs and rockets, although Iran does strive to downplay the involvement of the IRGC in these actions. 221-19 2 The attack on the Saudi oil facilities (Tasnim, September 17, 2019) The apparent shift in Iran’s strategy can be attributed to several possible reasons: The supreme importance Iran attributes to its efforts to bring about the lifting of U.S. sanctions. Iran’s leadership sees the removal of the economic pressures placed on it as the top national interest. It therefore prefers to act directly through Iranian forces rather than relying on proxies. The effectiveness and quality of the proxy organizations is generally lower than that of Iranian forces. Carrying out complex operations by different bodies and at different locations requires high levels of coordination and control by senior command and utilizing military capabilities that are usually the hallmark of Iranian forces alone. Therefore, Iran prefers to reduce the reliance on proxy organizations, or at most, to use them as part of operations that are carried out under the leadership of Iranian forces. Increasing Iranian sense of confidence, which encourages it to make direct and bolder offensive actions, with a greater willingness to take risks (which it perceives as calculated risks). This is, in part, due to an assessment that the U.S. president, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are not interested in military confrontation. Personnel changes at the helm of the IRGC, including the appointment of Hossein Salami at the commander of the organization, which contributed to the change in Iranian military strategy.1 Internal struggles among Iran’s military leadership and a significant effort by senior commanders, including Amir-Ali Hajizadeh, the Commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force, to prove their determination and abilities to realize the guidance of 1 See publication by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: “Hossein Salami The New Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps,” May 1, 2019. https://www.terrorism- info.org.il/en/hossein-salami-new-commander-iranian-revolutionary-guards-corps/ 221-19 3 the Iranian Supreme Leader to respond to the “maximum pressure” policy pursued by the United States by increasing “resistance” from Iran. Despite the significant change in Iran’s modus operandi, in our assessment, Iran does not strive for an all-out confrontation with the United States or Israel, preferring instead to pursue a policy of brinkmanship, constantly testing the “rules of the game.” Nonetheless, it is evident that Iran is willing to take calculated risks to achieve its strategic goals, by carrying out direct offensive operations, and not through the deployment of proxies. The changes to Iran’s strategy may have direct repercussions for Israel, which is also facing Iran and its proxies in the region. In our assessment, the latest attack on Saudi Arabia included a message to Israel regarding Iran’s willingness to directly respond to attacks attributed to Israel utilizing advanced weaponry. Meanwhile, senior IRGC commanders have recently voiced renewed vows to wipe Israel off the map. Iran’s Offensive Operations as Part of the Escalation in the Gulf The Goal of the Offensive Operations Since abandoning its “strategic patience” policy in May 2019, which Iran adopted following the announcement by U.S. President, Donald Trump, in May 2018, concerning US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of sanctions against it, Tehran initiated a number of offensive operations in the Persian Gulf. The steps taken by Iran in recent months, in addition to its gradual withdrawal from its obligations under the nuclear deal are intended to achieve a number of goals: exact a price from the United States and its allies for their “maximum pressure” strategy and demonstrate Iran’s ability to harm them; try to raise the price of oil through sabotage of oil tankers and oil-related infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, in an effort to relieve the immense economic pressure on it due to the significant challenges Iran faces in exporting oil; and gain bargaining leverage it can use in future negotiations and as part of the discussions ahead of the renewal of such negotiations. The Move to Direct Military Actions Some of the major attacks Iran has carried out in recent months include the attack on oil tankers in the Gulf (two of them Saudi, one Norwegian, one belonging to the UAE), near the emirate of Fujairah in the Port of Oman on May 12, 2019; sabotage of oil tankers in the Port of 221-19 4 Oman on June 13, 2019; the downing of the American UAV on June 20, 2019; the takeover of the MT Riah oil tanker of the UAE; the takeover of the Stena Impero sailing under a UK flag on July 19, 2019; and the attack on Saudi oil facilities using cruise missiles and UAVs on September 12, 2019. The pattern of Iranian actions indicates a growing preference for carrying out direct military attacks (even if enjoying some deniability) over the use of proxy organizations to achieve Iran’s strategic goals. However, this does not mean that Iran has stopped using proxies as part of the ongoing escalation in the Gulf. For example, the attack by explosive- laden UAVs against two pumping stations belonging to the Saudi national oil company Aramco, on May 14, 2019, was apparently carried out by the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who enjoy Iranian support (Reuters, May 14, 2019). A meeting between the Supreme Leader of Iran and the spokesman of the Houthis in Yemen (Tasnim, August 13, 2019) Although Iran has not totally abandoned the reliance on proxy organizations, it appears that most of the actions recently attributed to Iran were carried out by or led by Iranian armed forces. It appears that these attacks were carried out without significant involvement of the Qods Force of the IRGC under the command of Qasem Soleimani, which is responsible for Iran’s regional campaign through the use of proxies that receive military assistance, finance and guidance from Iran. For example: The attack near Fujairah was in high likelihood carried out by a force belonging to the naval commando forces of the IRGC, which sabotaged the four oil tankers. The findings of an international investigation, which was carried out under the leadership of the UAE, found that the highly sophisticated and well-coordinated attack was carried 221-19 5 out by several crews of divers, who moved using speedboats to reach the tankers and damage them by placing limpet mines on the sides of the tankers. The sabotage of two oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman on June 13, 2019, was apparently carried out by a naval force of the IRGC. Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, blamed Iran for the attack based on U.S. intelligence, the type of weapon used, the high degree of expertise required to carry out the operation, previous Iranian attacks against vessels in the region, and the fact that no proxy organization operating in the region has the resources and skills to carry out such a highly sophisticated attack. A few hours after the attack, the U.S. Navy published video showing an IRGC force removing a limpet mine that had failed to detonate from one of the sides of the targeted tankers.