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The Militarisation of Iran's Politics

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MIDDLE EAST The militarisation of Iran’s politics KEY POINTS Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is ■ Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has mobilised the Revolution Guards commanders. increasingly looking towards former members of the ■ The aim is to repel internal pressure for political Islamic Revolution Guards Corps to help maintain influence. and economic reform and external pressure related to the nuclear stand-off. Ali Alfoneh investigates what this could mean for the future ■ Such political calculations might deliver the in- of the Islamic Republic. tended outcome, but it also endangers clerical rule in Iran. ith Iran facing formidable chal- during the Ahmadinejad presidency. Be- administration as well as from his associ- lenges in its nuclear stand-off sides Ahmadinejad, the nine out of his ates during his term as Tehran’s mayor W with the West, and given the 21 cabinet ministers all come from the (2003-2005). Jane’s discovered IRGC internal pressures for political and eco- IRGC: backgrounds in the governors of Qom, nomic reforms, the political leadership ■ Minister of Energy: Parviz Fattah Kerman, Western Azerbaijan, Khuzestan, of the Islamic Republic is increasingly ■ Minister of Welfare and Social Secu- Hamedan and Ilam. In addition, the gov- relying on the Islamic Revolution Guards rity: Abdol-Reza Mesri ernors of Zanjan, Lorestan, Esfahan and Corps (IRGC) to maintain power. ■ Minister of Industries and Mines: Ali- Southern Khorasan are recruited from Having chosen the path of defiance in Akbar Mehrabian the prison administration in the Islamic relation to the West and repression of do- ■ Minister of Justice: Gholam-Hossein Republic. Former Ahmadinejad advisors mestic unease, Iranian Supreme Leader Elham from the Tehran municipality have pre- Ayatollah Ali Khamenei considers the ■ Minister of Culture and Islamic Guid- viously been appointed as governors of IRGC officer class more apt at crisis man- ance: Mohammad-Hossein Saffar-Haran- Western Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Hor- agement both at home and abroad than di mozgan and Khorasan Razavi. While the bureaucratic leftovers from the presi- ■ Petroleum Minister: Gholam-Hossein more investigation is needed to deter- dencies of Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Nowzari mine the IRGC dominance at the provin- (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami ■ Minister of Defence and Armed Forces cial level, there seems to be an increasing (1997-2005).This trend is refl ected in Logistics: Mostafa-Mohammad Najjar presence of the officer class among the the composition of President Mahmoud ■ Minister of Commerce: Masoud Mir- governors in the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad´s government, appoint- Kazemi If the composition of Ahmadinejad’s ments of provincial governors and the re- ■ Minister of Co-operatives: Mohammad government and appointments to the sults of the 14 March 2008 parliamentary Abbasi. governorships indicates a trend towards elections. Without Khamenei’s blessing, All of these people are war veterans the Islamic Republic’s militarisation, the who is the ultimate religious and politi- from the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and 14 March parliamentary elections, and cal authority, this militirisation of politics former members of the IRGC and the particularly the debate that surrounded could not have occurred, at least not at Basij (Islamist) Resistance Force. the legality of IRGC cadre contesting this pace. these elections, demonstrated the ap- Far from being an innovation, the Political apprehension prehensions of key political players re- IRGC’s presence in the Ahmadinejad A similar trend is apparent in the Ah- garding the increased political role of the government continues a constant in the madinejad government’s appointments IRGC in Iran. Islamic Republic’s politics, in which the to Iran’s 30 governorates. In a sweeping Hossein Mousavi Tabrizi, a former ideological officer corps has been repre- move, Ahmadinejad purged the provin- member of the Assembly of Experts and sented in all but the shortlived transition- cial level of supporters of former presi- former prosecutor general of the Islamic al government of Prime Minister Mehdi dents Rafsanjani and Khatami and in- Republic, has protested on several oc- Bazargan (February-November 1979). stalled new governors recruited from the casions against what he considers this Still, the number of former IRGC mem- ranks of the IRGC and the Basij Resist- “military takeover”. Furthermore, former bers seems to have reached a new peak ance Force, the Islamic Republic prison president Rafsanjani, who is currently 10 | jiaa.janes.com AUGUST 2008 | ISLAMIC AFFAIRS ANALYST IAA 08 p10-11 ME Iran.indd 10 1/8/08 10:37:00 chairman of both the Expediency Coun- of the guards from being involved in po- hensive Principalist Alliance was reports cil and the Assembly of Experts, warned litical activity and considers non-mem- of verbal clashes between Rezai and Lari- against the IRGC’s intervention in politics bership of political parties, groupings jani because of the Larijani campaign’s on several occasions, as have the cam- and institutions as a condition of being a excessive expenditure and political ex- paign chiefs of the reformist Holy Warri- member of the IRGC, the statute’s open- posure of Larijani supporters at the cost ors of the Revolution political grouping, ended mandate makes the IRGC into an of Rezai and Qalibaf supporters. It is too Mostafa Tajzadeh and Mohsen Armin. institution with abundant paths for politi- early to judge if such clashes are minor Most dramatically, criticism from Has- cal intervention. incidents due to lack of co-ordination or san Khomeini, grandson of the late Ayat- indicate deep rooted factionalism among ollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Engineering victory the IRGC officer class. But such clashes Republic, about the IRGC’s involvement It is not surprising that the carefully engi- could seriously damage the cohesion of in politics provoked a storm of attacks neered March elections resulted in victory the former Guards members as a political against him and the Khomeini household for the Comprehensive Principalist Alli- and social group in the long run. - who have resented the evolution of the ance, led by former IRGC commander-in- Ayatollah Khamenei’s tactic might work regime ever since Khomeini died in 1989. chief Mohsen Rezai; former guards com- in the short term. A unified and consoli- More recently, the Reformist Alliance mander and Secretary of the Supreme dated elite structure made up of the IRGC Headquarters warned against transfor- National Security Council Ali Larijani and officer corps could enable the Islamic Re- mation of the Ministry of Interior, which the Guards commander and current Te- public to maintain a tough stance in the among others is responsible for arranging hran mayor Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf, nuclear issue internationally, while also re- parliamentary elections, into a “military whose lists feature many former IRGC pressing demands for economic reforms garrison”, and Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sa- members. Widespread rejection of limited and political liberalisation at home. nei, a prominent Shia religious authority number of reformist candidates who were Still, the price for such policy could in Iran, declared military intervention as allowed to contest; the appointment of prove high, as it will politicise civil society being “opposed to democracy”. former IRGC commander Ali-Reza Afshar and radicalise university students, labour However, these criticisms have been to oversee the elections; and the decision activists, women in urban centres and refuted by the IRGC and its supporters. to bar reformist candidates from the state civil rights activists. Such policies are also The commander-in-chief of the IRGC, controlled television and radio, which is bound to alienate traditional regime sup- Mohammad-Ali Jafari, stressed the role in the hands of former IRGC member, porters such as the bazaar merchant class of the IRGC as a bulwark against what he Ezzatollah Zarghami, director general of and Rafsanjani-era technocratic and eco- called “soft regime change policy” of the the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting nomic elites, who are suffering under the United States. (IRIB), could hardly have led to a different sanctions regime. In addition, Khatami- In a later media conference, Jafari elabo- result. era political reformers, whose hopes for rated on the special nature of the IRGC, Nonetheless, the IRGC officer corps’ political reforms are already frustrated, as not “solely a military organisation”, but dominance of the Iranian parliament is are likely to become further alienated. also a “political and ideological organisa- not the end of politics in the Islamic Re- More dangerously, the Supreme Lead- tion”. Jafari’s comments refered to Article public. While the IRGC, as any military er’s sole reliance on the IRGC - should the 150 of the constitution of the Islamic Re- force, is characterised by a centralised former officers manage to preserve their public which, as the legal foundation for command, hierarchy, discipline, intercom- cohesion as a distinct group in Iranian the political intervention of the IRGC, munication, esprit de corps and self-suffi- politics - would make Ayatollah Khame- states: “The Islamic Revolution Guards ciency; the political behaviour of former nei a prisoner of his own guard in the Corps, organised in the early days of the officers exhibits rivalry and factionalism longer term, therefore could pave the way triumph of the revolution, is to be main- rather than homogeneity and cohesion. for a military dictatorship to replace the tained so that it may continue in its role One such example is the poor electoral theocratic regime. ■ of guarding the revolution and its achieve- performance of the Qalibaf team - which ments.” These general principles were could possibly be due to intra alliance Further Analysis later incorporated into and elevated to rivalry between Qalibaf, Larijani and Re- ■ Turkey denies giving intelligence to Iran the IRGC’s statute, passed by the Iranian zai - and made the Tehran mayor admit: Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 3 July 2008 parliament (the Islamic Consultative As- “politics make me sick!” sembly) on 6 September 1982.
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