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Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century This Page Intentionally Left Blank Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century This page intentionally left blank Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century Edited by D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas NUCLEAR INDIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Copyright © D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, 2002. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2002 978-0-312-29459-5 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner in critical articles or reviews. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE-MACMILLAN™, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE-MACMILLAN is the new global publishing imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave-Macmillan Publishers Ltd. (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd.). ISBN 978-1-349-38779-3 ISBN 978-0-230-10923-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230109230 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Nuclear weapons—India. 2. India—Military policy. 3. World politics—21st century. I. SarDesai, D. R. II. Thomas, Raju G. C. UA840 .N827 2001 355.02'17'09540905—dc21 200153134 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Composition by autobookcomp First edition: May, 2002 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 CONTENTS Preface vii Contributors xi PART I: GENERAL DIMENSIONS 1. Whither Nuclear India? 3 Raju G.C. Thomas 2. What Makes the Indian Bomb Tick? 25 George Perkovich PART II: STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS 3. India and the International Nuclear Order 63 K. Subrahmanyam 4. India, the International System and Nuclear Weapons 85 T. V. Paul 5. India’s Force Planning Imperative: The Thermonuclear Option 105 Bharat Karnad 6. Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? Comparing the Cases of India and France 139 Jacques E. C. Hymans 7. The International Dynamics of a Nuclear India 161 Siddharth Varadarajan PART III: TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS 8. India’s Nuclear Technology Policy: Capabilities and the Aftermath of Testing 179 Rajendran Raja 9. Ballistic Missiles: Complicating the Nuclear Quagmire 189 Ben Sheppard 10. Nuclear Weapons and the Indian Armed Forces 211 Rajesh Kadian PART IV: ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 11. The Economic Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Weapons 231 Deepak Lal 12. The Domestic Consequences of India’s Nuclear Tests 239 Devesh Kapur 13. The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia 259 Peter R. Lavoy 14. India’s Energy Policy and Nuclear Weapons Program 277 Raju G. C. Thomas PART V: PROLIFERATION LESSONS AND SECURITY PROSPECTS 15. On the “Lessons” of South Asian Proliferation 299 George H. Quester Index 309 PREFACE In October 1998, a symposium was held at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), a few months after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests were conducted in May 1998. The symposium was organized and sponsored by Professor Damodar SarDesai under his Navin and Pratima Doshi Chair in Indian History at UCLA. The conference was then appropriately called “India and the Nuclear Question.” India’s security directions at the time remained ambiguous and there were serious questions about the Indian nuclear decision and the possibility that India may revert back to a nonnuclear status as it did in 1974 under pressure from the West. Apart from some of the contributing authors in this book, the participants at the conference included the nuclear weapons specialists and notable scien- tists, Chancellor Albert Carnesale and Vice Chancellor Kumar Patel of UCLA, and the strategic nuclear analyst and Director of the Burkle Center for International Relations, Professor Michael Intriligator of UCLA. Other par- ticipants included Indian security specialists Ashley Tellis of the RAND cor- poration (now special advisor to the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi); Neil Joeck of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (now on the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department); K. Subrahmanyam, former Defense Production Secretary and Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board in India; and P. R. Chari , Director of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi. Presentations were also made by Ambassador T. P. Sreenivsan, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indian Embassy in Washington (now India’s ambassador to Austria and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna); the noted Indian historian, Professor Stanley Wolpert of viii PREFACE UCLA; and Gary Larsen, Executive Director of the Asia Society California Center. They provided a variety of assessments, some supporting the Indian nuclear decision, and others opposing it. A year later, Professor Raju Thomas, the Allis Chalmers Professor of International Affairs at Marquette University, in cooperation with Professor SarDesai of UCLA, decided to put together a volume based on the UCLA con- ference. The participants at the 1998 UCLA conference, together with other experts, were invited to submit chapters for a volume based on the theme of the conference. At the turn of the century, based on some feedback from the poten- tial contributors, the editors felt that as long as India showed no signs of doing what it did in 1974, that is, reverting back to a nonnuclear position, it would be best to recognize what India is today while allowing for the same assessments for or against India as a nuclear weapons state. Thus the emphasis shifted from whether India should have gone nuclear, to an assessment of the strategic, polit- ical, technological, economic, and military dimensions of a nuclear India. The contributors represent a mix of pro-bomb and anti-bomb observers of varying degrees. Raju Thomas explores the various strategic motivations and domestic compulsions underlying India’s nuclear policy over the last 4 decades. These include changing perceptions of regional and global nuclear threats, pres- sures arising from inter-party politics and coalition governments within India, and the search for great power status. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, he raises the question whether India’s nuclear capability is relevant when faced with transnational terrorism by nonstate actors. George Perkovich traces the origins of the Indian momentum towards a nuclear weapons capability, examining especially the domestic poli- tics, strategic thought, and technological factors surrounding India’s nuclear decisions. T. V. Paul adopts a more theoretical-strategic analytical scheme in explaining the Indian decision. He examines the relationship between great powers and rising powers determined to challenge the prevailing world order. Foremost among those supporting a major nuclear program by India are K. Subrahmanyam and Bharat Karnad, two members of India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) who drew up India’s draft nuclear doctrine in 1999. In many ways, they provide justifications for their advisory decisions on the NSAB. While Subrahmanyam takes a minimalist approach to deterrence, Karnad takes a maximalist approach. Subrahmanyam criticizes the world order of nuclear apartheid especially in the post-Cold War era of Western dominance and an unrivaled NATO alliance willing to use force to resolve the internal affairs of sovereign states. Karnad argues that India’s nuclear policy should be based on national interests and not be subject to Western pressures. Taking such an approach will compel the West to treat India on par with China as a great power. On the other hand, the main opponent of India’s nuclear decision in 1998 in this volume is the Indian-American scientist, Rajendran Raja, who consid- ers India’s actions as incongruent with Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy, and a demonstration of irresponsibility by the Indian scientific community which he PREFACE ix believes should be using its talents to reduce economic poverty and social ills. He suggests that in the context of the infinite universe of billions of galaxies, the acquisition of nuclear weapons that may destroy the tiny third planet from the sun in this solar system constitute the height of irresponsibility by world leaders who have now been joined by India and Pakistan. Siddharth Varadarajan takes a more middle ground between hawks and doves among the contributing Indian and Indian-American analysts. He argues that going nuclear has not advanced India’s security. All that India has done is emulate blindly the folly of the formal nuclear powers merely to show that this can be done. Nobody appears to be more secure. Jacques Hymans compares the political motivations in France and India in their decisions to go nuclear, much of which he argues revolved around both strategic considerations and prestige factors. Benjamin Sheppard focuses on the missile programs in and around the subcontinent, and Rajesh Kadian explores the role (or non-role) of the Indian armed services in the Indian nuclear deci- sion. Chapters by Deepak Lal, Devesh Kapur, and Peter Lavoy examine the eco- nomic aspects of the decision, with Lal focusing on the economics of nuclear weapons, and Kapur and Lavoy on the impact of international sanctions on the Indian economy. Kapur claims little or bearable economic impact, while Lavoy claims substantial adverse impact. Raju Thomas explores the links between India’s nuclear energy program and its nuclear weapons capabilities. He argues that the U.S. nonproliferation policy that imposed economic and technological sanctions on India after its 1974 atomic test did not stem the advances in India’s nuclear weapons capabilities but instead stymied its nuclear energy program and overall energy goals with adverse opportunity costs on its economic growth. In the final section, George Quester draws on the lessons for the region and the world from the failure to stem the proliferation tide in South Asia. The editors would like to thank Anthony Wahl, Roee Raz, Donna Cherry, Sara Safransky, and Aimee Hartmann (editors, copy, and production editors at Palgrave) for their cooperation and assistance in bringing this book project to fruition.
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