Before a Board of Inquiry East West Link Project In

BEFORE A BOARD OF INQUIRY EAST WEST LINK PROJECT

IN THE MATTER of the Resource Management Act 1991 (“the RMA”)

AND

IN THE MATTER of a submission by AUCKLAND HELIPORT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (#126324) under section 149E of the RMA in respect of applications for resource consent and notices of requirement by the NEW ZEALAND TRANSPORT AGENCY in relation to the EAST WEST LINK PROJECT in Auckland

STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE OF KEITH CHARLES STEPHENS FOR AUCKLAND HELIPORT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

AHLP Corporate

Dated: 22 May 2017

BERRY SIMONS S J Berry

Telephone: (09) 969 2300 Facsimile: (09) 969 2304 Email: [email protected] Postal: PO Box 3144 Shortland Street AUCKLAND 1140 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 3 2. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE ...... 5 3. AHLP AND THE EXISTING HELIPORT OPERATIONS ...... 10 4. BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIKES POINT SITE ...... 14 5. CONSTRAINTS ON THE LOCATION OF HELIPORTS AND ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVE SITES ...... 21 6. HOW THE PROJECT WOULD AFFECT AHLP’S OPERATIONS ...... 28 7. AHLP’S ENGAGEMENT WITH NZTA AND REQUESTED SOLUTION ...... 31 8. RESPONSE TO NZTA EVIDENCE ...... 36 9. CONCLUDING COMMENT ...... 38

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1. INTRODUCTION

Qualifications and experience

1.1 My name is Keith Charles Stephens. I am:

(a) The sole director and shareholder of Hangar One Limited, which is the sole General Partner in Auckland Heliport Limited Partnership (”AHLP”); and

(b) The Managing Director and Chief Pilot at Advanced Flight Limited (“Advanced Flight”), the helicopter management and charter company which currently operates out of the Heliport at 59 Miami Parade, Onehunga.

1.2 I have 27 years’ experience flying helicopters and am one of a very small number of pilots in New Zealand to hold a Category A Instructor Rating (with Flight Examiner privileges and including multi-engine and instrument ratings), from the Civil Aviation Authority (“CAA”). I have over 7,000 hours of flying experience.

1.3 I established Advanced Flight in 1998 and have been responsible for managing and developing the company since that time. This has included establishing the existing Heliport (a project that commenced in 2006) and subsequently AHLP. I have overall responsibility for and am familiar with all aspects of Advanced Flight, AHLP and the Heliport’s operations.

Purpose and scope of evidence

1.4 The purpose of my evidence is to outline relevant background; the impact that the East West Link Project (“EWL” or “the project”) would have on AHLP and the Heliport if the project is implemented in the proposed alignment; and the solution that AHLP requests.

1.5 In doing so, my evidence:

(a) Introduces AHLP and its existing Heliport facility (Section 3);

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(b) Outlines the background to development of the Heliport on its existing Pikes Point site (Section 4);

(c) Outlines the constraints that apply to selecting sites for commercial heliports and helicopter landing areas and the absence of suitable sites for the Heliport to relocate to (Section 5);

(d) Outlines why, if established in its current alignment, the EWL would mean the end of AHLP’s commercial helicopter charter business and usefulness as a Civil Defence and community asset (Section 6);

(e) Briefly summarises the extensive engagement that AHLP has had with NZTA regarding the EWL and the solution AHLP requests for mitigating the project’s effects on the Heliport (Section 7);

(f) Responds to the only evidence presented by NZTA regarding the Heliport, which is from Messrs Harrington and Nancekivell (Section 8); and

(g) Sets out some brief concluding comments (Section 9).

1.6 A summary of my evidence is set out in Section 2 below.

1.7 I am authorised to give this evidence on behalf of AHLP.

Expert Witness Code of Conduct

1.8 I am presenting my evidence as director and shareholder of Hangar One Limited and Managing Director and Chief Pilot at Advanced Flight, rather than as an expert witness. However, some of the technical matters that I address in my evidence are within my area of expertise, i.e., helicopter-related aeronautics and relevant Civil Aviation requirements. To the extent that the Board wishes to rely on that evidence, I confirm that I have read the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses contained in the Environment Court Practice Note 2014 and that I agree to comply with it. I confirm that I have considered all material facts that I am aware of that might alter or detract from the

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opinions that I express and that this evidence is within my area of expertise, except where I state that I am relying on the evidence of another person.

2. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

AHLP and the existing Heliport

2.1 AHLP operates a highly successful helicopter charter business which services the premium end tourism market, from a modern, purpose- built Heliport adjacent to the Mangere Inlet at 59 Miami Parade, Onehunga. This business is the realisation of my long-held vision to establish an Auckland-based helicopter management and charter company.

2.2 The operation began using a single helicopter from rented premises at Ardmore Airport. Today, AHLP is one of New Zealand’s largest helicopter charter service providers, employing 14 full-time and 2 part- time staff and with an annual turnover of $6,370,000.

2.3 The Heliport has approximately 2,700 aircraft movements a year and would transport on average 7,200 passengers through the facility on an annual basis. As outlined by Dr Wheeler, our charter business generates significant economic benefits for the wider Auckland region, with assets of over $50million USD, net economic effects of between $30million to $35million per year, and estimated employment effects of approximately 244 full-time jobs.

2.4 The Heliport is now home to a fleet of seven single-engine and four twin-engine helicopters. The bulk of our charter business (and therefore the economic benefits that the Heliport generates) relies on our single-engine helicopters, which undertake 90% of our commercial flights.

2.5 The Heliport is also a significant community asset and an important part of Auckland’s transport infrastructure, in particular because it can be used as a back-up facility for helicopters operated by our emergency services. The Heliport therefore represents a significant

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transport / tourism and community asset and an important part of Auckland’s transport infrastructure.

2.6 It has been a long hard road setting up this business and I funded the entire investigation, design and initial construction of the Heliport personally, at significant risk. I did so because the Pikes Point site presented a “once in a lifetime” opportunity to make the Heliport a reality which I could not let pass by. It was and remains an ideal site for our Heliport, given the range of factors that constrain where such facilities can locate. I am very proud of what I have worked very hard to achieve.

2.7 The EWL proposal does not just limit our operations; it threatens our very existence. We cannot operate if they put the road in front – it would be all over.

Constraints on heliport location and rationale for existing Heliport site

2.8 A range of regulatory and practical constraints apply to decisions about the siting of helicopter landing areas, heliports and helicopter operations. These primarily comprise the Civil Aviation Rules (“CARs”) relating to heliports and helicopter movements; the need to be able to comply with relevant noise abatement protocols; and district plan restrictions.

2.9 I undertook a detailed two year process (2005-2006) of site identification and evaluation before selecting the Miami Parade site for AHLP’s Heliport. Through this process, I was not able to identify any other site in sufficient proximity to the Auckland CBD and Auckland Airport that could safely and practicably be established as a new heliport for commercial helicopter charters. I remain satisfied that Miami Parade represents an ideal site for our operations having regard to the statutory and other constraints that apply and has a number of significant benefits.

2.10 Should the Heliport be required to close, relocating our fleet back to Ardmore Airport would not be possible for the same reasons we initially

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moved away. In addition, this is no longer an option due to the Mechanics Bay Heliport being at maximum capacity and therefore not able to accommodate the number of movements AHLP would currently require for passenger drop-offs and pick-ups.

2.11 Relocating to either Auckland or Whenuapai Airports is also not feasible as both are too far away from the Auckland CBD (and Whenuapai is also too far from Auckland Airport). There is also already an existing heliport operator at Auckland Airport. As a result, it is not feasible for the Heliport to relocate other than within its present site.

Adverse effects of EWL on the Heliport

2.12 EWL’s impact on the Heliport arises primarily as a result of the operation of CAR Part 91.127(d)(3). This imposes restrictions on the flight operations of single-engine aircraft such that we are unable to have approach and take-off paths over any third party or public area where a safe engine-off (auto rotation) landing cannot be assured.

2.13 If, as proposed, the EWL was placed between the Heliport and Mangere Inlet, the alignment would prevent AHLP’s seven single-engine helicopters from complying with this requirement. As Advanced Flight’s director and holder of the General Aviation Air Operator Certificate (“Certificate”) for the Heliport issued by CAA (attached as Appendix 1), I am required by the Civil Aviation Act 1990 (“the Act”) to ensure compliance with Act and all rules made under that Act. This is reinforced by the Exposition approved by the CAA that Advanced Flight operates under. Operating any part of our business not in compliance with the Act and its associated rules is simply not an option for AHLP or Advanced Flight.

2.14 For reasons of cost and customer demand, our single-engine helicopters undertake 90% of our charter flights and could not simply be “replaced” by twin-engine helicopters. Constructing the EWL would therefore mean the end of the successful charter business that I have worked hard for more than a decade to establish.

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2.15 Only a remnant of our former operations would remain, being to fly the twin engine helicopters for the owners’ private trips. Even those trips could also be restricted by the need to comply with the relevant CARs and possibly by NZTA raising concerns that flying the twin-engine helicopters directly over a busy expressway is distracting and causes a hazard to motorists. NZTA has not yet advised AHLP as to whether they would raise such issues.

2.16 The former “Heliport” would become just an overpriced hangar and we could not continue to justify our current rental costs, or continue to provide on-site maintenance services (which all our owners view as a fundamental requirement), in this circumstance.

2.17 In short, the remnants of AHLP’s operation would not be sufficient to justify continuing to operate from our present site, meaning the Heliport would inevitably be forced to close. With no other central Auckland site that we could relocate to, this would most likely leave Auckland without a comparable tourism offering within a reasonable distance from the CBD and the loss of the economic benefits that our operation currently brings, as outlined by Dr Wheeler.

Engagement with NZTA and AHLP’s requested solution

2.18 AHLP has not stood by and watched its highly successful business be curtailed by the EWL. NZTA was first made aware of the project’s impacts on the Heliport and the need to mitigate these in November 2013. AHLP has adopted a highly constructive approach to engaging with NZTA and since 2015 AHLP representatives have been in direct discussions with NZTA as part of a joint working party that was specifically set up with a view to developing a design solution that will address these effects.

2.19 The engagement has been typified by lengthy periods of no contact from NZTA and progress has been extremely slow. Various re- alignment options have been identified and discussed but NZTA has not yet adopted a viable mitigation solution for the Heliport. The latest

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alternative being investigated would involve relocating the Heliport to the east of its present site, within the project designation boundaries.

2.20 Given the significant time and effort that has been put in with NZTA to find a design solution that works for both parties and how close I thought we were to agreeing a solution with NZTA, it is extremely disappointing to AHLP that:

(a) NZTA have chosen an alignment they acknowledged early in our discussions was untenable, unless the Heliport was able to be relocated – putting the road behind us would solve the problem completely;

(b) The assessment of environmental effects (“AEE”) filed in support of NZTA’s applications does not adequately address the potential effects of the EWL despite NZTA people knowing full well what effects the EWL would have on the Heliport; and

(c) Most importantly, NZTA has not put before the Board any proposal for how these effects are to be addressed (e.g., relocating the Heliport). Addressing their impact on us should be NZTA’s problem, not ours, and yet we have thus far spent over $200,000 (plus GST) responding to the NZTA proposal.

2.21 Having told NZTA about the EWL’s potential effects on the Heliport as far back as 2013 and having worked in good faith with them for over two years to find a mitigation solution, it is frustrating that we have not identified a solution that NZTA is prepared to commit to. AHLP’s preference would be to remain in our existing site with the EWL behind us.

2.22 However, we have (very reasonably) also been open to the prospect of being relocated, provided NZTA commits to achieving this outcome at no cost to AHLP. The land included in NZTA’s designation boundaries includes an area to the east of the Heliport to which AHLP has indicated it is prepared to relocate; I fail to see why NZTA is not prepared to commit to this solution.

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2.23 I cannot conceive of a fair outcome of these proceedings that authorises the EWL but does not address the effects on our operation. NZTA needs to “stump up”. To the extent that it is a question of costs (which quite clearly it is), my position is that if they cannot afford to address the effects on the Heliport, they cannot afford to do the project. If they entered into the process too early, that is their problem.

2.24 I consider that NZTA has both a moral and legal obligation to properly assess the effects of the proposal on our business, identify how such effects will be addressed and implement a solution. AHLP has no option but to vigorously oppose the granting of the applications, to ensure its interest are properly protected. That is consistent with the position AHLP has taken and clearly advised to NZTA for over three years now. It cannot and will not stand idly by and watch the EWL destroy what is a highly successful operation.

2.25 That is why we are requesting a condition that precludes that part of the road being built until a solution is found; we need that certainty and it is only fair.

3. AHLP AND THE EXISTING HELIPORT OPERATIONS

Background

3.1 In 1997-1998, I was employed to fly New Zealand’s first Bell 407 helicopter. When the owners of that helicopter moved overseas, I obtained an Air Operators Certificate from CAA so that I could continue to generate a commercial income for the helicopter. In 1999, a second helicopter was purchased. This was the beginning of my long-held vision for an Auckland-based helicopter management and charter company becoming a reality.

3.2 I established Advanced Flight at Ardmore Airport in in 1998. The company’s operations initially focused on catering for the needs of a number of private helicopter owners while optimising commercial work, utilising those aircraft, around this. As the fleet grew, there was an increased focus on securing charter business. Page 10

3.3 By 2005, Advanced Flight was operating seven helicopters. Six of these were based in rented hanger space at Ardmore Airport. However, this arrangement had two critical shortcomings:

(a) The distance of Ardmore from central Auckland (Mechanics Bay), where the vast majority (85%) of our passengers wanted to be picked up - virtually none of our charter customers would travel out to Ardmore Airport. As a result, we were routinely having to fly between Mechanics Bay and Ardmore without any passengers.

(b) I was also aware that if anything happened to the existing facility at Mechanics Bay, our charter operation would be finished.

3.4 In 2006, following a lengthy process of site selection that resulted in identification of our current site at Pike’s Point (see below), I entered into discussions with Ports of Auckland Limited (“POAL”). Those discussions resulted in the execution of our current 35 year lease which was granted in 2007 and still has 25 years to run. We then obtained a resource consent for the carefully designed and purpose-built Heliport and opened the doors in March 2010 after the completion of construction of the Heliport building and associated facilities, which took almost a year to construct at a cost of $5.5m.

The Auckland Heliport

3.5 As shown in the various images attached as Appendix 2, the Heliport facility comprises:

(a) Three hangars which accommodate the 11 helicopters that are based on-site. The hangar area was designed accommodate all our helicopters while being only one helicopter deep. This provides quick access to the apron and means there is less likelihood of damage occurring to the helicopters.

(b) An award winning architecturally designed building containing a visitor entrance (with weigh bridge set into the floor), cafe style

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kitchen/lunch-room, bathroom shower area, visitor lounge, training room, large open plan office, simulator room, and one closed off meeting room.

(d) Car parking.

(e) Bulk fuel storage.

(f) Full security fencing.

3.6 The Heliport building also represents a major facility in its own right. It is used for corporate functions, training or planning days, product launches, and group events and has been used by senior politicians (including Prime Ministers and mayors) and foreign dignitaries.

3.7 The building has won two awards from the New Zealand Institute of Architecture, namely:

(a) The Auckland Architecture Award (Commercial) in 2010; and

(b) The New Zealand Architecture Award (Commercial) in 2011.

3.8 We were planning a further stage of expansion (Hangar 4), which would provide us with five more helicopter parking bays and an additional maintenance area. Unfortunately this is on hold due to the uncertainty created by the proposal. The downside of that is that we are unable to forward-plan and proceed with any options of further helicopter storage, which would allow us to expand our existing charter operations.

Community asset

3.9 The Heliport represents a significant community asset on the basis that:

(a) It has the flexibility and capacity to support a wide variety of roles performed by helicopters, including those that would be

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used by rescue services and New Zealand Civil Defence in the event of an emergency. It therefore can be used as a back-up facility for emergency services. For example, the heliport landing apron and whole area of our Heliport designated as “Hangar 1” has been specifically designed to accommodate the larger Agusta AW139 helicopter commonly used by larger Australian Air Ambulance and rescue operators. This was done because the Auckland Rescue Helicopter Trust was originally intending to relocate to the Heliport when it was first designed.

(b) In that regard, the Heliport represents a civil defence asset, providing a central and efficient point of access to the wider Auckland Isthmus in the event of a natural disaster (such as volcanic activity, flood, tsunami or earthquake). In this instance, there is certain to be significant demand for aircraft to conduct casualty evacuation, and supply stricken area(s) in the days immediately following the event, while road and rail links are disrupted. Helicopters are expected to be a particularly valuable resource during such a period, when the aerodromes and runways within the affected area will likely be unavailable. The importance of helicopters in this circumstance has been highlighted by the recent Kaikoura earthquakes.

(c) It is used as a refuelling facility by other rescue helicopters based outside Auckland, particularly when they are transporting a patient to Middlemore Hospital (these helicopters would otherwise need to travel to either Mechanics Bay or Ardmore to refuel).

(d) It is used as a staging point for power line maintenance on behalf of Transpower.

Helicopter operations

3.10 AHLP is now one of New Zealand's largest helicopter charter service providers (excluding off-shore rig operations). Our fleet of 11 modern helicopters comprise four twin-engine turbine helicopters, five single-

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engine turbine helicopters, and two single-engine piston helicopters. Other operators of comparable size are Garden City Helicopters in Christchurch, Heli Otago in Dunedin, and The Helicopter Line in Queenstown.

3.11 These helicopters form the basis of a charter service that provides transport for a range of purposes catering for the premium end of the tourism market such as scenic tours and access to remote lodges, etc and logistics support to companies such as Rocket Lab that require point to point time critical delivery of personnel and equipment.

3.12 The Auckland Heliport currently facilitates more than 2,700 aircraft movements a year and transports on average 7,200 passengers through the facility annually.

3.13 AHLP and associated businesses employ 14 full time and 2 part time staff members and we have an annual turnover of $6,370,000.

3.14 It therefore represents a significant transport asset and an important part of Auckland’s transport infrastructure. Dr Wheeler’s evidence addresses the value of this tourism operation to the wider Auckland region1.

4. BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIKES POINT SITE

4.1 Having described the Auckland Heliport and Advanced Flight’s operations, I now propose to describe the reasons for leaving Ardmore and the process by which our current Miami Parade site was identified in light of the constraints that apply to the siting of Heliport and helicopter landing areas, as this is important in understanding the impact the EWL has on us.

The need to move from Ardmore Airport

4.2 As noted, prior to commencing operations at our current site in 2010, AHLP / Advanced flight had operated from Ardmore Airport since 1998.

1 Note in particular the conclusions in paragraph 2.11 of his evidence that he economic effect of the AHLP enterprise is to generate between $31m and $38m in output per year with a net present value considered in total for 10 years lying between $239m and $293m in today’s dollars. Page 14

However, as time passed, it became increasingly apparent that continuing to operate from rented hangars at Ardmore was no longer sustainable because:

(a) Our two existing hangar rentals were on a month-by-month basis with both landlords expressing the wish to expand their own businesses in the near future.

(b) The availability of alternate existing hangar space at Ardmore Airport was becoming scarce.

4.3 This meant we were forced to consider all options which included building a purpose made hangar at Ardmore Airport or looking elsewhere to relocate.

4.4 The option to invest a considerable amount of money on a facility at Ardmore Airport was fatally flawed in the long term, for two main reasons:

(a) 85% of both our charter and private flight passengers required picking up or dropping off at Mechanics Bay Heliport in the Auckland CBD which would mean having to continue to make “dead” (i.e., non- passenger) flights between Ardmore and Mechanics Bay, which was not commercially sensible.

(b) Given our reliance on the Mechanics Bay Heliport, I was very aware that if that Heliport were no longer to be available in the future because it had reached capacity, been closed outright or for some other reason, then Advanced Flight’s operation would be significantly reduced and could only carry out charter work from Auckland Airport and for customers prepared to drive out to Ardmore Airport.

4.5 In 2007, I therefore decided that any significant investment should be future proofed by providing Advanced Flight with independence from any other Auckland Heliport location and during the next two years, relocation options became a priority.

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Identification of the Pikes Point site

4.6 A significant range of regulatory constraints (mainly Civil Aviation and town planning requirements) apply to helicopter operations which need to be taken into account in making decisions about the siting of heliports and helicopter landing areas. These make the identification of a heliport site a complex, difficult and time-consuming exercise.

4.7 These constraints are illustrated by the assessment criteria that I developed in considering Advanced Flight’s relocation options which comprised:

(a) Confirming the site could comply with all relevant CAA requirements, including around approach and departure path restrictions which ideally requires a site adjacent to a large open (uninhabited) space or large body of water.

(b) An assessment to avoid the location of the heliport within or near the Auckland noise abatement area (“Noise Abatement Area”) which is promulgated under CAR Part 93.

(d) A town planning assessment to find an appropriate industrial zoned site adjacent to a large open space or large body of water (see above) and which is also a sufficient distance from residential zones to prevent or reduce noise complaints and risk issues.

(e) Ensuring the site would be able to operate in a commercially viable and economically sustainable manner, including consideration of proximity to the Auckland CBD and Auckland Airport.

4.8 Early in the exercise I was able to eliminate:

(a) Whenuapai Airport - too far away from the Auckland CBD for

Advanced Flight’s customers; and

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(b) Auckland Airport - which was a possibility at the time, but had operational issues in a busy aviation environment and a location

still some distance from the Auckland CBD.

4.9 Also at the very early stages of this process, I identified the Mangere Inlet / Pikes Point area as a suitable location for a heliport due to its heavy industrial zoning, distance from residential development and ability to have approach and departure paths over water. The site also had long term aviation use as an existing microlight airstrip by the Auckland Microlight Club and Mt Roskill Aero modellers.

4.10 The site offered a number of benefits and was ideal in terms of the constraints discussed above to the extent that it was:

(a) Located where the approach and departure paths could be over water;

(b) Zoned heavy industrial to facilitate obtaining the resource consents needed to operate;

(c) Located equidistant from Auckland Airport and the Auckland CBD (thereby far better meeting the commercial requirements of our clients), while still being sufficiently distant from residential areas; and

(d) Located outside of the Noise Abatement Area.

4.11 POAL did not renew the Microlight Club’s lease because it had plans to redevelop the site for a car storage facility to accommodate cars being stored on its wharves in the CBD. They left in December 2005. However, when I approached POAL I was delighted to learn that they were prepared to make some land available that had become surplus to car storage requirements after car import numbers declined. I considered this to be a “once in a lifetime” opportunity that I could not forego. I took sole responsibility for successfully negotiating a lease from POAL for one hectare of land to build a heliport.

4.12 I was aware that I had to present the (now) owners of AHLP with a fully leased and consented site to relocate to before I could approach Page 17

them to invest any capital in it so after taking the huge leap of faith to enter into the 35 year lease, I went about obtaining resource consents.

Rationale for the Auckland Heliport design and function

4.13 Originally, I only intended to develop permanent hangars for our expanding fleet, rather than a full-service heliport. However, the considerable advantages and potential of the Miami Parade site presented the opportunity for the “hangar project” to mature into the “Heliport project”.

4.14 Building a heliport (rather than just hangars) offered a number of additional benefits, including that the facility can:

(a) Provide a safeguard for the future of AHLP’s operations, should the Mechanics Bay facility become unavailable in the future;

(b) Attract and retain pilots more easily than a more remote location;

(d) Provide secure on-site car parking;

(e) Provide a facility that includes pilot training;

(f) Be used as an alternative facility for emergency services and other rescue helicopters based outside Auckland;

(g) Operate as a critical access point to the wider Auckland isthmus in the event of a civil defence emergency; and

(h) Provide a client lounge / waiting area and associated amenities.

4.15 From the outset, I was committed to establishing a world-class facility. I retained top architects, Maxcey Architects, and spent several months working over plans before landing on the design that was ultimately built.

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Resource consents obtained

4.16 In September 2006, POAL and Hangar One Limited applied to the (then) Auckland City Council (“ACC”) and Auckland Regional Council (“ARC”) for the resource consents needed to establish and operate the Heliport (land use consents), authorise relevant discharges and store bulk fuel.

4.17 It was a lengthy process that involved obtaining a range of technical reports and assessments on:

(a) Proposed flight paths and technical flight details;

(b) Potential noise effects and mitigation of these;

(d) Procedures for the use and storage of hazardous substances;

(e) Visual / landscape matters and the design of the Heliport; and

(f) Bird strike and the ecological impacts of helicopters on bird life.

4.18 Our ACC consent (attached as Appendix 3) was granted on 13 March 2008. This consent runs with the land and therefore will not expire. The consent authorises a 24 hour Heliport with a maximum capacity of 15 helicopters and a maximum of 100 daily helicopter flights / movements. The regional consents were also granted by the ARC.

4.19 Overall, preparing and processing the application took over 18 months and cost Advanced Flight approximately $100,000.

Challenges for Heliport construction

4.20 Once we had our resource consents, we faced some challenges in establishing the facility due to the site being a former landfill. For example, the construction phase involved driving 103 steel piles some 20m through the landfill to reach solid ground. This process involved careful procedures when welding sections together to prevent setting

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fire to any gas escaping from the former landfill. The risk of back burn and an underground fire (inside the landfill) had to be taken very seriously.

4.21 The concrete foundation beams sit slightly elevated above the ground on these steel piles, to provide a cavity for toxic gas escaping from the landfill. Beneath the concrete floor slab is a honeycomb lattice to allow any toxic gas an escape route through two vents that are located above the roof level on the eastern end of the building. A gas proof membrane under the floor slab prevents any toxic gas entering the building.

4.22 The former landfill and associated flammable gas leaching also posed challenges in the design and installation of the out-of-ground fuel tank. To address this, the Heliport has been designed with all fuel lines running above ground until they reach the building where they enter a specially designed concrete trench which runs along the south side of the building where the bowser / hose reels are located.

4.23 The other key challenge in the Heliport design was appropriately collecting and disposing of stormwater, given the site’s proximity to the Mangere Inlet. In that regard, a specific helicopter wash down area was constructed to collect any dirty water preventing it from entering the storm water system and have it pumped into the sewer system (Advanced Flight holds a trade waste discharge consent for this). Likewise the entire apron area is contoured and bunded by curbing to contain any inadvertent fuel spill. In the event of a fuel spill the flow path enters an underground tank designed to accommodate it and separate the hydrocarbon out from the water. The water is discharged to storm water and the hydro carbons contained to be collected and disposed of by a specialist operator.

General comments

4.24 I have set out the background to the establishment of the Auckland Heliport in some detail because it is important that the Board understands:

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(a) That it has been a long and difficult road setting up the Heliport. I funded the entire investigation, design and initial construction of the Heliport personally, at significant risk. The total investment form “woah to go” (site selection, consenting, design and construction, and set up) was at least $5.6m. I did so because the Pikes Point site presented such a unique opportunity that I could not let it pass by. I am extremely proud of what I have achieved.

(b) That our Miami Parade site is completely unique; we simply do not have the option of and relocating like most other businesses (such as a car storage operation) can.

4.25 The reality is that we went through a lot to identify the Heliport site, get it set up and then to establish a highly successful business. That is why it is upsetting for the EWL project to turn up and threaten our very existence. While I understand the need for a new road to relieve congestion, etc., the way I see it, we have more right to be here than a new road, especially when they have the option of going behind us, and leaving us as is, which in my view they have not adequately considered, or moving us to the east.

4.26 That is also why it is extremely frustrating that, having told NZTA about the issue in November 2013 and having worked with them for two over years, we are no closer to identifying a solution.

5. CONSTRAINTS ON THE LOCATION OF HELIPORTS AND ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVE SITES

5.1 Having briefly touched on it above, I now propose to say a little more about the difficulty associated with identifying suitable sites for locating Heliport which is a critical factor in our wishing to remain in our current location (which could be achieved if the road were placed behind us) or to move on to land just to the east (which is covered by NZTA’s Notices of Requirement (“NoRs”).

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5.2 The siting and location of helicopter landing areas, heliports and helicopter operations is subject to a range of regulatory and practical constraints, including the need to:

(a) Comply with the requirements of the CAA under the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder;

(b) Avoid locating within the Noise Abatement Area and ensure helicopters can obtain as much altitude as possible before flying over this;

(c) Have an appropriately zoned (generally industrially zoned) site under the relevant district plan and to obtain all relevant consents under the RMA;

(d) Have arrival and departure paths away from built up areas (for practical purposes, in Auckland this means the arrival and departure paths are generally over water); and

(e) Be located as far as possible from any residential area, while still being in close proximity to both the Auckland CBD and Auckland Airport.

5.3 I expand further on the key constraints as follows.

Civil Aviation requirements

5.4 The CAA has broad powers under the Act to regulate and control air transport via restrictions on aircraft movements, airports, heliports, etc. This is generally done via the CARs, which are made by the Minister of Transport under the Act. As regards Civil Aviation requirements, I defer to (and adopt) Mr Fogden’s evidence which addresses the CARs that are most relevant to the Auckland Heliport’s operation and the effect it will have on the Heliport if the EWL is constructed in the alignment proposed. I do not intend to repeat the material contained in his evidence but rather to highlight some key points.

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5.5 Advanced Flight, AHLP and their associated companies hold a number of authorisations (or “aviation documents” as they are defined in the Act) that are required under the Act for the Heliport’s operations. Our two key aviation documents are:

(a) The Heliport Determination (“the Determination”) for the Heliport, which was issued to Hangar One Limited by the CAA pursuant to CAR Part 157 on 3 October 2007, following the required aeronautical study (attached as Appendix 4); and

(b) The Certificate which was re-issued to Advanced Flight by the CAA pursuant to CAR Part 119 on 27 February 2015. The Certificate authorises Advanced Flight to perform air operations and other associated activities pursuant to our Operations Specifications (or “Exposition”) and remains valid (unless otherwise suspended or revoked) until 2 March 2020.

5.6 As Advanced Flight’s director and the holder of both the Determination and Certificate, I am bound by statute to ensure that the Heliport complies with the CARs and all aviation documents that we operate under, as Mr Fogden explains in detail.

5.7 As Mr Fogden outlines2, the CAA’s safety and compliance regime is primarily based on requiring “voluntary compliance”. That is, as “participants” in the Aviation industry we are personally responsible for knowing the relevant regulatory requirements (as reflected in our documents procedures) and complying with these. We are all very aware that anything less than full compliance is unacceptable and requires correction by us as participants.

5.8 That system of “self-policing” works very effectively, in part because it is also supported by the Director having very broad powers to enforce compliance under the Act when required. I am resolute in my view that operating any part of our business not in compliance with the Act and its associated rules is simply not an option for AHLP or Advanced Flight.

2 Fogden EIC, 22 May 2017, Section 3. Page 23

5.9 CAR Part 157.9 requires the Director of Civil Aviation to undertake a site specific aeronautical study that in relation to any proposal to construct, re-align or alter a heliport. As confirmed by Mr Fogden3, the collective effect of this rule and CAR Part 91.127 is that if they are to accommodate machines other than Performance Class 1 helicopters, heliports are limited to sites adjacent to the coast or a large uninhabited area such as a park, to provide take-off and landing paths that do not cross public or third party land. The Heliport currently meets this requirement and was specifically located to ensure that could be the case. However, that would not continue to be the case should the EWL be constructed in its present alignment (i.e. in front of the Heliport).

Noise abatement areas

5.10 CAR Part 93.63 of the Civil Aviation Rules establishes a “noise abatement area” over urban Auckland and requires as follows:

“Except when operating in accordance with an instrument approach procedure, or being radar vectored by ATC, or during take-off climb, or during a visual approach to runway 23, a pilot-in-command of a turbo jet or turbo-fan powered aeroplane shall not operate over the Auckland noise abatement areas specified in Appendix A at an altitude of less than 5000 feet QNH”.

5.11 The extent of the Noise Abatement Area is shown in the map attached as Appendix 5. The existing Heliport lies just outside the Abatement Area, given the largely industrial nature of the surrounding land use.

5.12 CAR Part 93 does not establish a minimum height that helicopters must reach before travelling over the Noise Abatement Area. However, we are aware that aircraft noise is significant issue for many urban residents, particularly in Auckland. For example, in 2000 a heliport proposed for Rosebank Road, Avondale (which seemed to meet all the

3 Ibid. Page 24

constraints in terms of location, noise and compliance with the CARs) failed to secure resource consents due to public opposition rallying against the project.

5.13 In light of the above, I consider it would be extremely difficult to locate a heliport anywhere within the Noise Abatement Area, one of the reasons that makes Pikes Point such an ideal site.

District Plan controls

5.14 When the Heliport was consented in 2008, the relevant district planning instrument was the previously operative Auckland City District Plan: Isthmus Section (“District Plan”). Due to the nature of helicopter operations, the District Plan only provided very limited areas where helicopter operations were appropriate areas.

5.15 In addition, the District Plan contained stringent requirements that had to be met when considering the location for such a facility, including:

(a) The type of machines proposed to be used at the facility and their noise characteristics.

(b) Approach paths to and from all helicopter facilities.

(d) Frequency of use.

(e) Monitoring and regular auditing of noise and other effects.

(f) The proximity to and impact on noise sensitive activities or facilities.

5.16 The Heliport therefore had to meet the above stringent requirements to obtain its existing resource consent. I understand that the consenting requirements for heliports are equally as stringent, if not more so,

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under the partly operative Auckland Unitary Plan (“AUP”). This is addressed further in Dr Mitchell’s evidence4.

Other constraints

5.17 In addition to the above constraints, there are several other pragmatic or practical considerations that limit the possible siting of heliport facilities. These include:

(a) Accommodating the commercial requirements of clients, who predominantly demand facilities located conveniently to both Auckland Airport and the Auckland CBD.

(b) The need to maintain a commercially and economically viable business, for example by:

(i) Maximising the amount of time that is spent flying with passengers, as opposed to continually flying empty between an inappropriately located heliport and where passengers actually want to be picked up from. As I have outlined, when AHLP operated from Ardmore Airport, 85% of our customers elected to depart from or land at the Mechanics Bay Heliport in town. This resulted in repetitive “dead flights” back and forth from Ardmore to Mechanics Bay and Mechanics Bay to Ardmore; and

(ii) Reducing costs by providing on-site maintenance services.

(c) The need to minimise the risk associated with the storage of bulk fuel (so again being located in a heavy industry zoned area and as far as practical from residential areas).

(d) Being able to provide car parking and pilot training facilities on- site.

4 Mitchell EIC, 22 May 2017, Section 7. Page 26

Absence of alternative sites for AHLP’S Heliport

5.18 Through the comprehensive investigations I undertook in selecting the current Heliport site, I concluded that there was no other existing aerodrome or greenfields site in sufficient proximity to the Auckland CBD and Auckland Airport that could viably be used as a heliport.

5.19 Put simply, there were no greenfields sites that could meet all of the locational constraints required to establish a new heliport that I have set out above. Given the scope of these constraints and rapid urban growth within the Auckland region, that remains the case (if not even more so) today.

5.20 It would also not be feasible for us to relocate to either Whenuapai or Auckland Airports. Whenuapai Airport is too far away from both Auckland Airport and the Auckland CBD, proximity to which is critical to our charter business. As well as being a busy aviation environment, there is now another helicopter charter business operating from Auckland Airport. Like Whenuapai, it is also located too far from the Auckland CBD. It is therefore not a possible relocation option for AHLP.

5.21 If the Miami Parade site is compromised by the EWL, the only other possible option is for us to relocate AHLP’s fleet to Ardmore Airport. This option remains unsustainable for the reasons we originally moved away (as outlined in paragraph 4.4 above). In addition, the Mechanics Bay Heliport now does not have sufficient capacity to accommodate all of AHLP’s aircraft movements.

5.22 The upshot is that AHLP cannot feasibly relocate the Heliport away from its present location to any other site in sufficient proximity to the Auckland CBD and Auckland Airport, a factor which is critical to the commercial viability of our operation for the reasons I have outlined above.

5.23 Mr Fogden’s evidence further addresses and confirms the lack of viable, alternative sites in Auckland to which the Heliport could relocate5.

5 Supra Note 2, Section 6. Page 27

6. HOW THE PROJECT WOULD AFFECT AHLP’S OPERATIONS

Impact of Civil Aviation requirements

6.1 Given the importance of this issue and to ensure it can be fully understood by the Board, I have approached Mr Fogden to undertake an independent assessment of the project’s potential effects on the Heliport. As his evidence explains in detail6, if the EWL proceeds in its current alignment, AHLP would not be able to continue to operate from our current Pikes Point site due to the operation of Civil Aviation requirements.

6.2 This arises primarily as a result of the operation of CAR Part 91.127, the effect of which is that if a heliport is to accommodate machines other than Performance Class 1 helicopters, it must be located adjacent to the coast or a large uninhabited area such as a park, to provide take-off and landing paths that do not cross public or third party land.

6.3 The Heliport currently meets this requirement and was specifically located to ensure that could be the case. However, that would not continue to be the case should the EWL be constructed in its present alignment directly in front of the Heliport.

6.4 None of AHLP’s seven single-engine helicopters fall within the Performance Class 1 definition. It is the operation of these helicopters that would be most affected by the current EWL alignment. On average, these helicopters conduct 90% of all AHLP’s commercial charter operations.

6.5 While twin-engine helicopters can generally meet this definition, not all twin-engine helicopters will be able to do so in all circumstances. Due to the weight of the helicopter, wind or temperature conditions, the remaining engine from some twin engine helicopters might not be powerful enough to ensure continued flight using only one engine.

6.6 Only one of AHLP’s four-twin engine helicopters is capable of meeting Performance Class 1 in all circumstances but this helicopter is not

6 Supra Note 2, Sections 4 and 5. Page 28

available to be used for charter flights. Two of our twin engine machines could meet Performance Class 1 requirements 90% of the time; the fourth one even less.

6.7 The CAA has confirmed by email dated 8 July 2015 (attached as Appendix 6) that the location and design of new roads or structures near the Heliport has the potential to impact on the type of helicopter operations permitted there, particularly if the helicopters are not Performance Class 1.

6.8 Put simply, if the EWL was placed between the Heliport and Mangere Inlet, we could not continue to operate our single-engine helicopters (and on occasion our twin-engine helicopters) from the Heliport in compliance with Rule 91.127.

Impact on our commercial viability

6.9 Our single engine helicopters average undertake 90% of all our charter flying (and 70% of our total flying) annually. This is primarily because the difference in cost between chartering a single versus twin-engine helicopter is approximately $1,000 per hour. Given that our single- engine machines have an impeccable safety record, can fly to all the same locations our twin-engine helicopters do and have sufficient seating capacity to accommodate most of our charter clients, they understandably choose to charter the cheaper helicopter.

6.10 It is extremely unlikely that the owners of our single-engine helicopters would replace these with twin-engine helicopters, if the singe-engines could no longer be operated from the Heliport. This is primarily because the twin-engines are at least twice the capital cost of their single-engine counterparts and generally provide only one extra seat.

6.11 The upshot of the above is that, from the time there was a sufficient level of construction activity for the EWL being undertaken in proximity to the Heliport that overflying it would constitute “a hazard to persons and property”, I would have to close down AHLP’s existing charter operations.

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6.12 It would not be possible or commercially practicable to continue trying to run these using the one twin-engine helicopter that is available for commercial flights. Such a limited operation would not even justify the cost of maintaining our current Certificate. The EWL would therefore spell the end of the successful charter business that I have worked extremely hard to establish for over a decade. The significant economic contribution that this operation makes to the Auckland Region (as outlined by Dr Wheeler) would also be lost overnight.

6.13 All that would be left is a remnant of the business I have today, being the operation of private flights. Even those trips would also be restricted by the operation of CAR Part 91.127. As I have already explained, only one of our current twin-engine helicopters is capable of meeting Performance Class 1 under all circumstances. The remaining three helicopters would not necessarily be able to be flown as and when needed by the owners, as they require to be the case.

6.14 In addition, I consider it likely that NZTA would raise safety concerns around landing the larger twin-engine (Performance Class 1) helicopters directly over a main road, on the basis that this is distracting and causes a significant hazard to motorists. To date, NZTA has not provided any clear indication of whether they would raise such issues.

6.15 Following construction of the EWL, the former Heliport would become nothing more than an over-priced hangar. Limited to operating only a small number of private flights for four or five twin-engine helicopters, the facility would be too large and could not justify its associated ground rent and operational costs. Keeping a dedicated maintenance operation on-site (something our helicopter owners require) would also no longer be viable.

Summary

6.16 In short, the remnants of AHLP’s operation would not be sufficient to justify continuing to operate from our present site, meaning the Heliport would inevitably be forced to close. With no other central

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Auckland site that we could relocate to, this would most likely leave Auckland without a heliport location able to operate a significant tourism offering within a reasonable distance from the CBD and the loss of the economic benefits that brings, as outlined by Dr Wheeler.

7. AHLP’S ENGAGEMENT WITH NZTA AND REQUESTED SOLUTION

Advice to NZTA regarding project impacts on the Heliport

7.1 We could not stand by and watch our highly successful business be effectively curtailed by the EWL, and has not. We made NZTA aware of the project’s potential impacts on the Heliport as far back as 4 November 2013 when NZTA representatives attended a presentation at the Heliport (a copy of which is attached as Appendix 7). That presentation:

(a) Outlined why the Miami Parade site had been chosen for the Heliport location and the operational constraints that applied as a result of the relevant CARs; and

(b) Explained (consistent with the reasons outlined above) why it would be extremely difficult for AHLP to relocate its operations, should this be required as a result of NZTA’s chosen alignment for the project.

7.2 Following this presentation to NZTA, there was a significant period during which I heard nothing further from them. I was simply left to monitor the different options for the EWL being published by NZTA and get involved with local community groups to stay informed. At this stage there were up to six options being proposed for the EWL, only one or two of which directly affected the Heliport as the remaining options travelled to the north of (i.e. behind) the Heliport.

7.3 In response to a call for feedback on the project in May 2016, AHLP provided NZTA with a comprehensive submission dated 17 July 2015 (attached as Appendix 8), which:

(a) Outlined the background to the Heliport and AHLP’s operations;

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(b) Summarised the regulatory context within which the Heliport operates, the site selection process followed by AHLP in identifying the existing Miami Parade site and the importance of the current location;

(c) Provided a detailed explanation of how the project would severely compromise the Heliport’s operations in its current alignment and the constraints on the Heliport being able to relocate; and

(d) Put NZTA on notice that given the project’s severe effects on the Heliport, AHLP would have no option but to strongly oppose the applications unless those included a design solution for the Heliport to ensure AHLP can viably continue to operate from its existing site.

Engagement with NZTA on alternatives / mitigation solution for the Heliport

7.4 AHLP has been in discussions with NZTA since July 2015 with the aim of finding a mitigation solution that allows the EWL to be progressed in a way that does not affect the Heliport’s ongoing operational and commercial viability. This has primarily been via a Joint Working Party (“JWP”) that the parties established by way of a Heads of Agreement dated 22 December 2015. Dr Mitchell and I have acted as AHLP’s representatives on the JWP.

7.5 Through these discussions, the parties have considered a range of design options. These have included:

(a) Relocating the road alignment behind (to the north of) the Heliport;

(b) Constructing the project in front (to the south) of the Heliport but with features that would allow the Heliport to continue operating in compliance with the CARs; and

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7.6 Dr Mitchell addresses the options that have been considered in detail. I simply wish to note that our engagement with NZTA has been typified by long periods with no contact and progress has been very slow.

7.7 It is also extremely disappointing for AHLP that, despite the significant time and effort it has put into working with NZTA to find a design solution that works for both parties:

(a) They have chosen an alignment that they acknowledged very early in our discussions was untenable, unless the Heliport was able to be located.

(b) Despite nearly two years of consultation about options that would address the effects on the Heliport involving alignments to the north of (behind) the Heliport, or the relocation of the Heliport to the east so that the chosen alignment was behind the relocated Heliport), there has been virtually no consideration of them in any of NZTA’s application material or evidence.

7.8 Even more galling to me is that I had thought we were so close to agreeing a solution with NZTA I was hopeful that we would not need to participate in these hearings and perhaps even be able to lodge a submission in support. That optimism was clearly misplaced and, in my opinion, it does NZTA no credit to have failed to deliver in any tangible way on two years of what I thought had been constructive dialogue and to propose an option that they have verbally acknowledged as being untenable.

7.9 It seems to me that rather than deal with their stakeholders in good faith, they have made the “strategic” decision to make no commitments to anybody at all and instead wait to be told what to do by the Board. I consider that to be totally unacceptable and a breach of the good faith in which we entered into dialogue. In this day and age, that is an outrage.

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AHLP’s requested solution

7.10 Having told NZTA about the EWL’s potential effects on the Heliport as far back in November 2013 and having worked in good faith with them for over two years to find a mitigation solution, it is frustrating that we have not identified a solution that NZTA is prepared to commit to. AHLP’s preference would be to remain in our existing site with the EWL behind us.

7.11 However, we have (very reasonably) also been open to the prospect of being relocated, provided NZTA commits to achieving this outcome at no cost to AHLP. The land included in NZTA’s designation boundaries includes an area to the east of the Heliport to which AHLP has indicated it is prepared to relocate; I fail to see why NZTA is not prepared to commit to this solution.

7.12 The solution is simple – either move the alignment behind our operation (which would appear to me to be a very simple thing to do), or relocate us to the eastern end of the area designated.

7.13 Our clear preference is to remain where we are and for the alignment of the EWL to be amended. However, we have always been open to the prospect of being relocated (provided that NZTA facilitated this happening at no cost to us and were able to gain the necessary approvals under the RMA).

7.14 NZTA has designated a very large corridor within which to locate the EWL. This includes an area within the projects’ designation boundaries that is of a similar size to that AHLP currently occupies, which the Heliport could relocate to (as shown in the plan attached as Appendix 9). NZTA has advised me that their hope is that AHLP’s current facilities can be accommodated on that area, but despite working with us to discuss how such a site could be developed, it now seems that “all bets are off” and that they will leave it to the Board to recommend the avoidance (relocate the EWL) or “mitigation” (relocate the Heliport) they need to undertake.

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7.15 The relocated Heliport site would ensure the ongoing viability of AHLP’s operations, in that:

(a) It would still be located where the approach and departure paths could be over water;

(b) It is also zoned heavy industrial under the AUP and forms part of the wider site that our existing resource consent applies to, in order to facilitate resource consenting;

(c) It allows the Heliport to remain located equidistant from Auckland Airport and the Auckland CBD (thereby continuing to meet the commercial requirements of our clients), while still being sufficiently distant from residential areas; and

(d) It remains outside of the Noise Abatement Area.

7.16 I consider that NZTA has both a moral and legal obligation to properly assess the effects of the proposal on our business, identify how such effects will be addressed and implement a solution. I cannot conceive of a fair outcome of these proceedings that authorises the EWL but does not address the effects on our operation. NZTA needs to “stump up”.

7.17 To the extent that it is a question of costs (which quite clearly it is), my position is that if they cannot afford to address the effects on the Heliport, they cannot afford to do the project. If they entered into the process too early, that is their problem.

7.18 AHLP has no option but to vigorously oppose the granting of the applications, to ensure its interest are properly protected. That is consistent with the position AHLP has taken and clearly advised to NZTA for over three years now. It cannot and will not stand idly by and watch the EWL destroy what is a highly successful operation.

7.19 It will be readily apparent that achieving certainty from this process is crucial to the ongoing viability of the Heliport and AHLP’s operations and ensuring that NZTA properly addresses the potential effects of the EWL. That is why we are requesting a condition that precludes that Page 35

part of the road being built until a solution is found; we need that certainty and it is only fair. Dr Mitchell’s evidence addresses the consent condition that AHLP is requesting.

8. RESPONSE TO NZTA EVIDENCE

8.1 Only two NZTA witnesses have addressed AHLP’s submission in their evidence, being Messrs Harrington and Nancekivell, although we are not mentioned in any detail. Nor are the effects on our operation assessed or even acknowledged. I now address both their statements, to the extent they require a response on behalf of AHLP.

Mr Harrington

8.2 Mr Harrington has made the general comment that “where circumstances allow, the Transport Agency is open to accommodating landowners’ wishes in terms of land exchanges and other solutions to reach agreement on appropriate mitigation, reinstatement and / or compensation”7.

8.3 I do not consider our position as being a “wish” or preference of AHLP’s that it is asking NZTA to “accommodate”. We are trying to protect our business from a poorly considered proposal which has been designed to optimise flexibility for NZTA without them having to make any decisions of their own about how the effects of their proposal are to be addressed.

8.4 Mr Harrington’s evidence states that:

“AHLP is impacted by the Project to the extent that some of its operations will be constrained due to the location of the East West Link between the existing Heliport and the harbour. As a result AHLP is seeking suitable relocation options”8.

8.5 I consider that this statement is disingenuous and severely understates the project’s impact on AHLP and the Heliport, as has been explained

7 Harrington EIC, 12 April 2017, para 1.4. 8 Harrington EIC, 12 April 2017, para 7.4. Page 36

to Mr Harrington and other NZTA representatives on several occasions – and seemingly accepted by them. The evidence is clear – this project will not constrain “some of” our operations, it will prevent them from occurring. As a result, Auckland would likely be left without a Heliport location able to operate the significant tourism offering that AHLP currently provides and the significant economic contribution our operation makes to the Auckland Region would be lost.

8.6 I consider that NZTA has an obligation, both morally and legally, to properly assess the effects of its proposal on our business, identify how such effects will be addressed and implement a solution. In that regard, we have spent over two years working with NZTA to identify a mitigation solution for the Heliport which would enable the project to proceed in NZTA’s preferred alignment. As a result of those extensive investigations, it is clear that:

(a) With a minor change to the chosen alignment, i.e., to move the road to the north behind the Heliport, the adverse effects on us could be avoided altogether; and

(b) The EWL should not be permitted to be located in front of the Heliport unless and until NZTA has relocated the Heliport to the area of land to the immediate east of its current location.

8.7 Indeed, the reasonableness of our position seems to be acknowledged by Mr Harrington’s statement that:

“The land requirement plans reflect the land that is reasonably required to give effect to the Project.”9

8.8 In that regard, I note that the land included in the NoR includes an area of land to the east that we have specifically discussed this area as being a place to relocate the Heliport to. Given that that land is not part of the alignment, this would appear to imply an acceptance that that land is reasonably required for the project due to the need to relocate the Heliport to that location. I fail to understand why NZTA is not prepared to commit to this solution.

9 Harrington EIC, 12 April 2017, para 4.1. Page 37

Mr Nancekivell

8.9 Importantly and consistent with my evidence, Mr Nancekivell’s evidence states that:

(a) NZTA has been aware of AHLP’s concerns with the project and its ability to affect the Heliport operations for some time10.

(b) The parties have undertaken considerable work together to confirm the nature of the effects and potential opportunities to address those within the project11.

(c) NZTA accepts that if the impact of the project’s coastal alignment on the Heliport cannot be mitigated, the Heliport cannot continue to operate in its current location12.

8.10 I agree with and endorse all those statements.

9. CONCLUDING COMMENT

9.1 I have outlined why the EWL will mean the end of AHLP’s existing commercial charter operations if it constructed in its present alignment. Given the nature of those effects, I understand (for reasons that will be outlined in legal submissions) that NZTA is obliged to adequately mitigate them in order for the project to proceed.

9.2 AHLP have spent considerable time and money proactively engaging with NZTA over more than two years, to develop a solution that allows the EWL to proceed in a way that avoids its effects on the Heliport. As a result of these investigations, it is clear that other than adopting an alternative project alignment that travels to the north of the Heliport (which NZTA does not consider appropriate), implementing the Preferred Option is the only feasible and viable mitigation option. However, this option has not been adopted by NZTA at present.

9.3 AHLP does not oppose the EWL in principle or seek to challenge NZTA’s position as to the need for the project and transport benefits it will

10 Nancekivell EIC, 12 April 2017, para 15.11. 11 Nancekivell EIC, 12 April 2017, para 15.12. 12 Nancekivell EIC, 12 April 2017, para 15.13. Page 38

bring. But it requires certainty that the project will not be constructed in its present alignment without the implementation of the Preferred Option or other appropriate mitigation solution that ensures the Heliport can feasibly continue operating.

9.4 Dr Mitchell outlines the proposed condition that AHLP requests be imposed, should the Board be minded to approve NZTA’s applications. I endorse such a condition as being critical to ensuring the project’s effects on the Heliport are addressed and therefore securing the ongoing viability of the Heliport’s operations and the economic contribution these make to the wider Auckland Region.

______Keith Stephens 22 May 2017

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APPENDIX 1 ADVANCED FLIGHT’S AIR OPERATING CERTIFICATE