Structuring US Forces After the Cold
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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE CBC) STIJDY STRUCTURING U.S. FORCES AFTER THE COLD WAR: COSTS AND EFFECTS OF INCREASED RELIANCE ON THE RESERVES The Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office NOTES All years referred to in the study are fiscal years, unless otherwise noted. All dollars are expressed in 1993 budget authority, unless otherwise specified. The study uses the Department of Defense's fiscal year 1993 inflation as sumptions. Details in text and tables may not add to totals because of rounding. Reserves with a lowercase "r" refers to personnel in both National Guard and Reserve components. Cover photo: Members of the Puerto Rican National Guard disembark from a C-130 Hercules aircraft during Operation Ocean Venture '82. (U .S. Navy photo by PH1 W. Nanny.) Preface ow ready for war do U.S. military forces need to be during peacetime? The question has special importance in the austere budget climate fac H ing the nation, since maintaining a high level of readiness can be. ex- pensive. The appropriate answer may also have changed in recent years be cause of significant reductions in the threats to U.S. security. The Congress has expressed particular interest in one important factor in determining military readiness: the portions of forces serving on active duty and in the part-time reserve. In recent years, the Congress has mandated in creased reliance on existing types of reserves and has also called for experi menting with new types of reserve units. This study, requested by the Committee on the Budget of the United States Senate, analyzes the cost and effects of various mixes of active and reserve forces, including both existing types and new ones. The study does not, how ever, attempt to select one appropriate mix of active and reserve forces. This approach is in keeping with the mandate of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide objective analysis without making recommendations. Lane Pierrot of CBO's National Security Division prepared the report un der the supervision of Robert F. Hale Neil M. Singer also supervised the pre paration of the report and assisted in the later stages of its preparation. William P. Myers of CBO's Budget Analysis Division performed the cost analysis. Karen Ann Watkins provided valuable assistance during the analysis, as did Marc Shachtman and Jonathan I. Berg. The analysis of Army capability is based in large part on analysis performed by Frances M. Lussier of CBO, and the analysis of Navy capability is based on work by Michael B. Berger, formerly of CBO. Victoria A. Greenfield, Lisa Siegel, and David Mosher ofCBO, and Stanley A. Horowitz of the Institute for Defense Analyses, provided useful comments on an earlier draft of the study. The author and CBO, however, bear full responsibility for the final product. Paul L. Houts edited the manuscript. Chris Spoor provided editorial assistance. Cindy Cleveland prepared a number of drafts of the study. Judith Cromwell assisted in preparation of a later draft. With the assistance of Martina Wojak-Piotrow, Kathryn Quattrone prepared the report for publica tion. Robert D. Reischauer Director Contents SUMMARY lX ONE INTRODUCTION 1 Current Composition of the Force 3 TWO ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE MIX OF ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES 7 Costs of Active and Reserve Units 7 How Much Total Capability Is Needed? 12 How Quickly Are Forces Needed? 13 Specific Limitations on Reserves 22 How Many Reserves Can Be Used? 26 THREE NEW TYPES OF RESERVES 27 Designing New Types ofReserves 27 Cost of New Types of Reserves 30 Other Advantages 33 Disadvantages of New Units 34 FOUR THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN 39 Specifics of the Administration's Plan 39 Effects of the Administration's Plan on Costs 42 Effects on Reserve and Active Duty Manpower 43 Balance of Military Capability 46 FIVE ALTERNATIVES 55 Alternative I: Increase Reliance on Selected Reserves 55 Alternative II: Increase Reliance on New Types of Reserves 66 vi STRUCTURING U.S. FORCES AFTER THE COLD WAR September 1992 Alternative III: An Approach to Reconstituting Forces 71 APPENDIX Dependence on the Reserves in Other Countries 77 TABLES S-1. Forces for 1990, the Administration's 1997 Level, and Alternatives to the Administration's Plan xi S-2. Costs and Impact on Military Manpower of the Administration's Plan and Alternatives Xll 1. Estimated Annual Steady State Operating and Support Costs for Selected Active and Reserve Forces 8 2. Reserve Readiness: Percentage of Reserve Units Reporting "Marginally Ready" (C-3) Rating or Better in 198 7 14 3. Evaluation of Performance at the National Training Center of the 48th National Guard Brigade in 1991 and the Three-Year Average for the Active III Corps for 1986 to 1989 16 4. Assumptions About Mobilization for Selected Reserve Units 19 5. Annual Steady State Operating Costs of New Units 31 6. Forces for 1990 and the Administration's 1997 Level 40 7. Costs of the Administration's Plan 43 8. Manpower in the Administration's Plan 44 9. Forces for 1990: The Administration's Plan and Alternatives 57 10. Manpower for Alternatives 58 11. Savings of the Three Alternatives 60 CONTENTS vii A-1. Active and Reserve End Strength for the United States and NATO Allies in 1988 and 1991 and Reserve Shares of Manning 78 FIGURES S-1. Cumulative Capability of U.S. Ground Forces After Varying Training Periods in the Base Force and Options xiv 1. Active, Guard, and Reserve End Strengths in 1990 and 1997 4 2. Comparison of the Capability of U.S. Armed Forces with Those of Selected Regional Powers 49 3. Comparison of the Capability of U.S. Armed Forces with Those of Two Illustrative Large Powers 51 4. Cumulative Capability of U.S. Ground Forces After Varying Training Periods in the Base Force and Options 63 BOX 1. Major Forces 56 Summary ith the Cold War over, U.S. military forces are being reduced because of Criteria for Choosing W decreases in the threat to U.S. secu- rity interests and accompanying cuts in the the Right Mix of Active defense budget. How many of the remaining and Reserve Forces forces should be on active duty, and how many in the part-time reserves, is a major Several criteria deserve consideration in the point of contention. Some Members of Con gress have expressed a strong preference for debate over the active/reserve composition of the future military: increasing the portion of the force in the "se lected" reserves--that is, those reserves who typically drill part of the time. These Mem o Costs; bers note the lower cost associated with se lected reserve units and the additional warn o Reserve response times; ing time likely to be available before a major o Total capability (active and reserve) war. The Administration, however, has rec needed; and ommended proportional cuts in selected re serve and active forces, arguing that the most o Limits on the peacetime use of reserves. likely future threats to U.S. security would arise with insufficient warning to call up, train, and deploy large numbers of reserves. Costs Maintaining large numbers of selected Selected reserve units cost less to operate in reserves may also provide more capability, peacetime than do active units, though the and cost more, than is required in a world difference in cost varies considerably among where the warning time before a major war different types of units. Reserve ships cost could be measured in years. Future threats about 80 percent as much to operate as active may permit the United States to employ new, units; air units about 60 percent to 70 percent relatively inexpensive types of reserve units. as much. Ground combat units in the Army These units would rely more on stored equip and Mari~e Corps operate at roughly one ment and would be filled out in time of war quarter the cost of an active unit. New ~ypes with personnel who do not train in peacetime. of reserve units, which would be sparmgly x STRUCTURING U.S. FORCES AFTER THE COLD WAR September 1992 manned in peacetime and would rely more on those reserves, carrying out a future Opera stored equipment, might cost as little as 5 per tion Desert Storm might not be possible to do cent to 10 percent as much to operate. as quickly as was done in late 1990 and early 1991. Reserve Response Times Limits on the Peacetime Partly because they train only part time in Use of Reserves periods of peace, some selected reserve units would require more time to mobilize and pre There are also specific limitations on the pare for war than would active units. As with peacetime use of reserves. Some missions (for costs, the delay varies widely among types of example, the operation of nuclear forces) are units. Air units, as well as some ground units not well suited to part-time reserves. Nor can in the Army that provide logistical support, part-time reserves be used to maintain a are ready to mobilize and fight on short notice. continuous presence overseas during peace time. Recruiting problems may also limit the . Airlift and ground support units from the numbers of selected reserve units that can be selected reserve were sent to the Persian Gulf maintained in peacetime. Many selected re in the first few days of the buildup, along with serve units recruit heavily among people who active units. Ground combat units in the have previous experience in the active mili selected reserves would probably require more tary. A large increase in the portion of the time to mobilize and prepare for combat, per force serving in the selected reserve would haps several months to a year.