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RFPB Improving the Total Force 2020 Report.Pdf A Report for the transition to the next Administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE USING THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government 20-S-1868 RFPB Report FY20-01 The Honorable Dr. Mark T. Esper, then Secretary of the Army, later Secretary of Defense (Right) briefs the Board on reserve matters. Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro, USMC (Retired), RFPB Chairman (Left). This report, Report FY20-01, is a product of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The Reserve Forces Policy Board is, by law, a federal advisory committee within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As mandated by Congress, it serves as an independent adviser to provide advice and recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense on strategies, policies, and practices designed to improve and enhance the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the reserve components. The content and recommendations contained herein do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. As required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Title 5, and the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, Section 102-3 (Federal Advisory Committee Management), this report and its contents were deliberated and approved in open, public sessions. IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE Using the National Guard and Reserves IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE 4 5 IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................9 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................13 1.1: The Global Security and National Economic Environments .........................15 1.2: The Role of the U.S. Armed Forces ...............................................................19 1.3: The Reserve Component ..............................................................................20 1.4: Myths Surrounding the Reserve Component ................................................23 1.5: Opportunities for Immediate Improvement ..................................................27 1.6: Role of the Reserve Component ..................................................................28 1.7: Recent Contributions of the National Guard and Reserve ............................29 1.8: The Operational Reserve in the Total Force ..................................................32 1.9: Obstacles Limiting Long-Term Success .........................................................33 1.10: The Lack of a Total Force Policy and Definition for an Operational Reserve 34 1.11: Antiquated Laws, Policies and Information Systems .....................................35 1.12: Summary .......................................................................................................36 2.0: Priorities for the Near Term ...........................................................................37 2.1: Emphasize the Total Force Policy ..................................................................37 2.2: Formalize the Operational Reserve ...............................................................40 2.3: Improve Active Component and Reserve Component Integration ..............67 2.4: Enact Reserve Component Duty Status Reform ...........................................76 2.5: Eliminate Disparity in Benefits and Qualifications between Active Component and Reserve Component Members ..............................................................84 3.0: Optimize the Total Force for the Long Term .................................................90 3.1: Integrate the Reserve Component and Enhance Active Component and Reserve Component Permeability .........................................................91 3.2: Prioritize and Maintain Reserve Component Readiness ...............................97 3.3 Continue to Include the Reserve Component in Cyber Mission Force Requirements ........................................................100 3.4 Implement Individual Ready Reserve Management Reforms .....................103 IMPROVING THE TOTAL FORCE 8 3.5 Transition Service Members at Home of Record Reserve Component Sites ..........................................................107 3.6: Minimize Installation and Infrastructure Duplication and Ensure National Guard and Reserve Installations Receive Adequate Funding .......................................109 3.7: Reinstate Reserve Component Headspace Exemptions and Statutory Requirement for Reserve Component Chief and Director Positions ......................................115 3.8: Integrate the Reserve Component into the Space Force from the Outset to Leverage their Unique Skillsets ...............................................................119 4.0 Reserve Component Use ............................................................................123 4.1 The Operational Reserve Concept ..............................................................123 4.2: Reserve Component Cost Comparison and Efficiencies .............................125 4.3: Myths Concerning Reserve Component Accessibility ................................138 4.4: Reserve Component Performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom ....................................................................141 4.5: Role of the Reserve Component in Homeland Defense .............................145 5.0: The Reserve Components ..........................................................................154 5.1 Reserve Component 101 ............................................................................155 5.2: Army National Guard .................................................................................158 5.3: Army Reserve ..............................................................................................160 5.4: Marine Corps Reserve .................................................................................162 5.5: Navy Reserve ..............................................................................................164 5.6: Air Force Reserve ........................................................................................167 5.7: Air National Guard ......................................................................................169 5.8: Coast Guard Reserve ..................................................................................171 APPENDIX A: Board Member Biographies ...............................................................173 APPENDIX B: Reserve Component Contributions to the COVID-19 Pandemic Response .................................................................191 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Today’s Reserve Component forces provide the indispensable operational force and the strategic expandability the military services routinely employ to the meet the Nation’s defense requirements defined in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Reserve Component (RC) members constitute 38% of the Total Force and have repeatedly deployed and operated with their Active Component (AC) counterparts in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and numerous other contingency, humanitarian, and homeland support missions to include providing the majority of the COVID-19 (Coronavirus) pandemic response forces. The RC’s operational record consistently demonstrates exceptional performance delivered at less than one-third the cost of the comparable AC units when not mobilized. The Reserve Components also do not require the massive infrastructure and personnel support cost associated with the Active Component. While the utilization of the RC and related policies has changed radically since the end of the Cold War, and more recently after 9/11, numerous challenges remain that hinder future success for the Total Force. Because the AC cannot execute the NDS without the additional combat power provided by the RC, national security, defense and resourcing decisions by leaders and policymakers always impact the Reserve Component. For this reason, it is essential that leaders and policymakers understand the composition of the Reserve Component, their significant cost advantaged contributions, and challenges Reservists and Guardsmen face when volunteering. Priorities for the Near Term While much has been done to ensure the RC remains essential to the Total Force moving forward, there is more to do. Commissions, studies and think tanks over time have recommended numerous reforms to ensure the RC is ready, accessible and interoperable with the AC. Similarly, the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) identified key policy initiatives aimed at immediately removing barriers that adversely affect the efficiency, readiness and overall lethality of the RC. To create the foundations necessary to ensure the RC remains an operationally viable element of the Total Force, the Department of Defense and Military Service Secretaries should implement the following near term recommendations: • Emphasize a Total Force policy. The Department of Defense needs to strengthen and enhance the Total Force policy to provide comprehensive guidance and oversight to the services. The current Total Force perspective held by some Active Component leaders adversely impacts efficient utilization and resourcing decisions regarding the Reserve Components to include determining the correct
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