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Appendix A: List of Cases Included in the Analysis

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Appendix A: List of Cases Included in the Analysis APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES INclUDED IN THE ANalYSIS Individuals are grouped according to joint offence behaviours/travel/ arrest/death (although there are additional connections between several cases). Cases are listed in chronological order according to when individ- uals were arrested or killed. 1. Ibrahim Suleiman Adnan Adam Harun. Al-Qaeda operative arrested in Italy, June 24, 2011. Overseas conviction. 2. Mohammed Osamah Abed Mohammed, Mohammed Al-Obaidi and Wesam Al Jbory. The Swiss IS-Cell. Arrested in Switzerland, March-April, 2014. Prosecuted. 3. Khavazhi Amaev. Chechen militant. Allegedly fought for ISIS faction in Syria. Detained September 5, 2014, near Oinousses islands, Greece. Overseas legal allegations. 4. Abo Robeih Tarif. Syrian refugee smuggler/alleged member of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Arrested in Italy, September 2014. Public allegations. 5. Walid Hamam. French foreign fghter and member of Athens ISIS cell. Prosecuted in absentia for role in Verviers plot. Killed by US airstrike in Syria, December 4, 2016. 6. Louati Noussair. Attempted to go to Syria to join ISIS. Arrested in Ravenna, Italy, April 22, 2015. Prosecuted. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), 159 under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 S. Mullins, Jihadist Infltration of Migrant Flows to Europe, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13338-2 160 APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 7. Ahmed Faredaws A. Afghan explosives expert, designated as a Gefährder (“endangerer”), by German police in July 2015. Missing as of July 2016. Administrative sanctions/public allegations. 8. Ayoub el-Khazzani. Thalys train attack, France, August 21, 2015. Legal allegations. 9. Ayoub Moutchou. ISIS-aligned recruiter/facilitator arrested near Stuttgart, Germany, September 4, 2015. Prosecuted. 10. Ahmad al-I. ISIS member. Arrested in Salzburg, Austria, September 17, 2015. Prosecuted. 11. Mehdi Ben Nasr. Convicted Tunisian terrorist stopped at Lampedusa, Italy, October 4, 2015. Administrative sanctions (deported). 12. Unnamed male. JN member. Arrested in Salzburg, Austria, October 10, 2015. Prosecuted. 13. Abdelhamid Abaaoud, Bilal Hadf, Ismael Mostefai, Samy Amimour, Foued Mohamed-Aggad, Chakib Akrouh, “Ahmad al-Mohammad” and “Mohammad al-Mahmod”. Paris attacks, France, November 13, 2015. All perpetrators killed. 14. Ahmad Alali Alhussein and Hazem Alhamed. ISIS mem- bers arrested at Bergamo airport, Italy, November 17, 2015. Prosecuted. 15. Mohamed Usman and Adel Haddadi. Paris attacks net- work. Arrested in Salzburg, Austria, December 10, 2015. Legal allegations. 16. Mohanned B. JN member. Arrested in The Hague, Netherlands, November 30, 2015. Prosecuted. 17. Abdel Aziz K. and Abdel Hakeem K. Members of Ahrar al-Sham/ISIS. Arrested in Lebring, Austria, December 17, 2015. Prosecuted. 18. Youcef Bouimaiz and Kamal Agoujil. Paris attacks network. Arrested in Salzburg, Austria, December 18, 2015. Prosecuted. 19. Tarek Belgacem. Knife attack at police station, Paris, France, January 7, 2016. Killed. 20. Saleh A. Alleged ISIS member. Falsely claimed Düsseldorf attack plot. Arrested in Paris, France, February 1, 2016. Extradited to Germany. Prosecuted. 21. Farid A., Unnamed female and Fayssal M.B. ISIS supporters arrested in Attendorn and Berlin, Germany, February 4, 2016 APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 161 and June 17, 2016. Farid A. and wife: Overseas legal allegations/ Administrative sanctions (deportation). Fayssal M.B.: Prosecuted. 22. Almohammad Abdulhamid, Al Abdallah Fadi and Al Fandi Yasim. Attempted ISIS foreign fghters. Arrested in Bulgaria, February 9, 2016. Prosecuted. 23. Abshir Abdullahi Mohamed. Jihadi preacher. Arrested in Campomarino, Italy, March 9, 2016. Prosecuted. 24. Moftah Al Sllake and Abdalrhman Ismail. Alleged ISIS opera- tives suspected of planning in attack in Genoa, Italy, March 2016. Legal allegations (in absentia). 25. Sofen Ayari, Osama Krayem and Obeida Walid Dibo (aka Ahmed Alkhald). Paris/Brussels attacks network. Ayari and Krayem arrested in Brussels and Anderlecht, Belgium, March 18 and April 8, 2016. Legal allegations. Dibo at large: Administrative sanctions (US). 26. Najim Laachraoui and Mohamed Belkaid. Brussels attacks network. Killed in Brussels, Belgium, March 15 and March 22, 2016. 27. Shaas Al-Muhammad. ISIS member, arrested in Potsdam- Mittelmark, Germany, March 22, 2016. Prosecuted. 28. Bilal Chatra. Paris attacks network. Arrested in Aachen, Germany, April 16 and April 29, 2016. Legal allegations. 29. Kamel T. and Azad R. Ahrar al-Sham members, arrested in Bamberg, Germany, April 18 and April 20, 2016. Prosecuted. 30. Unnamed male. Alleged JN member. Arrested in South Rogaland, Norway, May 13, 2016. Public allegations. 31. Aras Mohammed Hamid and Shivan Hayder Azeez Zangana. Attempted to join ISIS faction in Iraq. Arrested in UK, May 17 and May 19, 2016. Prosecuted. 32. Abdul Jawad A.K., Abdoulfatah A., Abdulrahman A.A., Abdalfatah H.A. and Ahmet A.A. JN combat unit with links to Saleh A. Arrested in Germany between June 2, 2016 and May 31, 2017. Legal allegations. 33. Mukhamadsaid S. ISIS member, arrested in Warendorf, Germany, June 21, 2016. Prosecuted. 34. Abdesselam Tazi and Hicham El Hanaf. Alleged ISIS recruiters/facilitators/fnanciers based in Portugal. Arrested in Düsseldorf, Germany, July 1, 2016 and Marseilles, France, November 20, 2016. Legal allegations. 162 APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 35. Unnamed male. Hamas member. Encouraged attacks in Israel. Arrested July 17, 2016, in Litschau, Austria. Prosecuted. 36. Riaz Khan Ahmadzai. Axe attack in Würzburg, Germany, July 18, 2016. Killed. 37. Mohammad Daleel. Bomb attack in Ansbach, Germany, July 24, 2016. Killed. 38. Khaled H. and Ali I. Suspected of planning attacks in Germany. Arrested in Mutterstadt, Germany, August 5, 2016 and August 10, 2016. Public allegations. 39. Mourad T. Paris attacks network. Arrested September 5, 2016, in Rybnik, Poland. Legal allegations. 40. Mahir Al-Hmidi, Ibrahim Mallaeh and Mohamed Anbarji. ISIS sleeper cell, arrested in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, Germany, September 13, 2016. Prosecuted. 41. Unnamed male. JN member, arrested in Rutesheim, Germany, September 19, 2016. Prosecuted. 42. Mohammed J. ISIS “remote-controlled” attack plot. Arrested in Cologne, Germany, September 20, 2016. Prosecuted. 43. Jaber al-Bakr. ISIS attack plot. Arrested in Leipzig, Germany, October 10, 2016. Committed suicide. 44. Wajid S. Self-confessed member of the Taliban, arrested in Köthen, Germany, October 27, 2016. Prosecuted. 45. Charfeddine T. ISIS attack plot. Arrested in Berlin, Germany, November 2, 2016. Administrative sanctions (deportation). 46. Suphi Alpfdan. ISIS operative, involved in October 10, 2015, bombing in Ankara, Turkey. Posed as refugee in Germany. (Re) arrested in Turkey, November 10, 2016. Overseas conviction. 47. Abdullah S.K. Alleged member of the Taliban. Arrested in Karlsruhe, Germany, November 17, 2016. Legal allegations. 48. Diaab K. and Unnamed male. Denmark attack plot. Arrested in Ulm, November 20, 2016 and Copenhagen, December 21, 2017. Prosecuted/Legal allegations. 49. Hekmat T. Member of the Taliban. Arrested in Rhineland- Palatinate, Germany, December 2, 2016. Prosecuted. 50. Munir Hassan Mohammed. UK attack plot. Arrested in Derby, UK, December 12, 2016. Prosecuted. 51. Anis Ben Othmane Amri. Truck attack in Berlin, Germany, December 19, 2016. Killed. APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 163 52. Redouane Sebbar. Paris attacks network. Charged in France in relation to Thalys train attack. Arrested in Otter, Germany, December 20, 2016. Legal allegations. 53. Unnamed male. Unaccompanied minor suspected of planning an attack. Arrested in Bobbe, Germany, January 25, 2017. Legal allegations. 54. Haikel S. Alleged ISIS recruiter, arrested in Frankfurt, Germany, February 1, 2017. Overseas legal allegations/Administrative sanc- tions (extradition). 55. Abdol Moghadas S. Alleged Taliban member, arrested in Traunstein, Germany, February 8, 2017. Prosecuted. 56. Unnamed male. Alleged JN member, arrested February 6, 2017, in St. Pölten, Austria. Legal allegations. 57. Nasser A. JN member. Arrested in Chemnitz, Germany, February 15, 2017. Prosecuted. 58. Saer Hussein Shaker. Posted pro-ISIS content on Facebook; arrested in Stockport, UK, February 27, 2017. Prosecuted. 59. Tarik A. Alleged ISIS member, arrested in Rheinberg-Orsoy, Germany, March 1, 2017. Legal allegations. 60. Mohammed A. Algerian Gefährder, arrested in Bremen, Germany, March 2017. Administrative sanctions (deportation). 61. Kyuria A. Alleged ISIS member, arrested in Poland, March 27, 2017. Legal allegations. 62. Rakhmat Akilov. Truck attack in Stockholm, Sweden, April 7, 2017. Prosecuted. 63. Zoher J. Former JN member and alleged ISIS recruiter/facil- itator. Arrested in Adlkofen, Germany, April 12, 2017. Legal allegations. 64. Abdul Beset A. Alleged ISIS member, arrested in Wuppertal, Germany, April 12, 2017. Legal allegations. 65. Ahmad A.A. Saraya al-Furat member with alleged connections to JN and ISIS, arrested May 4, 2017, in Wachau, Germany. Prosecuted. 66. Abdulmalk A. and Anas Ibrahim A.S. Alleged former JN and ISIS members. Arrested May 9, 2017, in Magdeburg and Berlin, Germany. Legal allegations. 67. Omaid N. Alleged member of the Taliban. Arrested in Germany, May 19, 2017. Legal allegations. 164 APPENDIX A: LIST OF CASES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS 68. Raad Riyadh A.A. and Abbas R. Alleged ISIS members/ drug-dealing Gefährder. Arrested in Berlin, Germany,
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