Understanding Inter-Rebel Fighting Costantino Pischedda
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Wars Within Wars: Understanding Inter-rebel Fighting Costantino Pischedda Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2015 © 2015 Costantino Pischedda All rights reserved ABSTRACT Wars Within Wars: Understanding Inter-rebel Fighting Costantino Pischedda Why do rebel groups frequently fight each other rather than cooperating against their common enemy – the state? This dissertation presents a theory of inter-rebel war and tests it with a combination of case studies and statistical analysis. The theory conceives of inter-rebel war as a calculated response by rebel groups to opportunities for expansion and threats generated by the civil war environment in which they operate. Insurgent organizations attack weaker coethnic groups when government forces only pose a limited threat (i.e., when they face a window of opportunity), so as to eliminate potentially threatening rivals and acquire more resources to be used against the state. Additionally, rebel groups resort to force in desperate attempts to deal with a mounting threat posed by coethnic groups or a drastic deterioration of their power relative to other groups (i.e., when they face a window of vulnerability). Rebel groups’ cost-benefit calculus about infighting is powerfully influenced by whether they are facing coethnic insurgent organizations. Coethnic rebel groups’ overlapping mobilization bases make it possible for an organization to take over the resources (in particular, recruitment pools and tax bases) of defeated rivals and consequently improve their chances in the fight against the government. Thus coethnicity amplifies both defensive and aggressive motives for inter-rebel war. This dissertation adopts a mixed-method approach, combining case studies and statistical analysis. My three main case studies are the Kurdish rebellions against Iraq (1961-1988), the Eritrean war of national liberation (1961-1991) and the insurgencies in Ethiopia’s Tigray province (1975-1991). These case studies combine secondary literature with primary sources collected during fieldwork in Iraq, Ethiopia and several European countries – including fifty-four semi-structured interviews with forty former insurgent leaders, their memoirs, and archival materials. In order to assess the generalizability of my argument across a variety of historical, geographical and political contexts, I also conducted shadow case studies of the civil wars in Lebanon (1975-89), Sri Lanka (1983-2009) and Syria (2011-), and analyzed an original panel dataset of all dyads of rebel groups pitted against the same government in multi-party civil wars in the period 1989-2011. Table of Contents List of Tables ii List of Figures iii Acknowledgments iv 1. Introduction 1 2. Fighting the Wrong Enemy? Windows of Opportunity, Vulnerability, and Inter-rebel War 12 3. The Kurdish Insurgencies in Iraq, 1961-1988 73 4. Insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray, 1961-1991 125 5. Assessing External Validity with Shadow Case Studies: Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Syria 208 6. Assessing External Validity with Statistical Analysis: Are Coethnic Rebel Groups More Likely to Fight Each Other? 279 7. Conclusions 294 Bibliography 308 Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 346 Appendix 2: Robustness Checks for Statistical Analysis 351 i List of Tables Table 3.1: Summary of the findings of the Kurdish insurgencies in Iraq 111 Table 4.1: Summary of the findings of the insurgencies in Tigray and Eritrea 194 Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 285 Table 6.2: Testing the coethnicity argument (I) 287 Table 6.3: Testing the coethnicity argument (II) 288 Table 6.4: Changes in the probability of inter-rebel war using Clarify 290 Table 6.5: Testing minimum winning coalition theory 291 Table 7.1: Summary of inter-rebel wars by type and outcome 296 Table A2.1: Robustness to alternative measures of government strength and threat 352 Table A2.2: Robustness checks with number of rebel groups 353 Table A2.3: Robustness to alternative measures of the inter-rebel balance of power (I) 355 Table A2.4: Robustness to alternative measures of the inter-rebel balance of power (II) 356 Table A2.5: Robustness to alternative measures of external support 357 Table A2.6: Robustness to alternative measures of territorial control and hegemonic war 359 ii List of Figures Figure 2.1: Theory of inter-rebel war 46 Figure 3.1: Map of Iraqi Kurdistan 80 Figure 3.2: Timeline of inter-rebel war in Iraqi Kurdistan 85 Figure 3.3: Maximum extent of Kurdish rebels’ territorial control 112 Figure 4.1: Map of Eritrea and Tigray 126 Figure 4.2: Map of Eritrea 137 Figure 4.3: Timeline of inter-rebel war in Eritrea 140 Figure 4.4.: Map of Ethiopia 143 Figure 4.5: Timeline of inter-rebel war in Tigray 144 Figure 5.1: Map of Lebanon 220 Figure 5.2: Zones of Military Influence in Lebanon, 1976-1982 235 Figure 5.3: Map of Sri Lanka 250 Figure 5.4: Map of Syria 262 iii Acknowledgments I am deeply indebted to many people and institutions for their crucial intellectual, emotional, financial and logistical support while I was writing this dissertation. The members of my dissertation committee in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University provided constructive and insightful feedback at multiple stages of the project. Jack Snyder was a model advisor – genuinely committed to the independent intellectual development of his mentees, while always generous with his time and ideas. Page Fortna relentlessly spurred me to be systematic and rigorous in spelling out the logic of my arguments and in bringing empirical evidence to bear on them. Prof. Jervis’ (I think I am allowed to call him Bob now that I completed the PhD) work, courses and comments on the dissertation manuscript have been a major source of inspiration and stimulus to think more deeply about international relations and strategic interactions in civil war settings, in particular. I benefited enormously from tapping into Austin Long’s expertise on insurgency and counterinsurgency. Last but not least, I am thankful to Daniel Corstange: he joined the committee relatively late in the game but his thoughtful criticisms have given me much food for thought. Among Columbia’s faculty more broadly, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Prof. Betts and Massimo Morelli. Prof. Betts contributed to shape my thinking about war years before I met him, when I read his International Security essay “Is Strategy an Illusion?”. After taking his courses and serving as his teaching assistant multiple times, I continue to be amazed by his strategic wisdom whenever I read his work. Massimo Morelli has been an intellectual guide, a colleague and a close friend at the same time; he crucially enabled my field research in Iraq (and thus this dissertation) by involving me in a project of his in the country. Tanisha Fazal also generously provided valuable comments on an earlier draft of my theory chapter. At Columbia, I had the good fortune to meet a group of talented young scholars that graced me with their friendship. Graduate school would not have been as formative an intellectual and human experience without Sara Moller, Kelsey Finkel, Dianne Pfundstein, Bjorn Gomes, Andrew Cheon, Laura Vargas, Erica Borghard, Joe Brown, Melissa Valle, Stefano Recchia, Mark Schneider, Andreas Avgousti, Matias Mednik and Ben Schupmann. Matias also generously provided invaluable help in creating the dataset used in the Chapter 6 of the dissertation. Over the years Andreas has offered selfless friendship and support towards me, which I hope to be able to match one day. Outside Columbia, Peter Krause, Morgan Kaplan, Lee Seymour and Paul Staniland provided exceptionally helpful and detailed comments on drafts of several chapters of the dissertation. I am also thankful to Joan Ricart, Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli for engaging discussions and useful suggestions. Alan Kuperman radically strengthened my interest in the rigorous study of civil wars during my Master’s at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of International Advanced International Studies (SAIS) over ten years ago and (much to my surprise at the time) strongly supported my decision to pursue a PhD. My fieldwork in Iraq and Ethiopia would not have been possible without the help of the individuals – too many to mention here – that put me in touch with interviewees, helped arrange iv interviews and worked as interpreters. I am also extremely grateful to the interviewees themselves for their time and for sharing with me their civil war experiences. The Smith Richardson Foundation generously financed my field research in Ethiopia through the World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. Finally, I will be forever grateful to my mother, my sister and father; their unwavering love helped get through several dark moments on the way to the PhD. I dedicate this dissertation to my mother Mattia Pericu and to the memory of my friend Giancarlo Doria, two extraordinary individuals that have thought me much more than I could ever learn from books. v Chapter 1 Introduction In early January 2014, the news media were abuzz with reports of large-scale clashes between Sunni rebel groups taking part in the Syrian civil war, which had started over two years earlier when the government cracked down on peaceful protestors. Pundits were quick to point out that the Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Assad would be the ultimate beneficiary. Analysts Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, for example, noted that “rebel infighting is a boon to regime forces and clearly detrimental to the overall strength of the Syrian opposition.”1 This initial assessment was confirmed by subsequent developments, as the government made major gains in the following months as inter-rebel war dragged on.2 Analyses of the causes of the infighting, however, were not as insightful as the predictions of its consequences.