Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi╎s Memoirs, 1967•Fi1971
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Naval War College Review Volume 69 Article 18 Number 2 Spring 2016 Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971 Youssef H. Aboul-Enein Richard J. Norton Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. and Norton, Richard J. (2016) "Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967–1971," Naval War College Review: Vol. 69 : No. 2 , Article 18. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/18 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 142Aboul-Enein NAVAL WAR and COLLEGE Norton: REVIEWReconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War Minister Gen. Moham Today’s headlines are filled with discus- leaders. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein has, sions questioning the ethics of launching with this volume, begun to fill in some unmanned weapons (drones) against of the major gaps in the account. targets when nearby innocent civilians Aboul-Enein’s book is actually a col- might be killed or injured by an attack. lection of articles initially published It is interesting to reflect on the ethical in Infantry magazine. Each of the ramifications of launching thousands original accounts was written by General of unmanned weapons (the fu-go bal- Mohamed Fawzi, the man handpicked loons) against an entire continent, with by Nasser to build the defeated and no ability to predict within thousands demoralized Egyptian forces into a of miles where the weapons would professional, combined-arms military strike or who would be injured or killed. that could retake and hold occupied Such attacks today would certainly Egyptian territory. Fawzi served as war violate the law of armed conflict, but minister for both Nasser and Sadat and they must be judged within the con- was the master architect of the stunning- text of warfare in the last century. ly successful creation of professionalism I strongly recommend this book to in the Egyptian armed forces. His voice, those with an interest in the tech- despite whatever biases and personal nology of warfare, and to those axes to grind he may bring to the table, who may have heard of the balloon deserves to be heard, and Aboul-Enein’s bomb attacks and thought them translation gives Fawzi that opportunity. to be almost-mythical events. Fawzi’s challenge was massive. The pre- JOHN E. JACKSON Fawzi army was much more involved with state security than with power projection or war fighting. As the 1967 war had revealed, the Egyptian armed forces, even with Soviet equipment, Reconstructing a Shattered Egyptian Army: War were woefully inferior technologically Minister Gen. Mohamed Fawzi’s Memoirs, 1967– to Israeli forces. The Egyptian army was 1971, ed. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Annapolis, riddled with low morale and displayed Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 320 pages. an apparently well-deserved inferior- $10.94. ity complex. Its soldiery was, for the Few states in modern times have seen most part, uneducated and poorly their military beaten as badly as Egypt trained. The Egyptian high command did in 1967—and have that military was overcentralized, overpoliticized, survive. Even fewer, perhaps no oth- and, as events had proved, unable to ers, have then deliberately rebuilt that exercise anything like the command and defeated force to a point at which a control required in modern combat. mere five years later it could again offer The end of the war both left Israel with battle and, arguably, produce victory. strategic depth and turned the Suez How the Egyptians accomplished this Canal into a natural defensive barrier has been something of an incomplete that was further fortified with a series and little-known story up to now. This is of formidable defensive positions. mainly due to a lack of translated articles Fawzi admits to having certain un- and writings penned by senior Egyptian usual advantages in accomplishing his Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016 1 6798_BookReviews.indd 142 3/9/16 1:59 PM Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 18 BOOK REVIEWS 143 mission� Nasser was willing to give his soldiers underwent quantum improve- new war minister as close to a blank ments as well—and these improvements check as could be imagined� Nothing were the real war aims of this period� was more important than securing a It is also clear that whatever strategic victory and expunging the shame of deterrent the Israeli leaders thought they 1967� Furthermore, the Soviet Union might have against the Egyptians did became a guaranteed supplier of not work when it came to preventing at military hardware, not only making least a limited war� As the Egyptian army up the quantitative Egyptian losses but began to believe in itself, Fawzi and his substantially improving equipment officers crafted plans for what would quality as well� Fawzi makes the point become one of the most successful set- that the Soviets were less motivated by piece battles of the twentieth century: a common ideology in this effort than the 1973 crossing of the Suez Canal by the need to prove that their equip- and the breaching of the Bar-Lev line� ment was at least on a par with that of Reproducing the Infantry articles, com- the United States, and to maintain their plete with their original and somewhat geopolitical position in the region� Fawzi repetitive forewords, gives the book also confirms that the Soviet presence something of a choppy feel� It is also on the ground was extensive, that Soviet clear that this work is a synopsis of forces not only advised but performed Fawzi’s memoirs, not a complete transla- certain military duties as well� tion� Some readers will be left with a Fawzi brought new capabilities to Egypt desire to know more� Not surprisingly, and improved others� Surface-launched the focus of the book tends to be at ship-to-ship missiles, modern surface- the strategic level� Readers who want to-air missile batteries, new armor more tactical details will have to find and aircraft all entered the Egyptian them elsewhere� Unfortunately for our inventory� Fawzi understood, how- understanding of Egyptian perspectives ever, that new hardware would not be of how the war was waged, Fawzi was re- enough� Military-school attendance was lieved of his duties two years before the increased, and the military’s intellec- war began and was arrested for conspir- tual capabilities expanded� But beyond ing to overthrow Sadat, so this critical that, he explains, the three-year “war element is sadly lacking� However, these of attrition” that Egypt waged against shortcomings pale when compared Israel (1967–70) was a deliberate effort with the value inherent in this work� to blood the Egyptian army, test new RICHARD J� NORTON tactics, and deploy new forces� Over this period, Fawzi argues, the Israeli forces came to embrace a defensive mind-set, while the Egyptian army became imbued with the spirit of the offensive� Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military, Although most books claim Israel won by George E� Reed� Lincoln, Neb�: Potomac the war of attrition, Fawzi claims this Books, 2015� 216 pages� $26�50� was not the case� According to Fawzi, Although the term “toxic leadership” has not only did Israeli jets increasingly recently come into vogue, the U�S� mili- avoid Egyptian airspace, but Egyptian tary is no stranger to the phenomenon� https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/18 2 NWC_Spring2016Review.indb 143 3/8/16 10:29 AM.