2021 RBS MUNJAN 22. 23. 24

STUDY GUIDE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE ARABIC STATES 2

Table of Contents

1. Message from the Chairs

2. Introduction to the Committee

3. Related Incidents/ Incidents that have directly impacted the 6 Day War

4. Timeline

5. What went wrong?

6. Country Profiles

7. Portfolios (Responsibilities/ Powers)

8. Details on the Operation of Committee (Documents, How crisis works,

Awards)

9. Citations

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Message From The Chairs

Esteemed Cabinet Members, 15th May 1967

The existence of Israel in our beloved Arabic peninsula has persisted too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression. We welcome the battle we have long awaited. The hour has come.

Our suspicions on the Israeli conspirators against our great nations have now been confirmed by our Soviet allies. The Zionists’ audacity to deploy their brigades along the glorious Syrian frontier is an open invitation to war- the long awaited battle has come. Israel doesn’t stand a chance.

While our victory is inevitable, we must not underestimate our enemies either. Amongst our cabinet are decorated war heroes, renowned generals, perhaps even the most powerful men in the Middle-East. However, our place in history, our legacy, so to speak, depends entirely on the days to come, on moments to come when we face the Arab world’s greatest enemy.

What is expected of you, or rather what is undoubtedly required from you is an unwavering dedication to our cause. You must be quick to think, quick to protect, quick to strike. Every second we waste, the Israelis are gaining an upper hand. Every mistake we make, hundreds of thousands of brave Arabic lives are placed at risk.

Do you want to share your homeland with the cruel Zionists that wreak havoc over our Peninsula? Do you want to risk your children’s lives by condoning the discourse they create? Do you want our Holy City of Jerusalem to still be under their wretched control? Do you not want to see their obnoxious flag burn to ashes?

May Allah save us all, for we are all that stands between our great nations and a grim reality.

Saharsha Dhan Tuladhar Shaleen Baral Deputy Secretary General Chair of Chair of

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Introduction to the committee

takes us back to the 1960s to revisit (لا فلاحتلا) The Emergency Session of the Arabic States one of the most consequential conflicts which the middle east has ever witnessed: The Six- Day War, where bottled up tension from the First and Second Arab-Israeli War as well as other minor military engagements drove Israel and the belligerent forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon into war.

On one hand we have Israel, a country with detailed battle plans, visionary commanders and responsive, well-armed troops while on the other hand we have a coalition of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, whose combined military and diplomatic might goes unmatched in the Middle East. However, being mindful of what actually occurred, delegates shouldn’t be quick to claim victory and are expected to deal with internal conflicts, stagnancy and betrayals in addition to the foe outside. Armed with the benefit of hindsight, and the unique ministerial portfolios with the authority to issue directives, the fate and future of millions of Arabians and the “new face” of the Arabic Peninsula are in the hands of the delegates of this committee.

All in all, with the promise of not only dynamic debates but also jaw-dropping crisis updates and unexpected outcomes, delegates can rest assured that the Emergency Session of the will live up to the standards set over the years by RBSMUN’s iconic علا فلاحتلا) Arabic States crisis committees.

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Related Wars/ Incidents that have directly impacted the 6 Day War

Related wars a. 1948 Arab War In 1947, a vote in the United Nations had recommended the creation of a Jewish and Palestinian state in the land known then as the “British Mandate for Palestine”. The events of the holocaust had meant that the international community saw the creation of a Jewish state as being of great importance and voted in favor of it overwhelmingly but Arab countries of the Middle East were not as supportive, to say the least. They had openly threatened to destroy the “Zionist State” as soon as it would be formed. For them, the British Mandate belonged exclusively to the Arabs of the region and the creation of the Jewish State would mean a loss of land belonging, in their eyes, to them.

The 1948 war is known by different names to different people. The Arabs call it “the Nakba” which translates to “catastrophe” in English. The Jews call the war many things but the themes that flow across the various names are that of independence, liberation, and sovereignty. This encapsulates what the war meant for the two parties, a sovereign Jewish state for the Jews and a catastrophe for the Arabs.

The war of 1948 is a tricky one to deconstruct. As soon as the UN declaration of the partition of the British Mandate was passed a civil war of sorts had erupted. The British, who were technically in charge of the region under their mandate, took a hands-off approach as Jews and Palestinians clashed in the streets. Both groups of people had unofficial militaries that preceded the UN declaration and the creation of the states. The Jewish forces in particular called the “Haganah” were well organized and were able to drive Arab populations living in what was to soon be a new Jewish state as per the UN resolution out of the land that was soon to be theirs.

On the 14th of May, 1948 the first Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben Gurion declared the formation of a Jewish state, Israel. The very next day the British Mandate was terminated

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 6 and as the British left, the Arabs planned to move in. On the 15th of May, the surrounding Arab nations of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon invaded the day-year-old nation of Israel.

The Arabs overwhelmed the Jewish state and were seemingly marching towards victory. The first month of the war swung the tide of the war definitely in favor of the Arabs. Around 2000 Jews had lost their lives in the first month of the war. On the 11th of June, the UN managed to broker a truce that was to last 28 days. This time was to be spent talking and trying to move towards a peaceful alternative but in reality, the 28 days were used planning out strategies, shipping in arms and ammunition, and preparing for the continuation of the war after the end of the truce by both sides. These 28 days proved vital for Israel as they were able to ship in not only arms but also bring in Jewish refugees from Europe which allowed them to bolster their military, the Israel Defense Force, or the IDF’s military strength.

After the end of the truce, Israel launched an offensive called “Operation Danny”. The later phases of the plan failed but Israel was able to gain control of the roadways that joined Jerusalem and Tel Aviv which boosted Israeli morale. In the fall of 1948, the Israelis captured the Southern city of Be’er Sheva and dealt a major blow to the Egyptians, essentially gaining control of Southern Israel. With continuous efforts in the following months, Israel was able to push Egypt back enough that by February of 1949 the Egyptians withdrew from the war. The war eventually ended in March of 1949 and from the ruins of the war emerged a sovereign Jewish nation. Over 1% of the Jewish population lost their lives in the war including some holocaust survivors. On the Arab end, hundreds of thousands of Arabs were displaced from their homes, many lost their lives, and almost all were left without a safe place to call home. b. 1956 Suez Canal Crisis After the war of 1949, the Middle East grew unstable. With the Arab countries forming the Arab league fighting for a Palestinian state in the region, going as far as to createa representative body for the Palestinian people called the “All-Palestine government” and continuing their refusal to recognize Israel as a legitimate nation, hostilities were high. The Syrian government was actively commissioning terrorist attacks along the border and while no war was ongoing, peace was far from how one would describe the situation.

The Suez Canal was a man-made waterway that connected the Mediterranean Sea to the

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Red Sea. This allowed Ships to move from Europe to the Middle East and Asia with much ease. Instead of having to take a trip around the whole of Africa, they could simply move across the Suez Canal. This made the canal of much significance and the country who could control it powerful. The waterway was initially controlled by the Egyptians and later partially by the British. The Anglo Egyptian treaty of 1936 allowed the British to station 100000 troops along the waterway but the changing sentiments amongst the people of Egypt overtime meant the British were no longer welcome in the country. Eventually, the people of Egypt grew even more hostile towards the West and amid the instability in 1952, a coup d’état in Egypt saw the rise of General Gamal Abdel Nassar, a man who had served in the war of 1948 and had a strict anti-West mindset and policies.

The Suez Canal Nassar was a smart strategist and was able to exploit the Cold War to gain favors from both the West and the Soviets. He sought to make Egypt a powerhouse in the region and to do so he was secretly trading weapons from the Soviet Union while also making deals to receive money from the US and UK to build dams along the Nile. Things seemed to be going well for Egypt initially but when the West found out about their dealings with the Soviets they cut off all ties with General Gamal Abdel Nassar the country. As a form of retaliation Nassar declared he would nationalize the Suez Canal and the Europeans would have to pay the Egyptian government to use it in the future.

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This move infuriated the UK. They along with France and Israel sought to put things back in place. On the 26th of October 1956, the Israelis attacked Egypt and two days later French and British forces joined them. The three were able to easily overpower Egypt and take control of the canal. This move was seen in a negative light all around the Middle East and managed to spark protests. The USSR threatened the countries with nuclear retaliation and even the US, an ally of the invading nations, threatened economic sanctions over the “unnecessary” escalation in the region. This caused things to de-escalate and The UN was able to get all parties to accept a temporary ceasefire. By December 22nd, the British and French had already moved to remove their troops. By March the next year, the Israelis had also ejected their troops. The canal was again open for international trade.

Egypt had come out of the crisis as the winners and Nassar a hero. The Israelis also, however, had gained access to the Strait of Tiran, a strait that made trading much easier for them. The problems between the Egyptians and the Israelis would never completely subside and eventually result in the six-day war in 1967.

Long Term

While the Six-Day War that erupted in 1967 may have changed the face of the Middle-East, the broader Arab-Israeli conflict to which the war belonged was anything but new. It had begun decades earlier, driven by the ongoing refusal by Israel’s neighbors to accept Jewish sovereignty in the Middle East. As Jordan’s King Hussein admitted before the United Nations General Assembly, “Today’s war is not a new war but part of the old war,” which he said would continue until Arab demands were met.

The general animosities that led to the Six-Day War began even before 1948. Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration (fig below) and Jewish nationalism in British Mandate Palestine had instigated King Hussein of Jordan conflict as early as the 1920s, when Palestinian Arab rioters, often encouraged by Palestinian religious leader Haj Amin al Husseini, attacked Jewish communities in Tel Chai, Jaffa, Jerusalem and elsewhere. These deadly riots continued sporadically throughout the 1930s, leading Jewish armed groups to engage in defensive — and eventually preemptive and retaliatory — battles with Arab fighters and villagers.

The status of the international waterways, one of the main reasons for the Six-Day War,

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also has its roots in the decades preceding the eventual conflict. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Egypt blockaded the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran to shipping destined for Israel. These restrictions not only harmed the nascent Jewish state, but were considered a violation of the 1949 armistice resolution signed by Egypt and Israel, the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and Security Council Resolution 95. It wasn’t until 1956 — after Israel, France and the United Kingdom invaded and then quickly withdrew from Egypt’s Sinai peninsula — that passage through the Straits of Tiran (but not the Suez Canal) was opened to Israeli shipping. The presence of a United Nations Emergency Force stationed in the Sinai between 1956 and 1967 helped deter Egypt from reimposing its blockade.

By the summer of 1967, however, the UN troops were gone, and the blockades were back in place, leading The Balfour Declaration the drift to war to reach its climax. With all this said, however, it must be prefaced that the war was hardly expected, or pre-planned. Despite the unwavering Arab position that Israel must be destroyed, the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed tame, even after 1964, when attacks against Israel by the Palestinian Fatah organization and skirmishes along the Israeli-Syrian border occurred with increasing regularity.

But this apparent peace was disturbed in May 1967, when war became inevitable. As American relations with Egypt soured, the Soviet Union stepped up its influence in the Arab world, working to build (pro-Soviet) Arab unity by focusing Arab attention on their common enemy, Israel. The prospect of fighting against America had a deterrent effect on Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, just as fear of the Soviet Union weighed on Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol.

But as the weight of the Soviets shifted more firmly behind the Arabs’ anti-Israel positions, an emboldened Nasser moved to reclaim Egypt’s position as leader of the Arab world — a position that had eroded in part because of the Nasser’s stance that the Arabs should hold off on outright confrontation with Israel until the Arab world could successfully marshal its collective resources against the Jewish state. Any show of military strength against Israel, then, would help the Egyptian president regain his lost stature. The atmosphere in the spring of 1967 convinced Nasser that the time was right to flex his muscles.

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Immediate Drift: a. Syrian-Israel Conflict In the spring of 1967, tensions between Syria and Israel ran high, with flashpoints including terrorist raids against Israel originating from Syria and the Syrian diversion of water from the Jordan River. Following an attack on the water pump at Kibbutz Misgav Am, Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levi Eshkol resolved that after the next act of belligerence, Israel would position armored tractors deep into the demilitarized zones, wait to be hit, and then fire back. The plan went into effect accordingly and resulted in a large-scale dogfight on April 7 over Syrian skies, in which the Israeli Air Force shot down several Syrian planes. In the next month, Fatah, the Palestinian terrorist organization, launched more than a dozen attacks on Israel and planted mines and explosives on Israel’s borders with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. On May 5, violence escalated as Palestinian fighters shelled Kibbutz Manara. All the while, Israel continued with its forays into the demilitarized zones and Israel launched a diplomatic campaign to set the groundwork for retaliation.

Kibbutz Manara and Misgav Am b. Soviet Meddling In mid-May, Soviet meddling severely escalated the brewing conflict. On May 15, Israel Independence Day, plans for a parade involving large numbers of Israeli troops in western Jerusalem drew outrage in Arab countries. Wishing to defuse the situation, Eshkol forbade bringing heavy weapons into the capital. This decision was used by the Soviets to stoke tensions; on May 15, Anwar al-Sadat, then speaker of the Egyptian National Assembly, visited Moscow, where he was falsely warned by the Soviets that Israel was planning to invade Syria sometime between the dates of May 16 and May 22. The Soviets cited the absence of weapons in the Jerusalem parade as proof that the Israelis were preparing for war and Anwar al-Sadat

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 11 falsely claimed that Israel was massing brigades along its northern border with Syria. This disinformation made its way to Egypt’s President Nasser, who on May 14 declared a state of emergency and made a show of parading his troops through Cairo on their way to Sinai.

Jerusalem c. Claims of Israeli Troop Buildup Debunked, But Evidence Ignored On May 14, Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian chief of the general staff, visited Damascus and toured the Syrian border with Israel, where he saw no Israeli troop buildup. Fawzi’s findings, which were confirmed by the chief of Egypt’s military intelligence, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, and the CIA, were shared with Nasser, who nevertheless decided to proceed in his menacing troop buildups.

In response to the Egyptian troop buildup, Eshkol put the army on a first-level alert and authorized the placement of several tank companies in the south. Reluctant to send a message that Israel was eager for war, he did not call up the reservists. Israeli diplomats went into service on all fronts — inviting UN Observer Odd Bull to the north to confirm troops were not gathered there, seeking to relay to Egypt that Israel was not interested in war,

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 12 and sending international warnings about the gravity of Egypt’s actions.

Between the nights of May 15 and 16, the Egyptian and Palestinian troop presence in the Sinai tripled. On May 17, Egyptian planes entered Israeli airspace to carry out an unprecedented reconnaissance of Israel’s nuclear reactor in Dimona, prompting the Israelis to heighten the alert of their army and airforce. Syria announced that its forces were deployed in the Golan Heights. Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Golan Heights

Rabin called up 18,000 troops and ordered the laying of mines along parts of the Egyptian border. General Murtagi, the Egyptian Commander of forces in the Sinai, declared an Order of the Day, which was broadcasted on Cairo Radio May 18: “The Egyptian forces have taken up positions in accordance with our predetermined plans. The morale of our armed forces is very high, for this is the day they have so long been waiting for, for this holy war.” d. Egypt Evicts UN Forces In the evening of May 16, Egypt presented the United Nations Emergency Force, which had been deployed in the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip to discourage hostilities between Egypt and Israel, with a demand to withdraw from key locations. Without consulting with the General Assembly, as required by a commitment made in the UN in 1957, UN Secretary General U Thant decided to withdraw all of the UN forces. By May 19, UNEF officers relinquished their posts to the Egyptians and the Palestine Liberation Army. Meanwhile, Israel, by May 20, had called up nearly 80,000 reservists. e. Straits of Tiran closed On May 22, Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping for the first time since the 1956 war, an act of war under international law. (Israel had long made clear that blocking the Israeli port of Eilat was cause for war.) Nasser’s decision to close the strait set off activity across the Arab world. Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all activated their militaries. Iraqi troops reportedly approached the Syrian and Jordanian borders while Jordan moved tanks towards the West Bank. f. The Defense Pact On May 30, King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a mutual defense pact in which Egypt

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 13 gained joint command of the Jordanian army. Iraq joined a military alliance with Syria, Egypt and Jordan. In the context of the pact, Jordan permitted the reopening of PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) offices in Amman and essentially relinquished control of its army to the Egyptians, who transferred two Egyptian battalions to Jordanian territory. By this point, Israel was surrounded by some 500,000 troops, more than 5,000 tanks, and almost 1,000 fighter planes.

Alarmed by this development and succumbing to public pressure, Eshkol stepped down as defense minister on June 1 and named popular war hero Moshe Dayan as a replacement, which buoyed public spirit.

In the first several days of June, the Israeli government began to receive signals from the Americans that the U.S. no longer opposed a preemptive strike, and Dayan oversaw final preparations of Israel’s war plan.

Amman, Jordan Moshe Dayan g. Arab Preparations For Egyptians, their troops continued to pour into Sinai. Despite some disorganization, shortages and exhaustion among his forces, Nasser was sure of victory. On the Jordanian front, battalions from the Arab Legion, under the control of Egyptian General ‘Abd al-Mun’im

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Riyad, were laregely spread out across West Bank Palestinian villages instead of being concentrated in more strategically important locales.

Confident of victory, the Jordanians resolved to cut off western Jerusalem by attacking Israeli positions in the north and south of the city at the start of the fighting. As for Syria, it failed to coordinate with Egypt despite their defense pact. Like the Jordanians, the Syrians adopted ambitious war plans, opting for an offensive operation as opposed to a more limited plan to fend off Israeli attacks on the Golan Heights. Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia all sent troops to the Sinai. With the Arab nations united like never before, Arab oil companies pledged to boycott any country that supported Israel and Nasser threatened to close the Suez Canal. The Soviets, too, lent a hand of support by way of 10 warships which arrived in the eastern Mediterranean.

West Bank, Palestine h. Israel Decides Israel received word from France, the nation’s major arms supplier, that De Gaulle had issued a complete ban on weapons sales and transfers to Israel. And in a June 4 meeting, the newly formed Cabinet, received a cable from President Johnson seeming to contradict the earlier American softening on the issue of preemption. It warned that “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to do it alone.”, discouraging Israel from making the first move. Nevertheless, the Cabinet, in a 12-to-2 vote, opted for war, scheduled to begin early the next morning, Monday, June 5.

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Timeline

Day 1 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

Jordanian bombard- ment of Jerusalem First wave of Israeli air & Central Israel. Iraqi 7:46 attacks in Operation 9:45 and Jordanian aircraft Focus; hits Egypt. try to bomb Tel Aviv & other targets.

Southern District Commander Yehushua Gavish gives the attack order. Tal’s division Israeli bombing of crosses southern Gaza airfields in Mafraq and Syrian aircraft attack 8:15 into Rafiah; Jordanian 12:00 Amman. Jordanians 12:00 targets in Haifa radar at Ajlun detects capture UNO HQ in the Israeli attack and Jerusalem. warns Egyptians, but the Egyptians do not get the transmission.

Seventh Brigade in Israel bombs Iraq air- 10:15 12:25 June 5 Khan Yunis. base H-3

IAF attacks Cairo Inter- national Airport, de- The Jerusalem brigade 16:00 stroying combat aircraft 13:00 captures the UN gover- hidden under the wings nor’s HQ in Jerusalem. of civilian airliners.* IAF aircraft attack Seventh brigade armor 45th Israel armored Syrian air bases, de- 17:00 in El Arish; mopping up 15:00 brigade crosses border 13:00 stroying most of the in Rafiah near Ta’anach Syrian air force. Israel conquers Tsur Yoffe’s division at Bir al 18:30 15:30 Baher and Pa’amon lachfan junction. fortified positions. IN ships in Alexandria & Jordanian artillery shell 22:00 17:00 Port Said. Tel Aviv

Israel takes “Radar” Syrian artillery bom- 19:30 and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz 18:40 bards Rosh Pina positions.

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Day 2 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

Latrun Police fort cap- Syrian artillery bar- Sharon’s division tured by 55th brigade rage on Israeli border completes conquest & 4th armored brigade; communities and 6:00 3:00 5:47 of Umm el Katef, Afu 10th brigade cuts off attempt to advance Ageila Jerusalem-Ramallah to Tel Dan, Dan and road Ashmora. Conquest of Bir al Lah- 45th Brigade enters 12:00 fan completed. Tal and 5:30 Jenin. Yoffe link up. Counterattack of Conquest of Gaza com- 13:00 6:00 Jordan Legion 40th plete brigade in Dotan valley.

Conquest of “armor Ras el Naqeb con- 16:00 6:15 hill” (“givat hatahmosh- quered et”) in Jerusalem.

Jebel Libni junction North East Jerusalem 18:30 8:00 conquered conquered

June 6 General retreat ordered 37th brig. captures 20:00 11:00 for Egyptian army. Talpit Capture of “Givat 11:45 Hamivtar”

13:00 Jenin Surrenders

End of Dotan valley 17:00 battler

Qalqiliya conquered by 17:20 IDF

Abu Tor conquered by 18:00 IDF

19:30 Conquest of Ramallah

General retreat from the West Bank (Judea 24:00 & Samaria) ordered for Jordan Legion.

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Day 3 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

Syrian artillery bom- Zabbida-Aqaba was bardments continue 9:00 Bir al-Hasna conquered 2:00 conquered. all along the northern border with Golan.

Old city of Jerusalem 11:00 Al Qazima conquered 10:00 was conquered.

Israel Navy at Sharm el Tul Karm was con- 12:14 11:00 Sheikh quered

Nablus (Shechem) 11:15 conquered. June 7 Final general retreat 12:15 order for Jordanian forces.

Mar Elias monastery 14:30 Bir Gafgafa conquered 14;25 conquered

Gush Etzion con- 18:00 Mitleh pass was closed 18:00 quered by Israel.

Nasser turns down UN Security Council cease- fire initiative. Israeli Jericho was con- 19:40 19:30 fourth division prevent- quered by Israel. ing Egyptian retreat at Mitleh and Jiddi passes

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Day 4 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

Syrian artillery 3d Eg.The armored bombardments con- brigade attacks Tal’s 3:00 6:30 IDF conquers Hebron. tinue all along the vanguard west of Bir northern border with Gafgafa. Golan. Israel reconnaissance flight spots ship off Gaza coast, later iden- IAF attacks Syrian tified as USS Liberty, Link up of central and defenses in prepa- and marked on Israeli southern command 5:55 8:00 ration for operation situation map. Liberty forces at Dahirieh (west Hammer, which is had not received cables of Hebron). then cancelled. ordering it to withdraw 100 miles from the coast. IDF destroys Jordan 6:00 Kuntilah conquered. 13:00 river bridges. Israeli pilots spot Lib- erty 30 km north of El Arish. Rabin summons June 8 a US Naval attache and warns him to identify or 9:00 remove U.S. ships from the battle zone. Israe- li requests for naval liaison were repeatedly refused by the US. Israeli battle with Egyp- tian reserve at Kantara 10:00 approaches. Jiddi pass conquered by Israelis. Israeli duty officer goes 11:00 off shift, removes Liber- ty marker. Explosion of ammuni- tion dumps at El-Arish mistakenly attributed by 11:24 Israelis to naval attack. Rabin repeats the order to sink any unidentified ships.

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Day 4 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

Liberty spotted, but not identified, by Israeli torpedo boats, who re- 13:41 quested air assistance. Israeli air reconnais- sance fails to identify the ship.

2 Israeli Mirages strafe the Liberty. A squad of Mysteres dropped napalm on the ship. Before renewing the 13:57 attack, Israelis identify Latin alphabet lettering, showing the ship was not Arab, and break off attack. June 8 Torpedo ship squadron pagoda, ordered to hold back, nonetheless arrives on the scene of the USS Liberty battle and fires five torpedoes at the ship after US personnel fire at the torpedo boats.

Egypt accepts ceasefire 15:30 (9:30 PM N.Y. time)

End of Kalat a-nahal 16:00 battle.

18:00 Kantara conquered

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Day 5 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

After an intercepted message from Nasser indicates Arab forces are near collapse, Dayan reverses his Yoffe’s advance armor 1:00 7:20 stand and the deci- reaches Suez Canal sion of the cabinet, and orders attack on the Golan Heights. Initially a limited plan called “Hammer.”

8th brig. begins ad- 11:30 vance on Syrian lines in North Golan IDF conquers Tel 12:35 Hallal IDF conquers Tel 17:00 June 9 Azaziat IDF takes Tal Fahr 18:20 bunkers after bloody battle.

Nasser, in televised speech, blames the United States for the loss and insists that the US helped Israel. He threatens “The Sixth Fleet runs on Arab IDF takes Zaura-Kala 18:30 Petroleum.” Nasser 18:30 compound. announces resignation. Speech is followed by anti-aircraft fire and a huge “spontaneous demonstration” that causes him to retract the resignation.

20:00 IDF takes Rouya

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Day 6 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

IDF conquers Jalabina 4:00 fortifications.

Syrians announce falsely that Kuneitra 8:30 has fallen, in order to pressure for a cease fire.

Kuneitra falls to IDF June 10 (12:30 according to 14:30 Michael Oren, 6 Days of War)

Dayan meets Odd Bull and agrees to a 15:00 ceasefire by 18:00 hrs.

18:15 Mas’ada falls.

Day 8 Egyptian Front Jordanian Front Syrian Front

Hermon and Majdal June 12 Chams claimed for Israel.

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What went wrong?

Israel, within the span of only 6 days, from July 5 to July 10 in 1967 was not only able to defend themselves from the military might of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, four very strong Middle Eastern powers of the time but also push back and capture the territories of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, the Old City of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. The war was a total and utter humiliation for everyone not named Israel who was involved in the war. So what was it that went wrong?

Israel’s Preemptive Strikes On the 5th of July 1967, the Israelis caught wind of what the Arabs were planning. Israel’s defences were mobilized and quickly executed Operation Focus, a preemptive strike that destroyed 18 Egyptian airfields. Egypt had the biggest airforce in the Middle East but this operation had crippled almost 90% of their aerial prowess.

By the end of the day airfields in Jordan, Syria and Iraq had also been all but completely destroyed. Israel had established aerial superiority over the skies of the Middle East within the span of 24 hours. This made it so that an aerial option had been virtually eliminated for the Arabs.

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Jordanian Intelligence Lapse Before they got dragged into fighting with Jordan, Israel had written to the Jordanian King, explaining how Israel had no intentions to fight Jordan as long as they did not intervene. This would have been a proposition worth thinking about for Jordan had they not been fed lies by Egypt. The Egyptian government had been advertising a crushing victory on their front, proclaiming the war was all but sealed.

This could not be further from the truth but the Jordanians certainly did not know that. In their eyes, this was an opportunity for Jordan to claim the spoils of a victory over Israel without having to invest much at all. Jordan hence jumped into the war underprepared. They had reason to believe the Israelites would not put up a fight so to their surprise when Israel retaliated with full force the Jordanians were caught completely off guard and eventually absolutely humiliated.

Unsuccessful Demilitarization in the Sinai In 1956, Israel launched Operation Kadesh to end the insurgent raids and extricate the Egyptian control on the Straits of Tiran. Although Israel successfully gained control of Tiran, they had to relinquish the entire Sinai Peninsula which they had successfully won over the course of three days. In light of the open hostility among the two sides, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed along the armistice line of the Egypt-Israeli border in hopes to deter future conflicts. However, no agreements or policies contributing to demilitarizing or de-escalating future conflicts were ever drafted. This conflict marked the transition of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to a professional and formidable army capable of handling large scale operations. Furthermore, Israel also got the chance to confirm the competence of their new armoured corps and learned to refine their areal corps, which benefited them greatly during the 6-Day War a decade later.

Incoordination Within the Coalition The Arabian coalition’s defeat against Israel was primarily caused by their inability to launch a coordinated offense against a surrounded and outnumbered foe. Their centralized command structure, refusal to delegate military decisions, the appointment of higher military posts to those who are more loyal than qualified, along with a balance of power method made for a dysfunctional army. Poor leadership paired with substandard literacy, training and logistics are also prominent factors causing the Arabian loss. For example, the Egyptian retreat from the front lines fragmented the army and they scrambled back, breaking formation due to unclear orders and planning. The coordinated and motivated IDF capitalized on the chaos to pick apart their foes, killing up to 10,000 Egyptians on a single day.

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An army’s unit cohesion is the single most important element of its overall effectiveness. Arabian soldiers who were not particularly biased against Jews had little motivation to fight this war in contrast to the IDF soldiers who were to fight for their very existence. Arab leaders hesitated to allow routine joint military training in fear of being overthrown by their own military due to low morale. It is believed that the command enforced discipline through arbitrary means such as fear and forced orders to rally their soldiers for battle.

The Arabian education system consisted of a traditional method of learning by the book. Although their military leaders did possess knowledge and expertise in their fields, their inability to be creative and analyze the status quo to make effective decisions accordingly led to the defeat of the Arab coalition. The supply of advanced Soviet military equipment, vehicles and aircraft to ineptly trained Egyptian and Syrian military, who lacked the skill to operate skillfully also contributed to an Arab defeat. Furthermore, leaders and officers in the military ranks were often given the job in accordance to their loyalty and affiliation with the government. Such unqualified military leaders were incapable of making quick decisions. Firstly, due to their experience and knowledge and secondly, due to the limitations in the delegation of authority throughout the army. Such a rigid structure is undesirable in modern warfare. In contrast, the Israeli army consisted of qualified military leaders and officers who could adapt to the situations they were presented with and issue orders independently and on the spot to outmanoeuvre their opponents, which is key to winning modern conflicts.

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Country Profiles

Jordan

1. General Background a. Type of Country: What we know today is Jordan was part of the Ottoman Empire till 1918 and then part of the British Mandate till 1948 after which it finally gained its freedom and became the sovereign state of the “Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan”. As the name would suggest, the sole wielder of all power, the man who has the final say in everything is Hussein Bin Talib - the King of Jordan. Jordan became a constitutional, hereditary kingdom with a bicameral parliamentary kingdom in 1952. The country with an upper and lower house also has a Prime Minister who appoints a cabinet and is appointed by the king. b. Location/Geography: Jordan lies between Syria to the north, Israel to the west, Iraq to the east, and Saudi Arabia to the south. Jordan is landlocked on all sides but for a 16-mile coastline in the south towards the Red Sea in the gulf where their only port, Al-’ Aqabah lies. Jordan controls the West Bank, and it has ever since its independence since 1948. Beyond the West Bank lies Israel, Jordan’s only non-Arab. The Jordan River cuts the West Bank and the rest of Jordan, flowing from the north to the south.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 26 c. Type of Government: Since its inception, Jordan has been a constitutional monarchy; according to the constitution of 1952, the system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy. Structurally, the constitution divides the powers of the government into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In reality, most power is vested in the king as the head of state, chief executive, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Through his discretion, the king appoints and may dismiss the prime minister; the president and members of the House of Notables (Senate), the upper house of the National Assembly; judges; and most other senior government officials. Moreover, the king has the power to suspend or dissolve parliament, suspend the holding of elections, declare war, sign treaties, and approve or promulgate laws. In summary, the monarchy (as an institution) and the king (as a leader) constitute the most important political foundations of the state; as a result, the average Jordanian citizen has very little ability to affect or change the government. d. Leaders: The person on the top of the hierarchy in Jordan is the Jordanian king - King Hussein Bin Talib. Before Talib Jordan was a lot less hostile towards Israel and was the de facto country the Arab States and the Jewish one would go to facilitate de-escalation. Even when Bin Talib initially came in he was friendly to The West, going as far as to keep advisors who hailed from their former colonizers, the United Kingdom. While relations with Israel were never great they were tolerable, tension at the border and bilateral talks both rather prevalent. Eventually, however, King Hussain gave in to pressure from Egypt and other Arab countries, firing the British advisers and engaging in the crossfire in the border and compromising economic relations. e. Population: The people of Jordan are mostly Arabs, hailing predominantly from Jordan but some also from Palestine. The country also does have a sizeable indigenous population of Bedouin, Arab speaking nomads of the region. By 1967, almost 1.2 million Palestinians were living in Jordan with approximately 700,000 in the West Bank. In terms of language, most people in Jordan speak Arab which certain dialectical differences between regions. The religion of the majority of Jordanians is Sunni Islam, much like their Arab neighbors. Jordan does however have a small minority of Christians from the Greek Orthodox and Catholic churches.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 27 f. Economy: The Jordanian economy is a highly vulnerable one. Its geographical location puts it on the doorsteps of political turmoil at all times. Before the six-day war when Jordan still had control of the West Bank, it was a vital part of their economy. The Jordanian economy looked to privatize only during the late 90s. Before that, the economic sectors were mostly handled by the government.

Jordan is one of the few middle eastern countries that cannot boast of their oil reserves, they do however have some natural gas along with deposits of phosphates, potash, limestone, and marble, as well as dolomite, kaolin, and salt.

2. Military a. General Introduction of the country’s military: The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), also known as the Arab Army are the military forces of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They comprise 3 main sub bodies: ground forces, air force, and navy. The King of Jordan: Hussein Bin Talal is the Supreme Commander of the Jordanian Armed Forces. Along with him are the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Habis Majali, Allied Commander of the Jordanian Front: Gen. Abdul Moneim Riadh, and commanders of respective divisions who will be leading the Jordanian Armed Force.

The origins of the JAF dates back to 1920, when it was established as a “Mobile Force”. After the Arabization of the Force, British Officers were replaced by Jordanian Commanders. Ever since its establishment, the Jordanian Armed force had indulged in numerous wars and battles mostly against Israel.

The entire Jordanian Armed Force is divided into the following divisions for the Six-Day War:

• Royal Jordanian Army • Royal Jordanian Navy • Royal Jordanian Air Force • Royal Jordanian Intelligence Directorate • Royal Jordanian Special Operations Force

To be more efficient, prompt, and organized with their actions the divisions all these divisions as per their respective requirement have been modified into lighter, more mobile forces, based

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 28 largely on a brigade structure and with a better caliber of rapid reaction in emergencies.

The main objectives of the Jordanian Armed Forces are:

• Protect the Kingdom of Jordan borders from any invasion. • Protect the people inside the Kingdom and their rights. • Protect the King of Jordan. • Objectives specific to the Six-Day War: • Defend the Arab Coalition from Israel • Work with Egypt as per the Defensive Agreement b. Grounds Army:

The Royal Jordanian Army (“Jordanian Ground Forces”) is one of the integral division of the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). It was established as the Arab Legion at the same time when the Jordanian Armed Forces were established. i. Structure Limited to the Six-day war and for our cabinet, the Royal Jordanian Army has been divided into two divisions. The grounds force will be segregated into the western command and the eastern command.

The western command will include 1st ‘Princess Alia’ Infantry Brigade, 2nd ‘Hashimi’ Infantry Brigade, 3rd TalaT Infantry Brigade, 6th ‘Qadisiya’ Infantry Brigade, 25th ‘Khalid Ibn Walid’ Infantry Brigade, 27th ‘Imam AN’ Infantry Brigade, 29th ‘Hittin’ Infantry Brigade, 40th Armoured Brigade and 60th Armoured Brigade which will be led by Major-General Muhammad Ahmed Salim.

While the eastern command consists of Hussein Ali Infantry Brigade, Yarmouk Infantry, and

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 29 the Brigade Royal Guard Brigade and will be commanded by Brigadier-General Mashour Haditha al-Jazy. ii. Purpose/Objectives The mission of Jordan’s Army is to: defend and maintain the sovereignty, security, and stability of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan against any external or internal threat. Provide any form of grounds assistance to Syria and Egypt iii. Commanders Head of Western Commands: Major-General Muhammad Ahmed Salim

Muhammad Ahmed Salim the head of Western Commands of the Jordanian Army, started his career in the Royal Jordanian Army at a very early age. The commanding General of the West Front currently holds the post of Major General in the Jordanian Army.

Head of Eastern Commands: Brigadier-General Mashour Haditha al-Jazy

Mashour Haditha al-Jazy is a Jordanian Military figure Jordan will be serving as the Head of Eastern of the Jordanian Armed Forces. As a prominent figure from the Jordanian Army, al-Jazy joined the force in 1947 and has served for Jordan in several wars and battles in the past, and in recognition, for them, he has received the post of Brigadier General in the Jordanian Army. iv. Resources/Strength Do not be rest assured that the Jordanian Army’s resources are limited to the list provided below. Figures provided are also approximations due to the absence of concrete information.

• Jordanian Royal Army Order of Battle: • 2 × Armoured Brigades (Each 96 with Patton M-48/M-48A-1 MBTs, 40 × FV-701 Ferret ARVs, 45 × M-113 APCs, 18 × M-52 105mm self-propelled howitzers, 18 × M-42 2×40mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns) • 3 × Indp. Armoured Battalions (with Centurion MK-V/VII or Patton M-47 MBTs) • 1 × Paratroop Battalion • 1 × “Royal Brigade” (Mechanized Infantry) • 9 × Infantry Brigades (1/2/3/4/12/25/27/29/36) • 12 × Artillery Battalions • 6 × Mortar Batteries

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• Land Vehicles (Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)/ Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)/ Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)) : • 297 × Patton M-48(197)/M-48A-1(100) 90mm Main Battle Tanks • 49–160 × Patton M-47 90mm MBTs • 90–105 ×Vickers Centurion Mk.V/VII 20-pdr/84.6mm MBTs • 24 × Charioteer Mk.7 FV-4101 20-pdr/84.6mm medium tanks • 140–240 × Daimler FV-702 Ferret 4×4 armored reconnaissance vehicles • 130 ×FV-601 Saladin 76mm 6×6 ARVs • 150 × FV-603 Saracen 6×6 AIFV • 250 × M-113 armored personnel carriers

• Resources used by Groundsmen (Infantry Weapons/ Mortars/ Canons etc) : • Lee–Enfield Mk.4 rifle • Sten Mk.4 sub-machine gun • Bren light machine gun • Vickers .303 cal. machine gun • M1 Garand rifle • M1 Carbine • M1A1 Thompson submachine gun • Browning M1919 A4 machine gun • Browning M-2HB .50 cal. machine gun • M-20 Super-Bazooka • RO 2-inch light mortar • RO 3-inch medium mortar • 350 × M-40A1-C1 106mm recoilless rifle • 90 × 17-pdr 76mm Towed ATGs • 36 × Archer 17-pdr/76mm TDs • 20 × M-44 155mm self-propelled howitzers • 36 × M-52 105mm SPHs • 25 × M-115 203mm towed guns • 16–18 × M-59 Long Tom 155mm towed guns • 90–108 × RO 25-pdr/87.6mm towed howitzers/guns • Brandt 120mm Heavy Mortar • RO 4.2 inch/107mm heavy mortar • Reo M-35 • M-8 Towing tractor for M-59 guns • M-88 Recovery tank

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 31 c. Airforce: The Royal Jordanian Air Force is one of the core parts of the Jorda- nian Armed Force. Having its inception back in 1948, since then it has developed to become one of the major military organiza- tions of the entire Arab Region. The Royal Jordanian Air Force was charged with the missions of air defense of territorial integrity, close support of the army, tactical bombing, and airlift of troops and supplies. i. Structure The Royal Jordanian Air Force is divided into two subdivi- sions and will work from the Amman Air Base and Mafraq Air Base:

• Royal Jordanian Air Attacking Front • Royal Jordain Air Defense

The Royal Jordanian Air Attacking Front is responsible for implementing all forms of battle plans, strategies which include Jordan to take any form of air attacking action. While the Royal Jordanian Air Defense has the burden of maintaining stability, safety, and security in Jordan and the entire Arab Coalition from all forms of external air threats ii. Purpose/Objective • Precision Engagement: Application of selective force against specific targets such that there is both precise and reliable use of military power with minimal risk and collateral damage. • Information Superiority: Keeping up with information and incorporating it into a cam- paign/ battle plan. • Agile Combat Support: Deployment and sustainment operations of key combat support applies to all forces, from those permanently based to contingency buildups to expedi- tionary forces. • The Secondary Tasks • To support Land Forces in any armed conflict with any external power. • To support security forces in their tasks of maintaining the internal security and border security operations.

• Additional Tasks • Airlift operations. • Search and rescue.

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• Medical evacuation. • Relief operations. • Evacuation of citizens from areas of conflict. iii. Commanders Saleh El Kurdi is the commander of the Royal Jordanian Airforce. Having experience in the airfield since the very day he started serving the country, Kurdi is considered one of the greatest figures in the Jordanian Air Force. iv. Resources/Strength

Do not be rest assured that the Jordanian Air Force resources are limited to the list provid- ed below,

• Aircraft: • MiG-21 • MiG-19 • MiG-17 • Su-7B • Tu-16 • Il-28 • Il-18 • Il-14 • An-12 • Hawker Hunter • F-104A/B starfighter • C-47 Dakota

• Helicopters: • Mi-6 • Mi-4 • Sud Aviation Alouette III SA-316B • Westland WS-55 Srs-4 Whirlwind • Westland Scout AH MK-1

• Anti-aircraft Warfare: • SA-2 Guideline • ZSU-57-2 • Mobile Anti-Aircraft Cannon

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 33 d. Navy: The Royal Jordanian Navy is a part of the Royal Jordanian Armed Force. Even Though, this body was created back in 1951 its role and significance for our cabinet and Six-Day War is very minimal. Due to this reason, we have decided to not provide the description profile for it. Moreover, there will be no commander holding the sole responsibility of directing the navy. e. General Intelligence Directorate: Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate or GID is the intelligence agency of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and forms part of the Ministry of Interior. The GID holds a very vital role for the Arab Coalition to tackle Israel. GID was established in accordance with the Act 24 of 1964 which outlined the duties and responsibilities of the GID, namely to safeguard the security of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan domestically and abroad by means of carrying out necessary intelligence operations. i. Purpose/Objectives: Quoted by General Intelligence Directorate “to contribute to the safeguarding of the Kingdom and the Nation under the Hashemite leadership of His Majesty King Hussein, as well as protecting the freedoms of the Jordanian people and preserving a democratic form of government. It is our objective to share with others the responsibility of building the proper grounds that lead to creating an environment of security and stability, which will reflect prosperously on all sectors of the Nation, providing the confidence to all types of local and foreign investors to operate in a reliable and secure atmosphere.”

• protecting the internal and external security of Jordan through carrying out necessary intelligence operations and executing duties assigned by the Head of GID. • Collect information and intelligence reports from the Coalition and other international allies • Disseminate all relevant intelligence report and data to the Coalition and other Respective Stakeholders ii. Commanders: Amer Khammash is the Chief of Staff for the Jordanian Army. Amer Khammash’s service to Jordan was not limited to the military side only but in addition to that, he is also a political and personal advisor of the King Hussein of Jordan. Having held the position of Lieutenant General, Khammash started serving the country as a Jordanian Pilot in 1949.

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Due to the absence of the Commander of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), in our cabinet, Lieutenant General Khammash will also be taking over as the Commander of the GID. f. Jordanian Special Operation Force: Established on April 15, 1963, on the sets of King Hussein, its essential jobs is to incorporate reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, search and evacuation, intelligence gathering combat, and the protection of key sites. The Special Forces Group is additionally vested with the responsibility of executing impromptu actions against specific targets as per the requirement. The unit is well equipped in terms of resources and is prepared to get into action anytime as per the cabinets’ demand. i. Commander Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil is the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces. With decades of experience in the military world, he currently holds the post of Major General in the army. Before and during the Six-day war, Major General Nasser has been and will be working under the guidance of Marshall Majali.

In our cabinet, Major General Nasser will take over the post of Chief of Operations from Marshal Majali. As the Chief of Operations, Ma. Gen. Nasser will be leading the Jordanian Special Operation Force.

3. Battle plans Used by Countries and their Effectivity a. West Bank Highground attacks: The distance between the Israeli coastlines facing the Mediterranian Sea and Jordanian- controlled West Bank at one point of the Jordan-Israel border is only 9 miles or around 15 kilometers. This makes it so that the Jordanians can quite literally move across the border and cut the country in half. Add to that the strategic high grounds which they hold near the border and that spells catastrophe for Israel. Such a weakness is bound to be disastrous for Israel and disastrous it was. On the morning of June 5, Jordan announced its entry into the war by exploiting this weakness of the Jewish state and firing off mortar shells at the Israeli cities of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv all the way to the communities of Netanya and Kfar Saba along the coast. This for Jordan was a highly effective strategy. They were able to attack key Israeli cities without having to risk anything. This was one of the only good strategies employed by Jordan during the course of this war.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 35 b. The exploitation of Jerusalem’s significance: The city of Jerusalem is perhaps one of the most legendary and significant cities in the world. From its religious importance to the people of the Abrahamic faiths to its historical significance to various communities all around the globe, this city has always had it all. Jeru- salem, the holiest site of all for Jews was not something Israel could allow to be destroyed even at a time of war.

The holy city had been divided into two halves, the Jordan controlled east and the Israeli controlled west. Israel had decided not to use any artillery or heavy force when engaging with the Jordanians in the city and the Jordanians knew this. Jordan had initially planned to exploit this bound hand of the Israelis but was unable to do so in an effective way. This was a great advantage for the Jordanians but unfortunately for them, ended up being one they were unable to utilize. c. Defense of the West Bank: The Israelis were rather easily able to push the Jordanians at Jerusalem. By the 7th of June, the battle in the “Eastern Front”, called such for being east of Israel, had definitely turned against the Jordanians. The Jordanian defense was so weak that a restrained Israeli effort was able to, within the span of a single day unite the holy city of Jerusalem under a sov-

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 36 ereign Jewish flag for the first time in over 2000 years. The Israelis had reached the city of Mt. Scopus in Jerusalem, a strategic highpoint, and this along with their infamous proc- lamation “The Temple Mount is in our hands”, the Israelis had sealed the battle for Jerusalem within the afternoon of day three. With the capture of Jerusalem completed with much ease the Israelis, no longer running the risk of destroying their holy city, moved well-armed and high-spirited to the cities of Bethlehem, Hebron, and Gush Eizon and captured them with absolutely no resistance. This series of events that occurred on the third day of the war sealed the fate in the Eastern front, a devastating loss and utter humiliation by the hands of Israel with little to no issues. Jordan was unable to put up the slight- est resistance effort and their effort on the Eastern front was abysmal. The result of weak planning and a lack of prepara- tion along the West Bank’s borders and in its major cities had proven a fatal mistake.

4. Foreign Policies

Jordan had always had problems with the Jewish state but things began to take a turn for the worse when their alliance with Egypt grew stronger and pressure from the Egyptians for them to take a stronger stance against Israel. Jordan had control of half of the city of Jerusalem as well as the West Bank including its strategic cities and geographical locations. This made Jordan a powerful player in the region. Jordan during the war of 1947 was, in fact, the strongest of the Arab nations however by 1967 Egypt had taken that position. This meant the alliance against Israel was spearheaded by Egypt almost single-handedly but that did not mean Jordan was key if the Arabs were to make any progress regarding the issue of Palestine. Jordan also had good ties with the Soviets. The Soviets stood in opposition to the west friendly Israel and this similar stance allowed for the two countries to coordinate. Notably, Soviets provided Jordan with the majority of the military resources.

Jordan at the time maintained the policy that Palestinians deserved a state in what was formerly the British Mandate. Along with this Jordan was also friendly to the Palestinians of the region, taking them in as refugees. This did not mean Jordan embraced them as their own but they did give them a place to live.

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Syria

1. General Background a. Type of Country: After being a member state of the Ottoman Empire for 400 years, the Syrian Arab Republic was born after gaining independence from the French mandate in April of 1946. With their modern history filled with coups and political instability, President Nureddin al-Atassi of the Ba’ath party was their longest-serving president of socialist Syria during the 6-Day War period, succeeded by Hafez al-Assad. Formally, the country is regarded as being a Presidential Republic. b. Location/Geography: Syria is a country in Western Asia, bordering Lebanon to the southwest, Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan to the south, and Israel to the southwest. Its coast stretches 183 kilometres in the west to the Mediterranean sea and has a total surface area of 185,180 square kilometres, approximately eight times larger than Israel. Its oil reserves are mainly located in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate Province, which borders Iraq in the east.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 38 c. Type of Government: Egypt and Syria merged together in 1958 under the presidency of Shukri al-Kuwatli as the United Arab Republic, which fell after a military coup in 1961. The Syrian Arab Republic since then experienced even more coups and power struggles till the 1970s. Current President Nureddin al-Atassi of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party gained power of the legislature and cabinets in 1966 after overthrowing the National Council of the Revolution (NCA). Opposers of the government were often put down harshly, leading to a decline in public support for this government. During the Suez Crisis, Syria also maintained close political and trade relationships with the USSR, which still stands to this day with Russia. The Soviets were responsible for exporting aircraft, armored vehicles, and tanks alongside other military equipment to Syria and contributing to their rapid militarization. d. Leaders: Salah Jadid: With his party members and allies taking top positions in the government, the secretariat of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, Salah Jadid was the de facto leader of the Syrian Arab Republic from 1966-1970. A supporter of Gamal Abdel’s socialist policies, his implementation of such policies and transfer of legislative power to the Ba’ath Party brought civil unrest and economic instability in Syria. President: Nureddin al-Atassi Prime Minister: Yusuf Zuayyin

Salah Jadid Nureddin al-Atassi e. Population: As of 1967: Approximately 5 - 5.7 million f. Economy: The Syrian Arab Republic turned to a Socialist economic policy after the rise of the Ba’ath Party in 1963. Refineries, ore and oil reserves were just discovered during the 1950s and 60s. (no data on industrialization available)

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2. Military

The Syrian Arab Armed Forces are the military forces of the Syrian Arab Republic. It consists primarily of the Syrian Arab Army, Syrian Arab Air Forces and the Syrian Arab Navy. Along with these institutions, the Syrian Army also comprises several paramilitary forces. i. Structure The Syrian Arab Armed Forces have been divided into the following divisions for the Six Day War:

• Syrian Army • Syrian Air Force • Syrian Navy

In addition, the committee will also have a representative from the military intelligence wing of the government, “Deuxième Bureau”. ii. Commanders During the Six Day War, while Dr. Nureddin al-Attassi was formally the President (and hence the Commander in Chief of the military), Salah Jadid was effectively the ruler of Syria behind the scenes. Second in the chain of command was the then Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Suwaydani. a. Syrian Arab Army: The Syrian Army, also known as the Syrian Arab Army is the land force branch of the Syrian Armed Forces. It is the largest division of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and officially was founded in 1945. However, between 1948 and 1967, Syria faced numerous coups that destabilized the government as well as the military. As a result, the military transformed from a once honorable, respected institution to a largely disregarded, unprofessional one. Just a year prior to the 1967 Arab-Isreali War, Syria faced another coup d’etat. Nonetheless, by 1967 the army, while under prepared in comparison to neighboring powers, still had some strength. However, the frequent changes in the government observed in prior years and the resulting lack of proper coordination and organization within the army made Syria’s loss in the SIx Day War almost inevitable.

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i. Structure (Dunstan p.p 30-32) The forces of the Syrian Army were divided into three Group Brigades. These divisions were largely motivated by the resulting administrative convenience rather than any tactical rea- sons. The structure of the group brigades are as follows:

• 12th Group Brigade • 11th Infantry Brigade • 132nd Reserve Infantry Brigade • 80th Reserve Infantry Brigade • 44th Armoured Brigade

• 35th Group Brigade • 8th Infantry Brigade • 19th Infantry Brigade • 32nd Infantry Brigade • 17th Mechanized Infantry Brigade

• 42nd Group Brigade • 25th Infantry Brigade • 50th Reserve Infantry Brigade • 60th Reserve Infantry Brigade • 14th Armoured Brigade

In reality, the 12th Group Brigade was deployed North of the Kuneitra-Bnnot Ya’acov Bridge, the 35th Group Brigade was deployed to the South whereas the 42nd Group Brigade served as a general reserve. ii. Commanders The Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ahmad Suwaydani, has overarching authority over the army. Each group brigade also has a commanding officer:

12th Group Brigade - Colonel Amed Amir 35th Group Brigade - Brigadier-General Said Tayan 42nd Group Brigade - Brigadier-General Abdul Razzak Dardari

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 41 iii. Resources/Strength (Lonng p. 21)

~ 70,000 - 75,000 Troops (63,000 mobilized in reality)

Tanks 750

Armored Personnel Carrier 585

Artillery Pieces 315

Surface to Air Missiles 0

Anti Aircraft Guns 1100 b. Syrian Air Force: Syrian Air Force, also known as the Syrian Arab Air Force, is the air force branch of the Syrian Armed Forces. It was found- ed in 1948. During the Six-Day War, the Air Force flew few air strikes on targets in northern Israel on the first day of the conflict but subsequently evacuated to air bases in remote parts of Syria. While iit evaded most of Israeli air strikes that caused massive damage to Egyptian and Jordanian air bases, the decision to retreat also helped the IDF defeat the Syrian Army on the ground and led to the occupation of the Golan Heights. i. Structure During the time of the Six Day War, the Syria Air Force was organized into different Air Bri- gades. The precise structure and number of Air Brigades, however, remains unclear as in- formation on this matter remains sparse. That said, two known and renowned Air Brigades include the 3rd Air Brigade, based at Dmeyr Air Base, 49 km northeast of Damascus and the 7th Air Brigade, based at Almezzeh Air Base, in Damascus. ii. Commanders Officially in charge of the Syrian Air Force during the Six Day War was Hafez Al-Assadd. However, preoccupied with politics and his responsibilities as the Minister of Defence, the air force was effectively controlled by Mohammad Assad Moukiiad.

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iii. Resources/Strength While it is difficult to ascertain the precise strength of the Syrian Air Force and the equipment in use during the Six Day War, some well known, established figures include:

Combat Aircrafts 127 (Dunstan p. 21)

MiG-17Fs at least 40 (Cooper and Nicolle pp. 19-20)

II-28s at least 4 (Cooper and Nicolle pp. 19-20)

MiG-21F at least 34 (Cooper and Nicolle pp. 139-142)

MiG-21U at least 4 (Cooper and Nicolle pp. 139-142) c. Navy: The Syrian Navy, also known as the Syrian Arab Navy is the navy branch of the Syrian Armed Forces. The Syrian Navy was established in 1950, when the Syrian Government acquired a few aval vessels from France. At the time of initiation, the Navy was made up of army personnel who had been trained at French naval academies. It is no surprise then that com- pared to the naval forces boasted by its neighbors, Syria’s Navy is rather miniscule. i. Commander In 1967, the Syrian Navy was under the command of Brigadier General Mustafa Shumann. However, no portfolio has been allocated for this position in ii. Resources/Strength During the Six Day War, the Syrian Navy was still in its infancy and wasn’t involved in any major capacity in the war. While the use of the Syrian Navy is allowed in the committee, in- formation on it is too sparse and unreliable to be placed here.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 43 d. Deuxième Bureau (Military Intelligence): The Syrian Navy, also known as the Syrian Arab Navy, is the navy branch of the Syrian Armed Forces. The Syrian Navy was established in 1950, when the Syrian Government acquired a few aval vessels from France. At the time of initiation, the Navy was made up of army personnel who had been trained at French naval academies. It is no surprise then that com- pared to the naval forces boasted by its neighbors, Syria’s Navy is rather miniscule. i. Commander While the Deuxieme Bureau reports directly to the President, the Director, Ali Zaza, is in charge of the operations of the agency. ii. Resources/Strength • develop intelligence concerning enemy troops • to ensure the loyalty of the military as well • to carry out unconventional warfare operations (including covert operations)

3. Info on battle plans used by countries and their effectivity a. Background on the Conflict in Golan Heights: Prior to the Six Day War, Syria had been responsible for increasing tensions through acts of sabotage and routinely shelling of Israeli communities. Crucially, tensions were at an all time high during the second half of 1966 and early 1967 due to increase in interactions between the IDF and Syrian forces. As a result of false warning from the Soviet Union, Israel started mobilizing and preparing for an attack on Syria. In response, Israel and Syria activated their mutual defense pact and Syria started directing its troop to areas bordering Israel.

That border ran some 40 miles, from Kibbutz Tel Dan in the north down to the Sea of Galilee, with the Syrians occupying the high ground. In the northern half the terrain was extremely steep, rising up at the border or just after the border, while in the south the rise was a little slower at first. The escarpment and the plateau behind it, at an elevation of about 2000 feet, are known as the Golan Heights, Over most of that time Syria had also often shelled Israel’s northern communities.

In fact, Syrians had been fortifying the region for the better part of 18 years. It is no surprise then that by 1967 Syria had more than 265 artillery pieces aimed down at Israel. Additionally, they also had a dense network of fortifications including trenches and bunkers, all sitting behind mine fields. Just before the outbreak of

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 44 the war the Syrians forces in the Golan totaled over 40,000 troops with 260 tanks and self- propelled guns, divided up among three armored brigades and five infantry brigades. The Israelis, in turn, were clearly outmatched, with just one armored brigade and one infantry brigade. Although Syria maintained a radical and aggressive posture towards Israel, it counted heavily upon the initiative and success of the larger and better trained Egyptian army. b. Plans & Analysis (Dunstan p. 22): It is fair to say that the Syrian political and military establishment had no appetite for a general war with Israel. Nevertheless, the morale of the army was high and there was every confidence that the formidable defences of the Golan Plateau could absorb and defeat any attack as determined in the defensive plans known as Operation Jihad or Holy War.

Captain Muhammad Ammar served in the stronghold of Tel Fakhr and had no qualms about any forthcoming war: ‘We thought we were stronger, that we could cling to our lands and that the Golan was impenetrable. We were especially heartened by the unity between Syria, Egypt and Jordan.’ Furthermore, a major offensive into Israel had been formulated, together with the assistance of Soviet advisers, under the codename Operation Nasr or Victory. It envisaged a two-pronged attack to the north and south of the Sea of Galilee by the 35th Group Brigade spearheaded by the 14th and 44th armoured brigades. The two prongs would then meet to the west of the Sea of Galilee after capturing Safed and Tiberias and then sweep on to the port of Haifa.

Operation Nasr was scheduled to bring victory in six days. The general staff were even more optimistic as Colonel Mustafa Tlass, later to be Syrian defence minister during the October War of 1973, predicted: ‘If hostilities break out, the UAR [Egypt] and Syria can destroy Israel in four days at most.’ However, there was a flaw in the plan. The Bnot Ya’acov Bridge was in fact a World War II British Army prefabricated Bailey Bridge, with an internal width of 3.43m (11.3ft). This presents no problem for a Sherman tank at 2.62m (8.6ft) wide or even a Centurion that was designed to cross Bailey Bridges - just - with a width of 3.38m (11.1ft). Unfortunately, Syrian staff work was somewhat remiss as the principal main battle tank of the Syrian Army was the T-54/55 with a width of 3.57m (11.7ft). Furthermore, Syrian soldiers were also improperly armed with heavier AK-47 assault rifles, designed for combat in more open areas.

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4. Foreign Policy

• Allies: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, USSR (& rest of the Soviet bloc at the time) • Contribution The Syrian Arab Republic joined the war only on the 4th day, influenced by false Egyptian reports which stated successful Egyptian offensives in the southern front. Syria began by attacking northern Israel with artillery from the strategic Golan Heights and air raids in Galilee. However, the Syrian air force retreated and played no further role after the 5th of June when the Israeli air force destroyed two thirds of their aircraft In addition to intel, Syria’s soviet allies were also responsible for supplying its military with weapons and equipment, particularly combat airplanes.

Egypt

1. General Background a. Type of Country: Presidential Republic b. Location/Geography: Egypt, formally the Arab Republic of Egypt, is a transcontinental country spanning the entirety of the northeast corner of Africa and southwest corner of Asia, next to a land bridge formed by the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt, a Mediterranean country, borders the Gaza Strip (Palestine) and Israel to the northeast, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea to the east, Sudan to the south, and Libya to the west. Across the Gulf of Aqaba lies Jordan, across the Red Sea lies Saudi Arabia, and across the Mediterranean sea lie Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, although none of them share a land border with Egypt. c. Type of Government : Blaming King Farouk for Egypts poor performance in the 1948 war, and frustrated by the levels of poverty, illiteracy and disease in the country, th Free Officers, a group of officers in the Egyptian army led the Egyptian revolution, abrogated the the 1953 constitution, and declared Egypt a republic on 18 June 1953 with Muhammad Naguib as the first President. d. Leaders : Gamal Abdel Nasser: An iconic and a transformative leader, Abdel Nasser played a key role in abolishing the Egyptian Monarchy in 1952 and brought modernization and socialist reforms in Egypt, earning popular support after substantially improving the quality of life of his citizens. Under his leadership, the National GDP grew significantly, Egypt merged with

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Syria to create The United Arab Republic, and nationalized the Suez Canal, and promulgated a new constitution. Despite their humiliating loss in the Six-Day War, Abdel Nasser did not lose popularity among the populus. e. Population : 32.06 million (1967) f. Economy : 5.605 billion USD (1967) GDP 174.86 USD (1967) GDP Per Capita

2. Military a. General Introduction of the military: Prior to the June 1967 War, the Egyptian army divided its personnel into four regional commands (Suez, Sinai, Nile Delta, and Nile Valley up to Sudan).The Frontier Corps were solely responsible for the remaining 75% of Egypt’s territory. i. Structure The Egyptian Armed Forces are the national military organization who serve to defend the nation of Egypt. Consisting of the Egyptian Army, Egyptian Navy, Egyptian Air Force and Egyptian Air Defense Forces, they cover all aspects of national security and defense.

The regions of the military are as follows: • Central Military Region • Northern Military Region • Unified Command of the Area East of the Canal • Western Military Region • Southern Military Region • ii. A brief history Prior to the June 1967 War, the Egyptian army divided its personnel into four regional commands (Suez, Sinai, Nile Delta, and Nile Valley up to Sudan).The Frontier Corps were solely responsible for the remaining 75% of Egypt’s territory,

In May 1967, the Straits of Tiran, and consequently the passage of Israeli ships were closed by President Nasser. Considering the closing of the straits an act of war. Israel prepared its

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 47 armed forces for war. Although Nasser didn’t want war and was happy with his political and rhetorical accomplishments, Israel nevertheless was spurred into action.

At that time, The Egyptian army consisted of two armoured and five infantry divisions, all of which were deployed in the Sinai. In the preceding weeks of the war, Egypt made significant changes to its military structure, creating a new command by combining the forces of the general staff and the Eastern Military District. This new front called the Sinai Front, was placed under the command of General Abdel Mohsin Murtagi. Meanwhile, 6 out of the 7 divisions in the Sinai had their commanders and chiefs of staff replaced. b. Grounds Army: The largest service branch in the Egyptian Armed Forces, the modern Egyptian Army was established during the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805–1849). i. Structure The Egyptian Military Operations Authority, governed by the Ministry of Defense, has its headquarters in Cairo along with the Chief of Staff of Egyptian Armed Forces’ office.

The Egyptian forces consisted of seven divisions: four armored, two infantry, and one mechanized infantry. ii. The leaders/Commanders and their description Abd al-Hakīm Āmir, was a prominent military official who played a major role in establishing the republic of Egypt in 1952. As a leader of the army, he was one of the most powerful figures in Egypt until his death, despite having led the Egyptian forces to defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967. iii. Resources/ Strength (What did they have) 160,000 troops, 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs, and more than 1,000 artillery pieces c. Airforce: After the Israeli Air Force’s preemptive strikes that destroyed Egypt’s air bases and severely hampered their ability to be effective during the Six-Day war, the EAF saw little to no use in the war. It was only during the last four days of the war that the EAF conducted 150 sorties against Israeli units in the Sinai.

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The EAF’s first air-to-air victory is claimed by Mig-21 pilot Nabil Shoukry against a Mirage IIICJ fighter over Inchas air base two hours following the first Israeli strike.

On 8 June 1967, a pair of Egyptian MiG-21s engaged a pair of Mirage IIIs over the Sinai. In the ensuing air fight, the EAF’s 1st Lt Fakhry El-Ashmawy managed to destroy one of the Mirage fighters while the second Mirage crashed from fuel exhaustion. Initial Egyptian claims were highly inflated, but were later reduced to 72 Israeli aircrafts destroyed. The Israeli Defense Force admitted 45 losses on all fronts, while observers presume the figure to be between 55 and 60. i. Structure The EAF for the Six day war were divided into and operated from the following bases:

El Arish, Gebel Libni, Bir Gifgafa, and Bir Thamada in the Sinai Desert; Abu Sueir, Kabrit, and Fayid along the Suez Canal; Inchas, Cairo West, and Beni Sueif on the banks of the Nile River ii. Leaders Mohamed Sedky Mahmoud, an Egyptian military leader, served as Egypt’s Air Force Defense Commander from September 20, 1959 to June 11, 1967, which includes the Six-Day war. iii. Purpose/Objectives The aviation branch of the Egyptian Armed Forces, the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) is responsible for all air based defence missions and operates all military aircraft, including but not not limited to those used in support of the Egyptian Army, Egyptian Navy and the Egyptian Air Defense Forces. iv. Resources/ Strength (What did they have) The exact count of the number of jets the Egyptian military had is unclear but the number of losses they suffered is well-documented. Considering that almost all of Egypt’s air forces were destroyed by Israel at the very beginning of the war, it is safe to assume the number of available resources were very close to the number of losses suffered.

104 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 ‘Fishbeds’ 29 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 ‘Farmers’ 94 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17 ‘Frescos’ 14 Sukhoi Su-7 ‘Fitters’

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30 Tupolev Tu-16 ‘Badgers’ 27 Ilyushin Il-28 ‘Beagles’ 30 Ilyushin Il-14 ‘Crates’ 8 Antonov An-12 ‘Cubs’ 2 C-27’s from Egypt) 8 Mil Mi-6 ‘Hooks’ 2 Mil Mi-4 ‘Hounds’ d. Egyptian Navy: The Egyptian Navy’s blockade of Israeli ships in the Strait of Tiran that were headed toward the Israeli port of Eilat was one of the main causes of the Six-Day War. During the war, the Israeli Navy landed six combat divers from the Shayetet 13 naval commando unit to infiltrate Alexandria harbor. Both Egyptian and Israeli warships made movements at sea to intimidate the other side throughout the war, but did not engage each other. However, Israeli warships and aircraft did hunt for Egyptian submarines throughout the war.

One of the major immediate causes of the Six-Day War is considered to be the Egyptian Navy’s blockade of Israeli ships after Nasser closed off the Strait of Tiran. During the war, both Egyptian and Israeli warships made movements to intimidate each other, but never engaged in combat. Reportedly, however, Israeli warships and aircraft were in the hunt for Egyptian submarines throughout the war.

The Egyptian Navy has only been peripherally involved in a long series of minor conflicts with Israel.On October 22, 1848, an Egyptian sloop was destroyed in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Gaza by the Israeli Navy’s motor explosive boat. On October 31, the Ibrahim el Awal, an Egyptian warship was deployed to and reached Haifa and began shelling the city but was driven off by a French warship. The Egyptian ship was then chased by the Israeli destroyers which managed to capture the ship with the help of the Israeli Air Force. i. Leaders Admiral Suleiman Ezzat, Navy Admiral Soliman Ezzat will be shouldering the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the Egyptian Navy to ensure that Egypt’s maritime power will be essential, both offensively and defensively.

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3. Battle plans Used by Countries and their Effectivity a. When, where and what happened? i. Preparation for the War On the day before the war, Egypt concentrated approximately 100,000 of its total 160,000 troops in the Sinai, including all of its seven divisions (four infantry, two armored and one mechanized), as well as four other independent infantry and four independent armored brigades. Almost 30% of the troops were of Egypt’s intervention in the Yemen Civil War and another 30% were around reservists. The forces collectively had a total of 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs and more than 1,000 artillery pieces. However, at the same time, around 20,000 Egyptian troops were still stuck fighting in Yemen.

Nasser’s mixed feelings and indecisiveness also reflected in his orders to the country’s military, with the general operational plan of the war changing over four times in May 1967 alone. Each such change required the redeployment of troops, eventually taking a heavy toll on the troops and their vehicles. Even towards the end of May, Nasser was still making changes to the battle plan. Eventually, he finally forbade the general staff from proceeding with the Qahir plan, and instead ordered a forward defense of the Sinai.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 51 ii. Six Day War Battle in Golan Heights Fabricated and false Egyptian reports of a landslide victory against the Israeli army and mul- tiple forecasts that the Egytian artillery would soon make its way towards Tel-Aviv, spurred Syria into entering the war. Syria, however, adopted a much safer and more cautious ap- proach, shelling and conducting air raids on northern Israel. It was only when the Israeli Air Force had completed its mission Egypt and turned around to destroy the now surprised Syr- ian Air Force that Syria realized that the news of a massive Egyptian victory was a lie.

iii. Six Day War Battle Front in Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula Fabricated and false Egyptian reports of a landslide victory against the Israeli army and mul- tiple forecasts that the Egytian artillery would soon make its way towards Tel-Aviv, spurred Syria into entering the war. Syria, however, adopted a much safer and more cautious ap- proach, shelling and conducting air raids on northern Israel. It was only when the Israeli Air Force had completed its mission Egypt and turned around to destroy the now surprised Syr- ian Air Force that Syria realized that the news of a massive Egyptian victory was a lie. b. The battle plan used by that particular country For the entirety of the war, Egypt was left reeling, being forced to respond to Israel’s battle plans rather than enforcing its own. It felt as if they were always one step behind.

The Israeli forces that had concentrated on the border with Egypt, consisted of six armored

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 52 brigades, one infantry brigade, one mechanized infantry brigade and three paratrooper bri- gades, totaling around 70,000 men and 700 tanks, organized into three armored divisions. The plan of the Israelis was to surprise the Egyptian forces in timing (the attack on the border coincided with the Israeli Air Forces’ very successful strike on Egyptian airfields), location (attacking via both northern and central Sinai routes, as opposed to the Egyptian expecta- tions of an attack via the central and southern routes) as well as method (using a flanking approach, rather than directed tank assaults).

Consisting of three brigades and commanded by Major General Israel Tal, the northernmost Israeli division advanced very slowly through the sparsely protected regions of the Gaza Strip and El-Arish.

Meanwhile, the central division and the southern division entered the highly fortified region of Abu-Ageila- Kusseima, engaging Egyptian forces in the Battle of Abu-Ageila. Among the Egyptian forces stationed there included one infantry division (the 2nd), a battalion of tank destroyers and a tank regiment, formed of Soviet WW2 armor, which included 90 T-34-85 tanks (with 85 mm guns), 22 SU-100 tank destroyers (with 100 mm guns), and about 16,000 men, while the Israelis had a man-power of about 14,000, and 150 post-WW2 tanks including the AMX-13 with 90 mm guns, Centurions, and M50 Super Shermans.

The Southern Division first initiated an attack that was meticulously planned, coordinated and executed. Two of the brigades were sent to the north of Um-Katef, the first one with the objective to break through the defenses at Abu-Ageila to the south, and the second one to block the direct road to El-Arish and to flank Abu-Ageila from the east. A heliborne para- trooper force, at the same time, dropped to the rear of the Egyptian defensive positions and attacked the Egyption artillery positions. Admittedly, although the paratrooper force’s plan didn’t work out, the disruption they created sowed seeds of confusion among the artillery crews, helping to significantly slow Egyptian artillery fire.

The combined forces of paratroopers, artillery, infantry, armor, and combat engineers then attacked the Egyptian position from the front, flanks and rear, cutting off any escape routes. The minor battles, which happened in sandy areas and minefields, continued for nearly three and a half more days until Abu-Ageila finally fell to Israeli control. The Egyptians suffered a heavy loss, losing about 4,000 men and around 40 tanks as opposed to the Israelis who lost only 33 men and 19 tanks.

At virtually the same time, Israeli forces attacked and successfully captured the cities of El Arish and Jebel Libni, Bir Gafgafa, and Gaza areas. Although they were met with fierce re- sistance here, they still continued their rapid advance. In addition to the multiple armoured

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battles in which Israeli tanks defeated numerically superior Egyptian armored units, many Egyptian tanks also fell to the Israeli infantry wielding anti-tank weapons. Perhaps the most difficult battle for the Israelis took place at Gaza, where they fought for two whole days and suffered major casualties. Nonetheless, Gaza still fell to Israeli control. During the ground fighting, remnants of the Egyptian Air Force attacked Israeli ground troops, trying to support their ground units, but instead took heavy losses from the Israeli Air Force and anti-aircraft units.

Despite many of the Egyptian units remaining intact and equipped with the ability to prevent the Israelis from reaching the Suez Canal, when Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer heard about the defeat at Abu-Ageila, he panicked and ordered all of the units deployed in the Sinai to retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of Egypt.

As the Egyptian unit retreated out of the Sinai, Israeli aircrafts, who had air superiority through- out the entire war, bombarded them, using napalm bombs. The attacks destroyed hundreds of vehicles and caused heavy casualties. Seeing the Egyptians retreat, the Israeli High Com- mand decided to avoid pursuing the Egyptian units but rather bypass and destroy them in the mountainous regions of West Sinai. In the following two days, the three Israeli divisions were reinforced by an armored brigade each and rushed westward to flank the Egyptian retreat, blocking the Milta Pass and the Gidi Pass.

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Israel’s blocking action was only partially successful, managing to capture only the Gidi pass before the Egyptians approached it, but at the other places, Egyptian units managed to pass through and cross the canal to safety before the Israelis could engage them in a battle. The haste of the Egyptian retreat led many soldiers to leave behind their weapons, vehicles and other military equipment. Thousands of Egyptian soldiers, after being cut off their units had to walk almost 200 km on foot with limited supplies of food and water, before reaching the Suez Canal. Many died of exhaustion while others surrendered to the Israelis in this process.

On June 8, Israel successfully completed their campaign in the Sinai, sending infantry units to Ras-Sudar on the western coast of the Sinai. Sharm El-Sheikh, a city at the southern tip of the Sinai has already been taken a day earlier by units of the Israeli Navy with no resistance. c. Analysis of the battleplan There were numerous aspects which all together helped Israel get the triumph over the Arab Coalition. First, the unexpected airstrikes over the Egypitian Air Force gave the Israeli Air Force air dominance from the very first day. Second, well planned and proper execution of comprehensive, cogent and innovative battle plans significantly gave Israel an upper hand throughout the war. Third, on the Egyptian side, the lack of communication and coordination between one another was a big mistake ultimately leading Egypt to lose almost every battle they had throughout the 6 days.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 55 i. Allies Primarily the other Arab States and the Soviet Union ii. Contributions/ Aid While the Arab support was physical: they went to war together, the Soviet support was much more technical, and perhaps more impactful.

From the inception of the Soviet Union’s foreign military assistance programme, Egypt consistently receives one of the largest amounts of aid from them. Holding 15% share of Soviet foreign military assistance, Egypt got these resources at heavily subsidized bargain basement prices.

In the early 1960s the Soviet Union began providing more up-to-date equipment to modernize Egyptian inventories. The first supersonic MiG-zi fighters - the best in the Soviet inventory at the time - arrived in Egypt in 1962 to match the advanced French fighters which Israel had acquired. At about the same time, Egypt also received her first Tu- t 6 jet medium bombers, as well as Komar-class guided-missile patrol boats, followed somewhat later by the larger Osa-class missile patrol-craft. The first SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) were delivered in 1963,” as the Soviet Union began the development of a modern air defence system in Egypt. Along with military resource provision, Soviets also helped Egypt reorganize, train their Armed Force in accordance with the Soviet Model.

Not limiting their ties to military assistance only, Egypt and Soviet Further nourished their relationship by letting Soviets develop nuclear reactors and munition plants while Egypt in return gifted them several raw elements like cotton and coal.

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Portfolios (Responsibilities/ Powers)

Jordan

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of The Jordanian Armed Forces: Habis Majali

Habis Majali is a Jordanian Military figure from Ma’an, Jordan who has been serving as the Chairman of Joint of the Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces since 1958. Having started serving the country since 1932 by joining Jordan’s Arab Legion, Majali has been known for his boldness and acumen. Living up to these words, Majali led the Jordaninan Army during the Arab-Israel 1948 war and is one of the few individuals with the post of Field Marshal: the highest rank in the Jordanian army.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of The Jordanian Armed Forces, Majali will be the Commander in Chief (C-in-C) of the Jordanian Armed Force in the duration of the Six Day War. Along with the Joint Commander-in-Chief Gen Riadh, he will be the head of the force directing and supervising the actions taken by the Jordanian Armed Force.

Note: In reality, Marshal Majali was the Chief of Operations as well. However, in order to diversify and delegate the responsibility/ power, the assistant of Marshal Majali: Maj General Nasser will take over as the Chief of Operations.

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Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces: Major-General Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil

Habis Majali is a Jordanian Military figure from Ma’an, Jordan who has been serving as the Chairman of Joint of the Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces since 1958. Having started serving the country since 1932 by joining Jordan’s Arab Legion, Majali has been known for his boldness and acumen. Living up to these words, Majali led the Jordaninan Army during the Arab-Israel 1948 war and is one of the few individuals with the post of Field Marshal: the highest rank in the Jordanian army.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of The Jordanian Armed Forces, Majali will be the Commander in Chief (C-in-C) of the Jordanian Armed Force in the duration of the Six Day War. Along with the Joint Commander-in-Chief Gen Riadh, he will be the head of the force directing and supervising the actions taken by the Jordanian Armed Force.

Note: In reality, Marshal Majali was the Chief of Operations as well. However, in order to diversify and delegate the responsibility/ power, the assistant of Marshal Majali: Maj General Nasser will take over as the Chief of Operations.

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Chief of Staff: Lieutenant-General Amer Khammash

Amer Khammash is the Chief of Staff for the Jordanian Army. In addition to his role in the military, Aner is also a political and personal advisor of the King of Jordan. Currently holding the position of Lieutenant General, Khammash started serving the country as a Jordanian Pilot in 1949.

As the Chief of Staffs, Lieutenant General Khammash will be looking at the logistical and technical aspects of all the three divisions: Groundsmen, Airforce, and Navy. L.Gen Khammash will hold the burden of ensuring that all actions, plans, deployment of troops, transfer of resources are implemented and enacted smoothly.

Due to the absence of the Commander of the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), in our cabinet, Lieutenant General Khammash will also be taking over as the Commander of the GID. Leading the Jordanian Intelligence Network, Khammash will be responsible for collecting all intelligence reports and news from allies in the Middle-East and elsewhere. Along with that, Khammash will also be handling the distribution and dissemination of relevant information and intelligence reports to the members of the Arab Coalition.

Head of Western Command: Major-General Muhammad Ahmed Salim Muhammad Ahmed Salim the head of Western Command of the Jordanian Army, started his career in the Royal Jordanian Army at a very early age. The commanding General of the West Front currently holds the post of Major General in the Jordanian Army.

Leading the Western Command, Major General Salim holds the responsibility of directing and administering all the actions taken by the Western Command. All operations and activities which are to be enacted by 1st ‘Princess Alia’ Infantry Brigade, 2nd ‘Hashimi’ Infantry Brigade,

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3rd TalaT Infantry Brigade, 6th ‘Qadisiya’ Infantry Brigade, 25th ‘Khalid Ibn Walid’ Infantry Brigade, 27th ‘Imam AN’ Infantry Brigade, 29th ‘Hittin’ Infantry Brigade, 40th Armoured Brigade, and 60th Armoured Brigade will be supervised and taken by Major General Salim.

Head of Eastern Command: Brigadier-General Mashour Haditha al-Jazy

Mashour Haditha al-Jazy, is a Jordanian Military figure who will be serving as the Head of Eastern Command of the Jordanian Armed Forces. As a prominent figure from the Jordanian Army, al-Jazy joined the force in 1947 and has served for Jordan in several wars and battles in the past, and in recognition of them, he has received the post of Brigadier General in the Jordanian Army.

In our cabinet, Brigadier General al-Jazy will be leading the Eastern Front from its Headquarters at Zarqa. As the Bri. Gen. al-Jazy will have control and authority over all the actions which are to be taken by the Hussein Ali Infantry Brigade, Yarmouk Infantry, and the Brigade Royal Guard Brigade.

Commander of Airforce: Major-General Saleh El Kurdi

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Saleh El Kurdi is the commander of the Royal Jordanian Airforce. Having experience in the airfield since the very day he started serving the country, Kurdi is considered oneofthe greatest figures in the Jordanian Air Force. Kurdi currently holds the post of Major General in the Jordanian Armed Force.

Taking the position of the Head of Airforce of the Royal Jordanian Army, Major General Kurdi is vested with the power of directing and controlling the entire Air Force of Jordan. All actions: implementation of battle plans, defense strategies which include the use of Airforce resources: Aircraft, Airfields, etc will be done under Maj Gen Kurdi’s supervision and jurisdiction.

Syria

Minister of Defense: Hafez Al-Assad

By 1967, Hafez Al-Assad had already established himself as being a key figure in Syrian politics. Particularly, his participation in the 1963 and the 1966 coup were instrumental for his later success. The latter of which also brought radicalist Salah Jadid into power who decided to give the Defense portfolio to Hafez, believing that Hafez’s loyalties lied with him and the Ba’th Party’s left wing division.

As the Minister of Defense, he has the tough task of coordinating the entire Syria Arab Armed Force and coordinating defence affairs with other Arab nations all the while securing the direct interests of the nation of Syria.

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Army Chief of Staff: Ahmad Suwaydani Despite being promoted to the role shortly before the start of the Six Day War, Ahmad Suwaydani has a very important role to play in the committee. As the Army Chief of Staff it is his job to coordinate the three group brigades to come up with a unified response to the Israeli threat. He is also in charge of other logistical and technical actions such as transferring of resources, deployment of troops and coordination of Syrian land forces with the forces of other Arab nations.

Chief of Syrian Arab Airforce: Mohammad Assad Moukiiad While officially Hafez Al-Assad was delegated the authority to control the Syrian Arab Air Force, his political engagements and duties as the Minister of Defense made it impractical for him to assume such roles. Thus, Mohammad Moukiiad was given effective control over the Air Force. In committee, Mohammad will have the sole authority over the use of Syria’s Air Force.

Director of Deuxième Bureau: Ali Zaza As the Director of the Deuxieme Bureau, Ali Zaza serves the critical role of gathering and dispensing to the committee important intelligence on advancing enemy forces. The Deuxieme Bureau also has authority over planning and carrying out covert military missions.

Commander of 12th Group Brigade: Amed Amir As the Commander of the 12th Group Brigade, Amed Amir has the sole authority over and the responsibility to coordinate the response from the 11th Infantry Brigade, the 132nd Reserve Infantry Brigade, the 80th Reserve Infantry Brigade and the 44th Armoured Brigade.

Commander of 35th Group Brigade: Said Tayan As the Commander of the 35th Group Brigade, Said Tayan has the sole authority over and the responsibility to coordinate the response from the 8th Infantry Brigade, the 19th Infantry Brigade, the 32nd Infantry Brigade and the 17th Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

Commander of 42nd Group Brigade: Abdul Razzak Dardari As the Commander of the 35th Group Brigade, Said Tayan has the sole authority over and the responsibility to coordinate the response from the 25th Infantry Brigade, the 50th Reserve Infantry Brigade, the 60th Reserve Infantry Brigade and the 14th Armoured Brigade.

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Egypt

Commander-In-Chief: Mohammed Abd el Hakim Amer

Abd al-Hakīm Āmir, military official who helped establish Egypt as a republic in 1952 and, as leader of the army, was one of the most powerful figures in Egypt until his death.As army chief of staff he will lead Egyptian forces to the Six-Day War. In the cabinet, as the Commander-In- Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, he will be the head of the force directing and supervising the actions taken by the Egyptian Armed Force.

Army Chief of Staff: Mohamed Fawzi

Mohamed Fawzi was an Egyptian general and politician who served as minister of defense. In our cabinet, as the Army Chief of Staff, he will be looking after all the logistical and technical aspects of all the three divisions: the Grounds Force, Air force and the Navy. He will be burdened with the responsibility of ensuring that all actions, plans, deployment of troops and transfer of resources are implemented and enacted smoothly.

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Air Force General: Mohammed Sidki Mahmoud Mohamed Sedky Mahmoud was an Egyptian military leader. He served as Air Force Chief of Staff from June 23, 1953 to September 19, 1959, and Air Force and Defense Commander from September 20, 1959 to June 11, 1967.

In our cabinet, General Mohammed Sidki Mahmoud will be overseeing the preparations, plans and activities of the air force as well as the air defense force throughout the war.

Navy Admiral: Soliman Ezzat In our cabinet, Navy Admiral Soliman Ezzat will be shouldering the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the Egyptian Navy to ensure that Egypt’s maritime power will be essential, both offensively and defensively.

Note: In reality, the Egyptian Navy lacks its own air arm and depends on the Egyptian Air Force for maritime reconnaissance and protection against submarines. However, for diversifying and delegating equal powers to all the members of our cabinet, the Egyptian Navy will have its own air arm. This includes jets for naval shore reconnaissance, as well as combat with anti ship missiles and anti submarine torpedoes.

General: Abd el Mushin Murtagi In our cabinet, Gen. Abd el Mushin Murtagi will serve as the Sinai Commander. Leading the Sinai Command, he holds the responsibility of directing and administering all the actions taken by the Sinai Command. All operations and activities are to be enacted by the 2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Infantry Division, 4th Armoured Division and the 6th Mechanized Division.

Major General: Saad el-Shazly

Saad Mohamed el-Husseiny el-Shazly was an Egyptian military commander. During the Six- Day War, Shazly showed great merit and tactical awareness. He was positioned in the middle

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 64 of Sinai with a mixed unit of one infantry battalion, two Sa’ka (Thunderbolt) battalions, and one tank battalion.

In our cabinet, in order to diversify and delegate powers equally, Maj. Gen. Saad el-Shazly will lead the Sazly Task Force and will operate independently of the Sinai Command, with the options to reinforce any existing Egyptian war fronts, or strategically invade Israel, assuming offensive, defensive or supportive roles wherever appropriate.

Minister of Defense: Shams Al Din Badran

Shams Al Din Badran (born 1929) was one of the defense ministers of Egypt during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s era. He was among the leading figures in Egypt before the 1970s.

In our cabinet, he will be responsible for preparing Egypt’s defenses and coordinating with all three military fronts: Grounds, Air and Navy, and to mobilize defensive units as the war evolves.

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Details on the Operation of Committee (Documents, How crisis works, Awards)

Ministerial Statement

Writing a ministerial statement is an excellent way to streamline your understanding of a given topic and pinpoint the main ideas that you want to bring up in a cabinet. Ministerial statements should be broken up into three sections: • a statement of the problem • your portfolio/allocation’s relation to the issue • Proposals of possible plans and solutions

In the initial half of your statement, we expect you all to give us a concise summary of what you, under the perspective of your portfolio, see as the central issues and the problems the cabinet should address- not just from your nation’s perspective, but also from that of your allies.

After the statement of the problem, we expect you all to tell us where you stand, how important you are and what relation you have with this war. You must showcase the significance of your presence, your powers and your actions to help our coalition win this war.

The final part of your ministerial statement: possible solutions and plans is the most seminal and heavily weighted section of your statement. Not only does it help you set up yourself and your actions in the cabinet but also gives us an indication about what to expect from you all. Cabinet members are exacted to present their proposals about how they expect to cater to the issues related to the war. Presenting one’s solutions/objectives should not be limited to just one giving a one-liner vague solution (Eg: Plan to coordinate with all the Head of Navy and lockdown the Gulf of Eilat). We require you all to tell us what you are planning to do, a detailed and comprehensive step by step planning about how you are going to achieve it and how you plan to implement them.

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Format for the ministerial statements

Committee: Al Tahaluf al Arabiya Agenda: Six-Day War Portfolio: abc

A statement of the problem

Your portfolio/allocation’s relation to the issue

Proposals of possible plans and solutions

Citations

Documentation Through documentation the delegates are expected to produce their primary response to the crisis presented, and likewise use it as a means of communication with the rest of the committee. However, since the conference is being held online this year, there are specific procedures that have to be followed to send any kind of documentation to the EB. More information on this can be found at the end of the Conference Handbook. In this committee we entertain two types of documentation:

• Directives Directives are used to denote a course of action that the committee or members of the committee want to take. There are three types of directive:

• Individual Directives: These are directives authored by a single delegate utilizing the power conferred onto them by their portfolio. As such, the committee does not need to vote on these directives. In fact, the committee may or may not even know about the existence of such directives depending on the discretion of the author and the EB. Delegates should also keep in mind the power that such directives have in influencing the position of a delegate in the committee as well as the ongoing crisis. • Joint Directives: Joint Directives are practically the same as individual directives except it can have multiple authors. Evidently, the power of such a directive lies in the greater scope of actions that can be pursued due to the involvement of multiple portfolios. • Committee Directive: Committee Directives are directives that are voted on by the entire committee, with a simple majority yielding success. These directives are used in scenarios where it is in the best interest of all delegates to act in unison.

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These include cases where the committee comes up with a coordinated battle plan or cases where all the members want to make a joint statement fully utilizing the power that comes when functioning as a bloc.

While directives have the potential to produce great results for the committee as well as individual delegates, delegates must make sure to use directives appropriately. A simple declaration such as “Attack Israel” will not be entertained. What we want and expect from delegates is a more thought out approach answering the how and why as much as the what. In this case, an explanation of what type of attack (aerial, ground, naval), where to attack, and the reason for this course of action would all be welcome additions. Without such a thorough take on the issue, the committee would be a shadow of what it could be: there would be no real reassessment of what could have been, the very reason why this committee exists, the discussions in committee would be far too limited and the EB wouldn’t be able to judge you as sufficiently and thoroughly as we could.

Format: Directive Name: Committee: Agenda: Author: (Max 2)

Operative 1, ------;

Operative 2, ------;

Operative 3, ------;

• Communiques

Communiques are used as a medium of formal communication and to put forth several agreements in order to tackle current situations. A communique can be presented by a member of a bloc or by an entire bloc itself. It comprises vital statements, proposals, commands, threats or pitches for negotiations that are put forward by a member. Communiques generally consist of matters that need urgent notice and have an immense impact on the entire committee. Moreover, these communiques will be shared by press members in fellow cabinets and will possibly be used to mold future crises.

Communiques are a great way to acquire and dispense information and allow delegates to

Emergency Session of the Arabic States 68 get in front of whatever crisis the committee is facing. That said, the delegates must be aware of the fact that the communiques presented by one will be monitored by the dais members and may be discarded if it is found to lack context and importance in regards to the current situation.

Format: From: Delegate of X Type: Closed/ Open Content:

Midnight Crisis If certain situations require instant addressing from the Cabinet, the Emergency Session of the Arabic States may go into a formal session in the middle of the night. These sessions may start from any time from 2300 to 0300 (GMT +5:45). These sessions will happen on either the first day, second day or both the days of the conference. Cabinet members if required to attend will be sent a message 6:00 hours prior to the session.

Awards One Best Delegate One Outstanding Delegate One Special Mention 2 Verbal Mentions

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Citations

Dunstan, Simon, and Peter Dennis. The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria. Osprey Publishing, 2009. Mutawi, Samir A. Jordan in the 1967 War. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Oren, Michael. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford University Press, 2003. Woolf, Alex. The Arab-Israeli War since 1948. Heinemann Library/Capstone, 2012. B.O.C., Business Optimization Consultants. Jordan - Government - The Armed Forces, www. kinghussein.gov.jo/government5.html. Pike, John. “Military.” Jordan Arab Army, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/jordan/army. htm. www.jaf.mil.jo/Contents/Ground_Forcesar.aspx. “Air Power in the Six-Day War.” Taylor & Francis, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0140 2390500137382?scroll=top. Pike, John. “Military.” Royal Jordanian Air Force, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ jordan/rjaf.htm www.jaf.mil.jo/Contents/Air_Forcesar.aspx www.jaf.mil.jo/Contents/Leaders_and_Heads_of_Jordan_Army_Forcesar.aspx. General Intelligence Department, gid.gov.jo/. Gray, John. “List of Aircraft in Six Day War.” List of Aircraft in Six Day War ~ 6 Day War, sixdaywar1967.blogspot.com/2010/12/list-of-aircraft-in-six-day-war.html. “King Hussein’s Advisor, Royal Court Chief Amer Khammash Dies.” Ammon News, en.ammonnews.net/article/6577. Lonng, Charles B. Analysis of the Six Day War, June 1967. Air Command and Staff College, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a146294.pdf. “Syrian Front - Six Day War.” Six Day War, http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/northernfront. asp. Cooper, Tom, and David Nicolle. Arab MiGs, vol. 2, Harpia Publishing, 2010, pp. 19-20. Cooper, Tom, and David Nicolle. Arab MiGs, vol. 2, Harpia Publishing, 2010, pp. 139-142. Dunstan, Simon. “Opposing Plans.” The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria, Osprey Publishing, 2009, p. 22. Dunstan, Simonn. “Order of battle.” The Six Day War 1967: Jordan and Syria, Osprey Publishing, 2009, pp. 30-32. “The History of Syria.” HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/the-history-of- syria. “Battle of Abu Ageila (1967) - Alchetron, the Free Social Encyclopedia.” Alchetron.com, 26 June 2018, alchetron.com/Battle-of-Abu-Ageila-(1967). Bowen, Jeremy. “1967 War: Six Days That Changed the Middle East.” BBC News, BBC, 4 June

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2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39960461. “Egypt.” Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, by Kenneth M. Pollack, University of Nebraska Press, 2004. “Egyptian Air Force.” Scramble, www.scramble.nl/planning/orbats/egypt/egypt-air-force. “The Egyptian Front.” Egyptian Front, sixdaywar.org/content/southernfront.asp. Gray, John. “Battle Front in Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula.” 6 Day War, sixdaywar1967.blogspot. com/2010/10/battle-front-in-gaza-strip-and-sinai.html. Gray, John. “Battle Front in West Bank.” 6 Day War, sixdaywar1967.blogspot.com/2010/10/ battle-front-in-west-bank.html. History.com Editors. “Six-Day War.” History.com, A&E Television Networks, 11 May 2018, www. history.com/topics/middle-east/six-day-war. “Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A Premeditated Strategy or An Inexorable Drift to War?” Taylor & Francis, www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/13537120500233714?journalCode=fisa20. “Six-Day War.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., www.britannica.com/ event/Six-Day-War. “Soviet Arms and Egypt.” Taylor & Francis, www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/00396337508441555?journalCode=tsur20.

Emergency Session of the Arabic States