The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 59 1-15 October 2010 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-5 ISAF’s ongoing campaign of Kunar Governor (SAF, to the breadth and depth of 6-11 Northern Region targeting IEA leadership mortars) this period, the the conflict. 50% of these Western Region 11-13 came to the fore this report IED attack that killed the casualties were in the period, with various key lead- Kunduz Provincial Gover- South; 19 % in the East; Eastern Region 14-16 ers killed countrywide. The nor is significant as it marks 19% in the North; and the Southern Region 17-21 Western Region recorded the the highest official killed in final 6% in the West. greatest concentration, with recent years, following the ANSO Info Page 22 This periods 5 NGO inci- both the Badghis Provincial suicide attack against the dents also provided a snap- Shadow Governor (PSG) and Ghazni Deputy Governor shot to the variety of chal- Deputy PSG being killed in in end September. Numer- lenges faced. Along with YOU NEED TO KNOW two separate operations. As ous other lower ranking the previously mentioned well, the Kuskh District officials and community collateral death of INGO • IMF targeting AOG lead- Shadow Governor (Herat) leaders have also been exe- staff member from IMF ership was also killed in a direct en- cuted, as seen in the operations in Wardak, the gagement with IMF. Takhar VBIED attack against the AOG attack against a • AOG targeting GOA lead- and Faryab in the North re- head of the District Devel- ership demining convoy in ported similar incidents, with opment Association in Samangan also resulted in 1 • Suicide attack in Ghor both the Yangi Qala District Uruzgan. The south has death and 3 wounded. A Shadow Governor (Takhar) experienced these types of robbery of an NGO sup- • AOG attacks against and the Faryab PSG being attacks with disturbing deminers in North ported clinic by AOG in killed in airstrikes. In War- regularity throughout 2010. the West and the wounding dak, an IMF operation target- While overall incident vol- of 2 other NGO national ing the Chaki Wardak Dis- umes are well below those staff members in the north trict Shadow Governor had recorded in September (resulting from an interper- ANSO is supported by tragic consequences for an (elections), they are none- sonal dispute) rounded out INGO, as a national staff theless slated to trend well the threat picture. member became a collateral above seasonal norms, in Ghor (West) has long casualty. While such opera- range of those reported in tions tend to result in limited served as a south to north the summer months. The AOG transit route, and short term degradation in lethality of these incidents AOG tactical capacity, for recent incidents serve as also remains high, as at- early indicators that this NGO the effects may be tested by the number of longer term as it may serve to province may become the casualties tabulated for this newest front in the West- disrupt negotiated access and period: 55 IMF (13 killed); acceptance. ern theatre. The BBIED 113 civilians killed; and 112 attack against the PRT and In counterpoint to this, ANSF (ANP & ANA, the introduction of a Hel- AOG have also been en- killed and wounded). The mand based AOG in the gaged in their own long term geographic dispersion of south suggests an intent to program of targeting GOA the IMF casualties reflect expand their scope and officials for assassination. both the regional numbers influence, consolidating While there were two sepa- of ISAF deployed as well as their control over these rate attempts against the serving as a stark reminder transit and supply routes. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 6 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Except for Surobi, where AOG 40 continuously challenge IMF and District with two non-lethal IED 30 ANSF outreach, Kabul Province strikes against IMF convoys on 20 remains a reasonably safe opera- the Qarabagh – Istalif district 10 tional environment for NGOs if road, reportedly a manifestation 0 precautions are taken to avoid of factional power-struggles unre- proximity to the usual security lated to AOG activity, illustrated targets. The threat picture has once again the independence and KABUL AOG KABUL ACG remained low with incident levels opportunism in the political think- slightly decreasing from the past ing of local actors who will not installations in the city. cycle’s 13 incidents to the current hesitate to utilize whatever lever- Besides one case of a suicide attack threat that 10. The overwhelming majority of age there may be to ensure their sparked special police operations in PD 4, the AOG-initiated incidents featured local interests. capital has witnessed a formidable volume of low severity and lethality. Two single-rocket attacks in the mostly unsubstantiated threat reporting, mostly The environment in the peripheral capital and an additional two dis- pointing towards AOG complex attacks. While districts continues to be shaped by coveries of primed projectiles em- some reports appear credible, a significant por- sporadic AOG activity which con- phasized that IDF attacks remain tion of the reporting originated merely as a centrates more on ensuring logis- the preferred tactical expression product of subjective perceptions questioning tical supply chains from East, of AOG presence on the security the ‘disconcertingly’ long period of calm that South and South-West rather than map of Kabul City. Despite the Kabul has enjoyed the past few months. The on conducting effective military inherent inaccuracy of most IDF NGO community should note that the threat operations. The case of Qarabagh attacks, due to distance and types reporting revolved around extant threats fea- of weaponry used, NGO vulner- turing the usual risk factors, namely targeting KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ability to IDF attacks remains of the security forces, GOA high-profile ven- Spectacular attacks relative to their proximity to im- ues and commercial guesthouses. Avoidance of Demonstrations portant security targets such as the proximity to such targets is the primary risk management strategy. Criminality KAIA and other major military NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 40 The low incidents levels reported 30 from Kapisa (7 during this cycle delicate local sensibilities reflect- 20 against 6 incidents in the previous ing parts of NGO programming, one) may easily nourish a false such as micro-credit and female- 10 impression of stability in the education programs, as well as 0 province. The western districts, NGO programs’ actual or per- where NGOs operations tend to ceived impacts on the balance of concentrate, represent a safe envi- power among local political net- KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG works. In striking contrast, the ronment although an expansion local pro-GOA security forces with a focus on of AOG networks from the east security environment in the east- ern districts continues to be IED strikes and effective close-range attacks. towards Mahmudi Raqi remains a In counterpoint to this, 2 IMF-ANSF opera- possibility, as continued reports shaped by AOG kinetic activity against IMF and ANSF with lar- tions in Tagab targeted mid-ranking AOG of sporadic AOG intimidation of commanders, resulting in 5 killed and 1 in- local communities seem to indi- ger parts of Tagab and Alasay, and to a lesser extent Nijrab, being jured. A similar action was carried out in Ni- cate. Still, NGOs based in Mah- jrab district on 9th of October, when an IMF mudi Raqi should continue to only lightly penetrated by pro- GOA forces. unit tracked down and killed 3 AOG members monitor the risk factors related to while capturing a fourth. The same district Anecdotal evidence suggests that witnessed the only case, albeit two-fold, of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS the IEA has shuffled the leader- IED placements on the district road in Pach- AOG expansion ship of Tagab district in an at- gab. Both devices were secured and defused by Factional Disputes in west tempt to intensify the pressure on ANP. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 During this report cycle, the inci- 30 dent levels recorded in Parwan Ghorband Valley with the armed 20 returned back to the patterns of actors’ map complemented by a 10 the pre-election period, a drop local 20-men Arbaki. While this from 14 to 4 security incidents unit is formally controlled by the 0 with a single significant AOG at- district’s governor, it is informally tack reported from Shinwari. Be- affiliated to the local HIG com- PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG sides the AOG networks active in mander whose loyalty to the Gov- the Ghorband Valley and Kohi ernment remains questionable. trict and a growing base of active field com- Safi District, NGOs in Parwan do According to local sources, the manders. Counter to this, IMF have deployed not face major security obstacles Kabul-Bamyan Road, especially a permanent defence force to the DAC. With that would hinder program deliv- the section between Shinwari at least 3 different AOG operating under the ery. DAC and Siyagerd, is closely IEA authority, the district seems to be the fo- The Namak Ab and Quli Hir clus- watched by AOG while at the cus of the current IEA expansion due to its ters in Shinwari District came same time the road attracts atten- pivotal position between the Bagram IMF base again to the fore with an AOG tion of local commanders cum and Kabul City.