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Since the middle of the twentieth century Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has been dogged by war and its ever present partners; conquest, famine and death. Much debate can be, and is, had about who or what is to blame for this sorry state of affairs, and what is certain is that there are no shortage of political commentators who are all too happy to tell you their theories. In B’Maso I have attempted, but not always succeeded, to avoid any such postulating. Instead of politics, what the gamer will find inside is lots of information that will, I hope, allow him to refight a selection of African wars, stretching from the 1950s up to the 1990s across thousands of miles and hundreds of cultures. There are rule changes and additions that will help the gamer produce games that capture the feel of the various conflicts – some generic to Africa, others specific to one conflict. As will be seen, so much of the fighting in Africa was, in effect, the embodiment of the cold war fought by proxies. This can mean that all sorts of weird and wonderful equipment can turn up, from pre-WWII armoured trucks to the most modern technology. In many places it is impossible to provide detailed orders of battle, as formations operated on an entirely ad hoc basis, using anything that they could lay their hands on. What we have done throughout, however, is provide information on organisational structures and equipment that was used by the various nations, factions, tribes and groups. These are backed up with some introductory scenarios that, we hope, will capture some of the aspects of each conflict. Demands of space dictate that we cannot give a comprehensive breakdown of every conflict, what there is will hopefully be enough to inspire the gamer on to themselves research the conflicts that interest them. The wars that I have chosen to represent here, in what is a double supplement that can be used for both our I Ain’t Been Shot Mum company level rules and Troops Weapons & Tactics for smaller platoon sized games, are conflicts that I can only attempt to describe as colonial wars. It is, I fear, a messy description. The conflict in Nigeria and Biafra along with that in the Congo were, without doubt, post-colonial, as indeed was the struggle for power that occurred in Angola in 1975, however these events are so closely related to those nations’ independence that I have felt them important to include here, especially as the influence of the white man in Africa, in the shape of the ubiquitous mercenary, played such an important part in those conflicts. I struggle even more when I apply the term “colonial” to South Africa and her conflicts. The South African government was not a colonial government, however her presence in South West Africa, originally by Mandate and then later without it, fits well with the nature of the conflicts covered. Which brings me on to terminology used. Guerrilla, Freedom Fighter, Rebel, Terrorist; the arguments are as long as your arm, and usually tedious, typified by the statement that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”; a stupid cliché most often used by people who have never seen, nor are likely to see, the results of a terrorist’s actions at first hand. In B’Maso have used the terminology that I am most comfortable with. To my mind a guerrilla is a fighter who uses irregular tactics, a terrorist is someone who wages war through terrorising a civilian population, a freedom fighter is someone who can do either but you just happen to agree with his view point. In all of the above cases, be it “colonial”, “terrorist” or “rebel”, I hope that the terms that I use do not cause offence. The Africa presented in this supplement is a big continent, where larger than life characters walked the stage, both politically and militarily. Hopefully this supplement can provide us with a window on these conflicts and give us an insight into the interesting tactical lessons of our historical counterparts. Richard Clarke Lard Island, 2008 Page 2 Introduction to Guerrilla Warfare in Africa Page 4 Rule Changes For B’Maso! Page 11 Kenya – The Mau Mau Revolt Page 19 The Congo – Guns for Hire Page 27 Nigerian - The Biafran War Page 46 Rhodesia – War In the Bush Page 56 Angola, Guinea, Mozambique Portugal’s Wars Page 69 Angola, the Battle For Power Page 81 South West Africa War on the Border Page 90 Blinds & Markers for B’Maso Page 105 Scenarios for B’Maso! Page 107 For IDS. Always worthy of the name. Page 3 “Put yourself in their shoes: ‘Man, if I talk to the police the terrs are going to come in and kill me and my whole family.’ The same thing happened in Rhodesia, in Kenya during the Mau Mau, in Angola and Mozambique – in fact in about every African country where Russian backed “liberation movements” have operated. Believe me, it works” Senior Officer, Koevoet, South West Africa Police There is a tendency to consider guerrilla warfare as a modern manifestation, almost a new, somewhat abhorrent, form of war that is somehow inferior to the gentlemanly conflict that occurred in earlier times. Some commentators deny this, pointing out that two thousand years ago Sun Tzu was advocating the use of deception and cunning to defeat his opponents, concentrating your own strength, and striking where your foe is weakest. In fact there is truth in both arguments. There have indeed always been small forces that have attempted to strike blows against a larger opponent – the guerrillas in Spain who gave birth to the name being a classic example. What had changed, as we entered the middle of the twentieth century was the existence of military forces that owed their allegiance to a political creed rather than specifically to a nation state and the supercedence of this within the context of a global political struggle. Indeed it was Chairman Mao who took the writings of Sun Tsu and applied them to modern warfare, and provided a blueprint that many left wing groups around the world have used as their model every since. The Mao’ Blueprint In its simplest form Mao’s blueprint was based on avoiding direct confrontation with a stronger opponent. The first stage was to establish a network of bases within the general population from where the guerrilla forces could operate. Mao is quite clear in his instructions to Chinese communist forces during their civil war that they should behave in a manner that will endear the local population. These were, specifically as follows: (1) Not to do what is likely to damage the land and crops or spoil the houses and belongings of the people; (2) Not to insist on buying or borrowing what the people are not willing to sell or lend; (3) Never to break our word; (4) Not to do or speak what is likely to make people believe that we hold them in contempt; (5) To help them in their daily work; harvesting, fetching firewood, carrying water, sewing, and so on. This was not to suggest that Mao was attempting to make an omelette without break eggs, far from it, he was more than prepared to ingratiate himself with the peasant population by ruthlessly murdering “enemies of the people”. However in a country with a predominantly peasant population this was (initially) a relatively small percentage of people and could be presented as a way of freeing the peasants from landowners and money lenders. Indeed Mao’s whole policy with regards the civilian population was to differentiate his communist forces from those of the Nationalist warlords who had scant, if any, consideration for the population at large. The next phase of Mao’s plan was to strike hard at carefully selected points, causing maximum harm to his opponents, before withdrawing rapidly in order to fight again another day. Small outposts and supply convoys were the obvious targets. Not only were they relatively easy meat, but this approach had two very specific benefits. Firstly the morale of the enemy forces took a blow; they were losing troops with little or no hope of striking back in a “fair fight”. Secondly manpower resources were stretched as in order to maintain a presence in an area the outposts had to be strengthened in order to resist more effectively if attacked. This kept large numbers of troops tied down facing the mere possibility of a threat. Thirdly the life blood of the army, its ammunition and supplies, were restricted, in theory to the point where they were unable to function effectively. Page 4 It was at this point, with his opponent degraded to the point of ineffectiveness and shackled by having to maintain huge garrisons, that Mao recommended moving to conventional warfare and defeating his enemies in detail. In essence this is a simple and effective strategic plan. Naturally the Devil is in the detail, and how the blueprint is applied will determine success or failure, but it certainly served as the model used throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Of course Mao’s blueprint was devised for China where he had the advantage of operating in an environment that was largely exclusively Chinese with a peasantry that had little to lose. In Africa the liberation movements that sprung up from 1951 onwards were usually dealing with a colonial power that was well established in the area; the Portuguese, for example, first establish bases in West Africa in 1483.

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