Since the middle of the twentieth century Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, has been dogged by war and its ever present partners; conquest, famine and death. Much debate can be, and is, had about who or what is to blame for this sorry state of affairs, and what is certain is that there are no shortage of political commentators who are all too happy to tell you their theories. In B’Maso I have attempted, but not always succeeded, to avoid any such postulating.

Instead of politics, what the gamer will find inside is lots of information that will, I hope, allow him to refight a selection of African wars, stretching from the 1950s up to the 1990s across thousands of miles and hundreds of cultures. There are rule changes and additions that will help the gamer produce games that capture the feel of the various conflicts – some generic to Africa, others specific to one conflict. As will be seen, so much of the fighting in Africa was, in effect, the embodiment of the cold war fought by proxies. This can mean that all sorts of weird and wonderful equipment can turn up, from pre-WWII armoured trucks to the most modern technology.

In many places it is impossible to provide detailed orders of battle, as formations operated on an entirely ad hoc basis, using anything that they could lay their hands on. What we have done throughout, however, is provide information on organisational structures and equipment that was used by the various nations, factions, tribes and groups. These are backed up with some introductory scenarios that, we hope, will capture some of the aspects of each conflict. Demands of space dictate that we cannot give a comprehensive breakdown of every conflict, what there is will hopefully be enough to inspire the gamer on to themselves research the conflicts that interest them.

The wars that I have chosen to represent here, in what is a double supplement that can be used for both our I Ain’t Been Shot Mum company level rules and Troops Weapons & Tactics for smaller platoon sized games, are conflicts that I can only attempt to describe as colonial wars. It is, I fear, a messy description. The conflict in Nigeria and Biafra along with that in the Congo were, without doubt, post-colonial, as indeed was the struggle for power that occurred in Angola in 1975, however these events are so closely related to those nations’ independence that I have felt them important to include here, especially as the influence of the white man in Africa, in the shape of the ubiquitous mercenary, played such an important part in those conflicts.

I struggle even more when I apply the term “colonial” to South Africa and her conflicts. The South African government was not a colonial government, however her presence in South West Africa, originally by Mandate and then later without it, fits well with the nature of the conflicts covered.

Which brings me on to terminology used. Guerrilla, Freedom Fighter, Rebel, Terrorist; the arguments are as long as your arm, and usually tedious, typified by the statement that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”; a stupid cliché most often used by people who have never seen, nor are likely to see, the results of a terrorist’s actions at first hand. In B’Maso have used the terminology that I am most comfortable with. To my mind a guerrilla is a fighter who uses irregular tactics, a terrorist is someone who wages war through terrorising a civilian population, a freedom fighter is someone who can do either but you just happen to agree with his view point. In all of the above cases, be it “colonial”, “terrorist” or “rebel”, I hope that the terms that I use do not cause offence.

The Africa presented in this supplement is a big continent, where larger than life characters walked the stage, both politically and militarily. Hopefully this supplement can provide us with a window on these conflicts and give us an insight into the interesting tactical lessons of our historical counterparts.

Richard Clarke Lard Island, 2008

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Introduction to Guerrilla Warfare in Africa Page 4

Rule Changes For B’Maso! Page 11

Kenya – The Mau Mau Revolt Page 19

The Congo – Guns for Hire Page 27

Nigerian - The Biafran War Page 46

Rhodesia – War In the Bush Page 56

Angola, Guinea, Mozambique Portugal’s Wars Page 69

Angola, the Battle For Power Page 81

South West Africa War on the Border Page 90

Blinds & Markers for B’Maso Page 105

Scenarios for B’Maso! Page 107

For IDS. Always worthy of the name.

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“Put yourself in their shoes: ‘Man, if I talk to the police the terrs are going to come in and kill me and my whole family.’ The same thing happened in Rhodesia, in Kenya during the Mau Mau, in Angola and Mozambique – in fact in about every African country where Russian backed “liberation movements” have operated. Believe me, it works” Senior Officer, Koevoet, South West Africa Police

There is a tendency to consider guerrilla warfare as a modern manifestation, almost a new, somewhat abhorrent, form of war that is somehow inferior to the gentlemanly conflict that occurred in earlier times. Some commentators deny this, pointing out that two thousand years ago Sun Tzu was advocating the use of deception and cunning to defeat his opponents, concentrating your own strength, and striking where your foe is weakest.

In fact there is truth in both arguments. There have indeed always been small forces that have attempted to strike blows against a larger opponent – the guerrillas in Spain who gave birth to the name being a classic example. What had changed, as we entered the middle of the twentieth century was the existence of military forces that owed their allegiance to a political creed rather than specifically to a nation state and the supercedence of this within the context of a global political struggle. Indeed it was Chairman Mao who took the writings of Sun Tsu and applied them to modern warfare, and provided a blueprint that many left wing groups around the world have used as their model every since.

The Mao’ Blueprint In its simplest form Mao’s blueprint was based on avoiding direct confrontation with a stronger opponent. The first stage was to establish a network of bases within the general population from where the guerrilla forces could operate. Mao is quite clear in his instructions to Chinese communist forces during their civil war that they should behave in a manner that will endear the local population. These were, specifically as follows: (1) Not to do what is likely to damage the land and crops or spoil the houses and belongings of the people; (2) Not to insist on buying or borrowing what the people are not willing to sell or lend; (3) Never to break our word; (4) Not to do or speak what is likely to make people believe that we hold them in contempt; (5) To help them in their daily work; harvesting, fetching firewood, carrying water, sewing, and so on.

This was not to suggest that Mao was attempting to make an omelette without break eggs, far from it, he was more than prepared to ingratiate himself with the peasant population by ruthlessly murdering “enemies of the people”. However in a country with a predominantly peasant population this was (initially) a relatively small percentage of people and could be presented as a way of freeing the peasants from landowners and money lenders. Indeed Mao’s whole policy with regards the civilian population was to differentiate his communist forces from those of the Nationalist warlords who had scant, if any, consideration for the population at large.

The next phase of Mao’s plan was to strike hard at carefully selected points, causing maximum harm to his opponents, before withdrawing rapidly in order to fight again another day. Small outposts and supply convoys were the obvious targets. Not only were they relatively easy meat, but this approach had two very specific benefits. Firstly the morale of the enemy forces took a blow; they were losing troops with little or no hope of striking back in a “fair fight”. Secondly manpower resources were stretched as in order to maintain a presence in an area the outposts had to be strengthened in order to resist more effectively if attacked. This kept large numbers of troops tied down facing the mere possibility of a threat. Thirdly the life blood of the army, its ammunition and supplies, were restricted, in theory to the point where they were unable to function effectively.

Page 4 It was at this point, with his opponent degraded to the point of ineffectiveness and shackled by having to maintain huge garrisons, that Mao recommended moving to conventional warfare and defeating his enemies in detail. In essence this is a simple and effective strategic plan. Naturally the Devil is in the detail, and how the blueprint is applied will determine success or failure, but it certainly served as the model used throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

Of course Mao’s blueprint was devised for China where he had the advantage of operating in an environment that was largely exclusively Chinese with a peasantry that had little to lose. In Africa the liberation movements that sprung up from 1951 onwards were usually dealing with a colonial power that was well established in the area; the Portuguese, for example, first establish bases in West Africa in 1483. In many cases the colonial governments had a significant degree of support from the indigenous population who had gradually been increasingly empowered and encouraged to invest in the status quo. Indeed the political mantra of the left, with the downtrodden native oppressed by the evil white colonialist, was a simplistic parody of what was actually a complex co-existence, the nature of which varied from one area to another reflecting local circumstance and history. Let us look then at the systems that existed in sub- Saharan Africa before independence.

Portugal In the case of Portugal the “colonies” of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau were, in fact, not colonies at all; from the 1950’s onwards they were overseas provinces of Portugal itself. In these provinces the goal of the Portuguese government was to assimilate the black population to the point where they were equal Portuguese citizens (a policy that had its roots in pronouncements dating back to the 1600’s). Indeed a person of African or mixed race who spoke Portuguese, was a Christian, had signed a declaration of loyalty and could support himself financially was in every respect a Portuguese citizen with no colour bar. This is, of course, fine in theory, however it excluded 99% of Africans who due to accident of birth and lack of educational opportunity were unable to achieve this lofty ideal

Interestingly it was these Assimilados, assimilated Africans with Portuguese status, who provided the intellectual core of the independence movement, objecting in principle to the presence of the Portuguese in their land despite their own personal advantages. Nevertheless the fact remains that relationships between the Portuguese and their African citizens were generally good and after the Lisbon coup of 1974 the hand-over of power to the African population was good natured if embarrassingly hasty.

Britain In Britain’s colonies the relationship between the administration and their black population was somewhat different. The colonies were largely governed from Britain through the Colonial Office, historically they had been administered as cheaply as possible so that they paid their way within the British Empire. This statement suggests that the British were in Africa purely to exploit the resources, and to an extent that is true, however unlike India, where this was largely the plan of the Honourable East India Company from the outset, the colonisation of Africa was in many ways accidental. Indeed much of the expansion into the African hinterland occurred more to stop other nations, such as France, Germany, Portugal and Belgium getting their first. A poor blueprint for an Empire.

Once in place, however, the British were typically efficient in all that they did and the energy of the settlers ensured that the colonies’ development took on its own dynamic. Mines and farms were the first commercial concerns, followed by low-level industrialisation within the cities that grew as more settlers arrived from the UK, and more Africans were drawn to the cities by the wages that were offered for willing workers. Rightly or wrongly the sums of monies available for Africans was far less than that paid to the British settlers, but relative to their traditional income it was still a King’s ransom that allowed many to purchase items that their parents could not have imagined, let alone afforded.

A system of District Officers meant that the Colonial administration was in touch with local concerns and issues, and the men who took these posts formed a strong link with the indigenous population, being the dispenser of justice on the more trivial cases that punctuated every day life. What emerged was a paternalistic approach that, whilst sincere, would appear patronising when a more educated black middle class emerged.

From the end of the nineteenth century onwards these colonies were on a path of development that saw a modern infrastructure established. Roads, water, medical services and the law were all provided, whilst

Page 5 education for the Africans was largely the preserve of the Church until the mid-twentieth century when the colonial administrations recognised that if they were going to develop and modernise the colonies further they would need to educate the indigenous population. Indeed by the 1950s the Colonial Office was recognising that the future was based on an orderly transition of power to the indigenous population. What they failed to recognise was the speed with which this would have to happen, with their own projections suggesting that the colonies would remain just that until the early twenty-first century.

In most of Britain’s colonies the white settler population was small enough to recognise that they could not stand in the way of the winds of change that were about to sweep through the continent. Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Uganda and even Northern Rhodesia slipped quietly away to be replaced with Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In Kenya the 55,000 white settlers, supported by 165,000 Asians, had aspirations to become a self-governing colony. Despite their limited numbers (there were 6.5 million Africans in the colony) they were firmly in control of the political and economic structures. The experience of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya was, however, sufficient to show that the African population had aspirations that, were Britain to retain any influence in the area, would have to be met. Only in one colony, Southern Rhodesia, was the settler population strong enough to challenge the plans of the British government.

Rhodesia Unique within Africa, Southern Rhodesia had been a self-governing colony since 1923, the next step that the white population envisaged would be to move to a Dominion status like New Zealand, Canada and Australia. By the early 1960’s, however, the British government saw the next step as being independence of a different kind; with a black majority government. This was unacceptable to the settlers who by 1965 had had ample opportunity to see the events in the Belgian Congo unfold into a bestial conflict. Their call was for a continuation of “civilised rule”, and they elected a Prime Minister in the shape of Ian Smith who was prepared to force the political pace and unilaterally declare Independence for what by then was known simply as Rhodesia.

In Rhodesia the form of government was one of limited franchise based upon reaching a threshold in Income Tax payment. There could be no doubt that the system was unfairly skewed, white housewives, for example, could vote despite not paying any income tax as it was argued that the white Rhodesians’ collectively paid sufficient tax to allow them to quality. For black Rhodesians there were no such concessions and on average they earned a tenth of the average white Rhodesian’s salary (albeit for different jobs). The main tribal chiefs were present as Senators in the Upper House of government, but by and large the Africans were not represented in Parliament.

That said, the political situation in Rhodesia was very different to that in neighbouring South Africa. Land was divided into three main types (I am ignoring National Parks, the fourth type). The White farming areas represented around 35% of the country, this was largely the land that had been sold to the Pioneer Column by King Lobenguela, the last King of the N’debele (Matabele) in the 1890’s. It was land that he considered worthless as it was at too high an altitude to be well watered; however he had not heard of irrigation. The Tribal Trust Lands, 50% of the nation’s land, were the next area where the whites could not purchase land and the African population was free to live their traditional pastoral existence. Finally there were the African Purchase Areas with the remaining 15% of the country. This was established land suitable for farming that the government restricted to black ownership. In both the latter cases, the TTLs and the APAs as they were known, the government invested heavily to help the African population in the hope that they would “buy into” the success of the nation as a whole.

Belgium The Belgian Congo had one of the most unusual histories in that it began its existence not as a colony, but rather as the personal possession of King Leopold II of Belgium. Exploration of the area had been first undertaken in the 1870’s, but it was the Treaty of Berlin in 1885 that saw Leopold’s acquisition of this prime piece of real estate which he named the Congo Free State.

Largely Leopold’s interests in the region were financial, with rubber being the first major product that was exploited, coinciding with the development of the motor car. What investment that was ploughed into the country was largely to facilitate the movement of goods to the coast and subsequently to European markets. Sadly the African population were treated as a commodity to be exploited for their

Page 6 labour, and the actions of the Force Publique, Leopold’s militia, were to generate international condemnation.

In 1908 the Belgian government were obliged to act by the weight of criticism and took on responsibility for running what was then a colony administered from Boma and divided into fifteen administrative districts. In truth the colony was perpetually under-funded by a government that had little interest in the area. African education was almost exclusively in the hands of the Roman Catholic church but the levels of education were minimal and often largely religious in content. Indeed the state attempted to have as little involvement as possible in the area, with no real connection with the local population other than the relationship of employer/labourer. The African had almost no rights and certainly only a miniscule chance of social advancement due to extremely low wages and the lack of opportunity to purchase property.

White Belgians within the colony were lured there by generous pay and conditions, but as a rule they were not settlers who saw their labour as an investment in their future in the Congo, and this added to the feeling that the colony was just one large commercial venture.

Attempts by the Governor General in the 1950s to modernise the colony, with a plan to enfranchise the African population and to create an educated class capable of taking the country to independence over a thirty year timetable were met with suspicion by the Belgian government, and ultimately only a very small educated black middle class emerged in time for independence.

South Africa It is difficult to pass comment on South Africa without entering a minefield of opinion. To start, and in order to provide some perspective, I would say that whilst African nationalists may have been able to shout “Settlers go home” at white Kenyans, Congolese or even Rhodesians, they could not do the same with white South Africans. Indeed the European settlers who founded the Afrikaaner “tribe” had arrived in the Cape province in the 1600’s, earlier than the African tribes that were to migrate down from equatorial Africa. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this argument, the fact was that whilst the white Kenyan, the Belgian, the Rhodesian could all “go home” the white South African had nowhere to go, and as a result he dug his toes in and said “No further”.

It is notable that the fear of African majority rule was clearly deeper in South Africa than anywhere else. This can only be put down to the fact that collectively they had more to lose than any other white group in Africa. With the domino effect of colonial independence starting in the north and working its way southwards they also had longer to observe the impact that this had had on those newly created nations, and what they saw left them concerned for their future. Civil Wars, economic mismanagement, corruption, tribalism, all were there clearly to be seen throughout Africa. Their response was a desperate knee-jerk reaction; Apartheid.

In the Portuguese colonies the emergence of the nationalist movements saw the regime responding by becoming increasingly liberal and investing large sums of money to provide facilities and opportunities for the black population. In South Africa the reverse was true. Apartheid, or “separate development”, was an unapologetically racist concept, where “modern” whites and “backward” blacks would be separated and allowed to evolve at their separate paces. In practice this meant a political system under which black South Africans lost all rights, even their nationality as the regime attempted to categorise them according to a network of black homelands, Bantustans based loosely on the Indian Reservations in the US, apportioning almost all the Africans to their tribal homelands and treating them as migrant workers in a white South Africa.

Initially much of the English speaking white population of South Africa were both offended and shocked by the policies of the largely Afrikaans National Party government, however Harold McMillan’s “Winds of Change” speech to the parliament in Cape Town in 1960, now much lauded as a great and prophetic address, backfired in that it served to persuade the English section of South African society that Britain was abandoning them. The result being that they fell into line behind the National Party and any brake on the march towards racial extremism was now removed.

The list of laws passed to support this oppressive system is too long to list, suffice to say that they were repressive and guaranteed to trigger resistance and ultimately conflict. However any black nationalist

Page 7 organisation would have to confront a regime that was ready to use force to crush any threat to its existence.

South West Africa At the end of the Great War the League of Nations made what had been German South West Africa a mandate territory to be administered by the South Africans. In 1946 South Africa requested permission from the United Nations to annex South West Africa but this was refused, but that refusal was ignored and an informal de facto annexation resulted.

Unsurprisingly the South African administration was not well disposed to the black population. The white settlers who made up fourteen percent of the population were the main political power, with the ten main tribes being given self-government within homelands in the north of the country in a downscaled version of apartheid.

Mao - An African Variation What is clear is that the colonial political systems and consequently the attitude of the black African population were varied in the extreme. Most critically one also needs to factor in the issue of tribalism within African culture. In most of Africa before the arrival of the Europeans the indigenous population lived a primitive existence, at best associated with the bronze age in its development, at worst stone age. Their existence was largely as hunter-gatherers with some limited agrarian activity and the tribe formed a central part of that, providing a community where labour could be divided and security was provided through safety in numbers. Leadership of these tribes was often a combination of hereditary royal lines heavily influenced by the ethos of a strong-man culture. It was not enough to be born of the right blood line, tribal rulers also had to provide strong leadership; if they failed they were more than likely to find themselves overthrown and killed by stronger figures.

For hundreds or thousands of years these groups had been clashing with their neighbouring tribes and strong links, alliances, and antipathies had been formed. Whilst the advent of colonial rule largely ended inter-tribal warfare it would be wrong to assume that this peaceful co-existence represented an end to hostility and even hatred. Indeed the colonial powers had a vested interest in ensuring that vestiges of the old systems were retained in order to best divide and rule the subjugate peoples. In this environment tribal loyalties were often stronger than adherence to any political creed, something that Mao had not had to contend with in China.

In such an environment it rapidly became clear to the nationalist movements that Mao’s blueprint for guerrilla warfare was not always suitable. Even in their own tribal areas the nationalist guerrillas found that the strong-man culture did not mean that they would get support. The colonial power, often personified by the local District Commissioner, was generally regarded as the strong figure; the bringer of peace, the provider of modern medicine, the advisor on agricultural matters, the arbiter of the law. In order to usurp power the nationalists recognised that they would have to be seen as collectively stronger than the colonial power. Without a base among the people it was necessary to find an alternative, and this was more often than not across a border in a sympathetic neighbouring county.

It is notable that the spread of African nationalism was a domino effect from the north to the south, as one country became independent they provided support for the neighbouring nationalist movements. This was absent in Kenya and Nigeria/Biafra (the emergency in the former occurring in one isolated province, in the latter the war being a complex inter-tribal religious civil war) but was very much the case elsewhere. The Congo and Zambia provided safe-havens for Angolan nationalists, Tanzania and Zambia for those in Mozambique, Zambia and Mozambique for the war against Rhodesia and Angola and Zambia for the nationalists operating in South West Africa. Indeed this was a new and very African blueprint that relied on world opinion, and the United Nations in particular, condemning the colonial governments that neighboured these independent countries, thereby avoiding any legal issues about using cross-border bases. It is notable that when the Rhodesians and South Africans resorted to cross border incursions to strike against nationalist bases in neighbouring countries they received international condemnation, whereas the nationalists did exactly the same thing in reverse without any comment.

With seemingly secure bases provided the nationalist movements were free to prosecute their campaigns. Almost universally the guerrilla forces were inadequately armed or organised to even consider confronting the colonial armed forces. In such a situation the nationalists turned to intimidation of the local

Page 8 population, seeking to achieve power through the weapon of fear. Tribal leaders were killed, as were those individuals who were associated with the colonial authority; be they police officers or health workers. Their objective was to reduce the population’s confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect them, there by replacing them in the minds of the people as the strong men. With the traditional figures of authority removed the nationalists were able to exert their influence through fear, creating the base of compliant support within the people that allowed them to move to the next phase of Mao’s formula; to strike blows against the enemy.

With the imbalance between the military power of the terrorists and the security forces these targets were not the enemy’s soldiers, as had been the case with Mao, but the enemy’s economy, and through that their ability and determination to wage war. Yet even this presented significant problems for the nationalists. Industry was largely concentrated in towns and cities where large populations were protected by the authorities. The commercial infrastructure, railway lines and roads where industry’s produce was taken to market was, however, a much easier target. Commercial ventures away from urban areas were also popular. Farms are, by definition, isolated and away from towns. By striking at white farmers the nationalists were able to hit the colony’s economy. When farmers began to protect themselves it was discovered that a farm could be put out of production by eliminating the black workforce. The by-product of attacks on such targets was that other farmers would, it was hoped, be terrorised into abandoning their farms as well. It also served to stretch the security forces thinly and place more economic strain on the states concerned due to manpower shortages.

This policy, terror combined with economic warfare, was made all the more effective when combined with international sanctions that restricted the ability of the colonial power to trade normally. Indeed it was rare than any nationalist movement had to consider moving to Mao’s third phase, that of conventional warfare. Indeed only ZIPRA in Rhodesia considered such an option and it is extremely likely that had they attempted it they would have been heavily defeated due to lack of air support. In the Portuguese Empire a collective war weariness sapped the morale of the Portuguese people even though in Angola they were winning the war and elsewhere achieving a winning draw at worst. In Rhodesia the impact of the terrorist war and international sanctions on the economy was sufficient to bring the Rhodesia Front government to the table and the country to its knees. In South Africa, the African military superpower who had been able to fight and win their war on the Namibia-Angola border it was the impact of sanctions and the necessity to maintain a large and expensive armed forces due to internal unrest that brought independence for Namibia and eventually majority rule in South Africa.

Indeed Mao’s third phase was arguably replaced by a new one, the battle for the media and therefore the hearts and minds of the United Nations. It is interesting to view press coverage of the conflicts outlined here. From as early as 1960 in the Congo one sees an orchestrated campaign being run to discredit any body that opposed the communist sponsored side. As time progressed this becomes increasingly effective.

A classic case in point are the Rhodesian Selous Scouts who, following the lead set by the British in Kenya, infiltrated terrorist forces in the field with a view to destroying them. Almost immediately after the war concluded senior ZANLA commanders who were on the sharp end of their activities went on record to state how effective the Selous Scouts had been. This contrasted notably with the coverage that they were given during the conflict, when every atrocity committed by the terrorists, the killing of clergymen, the raping of Nuns, the murder of innocents, was laid at their door. What was more this was not just to be found in the columns of the terrorist organisations’ news sheets or Pravda, but in the pages of western newspapers in Europe and the United States. Indeed one can see exactly the same treatment of South Africa’s 32 Battalion which also operated in a pseudo role, and Koevoet in South West Africa.

It is no coincidence that the military successes of these units were directly mirrored by the campaigns of demonisation in the press. The opening of the Soviet archives showed what the authorities in Rhodesia and South Africa had known all along; these were co-ordinated attacks carried out to the Soviet blueprint for a new third phase. What was more the Soviets were hugely successful in this area and they found that they had an all too willing ally in the western press corps that was ever ready to see the conflicts as a two dimensional fight between “good” blacks and “bad” whites. What was more the United Nations and western governments were equally happy to take their lead from the press.

In summary, the wars that brought so much unrest and trouble to Africa were fought in a manner that reflected the diverse and complex societies in which they were fought rather than following any exact blueprint, be that Mao’s or Sun Tzu’s. What is now clear is that the wars of independence in Africa were

Page 9 largely a manifestation of the cold war being fought by proxy and that the winners, with their manipulation of the United Nations and their promotion of their own brand of global politics, were the Politburos in Moscow and Havana. The losers, sadly, were the Africans of all colours, many of whom are still paying the price today.

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Section One - CARDS

Sundowner Whilst stopping to brew tea was very popular ritual throughout the armed forces of British Commonwealth (membership past or present) Africa would not be Africa without the ubiquitous alcoholic “sundowner”. We suggest that the Tea Break card be replaced with a Sundowner card. It’s effect, however, remains unchanged.

DEATH FROM ABOVE This represents a bonus card for one aerial unit, be that fixed wing or helicopter. It may not be used by a fast moving jet propelled fixed wing aeroplane. On this card the aircraft of choice may undertake one additional move.

B’’Maso! This card allows one unit (up to platoon size in IABSM, section size in TW&T) that has already been spotted but is not now in line of sight of enemy forces to return to Blinds, being replaced with one real Blind and one Dummy. On returning to Blinds a “Spoor” marker must be placed on the table at the last point at which the unit could be seen.

A unit that is on a Blind (whether it has or has not been previously spotted does not matter) may use the B’Maso! card to remove the blind completely if it is taking up a position in cover. To do this it must declare it’s intentions on the B’Maso card and then remain stationary until the next B’Maso card is drawn. At that point the blind will be removed and replaced with a spoor marker. The unit is now considered to have taken a position in cover within 9” of where the blind was situated. Any wounds on the unit or units will be reduced by 50% (round down) and any Big Men with the unit will have their cards removed from the deck (or ignored) until they are again spotted or reveal themselves (militarily!). If an umpire is present he may be advised of their fresh position, if no umpire is available the player should mark this new position on a sketch map.

If, in between the two B’Maso cards, the blind is spotted the unit is deployed on the table as normal. If a tracking unit reaches the spoor and tracks successfully then the hidden unit is put on the table as spotted.

Looting Looting was a potential problem with any soldiers, and with poorer quality ones it can lead to the near disintegration of a unit for a period of time. Units that are prone to looting will have a Loot card in the deck. They will only be prone to its effects when they are within 12” of a source of potential loot (European buildings, rather than mud huts) and can neither see any enemy nor are under small arms fire. If those conditions are met then a Looting card kicks in.

Roll a dice for any looting prone unit (section in IABSM, team in TW&T). On a 1 or 2 they will disappear into the building in search of loot. To stop them they must be contacted physically by a Big Man.

SECTION TWO - Aerial Forces Both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft have unlimited movement over the table, but must actually be represented on the table if they are operating in a tactical role. If making a ground attack, they must be placed directly over their target once the attack is made, being removed once the “Sundowner” card appears. Helicopters attacking a ground target will be susceptible to AA fire in the turn that they are making an attack; most fixed wing aircraft, especially fast moving jets, are only susceptible to certain types of AA attack, however they may be driven off by fire.

Page 11 To clarify with an example. In a certain turn the Air Support card is turned, and the player decides to attack a village containing enemy forces. The attacking aircraft is immediately placed on the table directly above the village. Any enemy forces with reserved dice that are able to fire on the attacking aircraft may now do so, with the aircraft either surviving the attack or being downed or driven off. Supposing the aircraft survives, it now performs its attack. It then remains on table, susceptible to AA fire from enemy units as their cards appear. Once the “Sundowner” card appears, any surviving aircraft are removed from the table. Inserting and Evacuating Ground Troops Helicopters inserting or evacuating ground troops from the table will spend one turn hovering above a suitable landing zone (LZ). On the following turn, they may be on or just above the ground as the troops leave or enter. On the next turn they will hover above the LZ again. During these three turns, they are susceptible to AA fire. Helicopters may carry a certain number of troops safely, carrying more at increasing levels of risk. Below One you will find a list of the helicopters used in Africa. Each helicopter has a standard number of passengers that can be carried. Helicopters attempting to carry more than this standard load must roll 2d6 and add the number of passengers over this standard level. A score of over 12 means the helicopter crashes as it attempts to take off. Previously established stop Positions may be used in a scenario for troops who have aerial insertion capability. Having these in place before the scenario begins will allow the stop positions to be hidden until enemy units are driven onto them. Helicopters in African Service Type Load Armament Service Alouette III 4-5 troops Twin MGs Rhodesia, Portugal, South Africa Aloutette III Gunship - 20mm cannon Rhodesia, Portugal, South Africa Alouette III Dalmatian - Quad 0.30 MMGs Rhodesia Bell 205 UH1D 8 troops Twin MGs Rhodesia Puma SA330 14 troops None or twin 0.30 South Africa, Portugal Super Frelon 38 troops None South Africa Mi-17/Mi-18 24 troops Rockets Angola Mi 24 Hind 8 troops 23mm cannon Angola HMG AT-2 Swatter missiles

Parachute Drops Parachute drops were used extensively by the more professional military forces in Africa, the Belgians, the Congo, the Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans all used them to great effect in their wars. To represent these the player needs to know the method of insertion. With large transports, such as the C130 Hercules, the paras may exit two at a time, whereas with the older C47 Dakota they are restricted to one at a time. Dropping paras is a two stage process, as follows.

On the first turn of the unit card the player should indicate his Drop Zone on the table. He then rolls a deviation dice and 4D6. The DZ is then shifted accordingly to the new position and the first paratrooper (or two paratroopers if deploying from a large transport) is placed on that spot. The rest of the paratroopers are now placed on the table in a direct line from that point that reflect the line of the plane’s approach (this is entirely the player’s choice) at intervals of 1”.

These paratroopers are now on the ground, but are busy removing their chutes, getting friends down who are stuck in trees and the like. If they are attacked now they will always be considered a Great target.

On the next turn of the unit card the unit may move off and deploy as they desire.

For larger drops, such as when using IABSM, the above mechanism will suffice. For smaller drops some kind of deviation may be preferred to reflect the immediate disorder after a drop. In that case roll a deviation dice and 2D6 for each paratrooper. Any paratrooper landing on anything other than flat terrain

Page 12 will roll a D6. On a 1 they are immobile for the rest of the game. They may, however shoot or throw grenades in TW&T.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE Anti-Aircraft fire is undertaken either when an aircraft is attacking a position or a helicopter is deployed tactically, i.e. either inserting or evacuating ground troops. The unit attacked may fire, along with any anti-aircraft weapons within 24” of the target that has line of sight to the aircraft.

To make the attack roll 2D6 and add the AA Strike factor of the weapon to the result. Consult the table below to see if a hit has been achieved.

Target Total Required

Fixed wing jet 14

Fixed wing prop 13

Helicopter 11

Effect of Hits If a hit is achieved roll 1D6 and again add the weapon’s AA Strike factor. Adjusted Roll Result 1-5 Attacker aborts current action 6 Attacker aborts mission, return to base 7 Attacker badly damaged, crash lands off-table 8 or 9 Attacker shot down. Fixed wing crashes off table Helicopter crashes on table, roll 2D6 and deviation dice. One hit per crew member. Anti Aircraft Strike Factors Weapon Strike

Small Arms/GPMGs 0 HMG, Cannon 1 Heavy Cannon (30mm +), RPG 2 Stinger, SA-7, Strela 2 3

Air-strikes against troops These are covered in IABSM, but not in TW&T. Air support is treated as fire support in a similar way to artillery, however without any ranging shots.

The firer names his target, uses a deviation dice and a number of D6 to see where his strike actually lands, and then uses the number of strike dice named against any sections or weapons teams in the kill zone that is given for that weapon.

Where kill zones are given they either specify an area in terms of dimensions, or give a blast radius, the latter normally for single weapons or bursts. With the former the longer side of the kill zone follows the line of the attacking aircraft’s approach run. As aircraft movement is abstracted in the rules the aircraft can be said to be coming from any direction, however in certain scenarios the approach path may be specified.

The accompanying diagram best shows the two types of strikes, either a specified kill zone or a blast radius.

Page 13 Weapon Kill Zones and Deviation Weapon Kill Zone Deviation Rockets 4” on blast 2D6 Napalm/Frantan 12” x 24” 3D6 Single bomb 4” on blast 3D6 Multiple bombs or heavy single bomb 9” x 12” 3D6 Saturation Bombing 18” x 24” 4D6 Straffing Aircraft MGs or Cannon 3” x 6” 2D6 Gunship Cannon 3” on blast 1D6

The above are intentionally vague, I have no intention of listing every piece of ordnance that could be used over a thirty year time frame, however they do serve as a good guide that should satisfy all but the most obsessive technofiles. Saturation bombing will be unusual, however the Rhodesians did develop the Alpha bomb which when dropped in sufficient numbers from the Canberra could produce astounding devastation in a strip 100m wide by 1000m long due to the hundreds of ball bearings in each of the 300 football sized bombs that the Canberra carry. Feel free to adjust the damage area to reflect larger or smaller bombs, or specific weapons.

Weapon Effect The effect of the air-strikes should be against any infantry section or weapons team in the kill zone or blast radius, so the more troops in there the more effective the weapons will be. Use the Direct Fire Support table in the rules with the following damage dice. Some columns give a choice of two sets of dice to use, such a 2/3, in that case the first number is the dice that should be used if the target is within the kill zone or blast radius, the second is the dice that should be used if a direct hit is achieved.

Weapon IABSM TW&T Rockets 2/3 3/4 Napalm/Frantan 2/3 4/5 Single bomb 2/3 3/4 Multiple bombs or heavy single bomb 4 5 Saturation Bombing 5 7 Strafing Aircraft MGs or Cannon 2 3 Gunship Cannon 3 4

The following adjustments should be made to air-strikes: ¾ Attacks from the air ignore one level of cover ¾ Soft ground reduces the effect of cannon fire by one dice ¾ Top pilots or gunners may reduce the number of deviation dice by one ¾ Poor pilots will increase the number of deviation dice by one ¾ Forward Air Controllers may reduce the number deviation dice by one

SECTION THREE –- ON THE GROUND

Terrain It is worth mentioning that whilst dense foliage may not stop bullets it does affect the ability of the firer to see, and therefore aim at, his target. animals Africa is full of animals which will generally avoid human beings. Largely the effect of blinds on the players will reflect noise in the bush or unexpected movement, all of which can be put down to animals. If an umpire is present he may wish to add some specific blinds that represent animals.

Mini-blinds In games of IABSM it may be necessary to use smaller blinds to just represent one single section or fire team. Ordinarily this will be restricted to situations where their opponent will be aware of number restrictions, such as when deploying from a helicopter. In this situation a blind 3” round will be used.

Page 14 An often used tactic to confuse their enemy was for helicopters to land several times in quick succession so as to conceal where the troops actually deployed. In that situation mini-blinds should be used.

MORALE This supplement contains some basic morale parameters for the participating forces, specifically these are stated as a point where the number of wounds on a section causes it to retire. How many wounds, and how far they retire depends on the unit.

A unit forced to retire will do so immediately. If it has not been activated already in this turn this will count as the sections go, no other action being allowed unless it is on a bonus card. Big Men with the section are obliged to withdraw with it, however on the subsequent turn of their card they may rally the unit with their initiative (TW&T) or dice (IABSM), or they may choose to move away.

Off-Road Wheeled vehicles With the Second World War highlighting the importance of mobility in warfare the post war period saw military forces seeking wheeled vehicles that could operate effectively off-road. These are not subject to the same penalties that other wheeled vehicles are, using the following for movement.

Hard Ground Broken Ground Double Initiative Dice +2 pips per dice

Clearly some commonsense needs to be applied here with regards what constitutes broken ground, however a good rule of thumb would be that if a man could run on that surface then it can be driven on by one of these vehicles.

Not Real Soldiers Many of the troops encountered in Africa are not “real” soldiers. This relates to their lack of proper training and their capacity to do “The wrong thing” on the battlefield. Regular forces are trained to know that when under fire the best way to stay safe is to keep your head down and use whatever cover is available. Troops who are not real soldiers are far more likely to do the wrong thing and just run away from the threat.

In B’Maso troops who are not real soldiers ignore wounds when running away from their enemy. The wounds, therefore, only have a negative impact on movement when attempting to close with the enemy.

Some troops who are not real soldiers are unable to initiate close combat. They may be within 4” of their opponent but the casualties are calculated using the fire table rather than close combat. This does not apply to all troops who are not real soldiers, just the more cowardly ones.

Regular troops may not fire on enemy forces who are within 4” or friendly troops. Units who are not real soldiers may do so, however any near misses on their target will count as hits on friendly troops.

Technology gap The wars in Africa saw some of the Cold War’s most impressive technology used in action, however the man operating it was often without even the most basic education. As a result weapons that require a “to hit” roll will fire with a minus one or two on their roll if the technology gap exists between the man and the weapon. It should be noted that even poorly educated troops can be trained to operate complex weapons systems efficiently, however not all were.

Primitive ranged weapons Some units in Africa, whether through tribal custom or lack of an alternative, were armed with primitive ranged weapons, bow, arrows, spears, darts and so on. These units may only fire at short range, but will used the medium range table (9”-18” in IABSM, 12”-24” in TW&T) for effect. Some of these were undoubtedly poisoned (especially in equatorial Africa, such as the Congo), but there is no need for any specific rule to cover this with this level game.

Page 15 Horse Mounted Troops Mounted troops were used to good effect in southern Africa, the Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans using them for long range tracking and patrolling. To represent this we use the following rules.

Cavalry Movement At the walk cavalry move at the same rate as infantry +1 pip per dice. Trackers may follow spoor at this speed as normal.

Cavalry moving at the trot will move with +3 pips per dice. Trackers may follow spoor of a unit with a fieldcraft rating of 0 as normal and with fieldcraft rating of 1 with a -1 on the tracking dice.

Cavalry may charge towards an enemy that is in line of sight. They move with one extra dice and +3 pips per dice. If fired on when charging they are always a Great target. Mounted units’ movement is affected by wounds as normal unless moving directly away from the enemy when all wounds are ignored.

In Action Firing from horseback is particularly difficult and, therefore, is done at one range band further than is actually the case. A mounted target is also a good target, with losing much of the benefits of any cover due to their height. As such these troops would normally fight dismounted.

Horses are prone to be scared by firing and sudden movement, and were prone to ride away if that happened. Normally they would ride back to wherever they had camped the previous night and could be found there. Horse holders are not required, however horses left in the line of fire will roll a D6 each turn. On a 1 they will bolt, adding +1 for any other horses within 9” that have bolted this turn.

Civilians Civilians are notoriously difficult to control in games. When firing starts they can behave in such a wide range of manners as to be impossible to truly represent. The following table should be used as a guide along with common sense to tell you what any civilians in your games will do when they see combatants or when the firing starts.

Dice Upon Seeing “Unfriendly” Combatants When the Firing Starts 1 Ignore it 2 Ignore them Attempt to hide where they are 3 Run directly away 4 Move away, diverting them from any friends from unfriendly troops 5 Move away, diverting them towards friends Run away in 6 Run away in a random direction A random direction

It is, of course, possible that the scenario designer may wish for civilians to have a role to play in his game. For example a terrorist group may instruct the civilians to walk across spoor in order to hide their tracks. A simple guide here is that civilians may do as they are told, the easier and more simple the instructions the greater chance you have of it being done. Civilians are unlikely to intentionally risk their lives in any heroics.

Fieldcraft and Tracking Units may attempt to pick up the trail of an enemy from the Spoor marker. On subsequent turns of this card a Blind may attempt to use anti-tracking techniques. See Fieldcraft & Tracking.

All units will be allocated a Fieldcraft Factor to represent their capabilities in the field with tracking and anti-tracking techniques. These are described as follows:

0 Cannot follow spoor, only rudimentary attempts may be made to use anti-tracking techniques. 1 Follows basic trails, such as litter, blood and similar, have some knowledge of anti-tracking 2 Track across most terrain, good level of anti-tracking 3 Top tracker, can follow anywhere and read spoor like the written word. Almost invisible to pursuers

Page 16 Tracking Tracking units use their Initiative Dice to track. Once they are at a spoor marker, or once they are already following a trail, they will roll a die to see how successful they are.

Fieldcraft Follow Spoor Follow Spoor with no ID loss 1 4 or 5 6 2 3 or 4 5 or 6 3 2 or 3 4, 5 or 6

Adjust as follows: ¾ Target has a Fieldcraft of 0: +1 ¾ Target has Fieldcraft of 1: As roll ¾ Target has Fieldcraft of 2: -1 on roll ¾ Target has Fieldcraft of 3: -2 on roll ¾ Tracker has dogs*: +1 ¾ Spoor is in bad ground, solid rock or water -1 on roll

If they get a “follow spoor” result they have been successful in reading the spoor. One enemy Blind has been identified, either as a fake or real. A tracker with 1 or 2 fieldcraft rolls a dice to randomly see which of the enemy blinds has been “Spotted” and must be revealed. A Tracker with a fieldcraft factor of 3 may choose the blind he wants revealed. Once the blind has been revealed the tracking unit may then use its remaining Initiative dice as it wishes.

Trackers who are following spoor may move towards the enemy blind or blinds that they are following and be considered to be on spoor without following the exact path that their target unit took. If their target moved through bad ground they may not, however, avoid this by moving to the side of it.

If the result is “Follow the Spoor with no ID loss” then the process above is followed exactly, but the spoor has been found with ease and no Initiative dice has been used in tracking.

*Dogs rely on vapour to track their target which is fine in all but hot, dry countries, so in Africa, where those conditions combine they are of limited use. Nevertheless there was rumour that the Greys Scouts used foxhounds in some circumstances, which could make for a rather unusual game.

Anti-tracking A unit that has reverted to a Blind may attempt to use anti-tracking techniques to reduce the chance of it being followed at the cost of one Initiative Dice. If they are successful they may split one of their Blinds, real or Dummy, into two. To do this they roll against their Fieldcraft Factor.

Fieldcraft Anti-tracking successful

1 5-6

2 4-6

3 3-6

If successful they split one Blind and place a spoor marker at that point.

Spoiling Spoor If friendly units move across the spoor then it is lost completely and will only be picked up at another spoor marker.

Rating Big Men Each of the conflict specific section advises the gamer of the number of Big Men who should be present with a force and gives a general indicator of what quality they should be, from poor to excellent. As a guide the following table should be used to allocate ratings to Big Men based upon quality. It is entirely possible to dice randomly to allocate ratings should you wish.

Page 17 Quality IABSM TW&T Poor D4-2, D4-1, D4, DAv-1 Grades I or II Average DAv, D4+1, D6 Grades I, II or III Good D6, DAv+1, D6+1 Grades II or III Excellent DAv+1, DAv+2, D6+1, D6+2 Grades II, III or IV

Clearly the gamer should feel free to adjust this are required, however adhering broadly to this will give the balance that we intend.

Anti Tank Weapons The range of anti tank weapons used was wide, and we have attempted to cover as many as we can here. As a guideline man portable systems should have a -1 to hit compared to mounted weapons.

Infantry Anti-Tank 0-12” 12-24” 24-36” Direct Anti-infantry 84mm Carl Gustav 12 12 12 3 dice AT-3 Sagger* - - 16 @ 48” plus - Milan‡ - - 18 @48” plus - RPG 7 10 10 10 2 dice 66mm LAW 9 9 - 2 dice Up to 59mm Recoilless Rifle 6 6 6 2D6 60mm to 79mm Recoilless Rifle 9 9 9 2D6 80mm to 99mm Recoilless Rifle 12 12 12 3D6 100mm + Recoilless Rifle 14 14 14 3D6 Bazooka 8 8 - 2D6 HMG 4 3 2 - MMG 2 1 1 -

*The Sagger was a wire guided system that required the target to be fired on at a range of between 500 and 3000 metres in order to work effectively. This generally makes it irrelevant for the level of game that we are representing with TW&T or IABSM. However if you wish to use this we recommend applying a minimum range of 48”. It is worth noting that a two man Sagger team would normally deploy with an RPG-7 so as to cover any targets under 500m. ‡The Milan is an equivalent NATO system to the Sagger, being wire guided and with a minimum range of 400m and a maximum range of 2000m on the early model.

A Big continent for big men When playing TW&T we recommend that the gamer removes all section or squad cards from the deck, thereby putting more importance in the leadership of Big Men. Any unit not activated by a Big Man during a turn will consequently be able to fire on the Sundowner card as normal. The exception here is support weapon cards which are retained in the deck.

Page 18

“When the Missionaries arrived, the Africans had the Land and the Missionaries had the Bible. They taught us how to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, they had the land and we had the Bible”. Jomo Kenyatta

Unrest in Kenya had been brewing since the end of the Second World War. The African population were largely tied to their own tribal areas or employed on a network of European farms, being allowed to work their own patch of land of several acres in exchange for their labour during the busy periods of the year. This was generally four months at the most, and the land, up to five acres, was sufficient for the Africans to earn a reasonable income. After the war, however, things were to change. Basic commodities increased in price whilst the settlers were calling on the Africans to give up more of their time and simultaneously reduce the plots of land that they were allowed. This was clearly a recipe for disaster, and nowhere more so than in the Kikuyu lands. Situated in the central highlands the high altitude meant that the land here perfect for European farming, and more and more of what the tribe considered their ancient homelands were swallowed up by farms.

This situation was exacerbated by several other annoyances. The tribal chiefs were appointed by the colonial government and were generally unpopular. Many Kenyan Africans had served with the British forces during the war where, with no colour bar, they were treated in the same way as any British soldier. To return home and again assume the role of a second class citizen was difficult to swallow, and the Forty Group, men who had enlisted in 1940, formed to provide the basis for the Mau Mau insurrection.

Most serious of all was the refusal of the British Colonial Secretary to allow a sensible level of African representation on the colony’s legislative council. The Kenya African Union were bitterly disappointed when, in 1951, they were informed that whilst 50,000 white settlers were to have 14 representative on the council that five million Africans were to have only five, and those would be appointed by the British rather than directly elected. A nationalist campaign, based around swearing an oath to end British colonial rule, was begun.

The slide into revolt was, unusually, a slow one. Throughout early 1952 acts of defiance escalated, murders of Africans loyal to the British began and then increased, white farms were set on fire or livestock killed, and the lack of action by the colonial authorities served to encourage the perpetrators. It was only when the campaign was in full swing that a new Governor arrived and, in October 1952, a state of emergency was declared.

The Mau Mau were organised in a very simplistic fashion. Largely it was made up of men and, to a smaller degree, women of the Kikuyu tribe. The associated Meru and Embu tribes were also involved, but to a lesser extent. The Central Committee was located in the capital, Nairobi, whilst its “Passive Wing” provided logistical support from the tribal lands. The “Land and Freedom Army” created its operational bases in the forests, and from there launched their attacks into the tribal lands or the white farming areas. Theoretically this force was broken down into sections of 10 to 35 men, platoons of 35 to 100 men, Companies of 100 to 250 men and battalions above that. In practice it had almost no organisation at all, and certainly very little communication between its component parts.

Whilst the prevailing image in the British press was of white settlers being done to death with pangas in the most gruesome fashion, the truth was that lack of weapons meant that the Mau Mau would largely avoid contact with the white population whenever possible. Raids were made on police stations in the hope of getting weapons that could be used, but their targets were chiefly African civilians who were known to support the British and their livestock; in particular the unpopular chiefs. Indeed it is striking just how much of the violence was perpetrated against people who that particular Mau Mau group did not like. The 1953 massacre at Lari, for example, saw 100 people hacked to death by men who had lost out in an administrative land ruling that had gone in favour of the victims.

Page 19 Unlike later anti-colonial wars the Mau Mau were peculiar in that they represented only a small proportion of the population, the vast majority of Kenya – geographically 90% - was untroubled by the revolt. Also they lacked external support, with no safe havens in neighbouring countries and no arms supplied by interested parties overseas. The latter was a particular issue for them, with a complete dearth of firearms meaning that even high ranking General officers in the Mau Mau were obliged to use home made guns that were of very dubious reliability.

Indeed this reliance on pangas and axes was to be the hallmark of what can only be described as a terror campaign. The standard practice was to horribly mutilate victims before killing them and dismembering the bodies. This was a policy that was to prove the undoing of the Mau Mau. So sensational were their methods that they revolted the vast majority of Africans, let alone the white settlers and administrators. This was sufficient to ensure that the British and colonial government could not even consider negotiations, their policy had to be to defeat and destroy the Mau Mau outright. It also resulted in a large number of Kikuyu volunteering to assist the British and forming Home Guard units that worked hand in hand with the Police and military.

On the British side, their reaction to the Mau Mau was one of total horror. In 1952 the idea of the loyal African behaving in such a beastly fashion was one that had terrible implications for all of Britain’s possessions in Africa. Once galvanised their reaction was speedy if not altogether well co-ordinated at first.

The British had many years experience of counter-insurgency warfare dating back as far as the Boer War. Contemporary experiences in Malaya provided some very fresh ideas that were applied as the emergency progressed. The first step was to ensure that the command infrastructure was in place, linking the military and the government so that the two were working as a single entity. Secondly the British moved troops into the colony, both Kings African Rifles from neighbouring Tanganyika and Uganda and British regiments from the Canal Zone in Egypt. Initially the British troops were assigned to protect the European areas and the KAR to the African ones. The key decision, however, was to work with the African population to win hearts and minds and protect them from the Mau Mau, a policy that paid dividends in spades.

Initially the campaign floundered as the commander, Major General Hinde, and governor, Sir Phillip Mitchell, were too careful to balance the wishes of the settlers with those of the British and colonial government. The arrival of General Sir George Erskine in May of 1953 put an end to such dalliance. The police Special Branch was expanded in order to gather information. At that stage the British were unsure of the structure of their opponents’ forces, having assumed that their command and logistics network were scattered through the Kikuyu tribal lands. Erskine identified that the Mau Mau operating in the highlands and the forest

Page 20 were undoubtedly receiving succour from the civilians in the African reserve. To counter this he established a cordon sanitaire between the two, clearing a mile wide strip of bush and placing police outposts along the length of this. The initial large scale sweeps that had first been used unsuccessfully were now replaced with small patrols backed up by light aircraft spotting over the area.

The result of improved intelligence, aggressive patrolling and a general disgust for Mau Mau tactics among the African population was now turning the tide. The Kikuyu Home Guard was formed from loyal Africans. With over 24,000 members they were similarly armed to the Mau Mau at first, but were significantly better motivated as they were defending their own homes. They were also trained by the British to construct Guard posts protected by wire and punji pits and with sandbag firing positions when they did eventually get rifles. This was mirrored by the construction of a series of Protected Villages, moving over a million Kikuyu into these where they could be protected by Home Guard positions and British forces. This, as in Malaya, was key to stopping the Mau Mau.

A network of informers and loyal Africans were used, forming Pseudo Gangs to infiltrate the Mau Mau’s operational areas, locate the enemy and then destroy them. Initially these were led by white officers who blacked-up to fit in with their African troops and captured Mau Mau who had been persuaded to turn against their former comrades. Each gang would visit African villages at night, gathering information and, if they were lucky, meeting with real Mau Mau gangs. They could then arrest these, ambush them later or, if outnumbered, alert the regular British forces in the area.

A key breakthrough came in April 1954 when the British realised that Nairobi was the nerve centre of the Mau Mau operations. In Operation Anvil they effectively cordoned off the city and swept through it sector by sector. Sixteen thousand suspected Mau Mau were arrested after being identified by loyal Kikuyu. Their detention in prison camps was effective in cutting off the cells operating in the field from their commanders and this, linked with the Protected Villages, also wiped out the Passive Wing that had been responsible for providing food for the forces in the field. Coincidentally it also almost completely put an end to crime in the Nairobi area for a long period of time.

With the local population thus protected the British regular forces were free to conduct sweep operations without worrying about innocent lives. The Aberdare Mountains and Mount Kenya were now declared Prohibited Areas, where anyone present could be shot. Again Psuedo Groups, now named Special Force Groups, were used to identify Mau Mau forces. The Royal Air Force could be called on to operate in a ground attack role, with Vampires, Meteors and converted Harvard trainers used for this.

One of the most successful, if grisly, tactics was the “Grouse Shoot”, where British forces formed stop positions in a horseshoe around an area known to have Mau Mau forces present. Local Africans armed with pangas would then act as beaters, moving through the bush, chopping their way through as they swept the area. The Mau Mau could then either evade them by moving into the British stop positions or be chopped to bits by the Africans. Most chose to surrender to the British troops where they were likely to go to prison but live.

By 1956 the Mau Mau were largely leaderless. The capture of “General China”, Dedan Kimathi, signalled the end of their offensive capability, and whilst the State of Emergency was kept in place until 1960 the fighting and the atrocities were over in 1956. In all the British security forces lost over 600 men (at best estimate, some sources say up to 1,600), 63 of whom were white. Two thousand African civilians who had been loyal to the government had been killed, 32 white civilians had also died. Estimates of the numbers of Mau Mau who died range from 11,000 to 20,000 and another 2,500 were captured. 78,000 people were detained at one time or another during the eight year emergency and just over a thousand were hanged for their role in the revolt.

Wargaming the Mau Mau Revolt In essence the war against the Mau Mau was split into three distinct phases. Firstly the initial search, locate and destroy sweeps, where the Colonial authorities had little idea what they were up against or where to find it. The second was the implementation of the cordon sanitaire, and then the third, post Operation Anvil, where the British were operating in areas cleared of the civilian population and sweeping through to destroy Mau Mau forces.

When designing a scenario featuring the Mau Mau it is important to consider the imbalance between the forces concerned. It is a challenge to create a good scenario for this conflict, but by no means beyond the

Page 21 wit of man. The first phase of the conflict is more appropriate to I Ain’t Been Shot Mun, with larger forces involved, but this is not particularly gameable as the Mau Mau would normally leave the area when they came across such an operation. Troops, Weapons & Tactics, with smaller forces involved, would be good for a small Police garrison fighting off a Mau Mau force attempting to break in and seize weapons, or the second phase of operations where small patrols are seeking out the Mau Mau. Finally I Ain’t Been Shot Mum can deal with the Company level sweeps in the mountains. Tracking Operations in the Kikuyu lands or the Aberdare Mountains can be represented using the Tracking rules in the Generic Rules section.

The war in Kenya is best described as a policing action, with the Mau Mau having little in the way of modern armament that would enable them to stand up to the British Army in a conventional sense and not attempting to do so. Rather they used intimidation and fear in a clumsy attempt to persuade the African population to support them. As such we need some special rules to represent the conflict, as follows.

Mau Mau Firepower. There were very few occasions when the Mau Mau were able to source modern weapons, and when they did they quickly ran out of ammunition. In normal circumstances the Mau Mau will have no ranged fire capability, their home made guns being used at very close quarters and considered to be part of close combat. That said some Mau Mau did resort to loading home made weapons with shot gun cartridges, an extremely dangerous thing to do, however it could be effective.

One Mau Mau may have a one shot home made shotgun. It may only be fired at short range, but will roll 2D6 for effect in IABSM and 3D6 in TW&T. If more 1’s than 6’s are rolled then any hits are on the firing unit rather than the target. This weapon will not kill, but all hits will be diced for as follows, irrespective of troop type.

Near Miss Wound 1 2-6

Special Branch. Due to information that Special Branch have ascertained from loyal Kikuyu tribesmen the British player may have between one and three attempts at spotting on the whole table. Each spot will cover an area 12” square and any Mau Mau in that area will be shown by blinds.

British Air Support. The British may only employ their aircraft when operating in an area where the civilian population has been removed for fear of casualties among the innocent.

Aggressive Troops. Both the Mau Mau and the Home Guard should count as aggressive troops in close combat as they are more than happy to use their pangas and traditional swords to terrible effect.

Page 22 ! The Mau Mau organisation is extremely flexible, being based on what is to hand rather than any optimistic table of operations drawn up in Nairobi. The basic unit should be considered the ten man section as larger platoons would naturally break down into smaller groups when in combat. The Mau Mau will never have any support weapons, nor can they expect any support from anywhere.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Mau Mau 1,2,3,4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10

TW&T Rating On the odd occasion when the Mau Mau manage to steal some guns only one ten man group may be so armed as they will be very short of ammunition and will have pooled what they have for one group. They may never operate as weapons teams, always acting as a whole section. Mau Mau will never be armed with anything better than bolt action rifles and will count as Green troops, they are not real soldiers. They will have firing dice as follows:

Dispersed No Dice One Die Two Dice Three Dice Three Men or less Four men Five or six men Seven or eight men Nine or ten men

When dispersed the Mau Mau will surrender to the British. If facing Kikuyu Home Guard they will not surrender but will need to be overcome in close combat.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the Mau Mau will dice for effect on the following table:

D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead Morale When a Mau Mau section has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft Mau Mau forces may have a fieldcraft rating of anything from 1 to 3.

Big Men A Mau Mau forces should have one Big Man per three sections in both IABSM and TW&T. In TW&T the Big Man may command his whole force as one group until the firing begins, at which point he must control them individually. The Grade of a Big Man will depend on his charisma more than anything else. Leadership , and the quality of Big Men, should generally be rated as poor.

Force Characteristics Rapid Deployment. The Mau Mau were well know for their speed on foot.

Poor Fire Discipline. Where firearms are present the Mau Mau should have Dreadful or Abysmal Fire Discipline.

Ammunition Shortage. Any Mau Mau force with firearms will potentially be short of ammunition.

Dynamic Commander. A Mau Mau force may have a Dynamic Commander

Heroic Leader. A Mau Mau force may have an Heroic Leader

Looting. This will be present for any Mau Mau force where such an opportunity could present itself.

B’Maso! This should always be present for a Mau Mau force

Page 23

The British deployed both regular Army and colonial Police units in their fight against the Mau Mau. The former were a mix of British National Servicemen and the long service regulars of the King’s African Rifles and would have deployed in traditional platoon, company or battalion sized units. The local Police were deployed in a more ad hoc fashion, often in conjunction with native levies and trackers, as such they are not obliged to conform to any rigid structure, with the same applying for the Kikuyu Home Guard. Forest Operating units were also used, made up of one eight man section of the KAR, a British officer, interpreter, three African trackers, a tracker dog and a patrol dog.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 British National Servicemen 1, 2, 3 4 5, 6 7, 8 Kings African Rifles 1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 Kenya Police Tracker Combat Teams 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8 Kikuyu Home Guard 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10

TW&T Rating The British units and the Kings African Rifles are both considered as Average for firing capability, with the KAR improving to Good by 1953. They will begin the conflict armed with bolt action rifle and the Bren LMG of WWII vintage and end it with the SLR, the British semi-automatic version of the FN FAL and the FN MAG, however the upgrade did not occur until 1957 and so will not affect the majority of the conflict. The Kenya Police should be considered Green early on in the conflict, reaching Average as things progress. Kikuyu Home Guard will not have firearms in the first half of the conflict, but may be considered Green when they do get weapons.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Kings African Rifles & Kenya Police D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

British National Servicemen D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Kikuyu Home Guard D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead Morale When a Section of the KAR reaches the point where they have twice as many wounds as men remaining they will retire 6” immediately.

When a section of British National Servicemen or Kenya Police reach a point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a Kikuyu Home Guard section has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft British National Service units have a fieldcraft rating of 0. KAR units may have a fieldcraft of 1, Kikuyu Home Guard anything from 1 to 3. Kenya Police tracker and dog teams may have a factor of either 2 or 3.

Page 24 British Organisation British regular force, including the KAR, were organised almost exactly on the same lines as the British Army at the end of the Second World War. In Kenya they were less likely to deploy many of their support weapons, so items such as PIATs and Medium Machine guns were left in depots. Indeed it is questionable if the 2” mortar was used much at all in combat, as visibility was often poor enough without making it worse by deploying smoke.

The Kenya Police were, like most colonial Police organisations, operating on a very limited budget. The majority of their officers would have been African Constables operating under white officers, and their value in field operations would be limited in military terms. They did, however, form specific Combat Tracker Teams made up of eighteen men and a tracker from the Wanderobo tribe. This unit will have two eight man squads, one Big Man with IABSM, three with TW&T, one per squad and one senior officer, and a tracker. The tracker may have a Fieldcraft of two or three. Whilst the Police unit will not have a light machine gun it may split down into two teams in TW&T if the player desired.

The following table shows the organisation of a British Company. Commanded by a Major or a Captain backed up by a Sergeant Major, each platoon would have a Lieutenant commanding and a Corporal heading each squad.

Company HQ

One rifle section (8 men)

One 2” mortar

Platoon One Platoon Two Three rifle sections (8 men each) Three rifle sections (8 men each) One 2” mortar team (3 man crew) One 2” mortar team (3 man crew)

Platoon Three Three rifle sections (8 men each) One 2” mortar team (3 man crew)

The Forest Operating unit is best made up of one section of KAR who are rated as normal, add a Big Man, two or three tracker/interpreter figures and the dogs. This unit should be rated as having a Fieldcraft Factor of three.

Big Men A British force should have one Big Man per platoon and one more for the Company commander in IABSM. A Kenya Police force of three sections or less should have one Big Man whilst a Kikuyu Home Guard force should have one Big Man for every four sections.

If using TW&T it is possible to dice for the strength of the component squads and HQ, although with the light British casualties suffered these are likely to be at full strength. A Big Man should be present for each British or KAR section, with one or two for the platoon command. For Kikuyu Home Guard there should be one Big Man for every two sections.

Police leadership should be considered average, whilst that of the regular Army is good. The Home Guard leadership will be poor.

Force Characteristics Poor Fire Discipline. This should be present for the Kikuyu Home Guard whose fire discipline may be anything from Poor to Abysmal.

Ammunition Shortage. Any Kikuyu Home Guard force may be short of ammunition, but this is less likely than being so that for their Mau Mau opponents.

Page 25 Dynamic Commander. Any British force may have a Dynamic Commander, a KAR force should almost always have one, a Kikuyu Home Guard force rarely.

Heroic Leader. Any British force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available with a dedicated FAC if the British are operating in an area cleared of civilians.

Tracker. A Police tracker may be present with any regular British or Kikuyu Home Guard force.

Rally. This should be available for any KAR or British unit.

Page 26

“Now the drums were both loud and near. Hans Germani asked an ANC Lieutenant if he knew what they were saying. The officer consulted a fundi in his ranks. “The White Giants are coming” he said.” Mike Hoare, Congo Mercenary

Unlike Kenya the fighting in the Congo began after the Belgians had handed power over to the African population. Indeed the conflict began only days after King Badouin presided over the independence ceremony in June of 1960 where Patrice Lumumba, the newly installed black Prime Minister, delivered a speech that was unwise in its inflammatory and, specifically, anti-Belgian tone. This was seen by many Congolese as heralding the end of the old order, and Congolese troops throughout the country rebelled against their Belgian officers in response. Disorder reigned.

It is true that the diverse tribal make-up of the Congo led to deep divisions in a nation where borders had been drawn by European map makers with no regard for the indigenous population. Worse, however, was the system of government that had been put in place, where the one national parliament shared its authority with six provincial administrations.

The first elections that saw Patrice Lumumba elected as Prime Minister also heralded the start of intense rivalries amongst the very small circle of African political elite. In some cases the armed force mutinied against the rump of Belgian officers who had been retained by the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), and in Katanga the entire province rebelled; independence was declared under the provincial premier, Moise Tshombe. Tshombe was reliant on the Belgian owned mines that operated in Katanga to fund his secession and needed to reassure the white staff who managed those businesses. His answer was to call in mercenaries to organise and train a local para-military Gendarmerie and to provide a spearhead unit, the Compagnie Internationale, to repulse Congolese army units.

The situation in Katanga proved to be a stern testing ground for the United Nations, with Lumumba calling on them for help in restoring the rebel province to the union. A multi-national force was deployed, with elements from Sweden, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Morocco and Ghana arriving within days, closing the airports to all-comers. The speed of the response was prompted by the fact that the Congolese government had also approached the Soviet Union, asking them for assistance against the Belgians who, with the collapse of law and order through much of the country, had delayed their post colonial departure to ensure the safety of her citizens. Krushchev responded by warning the West that he would not stand by and allow Belgian aggression and promised that the Soviet Union would “not shrink from resolute measures”.

With Soviet materiel being unloaded on the coast President Eisenhower declared that the US deplored such intervention which, he said, were motivated by the Soviet Union’s “designs in Africa”. He was not wrong. It was at this point that the Cold War arrived in sub-Saharan Africa where it was, sadly to stay until the collapse of the Soviet system over thirty years later.

In September 1960 Lumumba was overthrown by Joseph Mobutu, the ANC Chief of staff, who immediately expelled Soviet and Eastern Bloc military personnel. With Lumumba under house arrest his supporters in the province of Oriental took white civilians hostage and threatened to behead them unless their man was freed. His chief aide, Antoine Gizenga declared independence in the province, calling for and receiving Soviet support.

In early 1961 Lumumba was sent to Katanga for his own safety. Unfortunately for him Tshombe had him executed on arrival. Gizenga’s government, with support from the Soviet Union, India, Ghana, Yugoslavia and nearly seventy other countries that fell within the Soviet sphere of influence then began attacks against the Mobutu government in Leopoldville and the Katangan government in the south. By July his forces had been successful enough to be invited to make peace and join a national unity government in Kinshasa.

Nothing, it seemed, lasted for long in the newly independent Congo. In November Gizenga broke away from the government, returning to Stanleyville where he renewed his mutinies against the central government and railed against the UN presence in the country. Throughout the Congo tribal massacres went on with no authority to control the population. Old scores were settled along with some new ones. In Kindu thirteen Italian UN airmen were cut to pieces and eaten by a mob. Yet again, however, the new-

Page 27 year saw changes. By January 1962 Gizenga had succeeded in splitting his party and losing his power, being taken prisoner by the centralist forces.

In Katange Tshombe’s mercenaries were proving to be a red rag to a bull when it came to pan- African organisations such as the OAU. The UN invested much time and effort negotiating in an attempt to remove these mercenaries, however Tshombe was not about to voluntarily remove his right arm. In August and September of 1962 the UN undertook two military operations, spearheaded by the Irish Defence Force contingent to forcibly remove these individuals. The mercenaries were largely not prepared to fight the UN forces and many left the country, although the second operation saw fighting between UN forces and mercenary led Katangese Gendarmes. The following year a major UN offensive resulted in Tshombe’s government falling and the country being reunited by the end of 1962. In essence the UN had played a role far beyond simply peace-keeper; rather they had provided the military muscle and political impetus that ended Katanga’s attempt at independence

Round Two By 1964, incredible as it may seem, Tshombe had returned from exile to the Congo where he was now Prime Minister in a coalition government that sought to stabilise the country and enforce a western style democratic government. The UN had withdrawn its troops in June of that year, prompting renewed interest from the communist bloc. China was now promoting its candidate, Pierre Muelele, and in September he declared the Congolese Peoples’ Republic which, based in Stanleyville, was intending to overthrow Tshombe’s government throughout the country.

Muelele utilised some of the most horrific tactics in attempting to subjugate the population. Mass public executions became the order of the day, generally taking place in front of the Patrice Lumumba memorial in the centre of Stanleyville. European settlers were rounded up, ostensibly for their own protection, but actually to serve as hostages with a view to stop any Belgian or US intervention. Muelele’s supporters, known as Simbas, were fed a mixture of communism and tribal voodoo, going into battle in a drugged state and convinced that by using their war-cry of Mai Muelele their enemies bullets would turn to water and pass through them harmlessly. This seems absurd to people with a western culture perspective, however to the African soldiers of the ANC witchcraft was a very real entity. Opposition to Muelele’s men began to melt away and it seemed likely that the whole of the Congo would fall.

Tshombe then made a decision that for him spelt political suicide; he engaged white mercenaries in an attempt to halt the advance of the Simbas. Mike Hoare, a former British Army Major who had been involved in a minor way in Katanga previously, formed Five Commando, a largely English speaking unit that recruited in Salisbury, Rhodesia and Johannesburg and this was used to bolster up the ANC along with anti-Castro Cuban aviators funded by the CIA. Hoare’s Commando, never more than four hundred strong,

Page 28 provided a cutting edge that was used with great effect by his Belgian commander, Colonel Frederic Vandewalle. Several small victories saw the ANC recover some of its composure, and certain key units were once again able to be called on for offensive action, in particular the Katangese troops of 14 Commando which was Brigaded with 5 Commando.

Most worrying was the presence of over 1000 white hostages who were held in Stanleyville, with some 800 more spread through outer cities in Orientale. The United States were understandably concerned about their nationals, and several plans were floated that would see anything from a handful of A-Teams to two battalions of US Airborne troops drop onto the city, however political pressures meant that US involvement would have caused a sensation. As it was the US provided air transport for a battalion sized force of Belgian para-commandos (made up of elements of the 1st Para-commando battalion and the 2nd Commando battalion) dropped onto the city on the 24th of November 1964 after Stanleyville Radio called for the massacre of the hostages with the words “Sharpen your knives! Sharpen your machetes! Sharpen your spears! If the paras drop from the sky, kill the foreigners. Do not wait for orders. You have your orders now: Kill, kill, kill!”

Twenty-nine hostages were killed before the Simbas fled as Les Paras dropped from the sky in Operation Dragon Rouge and Vanderwalle’s lengthy ground column of jeeps, trucks and armour (named L’Ommengang by its commander after the annual Brussels carnival parade) arrived almost consecutively. Yet for all its success the action served to bring international condemnation from those countries in the Soviet sphere of influence and almost the entire OAU who were ready to herald this intervention as a new era of colonialism emerging. Indeed so vociferous was this lobby that two more drops, Dragon Blanc and Dragon Vert were cancelled, only one more, Dragon Noir, the drop on Paulis to rescue a further 200 hostages, was undertaken before the Belgians withdrew on the 1st of December, leaving Hoare’s mercenaries with the task of rescuing what others they could with fast moving motor columns.

In 1965, despite significant military successes Tshombe was ousted from power by the President who was under huge pressure from neighbouring African countries to get rid of the white mercenaries that had made such a significant contribution to suppressing the rebellion. The new administration was, however, almost instantly ousted by General Mobutu who instigated military rule. Again Stanleyville rose up, but this time to support Tshombe, but Mobutu’s grip on power was to prove too strong and the revolt failed.

In fact Mobutu’s main challenge was to come not from a resurgent Simba movement, but from the mercenaries who he employed who could see that their period of employment was potentially coming to an end. For the most part these men now found themselves assuming the role of district administrators, Hoare had left and John Peter’s assumed command of 5 Commando, working through to the end of their contract and then demobilising and returning home. Some other mercenary groups were not so keen on ending their employment. There was much talk of intrigues involving the return of Tshombe from exile, however his imprisonment in Morocco was to end that. Instead “Black Jack” Schramme, a planter turned mercenary, was to strike in his own blow for power.

Schramme had run his family plantation at Yumbi in the Congo since 1947 when he arrived in the colony, aged eighteen. With the breakdown of law and order Schramme had fought for Tshombe and then Mobutu, then returning to his estates with his own 10 Commando he assumed responsibility for administering the province, and with some success. Schramme based his work on the old colonial structure, with white mercenaries in positions of authority, even asking for missionaries to come from Belgium to assist In rebuilding the region. Unfortunately for him he saw his success as indicative of what he could do for the Congo as a whole, and oh the 5th of July 1967 he, assisted by Bob Denard’s 6 Commando, attempted to seize Stanleyville and several other smaller towns with 150 white mercenaries and 800 Katangese troops of the ANC. What followed was a mix of drama and farce.

The anticipated support from the ANC 7 and 9 Commandoes failed to materialise, indeed these units played a significant role in opposing the coup. Stanleyville was captured immediately, the ANC melting into the bush, as were Bukavu and Kindu, the latter being key to the next stage of the plan, a drive south into Katanga to raise the standard of rebellion throughout that province. Yet at Kindu the mercenaries were to be surprised by an aggressive counter-attack by the ANC which retook the town that destroyed the mercenaries’ transport, obliging them to march back to Kindu through the jungle.

Stanleyville then also came under attack from loyal ANC units, and quickly it became apparent that its fall was only a matter of time. Bob Denard was wounded on the 10th of July and evacuated to Rhodesia where

Page 29 he received medical treatment. The city fell two days later following which Schramme spent several weeks driving his column around the jungle, seemingly unsure of how to keep his dream alive, before eventually attacking and seizing the border town of Bukavu on the 10th of August. From there he sent an ultimatum to Mobutu, giving him ten days to negotiate after which, he promised, his force would begin its conquest of the Congo.

In fact the period of grace allowed Mobutu to shift his elite 2 and 3 Para Divisions to the region and lay siege of Bukavu, however their lack of heavy equipment penalised them. Schramme’s mercenaries put up an able and effective defence based on eight strongpoints around the town and a highly mobile reaction force to support them Nevertheless Schramme was isolated and in need of help. He wired Denard in Salisbury.

Denard’s response was farcical. Assembling a force of exiled Katangese in northern Angola he launched his invasion of the southern Congo near Dilolo, not in a fast moving motorised column, but on bicycles. There was no limit to the Katangese who turned out to support him and it looked briefly like the province was about to rise again, however Denard had no weapons. His plan centred entirely on quickly capturing an ANC depot with an arsenal, and this he failed singularly to do. With surprise on his side he vacillated and allowed the ANC time to organise their defences. At full speed Denard’s force pedalled back over the border into Angola.

Schramme was now powerless to break through the siege, and on the 4th of November he sent several truck loads of money across the border into Rwanda followed by his white mercenaries and Katangese troops where they were disarmed and interned. The white mercenaries, fortunately for them, were eventually allowed to fly on to their own choice of destination. The Katangese, nearly 700 of them, were persuaded to return to the Congo where they were all executed on Mobutu’s orders. Through such tough justice Mobutu was to rule the country he renamed Zaire for the next thirty-five years.

Wargaming the Congo The Congo offers huge potential for the wargamer, albeit a strong stomach may be needed to deal with the sheer savagery of the conflict. The Katangese rebellion saw mercenary columns operating in fast columns of eight or nine jeeps rescuing missionaries from the deep jungle. The Katangese Gendarmes against the United Nations forces would make an interesting fight, such as the siege of Jadotville where a company of Irish troops fought a five day battle against Katangese forces led by mercenary Michel de Clary before surrendering due to lack of ammunition.

Probably most appealing to gamers would be the action of the Belgian Paras at Stanleyville and Paulis, or 5 Commando’s exploits as they quite literally fought their way around five of the Congo’s six provinces. This force is particularly appealing as its organisation, in small 40 man Commandos make an excellent game with TW&T, whilst larger multiple commando actions with armour support are perfect for IABSM.

As usual some conflict specific rule additions will help represent the war in the Congo.

Fear Card. The squad with the most wounds withdraws 2D6 inches when this card is dealt if the enemy are within 12” of their position.

Vengeance. Any European troops who discover murdered hostages will be motivated to kill the perpetrators. All Big Men in IABSM add 1 pip per dice for the rest of the game, in TW&T they add one Tactical Initiative per turn. All movement is undertaken with +1 pip per dice.

Mai Mulele! Card. When this card is dealt the Simba player may launch an attack. His troops will now move every turn, moving on the Sundowner card if they are not activated during the turn. They may not fire, and move with -1 pip per dice due to their drugged state. They ignore wounds until they have more wounds than men in a section when they break. Throughout the attack any Big Men add +1 pips to their dice in IABSM or automatically get an additional Tactical Initiative in TW&T.

Air Support. The Anti-Castro Cubans flying in support of the ground forces were notorious for both their close support and their incidents of friendly fire as a result. For any attack roll on the table below. Add +1 if a Forward Air Controller is present with the ANC forces.

Page 30 Dice Result 0 Attacks friendly target nearest the enemy in error 1 Makes run in to attack friendly target before pulling off at the last minute. 2-3 Attacks enemy target as normal 4-5 Attacks enemy target with -1 pip per deviation dice 6 Attacks enemy target with -2 pips per deviation dice

Shock & Awe Card. Once dealt this card remains open during a turn until the Sundowner card when it is returned to the deck. Any relevant vehicle mounted force that wants to attack an enemy using fast moving vehicles may choose to play this card, keeping it in play until they want to, or have to, stop moving. Any force that is using Shock and Awe tactics must move with all of its movement dice for the whole turn. If it does not want to do this, or is stopped from doing it, by a road block for example, then the Shock and Awe card is returned to the deck.

A unit using Shock and Awe tactics will double the resulting wounds on their opponent.

Firing from Vehicles. The fast moving motorised column was a very effective tool in the Congo. To reflect this we need to alter the fire and movement in the main rules. Unlike in TW&T or IABSM vehicles that are firing while moving on roads will reduce their normal firing by one dice. This only applies to weapons mounted in the vehicle, not the infantry weapons of the passengers which may not be used with any effect while on the move.

So a jeep mounting a Browning 0.30 cal will fire with two dice if it is moving on a road, a 0.50 cal will fire with three dice. It may not, however, target any specific enemy, rather any hits will be divided between any units that would have been in its arc of fire during that turn.

Fire Against Soft Skin Vehicles. Fire against soft skin vehicles will be considered a poorer shot if the vehicles are moving fast using Shock and Awe tactics. Any soft skin vehicle that is fired on will roll a dice to see where any hits are applied. On a 1 or 2 the hits are on the vehicle, on 3 to 6 they are on the crew. A soft skin vehicle that takes four hits will be halted. It may be repaired by its crew if they are not under fire. Roll 2D6. On a 2 or 3 the vehicle is completely written off, on a 4 or 5 it is repaired.

Hostages. Hostages must be accompanied by specifically designated guards. These are the only troops who can influence or harm the civilians. If the player wishes to kill the hostages he must roll a D6 to see what the unit does.

1,2 Vacillate, do nothing until next turn 3,4 Leave the hostages this turn to see what is going on 5,6 Kill the hostages. Roll 1D6 per hostage 1, runs off and escapes 2-3, wounded, still alive this turn 4-6, murdered

Rivers. The Congo is a country divided by rivers of all shapes and sizes. Some of the smallest water- courses may be crossed by vehicles by the expedient of simply hacking down stout roadside growth and packing the stream with it. To do this will take one section of men two turns of a blank card per 1” width of stream. This will work for streams of up to 2” width. Above that boats or bridging equipment will need to be used. The time suggested below are actually absurdly fast, however neither IABSM nor TW&T have a fixed time scale, so they serve to be practical within a normal game.

Bridging Equipment. Five Commando had at least one mobile temporary bridge which they attached to any column that may need it. This is for use on rivers of 6” width or less and takes five turns of the blank card to deploy.

Native Canoes. Dug-out Canoes may be lashed together to form a right platform to take any vehicle up to 5 ton lorry size. To ready the platform will take one section of men three turns of the blank card after which the platform may move at 4” per turn in the water.

Page 31 Ferries. Ferries were regularly used by both sides in the conflict, although their standard of maintenance since the Belgians had left was more than questionable and they were prone to breaking down. Some ferries were of the roll-on-roll-off variety, some required turning in mid-stream, having only one ramp.

These ferries move at 6” per turn, with the player dicing each turn. On a 1 the ferry’s engines will stop. If it is mid-stream it will drift 3” per turn with the flow of the river. Roll a die each turn, requiring 4 to 6 to mend the engine and get it working again.

Assault Boats. Mike Hoare used several rigid assault boats to launch several amphibious attacks from the lakes on the Congo’s eastern border. These move at up to 14” per turn when fully laden, 16” when empty. These craft have no buoyancy and in heavy seas they are liable to sink if not bailed out constantly. In such conditions roll 1D6 per turn for the water, and another for the bailers, keeping a running score. If the total for the water exceeds that for the bailers by 8 then the boat sinks. Any crew are hors de combat for the rest of the game.

Stand Cannons. Home-made shrapnel firing cannons devised by the Simbas. These are essentially drainpipes stuffed with an explosive charge and scrap metal. They have a range of 9” and strike with two dice on the fire table, with all wounds being doubled. Against vehicles they have a strike of two dice.

Blinds. Normally there will be one dummy blind for every three real blinds for forces made up of ANC troops, Mercenaries, Katangese and Belgians. Simbas have one dummy blind for each two real ones, whilst UN forces have no dummy blinds.

Page 32

The Congolese Army at the start of the period was almost entirely Belgian officered, and these dedicated professionals on loan from Brussels were never to entirely disappear throughout the conflict. There were, however, rebellions immediately after independence was declared and for a period of time the ANC dissolved into a leaderless, ill-disciplined mob that were unable and unwilling to defend their nation from even the most rudimentary of challenges. Indeed their failure to take on and defeat the secessionist Katangese in 1960 and ’61 resulted in a complete breakdown of central authority. It was only the arrival of the United Nations forces that restored some vague order to the nation, however that evaporated almost immediately after their withdrawal in 1964.

The emergence of the Simbas and the Congolese Peoples’ Republic again signalled the collapse of ANC morale. It was only the brave decision to employ white mercenaries and use them aggressively that went some way to restoring the troops’ morale to the point where they would actually stand and fight rather than running away at the mention of witchcraft.

The ANC was organised along Belgian lines, who in turn were organised along British lines. The quality of the troops varied hugely, and even the best suffered from poor discipline both in terms of looting, lack of fire discipline and utter savagery when it came to prisoners. Some units did make names for themselves, 14 Commando, for example was more than capable of taking the offensive against the Simbas and teamed up with the mercenaries of 5 Commando on numerous occasions. The Mercenary element seem to have decided on their own structure to suit the circumstances.

It is worth pointing out that Mercenaries generally get a poor press. This is quite understandable, however it is important to note that such units tended to mirror their commanders whose authority was based on their charisma and leadership skills. In many respects the photographs of the conflict tell a story in themselves. The men of 5 Commando tend always to be clean shaven and smart in appearance, whereas 6 Commando are dishevelled by comparison. Hoare is undoubtedly a self-publicist, however it is clear that his attempt to instil discipline based on the British Army model was largely successful when it came to his mens’ conduct on the battlefield and as a result they should be rated as Disciplined Mercenaries. Off duty things were undoubtedly different.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Poor ANC Troops 1, 2, 3, 4 5 6, 7 8 Good ANC troops 1, 2, 3 4 5, 6 7, 8 Mercenaries 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8 Disciplined Mercenaries 1, 2, 3 4 5 6, 7, 8

TW&T Rating The Poor ANC troops and tribal levies should be considered Green, with a very small number as Average. Mercenary units should be considered Good, in some cases, such as 55 Commando in Hoare’s first contract and Force John-John in his second as Elite. Poor ANC are not real soldiers. The ANC are armed with Belgian FN FAL rifles which count as assault rifles. The FN MAG GPMG is considered as an MG42.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Mercenaries D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Good ANC D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Page 33 Poor ANC D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a Section of Mercenaries, disciplined or not, or Good ANC reach the point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 6” immediately.

When force of Poor ANC has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 18” immediately.

Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not considered in the Congo.

ANC Organisation All ANC regular units were theoretically organised almost exactly on the same lines as the Belgian Army in the post-war era, i.e. along British lines. The availability of support weapons seems to have been particularly ad hoc in nature, with none generically attacked at platoon or company level. What fire support there was seems to have been largely mortars rather than artillery, with 81mm or 4.2” mortars being the norm. Armoured forces were made up of a potpourri of vehicles that had been left behind by UN forces, Ferret and Scania Vabis SKPF armoured cars along with M8 Greyhounds dominated, whilst transport was a mix of trucks, elderly British patterns, new Mercedes, Land Rovers, Jeeps all being used as available. Air support came in the shape of elderly T28 or T26 aircraft with rocket and MG capability. These were flown by mercenary pilots, South Africans or Rhodesians initially and then Anti-Castro Cubans latterly.

The following table shows the organisation of an ANC Company. Commanded by a Commandant Captain backed up by a Sergeant Major, each platoon would have a Lieutenant commanding and a Corporal heading each squad.

Company HQ One rifle section (8 men)

Platoon One Platoon Two Three rifle sections (8 men each) Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three Three rifle sections (8 men each)

The Mercenary units were able to select their own organisational structure. Five Commando is a case in point, with the whole battalion sized unit being broken down into smaller Commandos, numbered 51 to 57 or 58 depending on numbers. Each Commando was nominally forty men strong with two officers and three Sergeants, although casualties would rapidly have seen those strengths reduce. In essence the Battalion was split into platoons with no Company structure in place. Where larger forces were needed Hoare would simply use more than one Commando for a specific task, although during his second contract period he did create one larger 100 man unit, Force John-John under Captain John Peters which was used as a single tactical unit.

There were some variations on this theme, “Black Jack” Schramme’s 10 Commando was, apparently, organised on more traditional lines, with four companies, each of four platoons, whilst the Franco-Belgian 6 Commando, under Belgian regular Colonel Lamoline initially, and then that of French mercenary Bob Denard, appears to have followed Hoare’s lead, splitting the force into 60 to 65 Commando and an (apparently – I don’t believe it) para-borne Commando. Hoare mentions that Denard commanded an elite unit whilst under Lamoline called “Premiere Choc”, but in view of Denard’s performances generally quite how “premiere” they were seems doubtful. Tribal levies appear to have been Belgian commanded and

Page 34 split into three companies, albeit with no platoon structure below that. Armoured forces were comprised of whatever was available, and these tended to be apportioned out to give each column a spear point to head their mobile columns.

Below is the structure for 5 Commando in the period. As can be seen the unit as a whole is broken down into seven identical sub-units (allowing for manpower variation due to wastage) with an integral mortar platoon. At different stages other units were attached, such as a “58 Commando” of Cubans or armoured elements of the ANC who were assigned for various missions.

Five Commmando HQ “Tentacle” Armoured Command Vehicle Bazooka team (2 man crew)

51 Commando Four rifle sections (8 men each) Soft-skin Transport

52 Commando

53 Commando

54 Commando

55 Commando

56 Commando

57 Commando

Mortar Platoon Four 81mm mortars (4 crew each) Soft-skin transport

Big Men A Poor ANC force should have one Big Man per Company, whilst a Good ANC force should have three Big Men for IABSM. A mercenary force should have two per Commando, a Disciplined Mercenary forces getting three per Commando. An elite Commando may add an extra one.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in a Mercenary commando should be diced for, lose one man per pip on a D6+1. The player may then organise his force as he desires before the game begins. An ANC force will dice for each section as in the main rules (use the British strength as a basis for this), and then dice for Big Men. A platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present (-1 on the dice roll for Poor ANC forces). Mercenary sections always have a Big Man with them.

ANC leadership is poor or average, whilst mercenary leadership is good.

Page 35 Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Ferret scout Car Mk 2 3 7.62 Browning MG Wheeled Off-Road Skania Vabis SKPF 4 Twin 8mm AA MGs Wheeled Ford Mk 6 Armoured Car 3 Vickers 0.303 MG Wheeled Saracen Tentacle 4 None Wheeled Off Road M8 Greyhound 3 5 or 0.50 cal HMG Wheeled White Scout Car 2 None Wheeled Force Characteristics

Armoured Bonus Move. This can apply to soft-skins as well as armoured vehicles. It should always be present when any motorised elements are present.

Rapid Deployment. This should always be present when any motorised elements are present.

Reconnaissance Force. This may be used for any armoured vehicles that are heading a column.

Vehicle Breakdown. This will may be added to the deck if relevant.

Tank Killer Bonus. This may be used by a mercenary force with its own bazooka.

Poor Fire Discipline. This should be present for any African ANC units, whose fire discipline may be anything from Poor to Abysmal. Mercenary forces just arrived in the country may have Poor fire discipline.

Ammunition Shortage. This may be present, especially in a non-static operation.

MG Bonus. May be available for vehicle mounted MGs as well as MMGs.

Mortar Bonus. May be available.

Dynamic Commander. Any ANC force, regular or mercenary, may have a Dynamic Commander. Any Disciplined Mercenary force should almost always have one.

Hesitant Commander. This should be available for certain mercenary units, such as 6 Commando, who were less than enthusiastic about directly confronting the enemy. Especially so when Bob Denard assumes command.

Heroic Leader. Any force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available with a dedicated FAC if a radio car or command vehicle is present.

Fear. This should always be present for Poor ANC troops. If a mixed force is fielded then it will only apply to poor troops.

Shock & Awe. Always present for any motorised mercenary force.

Looters. Always present for an ANC force.

Page 36

The organisation of Armée Populaire de Liberation, or Simbas, was based more on what was available, as no possible attempt could be made to organise these into anything more than mobs. In essence the war in the Congo was a product of the breakdown of social order as a result of Lumumba’s inflammatory speech at the independence celebrations. This shook the traditional social framework to its very foundations. As in most African societies the elderly had been revered and led their tribes, now a new generation of jeunesse, youth, came to the fore. It was not just the Belgian colonial order that was destroyed, but also the older tribal order that collapsed as well. Youths as young as twelve stepped forward to conduct an orgy of killing, their targets being tribal chiefs and elders, black intellectuals and Belgian settlers.

The basic military tactics favoured by the Simbas were to ambush anything travelling by road, or to attack whilst under the influence of drugs. That said towards the end of the conflict Communist Cuban advisers were successful in teaching rudimentary tactics to the groups that they accompanied; once they left, however, it would be back to the drugs and the mass attacks. And, not without some success. In a drug induced frenzy it was regularly reported how they would continue to advance even when their wounds were such that any normal man would simply have died. It can only be assumed that the effect of the physical trauma of being shot was somehow suspended by the effect of the drugs, whatever the reason this is reflected below.

A second group should also be considered, the Baluba tribe, or Bloody Balubas as their nickname went. This tribal group, mostly armed with bows, arrows and pangas, were prepared to fight anyone, from the Belgians, to the UN and the ANC. Their organisation was tribal rather than political, but they did operate with the Simbas and, for ease, are included here.

For the sake of the game the basic unit should be considered the ten man group, with mobs being made up of between three and five such groups.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Simbas 1,2,3,4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10

TW&T Rating The Simbas are armed with bolt action rifles and the odd communist supplied light machine gun. They will never count as anything other than green troops, with firing dice as below. They are certainly not proper soldiers. Their armament varied hugely, Soviet supplied weaponry tended to be of WWII vintage, whereas that acquired from the ANC was more modern.

Dispersed No Dice One Die Two Dice Three Dice Three Men or less Four men Five or six men Seven or eight men Nine or ten men

When dispersed the Simbas will run away or, if surrounded will surrender.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the Simbas will dice for effect on the following table:

D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a Simba group has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 12” immediately.

When a drug inspired Simba group has four wounds or more than its strength then its morale will fail and it will retire 6” immediately. Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not considered in the Congo.

Page 37

Simba Organisation The Simbas have no specified organisation, as mentioned above they operate in groups of ten men and mobs of three to five groups. Early on they were able to seize some weapons from the ANC and seem to have had a smattering of 0.5 cal HMGs. Early support weapons were primitive, such as the “Stand Cannon” which was a home-made device that fired scrap metal in the manner of canister. As time progressed they did benefit from having weapons supplied by the communist countries, and may be supported with 120mm mortars, 76mm recoilless rifles as well as the 0.50 cal HMGs.

Transport was often provided using civilian busses and some brand new Jeeps did find their way through from overseas. Armour was largely home made, with both wheeled trucks and caterpillar vehicles being used. Air support was non-existant.

Big Men A Simba force should have one Big Man per three groups in both IABSM and TW&T. In TW&T the Big Man may command his whole force as one group until the firing begins, at which point he must control them individually or, more likely, launch a Mai Muelele attack. Cuban advisor Big Men may be attached after the fall of Stanleyville in 1964 at the ratio of two per mob.

Leadership should generally be poor, but the overall force commander can be good or even elite, representing a charismatic leader.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Home Made Armour 2 or 3 MGs Wheeled or Slow tracked White Scout Car 2 None Wheeled

Force Characteristics

Rapid Deployment. This should be available for a Simba force

Poor Fire Discipline. The Simbas should have Dreadful or Abysmal Fire Discipline.

Dynamic Commander. A Simba force should have a Dynamic Commander. Any Cuban advisors are dynamic.

Mai Muelele! Always present for a Simba force

Looting. This will be present for any Simba force where such an opportunity could present itself.

Page 38

Moise Tshombe’s declaration of an independent Katanga in 1961 presented a serious threat to the viability of the Congo as an independent country. The rich mining province made significant contributions to the national purse, and its loss would inevitability lead to bankruptcy. Indeed Tshombe’s biggest financier was the Belgian owned Union Minière company which had significant assets in the province. Naturally the central authorities attempted to end this rebellion, committing the ANC in order to do so.

Katanga had reacted quickly to their independence, forming a body of Gendarmes to defend their borders. This force was being trained by mercenaries under the leadership of Captain Robert Faulques, a veteran of the Foreign Legion Parachutists. He was fortunate in his timing in that the 1st Parachute Regiment were almost simultaneously being disbanded in Algeria for their part in the attempted coup against de Gaulle, and many of these men travelled south in search of new employment. This was supplemented by Belgian, British, South African and Rhodesian mercenaries recruited by the CIA and the Rhodesian Intelligence Services.

This eclectic mix of volunteers and hard-bitten soldiers was not without its problems. The French speaking and English speaking groups never got on, both suspicious of the others’ motives and aspirations, but despite this they were rapidly turned into a very effective military force, especially when the mercenaries were committed en masse as the shock troops of a Katangan force. Equally they formed the spine of the Katangese officer corps around which the Gendarmes were structured, each of the five military zones having a mercenary commander; Albertville under Jacques, Kongolo under Bosquet, Manono under Protin, Kamina under Barvaux and Kamiama under Faulques who also had overall command. Quickly the ANC found itself unable to make any headway, appealing to the UN to end the rebellion.

In 1961 the Irish contingent of the United Nations took on the task of clearing the mercenaries from the province, and this proved to be the key to ending Katangan independence. The majority of the mercenaries were not prepared to fight against the UN forces (or, possibly more correctly, the white Irish troops – they seemed not to have the same reservations when fighting against Ethiopian UN troops) and Operation Rum Punch saw many accept repatriation. This proved to be the key to ending Katangese secession, as with the mercenary spine removed from the Gendarmerie, the Katangese forces were severely reduced in effectiveness.

Some mercenaries, however, refused to lay down their arms, and fought the Irish troops at Jadotville in September of 1961, where after a five day siege they took the surrender of A Company, Irish 35th Battalion whose 150 men had held off several thousand Katangese until their ammunition and water had run out. More fighting occurred at Elizabethville in December and then again in the following year when the Katangese were defeated by UN forces and the rebellion ended.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Katangese Gendarmes 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8 Mercenary led Katangese 1,2,3 4 5, 6 7, 8 Disciplined Mercenaries 1, 2, 3 4 5 6, 7, 8

TW&T Rating The Katangese Gendarmes be considered Green, with a very small number as Average when led into combat by mercenaries. Mercenary units should be considered Good. Armament was variable, there is much talk of WWII vintage bolt loading rifles, however the photographs that I have viewed almost all show them armed with the FN FAL which is considered an assault rifle, and the FN MAG which is the equivalent of the MG42.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Page 39 Mercenaries D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Gendarmes D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a Section of Mercenaries reaches the point where they have twice as many wounds as men remaining they will retire 6” immediately.

When a section of Mercenary led Gendarmes reach a point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a force of Katangese Gendarmes has as many wounds as men left it will retire 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not considered in the Congo.

Katangese Gendarme Organisation All Katangese Gendarme units were organised almost exactly on the same lines as the Belgian Army in the post-war era. The availability of support weapons seems to have been particularly ad hoc in nature, with none generically attacked at platoon or company level. What fire support there was seems to have been largely mortars rather than artillery, with 81mm mortars or 4.2” mortars being the norm. Armoured forces were made up largely of home made vehicles, with both wheeled trucks and caterpillar vehicles being used.

Minimal but not ineffective air support came in the shape of three mercenary piloted Fouga Magister aircraft.

The following table shows the organisation of a Company of Katangese Gendarmes. Commanded by a Commandant or Captain backed up by a Sergeant Major, each platoon would have a Lieutenant commanding and a Corporal heading each section.

Company HQ One rifle section (8 men)

Platoon One Platoon Two Three rifle sections (8 men each) Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three Three rifle sections (8 men each)

The Mercenary units were able to select their own organisational structure depending on their mission, but the eight man section should be considered the basic building block.

Big Men For IABSM Katangese Gendarmes should have one Big Man per Platoon, whilst a force that is mercenary led may have one extra. A mercenary force should have two per platoon with a further one for the force commander.

Page 40 If using TW&T the overall number of men in a Mercenary commando should be diced for, lose one man per pip on a D6+1. The player may then organise his force as he desires before the game begins. A Katangese Gendarme force will dice for each section as in the main rules (use the British section strength as a basis for this), and the dice again for Big Men. A platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1 or 2 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. For a mercenary led Gendarme force a squad leader will always be present.

Big Men will usually be average to good.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Home Made Armour 2 or 3 MGs Wheeled or Slow tracked Whites Scout Car 2 None Wheeled

Force Characteristics

Rapid Deployment. This should always be present when any motorised elements are present.

Vehicle Breakdown. This will may be added to the deck if home made armour is fielded.

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for a Katangese Gendarme force whose fire discipline may be Poor

Ammunition Shortage. This may be present, especially in a non-static operation.

MG Bonus. May be available.

Dynamic Commander. Any Katangese force, regular or mercenary, may have a Dynamic Commander. Any Disciplined Mercenary force should almost always have one.

Heroic Leader. Any force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available with a dedicated FAC if a radio car or command vehicle is present.

Shock & Awe. Always present for any motorised mercenary force.

Looting. This will be present for any force where such an opportunity could present itself.

Page 41

The United Nations committed numerous national contingents to the Congo during the four years after independence. Ireland, India, Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia, Sweden’ Sudan, Nigeria, Malaya, Ethiopia, orway and Denmark providing contingents of varying sizes. The effectiveness of these forces was variable and certain stereotypes emerged that characterised each contingent. The Swedes were wedded to their armoured vehicles, avoiding leaving them at all costs, the two Moroccan battalions were made up of one former French and one previously Spanish battalion that were viewed as extremely tough disciplined fighters, the Ethiopians were hardy men who had tracking skills that no other contingent could boast but were prone to committing atrocities. The Ghurkas of the Indian forces were trustworthy, well ordered in the British tradition, as were the Jat and Dogra battalions under Brigadier Raja and his Sandhurst trained officers. The Irish were always willing to have a go, despite complete lack of military experience and poor equipment, the Nigerians, not too distant neighbours of the Congolese, were far more military in their bearing, indeed the overall commander of the Nigerian Army at this time was still British.

Like all stereotypes these descriptions have their limitations, however they do give some idea of the tower of Babel that the UN produced in the Congo. In the event the forces concerned were restricted by their peace-keeping briefing, with instructions not to initiate combat, ensuring that any force hostile to them would always get the first blow in. The Irish discovered this to their cost at Niemba where the attack on one of their patrols by disgruntled Balubas armed with nothing more than bows, arrows and pangas, proved all too successful as the Irish held their fire until it was too late.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Ordinary UN Troops 1,2,3 4 5, 6 7, 8 Disciplined UN troops 1, 2, 3 4 5 6, 7, 8

TW&T Rating The UN troops should generally be considered as Average with some units, such as the Moroccans and Indians considered Good with Ghurkas as Elite. Weapons were a very mixed bag, the Indians were armed with WWII vintage bolt action rifles and Bren guns, as were the Irish initially. Certainly towards the end of the UN involvement more modern weapons were being used but due to national differences there was no single policy.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Good UN troops D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Average UN troops D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead Morale When a Section of Elite UN Troops reaches the point where they have twice as many wounds as men remaining they will retire 6” immediately.

When a section of Good UN reach a point where they have three more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a section of Average UN reach a point where they have one more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not generally considered in the Congo, however the Ethiopians could be considered to have a rating of 2 if an appropriate scenario is undertaken.

Page 42 United Nations Organisation The organisation of the national contingents varied based on what forces were deployed and their military tradition. The British and French models were prominent, the Irish Battalion, for example, had an HQ Company with assigned armoured car platoon, mortar platoon, a Vickers machine gun platoon and anti- tank platoon, along with three Infantry companies. Their men were armed with the Mark IV 0.303 Lee Enfield with the Bren as the section machine gun, NCOs had the Gustav SMG. Each company had three platoons of three sections. In essence this follows the British model exactly, even the training manuals used were British, although designed for fighting a very different enemy – Germany.

As with most national contingents armoured vehicles were attached at a lower level than would have been the case in Europe, with small platoons often attached directly to battalions. This was equally true for support units, such as recoilless rifles or Carl Gustav anti-tank units that were popular for their ability to shake African morale with their high explosive rounds rather than necessarily taking on any armour.

Air support was present in the form of one squadron of Swedish SAAB Tunnan and one Ethiopian F86 which consistently outperformed the Katangese air force in the air and four Indian Air Force Canberra bombers.

Big Men For IABSM UN forces should generally have one Big Man per Platoon, this is the case for even the better quality contingents to represent their general non-aggressive approach to the conflict and the inertia created by the uncertainty of exactly where their responsibilities began and ended.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in a UN force will have Big Men for each section and an additional one for the platoon commander.

Big Men are normally average with some good quality.

Armoured Vehicles The Irish deployed the elderly Ford Mark 6 Armoured car in the Congo along with (remarkably) some very early M113 personnel carriers. The Indians fielded WWII vintage Daimler Armoured Cars and the newer Ferret as were the Malayans, the Ethiopians the Landsverk Armoured car based on the Unimog S404 chassis. The Nigerians had the Saladin, while the Swedes used ex-Belgian M8 Greyhounds and Whites Scout Cars Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Ford Mark 6 Armoured Car 3 MG Wheeled White Scout Car 2 None Wheeled Ferret scout Car Mk 2 3 7.62 Browning MG Wheeled Off-Road FV601 Saladin 3 9 Wheeled Off-Road Skania Vabis SKPF 3 Twin 8mm AA MGs Wheeled Ford Mk 6 Armoured Car 3 Vickers 0.303 MG Wheeled Landesverk S404 Unimog 3 MG Wheeled Off-Road M113 4 None Fast

Force Characteristics Armoured Bonus. Available anytime armour is fielded.

Rapid Deployment. This should always be present when any motorised elements are present.

MG Bonus. May be available.

Air Support. This may be available with a dedicated FAC if a radio car or command vehicle is present.

Tank Killer Bonus. May be present for any UN force with such capability.

Hesitant Commander. Should regularly be present.

Page 43

The Belgian intervention in the Congo post Independence was initially brief, with a residue of forces that had yet to return home deploying to keep the peace before the arrival of United Nations Support. They did, however, return in a more aggressive guise in November 1964 when a battalion sized force of Para- Commandos were inserted at Stanleyville to rescue over a thousand European hostages who were at the mercy of the Simbas.

This force was made up largely of National Service troops with a core of full time regular officers and NCOs. The 1st Parachute Battalion had two companies deployed, most of whom had completed the training having been with the colours for ten months. A third company was provided by the 2nd Commando Battalion, this had not completed its parachute training, most of the men having only four months service.

The force operated under fairly strict rules of engagement, not being allowed to fire until fired upon and with instructions to keep collateral damage to a minimum. Their first objective of the parachute jump was to seize the airport, thus allowing more troops to be airlifted in on the US Hercules transport planes that would be used to evacuate the hostages. They were then to simultaneously hold the airfield against determined Simba attacks and also rescue the hostages whom they knew were in “Stan”, but had no idea of their exact location.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Les Paras 1, 2, 3 4 5,6 7, 8

TW&T Rating The Paras must be considered Good troops. They are armed with FN FAL rifles which are classed as assault rifles and the FN MAG GPMG which is considered as the MG42.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take his from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a Section of Paras reaches the point where they have twice as many wounds as men remaining they will retire 6” immediately.

Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not considered in the Congo.

Belgian Paras For Operation Dragon Rouge the force deployed was altered to suit the operation. The standard structure of a company was adhered to, with three platoons, each with four eight man sections, but the integral platoon mortars were brought together in one squad. Four armoured Minerva Land Rovers were brought in by air, each one mounting twin 0.30 Brownings on the front and a single Browning on the back. A Headquarters platoon also had four GPMG teams with sustained fire capability. The Belgians also deployed the very unusual FN AS34 tricycles, a small motorised unit with a four man capacity.

The following table shows the organisation of a Company of Para-Commandos. Commanded by a Captain backed up by a Sergeant Major, each platoon would have a Lieutenant commanding and a Corporal heading each squad.

Page 44

Company HQ

One rifle section (8 men)

HQ Platoon

Four GPMG (3 crew each)

Three 60mm mortars (2 crew

each)

Platoon One

Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Two Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Big Men For IABSM the Belgian Paras should have one Big Man per Platoon, and two more Big Men for the company command.

If using TW&T One Big Man will be present for each squad, plus a Captain and Sergeant for the Company HQ.

Big Men should be good quality.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Minerva Land Rover 2 MGs Wheeled

Force Characteristics

Rapid Deployment. This should always be present when the Land Rovers are represented or the FN tricycles are being used.

Reconnaissance Force. Available for any motorised elements.

Dynamic Commander. A force of Belgian Paras should always have this card.

Heroic Leader. Any Belgian force may have an Heroic Leader card.

Air Support. This is not available due to the necessity to avoid civilian casualties.

MG Bonus. Available for the support platoon.

Mortar Bonus Fire. May be available.

Shock & Awe. May be present for the Minervas, but not the tricycles.

Page 45

“Let us go and crush them. We will pillage their property, rape their womenfolk, kill off their menfolk and leave them uselessly weeping. We will complete the pogrom of 1966” Nigerian State Radio, 1967

The Civil War in Nigeria, sparked by Biafra’s declaration of independence marked two key points. Firstly It was Africa’s first truly modern war, where two organised armies fought each other in a conventional fashion. Secondly it was a war sparked by religious hatred, where a Muslim population was intent on wiping out a Christian minority; sadly a formula that has been ever more prevalent since.

During the colonial period a Pax Britannica had reigned across Nigeria, with the Muslims in the North and Christians in the south co-existing, albeit having little to do with one another on a daily basis due to geographical separation. In the north of the country the tradition was largely Islamic, where the Hausa- Fulani tribes had traditionally been governed by a number of powerful Emirs who had originally come to the region to find slaves.

In the West the Yoriba had a system of city states, each controlling the surrounding countryside, whereas the Ibo people in the South-East had been highly traditional in their African, animist and ancestor worshiping religions, isolated as they were by the heavy jungle terrain that kept them separate from the other tribes. However under British colonial rule they had become the most westernised of the population, embracing Christianity with enthusiasm and a work ethic that encouraged them towards education and the development of modern skills. In the north and west the other tribes clung on to their traditional beliefs and way of life.

In 1963 the Organisation for African Unity had decided that throughout Africa its members would recognise and retain the existing boundaries as drawn up by the colonial powers. This created certain issues with regards the balance of power in a post colonial world, and in Nigeria this meant that care had to be taken in drawing up a system of government that would minimise those problems. The British colonial authority worked with the indigenous African population to produce a model that they thought would work. A loosely structured federation of states was the result which meant that two of the three tribal groups would have to work together to form a national government.

In October of 1960 the transition to independence was achieved entirely peaceably. The British were generous in leaving in place key staff to assist with the development towards complete independence (for example the Nigerian Army had a British head until 1965) and provided support for the new nation. In all it appeared the perfect transition to independence, and things looked promising until in 1962 the census returns indicated that of a population of 55.6 million souls 29.8 million were in the northern province, giving them an overall majority of the population that was not reflected in the structure of the government and, indeed, did not reflect previous data.

The other regions naturally questioned this result, but it did not stop the 1964 elections being called into disrepute, especially in the Islamic north, and sparking a wave of civil unrest. By January of 1966 this had grown to a point where the Nigerian military took control of the country in the hope of stabilising the situation. This, as it turned out, was a vain hope. The military lacked the strength to run the country and was also split by the same tribal and religious issues that divided the nation as a whole. Instead of bringing stability the coup, and the subsequent counter-coup that happened in July when General “Jack” Gowon assumed power, saw the army stripped of its officer corps as religious and ethnic cleansing took place.

For the Christian Ibo population this was an extremely painful period. During the colonial era their westernisation and industriousness had meant that they had naturally risen to prominent positions throughout Nigerian society, including the military. The January coup had been instigated by Ibo army Majors, and the rest of the population now perceived that there was an active plan amongst the Ibo to take control of the Nigerian state.

Page 46 The Muslim elements of the army, aided by civilian mobs, began pogroms throughout the north and west of the country, including the capital, against the Ibo people. Thousands died simply for being the wrong religion. Indeed General Gowon’s declaration in October of 1966 that the Ibo would not be persecuted saw fresh rioting and pogroms. An exodus began, with the Ibo returning to their traditional home lands in the south east where, they believed, they would be safe from persecution. By October 1967 it was generally believed in the Ibo lands was that only full independence from Nigeria as a whole could save the tribe from massacre, and, on the 30th May, Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu declared independence on that premise. What followed was two and an half years of terrible civil war.

By the time that the war broke out the coups had ravaged the Nigerian military. It was a force that was not without experience, having sent peacekeeping troops to the Congo and Tanzania, but the 10,000 man army was torn apart by the same tensions that affected Nigerian society as a whole. The Federal forces had only 184 officers at their disposal at the start of hostilities, the Biafrans had just 93. The old Army was, to all intents and purposes, dissolved, and new battalions were formed with just five or six officers, making even the simplest staff work almost impossible. On both sides the work of building forces fit for purpose began with rapid growth having a predictable effect on training and discipline, and this proved problematic in the early stages of the conflict.

At the outset the Federal Nigerian forces were convinced that defeating the separatists would be little more than a police action. In July of 1967 the first Federal offensive was launched, with four different axes of advance intended to stretch the Biafran forces and overwhelm them. Initial success was fleeting and it soon became apparent that Ibo fervour in defending their homeland was more than a match for the ill-disciplined, untrained Federal forces.

Defences were prepared along likely routes of advance, ditches were dug, obstacles and bunkers constructed and manned by local militias. The Nigerians attempted to use their superiority in materiel, launching massive artillery bombardments before the smallest of attacks then consolidating limited gains before the next bombardment and another advance. Indeed these tactics were successful in obliging the Biafrans to fall back from their initial positions, however they harried the pursuing Federal forces continuously with ambushes and traps.

Whilst the war was bogging down in the north the Nigerian forces did secure one major and significant victory in the south. An amphibious assault by 1000 men on the island of Bonny at the mouth of Port Harcourt harbour overwhelmed the company of defenders garrisoned there, and was effective in shutting off that port for the delivery of supplies. The Biafrans astoundingly were not perturbed by this, being confident that they could bring in supplies by air. The suffering and starvation that occurred subsequently was largely due to this misapprehension.

Page 47 Interestingly the fall of Bonny saw the first real mercenary action in Biafra. Robert Faulques, the former Legion paratrooper who we saw in Katanga had appeared with a group of white mercenaries that had been hired to train the Biafrans. When the Island of Bonny fell to the Federal 3rd Commando Brigade the mercenaries were committed as a body in an attempt to drive them off and re-open the port. They did it with all the finesse that they had found necessary when attacking the Simba rabble in the Congo, and were repelled with heavy casualties. The Nigerians were not Simbas, but a well trained, if poorly led, army and, recognising this, the vast majority of mercenaries immediately packed their bags and left.

Only a handful of mercenaries remained to assist the Biafrans, forming and training the 4th Commando Brigade of just short of four thousand men split into three battalions under the overall command of German former Legionnaire Rolf Steiner. The Ahoada Strike force was commanded by former Legionary Armand Ianarelli, the Abaliki Strike Force by Rhodesian Johnny Erasmus and “The Guards” by South Africa based Welshman “Taffy” Williams.

Recognising that the Federal forces were dictating the pace of the conflict, the Biafrans decided to risk an aggressive strike into the neighbouring province to the west. There was a significant Ibo minority in that region and, they surmised, that with their support they could expand the territory that they controlled and threaten Lagos itself. Indeed Ibadan and Lagos, the provincial and federal capitals were the objectives for what was intended to be a lightening strike against an unprepared opponent.

It was certainly true that Nigerian troops in that sector were unprepared and spread thinly in order to concentrate forces for the Federals’ own offensives. However in the interest of security the Biafrans did not train any of their forces for the attack and only appointed a commander on the day before their offensive began. At 03.00 on the 9th of August 1967 a column of 100 vehicles crossed the Onitsha bridge across the Niger river. Rapidly the mid-west provincial capital of Benin was seized and the force was spreading out further into enemy territory. Cracks were, however, beginning to appear.

The superbly named Lieutenant Colonel Victor Banjo had been the political choice to lead the operation, largely because he was not an Ibo and it was hoped his presence would bring other non-Ibos on side. In Benin he halted for two days to argue with his second in command about who was to assume the role of provincial governor. When he resumed the offensive on the third day his approach was timid, failing to seize the initiative and capitalise on the chaos within the Federalist ranks.

Despite a golden opportunity all the Biafran offensive achieved was to awaken the Federal authorities from their complacency. Now they recognised the seriousness of the threat, and rapidly took steps to concentrate their troops in key stop positions to oppose the advance and blew several key bridges. This was sufficient to halt further Biafran progress. Suddenly the balance tipped and now it was the Federal forces that assumed the offensive, driving back their opponents at all points, cutting off significant numbers of Biafran troops and maintaining the pressure so as not to allow any stabilisation of the line. Benin was evacuated, and the Onitsha bridge blown by retreating Ibo troops.

On the Federal side calm was restored largely by the unflappable leadership of Major General “jack” Gowon. Unusually for the Federalist forces Gowon was a Christian from a minority tribe in the north. As such he was seen as a politically acceptable choice for Federal command. In fact his cool-headed approach to the war was a great asset, avoiding panic and allowing his field commanders to do their jobs without interference. This was in marked contrast to the conditions in Major General Ojukwu’s Biafra. The failure of the offensive was marked with accusations of sabotage; indeed nearly all Biafran operations were marked with cries of treachery, and the officer corps was constantly purged throughout the war.

The Biafran offensive into mid-west Nigeria had been a one shot weapon that had failed to work. They now faced the reality of lacking both military equipment and food to feed their population. Yet despite this they fought on, convinced that to surrender would lead to genocide. This was an opinion strengthened by events such as the massacre of 300 Ibo women and children in the Cathedral at Onitsha in March of 1968.

On the Nigerian side the war followed a set pattern of massive barrages preceding each attack. In fact this slowly-but-surely approach led to missed opportunities. At Enugu in September 1967, for example, the Nigerian 1st Division failed to follow up on the retreating Biafrans when a decisive victory could have ended the war there and then.

Page 48 As it was the Nigerians continuously nibbled at the edges of Biafran territory, forcing the defenders into an ever smaller area of land. Five fronts were maintained, at Bonny, Onitsha, Enugu, Calabar and in the north east, stretching their opponent’s resources to near breaking point.

In May of 1968 Port Harcourt fell, removing the last major conurbation in rebel hands. Yet still Biafra fought on. Ojukwu desperately called on civilian volunteers to take up arms and fight a guerrilla war against Federal forces, but a ray of hope changed his mind. France recognised the Biafran state and began to send in military aid. Twenty tons of materiel were flown in each night to the airstrip at Uli, and optimism returned to the Ibo people.

The Federal forces were clearly keen to shut off this supply, and launched an amphibious assault across the lake at Oguta, only twelve miles from Uli, causing panic in Biafran ranks. General Ojukwu himself was now seen on the battlefield, leading a counter attack against the landings and obliging them to withdraw. Indeed a counter offensive was now launched, seizing Ekpene and then moving down to threaten Aba. It was here in September that Rolf Steiner’s mercenary trained 4th Commando Brigade was committed for the first time amid much hope on the Biafran side. At the end of four days of fighting only 922 men of the 3742 that had entered the battle remained fit for duty. Briefly they had halted the Federal advance, but rates of attrition simply overwhelmed them. Withdrawn from battle they were now to form the nucleus of the 4th Commando Division.

In November this fresh force of 8,500 men attacked Onitsha where it was unable to break into Federal positions. Steiner and Ojukwu now fell out and the former was replaced in command by Taffy Williams, however on the 13th of November he fared little better, his men were decisively beaten and the force simply fell apart.

Ultimately Biafra now lacked the infrastructure to maintain the fight. With no major city from which to run their administration they found it increasingly difficult to function, especially as they had lost their oil fields early in the conflict and now lacked hard currency to purchase supplies. Ojukwu had taken control of all military operations, yet from May to November 1969 the Federal forces maintained an unbroken series of victories. Always operating with limited objectives, consolidating as soon as they had been achieved.

In January of 1970 the Federals changed their tactics. With the Biafrans restricted to just 2000 square miles of territory attacks were launched into this. But this time the Nigerian columns did not stop to consolidate; they continued to push on overwhelming the enemy with their speed. On January the 11th 1970 General Ojukw flew out of Uli into exile, leaving Colonel Effiong to announce the surrender. After three years the “small police action” was over.

Wargaming Biafra The war in Biafra presents some unusual gaming opportunities for Africa in that the majority of the fighting is conventional warfare rather than counter insurgency operations. Some rule additions are advisable in order to reflect the unique flavour of the war in the region.

Home Made Armour. The Biafrans were particularly adept at converting old junk into their “Red Devil” armoured vehicles. At least three marks of these existed, built by the “Heavy Equipment & Industrial Materials Group” by using heavy steel sheet on a variety of chassis. Some old pre-WWII French armoured vehicles apparently provided the basis for one variation (although my research has not confirmed which model this was), the Land Rover another and heavy construction plant for others. They were described as slow, cumbersome and blind, and need to be represented as such.

We will use the term very slow vehicle for the tracked versions, and slow for the wheeled ones. Very slow AFVs move as follows.

Speed Hard Ground Broken Terrain Very Slow Initiative dice -1 pip Initiative dice – 3 pips Any home made AFV will be difficult to spot from, reducing visibility significantly (-2 if using the spotting table) for anything not directly ahead. A home made AFV should always run the risk of breaking down, a vehicle breakdown card being added to the deck.

Page 49 Alalaba Tactics. Federal forces were aware that Biafran armour had poor visibility and used “Alalaba tactics”, literally Sneaky Tactics, to attack them from close quarters. A Federal bazooka team may add an Alalaba Tactics card to the deck, taking an extra move on that card. They may use one initiative dice to make their move sneaky, reducing their chance of being seen.

Biafra Gin. Lacking anti-tank weapons the Biafrans developed their own napalm like substance which they used to attack Federal armour and to create barriers, essentially combustible “minefields”. Any Biafran section that has a supply of bottled Biafra Gin may add a card of that name to the deck, taking a bonus move on the turn of the card to attack an enemy armoured vehicle. Attacks are made with a strike of 3.

If deployed as a barrier it will be dug into a shallow trench which may be lit at any point providing a flaming obstacle through which troops or vehicles may not move. It will burn for six turns after which it will still smoulder but be passable.

High Command Panic. The Biafran high command were always ready to throw in reinforcements piece- meal, rather than co-ordinate their attacks. Any Biafran force with reinforcements off table will roll a dice each turn. On a 6 they will arrive randomly on a friendly table edge. Select six equidistant points and roll a D6.

Sabotage! The Biafrans were convinced that a saboteur was behind every bush, blaming them for what was simply battlefield friction. To represent this any blind that is being deployed on the table will roll a D6. On a 1 that unit is not where the commander thanks it is. The blind will become reinforcements that are diced for as with the High Command Panic rule on subsequent turns.

Page 50

With the collapse of the Nigerian Army in 1967 a new Federal Army had to be recruited very quickly. In the end this amounted to around 100,000 men. The 1st Division was largely made up of the rump of the old Army with about 40,000 well trained and disciplined troops in six Brigades. The 2nd Division had only three Brigades, totalling 30,000 men but with poor levels of training and leadership. With 35,000 men the 3rd Marine Commando Division was divided into eight Brigades and were well trained in amphibious operations.

Armoured vehicles were limited, there were no tanks operating in Nigeria however the Federals were relatively well equipped with armoured cars, fielding Saladin, Saracen and Ferret models from Britain and the Panhard AML 60 and AML 90 from France. Artillery was also prevalent, with guns of up to 122mm in calibre being used to herald every new attack.

The Nigerian Air Force was a relatively new body, having only been founded in 1962. By the time the war began they had only transport aircraft, however they were successful in acquiring Soviet Mig 15 and Mig 17 fighters and Delfin L29 trainers from Czechoslovakia which were adapted for ground attack. Three IL28 Ilyushin bombers arrived in 1968 and eight Westland Whirlwind helicopters were purchased from Australia. Despite outnumbering the Biafran Air Force hugely the Federal air forces never really made their mark, gaining an unpleasant reputation for attacking Red Cross installations and civilian targets.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Poor Federal Troops 1, 2, 3, 4 5 6, 7 8 Good Federal Troops 1, 2, 3 4 5, 6 7, 8

TW&T Rating The Poor Federal Troops should be considered Green, whilst Good Troops are considered Average or Good. Weapons are the modern FN FAL or British SLR, the former being considered an assault rifle, the second a self-loading rifle. The FN MAG was the standard GPMG, being treated as an MG42, but with the Bren still being seen in service.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Good Troops D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Poor Troops D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a section of Good Federal troops reach a point where they have four more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When force of Poor Federal troops has two more wounds than men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 18” immediately.

Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not considered in Biafra.

Federal Nigerian Forces The Nigerian Army was based on the British model, having originally been part of the West African Frontier Force. A significant number of senior ranking Nigerians had been trained at Sandhurst and other British

Page 51 run colonial military institutions and were professional soldiers. The same could not be said of the junior ranking commanders who were very much a mixed bag.

In terms of performance, the 1st Division and the 3rd Marine Commando Division were good, well trained troops, well led and capable of achieving objectives. The 2nd Division was largely a rabble, and by 1969 had ceased to be an effective fighting force.

The Federal forces were able to call on plenty of artillery support, 81mm mortars and 105mm guns being most prevalent. In 1969 some Soviet 122mm guns were added to their arsenal. Artillery support was generally used as a bombardment before an attack, as such the Stonk rule should be used with 1DAv+2 stonks being allowed. Forward Observers should not generally be present and no reactive artillery fire will be used unless the Federal forces are in defensive positions.

The following diagram represents a Nigerian Company.

Company HQ One rifle section (8 men)

Platoon One Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Two Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Support Platoon

One or two MMG teams

One or two 2” mortar teams

Post independence the Nigerian Army had been promoted by one grade in rank across the board, so the company would be commanded by a Major, each platoon by a Captain with a Sergeant commanding each section.

Big Men A Poor Federal force should have one or two Big Men per Company, whilst a Good Federal force should have three or four Big Men for IABSM.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the British squad model in the main TW&T rules. For a poor force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Good forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men.

Big Men are rated as average, but some poor and a few good commanders may be present.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Ferret scout Car Mk 2 3 7.62 Browning MG Wheeled Off-Road FV601 Saladin 3 9 Wheeled Off-Road FV 603 Saracen 3 7.62mm MG Wheeled Off-Road AML 60 3 60mm mortar Wheeled Off-Road AML 90 3 12 Wheeled Off-Road

Page 52 Force Characteristics

Vehicle Breakdown. This will may be added to the deck if relevant.

Alalaba Tactics. This may be used by a force with its own bazooka.

Poor Fire Discipline. This should be present for any Poor Federal force, whose fire discipline may be anything from Poor to Abysmal. Good Federal may not have Poor fire discipline.

MG Bonus. May be available for MMGs teams.

Mortar Bonus. May be available.

Hesitant Commander. This may be present to reflect the Nigerian policy of a methodical, slow advance.

Dynamic Commander. Any Good Federal force may have a Dynamic Commander.

Heroic Leader. Any force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available but with no FAC team.

Fear. This should always be present for Poor Federal troops. If a mixed force is fielded then it will only apply to poor troops.

Page 53

With the birth of the new nation it was recognised that it would need to form an Army to protect its borders and, indeed, its very existence. In fact steps had been taken even before independence was declared, and this force had no shortage of volunteers, soon growing to a strength of some 90,000 men. The nucleus of this forces was two thousand former Nigerian soldiers, however whilst men were available weapons were not. Even the best Biafran units could only arm and equip half of their men and then the weapons issued were described as relics of the First World War. Single shot Mauser rifles, no support weapons such as mortars or bazookas unless they were captured from the enemy. It was a parlous state in which to fight a war for survival.

Five regular Divisions were formed along with the guerrilla forces of BOFF, Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters, which was set up to harass the enemy behind their lines and interfere with their communications.

Armoured vehicles were even more limited than for the Nigerians, what there were having to be home- made on a variety of chassis or captured from the enemy. Any form of support weapons, be that mortars or artillery were lacking as was, initially, air support. In 1967 one B26 WWII vintage bomber arrived with its mercenary pilot, “Kamikaze” Brown, at the controls. In 1968, however, Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, a Swedish noble who had flown for many nations in their hour of need, was able to acquire five MCI-9B Minicon aircraft which were fitted with 68mm rocket pods and flew for Biafra in a ground attack role.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Biafran Troops 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8

TW&T Rating Biafran troops can be considered anything from Green to Average. They are armed with a mixture of bolt action rifles and more modern SLRs which are considered self-loading rifles or later FN FAL assault rifles.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Average Troops D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Green Troops D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a section of Biafran troops reach a point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

Fieldcraft Fieldcraft is not considered in Biafra.

Biafran Forces Like the Nigerian Army the Biafrans based their Army on the British model. The generally poor quality of their troops was offset by the enthusiasm for their cause and the fact that their people were fighting for their very existence.

Very little would be available in the way of support weapons, however some home-made armoured vehicles may be present or even a captured Nigerian AFV. Biafra Gin may be available, either bottled or

Page 54 used as an incendiary barrier. The Biafrans did use entrenchments and bunkers extensively and would have limited access to MMG teams.

The following diagram represents a Biafran Company.

Company HQ One rifle section (8 men)

Platoon One Platoon Two Three rifle sections (8 men each) Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three Three rifle sections (8 men each)

The company would be commanded by a Captain, each platoon by a Lieutenant with a Sergeant commanding each section.

Big Men A Green Biafran force should have one or two Big Man per Company, whilst an Average force should have three or four Big Men for IABSM.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the British squad model in the main TW&T rules. For a poor force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Good forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed Red Devil Mark I 3 Various Wheeled Red Devil Mark II 3 Various Very Slow

Force Characteristics Vehicle Breakdown. This will will always be in the deck when home-made amour is present.

Biafra Gin. A tank killer bonus for troops suitably armed.

MG bonus Fire. May always be present.

Ammunition Shortage. Should always be present for any Biafran force.

Poor Fire Discipline. This should be present for any Green Biafran force, whose fire discipline may be anything from Poor to Abysmal.

Dynamic Commander. Any Biafran force should have a Dynamic Commander.

Heroic Leader. Any force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available but with no FAC team.

Fear. This may be present for Green Biafran troops. If a mixed force is fielded then it will only apply to Green troops.

Looting. The Biafrans will be susceptible to this if they are in a position to loot Nigerian weapons.

Page 55

“The problem round here is that the civvies are more scared of the terrs than they are of us. And whichever side scares them the most they’ll obey. They disobey terrs and what happens? They get their throats cut or their lips hacked off with pliers, or their family are grilled to a crisp over a fire….Well, who the f--- would you obey? Until we change that balance of fear we’ll never win this bloody war” Patrol Officer, British South Africa Police.

Rhodesia, amongst all of Britain’s African colonies, was unique in that since 1923 it had self-governing status, electing its own government which was responsible to the Governor, rather than having a colonial administration run from London. This put the white population in a strong position to oppose black- majority rule. Added to this was the fact that the white population was, by 1965, approaching a quarter of a million in numbers, a far larger group than in any other colony.

African nationalism in Rhodesia was undoubtedly a product of a political system that favoured the whites in every respect. The Land Apportionment Act allocated over one third of the land to the white population, this being the most fertile land at higher altitude which the settlers had first purchased from Lobenguela, the last Matabele King, in the 1890s. Whilst the 4,000,000 black Rhodesians were not entirely disenfranchised, the MPs representing them in Parliament held less than 25% of the seats and were powerless in the face of a white majority that, under the leadership of Ian Smith, closed ranks in the face of British demands for majority rule.

Famously the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence saw Rhodesia take charge of its own destiny. It’s white population had been horrified by what it has seen happening in the Congo, and was resolute that African majority rule would not happen in their country. The settler population felt strongly that it was owed a debt by Britain. In both the Great War and the Second World War the numbers of white Rhodesians volunteering to serve the Empire was so large that laws had to be introduced to stop the country being completely stripped of European men. Ian Smith had himself served as a pilot with the Royal Air Force over North Africa and Italy. Surely Britain would not abandon them now?

Smith offered British Prime Minister Harold Wilson the option of investing in black education and a gradual move towards power-sharing over a fifteen year period, but Wilson was insistent that only immediate majority rule was acceptable to the British government. There was no way forward and Smith took the steps he believed represented the best interests of his white electorate. There was talk of the British Army and the Royal Air Force intervening, but Wilson had already been advised by the Chiefs of Staff that they would not countenance the use of force against “kith and kin”. Wilson complained bitterly, but he was toothless.

In Rhodesia the immediate nationalist backlash failed to materialise. Despite International economic sanctions life went on, albeit with rationing on some goods, such as petrol. Indeed whilst there had been incursions by nationalist guerrillas since the early 1960s the war did not really begin until 1966, and then remained at a low level for nearly ten years.

Initially the nationalist movements, Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbawe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua N’komo’s Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) were content to establish bases in neighbouring countries where they could train and equip their forces for the coming struggle. Despite the supposedly communist stance taken by these two groups their origins were strictly tribal African. Sithole and Mugabe were both from the majority Mashona tribe, N’komo represented the minority, but warlike, Matabele people from the south-western part of the country. Their support was equally tribal. ZANU found backing from Red China, ZAPU from the Soviet Union. Geographically ZANU had their bases in Tanzania whilst ZAPU had theirs in Zambia.

Page 56 The Rhodesians were fortunate in that, during their many years of close military co- operation with Britain, they had first hand experience of non- conventional and counter insurgency warfare. The Rhodesians had served in the LRDG in WWII and the British 22 SAS had a Rhodesian squadron, C squadron, which served in Malaya and Aden during the emergencies there. From these ranks came many of the senior officers in the Rhodesian security forces who were able to put the lessons they had learned in the service of Britain into practice.

On the nationalist side the two main political parties both had their own armed wings; ZANU had the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. ZAPU the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, ZANLA and ZIPRA respectively. In the early days recruits were generally shipped out of the country for training abroad, as far afield as China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, but also in friendly African states such as Libya, Egypt, Ghana and Tanzania. By 1970 however the trainers came to be based in the nationalist camps in order to process numbers more effectively.

ZANLA’s War In essence ZANLA adopted Chinese tactics along Maoist principles. Their prime objective was to politicise a population that had previously had little contact with politics (and had been actively discouraged from doing so by the Rhodesian authorities) and lived a simple but harsh agrarian existence. ZANLA cadres were sent into the Tribal areas with the task of creating an environment where they could exist freely and form a base from which to strike against Rhodesian targets. These groups were largely frustrated in the early years of the war as the local population was generally not keen to see their peaceful existence disturbed, and information flowed readily to the security forces resulting in a large number of nationalists were killed or captured.

The success of the Security forces to control the level of incursions thanks to public support had two very distinct results. Firstly it convinced the Rhodesians that the war was winnable, and secondly it persuaded the nationalists that they needed to step up their attempts to politicise the people. It was at this point that a guerrilla war became a terrorist war.

The tactics of nationalist groups changed abruptly. Now, rather than attempting to politicise through debate and reasoned argument the emphasis became one of terrorising the population into withdrawing their support from the security forces. Killings of “traitors” became the norm, the use of rape as a weapon, torture, mass killings, guilt by association all were tactics used by the terrorists over the years of the war. Whatever the moral rights and wrongs, this approach was successful, especially when aided by the backlash from the Rhodesian security forces whom, frustrated by their flow of information drying up, became heavy handed in their response.

With a base within the civilian population the terrorists were free to take their campaign to the next stage; the attack on Rhodesia itself. This was not an attempt to engage with the security forces, but

Page 57 rather an attempt to hit at the nation’s economy in the shape of transport links, such as railway lines, or white farms, where the bulk of the nation’s wealth was generated. Initially attacks on white farms were all too easy for a determined gang of terrorists, however the farming community reacted rapidly with a range of responses to improve their security. The Agricalert radio network was established linking each farm to the local police base and their neighbours. As most farmers had some involvement in the security forces they were armed and ready to respond to their neighbours’ calls for help. Breeze-block anti- grenade walls were built around farmhouses, security fences errected, all of which served to make the farms small fortresses. The classic colonial image of the farmer and his sons firing while the wife and daughters loaded their weapons was reborn with a vengeance.

The terrorist response to this change of tactics by the farmers was simple; they killed the farm workers. In Rhodesia the sheer size of the farms meant that they became communities in their own right. Each farm would have its own village for African workers. Many farmers would provide ancillary services for their employees; schools, medical clinics and beer halls were all popular. However the terrorists were not blind to the fact that killing the workers would stop the work on the farm every bit as quickly as killing the farmer. In response the farmers erected fences to protect their workers who were now obliged to live in compounds for their own safety.

The Rhodesian Response Across Rhodesia the Security Forces were constantly evolving their tactics to provide an effective counter to the terrorists activities. The country was gradually divided into Operational areas, Operation Hurricane opening in December 1972 and then Thrasher, Repulse, Tangent, Grapple, Splinter, Ranger and SALOPs. In each area a Joint Operation Command (JOC) would bring together the army, police, air force and civilian administration into one unit to ensure unity of purpose. In 1977 Combined Operations (COMOPs) was established at national level to oversee all of the Operational Areas.

In the tribal areas the Rhodesian Internal Affairs department attempted to provide protection for the African population by building Protected Villages. Each PV would have a central ‘Keep’, most often an earthen walled fort, manned by black troops of the Internal Affairs department or, later, the Guard Force. Again this had radio links to the local police and military bases and could call upon their support if terrorists attacked.

The Army developed a range of measures to counter terrorist incursions, most famous being the Fireforce vertical envelopment tactics, using small numbers of highly trained troops deployed by helicopter to isolate and destroy their opponents. Indeed the use of helicopters is the chief enduring image of the Rhodesian Bush War, with limited numbers of military personnel relying on air mobility to allow them to cover huge areas of inhospitable terrain.

The Selous Scouts were formed to undertake covert counter-terrorism operations using Pseudo Gangs, as had the British in Kenya. African security force members and any “turned” terrorists that agreed to turn against their former comrades would operate in the Tribal Trust Lands, moving freely among the local population and real terrorists groups, gathering information which was passed on to the regional JOC. Fireforce troops would then respond to destroy these groups.

As the military situation worsened increasing demands were placed on the white Rhodesian civilian population. All white males were obliged to do national service in the armed forces. Initially this was for period of nine months but that increased to a year, then 18 months and then two years. After service they entered the reserve, being regularly called up to supplement the forces in an active front line role. By 1979 this had reached a point where civilians spent six weeks in their real jobs and then six weeks in uniform. This in itself brought the Rhodesian economy to the brink of disaster.

In the latter stages of the war the pressure on the Rhodesians was so intense that they threw caution to the wind and mounted numerous cross-border raids into neighbouring Mozambique and Zambia, intent on destroying the terrorist bases located there and thereby, it was hoped, destroying large bodies of terrorists before they could cross into Rhodesia. The success rates were stunning. On one raid into Mozambique 1200 terrorists were killed for the loss of one Rhodesian. International condemnation was swift, with claims that the Rhodesians were striking against refugee camps, despite the incontrovertible documentary evidence and huge quantities of military equipment seized by the Rhodesians. But despite such military successes there was little doubt that it was too little, too late.

Page 58 ZIPRA’s War Unlike ZANLA, Joshua N’komo’s ZIPRA forces were better equipped and trained, indeed it was training for a very different war to ZANLA. The father of African nationalism in Zimbabwe, N’komo was also a realist. He recognised that as the head of a minority tribal group – the Matabele roughly outnumbered 2:1 by the Mashona – he needed to play a smarter, longer game than Mugabe (who by 1974 had managed to oust Sithole and seize complete control of ZANU/ZANLA). His hope was that the Rhodesians and ZANLA would fight each other to the point of exhaustion, at which point he would intervene in a conventional military manner, invading the country from their bases in Zambia.

With this plan in place N’komo was prepared to sit on his hands for much of the conflict, building up a complete mechanised brigade, complete with T34 tanks, BTR-152s APCs, and a full complement of artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry. To that end ZIPRA deployed far fewer guerrilla forces in Rhodesia, and these were largely confined to their tribal areas where they were just as likely to fight ZANLA as the Rhodesians. Nevertheless it was ZIPRA forces that undertook two of the most shocking attacks of the war. In September 1978 Rhodesian Air Lines Viscount Hunyani was brought down by ZIPRA forces near Kariba using a surface to air missile. The survivors, all civilian holiday-makers, were then massacred by ZIPRA terrorists on the ground. A second Viscount, Umniati, was brought down in February 1979 in similar circumstances, this time all the passengers died in the crash. These horrific incidents undoubtedly played a significant part in destroying the morale of the white Rhodesians and their government.

The End When the end came in Rhodesia it was a combination of circumstances that caused it. Chiefly among these was the withdrawal of South African assistance. Pretoria was under intense pressure to end its support and, in the interest of self-preservation, they reached a point where they were prepared to make that sacrifice and pull the plug. Despite an internal political settlement, with Bishop Abel Muzorewa elected as the first Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, there had been no end to the war. The economy was in melt down, with so many whites leaving and white farms shut down for the duration of the conflict. On the nationalist side Mugabe’s ZANLA had suffered severe set-back from the Rhodesian cross-border raids that showed little sign of being called off. Indeed under Muzorewa these increased in an attempt to persuade the nationalists that continued war was pointless. The final straw, however, was the British refusal to recognise the Muzorewa regime, despite Margaret Thatcher’s promise to do so before her election victory in 1979. Had she done so many other nations were ready to fall into line and support the moderate pro-Western black government. She did not. The Lancaster House talks saw Mugabe and N’komo form a Patriotic Front for their duration, but when the agreed elections happened in Zimbabwe Mugabe fought on his own ticket, winning a majority under the eyes of a Commonwealth Monitoring Force. The results would be disastrous.

Wargaming the Rhodesian Bush War The war in Rhodesia offers the gamer plenty of opportunities, from small police tracker actions and ambushes up to cross-border raids with attacks on heavily fortified, well defended positions with armour, air and artillery support. A Fireforce action with stop positions and sweep lines makes a superb game. The range of troop types on both the government and the nationalist sides is also broad, from untrained civilians to some of the most professional soldiers in the world, so there should be something for everyone.

If the conflict is to be represented effectively it is important to model some of the key features of it. The following rules have been devised to do just that.

Blinds and their Limitations. The security forces may deploy one dummy blind for every four real blinds, this may be doubled if there are operating from helicopters. Terrorists may deploy one dummy blind for every real blind that they have. Only blinds that contain actual troops or Mujibas (see below) may spot. Dummy Blinds will not spot. A terrorist force will ordinarily have to deploy its dummy blinds within 24” of real units.

Bombshell. If under pressure and unable to escape as a single entity terrorist groups were inclined to split up and run in different directions, meeting later at a previously appointed rendezvous. The security forces described this as “bombshelling”. As a means of escape it meant that the Rhodesians were unlikely to be able to pursue all of the terrorists, thereby allowing some to escape.

Page 59 When bombshelling each terrorist group is replaced by three bombshell markers within 12” of its current location. These will then move on the Terrorist Blinds card using 3D6 movement whatever various routes they choose, towards a previously appointed table edge exit point, not stopping to engage the enemy. Blinds that are spotted during this process will be replaced by the relevant figures and may not return to blinds for the rest of the game.

Blinds or spotted figures that reach the bombshell exit point must leave the table immediately and will be considered to have escaped to fight again.

Men bombshelling may be shot at if spotted. If they take wounds from fire they will surrender. If they are not killed or wounded they will keep running.

Mine-Proof Vehicles. The Rhodesians pioneered the current generation of mine proof vehicles, developing a range of personnel carriers that were designed to protect life if a mine was detonated. Largely these vehicles, such as the Crocodile, the Cougar, Hyena, Kudu, Leopard, Puma and Rhino were without armament, but were proof against an explosion. Mine-proof vehicles that detonate a mine will roll 1D6. On a 1 the vehicle is immobilised and 1D6 hits on the crew are diced for. On 2-5 the vehicle is immobilised. On a 6 it may still move, but with -2 inches per dice.

These vehicles had the following capacity of troops.

Vehicle Men (Cab+Compartment) Cougar 1+5 Crocodile 2+12 Hyena 1+6 Kudu 4 or 6 Leopard 1+4 Puma 2+8 Rhino 1+6

Mine Detector Vehicles. The Rhodesians developed some strange looking mine detector vehicles that were universally named the “Pookie”. The earliest prototype was based on a VW Beetle engine attached to a low chassis with a high driving compartment. Four Formula 1 racing tyres were used to disperse the weight across the ground sufficiently, so that the vehicle could drive over landmines without detonating them. In between the front and rear wheels were mine detector plates that flapped down like wings and could find mines as it drove along at speeds of up to 40mph.

If a Pookie drives across a mine it will identify its presence. If it moves back across it the exact location will be identified. Roll 2D6. On a roll of 2 the Pookie will detonate the mine and will be unusable for the rest of the game.

Pseudo Operations. Due to information that Selous Scout teams in the area have provided the Rhodesian player may have between one and three attempts at spotting on the whole table. Each spot will cover an area 12” square and any Terrorists in that area will be placed on blinds on the table. Any dummy blinds are removed.

Mujiba. Terrorist groups would use young African boys, often those herding flocks, as a reconnaissance force. If they believed that the security forces may be in the area these boys would be tasked with finding them and reporting back. Mujiba may be represented using blinds or civilian figures. Security forces will not shoot Mujibas unless they are with the terrorists, in which case they are considered as terrs.

Ordinarily a mujiba should be removed from the game once he spots a Rhodesian unit.

Civilians. Unfortunately countless civilians were caught up in the war, and often found themselves in the direct firing line. The terrorists would often take whole classes from African schools to cross the border to be indoctrinated and trained as fighters. The Security forces were often called out to rescue these children.

Page 60 Army units may shoot civilians if they are with terrorists, they are officially considered “running with terrorists” and are considered fair game. Clearly they will avoid this if their objective is to rescue the civilians. Police units should make some attempt to avoid civilian casualties where they can. Where firing is on a mixed group of civilians and terrorists any hits will be divided proportionately between the two groups with any odd numbers being on the terrorists.

Nowhere to Hide. The Rhodesian forces must attempt to kill or capture all of the terrorists. If a Rhodesian unit sees even one terrorist near them they must attempt to kill or capture him unless they can also see a larger group which is of greater priority.

Page 61

The Rhodesians deployed a mix of Army and Police units throughout the war. Initially the whole affair was treated as a police action, however by 1972 it had become clear that this was a war, and military operational areas were formed. The Army was a mix of regular and National Service troops, with whites and coloured Rhodesians being obliged to register for military service at the age of 16. Black Rhodesians only served as volunteers, having no legal obligation for service.

In the broadest terms, the National Service troops of the Rhodesia Regiment provided static troops for positional defence and limited patrolling. The Police were the eyes and ears on the ground, tasked with gathering information as well as maintaining law and order. The Police Anti-Terrorist Unit, with its local farmers and trackers was an excellent conduit for such information at the lowest level. Special Branch and CID took on increasingly anti-terrorist roles, and they worked closely with the Army’s pseudo-ops regiment, the Selous Scouts.

The regular troops of the Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Rhodesian African Rifles were there as react troops, available for Fireforce duties when terrorist gangs were identified. They also undertook major operations, such as large area sweeps, providing both the manpower for the stop positions and the sweep line. Greys Scouts, the Rhodesian Army’s only mounted regiment, provided mounted troops for long range patrols.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Rhodesia Regiment 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8 Rhodesian Light Infantry/RAR Fireforce - 1 - 2, 3, 4 Rhodesian African Rifles/Greys Scouts 1, 2 3 4, 5 6, 7, 8 Rhodesian African Rifles “Go Large” 1, 2, 3 4 5, 6, 7 8, 9, 10 BSAP PATU or Support Unit 1 - 2 3, 4, 5 Selous Scouts/SAS sticks - - 1 2, 3, 4 Int Af/Guard Force 1, 2, 3, 4 5 6, 7 8 Selous Scout Pseudo Gang 1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8, 9, 10 Generic Four Man Stick 1 - 2 3, 4 Notes. The RLI four man stick is an extremely odd unit to model in IABSM. What I have done is used the TW&T weapons team model. With TW&T the small size of the four and five man sections means that their commanding Big Man should be counted towards their strength in combat, so a stick with one Big Man and three riflemen counts as a four man stick.

TW&T Rating Rhodesia Regiment troops should be considered Average Troops. The RLI, SAS and Selous Scouts are Elite. RAR are Good troops, as are the BSAP Support Unit and PATU. All of these are armed with a mixture of FN FAL rifles (some Territorials had the British SLR), the Belgian FN MAG GPMG, rebored Bren guns, and the odd pump action shotgun. They should be considered as using Assault Rifles. Internal Affairs and Guard Force troops are Green and are largely armed with Lee Enfield bolt action rifles.

The Fireforce sticks of four men will always operate as a single fire team using the MG42 team as their basic model. Other units may breakdown into fireteams as they see fit.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

RLI, SAS, Selous Scouts, RAR, PATU, Support Unit D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Page 62 Rhodesia Regiment, Greys Scouts D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Guard Force, Internal Affairs D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a stick of RLI, SAS or RAR reach a point where they have twice as many wounds as men they will retire 6”.

When a section of Rhodesia Regiment or BSAP reach a point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a Guard Force/Internal Affairs section has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft Rhodesia Regiment and RLI units normally have a fieldcraft rating of 0. RAR units may have a fieldcraft of 1, BSAP units anything from 1 to 3 (PATU always at least 2). Guard Force units may have a fieldcraft rating of 1 or 2. Any unit may have a tracker attacked. Some Kalahari bushmen were employed for their superb tracking abilities and would always be brought in to assist units like the RLI on a major sweep operation.

Rhodesian Organisation Rhodesian forces were originally organised on the British model, and for some units this remained the case throughout the conflict. The RAR, as a regular unit, tended to be well supplied with good quality troops and could regularly field forty man platoons or 140 man companies for larger operations; the eight or ten man section and the four man stick is presented above.

In the field operational realities dictated certain changes. The four man payload of the Allouette III helicopter made it imperative that RLI and then RAR troops on Fireforce duties were organised as a four man team with one MAG and three FNs. This structure worked well and was kept by the RLI even when deploying in larger sized forces on operations such as sweeps. This was also adopted by other units who served in Fireforce duties, such as some of the Rhodesia Regiment Independent Companies and PATU sticks. For these forces the generic four man stick ratings should be used.

Greys Scouts, a mounted regiment, was formed on the standard model of two Squadrons, each of three sabre troops. Each troop was made up of three eight man sections with the troopers largely armed with the FN FAL or the shorter folding stock AK47 or variant thereof. The FN MAG was the standard GPMG, although this was not practical in the field so its use was variable. For TW&T the section was split down into two four man teams, each led by an experienced tracker. Indeed the purpose of Greys Scouts was largely one of patrolling, two weeks in the field at a time, or fast follow-up on spoor.

The example on the next page shows the organisation of a Rhodesian Light Infantry Commando on a Fireforce Operation. Commanded by a Major with a Captain as his second in command, he would have four Troops under him, each one of seven four-man sticks. A stick could be commanded by anything from a Senior Trooper to a Lieutenant.

In the example shown a Fireforce is operating with five helicopters. It would undoubtedly be called out due to solid information about the presence of terrorist forces, often provided by Selous Scout teams operating in tribal areas. The K-car would be the first to arrive in the operational area, identifying Landing Zones for the troop carrying Allouette III G-Cars. The force would then deploy into stop positions before returning to their base to collect the next wave. Depending on the size of the operation these may be deployed as further stops, or they could form the sweep line.

Page 63 K-Car One Allouette III with door Lynx mounted 20mm cannon Ground attack Reims-Cessna F337 Fireforce commander Rockets and Frantan (napalm)

G-Car One Allouette III One four man stick

G-Car One Allouette III One four man stick

G-Car One Allouette III One four man stick

G-Car One Allouette III One four man stick

The K-Car remained over the area at all times, with the commander controlling his forces from an elevated position and also controlling where the firepower from the 20mm cannon is used and where the Lynx, if it was available, could provide close support. With a large operation it may be that C47 ParaDaks would be used to bring in four or five sticks at a time, in which case the Fireforce commander would instruct them where to drop the parachutists, often some distance away with the G-Cars then ferrying them into position. Alternatively they may deploy straight from the jump into a sweep line.

In 1978 the Rhodesians introduced the Allouette Dalmation K-Car with quad mounted 0.303 machine guns. This never replaced the original K-Car with its 20mm cannon as the command platform for the Fireforce, but added a huge amount of firepower when added as a pure gunship that operated at lower altitude and was able to concentrate on its prime function; killing.

The emphasis was on surrounding the enemy, covering any possible lines of retreat with stop positions and sweeping the terrorists onto them. Captures were sought by the intelligence services who were constantly looking for information and more captives to ‘turn’ and join the Selous Scouts, however on the ground few were made. In close terrain any possible enemy was shot at rather than capture attempted.

The Rhodesians had armoured support in the shape of the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment which fielded Ferret armoured cars, later supplemented with South African Eland 90 (AML 90) armoured cars which it used to great effect on external operations. In October 1979, with the threat of ZIPRA mounting a conventional assault on the country the South Africans provided some T55 tanks which had been seized when a ship carrying Libyan arms to Mozambique mistakenly docked at Durban instead. These were never used in anger, but were ready to implement the aborted Operation Quartz, the attack on ZANU/ZANLA after the elections.

The Rhodesian 1st Field Regiment was equipped with two batteries, one of 105mm howitzers, the other of 25 pounder guns of WWII vintage. Both had six guns each and were used on cross-border operations.

When on cross-border operations the Rhodesians made lavish use of captured communist bloc weaponry, often mounted on softskin vehicles, such as the Unimog. 82mm Recoilless rifles, 120mm mortars, 14.5mm AA guns, 12.7mm MGs, not to mention the ubiquitous RPG 7. Their own 0.50 cal Brownings were also deployed on vehicles for this more conventional type of operation.

Page 64 The British South Africa Police, the historic title of the Rhodesian Police, played a major role in the conflict, working very closely with the army, to the layman they would be utterly indistinguishable, in camouflage uniform and armed with FNs and MAGs. The Police Anti Terrorist Unit, sticks of four or five men, usually whites with one African tracker (very often a senior employee of one of the farmers and a trusted member of his extended family) provided much of the localised information on the ground, operating in the areas in which they lived and knowing the local black population intimately.

The BSAP Support Unit was organised into twelve Company sized units of around 120 men under an Inspector or Chief Inspector. These were then broken down into Troops (The British South Africa Company Police were originally a mounted force, so the term “trooper” or “troopie” was used as a generic description of all Rhodesian servicemen) of 35 men. Below the troop were sections of five men operating under the more experienced Constables or Lance Sergeants. These units could act as individual section or, on major operations, the whole company would deploy. They were almost indistinguishable from Army units, excepting the BSAP epaulette flash. The following diagram shows a Company of the BSAP Support Unit.

Company HQ Inspector Two 60mm mortar teams

Troop One Platoon Two Seven rifle sections (5 Constables each) Seven rifle sections (5 Constables each)

Platoon Three Seven rifle sections (5 Constables each) The Rhodesian Air Force was well equipped by 1950’s standards, but still managed to pack a significant punch throughout the war, intimidating far better equipped neighbouring air forces by their aggressive tactics and reputation for accuracy. The main strike aircraft was the Hawker Hunter with the elderly Vampire largely retired but brought out of mothballs for some very large cross-border operations. The English Electric Canberra was the main bomber and the C47 Dakota the chief transport plane. A range of light aircraft were deployed in reconnaissance roles, the Hunting Percival Provost, the Aermacchi AL60-B2l Trojans, Britten-Norman Islander and SIAI Marchetii Genet, being primary. As mentioned already the Reims Cessna FTB 337G Lynx was used for Fireforce close support, eighteen having been purchased in 1976 for a “Spanish Fishing Company” in order to avoid sanctions. An additional three planes arrived at the end of 1977 purchased, according to their documentation, by the “Panamanian Coast Guard”.

Big Men For IABSM a Rhodesian force should have one Big Man per wave of three or four sticks or ParaDak load of four or five sticks when on Fireforce duties and one more for the Fireforce commander. More traditional eight or ten man section structures should have two Big Men per platoon and one further one for the Company commander. A Guard Force/Internal Affairs unit should have one Big Man for every four sections.

If using TW&T it is possible to dice for the strength of the component sections, although units operating in four man sticks would always be up to strength on operation (the Commandos were not, some were temporarily reduced to around ten men on occasions). One Big Man will be with each stick, or with each section if operating in a more traditional manner. A platoon or Troop commander will always be present and often a Senior NCO as well.

Rhodesian Big Men should be largely good, sometimes elite to represent the fact that they were a highly trained force with a long history of irregular warfare.

Page 65 Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Strike Speed Ferret scout Car Mk 2 3 7.62 Browning MG Wheeled Off-Road Eland 90 4 12 Wheeled Off-Road Mine Proof Vehicle 2 None Wheeled Pookie 2 None Wheeled

Force Characteristics

Fire Support. This should only be available on external operations in Mozambique or Zambia when an FOO card will always be present.

Rapid Deployment. This may be used for any motorised unit other than a Pookie mine detector vehicle.

Reconnaissance Force. An armoured force on cross-border operation may use this.

Petrol Shortage/Vehicle Breakdown. This may be used, especially on cross border operations. Refuelling may take place is a helicopter brings in fuel.

Machine Gun Bonus card. This may be used by any MG team in TW&T, including a four man stick. It is not relevant for IABSM.

Rally. Always in the deck for a regular Rhodesian Army or Police force.

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for a Guard Force unit whose fire discipline may be Poor.

Dynamic Commander. Any Rhodesian force may have a Dynamic Commander.

Heroic Leader. Any Rhodesian force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available with the senior Big Man acting as a FAC.

Death From Above. Always available when air support is present.

Page 66

The terrorist forces of both ZANU and ZAPU were part and parcel of their parent political organisations, and their deployment reflected the strategies that the two groups had devised. ZANLA spent the war focussing on ensuring that the African population provided them with the logistical support they needed to exist inside Rhodesia and mount attacks against its economy. ZIPRA was more interested in deploying men inside Matabeleland in order to protect their own tribe, especially in the late 1970’s when ZANLA were infiltrating that area and stripping it bare of supplies.

The military structure of the organisations differed only in high level detail, on the ground they operated with what they had and could acquire. Operating from Mozambique ZANLA used the provinces in which they were based to differentiate the three main command groups. The Tete province supported the Nehanda, Chaminuka, Takawira and Chitepo Sectors. Manica Province supported the Tangwena, Monomatapa and Musikavanha Sectors, and Gaza Province in the south supported Sectors One to Four. They also had a Zambia Province which was shut down when ZANU were expelled from that country and a Botswana Province which was never activated as the Botswanan government refused to house terrorist bases.

For ZIPRA the whole of Rhodesia was split into Six Regions. Northern Front was comprised of Regions one to three, these bordered Zambia and were roughly in line with Victoria Falls, Lake Kariba and then the Zambian border along the Zambezi up to Mozambique. The Southern Front also had three regions, Region One was from Salisbury to Umtali, Region Two in the inhospitable area around the Gona-re-zhou national park and Three from Beit Bridge up to Bulawayo. Of these they operated in all of the Northern Regions and only Region Three in the South.

The best way to describe the two types of terrorist is to split them into military or political headings. The former were trained in military tactics, the latter in terror. ZIPRA are more likely to be Military, ZANLA are almost exclusively Political.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Military Terrorists 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8 Political Terrorists 1, 2, 3, 4 5 6, 7 8

TW&T Rating Terrorist groups are capable of breaking down into fire teams. The AK47 or variant should be considered an Assault Rifle, the LMG as the DPM or DPD. Military terrorists should be treated as Average, Political Terrorists as Green. An RPG-7 will often be present with a section with up to two reloads.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Military Terrorists D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Political Terrorists D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead Morale When a section of Political Terrorists reach the point where they have more wounds than men remaining they will immediately bombshell.

When a section of Military Terrorists reach the point where they have three more wounds than men they will immediately bombshell.

Fieldcraft Terrorists may have Fieldcraft ratings of 1 to 2.

Page 67 Terrorist Forces ZANLA was organised by Province, each one having its own command structure and below them the command group for each of the Sectors. Under that were Detachments and then Sections at the lowest level. Military titles were not used, at each level of command the unit was replicated with an overall Commander, a Political Commissar, a Security Officer, Logistics Officer and Medical Officer. These would have their title prefixed with their level of command, so a Detachment Commander would command a detachment, Section Commander a section. Only at section level were the last two dropped in favour of the armed terrorists who ensured the security of the section.

ZIPRA had its military high command under which were the Front Command at a rear area base in Zambia. The Regional command was supposedly based inside Rhodesia under which a Zone command controlled a number of Zone sections. Within the Zone section were three units, each supposedly made up of a Commander, Deputy Commander, Commissar, Deputy Commissar, Logistics Officer, Security Officer, Medical Officer and three soldiers.

Frankly those structures seem a staggering display of wishful thinking. Far more likely on both sides is a ten man group operating under a commander with a commissar and the rest being rank and file. To suggest a logistics officer is somewhat laughable as the terrorists took what food they needed from the African population. They had no medical officers and security seems an amorphous title that meant nothing in reality.

For both ZANLA and ZIPRA in IABSM or TW&T the force should be based on units of eight to twelve terrorists. They normally operated in smaller groups when in their designated area of operation, in larger groups when infiltrating into or out of the country for reasons of security when passing through the border region where Security Force presence was most prominent. As an indication, groups of 20 to 30 were everyday events, 30 to 50 less likely, 50 to 60 very unusual, 60 to 100 were very rare until late in the war.

Whilst ZIPRA collected sufficient armoured vehicles to field a small Armoured Brigade it was never used in anger. If you wish to field T34s and BTR 152s then their stats may be found in the section on South West Africa. ZIPRA were in possession of the Strela 2 anti-aircraft system from 1977 onwards, although numbers were limited.

When in bases in Zambia and Mozambique the terrorists may be equipped with some heavy weapons

Big Men A Political Terrorist force should have one Big Man for the entire force. Military terrorists may have one per three groups.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the British squad model in the main TW&T rules. For a poor force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Military Terrorists should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men.

Force Characteristics

Rapid Deployment. The Rhodesians reckoned that the terrorists could move at 500m per minute when fleeing from the sound of approaching helicopters, so this card should usually be present.

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any Terrorist force whose fire discipline may be Poor.

Dynamic Commander. Any Military Terrorist force may have a Dynamic Commander.

B’Maso! Always available for a Terrorist Force.

Page 68

“I estimate we've killed 30,000 of these animals already. There are perhaps 100,000 of them in revolt, and we intend to kill every one of them when the dry season starts late in May." Portuguese Officer, Interviewed for Time Magazine, April 1961.

Portugal was unique among the colonial powers in almost every respect. Firstly she had been present for five hundred years, establishing bases in Guinea Bissau in 1446, Angola in 1482 and Mozambique in 1498. Secondly her system of rule was significantly more open to black Africans than those of the other colonial powers. Under what the Portuguese saw as a their civilising mission in Africa there were established mechanisms for black citizens to achieve the same rights as whites, although the level of education required to achieve this was not available to many Africans away from the Europeanised coastal areas. That said the Portuguese colonies had introduced laws on racial equality as far back as the seventeenth century.

Portugal, under the right wing dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar’s Estada Novo, avoided involvement in the Second World War, but despite this she could not hide from the realpolitik of the post war period. She was a founder member of NATO in 1948, but this did not protect her from the machinations of the Cold War or the anti-colonial stance of the United Nations. By the late 1950’s the small independence movements in her African colonies were beginning to get financial and military support from the two super-powers.

Angola In January 1961 a strike over pay and conditions by African workers in the Malanje province provided the spark that began the battle for independence. With anger boiling over the strikers attacked Portuguese civilians. The response was immediate, with villages being bombed by the air force. In response a police station and prison were stormed in Luanda by militants of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) resulting in the death of seven policemen and forty attackers. The backlash by the Portuguese civilian population that followed was shocking, with indiscriminate killings of the black population in slum areas of the capital where the MPLA had its base of urban intellectual Marxists. The military were equally quick to respond, sweeping the area around Luanda for any militants, forcing the MPLA to retreat northeast into the Dembos Region where they established the 1st Military Region.

On March the 15th of that year a more serious threat to Portuguese rule arrived in the shape of the União das Populações de Angola (UPA). A force of 5,000 militants led by Holden Roberto (interestingly he was the brother-in-law of Congolese General Mobutu) and using arms supplied by the United States crossed the border from the Congo where, since that country’s independence, they had been training in camps. Attacking anything associated with Portuguese rule they killed over 1000 whites and unknown numbers of Africans and formed the Zona Sublevada do Norte, the Rebel Zone of the North, in the provinces of Zaire, Uige and Cuanza Norte.

This success was, however, to be short-lived. In September a large military sweep of the north destroyed the UPA bases and forced them back across the border into the Congo. This was to form a pattern for African Wars from that point on, with the nationalist organisations seeking safe havens in friendly states from which to attack their opponents. 1961 also saw another milestone when the UPA captured 21 MPLA prisoners and exectued them, sparking off the internecine conflict that was to tear Angola apart for nearly forty years.

Page 69 In 1962 Agostinho Neto took control of the MPLA whilst the UPA changed its name to the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), both were active in seeking foreign funding and arms, in 1965 Neto met with Che Guevara and received assistance from Cuba, East Germany, the Soviet Union and, in 1970, China. The FNLA were funded largely by the USA but with additional assistance from Israel as the two parties lined up with the Cold War rivals. Militarily the two organisations were relatively ineffective during the bulk of the 1960s. The FNLA preferred to sit and wait in the Congo rather than confront the Portuguese, whereas the MPLA did attempt to take the war to their opponents, opening up their “Eastern Front” in 1966 with bases in Zambia. Unfortunately for them the Eastern provinces were a long way from their urban support base around Luanda and they were regularly routed by the Portuguese Army thanks to information from the African population.

Inactivity within the FNLA ranks led to much frustration and in 1966 the party split, with Jonas Savimbi, Roberto’s Foreign Minister, forming União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and opening bases in Zambia. Here they received Chinese support and undertook a number of attacks on the Benguela railway. This was somewhat naiive as that was the route used by Zambia (since its borders with Rhodesia were closed) to send its copper to the sea. Any interruptions to that service had significant financial implications for their hosts, and in 1968 UNITA was expelled from Zambia. Without external support a rump of only around 500 UNITA supporters were to base themselves in the south of Angola where their main military intentions seemed to be to fight the MPLA and FNLA who were also expending more energy on this fratricidal struggle than confronting the Portuguese.

By the start of the 1970s things were hotting up in Angola. The MPLA began to form company sized units with integral support weapons and take on Portuguese outposts. This escalation saw the Army conduct extensive sweeps that again destroyed the MPLA’s camps and disrupted their activities in most of Angola. In the west the entire MPLA “Eastern Front” collapsed when the Portuguese deployed troops in a major offensive, sweeping through that area. Neto retreated with only 800 men into the Republic of the Congo (the former French colony to the North of the former Belgian Congo). The result was a power struggle within the MPLA which resulted in the Soviet Union ending its support and China switching its support to the FNLA which, clearly without popular backing, had ceased to enjoy US funding.

By now it was obvious that Portugal was winning the war in Angola, her opponents were divided, defeated and unable to present any serious challenge to the 55,000 men that Army had deployed. Indeed Angola had been enjoying an economic boom throught the period of the war and an influx of settlers from Portugal seeking a better life. This, combined with the general support that the authorities enjoyed from the African population was sufficient to ensure that Portugal could retain power in the overseas province, although foreign aid, arms and sanctuary did mean that they unlikely to ever completely eliminate the rebel threat.

Page 70 Even the Soviet Union was grasping the fact that their prescribed plan of insurgency was failing in Angola. They then turned their attention on Portugal where the Communist Party was actively infiltrating the association of Army Officers whose young officers were tiring of the ceaseless war. The result was Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution” of 1974 which suddenly saw the new government ready to withdraw from its African posessions. Suddenly the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA were back in business as the only serious opposition movements and involved in negotiations with the transitional Portuguese government. In July 1974 the three leaders, Neto, Roberto and Savimbi, met in Zaire (formerly the Congo) and agreed to negotiate as one group. The following month they declared that they would stop fighting each other.

On November the 11th 1975 the Portuguese withdrew from the newly independent nation of Angola. What was to follow was Civil War.

Guinea Bissau Set on the coast of West Africa the Portuguese had had a trading post there since 1446, predominantly used for the slave trade until the nineteenth century. Typically much of the interior was left alone until the late 19thC, indeed the Bijagos islands were not subjugated until the 1930’s.

In 1956 the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was formed to oppose Portuguese Rule. The first clash with the authorities came in 1959 when a strike by dock workers at Bissau was suppressed violently by the police with fifty workers killed, and in 1960 it was decided that the group should prepare for an armed struggle. To achieve this they set up a base in neighbouring Guinea from where, in 1963, they launched their military campaign.

Attacks were made across the province against police and army bases, resulting in a major influx of Portuguese personnel who assumed a largely defensive posture, simply holding the line and allowing the rebels to operate in the inhospitable jungle. By 1967 this had resulted in the PAIGC controlling two-thirds of the territory, albeit the unproductive parts. This was to change with the arrival of General Antonio de Spinola in 1968. The new commander undertook a major policy of infrastructure works; roads, schools, and hospitals were built as part of a hearts and minds campaign. He combined this with an aggressive military policy that began to drive the PAIGC out of the province. Portuguese forces, now 28,000 strong, even raided the PAIGC base in Guinea where they rescued hundreds of Portuguese Prisoners of War who were held there. This cross-border raid rather backfired as it escalated the conflict, with Soviet assistance now arriving for the rebels. The United Nations recognised the PAIGC as the government of Guinea Bissau in September of 1974, despite the fact that the Portuguese were still controlling most of the province and were winning an increasing number of battles against the rebel forces. Indeed the fact that the PAIGC had its own internal problems had been revealed in January 1973 when its leader, Amilcar Cabral, was assasinated by a party member.

Yet for all the UN’s machinations it was the 1974 coup in Lisbon that gave Guinea Bissau its independence, the Portuguese leaving on the 11th November 1975. Tragically thousands of African and mixed race troops who had fought with the Portuguese were massacred by the PAIGC and their bodies disposed of in mass graves.

Mozambique The Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) was formed in June 1962 at Dar es Salaam in neighbouring Tanzania with a merging of several smaller anti-colonial organisations of disparate political leanings and retained its headquateres there throughout the armed struggle. Base camps were also formed near the border from where insurgents could be trained and then operate. Advisors were supplied by Russia, Cuba and East Germany to assist with creating a military force.

Initially FRELIMO’s objective was to used armed force to persuade the African population to support them in calling for Independence rather than directly confronting the Portuguese Army, however the failure of exploratory negotiations in 1964 persuaded the leadership under Eduardo Mondlane that this would not be sufficient. On the 25th of September 1964 an attack was launched against the Portuguese Administration Centre at Chai Chai in the Cabo Delgado province. This was the first of a series of scattered hit and run attacks by small groups of lightly armed FRELIMO groups with the purpose of dispersing the Portuguese forces.

The success of these attacks allowed FRELIMO the luxury of volunteers which in turn allowed them to increase the size of their operating units in the field. Whereas in 1964 a typical FRELIMO unit would be a

Page 71 dozen men, by 1966 groups of one hundred strong were not unusual. Indeed by 1967 one fifth of Mozambique was in FRELIMO hands and they had 8000 guerrillas in the field.

Portugal, as in Guinea Bissau, responded with a range of social projects, schools, hospitals, roads, culminating in the massive Cabora Bassa Dam and hydro-electric plant that was started in 1969. The military commander, General Antonio Augusto dos Santos began applying the latest counter-insurgency tactics, with all black units undertaking tracking and covert operations, and even inviting the Rhodesians to deploy troops in the Tete province which neighboured their north western border.

In February 1969 Mondlane was assassinated with a bomb. This was rumoured to be due to his rather too conservative outlook, indeed FRELIMO had experienced some problems with various tribal groups that were keen to promoted a Mozambican society based on historical tribal structures rather than the socialist model, and this was a culmination of the conflict within the party. Whatever the reasons Samora Machel, who was firmly in the pro-Soviet camp, took power as part of a ruling triumvirate, and within a year was in sole charge.

While this was going on the Portuguese were proving that they essentially misunderstood the situation in Mozambique. Large sweeps that had been successful in Angola were less so here. Enemy camps were destroyed, munitions captured, but this was generally as a result of FRELIMO falling back wherever the Portuguese applied pressure and striking where they were absent. Operation Gordion Knot that ran for seven months in 1970 was a case in point. With 35,000 Portuguese troops deployed across huge swathes of the northern provinces FRELIMO losses were limited to hundreds, minimal when compared with the cost of the operation. Portuguese claims to have liberated areas were only valid for as long as they garrisoned them; when they left FRELIMO would return.

By 1972 the Portuguese had shifted from a US model based on Vietnam to a British model based on Malaya and Kenya. Protected villages, Aldeamentos, were built, civilian populations were relocated for their own protection and to remove the logistical support that they could provide for the rebels. Units of black Flecha anti-terrorist warfare specialist troops were utilised on long range patrols that impressed even the Rhodesian SAS operators who would sometimes accompany them. But despite 60,000 Portuguese troops in the country it was largely too late. The various tribes had already formed their allegiances one way or another, and whilst some saw relocation and protection as a positive thing others rebelled against it.

On the 9th of November 1972 FRELIMO launched a major offensive into the Tete province, leading to direct confrontation with the Portuguese. The civilian population was now caught up in the fighting. Massacres occurred on both sides as regular troops were again deployed on large sweeps but failed to achieve the success that they thought they deserved. For FRELIMO their previous policy of not harming the Portuguese population came to an end. Machel’s declared intent was to foster “panic, demoralisation, abandonment and futility” among the white population. Indeed the liberal use of land-mines by FRELIMO was very effective in promoting just that.

FRELIMO had achieved what the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA had failed to do; mount a coherent campaign of guerrilla warfare against the

Page 72 Portuguese. Their success can largely be put down to the fact that they were one united organisation that was not tied up with internal conflict. They were never going to win the war in Mozambique through military strength, however they did succeed in inflicting losses on the Portuguese that were unknown in Angola. FRELIMO’s successes struck at the morale of the Portuguese conscripts who had no real desire to fight a war many thousands of miles from home, and with two other wars being fought at the same time, in Angola and Guinea Bissau, resources were very short.

Like Portugal’s other wars the end in Mozambique came not with victory for either side, but a change of regime in Lisbon heralding a withdrawal from Empire. A ceasefire was agreed in September 1974 and then independence followed in June of 1975.

Wargaming Portugal’s African Wars Portugal’s three wars give the player a wide range of gaming opportunities, many quite different, reflecting Portuguese solutions to African military problems. The range of troop types available and the various missions that were undertaken provide some interesting contrasts, from large scale sweeps with IABSM and small scale tracker or outpost actions with TW&T.

If the conflict is to be represented effectively it is important to model some of the key features of it. The following rules have been devised to do just that.

Blinds & their Limitations. Portuguese forces will generally deploy one dummy blind for every four real blinds, however Flecha units may double that. Angolan rebel forces will have one dummy blind per three real ones, with PAIGC and FRELIMO getting one dummy per two real. Only blinds that contain actual troops may spot. Dummy Blinds will not spot. A rebel force will ordinarily have to deploy its dummy blinds within 24” of real units.

Mine Detection Whilst some lucky Portuguese units had electronic mine detection equipment this was unusual. This was particularly problematic as almost all of the roads in Portuguese Africa were un-surfaced. The normal method of mine detection was for a party of eight engineers to walk along the road in front of any vehicles, four in each wheel rut, prodding the ground with a long stick with a pointed end called a pica. When operating in this fashion the Pesquizadors with their picas move with 2D6. When crossing a mine the group identifies it on a 3-6 on a D6. The test for this should be rolled secretly or once the first vehicle gets to it. It will then take one whole move not under fire to remove it.

The Portuguese also developed at least one “mine-crasher” vehicle, a hybrid Unimog with Berliet truck parts that pushed heavy roller before it with the purpose of detonating any mines in advance of a column. It seems that even when this was deployed it was used behind the Pica carrying engineers to catch the ones they missed. If this is deployed then it will do just that; the heavy lead rollers will detonate anything without need for a roll. If any infantry are within 3” then they take one hit.

Flecha Operations. Flecha units were deployed in Angola and Mozambique. Made up of loyal Africans and former rebels who now fought for the Portuguese, these units would often disguise themselves as rebels. They were paid a bounty for any enemy killed or captured, so they were likely to take on their opponents when they met them rather than pass the information of their whereabouts.

Flechas were noted for their tireless strength when on operation. They would attempt to get in close and engage their enemy at close quarters, using their firepower and surprise to overcome them. A Flecha unit will have a Flecha card in the deck which it may use as either a Rapid Deployment or Reconnaissance Force card. Alternatively it may use it to ambush an enemy at close range, opening fire at full effect even if they have already moved this turn, but that deployed or on a blind. Such an ambush will double the number of wounds inflicted on the target unit.

Macho, Macho Man. The Rhodesians who operated with Portuguese troops were astounded by the audacity of their attacks. Even conscript troops would rush forward to engage the enemy at close quarters, often breaking their morale when doing so. Any Portuguese force can have this card, although it us more likely that better trained units will be more conscious of their training than their machismo so it could be restricted to Caçadores. This card is effectively an Uhraaaah card as seen in the main rules. It may be used only once in a game, but when it is any rebel units receiving the charge will add 1D6 wounds to their current state, retiring before the charge if their morale breaks.

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The troops in their African possessions were, for the most part, National Service conscripts who served between two and four years with the colours, some of which was normally overseas. The normal unit seen was the Caçadores Battalion, made up of men assembled from a range of Regiments for their duration of service in Africa. This was not an ideal starting point for engendering esprit de corps, and there were significant morale problems as a result. Whereas a metropolitan Portuguese infantry battalion was made up of three rifle companies of three platoons, a support platoon and an HQ body, in Africa this was altered to have four combat groups with specialist troops, such as Engineers and trackers, attached at that level.

In broad terms the Caçadores did the donkey work in the field, patrolling and sweeping, whilst elite forces were brought in if a rebel force was identified. These units were the Para-quedista, Commando and Fuzileiro units that would normally be inserted by air to deal with an identified threat. The Portuguese turned to horse mounted units, the Drãgoes, to patrol long distances in the bush, and a range of para- military support units were deployed for a range of duties, from defending the Aldeamento protected villages to keeping roads open for convoys.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Caçadores 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8 Para-quedista sections 1,2 3 4, 5 6, 7, 8 Para-quedista or Commando teams 1 2 3 4, 5 Drãgoes 1, 2, 3 - 4 5, 6 Flecha team 1, 2 3, 4 5, 6, 7 8, 9, 10 Grupo Especiais 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9

TW&T Rating Caçadores and Drãgoes should be considered Average Troops. The Commando and paras as Good troops as are Flechas. These are armed with a mixture of G3 and FN FAL rifles. The standard section machine gun was the German MG42 made under license and later, after 1968, the HK21. Troops would also have access to the 60mm and 81mm mortar, and the bazooka, all of which would be easily transported as long as the Portuguese troops stayed on or near the roads. Some Grupo Especiais had older bolt action rifles and should be considered Green.

The Commando and Para-quedista five man teams may operate as a single fire team using the MG42 team as their basic model. Other units may breakdown into fireteams as they see fit.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Commandos and Para-quedista D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Caçadores, Drãgoes and Flechas D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Grupo Especiais D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a stick of Commandos and Para-quedista reach a point where they have twice as many wounds as men they will retire 6”.

Page 74 When a section of Caçadores, Drãgoes and Flechas reach a point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a Grupo Especiais section has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft Caçadores normally have a fieldcraft rating of 0. Drãgoes may have a fieldcraft of 1 as their primary role was to patrol and spot for signs of incursions, Flecha units may have anything from 1 to 3. The Army did form Pisteiros sections of trackers who may be either rated as 2 or 3.

Portuguese Organisation Portuguese forces were organised specifically for their service in Africa with much latitude for ad hoc adjustments in the field. Primarily a combat group would be made up of three platoons, each having three sections of eight men. Attached would be Engineers and any support weapons required for their current mission. Transport was, more often than not, provided by the ubiquitous UNIMOG 4x 4 truck, with Berliet lorries, Austin Gipsys and Landrovers plentiful. In metropolitan Portugal a battalion would have a support platoon of three 60mm mortars, three MG42 equipped for sustained fire and three 57mm recoilless rifles. As the companies tended to operate independently in Africa these support weapons could be present anywhere in the organisation in the field.

The mounted Drãgoe Squadron had three platoons, each with two sections of twenty four men. Each section was split into two Esquadras of two “trios” each. A support section had one MMG and three rifle grenadiers.

The elite units found that their structure was often dictated by their role. In Portuguese service the Alouette III helicopter was considered to have a payload of five men (interestingly one more than the Rhodesians allowed) and as these special force units were more often than not deployed in that manner their organised themselves appropriately.

In 1964 the first commando units were organised into twenty five man units, represented below.

Command Team Commander, signaller, Medic, two riflemen

Manoeuvre Team One One Allouette III One five man team

Manoeuvre Team Two One Allouette III One five man team

Manoeuvre Team Three One Allouette III One five man team

Back Up team One Allouette III NCO, two man RPG team, Two riflemen

Page 75 Within a year of the unit forming it was seen that larger, company sized formations, were needed. This resulted in a Light or Heavy company option. The Light company had four commandoes of four teams each, 80 men total, presumably dropping the back-up team. The Heavy company had five commandos of five groups each, those organised as above.

Grupos Especiais were normally twenty-seven men strong with one officer and a sergeant, with three sections of nine men each. Flecha units were normally deployed in platoon strength, so roughly three ten man sections.

Para-quedista units were either deployed by C54 Skymaster aircraft or Nord Noratlas transport planes, however increasingly they too took on a heliborne role, adapting their formation to the 25 man teams used by the commandos. In support of these airborne troops the Portuguese deployed the Alouette III gunship with a 20mm cannon mounted in the port side door. The Air Force flew a wide range of planes, some elderly but all effective. These included the T-6, B-26, PV-20, F-84, F-86, Fiat G91. Latterly some SA 330 Puma helicopters were deployed but there is little information on what impact these had.

Artillery support was provided by 105mm howitzer, 25 pounders, 5.5” howitzers and 75mm Field guns. The armoured forces deployed were Daimler Scout cars with additional superstructure added, Panhard AML 90 armoured cars, Ferrets, the old Fox Armoured Car (the Canadian model based on the Humber Mk IV, not the 1970s British Ferret replacement), and the Panhard EBR 75. There is some talk of M5A1 Stuarts being deployed in small numbers, but I have been unable to confirm this.

Big Men For IABSM a Portuguese force should have one Big Man per platoon normally, with two per commando or para-quedista twenty-five man force.

If using TW&T it is possible to dice for the strength of the component sections, although units operating in five man teams would always be up to strength on operation. One Big Man will be with each team and a commander and senior NCO will always be present as well for these elite forces.

Portuguese Big Men will normally count as Average, although the Drãgoes and good Portuguese troops will have good leadership, even elite with the airborne units.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Strike Speed Ferret scout Car Mk 2 3 7.62 Browning MG Wheeled Panhard AML 90 4 12 Wheeled Daimler Scout Car 3 None Wheeled Bravia Chaimite 4 0.50 cal HMG Wheeled EBR 75 4 9 Wheeled Fox Armoured Car 3 0.50 cal HMG Wheeled

Force Characteristics

Fire Support. This may be present as a preliminary stonk prior to a major sweep operation.

Rapid Deployment. This should be included for Drãgoes

Reconnaissance Force. An armoured force may use this.

Vehicle Breakdown. This will be present for any truck mounted force.

Machine Gun Bonus card. This may be used by any tripod mounted MG or vehicle mounted HMG.

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for a Grupos Especiais unit whose fire discipline may be Poor. Some newly arrived Caçadores may suffer from the same, but that should be unusual.

Hesitant Commander. This should be present for a Caçadores force.

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Dynamic Commander. Any high quality force may have a Dynamic Commander.

Heroic Leader. Any Portuguese force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available with the senior Big Man acting as a FAC.

Tracker. A tracker may be present with any force.

Macho, Macho Man. Ideal for a Caçadores force.

Flechas. For, unsurprisingly, Flecha forces.

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The rebel forces in the three Portuguese territories were in many ways similar, but different in others. It does, however, make sense to cover them with a broad-brush when looking at their usage on the tabletop. With five specific bodies to cover I have avoided using the names of their military wings and instead restricted myself to the titles of the political organisations, FRELIMO, FNLA, MPLA, UNITA and PAIGC, indeed this is how they were referred to during the conflict by just about all present, including themselves.

The rebels can generally be classed according to their military qualities, raging from poor to good. UNITA and PAIGC should generally be considered good, the MPLA and FRELIMO as Average, the FNLA as poor to average.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Poor Rebels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6, 7 8 9, 10 Average Rebels 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10 Good Rebels 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10

TW&T Rating Rebel groups are capable of breaking down into fire teams. The AK47 or variant should be considered an Assault Rifle, the LMG rated as a DPM or DPD in the rules. Good and Average rebels should be treated as Average shots, Poor rebels as Green. The player may break his groups down as he desires into fire teams.

The MPLA, FNLA and FRELIMO are not real soldiers. The FNLA may not initiate close combat.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Good Rebels D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Average and Poor Rebels D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a section of Good Rebels reach the point where they have three more wounds than they have men they will immediately retire 9”.

When a section of Average Rebels reach the point where they have one more wound than they have men they will immediately retire 9”.

When a section of Poor Rebels reach the point where they have one less wound than they have men they will immediately retire 12”

Fieldcraft Rebels may have Fieldcraft ratings of 1 to 2.

Rebel organisation PAIGC were the most organised of all the forces, forming three fronts early in the war, Eastern, Northern and Southern, and later breaking them down into 12 Corps. Early in the conflict the standard military forces was the Bigrupo of 30 to 50 men, later it became the 48 man commando, with larger 120 man Incursion units formed if required. Initially their armament was limited to older WWII vintage weapons,

Page 78 but with the arrival of Soviet help this very quickly changed, even the 122mm BM-21 rocket launchers, the modernised Katyusha, being supplied along with Chinese recoilless rifles and modern small arms. In 1972 the SA-7, Strela 2 ground to air missile was received which, whilst no planes were shot down, did discourage Portuguese pilots from flying low over the province.

FRELIMO originally operated in small 10 to 15 man groups purposely, in order to achieve a pin-prick effect across a large area, spreading the Portuguese thinly as they attempted to react to those tactics. In 1966 larger 100 man groups were being deployed, and then by the late 1960’s more formalised structures were adopted. Each battalion had four 150 man companies with four platoons of 36 men. These had three 12 man sections which broke down further into three man groups. FRELIMO got the 122mm Grad rocket launchers in 1972 and the Strela 2 surface to air missile in 1974. Equipment throughout was largely Soviet supplied.

The MPLA had a disastrous career that shaped its unit structures, starting with the small 10 man groups and then by 1971 deploying “Squadrons” of 100 to 150 men. These had their own 60mm and 81mm mortars as well as the 82mm recoilless rifle, and were specifically assembled to allow them to take on Portuguese static forts and outposts in far-flung regions. In fact the Portuguese reacted so violently to these tactics that the MPLA were almost destroyed and never again attempted to deploy large formations while the Portuguese were present.

The FNLA experienced an even more disastrous career than the MPLA. The groups that attacked the northern Angolan provinces in 1961 were nothing more than armed mobs, and the units that assembled in Congo/Zaire and were trained by the Congolese ANC were good at drill but little else. Their structure was by then at least more military – see the traditional triangular battalion/company as illustrated in the ANC section for the Congo, but achieved little on the battlefield.

UNITA was generally seen as the most military of the Angolan rebel forces, however it was very poorly equipped, having few friends overseas. Largely fielding WWII vintage bolt action rifles we can assume that UNITA deployed platoons of three sections each, with almost no support weapons apart from the ones they captured from other nationalist forces.

Rebel forces would often be supplied with Soviet heavy weapons, more often than not with an anti- aircraft capability as their lack of air power was their main weakness. This could be anything from a single barrelled heavy machine gun, up to the four barrelled 14.5mm ZPU 4. Largely these were found defending their bases, either internally within their target country, or externally in their cross-border safe-havens. They were largely impractical for mobile forces in the bush.

Some forces were successful is collecting armoured vehicles, such as the BTR-152 armoured personnel carrier, but these were never used operationally.

Big Men For IABSM a Poor Rebel forces should have one Big Man per group of up to three sections. Better organised units may have two per platoon and Average ones will have one per platoon plus one per company commander.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the British squad model in the main TW&T rules. For a poor force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Good forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men.

Big Men will tend to be of poor quality in Angola, average in Guinea and Mozambique but with some good senior commanders.

Force Characteristics

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any Rebel force whose fire discipline may be Poor or Dreadful.

Rapid Deployment. This may be available for a PAIGC, FRELIMO or UNITA force.

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Tank Killer Bonus. This may be available for any Good quality rebel force with RPGs.

Mortar Bonus card. This should be present for a large MPLA force that has been trained to operate with mortar support.

Hesitant Commander. This may be present with any Poor or Average terrorist force.

Dynamic Commander. Any rebel force may have a Dynamic Commander.

B’Maso! Always available for a Rebel Force

Page 80

“Ex-Commandos, paratroopers, SAS troopers, wanted for interesting work abroad. Ring Camberley 33451” Daily Mail and Daily Mirror, 1975

As we have seen the warring factions in Angola, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA met in July 1974 declaring the end of inter-factional fighting in anticipation of forming a government after the Portuguese withdrawal in November 1975. Elections were scheduled for October 1975, with the Portuguese High Commissioner ruling up until independence. In Portugal the government’s main aim was to ensure that the settler population could continue to reside in Angola, and that a mass exodus did not result in huge strains being put on the home country’s small economy. In their attempt to achieve this they effectively emasculated all three of the main parties by dividing the decision making function in three ways and, effectively requiring a 2:1 majority on any decisions made. This was a recipe for future conflict, and it did not take long to come to the surface.

As it was all three parties took advantage of their new legal status to recruit forces, soon each one having more men under arms than the Portuguese military. Into this mix was added the involvement of the super-powers. Cuba very quickly identified that the three way equal split of power would emasculate the MPLA and reported as such to Moscow. Henry Kissinger in the US was equally determined that the pro- Soviet MPLA should play no part in the future government, and President Gerald Ford authorised military aid to the FNLA. Communist China had no interest in the pro-western “stooges” of the FNLA, but nor did they wish to have anything to do with the MPLA who were perceived to be in the pockets of Moscow. Almost incredibly they joined South Africa in supporting UNITA. By now Angola was awash with armaments and foreign military advisors and each party was being actively encouraged to distrust their partners in the future government.

In July the MPLA struck. FNLA forces were expelled from the area around Luanda and then they moved to take on UNITA. Savimbi moved his forces south to their tribal lands to avoid conflict, but the MPLA followed and clashed with him there. By mid-August the MPLA were in control of eleven of the fifteen provincial capitals and it seemed likely that they would seize control of the whole country. And then South Africa intervened.

It is almost impossible to separate the Angolan Civil War from the war in South West Africa. The South Africans had already seen half a dozen examples of terrorists operating from the safety of bases in a friendly power. While Portugal reigned in Angola and Mozambique and Rhodesia held firm the South African ANC forces and those demanding independence for Namibia were unable to prosecute their military campaigns effectively for lack of external safe-havens. Were an unfriendly government to be installed in Luanda, and the communist MPLA would certainly qualify as unfriendly however one defined the word, then there was no doubting what would follow. The government in Pretoria was not about to allow that to happen without a fight.

War in the North On the 18th October 1974 nearly 2000 troops crossed from Namibia into southern Angola. Joining with UNITA these forces seized five of the southern provincial capitals in just over two weeks and advanced on Luanda. The FNLA, assisted by General Mobutu’s Zairian forces, responded by advancing on the capital from the north. On the 10th of November a column of two battalions of Zairian troops (formerly the Congolese ANC), 1,500 FNLA troops and some Portuguese Angolan soldiers were within 30 miles of the capital. Here, at Quifandongo, they met with a Cuban force that utterly destroyed the column, largely with the 122mm multiple rocket launchers. Despite some intervention by the South African Air Force the attack had failed and on the 11th of November, with Luanda still in his hands and the Portuguese gone Nete could declare the new state of the Peoples’ Republic of Angola.

In fact there were three declarations of independence that day. In Huamo Jonas Savimbi of UNITA declared the creation of the Social Democratic Republic of Angola, and in Ambriz Holden Roberto, still smarting from his failure to seize Luanda the day before, declared the Democratic Republic of Angola

Page 81 open for business. Of the two Savimbi had the most to be hopeful of. The previous day he had flown to Pretoria and persuaded Prime Minister Vorster not to withdraw South African forces from the country until at least December. In the north Roberto had no such guarantor of his independence. General Mobutu in Zaire had already seen two of his battalions routed by the Cubans and was coming to the conclusion that he might be best to wash his hands of his increasingly costly brother-in-law. Especially as fresh reports were arriving of more Cubans with T54 tanks and BM21 rocket launchers being unloaded at Luanda.

What Roberto and the FNLA did have, however, was cash. When the first Cubans had landed in spring of 1975 the US government had been shocked into action. Timing is important here, as on the 30th of April 1975, almost simultaneous to the Cubans landing in Luanda, the North Vietnamese raised their flag over Saigon, ending, disastrously for the South Vietnamese and the United States, the war in South East Asia. There was no chance of American committing forces to another distant war, yet they were prepared to provide financial support to those who they believed were fighting the spread of communism.

In the Congo General Mobutu’s regime was heavily supported by the CIA and that organisation planned to use Mobutu as a conduit through which to channel money to both the FNLA and UNITA. This was less than ideal situation as Mobutu, thought by Mike Hoare to be the honest man of the Congo, had turned out to have his own financial self-interest at heart, however sizeable sums of money did reach Roberto, usually in cash filled suitcases. His solution to his immediate military problem was white mercenaries.

It seems that early on, in the spring of 1975, Mike Hoare’s name was in the frame, with talk of a 350 man resurrected 5 Commando joining the FNLA, but after Schramme’s mercenary revolt Hoare had no inclination to be based in the Congo. Bob Denard had been approached by a former Lieutenant-Colonel in the US Marines, now representing the CIA, who had negotiated a contract for twenty French mercenaries to train UNITA. At that stage, however, neither Roberto nor Savimbi wanted to dirty their hands with white mercenaries. This was, however, to change as by December 1975 the MPLA and their Cuban allies were forcing the FNLA back further and further north. On the 27th of December the FNLA abandoned the town of Carmona without a fight, it seemed likely that the rest of northern Angola would follow suit. Roberto bit the bullet and engaged a young British ex-paratrooper of Greek Cypriot extraction who had been working as a medical orderly for a British Doctor serving with the FNLA. Costas Georgiuo was soon to find fame under another name; Colonel Callan.

Callan’s activities for a few brief weeks in January of 1976 were to shock the world. Very rapidly a body of over 100 mercenaries were assembled in London and shipped out to Angola. What the recruiter, John Banks, achieved in terms of speed of delivery he could not match with quality. Of all the mercenaries who travelled to Angola there were no former officers and a significant proportion of the men had no military experience. All had been told that they would enjoy a period of instruction and acclimatisation before taking on the role of training the FNLA.

This was a case of blatant misrepresentation which served only to make Banks a wealthy man. When deployed immediately onto the front line the mercenaries objected and a dozen were executed in cold blood by Callan, pour encourager les autres. Callan did then get the rest to fight, but what followed was a brief and unpleasant farce.

Some accounts speak of Callan’s personal leadership qualities; his dynamism in battle and his sheer disregards for danger. Indeed several very successful raids and ambushes were carried out on MPLA and Cuban armoured columns attempting to advance north and squash the FNLA. However such Devil-may-

Page 82 care soldiering, with no planning or co-ordination of action, can only be a temporary solution. Within three weeks Callan was wounded and captured and his men were either dead, captured, or fleeing across the border into the Congo. The introduction of mercenaries at such a late stage had failed to achieve its goal of halting the MPLA advance and Roberto’s organisation was reduced to a political party in exile.

The show trials of the mercenaries that were to follow saw three former Paras, “Callan”, “Brummie” Barker and Andy MacKenzie all sentenced to death and shot. Most unfortunate was American, Daniel Gerhart who had only just joined the mercenaries after reading about their “adventure” in Soldier of Fortune magazine. The Cuban sponsored show trial saw him executed for, as many western journalists who were present stated, “being an American” in the wrong place at the wrong time.

War in the South South Africa first got involved in southern Angola on the 9th of August 1975, crossing the border in limited numbers to protect the hydro-electric plant at Ruacana and the associated dam and pumping station at Calueque. It was a construction project that the Portuguese and South Africans had both invested in and provided electricity for parts of both Angola and South West Africa. But it was not just South Africa that was concerned for the futures of Angola. In Zambia, the Congo and the Ivory Coast there was deep concern that a hard line Marxist government in Luanda could destabilise the region, and these black African nations approached South Africa asking them to intervene to ensure that it did not happen. The CIA were also keen to see a joint policy to support UNITA in the run up to independence. Pretoria reluctantly responded.

Task Force Zulu was assembled under Colonel Koos van Heerden, a mixed bag of a force comprising initially one battalion of Kaprivi Bushmen and one battalion of former FNLA troops that had begun, but not completed, training under South African tutelage. This force was largely transported in civilian trucks with some Vickers MMGs for support. Its impact was surprising. Focusing on capturing a succession of airfield to allow supplies to be flown in for each phase of the offensive Task Force Zulu won a series of victories against MPLA and Cuban opposition. Gradually additional support was added in the shape of Eland armoured cars, mortars and more SADF troops until by early November the South Africans had advanced over two thousand miles and were threatening to take Luanda.

At this point news of the FNLA defeat at Quifandongo reached the South Africans. It was clearly going to be their fight alone. The OAU and the UN were now beginning to make noises about the South African presence and the very nations that had called on South Africa to “shoulder her responsibility as an African power” and invade were now calling on them to withdraw. Despite their successes the South Africans found themselves in possession of land that they had no interest in keeping, and once again being painted as the regional pariah. They began to withdraw, leaving their positions in the hands of UNITA forces. These, however, were in no shape to oppose the MPLA with their Cuban allies, and very quickly Savimbi’s units were pushed back into the most inhospitable south eastern corner of Angola from where they were to keep up their fight for the next thirty-five years. The MPLA had for now taken power of an independent Angola.

Wargaming the Angolan War of 1975 The war in Angola in 1975 is an extremely mixed bag. At one end of the scale a rag-tag band of mercenaries supporting an even more rag tag bunch of FNLA troops can make for an interesting game when facing Cuban tanks. In the south of the country the South African intervention is extremely gameable, with almost any units fighting along side each other in the ultimate wargaming “pick’n’ mix”.

If the conflict is to be represented effectively it is important to model some of the key features of it. In many respects the war of 1975 needs the least amendments to the rules as the stand, with the fighting being largely conventional in the dash to control territory, however we recommend only the following adjustment.

Blinds & their Limitations. All forces operate with one dummy blind for every three real ones.

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The MPLA forces were exactly the same as the forces that fought against the Portuguese, however by October 1975 they were better equipped thanks to their Cuban allies. There were also significant numbers of Cuban troops deployed on the front line fighting amongst the MPLA units. During the battle for the control of Angola in 1975 Cuban numbers rose, but they were still deployed as part of MPLA units rather than fighting as distinct Cuban units as they did from the late 1970s onwards.

Most MPLA units will be Average, however when operating with Cuban advisors within a section they will be good. I have included Cuban only sections so that the gamer may employ them as such if he wishes, but this should be very unusual.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Average MPLA 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10 Good MPLA 1, 2, 3 4, 5, 6 7 8, 9, 10 Cubans 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10

TW&T Rating MPLA groups are capable of breaking down into fire teams, with a three man LMG team and a six man rifle team commanded by a Corporal. The AK47 or variant should be considered an Assault Rifle, the LMG a DPM or DPD. The RPG-7 is widely available, one per section not being unusual with two reloads. They may be considered average shots.

Average MPLA are not real soldiers.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Cubans D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

MPLA D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead Morale When a section of Good MPLA reach the point where they have two more wounds than they have men they will immediately retire 9”.

When a section of Average MPLA reach the point where they have the same number of wounds as men they will immediately retire 9”.

Fieldcraft. Fieldcraft is not considered in this campaign.

MPLA Organisation The MPLA were, by October 1975, taking on the structure of a regular army as organised by their Cuban instructors. The Soviet model was used, with battalions being formed with three rifle companies and a support company. Each company was composed of three platoons, each with three ten man squads. In the war zone these were almost always motorised, using either former Portuguese trucks or the armoured Soviet BTR 152. Armament was almost exclusively communist supplied, with support at low level being provided by 75mm or 82mm recoilless rifles, 82mm mortars and Sa-7 ground to air missiles. Artillery would be either the 76mm Zis3 of WWII vintage or the 122mm howitzer, these being deployed in four gun batteries. The BM21 rocket launcher system, knows as “Grads” by the Cubans and as “Stalin Organs” by the South Africans, was used to great effect against the FNLA, UNITA and the South Africans.

Armour was present in the shape of the T35-85 and the more modern T54 and T55 tanks with the amphibious BRDM 2 scout car also being used, these were normally deployed in platoons of three AFVs. The following shows an MPLA company in 1975.

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Company HQ

One rifle squad (10 men)

One truck

Platoon One Three rifle squads (10 men each) Three trucks

Platoon Two Three rifle squads (10 men each) Three trucks

Platoon Three Three rifle squads (10 men each) Three Trucks

Support Platoon Two 82mm mortar teams One 82mm Recoilless Rifle Three Trucks

Big Men For IABSM an MPLA forces should have one Big Man per Company. To this may then be added Cuban advisors at a rate of one per platoon for Average forces or two per platoon for Good ones.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the Soviet squad model in the main TW&T rules. For an Average force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Good forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men. Many of these Big Men should be Cubans.

Big Men should generally be poor, with Cubans being good.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed T34-85 7 11 Fast T54 10 14 Fast T55 11 14 Fast BRDM 2 3 14.5mm HMG Wheeled Amphibious

Force Characteristics Armoured Bonus. Available for all motorised forces

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any MPLA force whose fire discipline may be Poor or Dreadful.

Rapid Deployment. This may be available for a motorised or armoured force.

Mortar Bonus card. This should be present for a large MPLA force that has been trained to operate with mortar support.

Hesitant Commander. This may be present with any Average MPLA force.

Dynamic Commander. Any Cuban led force may have a Dynamic Commander.

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The FNLA represent a mix of troops, FNLA guerrillas, Zairian allied troops and the ill-fated British mercenaries under Callan. After the battle at Quifandongo the FNLA were in melt-down, whilst the Zairian troops withdrew into their own country. Holden Roberto based himself outside Angola, his headquarters compound was in Leopoldsville, now renamed Kinshasha, which cannot have done much good for the morale of the men fighting for him.

Most MPLA units will be useless, the Zairians are the successors to the Congolese ANC who had regained some order compared with their earlier performances on home turf, but were less than interested in the FNLA cause. The mercenaries performance was utterly reliant on strong leadership.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 FNLA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 6 7 8 Zairian Army 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8 Mercenaries 1, 2 - - 3, 4

TW&T Rating FNLA or Zairian groups are capable of breaking down into fire teams, with a three man LMG team and a four man rifle team commanded by a Corporal. The AK47 or variant should be considered an Assault Rifle, the LMG a DPM or DPD for the FNLA whilst the Zairians have FN FAL rifles and the FN MAG GPMG. The FNLA may be considered poor shots whilst the Zairians are average. The Mercenaries operate in small teams and are armed with the FN FAL although some, such as “Shotgun Charlie” Christodoulou, bought their own weapons of choice, largely these can be described as assault rifles, they seem to have had no LMGs.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Mercenaries D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

FNLA D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Zairians D6 1,2 3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a section of Zairians or Mercenaries reach the point where they have two more wounds than they have men they will immediately retire 9”.

When a section of FNLA reach the point where they have the same number of wounds as men they will immediately run away, never to return.

Fieldcraft. Fieldcraft is not considered in this campaign.

FNLA Organisation By October 1975 the FNLA had been recruiting openly since the Portuguese announced their intended withdrawal. Their structure was based on the Zairian armed forces using the old ANC model. Each company was composed of three platoons, each with three eight man squads. In the war zone these were almost always motorised largely using former Portuguese trucks. Armament was a mix of communist supplied small arms and the FN FAL supplied via Zaire. but there was very little in the way of support

Page 86 weapons available. Some US weaponry had got through, specifically the 66mm LAW which was used to great effect by Callan. The FNLA had very little in the way of armour, however some AML 90 armoured cars were on loan from Zaire.

The following shows an FNLA company in 1975.

Company HQ One rifle section (8 men)

Platoon One Platoon Two

Three rifle sections (8 men each) Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three

Three rifle sections (8 men each)

Mercenary groups were deployed randomly in small mobile “Killer groups”. These ranges from four men up to thirty, but the small four man sub-unit works best as they are very tactically flexible but also brittle in their nature, as they proved to be historically.

Big Men For IABSM an FNLA forces should have one Big Man per Company. Zairian units should have three Big Men per company and Mercenary units one per two groups.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the Soviet squad model in the main TW&T rules. For an Average force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Zairian forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men. Mercenaries should have one Big Man per four man team.

Mercenary Big Men should be good, if not elite (representing their dynamism on the battlefield rather than any great abilities as commanders), with the FNLA poor and the Zairians average.

Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed AML 90 3 12 Wheeled Off-Road

Force Characteristics

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any FNLA or Zairian force whose fire discipline may range from Poor to Abysmal.

Rapid Deployment. This may be available for a motorised or armoured force.

Hesitant Commander. This should always be present with any FNLA force.

Dynamic Commander. Any mercenary force should have a Dynamic Commander.

Anti Tank Bonus. Any mercenary force should get this.

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The South Africans were loathe to deploy their troops into Angola in 1975, they had intentionally avoided contact with their black African neighbours in the hope that they themselves would be left alone. When they did cross the border in Operation Savannah they were very conservative in the forces they originally deployed. One battalion of Kalahari Bushmen and another of former FNLA fighters who were being trained up by the South Africans and who deployed with South African and former Portuguese officers. Support was forthcoming after initial advances proved a success and more troops were deployed, however this was really a relatively small force that took part. It did, however, prepare the ground for later fighting that escalated along the border with South West Africa and Angola.

Included here are details for the SADF and their ex-FNLA and UNITA Allies.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 SADF 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9 , 10 Ex-FNLA 1, 2, 3 4 5, 6 7,8 UNITA 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10

TW&T Rating The SADF are Good troops, the South African led ex-FNLA are average as are UNITA. The SADF Bushmen and the FNLA are using the R1 Assault rifle, a local copy of the FN FAL, other South African troops were in the process of being issued the R4, the Galil copy. Both should be considered as assault rifles.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

SADF D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Ex-FNLA and UNITA D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When an SADF section reached a point where they have four more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When an ex-FNLA or UNITA section has more wounds than men left it will retire 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft Ex-FNLA and UNITA troops have a fieldcraft of 1, SADF forces generally are 1 or 2 but with Bushman battalion is level 3.

SADF Organisation The South African Defence Force was an extremely flexible organisations, forming battlegroups from disparate forces in very much the same manner as German Kampfgruppe in the second world war. What is more their battalion structures were also variable, with the number of companies present depending on composition and circumstances, as such what follows is a guide rather the full chapter and verse on the SADF. Each company was made up of three platoons with four ten man sections. These were supported by a relatively comprehensive range of equipment that, if becoming obsolete was still impressive by African standards. The four gun platoon of Vickers MMGs in each battalion was starting to be phased out and replaced by the FN MAG in a sustained fire role, a battery of 81mm mortars was also present. At platoon level there would be a 60mm mortar and possibly a recoilless rifle.

Page 88 The ex-FNLA formations were an entirely new venture that would eventually become the elite 32 Buffalo Regiment of Portuguese speaking troops, but at this stage they were little more than semi-trained. The SADF instructors were to form the backbone of this force during Operation Savannah and its performance in the field showed what mediocre troops could do when well led. Their structure should be based on the standard SADF model above.

Operations in Angola in 1975 served to highlight the real weakness of the SADF in artillery. It’s WWII vintage 25 pounders and 5.5” howitzers simply did not have the range to take on modern Soviet weapon systems. They were to play a relatively small part in the campaign as a result. Armour was provided almost exclusively by the Eland 90 armoured car in this campaign. In the air the South Africans reigned supreme, with their Mirage fighters backed up by Canberra bombers but more importantly the transport vehicles that replaced the land based supply train that allowed the deep penetrations into Angola to happen.

UNITA forces followed a traditional three platoon/three section format, albeit with very few support weapons. At least one AML 90 – the equivalent of the Eland 90 – was on loan to them from Zaire, and they certainly used captured MPLA equipment when they could get it, in broad terms, however, they should be restricted to assault rifle sections.

Big Men For IABSM an SADF force should have two to three Big Man per platoon. FNLA and UNITA forces may have one of their own Big Men and one SADF Big Man on attachment.

If using TW&T SADF sections should be at full strength. FNLA and UNITA forces may be diced for, being one man short on a 1 or 2. An SADF force should have one Big Man per section and a platoon commander and NCO available. An FNLA or UNITA force should have an SADF platoon commander and one Big Man per section.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Strike Speed Eland 90 4 12 Wheeled Off-Road Eland 60 4 3 Wheeled Off-Road

Force Characteristics

Fire Support. This should rarely be available but will always have an FOO card when present.

Rapid Deployment. This may be used for any motorised unit.

Reconnaissance Force. This may be available for operations on foot as well as motorised.

Machine Gun Bonus card. This should always be present for a force armed with sustained fire MAG teams.

Rally. Always in the deck for an SADF force.

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for a UNITA or ex-FNLA force unit whose fire discipline may be Poor.

Dynamic Commander. Any SADF force may have a Dynamic Commander.

Heroic Leader. Any SADF force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may often be available with the senior Big Man acting as a FAC.

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“The use of force is allowed on those that do not want to support the organisation. A revolutionary has a goal to achieve. To be cruel in the struggle is to do good for the future.” SWAPO memorandum, March 1985

Whatever ones opinion of the apartheid regime in South Africa it is impossible not to understand their stance on South West Africa and the consequent border war that was fought from 1975 until the end of 1989. By the mid-1970s the South Africans had had ample time to watch the results of black majority rule in the states to their north. Not only were they not impressed by what they saw, corruption, misrule, tribalism and anarchy that gripped much of the continent post independence, but they recognised the patterns that had emerged.

It was clear that the Soviet bloc was fighting a war by proxy in Africa and was winning the propaganda war hands down. No longer was the argument of the 1950s, that states like South Africa were bastions against communism, popular. Indeed the liberal media in the west were vehemently opposed to white majority rule and were demanding its immediate end. This was, in theory, laudable, however it missed the very clear message from the rest of Africa that immediate hand over of power had almost universally created as many problems as it solved for black Africans.

What was more, the domino effect throughout Africa, with newly independent nations providing succour for those who fought against white majority regimes to their south, was clear to see. In the early-1970s South Africa had very limited problems with internal nationalist forces. In simple terms this was because the governments of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana were disinclined to get involved in such activities, while Rhodesia held out the Limpopo was secure, and the Portuguese presence protected South West Africa and the border with Mozambique.

This naturally changed once the Portuguese left their overseas provinces, however the government of Samora Machel in Mozambique was initially disinclined to pick a fight with their powerful neighbour, only in Angola did the new regime begin to support SWAPO in its activities. For South Africa, however, the very existence of South West Africa created a buffer between them and the communist backed insurgents. Indeed South Africa’s main fight against communism was to be on the Angolan border rather than within her own territories.

It is important when attempting to understand the conflict in

Page 90 South West Africa to realise that SWAPO was not the unified national independence movement that it presented itself as. It’s roots, as with ZANU and ZAPU in Rhodesia, were tribal. Indeed it had been established in 1957 as the Owambo Peoples’ Congress to represent the interests of the Owambo people, roughly 50% of the population of SWA. The group changed its name to South West African Peoples’ Organisation in 1960 in order to present itself as a more inclusive party, yet this did nothing to change the fact that over the next thirty years its membership was almost exclusively from that tribe. Indeed, as is often the case in Africa, many of the other tribal groups were implacably opposed to SWAPO, seeing its objectives as contrary to their own interests. Indeed these groups provided much support for the South Africans during the fifteen year war.

In an attempt to protect South West Africa, and consequently the Republic of South Africa, from terrorism the SADF pursued a policy of attempting to take the battle to the enemy inside Angola, taking a leaf from the experiences of the Rhodesians who were also finding it easier to take on their own terrorists while they were concentrated in their camps outside the country rather than when in small groups inside it. Indeed Operation Savannah in 1975 set a precedent that held good for the duration of the war. Support was given to UNITA forces operating in southern Angola and South African forces were committed liberally to the war zone as required.

The result of this policy was, unavoidably, regular clashes between the South Africans and the Angolan Army, the FAPLA, and its Soviet and Cuban advisers. At first these tended to be accidental rather than by design, but SWAPO soon found that it was unable to stand up to the South Africans on its own and began basing itself along side, or even in, FAPLA bases. Indeed, as the war progressed it became clear that SWAPO would use the political situation of the moment to its advantage. The South African government was constantly involved in peace talks with the Angolans, and for significant periods of the conflict the SADF was under orders not to engage FAPLA forces under any circumstances. When such orders were in place SWAPO knew that it could operate with increased freedom by “hugging” Angolan forces in the area. This was, obviously, in breach of the political agreement, however it was undoubtedly true to the tried and tested communist blueprint of gaining the advantage over their opponent by fair means or foul.

Inside South West Africa SWAPO operated in small groups in the hope of avoiding the security forces. This, naturally, left them weak when contacted, and ultimately they found that they were unable to make headway against the South African forces. The tribal lands along the northern border provided a secure buffer zone where the security forces could operate and stop the terrorists reaching the most northern of the white farming areas around Grootfontein. What was more the South African policy of constant harassment of SWAPO in southern Angola meant that their bases were largely pushed further and further north, causing increased logistical problems for any groups attempting to operate inside South West Africa.

By the mid-1980’s SWAPO was largely defeated as a serious military threat due to the readiness of the South Africans to commit troops and their development of some of the most effective counter-insurgency forces in the world, however far from seeing the conflict die down it did, in fact, escalate towards a conventional war, however the chief enemy was the FAPLA and their communist backers. Indeed the South Africans captured a number of Soviet advisors during the border war, unknown anywhere else during the cold war.

In the end political reality ended the conflict. South Africa had always been ready to fight and withdraw if that allowed her to fight another day. In 1979 she had withdrawn her support for Rhodesia, effectively ending that nation’s ability to continue her fight, handing power to Mugabe in a desperate attempt to prolong the life of the apartheid regime by appearing to be an honest broker in that affair. By the late 1980s she was ready to do the same with South West Africa and a hard fought war, won by the professionalism and sacrifice of South African servicemen, was abandoned, along with the newly independent Namibia for the sake of expedience.

Wargaming the Border War in South West Africa The war on the border offers huge opportunities for the gamer, from the fast, hard-hitting columns of 1975 through small tracker actions in the bush to the large combined arms operations of the mid 1980s. Whatever you choose the South Africans are a wargamers delight due to their liberal use of battlegroups assembled from all sorts of units, allowing you to field just about any combination of forces you like.

Page 91 SWAPO are undoubtedly tougher cookies than ZANLA forces in Rhodesia, though their modus operandi within South West Africa undoubtedly qualifies them for the title ‘terrorist’. Indeed their liberal use of the landmine in order to cause terror demonstrates both their devotion to that method and their utter inability to wage an effective campaign against the SADF and the South West Africa Territorial Force.

The FAPLA are equally as much fun to game as the South Africans, as they are increasingly well equipped as well as being backed up by Cuban regular formations. By the mid 80’s the battles were increasingly hard fought and resembled a modern conventional battlefield albeit one that was twenty years out of date by European standards.

If the conflict is to be represented effectively it is important to model some of the key features of it. The following rules have been devised to do just that.

Blinds and their Limitations. Most South African or FAPLA forces will field one dummy blind per four real ones. SWAPO, UNITA guerrillas and 32 Battalion will field one dummy per two real ones.

For small actions inside South West Africa only blinds that contain actual troops or lookouts may spot. Dummy Blinds will not spot.

Bombshell. If under pressure and unable to escape as a single entity terrorists were inclined to split up and run in different directions, meeting later at a previously appointed rendezvous. The security forces described this as “bombshelling”. As a means of escape it meant that the South Africans were unlikely to be able to pursue all of the terrorists, thereby allowing some to escape.

When a section sized force is bombshelling each terrorist group is replaced by three bombshell markers within 12” of its current location. These will then move on the Terrorist Blinds card using 3D6 movement whatever various routes they choose, towards a previously appointed table edge exit point, not stopping to engage the enemy. Blinds that are spotted during this process will be replaced by the relevant figures and may not return to blinds for the rest of the game.

Blinds or spotted figures that reach the bombshell exit point must leave the table immediately and will be considered to have escaped to fight again.

Men bombshelling may be shot at if spotted. If they take wounds from fire they will surrender. If they are not killed or wounded they will keep running.

Big Bombshell. Sometimes larger groups of SWAPO operating inside Angola would choose to bombshell in a rather more orchestrated fashion than the panicky reaction above. Here platoon sized groups (and that definition should apply to groups that started off as 24 men or more) may choose to bombshell, breaking down into groups of four or five men each. These may have a bombshell rallying point pre-designated on the table where they will head for and reform there as a unit.

In this case the individual groups will still be represented by bombshell markers and move as above, however if spotted they will go to ground and enter a firefight with the South Africans. If, consequently, they suffer sufficient wounds to oblige them to withdraw they will surrender.

Pseudo Operations. Due to information that Three-Two Battalion or Special Forces in the area have provided the South African player may have between one and three attempts at spotting on the whole table. Each spot will cover an area 12” square and any enemy forces in that area will be placed on blinds on the table. Any dummy blinds are removed.

Civilians. South African forces were in a situation where civilian casualties were politically unacceptable. Fire support missions on inhabited areas may not happen without several hours warning, either by leaflet drop, loud speakers or a small number of warning round being fired close to the area. From a game perspective this means that no artillery support may be called in within 24” of civilian dwellings.

Mine-Proof Vehicles. If the Rhodesians were the pioneers of these vehicles the South Africans took them on to an entirely new level, using their industrial capabilities to produce vehicles that were purpose built for warfare dominated by the landmine and rugged terrain. The results were fast, well-armoured vehicles that proved to be user-friendly, efficient fighting platforms rather than simply safe transport.

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Mine-proof vehicles that detonate a mine will roll 2D6. On a 2 the vehicle is immobilised and ½D6 hits on the crew are diced for. On 3-8 the vehicle is immobilised. On a 9-12 it may still move, but with -2 inches per dice. The exceptions are the home-made Bossvark and the early Hippo which use the Rhodesian mine- proof vehicle effect if they hit a mine.

These vehicles had the following capacity of troops.

Vehicle Men (Cab+Compartment) Bossvark 2+10 Hippo 2+10 Bulldog 1+10 Buffel 1 + 10 Casspir 2+12 Ratel 20 3+9 Ratel 60 4+7 Ratel 90 4+6

Nowhere to Hide. Inside South West Africa the security forces must attempt to kill or capture all of the terrorists present. If a South African or South West African unit sees even one terrorist near them they must attempt to kill or capture him unless they can also see a larger group which is of greater priority.

Oshanas. These were low lying areas of ground that during the rainy season would fill with water, also known as ‘shonas. They should be impassable for ordinary vehicles and the modern fighting vehicles, such as the Buffel and the Casspir should have an increased chance of bogging in. If any 1 is rolled for movement then the vehicle bogs down. On the following two turns there is an opportunity to free the vehicle, using all of the vehicles initiative dice. If any 1 is thrown then the vehicle is bogged in for the rest of the game.

Oshanas also make tracking harder when containing water, counting as difficult terrain for that purpose.

Kalahari Ferrari. The Casspir and the Wolf Turbo were not just off-road vehicles, these were designed to operate in the harshest of terrain, even knocking down trees that got in their way. They generally operated at breakneck speed, following the running trackers and leaving a trail of broken foliage in their wake. These vehicles move in broken terrain as though in hard ground, doubling their movement dice.

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The South Africans deployed a mixture of Army and Police units throughout the war, both from the South African Defence Force and the South West African Territorial Force. Unlike the Rhodesians they were never under the impression that this was a policing action; any police units deployed were from dedicated well armed and equipped anti-terrorist units.

White South Africans were obliged to undertake a two year period of National Service during the second year of which they would spend some time deployed on operational duties on the border. The officers and NCOs were largely long service regulars, as were those troops of the specialist battalions, such as 32 battalion.

The Modular Battalions of the SADF provided the backbone of the forces, deploying its companies in largely static defensive positions responsible for specified sectors of the border, with several well equipped units ready to undertake more aggressive operations are required.

The battalion sizes varied depending on the strategic requirements, Three Two Battalion, for example fielding up to eight rifle companies at any time. Prime among the specialised units was 61 Mechanised Battalion Group, as the name suggests a mechanised armoured strike force, the Portuguese speaking 32 Battalion made up of former FNLA members and now an elite Light Infantry unit capable of conducting pseudo-operations deep within Angola as well as conventional operations with suitable support. The “Parabats”, 1 Parachute Battalion were an elite force with complete airborne/heliborne capabilities. These were backed up by the excellent troops of the SWATF and SWAPOL, the latter providing a range of support units, from the Special Constables of the Guard Force that oversaw security in kraals and major installations, through the Police COIN units and ultimately Koevoet, Crowbar, the hard-hitting police tracker unit that’s effectiveness was measured by the vitriolic coverage it received in the pro-SWAPO western liberal press.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 4 SADF Modular Battalion NS Troops 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10 - 61 Mechanised Battalion 1, 2 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10 32 Battalion/Parabats 1, 2 3 4 5, 6 7 Ops K, Koevoet, Romeo Mike Force 1, 2, 3 4 5, 6, 7 8, 9 10 Police COIN unit 1, 2, 3, 4 5 5, 7 8, 9, 10 - Guard Force 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10 - Reconnaissance Commandoes - - 1 2, 3, 4 - SWATF Infantry Battalion 1, 2, 3, 4 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10 - Notes. The mechanised units and those who were deployed into action in the Puma helicopter were restricted by the passenger capacity of their vehicles. The Puma deployed sticks of 14 men who operated as two sections of seven. The Ratel 20 had room for nine infantrymen as well as the section commander who was in the commander’s cupola while mounted but deployed with his section once dismounted, the driver and gunner remaining with the vehicle to provide support. The Ratel 60 and 90 carried six infantry and the commander, making seven man sections once dismounted. The Ratel 90 would carry fewer infantry when used in an anti-tank role, making more room for ammunition.

TW&T Rating Normal SADF should be considered Average Troops. The specialist units, with their longer serving regular troops, such as the Reconnaissance Commandoes, 61 Mechanised, 32 Battalion and the Parabats are Elite. Koevoet and the regular SWATF infantry battalions are Good troops. Some of these may still be armed with the R1, a licensed copy of the FN FAL rifle, early in the conflict although most were rapidly converted to the R4, the Galil copy, or the R5, the short barrelled version of the R4 in the late 1970s, all of which are Assault Rifles. They also had the 40mm grenade launcher and the 60mm mortar was issued at platoon level. The Belgian FN MAG GPMG, the equivalent of the MG42 in the rules, provided section light support weapon, although the modular battalions still used the rebored Bren gun and the Vickers MMG. Koevoet often used captured Soviet light machine guns as captured from SWAPO, especially as some of their “turned” terrorist members were familiar with the weapon. On external operations 32 Battalion would use communist weaponry as a matter of course.

Page 94 Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hit from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

61 Mech, 32 Btn, Parabats, Recces D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Koevoet, Romeo Mike units, SWATF and Modular SADF D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Guard Force D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead Morale When a stick of Elite troops reach a point where they have twice as many wounds as men they will retire 6”.

When a section of Good troops reach a point where they have three more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a section of Average troops reach a point where they have one more wound than men they will retire 9” immediately.

When a Guard Force section has as many wounds as men left its morale will fail and it will flee, retiring 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft SADF National Service troops, parabats and mechanised troops normally have a fieldcraft rating of 1. SWATF troops have a fieldcraft of 2, 32 Battalion, Koevoet, Romeo Mike, Recce Commandoes and specialist tracker teams have a rating of 3. Guard Force units have a fieldcraft rating of 2. Any unit may have a tracker attacked.

South African Organisation South African forces were originally organised on the British model although this changed greatly to suit the demands of the conflict. The basis of their force was the Modular Infantry Battalion which essentially served as a holding unit to which companies were attached as operational demands varied. Generally between three and five companies would be present at any time along with a bewildering array of support units tailored to suit whatever was required at that particular moment.

The infantry company was the chief tactical unit; in the field each one had a fortified base camp near the border and was responsible for security in its sector. The Company was made up normally of five platoons, each of four rifle sections. Each base was protected by an array of static defences, including the old Vickers MMG and 81mm mortars dug in for fire support. A limited allocation of Buffel mine proof vehicles was available for patrols and motorcycles for patrolling the roads to search for landmines. To this could be added any units from the SADF arsenal, from a small tracker team to a squadron of Oliphant tanks, and anything else in between.

Some units found their section structure evolving to suit their mode of transport; the Parabats who, despite their parachute training were normally deployed by helicopter, found that a seven man section suited the 14 man payload of the Puma, also true for the men of 32 battalion who were often inserted deep into Angola by helicopter. Police units such as Koevoet and the Reaksiemag, Romeo Mike, Reaction Force of 101 Battalion used the 12 man Casspir but found that ten men plus the section commander was ideal. The following shows a Koevoet unit in the field. This is equipped with four “Cars”, the Casspir or in the late 1980’s the Turbo Wolf, each with a white Car Commander and ten African police officers, the NCOs being classed as Warrant Officers. With them would be a Blesbok armoured supply truck built on the Casspir chassis, or later the Strandwolf based on the Turbo Wolf. The latter would be used to carry supplies and also to retrieve captured weaponry taken from contacts with SWAPO or retrieved from SWAPO caches. The following diagram shows one such Koevoet or Romeo Mike team. With Koevoet, a

Page 95 police unit, the Cars would be commanded by Warrant Officers with Special Constables in the rifle sections, with Romeo Mike teams the ranks would be military.

Command Car One rifle section (10 men) One Casspir or Turbo Wolf

Car Two One rifle section (10 men) One Casspir or Turbo Wolf

Car Three One rifle section (10 men) One Casspir or Turbo Wolf

Car Four

One rifle section (10 men)

One Casspir or Turbo Wolf

Support Car One Blesbok or Strandwolf armoured supply truck.

The Reconnaissance Commandoes tended to operate in smaller units, be that manning fast moving Sabre Land Rovers or as small recce teams in the bush. Guard force units tended to be organised on an ad hoc basis.

A mechanised Company would have a head quarters with three Ratel Command vehicles. Three platoons would each have a Ratel 60 as its HQ which would carry the commander and provide close support with its breach loading 60mm mortar in the turret and the platoon’s own 60mm light mortar which could deploy from this vehicle. Three Ratel 20s made up each platoon, with one ten man section each. Support would come from Armoured Car Squadrons with three troops of three Eland 90s or four Ratel 90s each. Heavier support could be provided by the Oliphant main battle tank which was deployed in squadrons of three troops, each with three tanks. A command tank and an armoured recovery vehicle made up the Squadron HQ.

At company level mortar support could be anything from the 60mm, 81mm, 82mm or 120mm mortar. Heavier support was available from the G1 25 Pounder and the G2 5.5” guns in 1975 but the experiences of Operation Savannah led to South Africa developing its own 155mm Field Gun in the G5 towed variant and the G6 self propelled model. The 127mm Multiple Rocket Launcher, the Valkiri, with its 24 rocket capability was also developed from the Soviet BM21. Anti-tank units were armed with the Ratel 90 or the 106mm recoilless rifle, infantry anti-tank was present in the shape of the Milan.

In the air the South Africans used the Puma helicopter as their workhorse, with the Allouette III being used for Casevac or as a gunship with a side firing 20mm cannon. The Impala provided the majority of the fixed wing close support, with its 68mm rockets and 120kg bomb load, although the Buccaneer, Canberra, Impala and the Mirage family, the F-142, F-162 and Mirage III were also available when required. Transport was undertaken by the C130 Hercules or the C160 Transall. Although sanctions on purchasing weapons meant that South Africa’s Air Force was trapped in a time bubble it functioned superbly throughout the conflict, developing a close relationship with the SADF and the SWATF. Racially the SADF Territorial Soldiers in the Modular Battalions were all white. 32 Battalion began with all white officers and 90% of NCOs being white, however an increasing number of black NCOs emerged over the years and eventually black officers were commissioned from the mid 1980’s onwards. The Mechanised forces, Parabats and Recces were all white, whilst the SWATF were black with white officers. I mention this purely for the purposes of painting units, the colour of the troops made no difference to their performance in the field.

Page 96 Big Men Big Men should be generally good, with elite for the best units. For IABSM a South African force should have two Big Men per platoon or one per 14 man stick if inserted by helicopter. For high quality units an additional two Big Men can be added for the company command. A Guard force should have one Big Man for every three sections.

If using TW&T units should be at full strength, although on external operations carried out by 32 Battalion the gamer may choose to reduce numbers slightly to represent attrition. Normally one Big Man will be with each section, two with a heliborne stick. A platoon or Troop commander will always be present and often a Senior NCO as well for good quality units.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Strike Speed Oliphant MBT 13 16 Fast Eland 90 4 12 Wheeled Off-Road Eland 60 4 3 Wheeled Off-Road Ratel 20 3 4 (20mm cannon) Wheeled Off-Road Ratel 60 3 2 (60mm mortar) Wheeled Off-Road Ratel 90 3 12 (90mm Wheeled Off-Road Ratel ZT-3 3 13 Wheeled Off-Road Ratel Command 3 - Wheeled Off-Road Bulldog 3 - Wheeled Off-Road Buffel 3 - Wheeled Off-Road Casspir 3 Various Kalahari Ferrari Turbo Wolf 3 Various Kalahari Ferrari

Force Characteristics Fire Support. This should often be available along the border or on external operations in Angola when an FOO card will always be present.

Rapid Deployment. This may be used for any motorised unit, especially Koevoet or Romeo Mike teams.

Reconnaissance Force. An armoured force on cross-border operation may use this as may a high quality (level 3 fieldcraft) tracker team which can take a bonus move.

Vehicle Breakdown. This may be used, especially in the wet season for bogging in.

Machine Gun Bonus card. This should often be present, however not for the slow firing Vickers.

Anti Tank Bonus. For any Ratel 90 force deployed in a pure AT role

Rally. Always in the deck in IABSM for a good or elite SADF, SWATF or Police force.

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for a Guard Force unit whose fire discipline may be Poor.

Dynamic Commander. Any good or elite force may have a Dynamic Commander.

Heroic Leader. Any South African force may have an Heroic Leader

Air Support. This may be available with the senior Big Man acting as a FAC or with an airborne FAC on external ops.

Death From Above. Always available for a force operating with air support.

Page 97

SWAPO never posed a serious military threat to the South African forces, the terrain was not favourable as it had been for ZANLA and ZIPRA in Rhodesia and the SADF was a much larger, better supplied and equipped force than the Rhodesians could have dreamed of. However they were a constant annoyance for the security forces and an unpleasant hazard for the civilian population in the border area. Indeed it was the black population that bore the brunt of SWAPO’s frustration as they continually failed to make inroads, politically or militarily, and were rarely able to penetrate sufficiently far south into the country to attack white civilians. As such their main targets were anything that they could vaguely associate with the establishment; Headmen, shopkeepers, businessmen, local politicians, prominent figures, all of whom they could label as puppets of the “Boere”. Almost exclusively their weapon was terror, using the landmine liberally in an attempt to instil fear in the local population, and their targets were more likely to be school children to kidnap in order to aid their recruiting process rather than the security forces.

In their camps in Angola SWAPO had learnt the brutal lessons taught by Rhodesian cross-border raids and kept their forces spread out over large areas of land, a “camp” with a thousand men was likely to be, in fact, twenty small camps spread out over hundreds of square miles, making it hard for the South Africans to land a knock-out blow. This was even harder when SWAPO shared facilities with the FAPLA whom the SADF were usually under strict orders to avoid.

In theory SWAPO forces were organised into battalions, although these could be as weak as 100 men, with 250 to 300 being the norm. Their structure was incredibly top-heavy, with 100 man HQ company being normal and then three or four thirty man platoons under that, each with ten men sections. In practice these numbers varied hugely, eight man sections in a larger 36 man platoon were common and when crossing the border into South West Africa groups tended to be between 5 and 15 men, larger groups being too easily identified by the SADF.

SWAPO operatives were armed with a range of communist small arms, the AK47, the SKS carbine with rifle grenade, RPG 7, later the 75 model, with several reloads, mortars, Recoiless rifles, single tube 122mm rocket launchers, 60mm and 82mm mortar and the SA-7 anti-aircraft missile. Normally these troops would only engage the South Africans if they had no choice, however some better trained troops, the specialist units, were more inclined to a stand-up fight, something that the South Africans relished, and these troops, well trained in anti-tracking techniques, were a tough adversary.

The best way to describe the two types of terrorist is to split them into Specialist or what the South African rather demeaningly called “Garden Boys” as they had about as much military training as their domestic employees at home in the Cape or Natal. The former were trained in military tactics and anti- tracking techniques, the latter in very little at all.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Specialist SWAPO 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6 7, 8 “Garden Boys” 1, 2, 3, 4 5 6, 7 8

TW&T Rating Terrorist groups are capable of breaking down into fire teams. The AK47 or variant should be considered an Assault Rifle, the LMG is treated as a DPM or DPD in the rules. SWAPO Specialists should be treated as Average or even Good sometimes, “Garden Boys” as Green.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Specialist SWAPO D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Garden Boys D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Page 98 Morale When a section of Garden Boys reach the point where they have as many wounds as men they will immediately bombshell.

When a section of Specialist SWAPO reach the point where they have two more wounds than men they will immediately retire 9”.

Fieldcraft Terrorists may have Fieldcraft ratings of 1 for Garden Boys or 2 or 3 for Specialists.

SWAPO Forces SWAPO operated largely in three Fronts, the North Western Front in Kaokoland and western Owamboland, the Northern Front in central Owamboland, and the North Eastern Front in Eastern Owamboland and Kavango. Typically each of these areas were limited by manpower restrictions which were made worse when the South Africans launched their periodic raids across the border to strike against their camps.

The platoon, which was essentially the largest tactical unit used, ranged in size from 24 to 50 men and was made up of a number of sections, eight to ten men in each. In theory each platoon would have a political commissar, a reconnaissance and intelligence section, sappers and the likes. In practice this would only really apply to the Specialist units, the normal SWAPO operatives that were encountered were undertrained and with only the most basic structure of having a leader who was tasked with a set objective before leaving Angola.

In Angola SWAPO forces may be equipped with some heavy support, ex-FAPLA T34-85 tanks were not overly unusual, 14.5mm ZPU-1 or the twin ZPU-2 machine guns were often present to be used against aerial and ground targets. Mortars, up to 120mm in calibre seem to have been liberally supplied as well as jeep mounted 107mm recoilless rifles. However the most powerful asset that SWAPO had was the support that they could call upon from the better armed FAPLA forces and their advisors.

Big Men In IABSM a “Garden Boy” force should have one Big Man per platoon, whilst a Specialist force can have two. When operating in larger formations in Angola a Specialist force may add a Big Man to represent the Company commander.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each section operating in South West Africa should be diced for as follows:

Dice Strength 1 7 men 2 8 men 3 9 men 4 10 men 5 11 men 6 12 men

For a platoon sized force of Garden Boys a commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no section leader will be present. Specialist SWAPO forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men.

Force Characteristics Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any Terrorist force whose fire discipline may be Poor.

Dynamic Commander. Any Specialist SWAPO force may have a Dynamic Commander.

B’Maso! Always available for a Terrorist Force

Page 99

Throughout the border war UNITA was dependent on assistance from South Africa, be that in terms of supplies of arms or, in some cases, actual physical intervention to stop the organisation from being completely destroyed by the increasingly effective FAPLA. UNITA had always stood out during the war against Portugal, and then the MPLA, as the most efficient of the guerrilla forces. With the withdrawal of Portugal, and then the South Africans after Operation Savannah, UNITA was obliged to make the transition from a guerrilla force into a regular one in able to hold its own territory and ensure its survival. It was not an easy leap to make, and never one that it wholly achieved even when Ronald Regan began his policy of generous support in the 1980s.

UNITA developed three types of force to operate concurrently; a guerrilla force, a semi-regular force and regular troops in the hope that these structures would allow them to both control their own territory and operate in that of their enemy. The policy resulted in partial success, largely due to the aid that they received from South Africa and the USA and the fact that Pretoria would never allow Savimbi’s forces to suffer a crippling defeat. The South Africans found that on several occasions, when UNITA were seriously threatened by major Cuban led FAPLA offensives they were unable to resist effectively and the SADF were required to mount major offensives to protect them.

The supply of equipment for UNITA came from a wide range of sources, from Communist China to the USA, and as a result it was diverse to say the least. Chinese 75mm bazookas, the Type 63 107mm multiple rocket launcher served along side the Milan, the RPG7 and the Stinger, FN FAL rifles and G3s were used with the AK47. That said most of the weapons used were of Soviet origin, captured from the FAPLA.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 UNITA Guerrillas or Semi-Regulars 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7, 8 9, 10 UNITA Regulars 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10

TW&T Rating UNITA Guerrillas and Semi-Regulars are Average troops, whereas the Regulars are Good troops. They are armed with assault rifles and Light machine guns of Soviet origin.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

UNITA Regulars D6 1,2,3 4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

UNITA Guerillas and Semi-Regulars D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a regular UNITA section reaches a point where they have two more wounds than men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When a semi-regular UNITA section reaches a point where they have as many wounds as men remaining they will retire 9” immediately.

When an UNITA Guerrilla section has as many wounds as men left it will retire 12” immediately.

Fieldcraft UNITA troops have a fieldcraft of 1 or 2.

Page 100 UNITA Organisation UNITA guerrilla forces were made up of fifty man groups which operated semi-independently in territory controlled, theoretically, by the MPLA/FAPLA. These were made up of ten man sections which resembled a standard infantry section with one light support weapon and assault rifles. An RPG 7 may be present.

The regular battalions were formed on the standard triangular model, with three companies of three platoons. Each platoon would have three ten man sections with one light machine gun each. The platoon HQ may have a recoilless rifle available and RPG7s would be liberally supplied. This force could call upon a wide range of support weapons, notably 120mm mortars, Milan teams, field artillery in the shape of 76mm Zis 3 or 122mm M38 howitzers. They also had some access to captured 122mm BM21 rocket launchers. Anti-aircraft weapons ranged from the 14.5mm machine gun, the 12.7mm AAHMG and the SA-7 or Stinger teams. Armour was present in the shape of captured T34-85 or T54/55 tanks. Transport tended to be trucks and jeeps of Soviet origin rather than any armoured carriers.

The semi-regular forces were battalion sized formations, each of two or three companies, with three platoons each. These were equipped as the guerrilla sections, but were able to call on support from mortars and recoilless rifles, which allowed them to operate as second line reserves to support the regular forces or, in extreme circumstances, the guerrilla troops.

Big Men UNITA Big Men are normally Average quality. In IABSM a UNITA Guerrilla force should have two Big Men per 50 man group. Regular forces should have one to two per platoon with an additional one for the company commander. Semi-Regular fores should be limited to one per platoon.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each section may be diced for using the British section table in the main rules. Each Regular or Guerrilla section should have a Big Man and a Platoon commander, whilst a platoon sized force of Semi-regular troops will always have a commander be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no section leader will be present.

Force Characteristics

Rapid Deployment. Will often be available for all types of force.

MG Bonus. May be available

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any UNITA guerrilla force whose fire discipline may be Poor.

Dynamic Commander. Any Regular force may have a Dynamic Commander.

B’Maso! Always available for a Guerrilla Force.

Death From Above. May be present if operating with South African air support.

Page 101

After the withdrawal of the Portuguese in 1975 the development of the new Angolan Army, the FAPLA, was dominated by Soviet and Cuban influence. Unit structures and tactical doctrine were lifted straight from Soviet text books, although the quality of the equipment provided was always second rate by modern standards.

At the cutting edge of the FAPLA were its five mechanised brigades, mobile armoured formations based on Soviet Motorised Rifle Regiment, that provided its main mobile offensive strike forces. These were backed up by seventeen infantry brigades which whilst largely organised for defensive operations did have some integral mobile elements capable of launching localised counter-attacks. At local level the ODP militia formations were used purely for defence, operating against UNITA guerrilla forces that were attempting to infiltrate their area.

The Cubans began deploying entire Brigade sized units, their Motor Rifle Regiments, in the late 1970s, with up to six being present at any time. These were better equipped than the FAPLA, however they were largely deployed as internal security forces in order to free up FAPLA forces to operate against UNITA. That was on the verge of changing in 1988, when South African forces had some minor clashes with Cuban forces. Indeed the South African government was so concerned about a potential Cuban invasion of South West Africa that they threatened to use nuclear weapons were that to happen. In the event the Cubans were becoming exhausted by their commitment to Angola and with the Soviet Union attempting to reposition itself in the age of glasnost and perestroika they were as happy to end the conflict in the region politically and withdraw their forces as part of the agreement. For most of the conflict the Cubans and Soviets restricted their activities to taking command at a senior level with planning and strategic command.

The Angolan Air Force was largely reliant on Cuban and some Romanian pilots to fly their Soviet designed planes and helicopters. The MI 18 and MI 17 helicopters flew throughout with the M24, M25 and M35 Hind being deployed from 1984 onwards. The MIG17 provided the main interceptor and the MIG21 and MIG23 operated as fighter bombers.

Most FAPLA units will be Average, however the ODP will be poor. A leavening of Cuban advisors within any FAPLA force will increase their effectiveness by the presence of better quality Big Men.

I have included Cuban only sections so that the gamer may employ them as such if he wishes, but this should be very unusual.

IABSM Rating Troops 0 1 2 3 Poor and Average FAPLA 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6 7, 8, 9 10 Good FAPLA 1, 2, 3 4, 5, 6 7, 8 9, 10 Cubans 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7 8, 9, 10

TW&T Rating FAPLA groups are capable of breaking down into fire teams, with a three man LMG team and a six man rifle team commanded by a Corporal. The AK47 or variant should be considered an Assault Rifle, the LMG treated as a DPM or DPD in the rules. They may be considered average shots.

Poor FAPLA are not real soldiers.

Casualties and Hit Effects When they take hits from firing the following tables should be used when dicing for effect:

Cubans D6 1,2 3,4,5 6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Page 102

Average and Good FAPLA D6 1,2 3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Poor FAPLA D6 1 2,3,4 5,6 Effect Near Miss Wound Dead

Morale When a section of Good FAPLA reach the point where they have two more wounds than they have men they will immediately retire 9”.

When a section of Average FAPLA reach the point where they have the same number of wounds as men they will immediately retire 9”.

When a section of Poor FAPLA reach the point where they have the same number of wounds as men they will immediately bombshell.

Fieldcraft FAPLA troops may have Fieldcraft ratings of 1 to 2.

FAPLA Organisation As we saw in 1975 the FAPLA, as successors to the MPLA, were basing their unit structures on the Soviet model, with battalions being formed with three rifle companies, each with three platoons. Better equipped forces, such as the Mechanised Brigades, would also see a Support Company within each battalion. Headquarters elements at all levels were minimal, within a company one rifle section was all that was present, at battalion level a platoon accompanied the commander. Sections were ten men each, although this would vary in combat due to attrition and desertion.

Within the Motorised Brigades the following company structure would be used by the infantry elements.

Company HQ One rifle squad (10 men) One BTR-60 BP One 82mm Recoilless Rifle

Platoon One Platoon Two

Three rifle squads (10 men each) Three rifle squads (10 men each)

Three BTR-60 BP Three BTR-60 BP

Platoon Three Three rifle squads (10 men each) Three BTR-60 BP

Towards the very end of the conflict some Mechanised units received the BMP-1, however this should only be for operations in 1987 and 1988.

Within the Support Company elements included an 82mm mortar platoon of six pieces with FOO transported in trucks. An anti-aircraft platoon armed with three SA-7 missiles and four 14.5mm ZPU-1 anti-aircraft MGs would have truck transport whilst the anti-tank platoon had either six AT-3 Sagger missile launchers or six B10 82mm recoilless rifles transported in jeeps (on which the Recoilless rifles could be mounted) or in BTR-60s.

Page 103

Artillery would be either the 76mm Zis3 of WWII vintage or the D30 122mm howitzer, these being deployed in four gun batteries. The BM21 rocket launcher system was also popular, as was the 120mm mortar

Armour was present in the shape of the T35-85 with the infantry brigades and the T54 or T55 tanks with the mechanised forces, later the T-62 being introduced in the mid 1980s. The amphibious BRDM 2 scout car also used with the reconnaissance units, all armour normally being deployed in platoons of three AFVs.

Big Men Big Men should be poor for FAPLA infantry divisions and average for the motorised units. For IABSM an FAPLA forces should have one Big Man per Company and 0.5 per platoon. To this may then be added Cuban advisors at a rate of one per platoon for Average forces or two per platoon for Good ones.

If using TW&T the overall number of men in each squad should be diced for using the Soviet squad model in the main TW&T rules. For an Average force a platoon commander will always be present, but on a 1-3 on a D6 no squad leader will be present. Good forces should always have one platoon officer and one NCO per squad as Big Men. Many of these Big Men should be Cubans.

Armoured Vehicles Vehicle Armour Class Weapon Strike Speed T34-85 7 11 Fast T54 10 14 Fast T55 11 14 Fast T62 13 16 Fast BRDM 2 3 14.5mm HMG Wheeled Amphibious BTR-60 3 14.5mm HMG Wheeled Amphibious BMP-1 4 9 Wheeled Amphibious

Force Characteristics Armoured Bonus. May be available for motorised units

Poor Fire Discipline. This may be present for any FAPLA force whose fire discipline may be Poor or Dreadful.

Reconnaissance Bonus. Available for any dedicated recce force

Rapid Deployment. This may be available for a motorised or armoured force.

Machine Gun Bonus. May always be available for a better quality force.

Mortar Bonus card. This should be present for a large FAPLA force that has been trained to operate with mortar support.

Hesitant Commander. This may be present with any Average MPLA force.

Dynamic Commander. Any Cuban led force may have a Dynamic Commander.

Death From Above. Available when supported by the Cuban crewed Hind gunship.

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Page 105

Page 106

The following section is designed to give an insight into the type of games we envisage B’Maso being used for. These are all generic scenarios, although based heavily on historical accounts of typical actions. The exception is scenario eight where South African tanks take on FAPLA armour, which was unusual, however this is based on a real action and serves to show just how the conflicts on the continent had escalated over the decades since the low level almost policing action of the 1950s and ‘60s.

Throughout these scenarios we have stuck pretty much to the letter of the guidelines in the main supplement, however this should not suggest that anything here is written on a tablet of stone, far from it. Feel free to tinker with any of the stats given, create your own bonus card to reflect the aspects of your force that you feel most important. In a nutshell treat this supplement, and the main rules, as a tool box from which you can select the bits you need to create the games you want.

Scenario One – Kenya – Don’t Panic, It’s the Home Guard. Page 108

Scenario Two – The Congo – They Drink it in the Congo Page 111

Scenario Three – Biafra – Make Mine a Large One Page 114

Scenario Four – Rhodesia – Fireforce Page 117

Scenario Five – Rhodesia - Blackboots on the Trail Page 120

Scenario Six – Mozambique – Flying the Flag at Fort Salazar Page 123

Scenario Seven – Angola - Bridge 17 Page 126

Scenario Eight – Angola – On the Horns of the Buffalo Page 129

Scenario Nine – South West Africa – Koevoet! Page 132

Page 107

Introduction The Kenyan Emergency is notoriously difficult to game, largely due to the imbalance between the armament of the two forces; consequently getting the design of the scenarios right is critical. This game is set during the middle phase of the revolt and is based in the cordon sanitaire zone between the forests and the tribal lands. Dotted throughout this area were Guard Posts manned by the Kikuyu Home Guard whose function was to observe and patrol the area. The Guard Post shown here is typical in its structure and strength, most would have a headman, a tracker and fifty Kikuyu. They would live in the traditional thatched hut and have firing positions in sangars within the perimeter. The Post was normally situated where visibility was good and the whole position was ringed with a punji pit and two six foot six inch barbed wire fences to protect it from attack. A small removable bridge would allow access across this “moat”.

At right is a cross section of a section of one such Guard Post.

This scenario is something of a hybrid, being playable with either IABSM or TW&T. The troop classifications are exactly as written in the supplement. This is a low level action where most of the troops on the table are armed with traditional weapons; however that presents some interesting tactical options.

Home Guard Briefing You are Magani Njojo, a Kikuyu Headman and commander of this Guard Post in the open lands that the British have created between the forests and your tribal lands. It is here that you catch and kill the Mau Mau, the terrible murderers of your people and the stealers of your cattle.

It is early morning, just as sun is rising, and Mugo Atherwu, your nephew, has led a group of a ‘full nine’ men out on patrol. It is your hope that they also catch some food for breakfast, so they have taken their traditional hunting weapons rather than the new rifles that the District Commissioner brought you.

You are in the Guard Post with forty men, of whom twenty are armed with the Lee Enfields and twenty more with traditional weapons of bows, swords and spears. You will keep watch for Mugo, and hope that you catch some Mau Mau today. You know that if they come near you there are patrols of the King’s African rifles who may be summoned with the fire pistol that shoots “falares” that glow like the sun even in day time. Your force is as follows:

In the Guard Post Headman Magani Njojo (DAv IABSM, Grade III TW&T) Twenty men in two sections armed with Lee Enfields Twenty men in two sections armed with traditional ranged weapons

Page 108 On Patrol Mugo Atherwu (D4 IABSM, Grade I TW&T) Ten men with traditional ranged weapons

Mau Mau Briefing You are General Dedan Kimathi of the Land and Freedom Army, commanding a forest detachment in the area of Ibudo. Your platoon has been on an important mission in the white farming areas where you had much military success hamstringing a goat; a famous blow for the people of Kenya against the white robbers! You were planning to cross the open land in the darkness to return to the forests and safety, but you got lost in the darkness and the sun is now rising. From your position you can see that a Guard Post is in your way. The traitors will be manning it and you know that the Kings African Rifles will be patrolling the area soon.

But wait! Here comes a patrol of traitors. If you can ambush them it may be that you will be able to seize the Guard Post, or if the alarm is raised then you could attack the Kings African Rifles and steal their weapons. Either way this is an opportunity for another great victory before you escape and hide. Remember, one of your men has made a “cannon gun” from an old bicycle part, and alarm clock and a shot gun cartridge that he has loaded with extra charge, this weapon will strike fear into your enemies! Your force is as follows.

Big Men General Dendan Kimathi (D6 IABSM, Grade IV TW&T) Major Juju Ambitamanje (D4 IABSM, Grade I TW&T)

One group of then men with Lee Enfield rifles (Dreadful fire discipline, short on ammunition) Five groups of ten men with traditional ranged weapons

Umpire’s Notes The Mau Mau have the initiative at the start of the game. They may be deployed anywhere within 12” of the eastern table edge, between points A and B on blinds. They may also place the ten man Home Guard patrol anywhere on the table that is a minimum of 10” from any of their troops before the game begins.

The Guard Force headman may only fire his Verey pistol to warn the KAR when he, and not the patrol, can actually see the Mau Mau. Then he rolls a D6 to operate the gun on his card, requiring 4-6 to fire it effectively. When

Page 109 summoned thus a section of Kings African Rifles will arrive at point A on the map. These are commanded by Corporal Idi Amin, a DAv Big Man in IABSM, Grade II in TW&T.

The terrain is as shown on the map. The Guard post stands on a small hillock providing good visibility. To the south is a dry water course that is rocky enough to provide reasonable cover to any troops moving in it but not hamper movement. It is about four foot deep and is crossed by a small wooden bridge near the Guard Post. Most of the ground is open, but the mustard colour patches are scrubby grass of about four foot height in which men can hide, the wooded areas are represented by the trees. None of the terrain impedes movement.

Ultimately the Mau Mau must escape off the table edge between C and D. They win a major victory if they capture any firearms, be that from the Home Guard or the KAR. They win a significant victory if they kill some KAR and more Home Guard than they lose themselves, and a moral victory if they just escape (however ideally they should not know that).

The Home Guard win a major victory if they destroy all of the Mau Mau for minimal losses. They win a significant victory if they destroy all the Mau Mau and lose less than ten men themselves. They win a pyrrhic victory if they destroy all the Mau Mau but lose more than ten men.

Historical Note Dedan Kimathi was actually a Mau Mau Field Marshall, which in real terms should be tempered by the fact that gangs of thirty or more were regularly commanded by a “General”. He was captured in 1956 and hanged the following hear. Corporal Idi Amin was a section leader in the Kings African Rifles during the Mau Mau revolt; he went on to become rather well known. Magani Njojo would describe his nephew’s patrol of ten men as a “full nine”, it is unlucky in Kikuyu culture to say the number ten.

Cards British Mau Mau General Magani Njojo General Dendan Kimathi Sundowner Mugo Atherwu Major Juju Ambitamanje Blank Card Corporal Idi Amin Unit cards Unit cards Poor Fire Discipline Blinds Ammunition Shortage Poor Fire Discipline Blinds KAR Rally B’Maso Rapid Deployment Dynamic Commander

Why not “Go Large” and expand this scenario to make a larger IABSM sized game. Increase the KAR force to a platoon under a Lieutenant and have a second group of Mau Mau arriving at point C or D (dice for which). This force will be forty men strong with two more Big Men and intent on capturing the Guard Post.

Page 110

Introduction The war in the Congo presents a huge variety of game options. This scenario is set immediately after the Belgian airborne assault on Stanleyville when, for political reasons, the Belgians were obliged to cancel other airborne drops which had been planned to rescue hostages held throughout north eastern parts of the Congo. Instead small mercenary Commandos were despatched by road in fast moving motorised columns in the hope of reaching their objectives in time. The price of failure was all too gruesome.

The terrain featured here has been arranged to give the longest practical road distance for the mercenaries to travel, while at the same time having two potential river crossings to choose from. The larger the table the better for these types of games, this 6’ by 5’ table is somewhat cramped, but we make the best of the space available by not allowing any movement more than 6” from the roads or houses. This, effectively, creates a longer table than we actually have.

This scenario is with either IABSM or TW&T, although I’d be inclined to use the former due to the number of Simbas. That said, the numbers on the table at any one time are quite manageable with TW&T as the action is likely to be broken down into more than one small battle. The troop classifications are exactly as written in the supplement.

52 commando Briefing The cancellation of Operation Dragon Magenta means that the European hostages at Shumbvi are in terrible danger. You have orders from Major Hoare to lead 52 Commando along the long and dangerous route north to effect a rescue with all haste. You know for a fact that the Simbas are agitated following the capture of Stanleyville; you had proof of that six miles back when you burst through a large group who were clearly expecting you.

One problem you have is that you are unsure if the ferry at Ullanga is still operating. The Cuban pilots have been unable to locate it, so you won’t know until you get there. There is an alternative; to float your vehicles across on pontoons made from local canoes, but as speed is of the essence you’d rather not waste time.

Your force is as follows: Captain Johnny Danger (D6 for IABSM, Grade III for TW&T) Lieutenant Jerry Walker (DAv for IABSM, Grade II for TW&T) Four rifle sections, each in softskin transport. Two of these trucks may have mounted 0.50 cal HMGs.

Armoured Spearhead “Frenchy” (D4 for IABSM, Grade II for TW&T) Two Ferret Armoured cars One M8 Greyhound. With TW&T each of the rifle sections will have a Big Man, Grade I, the armoured vehicles will have a commander with a Grade II status.

You must reach the mission at Shumbvi and rescue the hostages before they are killed. Killing Simbas is a secondary objective. Your force is made up of Disciplined Mercenaries.

Simba Briefing The white giants are coming! You, Pasqual M’bongwe are sure that the rumours that Stanleyville has been captured by the Belgians are true, and you wish only to kill the whites who you have locked up in the mission church. But you have instructions from above that by keeping them hostage you are ensuring that

Page 111 the Americans do not bomb you and parachute in to kill you. But if they do come you will be ready and the prisoners will die!

You have 120 men under your command, but you want to ensure that you stop the white giants before they reach you. You will keep at least 40 men on both sides of the river, deploying the balance where you wish. You have instructed a road block to be constructed somewhere on the south side of the river, you may choose where, and you have issued a barrel of magic potion to dish out to your troops to make sure that they are protected from the bullets of the enemy. In fact you think a couple of pints might settle your nerves…

Your force is as follows.

Big Men Pasqual M’bongwe (D4 IABSM/ Grade II TW&T) Patrice Malengwe (D4-1 IABSM, Grade I TW&T) Jean Tshunge (D4-1 IABSM, Grade I TW&T) Alphonse Obi (D4-1 IABSM, Grade I TW&T) Twelve groups of ten men each, one of which has a Stand Cannon they have built.

There are forty white hostages in the church (the red-roofed building) and they require at least one group to guard them.

Umpire’s Notes The Mercenaries enter the table on the road at the bottom left had corner of the map. The Simbas may be anywhere on the table, complying with their orders, as long as they are at least 18” from the mercenaries’ entry point.

The table is chiefly about the roads rather than the jungle, indeed no movement further than 6” into the jungle is allowed. Any troops who, for reasons of morale, retreat into it are considered lost for the duration of the game. Any movement in the jungle within 6” of the road is done with -1 pip per dice.

The white roofed buildings are European structures, the other rather grubby huts are native properties. In the small mission station to the north is the red- roofed church where the

Page 112 hostages are kept, the grey roofed shack in which the mission school used to operate and the white roofed vicarage. This is now the headquarters of M’bongwe.

The Simbas may set up their road-block anywhere on the table. This is a shoddy affair and can be pushed to one side by any vehicle using two of its initiative dice. However it will be enough to halt the column’s movement, thereby interrupting any Shock and Awe tactics.

There is a ferry at the more northerly crossing point. When the mercenaries arrive there they must see if it is working. They must have at least one Big Man or a section on the boat to do this, and will then roll one D6. On 3 to 6 the ferry can be started, however it can only transport two vehicles or forty men at a time.

If the mercenaries have lost more than ten men when they reach the river they may call for air support. This will arrive after two turns of the blank card in the shape of a Cuban piloted T26 which will attack any visible target with rockets on its first run and then MGs on its second, after which it returns to base.

The Simbas may not begin to consider executing the hostages until the mercenaries land on the northern bank of the river. Indeed their survival is part of the Simba victory conditions as they are sure that keeping them alive is protecting them from American air strikes.

The Simbas win a major victory if they keep the hostages alive and stop the mercenaries reaching them. They win a huge victory if they wipe out most of 52 commando. They win a marginal victory if they kill the hostages and at least ten mercenaries.

The mercenaries win a major victory if they rescue the hostages whilst losing ten men or less. They win a significant victory if the rescue the hostages and lose fifteen men or less. They win a victory if they rescue the hostages by lose more than 15 men.

Cards 52 Commando Simbas General Captain Johnny Danger Pasqual M’bongwe Sundowner Lieutenant Jerry Walker Patrice Malengwe Blank Card Frenchy Jean Tshunge TW&T Section Leaders Alphonse Obi Unit Cards TW&T Group Leaders Armoured Bonus Unit Cards Rapid Deployment Rapid Deployment Shock & Awe Poor Fire Discipline MG Bonus Dynamic Commander Dynamic Commander Mai Muelele Looters Blinds Blinds

Page 113

Introduction When Biafra declared independence there was little or no chance of outside assistance, so the Biafrans set about constructing their own armaments industry with what was to hand under the umbrella of the Research & Production Organisation. One of the subsidiaries of this, the Chemicals & Materials Workshop, produced a napalm like substance that they bottled for use against Federal Nigerian AFVs, giving it the nick-name Biafra Gin. There were also several attempts made to created their own armoured vehicles, called Red Devil’s in Biafra, from construction plant and old vehicle chassis. This scenario, designed for TW&T, features both.

Biafran Briefing Ekpene is once again threatened by the advance of the Federalists and we have little with which to stop them. Slowly Biafran dreams of independence are dying in the ruins of our towns and villages, but here you intend to stop them. You are Captain Obi Wankonobe of Bifara’s elite 4 Commando. Your Division was badly damaged by the fighting at Aba and you have retired on Ekpene in the hope of reforming, but the pressure is relentless. A force of infantry and armour has been reported attempting to enter the town from the south and you have been sent to stop the enemy advance here.

Two “Red Devils” have been supplied, but frankly they are very slow old earth moving tractors with caterpillar tracks that move so slowly you fear that they will not be much good for anything other than blocking the road. Your force is as follows.

Platoon Command Captain Obe Wankonobe, Grade IV

Section One Sergeant Rufus Ollajenge (Grade II) Eight men with FAL FN assault rifles

Section Two Sergeant Moses N’jabengwe (Grade II) Eight men with FAL FN assault rifles

You have eight bottles of Biafran gin which can be split between these forces.

Two Red Devil Mark III Armoured cars, no armaments. Commanded by Sergeant Rambo Banjo, Grade II

Already in place are two eight man sections of Biafran troops, one of which is occupying a bunker, the other a 12” section of trench that the player may place anywhere on the northern half of the table. These troops are average but are armed with bolt action rifles and have no grenades. They may be split down into fire teams in any way the player desires. They have one Big Man, Corporal Ulleje who is a Grade I Big Man.

Page 114 Nigerian Briefing As part of the Nigerian 1st Division you are spearheading the attack on the rebel held town of Ekpene. There has been tough fighting in this area for some time; the town was captured a few months ago and then was reclaimed by the rebels soon after, so you can expect hard fighting. Your battalion has been broken down into small units in an attempt to find a way through the enemy’s defences. It is your objective to advance through this sector and make your way northwards via the main road. You have no idea where the Biafrans are, what you do know is that they are poorly armed, but full of spirit. You must overcome them with your superior armament, they have no answer to your Saracen armoured cars so use them well. Your force is as follows:

Platoon HQ Captain Yussuf M’bengwe (Grade III) Two 81mm mortars, off table One 0.50 HMG, three crew.

Section One Section Two Sergeant Olla Yussuba (Grade I) Sergeant Jojo Hada (Grade I) 8 men, SLR armed 8 men, SLR armed

Section Three Armoured Troop Sergeant “Johnnie” Ramahl (Grade I) Lieutenant “Sandy” Umbotto (Grade III) 8 men, SLR armed Three Saladin Armoured Cars

Umpires Briefing The table represents relatively close terrain on the edge of a conurbation. This would be better represented if a few old burnt out cars could be added to the scene (E-Bay is a good source of these for 1960s scale vehicles).

The Nigerians may enter the table on either of the two surfaced roads at the southern end of the map, or the dirt track in the bottom left hand corner. Their objective is to leave the northern edge on the main road – the one with the white line down the middle - but the Biafrans should not know this.

The Biafrans start the game with the two sections under Corporal Ulleje on the table, anywhere in the top half of the map. They may choose where to locate their bunker – it has been built into one of the buildings, and is of solid concrete construction – and the trench. Indeed they may swap the 12” of trench for several smaller bits totalling 12” if they wish.

Captain Wankonobe arrives with his troops and the Red Devils on the second turn of the blank card

Page 115 on the unmade road in the top right hand corner, like all the other units they will start the game on blinds.

The Nigerians win a major victory if they get off the table with all their armour intact and less than nine men dead. They win a victory if they get off the table with two of the three armoured cars intact and less than a dozen men dead. The Biafrans win a major victory if they destroy two armoured cars and stop the Nigerians exiting off the table on the main road. They win a significant victory if they just stop the Nigerians exiting the table. They get lots of extra bonus points if they capture any armoured vehicle intact with only one point of damage on it.

Cards Nigerian Biafran General Captain Yussuf M’bengwe Captain Obe Wankonobe Sundowner Sergeant Olla Yussuba Sergeant Rufus Ollajenge Blank Card Sergeant Johnnie Ramahl Sergeant Moses N’jabangwe Sergeant Jojo Hada Sergeant Rambo Banjo Lieutenant Sandy Umbotto Unit Cards Unit Cards Biafra Gin Alalaba Tactics Vehicle Breakdown Mortar Bonus Heroic Leader MG Bonus Blinds Hesitant Commander Blinds

It is entirely possible to extend this to make it more suitable with IABSM by increasing the Nigerian side to a full company, and the Biafrans to two platoons. Keep the number of AFVs the same.

Page 116

Introduction It would simply be wrong to have a supplement covering the Rhodesian war without a Fireforce scenario. The Rhodesians were pioneers of this technique which evolved through three distinct phases, from the early purely helicopter actions through to the jumbo-Fireforces of the late war, with C47 Dakotas and the Dalmatian gunship with quad mounted 0.303 machine guns.

This action uses the classic original model, ideal for the wargames table due to its smaller size. The game can be played using either IABSM or TW&T, I would recommend the former as the game will play quicker, however we have happily played games of this size with TW&T, the waits between the waves of heliborne arrivals should just be doubled.

As will be seen we start this game with the first wave of stop teams on the ground and the second wave about to arrive. The first drops would be unlikely to initiate any contact with the enemy as the system of vertical envelopment relies on the stops being in position first in order to stop the enemy from simply running away and avoiding contact with the security forces.

Rhodesian Briefing The siren has just gone off at Grand Reef air base. A terrorist party has been identified in the Sabi Tribal Trust Land by a Selous Scout Pseudo team operating in the area near Nzungu Kraal and the St Ethelread’s mission. CID have informed you that this is likely to be a group of around thirty terrs that crossed from Mozambique four days ago.

A Fireforce action has been decided upon and your Commando is undertaking the mission. You have one K- car and three G-cars to insert your force. You have a total of eight sticks of four men which will be deployed in three waves. The Air Force inform us that there is no close air support available as the Lynx is on other operations. In extreme circumstances we have Hunters at New Sarum that can be over the area in fifteen minutes maximum. Your force is as follows:

Callsign: Three Nine One K-Car with 20mm cannon Major Hugh Jarce

First Wave Lieutenant Skip Pieterson D6 Callsigns: Stop One to Stop Three Four men each, One FN MAG GPMG, three FN

Second Wave Sergeant Jim Crankie D6 Callsigns: Stop Four to Stop Six Four men each, One FN MAG GPMG, three FN

Third Wave Sergeant Andy McNutt D6 Callsigns: Stop Seven to Stop Eight Four men each, One FN MAG GPMG, three FN

If required we can have a combat tracker team in the area within ten minutes.

Page 117

ZANLA Briefing You are Comrade Freedom Mukundu of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army. You have recently crossed the border from Mozambique and are currently operating in the Sabi Tribal Trust Land in Manicaland where you have orders to establish a presence amongst the people of Nuzungu kraal and meet up with Comrade Sixpence Pamberi. The party has been informed that the people in this area are under the sway of a Priest in the local mission. His school teaches the children the ways of the whites. You must destroy the school and let the people know, in no uncertain terms, that they are not to support the whites in any way.

You have no order to encounter Smith’s soldiers, but if you meet them you will engage them and inflict the most possible deaths before ensuring your own safety and escape to your hide out in the bundu. There is a road nearby, you may choose to mine it if you desire.

Your force is as follows.

Comrade Freedom Mukundu D4 Comrade Lovemore Muzimba D4-1

Three groups of 10 comrades. You have one land mine.

Page 118 Once you get to the kraal you may use two young boys as mujibas to seek out the soldiers or police.

Umpires Notes Ideally the terrorists will not be expecting a fireforce action, better that they assume that any Rhodesians will be on foot, indeed if an umpire is present he should do all he can to encourage that.

The ZANLA forces begin the game anywhere in the kraal or up as far as the triangle in the road. The premise is that they are in the village doing unspeakable things to the headman and his family when the fireforce helicopters arrive. You will need to establish before the game starts where the pre-designated bombshell point is on the table.

The Rhodesians may already have three sticks on the table, however get the commander to plan before the game just where he plans to insert his troops. The game starts with the second wave hovering above their LZs, at which point the ZANLA player will realise that he is in trouble.

The Rhodesian third wave will arrive on the table on the fifth turn of the blank card. A second ZANLA force under Sixpence Pamberi will arrive on the centre of the northern (top) edge of the table on the fourth turn of the blank card, between the river and the kopje. This will be comprised of twenty terrs in two groups. These newcomers will be acting on their own initiative, intent on rescuing Freedom Mukundu’s men and escorting them to safety off the northern table edge. The ZANLA player should not know this until the two groups meet.

The Rhodesians win a major victory if they kill 40 or more terrorists with a 10:1 kill ratio. They win a victory if they kill 30 or more with the same kill ratio. Their victories are downgraded if they achieve a 8:1 kill ratio or less. They lose if their kill ratio is below 5:1. The ZANLA player wins a major if they manage to escape with half their force or more. Their level of victory is increased for every security forces member killed. Don’t forget that modern medicine will save two thirds of the Rhodies who have been “killed” during the game.

Cards Rhodesian ZANLA General Major Hugh Jarce Comrade Freedom Mukundu Sundowner Lieutenant Skip Pieterson Comrade Lovemore Muzimba Blank Card Sergeant Jim Crankie TW&T Section Leaders Sergeant Andy McNutt Unit Cards TW&T Section Leaders Poor Fire Discipline Unit Cards B’Maso Machine Gun Bonus Blinds Death From Above Blinds

Page 119

Introduction Having started the last scenario lauding the importance of Fireforce actions in Rhodesia I feel that it is important to restore some balance by giving credit to the men who were at the uncomfortable sharp end for most of the conflict, the men of the British South Africa Police.

Originally formed as the Company Police of Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company the title was retained when the force entered the service of the Crown before the Boer War. Always a para-military force, the BSAP were to find that they were increasingly called upon to deal with the escalating terrorist threat, both from a point of view of combating these elements and dealing with their victims. As a result the BSAP Support Unit was formed to concentrate on COIN operations, allowing other policemen to continue their role dealing with with day to day crime. Proud of their military service the Support Unit wore black boots rather than the standard BSAP brown footwear, hence their nickname. Always smart and well turned out the Support Unit was far from PC Plod with guns; this was an efficient anti-terrorist body that were both feared and respected by their opponents.

Here we see a Company deployed under an Inspector in a game that can be played with either IABSM or TW&T. The table shown is 6’ by 5’, but the larger your table can be the more accurately you will reflect this type of sweep action.

Rhodesian Briefing Reports of arson in the Africa Purchase Areas were not unusual, and they generally meant one thing – terrorists. So Mr Patel’s phone call, stating that the Chisumbanje Development Company’s storage sheds were burning was not just a job for the Fire Brigade. In response you have decided to bring Bravo Troop to the area in the Crocodiles to conduct a small sweep. Patel’s Wonder-Market is just up around the next bend, you can see the smoke from the storage sheds already, so you’ll be on your guard. Your force is as follows:

Troop Headquarters Inspector Charlie Barlow, Grade IV, D6+2 Patrol Officer John Watt, Grade III, DAv+1 Section Four One tracker, Fieldcraft Two Constable Chisadza, Status I, DAv Three Crocodile Mine Proof Vehicles Four Constables

Section One Section Five Constable Njengwe, Status II, D6 Lance Sergeant Tongayi, Status II, D6 Four Constables Four Constables

Section Two Section Six Constable Induna, Status II, D6 Constable Mthekeli, Status I, DAv Four Constables Four Constables

Section Three Section Seven Lance Sergeant Massinga, Status II, D6 Constable Kuwadza, Status II, D6 Four Constables Four Constables

Page 120

ZIPRA Briefing Your plan is simple, experience has taught you that this is the best method! An hour ago you set fire to the Chisumbanje Development Company’s storage sheds on the edge of the African Purchase Area and the Seki Tribal Trust Land in which you are based. You sent a small boy to tell Mr Patel at the local store to contact the police and now you are awaiting their response.

Your plan is to ambush the police and then take advantage of the rugged terrain to withdraw and then ambush again. Indeed you have sufficient men to repeat this process several times before escaping back into the safety of the Trust Lands.

You have two land mines which you may place in anticipation of the police reaction force who are likely to arrive on the road at point A. Your force is as follows:

Headquarters Section Three Zone Section Commander Watchout Nkube, Comrade Helicopter-Downer Tzekel, Grade I, D6 Grade III, D6 Ten Men One RPG team, two men.

Section One Comrade Jacob Ndluvu, Grade II, DAv+1 Ten men

Section Two Comrade Garfield Shabanje, Grade I, DAv Ten men

Page 121 Umpires briefing In this game the terrorists are ready and waiting for the Security Forces, they may deploy anywhere on the table to the west (left) of the road on blinds. They may have laid their mines anywhere on the road. They have a Fieldcraft rating of One.

The Rhodesians arrive on turn one at point A on the road. Gamers are naturally expecting something to happen, so are often inclined to start doing daft things like driving off-road without any prompting. This should be discouraged. If they intend to visit Mr Patel’s Wonder-Market at point B then they should drive there by road. If, however, they intend to debus immediately and make for the burning buildings at point C then that is equally reasonable. The tracker will operate on the Inspector’s card if he is with him, or the card of the Big Man that he is accompanying if he is deployed with one of the sections.

The terrain should be close, hilly, rocky and scrubby, offering excellent cover for ambushes. At some point Watchout Nkube needs to consider the fact that his objective is not to die here, but to hit hard and then retire to the Tribal Trust Lands, exiting the table on its western edge. He should designate his bombshell point for any forces that are obliged to run from contact.

The small family kraal at D is utterly irrelevant unless manned by ZIPRA forces, the inhabitants have no real interest in the conflict and are afraid of both sides.

The Rhodesians win a major victory if they kill more than twenty terrorists with a 7:1 kill ratio. Less than that ratio will be bad news for the local Police force, however the over-riding mission is to kill all the terrorists.

ZIPRA win a large victory if they lose less than ten men and inflict four or more kills on the Police (remember that only 1 in 3 “kills” are actually dead for the Security forces thanks to modern medicine).

Cards Rhodesian ZANLA General Inspector Charlie Barlow Commander Watchout Nkube Sundowner PO John Watt Comrade Jacob Ndluvu Blank Card Constable Njengwe Comrade Garfield Shabanje Constable Induna Comrade Helicopter-Downer Tzekel Lance Sergeant Massinga Unit Cards Constable Chisadza Rapid Deployment Lance Sergeant Tongayi Poor Fire Discipline Constable Mthekeli B’Maso Constable Kuwadza Blinds Unit Cards Dynamic Commander Heroic Leader

It is possible to make an even smaller game of this which is still fun to play. Reduce the terrs to two groups and the Rhodesians to just three Sections under the Patrol Officer and, of course, the tracker.

Page 122

IntroDuction In all of their colonies the Portuguese were insistent that their flag could fly wherever it was planted, and to prove this they built a succession of earth forts throughout the provinces which they then manned with troops. Indeed it was this obsession with holding ground that tied up huge numbers of Portuguese troops and allowed them to be targeted in the most disadvantageous circumstances.

The scenario presented here for IABSM represents one such fort in 1971 with a FRELIMO force attacking both it and the supply column that is attempting to reach it. The forts were nothing like the Beau Geste affairs of the North African deserts, these were little more than strong-points, sometimes with a basic earth rampart, but often with just a small fence to delineate extent of the position and trenches for firing positions.

Here a larger table than our normal 6’ by 5’ would help, but the important thing is to keep the fort quite large, say 2’ by 1’ and have as much wooded bush as possible to allow the rebels to come from any direction.

Portuguese Briefing You have been sat in this fort north of Cabora Bassa for too long now, still only four months until you get out of this uniform and return to Lisbon and get a real job. You can’t wait. Your orders are to stay here and fly the flag, do a few patrols and wait until your relief comes. To be really honest patrolling is somewhat tiresome, especially since the turras have been mining the roads, and you certainly have no intention of wandering around in the bush!

You are expecting a supply convoy this morning and this is always a tense time as an attack now could prove difficult. Not only do you have to man the fort against attacks but also be prepared to assist the convoy if it runs into trouble. You are looking forward to getting your mail, but be aware that there may be turras who will want to spoil your day. Your force is as follows:

Big Men Capitão Carlos Quarezma D6 Tenente João Fernandes DAv Alferes Hugo Meira D4+1

Caçadores Company Headquarters Two 60mm mortars Two MG 42 sustained fire role One Austin Gipsy Three Berliet lorries

Platoon One Three sections (8 men each)

Platoon Two Three sections (8 men each)

Platoon Three Three sections (8 men each)

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FRELIMO Briefing With these rockets they are really spoiling us! A whole box of RPG-7 and a SA-7 ground to air missile too, we shall destroy the foolish Portuguese and their ridiculous fort. Then they will nave nowhere to hide.

For some time now our forces have been attempting to halt work on the Cabora Bassa Dam, the symbol of Portuguese repression in the north-west of the country. It has been decided at headquarters that the key to destroying the facility is to kill the Portuguese troops who defend it. Before we can kill them we must kill the troops in the forts that defend the defenders who are defending the dam. War is Hell!

Your informants tell us that a supply convoy will be moving to Fort Salazar in the morning and you intend to attack both the convoy and the fort to achieve maximum damage. Your force is as follows:

Big Men José Chissano D6 Fernando Gebuzana DAv Amadeo Nijassa D4 Christiano Umboloque D4 Two 82mm mortars (three crew each)

Platoon One Four sections of nine men.

Platoon Two Four sections of nine men.

Page 124 Platoon Three Four sections of nine men.

Platoon Four Four sections of nine men.

Each section may have an RPG with one round only. Additionally two mines may be used on the road, these should be planted anywhere further than 9” from the fort before the game starts.

Umpire’s Notes The terrain is largely close bush, but with a cleared area around the fort. The fort has a low earth rampart, roughly five foot high which serves as a firing position. Inside the fort are a couple of corrugated prefabricated sheds which serve as an Ops room and a wireless hut, the men sleep in tents. Additionally 9” of trench may be constructed within the fort.

The supply column will arrive at point A with instructions to unload supplies at the fort and then continue off the table at point D. The rebels may be on the table anywhere in the bush. They may also have laid mines on the road in anticipation of the supply column arriving. They should be encouraged to do this between point A and the fort, rather than point D and the fort, for obvious reasons.

The convoy, commanded by Tenente Luis Pinto is preceded by eight Engineers with picas checking for mines. After them are four trucks, with supplies, and each one has half a section of infantry on them.

Visibility is poor in the bush, troops not on the edge, or within a few inches of it, cannot be seen by those in the fort. The FRELIMO forces have just been armed with the RPG 7s, and they are not entirely familiar with them Apply a minus one to each roll to hit.

FRELIMO win a major victory if they take the fort. They win a significant victory if they completely destroy the convoy. The Portuguese win a major victory if they get the convoy into the fort and successfully defend their position.

Cards Portuguese FRELIMO General Capitão Carlos Quarezma José Chissano Sundowner Tenente João Fernandes Fernando Gebuzana Blank Card Alferes Hugo Meira Amadeo Nijassa Unit Cards Christiano Umboloque Vehicle Breakdown Unit Cards Machine Gun Bonus Poor Fire Discipline Hesitant Commander Rapid Deployment Heroic Leader Mortar Bonus Macho Macho Man B’Maso Blinds Blinds

Looking to reduce this scenario in size for TW&T? Replace the company in the fort with a platoon size force. This is now an outpost of a larger base that is about to be re-supplied by one truck. The FRELIMO forces should be reduced to five sections with a 60mm mortar.

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IntroDuction Throughout their involvement in Angola the South Africans were regularly called upon to assist UNITA in their fight against the FAPLA and their Cuban allies. The following scenario could be set at any time in the conflict from 1976 onwards, and represents a team of South African Engineers who have crossed the border to blow up a bridge in order to halt an FAPLA drive into UNITA territory. Unfortunately for them what should be a simple piece of demolition work is complicated by the early arrival of the enemy. Now their UNITA allies will have to fight to buy time so that the bridge can be blown.

This scenario is designed specifically for TW&T using a 6’ by 5’ table.

Unita Briefing With the latest FAPLA offensive launched against us we have orders to destroy Bridge 17 near Cuito Cuanavale in order to stop their mobile columns for long enough to bring reinforcements to the region. A team of South African Engineers is here and they are beginning to lay their charges, so hopefully we can all go home very shortly. You are concerned as the sound of engines can clearly be heard from the north- west. It can only be the FAPLA or their Cuban friends. Your platoon must prepare itself for an immediate defence of the bridge and only withdraw once the South Africans are ready to blow it.

Your force is as follows:

UNITA Regular HQ Section Tenente Manuel Machado, Grade III, DAv One 82mm Recoilless Rifle, three crew One RPG-7 team, two men.

Section One Sargento Dingani Santa Cruz, Grade II, D6 One ten man Assault Rifle section One RPG-7

Section Two Cabo Eduardo Tunga, Grade II, D4+1 One ten man Assault Rifle section One RPG-7

Section Three Cabo Pedro Flavio, Grade I, D4+1 One nine man Assault Rifle section

South African Engineers Sergeant Piet van Els One eight man section

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FAPLA Briefing Onwards! We march to victory against the UNITA running dogs of the racist oppressors. Our latest attack cannot fail; our fraternal allies, the Cubans, have kindly provided us with a plan that will see us destroy Savimbi and his dogs for ever. Once we pass the next bridge there will be nothing to slow our advance, victory will be ours.

We must keep the enemy on the run, do not slacken your pace. Any opposition must be crushed mercilessly.

Your force is as follows:

Section One Platoon Commander Raol Malengwe, Grade II, DAv 10 man Assault Rifle section. One BTR-60

Section Two Section Commander Jose Xosa, Grade I, D4-1 10 man Assault Rifle section. One BTR-60

Section Three Section Commander Jamal Aspinada, Grade I, D6 10 man Assault Rifle section. One BTR-60

Umpires Notes The terrain is almost entirely flat, with the river running through a depressed area about seven foot deeper than the surrounding terrain. It’s banks can be used to gain cover, they are impassable for vehicles. The bush is scattered, blocking visibility rather than impeding movement, with trees, bushes, scrub and tall grass being present. An old Portuguese villa, now abandoned, is on the north side of the bridge with a small rear garden enclosed by a four foot wall. This is well constructed from brick and block and offers good cover.

The UNITA forces start the game anywhere on the bottom half of the table on blinds. They are not dug in as they had not been anticipating an attack. They do, however, have three landmines which they may lay before the game begins.

The South African Engineers are fully occupied under the bridge setting the charges. They will complete their work on the ninth turn of the blank card at which point the UNITA platoon must withdraw across the bridge before it is blown. The Engineers may function as an eight man rifle team if circumstances become desperate, however this will delay the work on the bridge if they do this.

Page 127 The FAPLA forces arrive on the road in column on the first turn deployed on the table. They must use all of their turns to drive towards the bridge until fired upon. Until that time they may not spot, fire, leave the road, or do anything other than drive straight down the road.

The South African Engineers do have a “Thousand Footer” flare with them that, it under pressure, they may use to call in air support from some Impalas that are operating in the area. These can be on the scene in just two turns of the Air Support card. However setting off the Thousand Footer will delay their work on the bridge by one turn.

Once the work on the bridge is complete and the UNITA forces have withdrawn it is assumed that the demolition will happen automatically.

The FAPLA win a major victory if they take the bridge intact. UNITA win a major victory if the bridge is destroyed. Losses of men are not overly relevant in this scenario.

Cards UNITA FAPLA General Tenente Manuel Machado Platoon Commander Raol Malengwe Sundowner Sargento Dingani Santa Cruz Section Commander Jose Xosa Blank Card Cabo Eduardo Tunga Section Commander Jamal Aspinada Cabo Pedro Flavio Unit Cards Sergeant Piet van Els Armoured Bonus Unit Cards Blinds Air Support Rapid Deployment B’Maso Dynamic Commander Blinds

If you fancy going large to turn this into a scenario for IABSM, why not increase the FAPLA force to Company size and do the same with UNITA but adding three Eland 90 armoured cars to support them. If you do this then the FAPLA forces will suffer from the “technology gap” when it comes to aimed anti-tank firing.

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Introduction South Africa’s 32 Battalion was one of the most effective units serving on the South West African border due to its outstanding ability to undertake both pseudo and conventional operations. Indeed it spent most of the war inside Angola, where its Portuguese speaking former FNLA soldiers were in their element. In October 1987, during Operation Modular, it took part in the South African Army’s first combined tank and infantry battle since 1945. This scenario is set at that time, and whilst it does not replicate that historical battle completely there is much in there to make it a really enjoyable and, for Africa, unique situation, with British and Soviet Main Battle Tanks from the 1960s meeting on the African veldt in a miniature Cold War. It also gives us the opportunity to deploy some of Fidel’s finest.

FAPLA Briefing The bridgehead across the Lomba River is critical for the continuation of the advance into UNITA held territory, and clearly the South Africans know that as well as we do – you have been under fire from their heavy artillery for most of the morning, and you can only assume that they will be launching a ground attack before long. You can only hope that the armour support that you have been promised arrives in time!

Your force is currently dug in and anticipating an enemy attack. This is likely to be a South African force with armoured cars and infantry. Whatever happens you must hold on until armour support arrives, once we have tanks the South Africans will have to withdraw and the advance can continue. Do not let the enemy push you back across the river!

Your force is as follows.

Angolan Big Men Anti Tank Platoon Capitão Paulo de Carvalho, D4-1 Three 82mm Recoiless Rifles (4 crew each) Tenente Olengwe Mendes, DAv-1 Tenente Augoustino Ferriera, D4 Platoon One Three ten man Assault Rifle Sections Cuban Big Man Attached Ramon y Estíbaliz, D6+1 Platoon Two Three ten man Assault Rifle Sections Company Headquarters SA-7 Anti-Aircraft team (2 crew) Platoon Three 14.5mm Anti Aircraft HMG (3 crew) Three ten man Assault Rifle Sections

Page 129 South African Briefing With the latest attack on UNITA’s power base we have had, again, to intervene to stop the FAPLA from sweeping the south of Angola free of opposition. If they are successful then SWAPO will have unrestricted access to the border and that will spell trouble in South West.

The FAPLA forces have established a bridgehead on the south side of the Lomba River. If they can get armour across the bridge then they will be difficult to deal with. We must clear them out and chuck them back across the Lomba; there is no alternative. At present we believe that the enemy has only infantry on this side of the river, but they can still pack a punch. For the first time the government have authorised the use of tanks across the border. Let’s make sure they are a nasty surprise. Your force is as follows:

Big Men Captain Henk Winkler, D6+2 Platoon Three Lieutenant Carlos Mendes, DAv+2 Four ten man Assault Rifle sections Lieutenant Mike O’Reardon, D6 Warrant Officer Randy van Heiter, DAv Platoon Four Sergeant Fernando Tordo, D6 Four ten man Assault Rifle sections Sergeant Carlos Paião, DAv Anti Tank Platoon Headquarters Lieutenant “Ginger” Rogers Two 60mm mortar teams (three crew each) Three Ratel 90

Platoon One Tank Troop Four ten man Assault Rifle sections Lieutenant Olaf van der Merwe, D4 Three Oliphants Platoon Two Four ten man Assault Rifle sections

Page 130 UMPIRES Notes The terrain here is best described as undulating, with the rises in the ground just sufficient to provide hull-down positions for armoured vehicles and an advantage for infantry on them firing down on troops below. The river is not fordable, being wide and full of nasty creatures. There are several shell holes on the battlefield where the South Africans have shelled the bridgehead before their attack.

The vegetation is best described as scrub and only in the densest areas does this affect visibility (think European copses rather than thick bush). The areas displayed as rocky are impassable to vehicles.

The FAPLA forces start the game deployed anywhere on the table above the line B-C. They may have 18” of trenches dug in whatever configuration they choose. There may also be one substantial bunker present, however it must be accompanied by at least 6” of trench. They begin the game on blinds.

The South Africans start the game on blinds anywhere on the table edge marked D-E. If they wish individual tanks may be allocated to the rifle platoons to reflect the close co-ordination between the two. If that is the case the tanks are limited to one per platoon but will activate on the Platoon’s card. Their attack should be preceded by six Stonks. If the South Africans lose one Oliphant they may call on a strike by Impala aircraft. If they lose two tanks they may call for a Mirage strike. They may not call for both. These will arrive after two turns of the blank card.

On the sixth turn of the blank card a platoon of three T55 tanks will arrive at A under the command of Tenente Ide Hwangwe, D4. On the eighth turn a second platoon of T55 will arrive at the same point under the command of Diallo Salazar, D4 and on the ninth turn a further Platoon will arrive under Sargento Omar Bazongas, D4. These units definitely suffer from the “Technology Gap” when compared to the South African tankers, they should have a -2 to hit when firing at a target.

The FAPLA win a major victory if they hold their bridgehead, the South Africans win if they push the FAPLA back across the river.

Cards UNITA FAPLA General Captain Henk Winkler Capitão Paulo de Carvalho Sundowner Lieutenant Carlos Mendes Tenente Olengwe Mendes Blank Card Lieutenant Mike O’Reardon Tenente Augoustino Ferriera Warrant Officer Randy van Heiter Ramon y Estíbaliz Sergeant Fernando Tordo Unit Cards Sergeant Carlos Paião Armoured Bonus Unit Cards Rapid Deployment Blinds Blinds AT Bonus Hesitant Commander Air Support Death From Above

Looking to reduce your intake to a TW&T sized game? If so why not restrict the FAPLA to a platoon sized force supported by an SA-7 team and a recoilless rifle. This is not a patrol that has discovered a bridge intact and has radioed for the armour to cross here. The South Africans of 32 Battalion have sent a similar sized force, four sections backed up by three Ratel 90’s to stop any crossing. If you want you can always chuck in an Oliphant too!

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Crowbar! A hard name for a hard unit of policemen from South West Africa who patrolled the border regions, taking on terrorists wherever they found them with their fast-moving, hard-hitting combination of tracking at speed and firepower, usually fighting from their Casspirs rather than dismounting other than to track. Established by Brigadier J.G. Dreyer who had learnt much from his service along side the BSAP Support Unit in Rhodesia Koevoet became a master of its art, by 1987 it was reckoned that SWAPO terrorists had less than thirty-six hours in South West Africa before Koevoet were on the spoor and closing fast.

This scenario for TW&T represents a typical action where a Koevoet team has been tracking on the spoor of twenty terrs for seven or eight hours, sometimes running on the spoor for hours, sometimes at a snail’s pace. It’s the rainy season and the SWAPO operatives are using their skills in anti-tracking to try to get back across the border before they are discovered, but the Police trackers are convinced that their prey is only a few minutes ahead of them. One of the cars has been bogged down in a ‘shona some way back, but the rest of the team has continued on the spoor, the Casspirs sometimes attempting to Voorsny, rush ahead in the hope of anticipating the line of the spoor and thereby cutting down the time taken in the chase.

South West African Briefing “Minutes ahead”, that’s what Constable Hangula says, and he should know, he’s been on the spoor for six hours now. You have lost one Casspir, bogged down in a ‘shona, and it has stayed back with the Blesbok, still three cars should be enough firepower to deal with these Swaps.

This is the most dangerous time. The terrs will know you are close, they’ll be trying to decide whether to keep running or try to shoot it out. Your force is as follows:

Command Car Warrant Officer Pik du Toit, Status IV, D6+2 Ten Constables, assault rifles and LMGs One Casspir with 0.50 HMG

Car Two Warrant Officer Koos Lehrmann, Status II, DAv+1 Ten Constables, assault rifles and LMGs One Casspir with twin 0.30 MMGs

Car Four Warrant Officer Lukas Mallingo, Status II, DAv+1 Ten Constables, assault rifles and LMGs One Casspir with twin 0.30 MMGs

You must kill or capture all of the terrorists, do not let any escape. Use your cars to ensure that the trackers are safe but that there can be no way out for the Swaps. Your tracking team of four men is made up of Constables from the Command Car, they have a Fieldcraft rating of 3.

Page 132 SWAPO Briefing It’s the cops! And they are too close for comfort. Only about seven more kilometres and you’ll be in Angola, but these guys are hot on your tail, despite your anti-tracking techniques. What to do?

You can keep running, but they are gaining on you with every step. You can try to take them on, maybe surprise will be your best weapon. Whatever happens you need to do something!

Your force is as follows:

Commander Alois M’kimbwe, Grade II, D4 Twenty men from a specialist unit with mixed light weapons including three RPK LMGs and two RPG-75, both with three reloads.

You have a fieldcraft rating of two, and you are confident that your anti-tracking technique is as good as it can be. It seems the South African trackers are, however, better.

Umpires notes The terrain is rolling rather than hilly, with several water filled Oshanas in the depressed ground. The vegetation is scrubby and restricts visibility, however the Casspirs will be able to go anywhere on the table, albeit with a risk of bogging down in the Oshanas.

SWAPO begin the game anywhere in the southern half of the table. They are hidden on blinds, however if they move two blinds will be instantly put on the table, one to represent the real group, the other a dummy. If Alois wishes to set up an ambush he will have to work fast as his men will not move without him there, so he will need to do the best he can with regards his command status.

The Police begin the game on the spoor marker with a tracking team of four men deployed from the Command Car. As SWAPO are starting the game hidden on blinds the trackers may find that they are following the spoor with no blinds to aim for. In this case the SWAPO player should give a general indication of the direction he is in.

The RPG-75 should be treated as an RPG-7, the Casspirs are Kalahari Ferraris.

Koevoet win if they kill or capture all the SWAPO members whilst losing less than three dead. SWAPO win if they escape or inflict heavy casualties on the police.

Page 133 Cards Koevoet SWAPO General Warrant Officer Pik du Toit Alois M’kimbwe Unit Cards Sundowner Warrant Officer Koos Lehrmann Rapid Deployment Blank Card Warrant Officer Lukas Mallingo Blinds Unit Cards B’Maso Rapid Deployment Blinds MG Bonus Rally Dynamic Commander

This game is eminently playable with IABSM, just add Car Three and the Blesbok to the South African side and increase the SWAPO numbers to around fifty. With a larger table – or in a smaller scale – an Owambo kraal can be added to make the terrain more variable.

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