may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Riyaz Bhatkal and the Origins

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Riyaz Bhatkal and the Origins of the of the Indian Mujahidin Indian Mujahidin By Praveen Swami By Praveen Swami

Reports 5 Salafi-Jihadi Activism in Gaza: Mapping the Threat By Benedetta Berti 10 The Virtual Jihad: An Increasingly Legitimate Form of Warfare By Akil N. Awan 13 Internet Jihadists React to the Deaths of Al-Qa`ida’s Leaders in Iraq By Abdul Hameed Bakier 15 The Kidnapping and Execution of Khalid Khwaja in Pakistan By Rahimullah Yusufzai 17 The Sources of the Abu Sayyaf’s Resilience in the Southern Philippines By Rommel C. Banlaoi

20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts The aftermath of the German Bakery bombing in the Indian city of Pune in February 2010. - Photo by Barcroft Media via Getty Images

n the summer of 2004, a group Today, the Indian Mujahidin has been of young Indian Muslim men implicated in a number of attacks in India, gathered for a retreat at one of and there are signs that the group could the sprawling villas that line the become increasingly dangerous due to Icheerfully-named Jolly Beach, the pride its growing collaboration with Lashkar- of the small, south Indian fishing town i-Tayyiba (LT, or LeT) in Pakistan. The of Bhatkal. They swam, went for hikes in expansion of this network could pose a the woods, honed their archery skills, and serious challenge to regional stability in occasionally engaged in target practice South Asia. About the CTC Sentinel with an airgun. Local residents recall The Combating Terrorism Center is an occasionally hearing small explosions, independent educational and research but presumed the men were setting off institution based in the Department of Social fireworks. Nothing the men did gave Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Bhatkal’s police cause for concern. The November 23, 2007, the group e-mailed a manifesto to the West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses police, however, were unaware that the media that for the first time identified itself as the Indian the Center’s global network of scholars and men on Jolly Beach composed the core Mujahidin. The letter, reprinted in its exact form below, practitioners to understand and confront team of the jihadist network that would stated that the attacks were carried out to protest “the pa- contemporary threats posed by terrorism and soon be known as the Indian Mujahidin. thetic condition of muslims in India that idol worshipers other forms of political violence. Long before the network adopted that can kill our brothers,sisters,children and outrage dignity name, the men from Jolly Beach executed of our sisters at any place and at any time and we can’t re- a succession of bomb attacks beginning sist them. AL-HUM-DU-LILLAH now we are prepared 1 The views expressed in this report are those of in 2005, killing hundreds across India. enough to retaliates...Only Islam has the power to establish the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, a civilized society and this could be only possible in Islamic the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 1 Minutes before bombs exploded outside court buildings rule,which could be achieved by only one path JIHAD- in the Indian cities of Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad on FEE-SABILILLAH.”

1 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Prosecutors in New Delhi charge that Riyaz Shahbandri’s Early Life i-Islami Hind into confrontation with the principal organizers of the Jolly Riyaz Shahbandri’s father, Ismail the Indian government.7 SIMI sought Beach gathering were Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri, left Bhatkal approximately to re-establish the caliphate, without Shahbandri (also known as Riyaz three decades ago, hoping to make his which it felt the practice of Islam Bhatkal) and his brother Iqbal. Most of fortune in Mumbai. He established a would remain incomplete. Muslims the men at Jolly Beach knew each other successful leather-tanning business in comfortable living in secular societies, only by aliases, but Indian intelligence Mumbai’s Kurla area, and eventually its pamphlets warned, were destined for officials believe that the gathering purchased an apartment in Kardar hell. Ideologies other than Islam were included the Bhatkal brothers, Abdul Building off the busy Pipe Road— condemned as false and sinful.8 After Subhan Qureshi, and the key figures an impossible dream for most city Hindu fundamentalists demolished a responsible for the physical execution migrants.6 Ismail Shahbandri’s mosque in the north Indian town of of bombings in northern India, prosperity ensured that his son, Riyaz, Ayodhya in 1992, SIMI began to call for Mohammad Sadiq Israr Sheikh and Atif who was born in 1976, was able to study direct action. SIMI President Shahid Amin. Documents filed in Indian courts at local English-medium schools, and Badr Falahi demanded that “Muslims allege that the men played a key role in later civil engineering at Mumbai’s organize themselves and stand up to recruiting operatives, sourcing bomb defend the community.”9 components and organizing attacks. Furthermore, according to recent “The Jolly Beach meeting Later in the decade, SIMI’s polemic statements attributed to Pakistani- would serve as a key became increasing venomous. In a 1996 American jihadist David Coleman statement, SIMI declared that since Headley (also known as Daood Gilani),2 planning gathering before democracy and secularism had failed to the Shahbandri brothers now lead the group executed a series protect Muslims, the sole option was to the “Karachi Project,”3 an alleged LT struggle for the caliphate.10 Soon after, operation to train and equip Indian of increasingly lethal it put up posters calling on Muslims jihadists for attacks in India.4 The bombings.” to follow the path of the 11th century bombing of the German Bakery in Pune conqueror Mahmood Ghaznavi, and on February 13, 2010, for example, appealed to God to send down a latter- may have been part of this project; one day avatar to avenge the destruction of of the suspected bombers was Riyaz Saboo Siddiqui Engineering College. mosques in India.11 The organization was Shahbandri’s lieutenant, Mohammad In 2002, Riyaz married a Bhatkal-area finally proscribed after the 9/11 attacks Zarar Siddi Bawa, known as Yasin woman, Nashua Ismail, the daughter of in the United States when SIMI activists Bhatkal, who was also present at Jolly an electronics store owner. By this time, organized demonstrations in support Beach.5 however, Riyaz’s story had begun to of al-Qa`ida chief Usama bin Ladin, diverge significantly from the trajectory hailing him as a “true mujahid.”12 This article provides an overview of his businessman father had likely Riyaz Shahbandri’s journey into India’s mapped for him. Due to Shafiq’s SIMI activism, Riyaz nascent jihadist movement, while began to spend time at SIMI’s offices also providing insight into the origins Shafiq Ahmad, Riyaz’s brother-in-law in Mumbai around 2001 at the peak of the Indian Mujahidin and how its to be, lived in the family’s apartment of the organization’s radical phase, collaboration with the LT is a growing as he pursued his studies in Mumbai. associating with men who would play threat to the region. Shafiq, however, was also an activist in key roles in the development of the the Students Islamic Movement of India jihadist movement in India. Among 2 David Coleman Headley was arrested in October 2009 (SIMI), an Islamic youth organization, them were: Abdul Subhan Qureshi and in the United States. He faced a number of charges in and eventually rose to become the head Mohammad Sadiq Israr Sheikh, who the United States, from involvement in the November of the group’s Mumbai chapter. Set up 2008 Mumbai attacks to plotting against employees at in 1977 by the Jamaat-i-Islami Hind 7 For a superb account of SIMI’s history, see Yoginder a newspaper in Denmark that published caricatures of organization, the Indian branch of the Sikand, “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India: The the Prophet Muhammad. He pleaded guilty to multiple largest Islamist grouping in South Case of the Students Islamic Movement of India,” Jour- charges in March 2010 and is reportedly cooperating Asia, SIMI was the group’s student nal of Muslim Minority Affairs 23:2 (2003). Also see Irfan with U.S. authorities on providing intelligence informa- wing. SIMI, however, was disowned Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India (New Delhi: tion. by its founders five years later due to Permanent Black, 2010). 3 For more specific details on the Karachi Project, see its increasingly inflammatory rhetoric, 8 “Interview with [SIMI President] Shahid Badr Falahi,” Animesh Roul, “After Pune, Details Emerge on the Ka- which was viewed as pushing Jamaat- Afkar-i Milli [New Delhi], November 2000. rachi Project and its Threat to India,” CTC Sentinel 3:4 9 Sikand, “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India: (2010). 6 Biographical details on the Shahbandri family derive The Case of the Students Islamic Movement of India.” 4 Shishir Gupta, “ISI, LeT Getting Indian Jihadis To- in part from Riyaz Shahbandri’s police dossier: “Riyaz 10 Sayyed Abdul Bari, Azad Hindustan Main Muslim Tan- gether in Karachi for Attack,” Indian Express, February Ismail Shahbandri @ Riyaz Bhatkal,” Maharashtra Po- zimein (New Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 2001), 1, 2010. lice Anti-Terrorism Squad, September 30, 2008. Mate- p. 305. 5 This information is based on police review of closed- rial was also gathered by the author during interviews 11 Anita Verma, “India Urgently Needs a Ghaznavi: SIMI circuit surveillance footage. For details, see “IM Leader of relatives and friends of the family during multiple vis- Chief,” The Asian Age [New Delhi], March 29, 2001. Yasin Bhatkal Mastermind of Pune Blasts, Claims ATS,” its to Mumbai and Bhatkal between October 2008 and 12 Sikand, “Islamist Assertion in Contemporary India: Daily News and Analysis, April 8, 2010. April 2010. The Case of the Students Islamic Movement of India.”

2 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 would co-found the Indian Mujahidin Later in his life, Iqbal appears to have been terrorism, because according to the along with Riyaz Shahbandri; Ehtesham drawn to the work of the controversial neo- glorious Koran, if you kill one innocent Siddiqi, who is now being tried for fundamentalist Mumbai-based doctor- person, then you have killed the whole his alleged role in the bombings of turned-televangelist, Zakir Naik.16 Naik of humanity.”23 Nevertheless, ideas such Mumbai’s suburban train system in July has never been found to be involved in as these were profoundly attractive to 2006; and Rahil Sheikh, who recruited violence, but his words have lit up the angry young Muslim men in the years dozens of Maharashtra jihadists, most imagination of diverse jihadists—among after the anti-Muslim violence that tore notably for an abortive 2006 terrorist them New York taxi driver Najibullah apart the state of Gujarat in 2002. For strike in Gujarat to avenge the anti- Zazi, who pleaded guilty in the United Muslim violence that had taken place States in February 2010 for plotting to there four years earlier.13 attack New York City’s Grand Central “For Riyaz and the men Station, among other targets.17 Zazi who would form the Indian In addition to his role in SIMI, Riyaz’s reportedly “became enchanted” with worldview also appears to have been Naik’s preaching.18 Mujahidin, their anti-India shaped by his brother, Iqbal. Iqbal’s jihadist project represented adult life took a rather different course Naik’s Islamic Research Foundation from that of his brother. He studied (IRF), which was listed as an approved a response to the political Unani medicine, a form of traditional theological resource on the LT- challenges confronting healing based on Greek, Arab and affiliated Jama`at-ud-Da`wa website, Indian practices that has some currency has proved a magnet for LT operatives their communities, not an across South Asia.14 Yet Iqbal’s primary and many rank-and-file SIMI members. abstract global cause.” interests were religious. Although it Rahil Sheikh, a key LT organizer who does not appear he received a formal allegedly assembled a jihadist network education in theology, Iqbal was that sought to execute terrorist strikes an enthusiastic participant in the in the state of Gujarat, recruited cadre Riyaz and the men who would form activities of Tablighi Jama`at, a neo- at the 2003 Srinagar convention of the the Indian Mujahidin, their anti-India fundamentalist Islamic proselytizing Salafi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadis, where Naik jihadist project represented a response order whose annual gatherings at was a speaker.19 Sheikh’s associate, to the political challenges confronting Raiwind in Pakistan are reputed to Feroze Deshmukh, who is being tried their communities, not an abstract draw more followers than any Muslim on multiple terrorism-related charges global cause. congregation other than the Hajj in Mumbai, worked as a librarian at the pilgrimage.15 IRF.20 In 2001, Riyaz’s SIMI links to ganglord Aftab Ansari brought him into contact Naik has made various speeches that with well-known organized crime 13 For details of the role of Abdul Subhan Qureshi, also could result in radicalization. In one figure Asif Raza Khan, a year before known as Tauqir, and Sadiq Israr Sheikh, see “Final speech, he said, “If he [Bin Ladin] is Khan was killed in a shootout with the 24 Form Report Under Section 173, Code of Criminal Pro- fighting the enemies of Islam, I am for Gujarat police. Authorities believe cedure in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan him. If he is terrorizing America the that Riyaz looked to Khan to use crime 25 Magistrate,” New Delhi Police Special Cell, November terrorist—the biggest terrorist—I am to fund jihadist operations. Following 21 2010. For background on the 2006 Mumbai train bomb- with him.” Naik concluded, “Every Asif Khan’s death in 2002, his brother, ings, including the role of Ehtesham Siddiqi, see Prerana Muslim should be a terrorist. The thing Amir Raza Khan, set up the Asif Raza Thakurdesai, “How the Case was Cracked,” India Today, is, if he is terrorizing a terrorist, he is Commando Force, a jihadist group 22 October 16, 2006. For details on the Aurangabad case, its following Islam.” When interviewed by dedicated to the memory of his brother. links to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the role of Rahil reporters after Najibullah Zazi’s arrest, Amir Khan, who is linked to a welter Sheikh, see Praveen Swami, “Investigators Put Face to Naik insisted, “I have always condemned of jihadist operations including an Voice on Mumbai Attack Tapes,” Hindu, February 10, attack on the U.S. Consulate in Kolkata, 2010. 16 For example, inside Bhatkal-area Indian Mujahidin allegedly provided passports and funds 14 Biographical details on the Shahbandri family derive safehouses raided by the Karnataka Police in October to facilitate the training of several Indian 26 in part from Riyaz Shahbandri’s police dossier: “Riyaz 2008, investigators found an abundance of pro-Taliban Mujahidin members in Pakistan. In Ismail Shahbandri @ Riyaz Bhatkal,” Maharashtra Po- videos and Naik speeches. lice Anti-Terrorism Squad, September 30, 2008. Mate- 17 On Najibullah Zazi, see David Von Drehle and Bobby 23 Drehle and Ghosh. rial was also gathered by the author during interviews Ghosh, “An Enemy Within: The Making of Najibullah 24 For details, see “Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri @ Riyaz of relatives and friends of the family during multiple vis- Zazi,” Time Magazine, October 1, 2009. Bhatkal,” Maharashtra Police Anti-Terrorism Squad, its to Mumbai and Bhatkal between October 2008 and 18 Ibid. September 30, 2008. April 2010. 19 Praveen Swami, “New Proof on Mumbai Blasts,” Hin- 25 Ibid. Mumbai police records show criminal proceed- 15 For background on Tablighi Jama`at and its belief du, August 1, 2006. ings were first initiated against Riyaz in 2002 for the system, see Yoginder Sikand, The Origins and Develop- 20 S. Husain Zaidi, “First Clues from Chat Room,” Indian extortion-related attempt to murder Kurla businessman ment of the Tablighi Jamaat, 1920-2000 (New Delhi: Orient Express, September 30, 2006. Deepak Farsanwalla. Longman, 2002). Tablighi Jama`at is a non-violent orga- 21 Zakir Naik, “Every Muslim Should be a Terror- 26 “Final Form Report Under Section 173, Code of Crimi- nization, yet some of its members have been involved in ist,” speech in English available at www.youtube.com/ nal Procedure in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Met- terrorist operations, usually because they have had dual watch?v=Bxk5AAA5FbI, undated. ropolitan Magistrate,” New Delhi Police Special Cell, memberships in a more violent cell or group. 22 Ibid. November 2010, p. 48.

3 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

May 2003, Mumbai police investigators eventually meet Asif Raza Khan.32 Riyaz example, Rahil Sheikh formed cadre say that Riyaz and Ehtesham Siddiqi and Sheikh had known each other from who attempted to stage an abortive held the first of a series of meetings, their days as SIMI activists in Mumbai; attack on Gujarat in 2006—an operation some involving Khan, to discuss the however, they came together as partners the Maharashtra police claim involved prospect of using Nepal as a base to in the Indian Mujahidin project through assault rifles and grenades packed into train jihadists.27 Nothing came of this Asif Khan. After reportedly receiving computer cases and shipped across the plan, but Riyaz is alleged to have used training at an LT camp in Pakistan, Indian Ocean by the LT. Nevertheless, Khan’s funds to send several operatives Sheikh, on instruction from Amir the leadership of each separate jihadist for training in Pakistan.28 Raza Khan, began to recruit cadre in network appears to have maintained Azamgarh, starting in late 2002. Key operational secrecy, despite their By 2004, Riyaz had succeeded in among them were Atif Amin, who was common political past. tapping diverse sources to put together killed in an October 2008 shootout an organization committed to jihadist with New Delhi police, Arif Badar, and Little is known about the precise state violence within India. The Jolly Beach Mohammad Shahnawaz. of play between the Indian Mujahidin meeting would serve as a key planning and the Karachi Project, but it is clear gathering before the group executed a By 2005, after the gathering at Jolly that the Indian Mujahidin network series of increasingly lethal bombings. Beach, the multiple Indian Mujahidin itself is just part of a larger jihadist network components had fallen into project across India.34 The 2008 The Origins and Formation of the Indian place. Prosecution documentation bombings in Bangalore, for example, Mujahidin filed in New Delhi suggests Atif were carried out by a jihadist cell that Information on the early years of the Amin’s Azamgarh cell was responsible had supplied explosives to Riyaz, but Indian Mujahidin has been drawn from had no knowledge of his operations.35 Sadiq Israr Sheikh, the only founding “The jihadist networks in In the Bangalore case, LT-linked SIMI member of the group in custody.29 Like operative Sarfaraz Nawaz funded a Riyaz and Iqbal, Sheikh was born in a India remain extremely Kerala-based jihadist cell run by long- family that had migrated to Mumbai.30 fluid and consist of small time Islamist activist Tandiyantavide Beginning in 1996, he began attending Nasir that trained recruits to carry out SIMI meetings near his home in groups of individuals who bombings on a ginger plantation in the Mumbai’s Cheeta Camp area. Perhaps are loosely allied together.” forests around Kodagu, in southern drawn by the sense of purpose, SIMI India. Nawaz, who had worked closely appeared to provide many young with Qureshi in SIMI, does not appear Muslims in Mumbai a calling when to have known of his role in the Indian the relationship between Hindus and for providing manpower for the Mujahidin. Muslims became increasingly strained attacks. Sadiq Sheikh liaised between due to communal violence. According the Azamgarh cell and the Indian The central point is that the jihadist to police, Sheikh grew tired of SIMI’s Mujahidin’s Mumbai-based senior networks in India remain extremely polemics and was in search of a more leadership. Iqbal Shahbandri raised fluid and consist of small groups of effective medium to turn his beliefs into operatives for a specialist computer- individuals who are loosely allied action.31 services cell. Riyaz Shahbandri and together. In this sense, they bear little his cell sourced explosives and bomb resemblance to the large, hierarchically- In April 2001, a relative of Sheikh set components that were assembled into structured Pakistan-based jihadist forth a process where Sheikh would usable devices. Abdul Subhan Qureshi groups such as the LT or Jaysh-i- traveled nationwide, finding SIMI Muhammad—although even in the 33 27 “Riyaz Ismail Shahbandri @ Riyaz Bhatkal,” Maha- sympathizers to assist with cells. Pakistani cases there appear to have rashtra Police Anti-Terrorism Squad, September 30, been some recent splintering. 2008. During this period, parallel jihadist 28 Ibid. groups led by figures who knew the Conclusion 29 For Sadiq’s story, see Praveen Swami, “The Indian Indian Mujahidin leadership from their Riyaz Shahbandri’s story is evidence that Mujahidin and Lashkar-i-Tayyiba’s Transnational Net- time in SIMI proliferated as well. For substantial political problems are driving works,” CTC Sentinel 2:6 (2009). Also see “Final Form jihadist mobilization within India. It Report Under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 32 Material in this paragraph is drawn from “Final Form also makes clear, however, that the LT’s in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan Mag- Report Under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure infrastructure in Pakistan is critical to istrate,” New Delhi Police Special Cell, November 2010, in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan Mag- these networks’ reach and lethality. Key pp. 47-49. istrate,” New Delhi Police Special Cell, November 2010, leaders such as Riyaz Shahbandri and 30 Biographical details are drawn from interviews con- pp. 47-49. Sadiq Israr Sheikh trained in Pakistan. ducted with relatives and friends of Sheikh in Mumbai 33 For more details on Qureshi’s background, see Swa- Indian investigations into the Indian in March 2010, as well as from “Final Form Report Un- mi, “The Indian Mujahidin and Lashkar-i-Tayyiba’s Mujahidin’s bombings have not reached der Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure in the Court Transnational Networks.” For other source material, see of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,” New “Final Form Report Under Section 173, Code of Criminal 34 Roul. Delhi Police Special Cell, November 2010, pp. 47-49. Procedure in the Court of Kaveri Baweja, Chief Metro- 35 For a discussion of this case, from which the material 31 Personal interview, senior Mumbai police official, politan Magistrate,” New Delhi Police Special Cell, No- in this paragraph is drawn, see Praveen Swami, ‘To Ban- March 2010. vember 2010. galore with Hate,” Hindu, April 21, 2010.

4 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 closure because figures central to the Hizb-ut-Tahrir) is an example of this network’s functioning have sought safe Salafi-Jihadi Activism in non-violent Salafist trend, advocating haven in Pakistan. Gaza: Mapping the Threat the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Palestine while politically opposing Many in India’s intelligence services By Benedetta Berti the Hamas government.3 fear that the recent bombings in Pune in February 2010, Bangalore in April in june 2007, Hamas took control of Violent Salafist groups, on the other 2010, as well as the abortive attack the Gaza Strip. Since then, numerous hand, only developed in the Palestinian in Deloitte in Hyderabad in May 2010 reports have surfaced about Salafi- Territories in the past few years. These herald the coming of a renewed wave of jihadi and al-Qa`ida activity in the groups are focused on armed jihad jihadist violence intended to undermine Palestinian Territories. Despite and are globally referred to as Salafi- the country’s economic progress and these reports, there is relatively little jihadis—this marks their distinction status in the run-up to the high-profile information on the Palestinian Salafist with non-violent Salafist groups. They Commonwealth Games, which will be community and its connection with mushroomed in the months leading held in New Delhi in October 2010. Hamas and the international Salafi- up to and following the 2005 Israeli Whether or not Riyaz Shahbandri’s jihadi movement. This article provides withdrawal from Gaza, and their so-called Karachi Project is a new an overview of the characteristics of the presence additionally increased in endeavor or simply a name for ongoing Salafi-jihadi movement in Gaza, and it the midst of the internecine struggle jihadist activity directed at India, maps the existing groups that pursue between Hamas and Fatah before the country clearly faces a growing this militant ideology in the Palestinian Hamas’ eventual takeover of Gaza in problem from Indian Muslims who Territories. 2007.4 In conjunction with a process have become radicalized and are able of fragmentation within Palestinian to seek assistance from Pakistan-based The article finds that the Salafi-jihadi society, new Salafist-inspired groups militants. network in the Gaza Strip is largely a local were created both to challenge the phenomenon and it has thus far lacked internal distribution of power between Praveen Swami is Associate Editor of the concrete organizational and operational Fatah and Hamas and to advocate Hindu, one of India’s largest English- links with al-Qa`ida or other international for stronger links between the language newspapers, and reports on jihadist groups. Nevertheless, the network predominantly nationalist or statist terrorism and low intensity conflicts in admires al-Qa`ida’s modus operandi, is Palestinian cause and the international India. His most recent book, India, Pakistan ideologically aligned with al-Qa`ida, jihadist network. These groups initially and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in and in the past has attempted to strike emerged in Gaza and gained strength Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-2002, was foreign targets in Gaza.1 These worrying because of the temporary situation published by Routledge in 2007. The book factors demonstrate the importance of of anarchy and the vacuum of power was written while he was a Jennings Randolph monitoring Salafi-jihadi activity in the created by the struggle between Hamas senior fellow at the United States Institute of Palestinian Territories. and Fatah. They were, however, able Peace in Washington, D.C., in 2004-2005. to gain legitimacy due to the ongoing His scholarly work includes a 1999 book, Defining the Salafi-Jihadi Movement: process of decaying secularism within The Kargil War, chapters in several edited A General Framework Palestinian society and the rise of volumes, and papers in journals including Salafism, an Islamist revivalist Islamist political forces—a trend that is The India Review and Faultlines. Mr. movement within Sunni Islam, is not tightly connected with a wider regional Swami has won several major awards for his an entirely new phenomenon in Gaza. dynamic.5 Despite this phenomenon, work, including the Indian Express-Ramnath Non-violent Salafist organizations, the rise of Salafi-jihadi groups has Goenka Print Journalist of the Year prize, focused on social work and proselytism, occurred predominantly in Gaza, as the 2006. first emerged in the early 1980s under Fatah-controlled West Bank has mostly the guidance of clerics such as Shaykh managed to contain the rise of new Salim Sharab. Many of these clerics Islamist groups while cracking down on studied in Saudi Arabia before returning more established actors such as Hamas. home to the Palestinian Territories. The movement continued to grow during the 3 Reuven Paz, “Salafi-Jihadi Responses to Hamas’ Elec- 1990s, but never became a mainstream toral Victory,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 4, No- faction within the Palestinian political vember 1, 2006. 2 arena. Hizb al-Tahrir (also known as 4 For some of the first reports, see Khaled Abu Toameh, “Al-Qaida-Linked Terrorists in Gaza,” Jerusalem Post, 1 See, for example, the July 2008 interview between February 6, 2005; “Al-Qa’idah Claims Attack on Pales- Salafi-jihadi activist Abu Mustafa and Der Spiegel. On tinian Official,” al-Arabiya, May 21, 2006; Khaled Abu that occasion, Mustafa stated: “We have to fight—just Toameh, “Al-Qaida in Palestine Issues Death Threat like our brothers on Sept. 11…We feel just like al-Qaida Against Abbas. PA Foils Attempt To Kill Fatah Security and we think as they do.” For the interview, see Ulrike Chief,” Jerusalem Post, May 22, 2006. Putz, “Compared to Us, Hamas is Islamism Lite,” Der 5 Asher Susser, “The Rise of Hamas in Palestine and the Spiegel, July 18, 2008. Crisis of Secularism in the Arab World,” Crown Center 2 Hasan Jabr, “Al-Ayyam Opens File on Salafi Groups in for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, February The Gaza Strip,” al-Ayyam, May 17, 2007. 2010, pp. 1, 45-46.

5 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Since then, the number of Salafi- approximately 4,000-5,000 members,7 mix of religious and clan politics, and jihadi groups operating in Gaza has although its alleged followers could be with the intent of emphasizing its multiplied, generating a myriad of as many as 50,000 people.8 Despite capacity to prevent Hamas from ruling small organizations and operational reports from the Palestinian Authority Gaza, Jaysh al-Islam kidnapped BBC cells whose main focus has been both claiming the contrary, the movement correspondent Alan Johnston and held attacking Israel as well as attempting to appears to be overwhelmingly him for more than four months until “Islamize” Palestinian society by force. Palestinian. Nevertheless, in the past Hamas was finally able to ensure his Although these groups may share with couple of years a few dozen foreign Hamas an interest in conducting jihad militants, some of them returnees from “The Salafi-jihadi against Israel and a focus on Islamizing Iraq, are believed to have entered the Palestinian society, the differences Gaza Strip through Egypt to join the movement within Gaza has between the new Salafi-jihadi factions local jihadist movement.9 been growing since 2006, and the more established Palestinian political actors could not be more Mapping the Threat and it now constitutes a pronounced. Jaysh al-Islam loose network of mostly One of the first Salafi-jihadi groups to First, the Salafi-jihadi groups do not emerge in the Gaza Strip is the Army Palestinian fighters define the “resistance” against Israel of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam), which gained who have adopted an in nationalist terms—as compared with international notoriety by participating, Fatah or Hamas—and they instead together with Hamas’ Qassam Brigades international jihadist insist on the transnational dimension and the Salah al-Din Brigades, in the approach to the previously of the Palestinian jihad, making their kidnapping of Israeli Defense Force rhetoric far closer to al-Qa`ida than to (IDF) soldier Gilad Shalit in June more statist Palestinian other Palestinian armed and political 2006.10 In the wake of the kidnapping, struggle.” groups. Second, the Salafi-jihadi forces the group, using an al-Qa`ida-affiliated are determined to Islamize Palestinian online forum, introduced itself as society and to implement Shari`a law a Palestinian jihadist organization by employing all available means, waging a religious war on Israel.11 A few release.14 Although the kidnapping including force; this approach radically weeks later, Jaysh al-Islam conducted was likely organized to embarrass and differs from both Fatah’s secular another major operation by kidnapping challenge Hamas, the group revealed agenda as well as from Hamas’ more Fox News journalist Steve Centanni and its international jihadist orientation gradual approach to the issue. Third, cameraman Olaf Wiig.12 by linking Johnston’s freedom with these groups are completely opposed to the release of an al-Qa`ida cleric held political participation in non-Shari`a Jaysh al-Islam, created by former in the United Kingdom, Abu Qatada. based political systems (such as the Popular Resistance Committee member This stressed the group’s ideological Palestinian one)—another commonality Mumtaz Dughmush and linked to the proximity with al-Qa`ida.15 between these groups’ worldview and powerful Dughmush clan in Gaza, the vision of international jihadist became increasingly hostile to Hamas In the aftermath of the “Johnston Affair,” organizations such as al-Qa`ida. As a in the months preceding Hamas’ Hamas cracked down on Jaysh al-Islam’s result, the Salafi-jihadi groups in Gaza takeover of the Strip in 2007. During activities, significantly reducing the are highly critical of Hamas’ decision this period, Jaysh al-Islam began to group’s size and importance. Yet Jaysh to participate in the 2006 Palestinian openly challenge Hamas’ authority, al-Islam continued to conduct internal elections, and since then they have leading to armed clashes between the attacks against “corrupt” businesses opposed the Hamas government. More two organizations.13 Motivated by a in Gaza (including international co- recently, these groups have become ed schools), and on several occasions 16 even more confrontational with respect Including Hamas,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 16, 2009. targeted the local Christian community. to Hamas, albeit lacking the strength to 7 Daniel Williams, “Salafism: A New Threat to Hamas,” In February 2008, for example, the militarily challenge the organization. New York Times, October 29, 2009. group claimed responsibility for 8 Jonathan Spyer, “Al-Qaida-Style Islamism Comes attacking the YMCA building in Gaza The Salafi-jihadi network in Gaza to Gaza. Millions of Petrodollars are Flowing in Every is predominantly composed of self- Month to Fund Islamist Extremists,” Jerusalem Post, Au- radicalized Palestinians as well gust 20, 2009. Hamas.” as disenchanted Fatah and Hamas 9 Amos Harel, “Terrorists Who Fought U.S. in Iraq 14 Ibid. 6 militants. The network consists of Make Way to Gaza,” Haaretz, August 11, 2009; “Ruling 15 Donald Macintyre, “Tape Provides First Evidence Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas,” p. 26. That BBC Reporter Was Taken,” Independent, May 10, 6 “Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas,” Interna- 10 Michael Slackman and Souad Mekhennet, “A New 2007. tional Crisis Group, March 19, 2008, p. 25; Khaled Abu Group That Seems to Share Al Qaeda’s Agenda,” New 16 “Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas,” pp. 25-27; Toameh, “Jund Ansar Allah Group Was Armed by Fatah York Times, July 8, 2006. “Unidentified Gunmen Attack American School in Bayt Operatives, Hamas Claims. Radicals Were Latest In Gaza 11 Ibid. Lahiyah,” Ma’an News Agency, January 12, 2008; Josh- To Seek Imposition Of Islamic Law,” Jerusalem Post, Au- 12 Ibid. ua Mitnic, “Gaza Christians in Peril After Takeover By gust 16, 2009; Kifah Zibun, “The Salafi Groups in Gaza 13 Zibun, “The Salafi Groups in Gaza Are Close to Hamas; Attacks Against Churches Trigger Concern,” Are Close to Al-Qa’idah, and Have Split from Factions Al-Qa’idah, and Have Split from Factions Including Washington Times, June 27, 2007.

6 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 and temporarily abducting its guards.17 the group has repeatedly threatened group’s ideological proximity with al- While recurrently clashing with Hamas, the Gaza-based Christian community. Qa`ida, a link confirmed by Abu Hafs the organization remains active, and In 2006, for example, it announced its during several public appearances.29 in 2009 it was reportedly involved in intention to blow up local churches in On one occasion, he stated: “For us Al- training Egyptian jihadists of the “al- response to the publication in Denmark Qa’idah, Fatah al-Islam, and all those Zeitun cell,” an al-Qa`ida-inspired of political cartoons depicting the who believe in the Salafist creed are the group that was planning to assassinate Prophet Muhammad.22 Finally, Suyuf al- same,” while however ensuring that the Shalom Cohen, the Israeli ambassador Haq has been involved in assassinating group holds no operational contacts with to Egypt.18 its political enemies and is charged with the international jihadist network.30 killing senior Palestinian intelligence During a separate interview, Abu Hafs Suyuf al-Haq officer Colonel Jed Tayya in 2007, who A “veteran” Salafi-jihadi group in Gaza the organization accused of being a is Swords of Righteousness (Suyuf al- Mossad agent.23 “The Salafi-jihadi groups Haq). The group’s operations in Gaza in Gaza are highly critical date before Hamas’ takeover of the Jaysh al-Umma Strip in 2007. Suyuf al-Haq is primarily Another major jihadist organization is of Hamas’ decision to concentrated in the Beit Hanoun area the Army of the Nation­ (Jaysh al-Umma), participate in the 2006 of northern Gaza. It is supposedly led operational since June 2007 when it by former Hamas cleric Abu Suheib first took responsibility for firing three Palestinian elections, al-Maqdisi, who left Hamas to protest rockets from Gaza into southern Israel.24 and since then they have its decision to take part in the 2006 The organization, led by Abu Hafs al- Palestinian legislative elections.19 Since Maqdisi,25 has since focused mostly on opposed the Hamas 2006, Suyuf al-Haq has been mostly firing rockets, detonating explosives, government.” involved in internal attacks within and firing shells at Israel,26 while Gaza, aimed at changing the mores of largely avoiding claiming responsibility Palestinian society and at “implementing for attacks against internal Palestinian God’s shari’ah and…to eradicate all targets.27 At the same time, Jaysh al- also clarified the group’s oppositional forms of corruption.”20 For example, Umma demonstrated its interest in stance with respect to Hamas, by Suyuf al-Haq has been responsible for international targets during its first stating: “We believe that Hamas does bombings against Gaza’s internet cafes press conference in January 2008, not implement the rule of God on earth, and music shops, attacks at the al- when it announced its intention to and does not implement or enforce any Arabiya media facilities in Gaza, as well assassinate U.S. President George W. ruling of the Islamic Shariah.”31 as for kidnappings and attacks against Bush during a forthcoming trip to the people involved in activities deemed region.28 This declaration stressed the While Hamas at first tolerated Jaysh as “immoral”—ranging from throwing al-Umma’s activities against Israel, it sulfuric acid at a woman dressed eventually changed its position and “provocatively” to attacking a young Group Threatens Internet Cafes in Gaza Strip,” al-Ayyam, reacted to the increased activism and 21 man listening to music. Moreover, September 2, 2006. animosity by temporarily arresting 32 22 “Islamist Group Claims Attack on Gaza Al-Arabiya Jaysh al-Umma’s leader, Abu Hafs. 17 “YMCA Library Building in Gaza City Blown Up: Office.” Since then, the two groups have been Another Incident in a Series of Attacks on Western and 23 Ali Waked, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Burns Coffee Shop in reciprocally hostile, with Jaysh al- Christian Targets in the Gaza Strip by Groups Associat- Gaza Strip,” YNetNews, October 10, 2006. Umma defying Hamas’ calls to preserve 33 ed With the Global Jihad and Radical Islam. The Hamas 24 “New Organization Dubbed ‘Army of the Nation’ a cease-fire with Israel, and with Movement, Which Controls the Gaza Strip, Does Not Put Claims Firing 3 Rockets at Sederot,” Ramattan News Hamas periodically arresting the an End to the Phenomenon. Attacks on Western Targets Agency, June 9, 2007. in the Gaza Strip: Burned Down School Buses Belong- 25 “Al-Ayyam Interviews One of its Leading Figures in 29 Ibid.; “Al-Ayyam Interviews One of its Leading Fig- ing to the American International School,” Intelligence the Gaza Strip: Is Jaysh Al-Ummah the Palestinian Ver- ures in the Gaza Strip: Is Jaysh Al-Ummah the Palestin- and Terrorism Information Center, February 28, 2008; sion of Al-Qa’idah Organization?” al-Ayyam, January 12, ian Version of Al-Qa’idah Organization?”; “Al-Arabiya “Unknown Assailants Blow up Christian Youth Organi- 2008. TV Airs Footage Of Al-Qa’idah-Affiliated Jaysh Al-Um- zation Library in Gaza,” Ma’an News Agency, February 26 See, for example: “IDF Troops Kill Palestinian Youth mah In Gaza,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 15, 2008; Khaled Abu Toameh, “Gunmen Destroy Gaza in West Bank, Two New Militant Groups Emerge,” 3, 2008. Strip’s YMCA Library, Kidnap Guards,” Jerusalem Post, Ma’an News Agency, September 17, 2007; “The Jaysh al- 30 “Al-Ayyam Interviews One of its Leading Figures in February 17, 2008. Ummah [Army of the Nation] Brigades Claimed Respon- the Gaza Strip: Is Jaysh Al-Ummah the Palestinian Ver- 18 Yoram Cohen, Matthew Levitt and Becca Wasser, sibility for Firing a Qa’qa Rocket,” Ma’an News Agency, sion of Al-Qa’idah Organization?” “Deterred but Determined: Salafi-Jihadi Groups in the January 12, 2008; “Jaysh al-Ummah Claims Responsibil- 31 “Al-Arabiya TV Airs Footage Of Al-Qa’idah-Affiliat- Palestinian Arena,” The Washington Institute for Near ity for Sniping Two Israeli Farmers East of Al-Qararah,” ed Jaysh Al-Ummah In Gaza.” East Policy, January 2010. Ramattan News Agency, April 4, 2008. 32 “Jaysh al-Ummah: We Seek Abu-Hafs’s Release 19 “Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas,” p. 25. 27 “Al-Ayyam Interviews One of its Leading Figures in Through Peaceful Negotiations with Hamas,” SAMA 20 Jabr, “Al-Ayyam Opens File on Salafi Groups in the the Gaza Strip: Is Jaysh Al-Ummah the Palestinian Ver- News Agency, September 9, 2008. Gaza Strip.” sion of Al-Qa’idah Organization?” 33 “News of the Terrorism and Israeli-Palestinian Con- 21 “Islamist Group Claims Attack on Gaza Al-Arabiya 28 “Palestinian Group Threatens to Kill US President – flict,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Office,” Ma’an News Agency, January 25, 2007; “Salafi Details,” Ma’an News Agency, January 8, 2008. November 11-28, 2008.

7 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 group’s militants and leaders.34 To date, The group suffered a serious blow on they visited Gaza.49 Within Gaza, Jaljalat however, there has not been a major that occasion, and since then it has has attacked local internet cafes, and it open armed clash between the two maintained a relatively low profile, has claimed responsibility both for the organizations. although it continues to recruit new bombing of the house of Marwan Abu members.42 Recently, in October 2009 Ras, a Hamas member of the Palestinian Jund Ansar Allah and March 2010, Jund Ansar Allah Legislative Council,50 as well as for Another group, the Army of Allah’s resurfaced and claimed responsibility the bombings against Hamas’ security Supporters (Jund Ansar Allah), emerged for rocket attacks against Israel.43 buildings in August 2009 following in Rafah at the end of 2008 and was the group’s crackdown on Salafists in founded by Syrian-born Abu Abdallah Jaljalat Rafah.51 al-Muhajir (Abu Abdallah al-Suri).35 Finally, another important Salafi-jihadi The organization, whose size was network is the so-called Jaljalat (or Ansar Recently, Hamas launched a massive originally estimated at approximately al-Sunna), a loosely-structured group operation to arrest Jaljalat leader 500 men, operates mostly in the cities composed largely of former and current Talib, who was previously arrested of Khan Yunis and Rafah in Gaza.36 Hamas militants.44 Its military cadre but escaped from custody in December According to Israeli security officials, is estimated at around 700 fighters.45 2009.52 The operation ended with the its composition includes former Hamas The group is led by Mahmud Talib, a imprisonment of Talib in March 2010, and Fatah members,37 as well as a few former leader within Hamas’ military weakening—albeit not destroying—the Egyptians, Yemenis, Pakistanis, and wing, and it first became operational group’s operational capabilities.53 Afghan militants.38 The group’s main in 2006 in response to Hamas’ operational focus has been striking “moderate” stance and its participation Fatah al-Islam Israel, and its actions include a failed in the Palestinian elections.46 Talib has More controversial are reports related attack against the Nahal Oz fuel terminal declared Jaljalat’s intention to officially to the presence of Fatah al-Islam cells station and IDF soldiers based there.39 pledge its allegiance to al-Qa`ida in the in Gaza. The group, active in Lebanon course of a future terrorist operation, since 2006 and concentrated in the Jund Ansar Allah’s activism has been and reiterated its current ideological Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, gained substantially curbed since August 2009 proximity with Usama bin Ladin’s notoriety in May 2007 when it engaged when it violently clashed with Hamas, group.47 In the past, the group has in a prolonged and bloody confrontation resulting in more than 22 casualties. On targeted Israel, other Palestinians, with the Lebanese Army, a fight that that occasion, one of the organization’s as well as international targets.48 For claimed more than 400 lives—resulting leaders and imam of the Ibn Taymiyya example, Jaljalat is held responsible for in one of the worst episodes of internal Mosque in Rafah, `Abd al-Latif Musa, attempting to assassinate both former violence since the end of Lebanon’s announced a rebellion against Hamas U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former civil war.54 As early as December and the creation of an “Islamic Emirate” British Prime Minister Tony Blair when 2007, sources within the Palestinian in Rafah.40 This prompted Hamas to Authority affirmed that Fatah al-Islam intervene militarily and to kill both militants had infiltrated Gaza, where they had allegedly been involved in the Abd al-Latif Musa as well as the group’s Rafah Calm,” al-Arabiya, August 15, 2009. 41 launching of rockets against southern military leader, Abu Abdallah al-Suri. 42 Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Qaeda Ally In Gaza Defiant, See- Israel.55 There have not been additional ing New Recruits,” Reuters, September 16, 2009. facts to substantiate these allegations, 34 “Gaza Armed Group Says Hamas Arrested Seven 43 “Gaza Salafi Groups Claim Firing Two ‘Projectiles’ At Fighters,” Ma’an News Agency, May 26, 2009. Israel Agency,” Ma’an News Agency, October 2, 2009; 35 Fathi Sabbah, “Gaza, a ‘Suitable Greenhouse’ for the Fares Akram and Isabel Kershner, “Friday Rocket From 49 Zibun, “The Salafi Groups in Gaza Are Close to ‘Takfiri Groups,’”al-Hayat , August 16, 2009. Gaza Kills Thai Worker In Israel; Attack By Jihadist Al-Qa’idah, and Have Split from Factions Including 36 Ibid.; Hassan Jabr, “Jund Ansar Allah: New Salafi Group Comes As E.U. Foreign Policy Chief Visits Re- Hamas.” Organization Appears in Southern Part of Gaza Strip,” gion,” International Herald Tribune, March 19, 2010. 50 Jabr, “’Jaljalat’ is Waiting to Carry out a Big Operation al-Ayyam, January 5, 2009. 44 Hasan Jabr, “‘Jaljalat’ is Waiting to Carry out a Big in Order to Dedicate it to Bin-Ladin.” 37 Toameh, “Jund Ansar Allah Group Was Armed By Operation in Order to Dedicate it to Bin-Ladin,” al- 51 Kifah Zibun, “Salafi Jihadi Movement Leader and Fatah Operatives, Hamas Claims. Radicals Were Latest Ayyam, July 11, 2009. former leading member of Al-Qassam Brigades: We In Gaza To Seek Imposition Of Islamic Law.” 45 Jonathan Spyer, “Al-Qaida-Style Islamism Comes to Will Take revenge on Hamas; Islamic Emirate Will Be 38 Zibun, “The Salafi Groups in Gaza Are Close to Gaza,” Jerusalem Post, April 19, 2009; Jonathan Spyer, Achieved,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 25, 2009. Al-Qa’idah, and Have Split from Factions Including “New Fundamentalist Movements on the Rise In Gaza. 52 “Salafi Group: Leader Escapes Gaza Jail,” Ma’an News Hamas.” See also Cohen et al. Salafi Groups Find Support Among Hamas Militants,” Agency, December 25, 2009. 39 “Hamas Steps up its Struggle Against the Global Ji- Jerusalem Post, October 29, 2009. 53 “Jihadist Groups in Gaza Declare Hamas to be Infi- had-Affiliated Networks Trying to Challenge its Control 46 Zibun, “The Salafi Groups in Gaza Are Close to del. Their Loyalty is to Bin Ladin and Their Bombings of the Gaza Strip. Hamas Recently Used Extreme Force to Al-Qa’idah, and Have Split from Factions Including Reached the Home of Haniyah,” al-Hayat, March 3, Suppress Global Jihad Operatives, One of Whose Lead- Hamas.” 2010. ers Proclaimed the Establishment of an Islamic Emirate 47 Ibid. 54 Tine Gade, Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Between Global in the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque in Rafah,” Intelligence and 48 See “Hamas Steps up its Struggle Against the Global and Local Jihad (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Es- Terrorism Information Center, September 1, 2009. Jihad-Affiliated Networks Trying…”; “Ansar al-Sunnah tablishment, 2007), pp. 27-29. 40 “Rafah Clashes Between Hamas Police, Salafi Group,” Claims Responsibility for Shooting at Israeli Patrol Near 55 Khaled Abu Toameh, “PA Claims Fatah al-Islam Mil- al-Arabiya, August 14, 2009. Kissufim Post,” Ramattan News Agency, August 28, itants at Work in Gaza, Blames Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, 41 “Mideast: Hamas Declares Salafi Group Leader Dead; 2009. December 26, 2007.

8 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 and the Hamas government has since Conclusion and Threat Assessment reaction to the Salafi-jihadis’ repeated denied any operational presence of the The Salafi-jihadi movement within Gaza defiance of the Hamas government.62 Lebanese Salafi-jihadi group in Gaza, has been growing since 2006, and it now accusing the Palestinian Authority constitutes a loose network of mostly In parallel, however, the jihadist of fabricating accusations to further Palestinian fighters who have adopted factions have grown even more defiant destroy Hamas’ international image.56 an international jihadist approach to of Hamas, both by continuing to Even if the Palestinian Authority’s the previously more statist Palestinian disregard its calls to maintain a cease- reports are accurate, Fatah al-Islam’s struggle. Although none of these groups fire and, more recently, by starting to presence in Gaza has insofar been seem to have concrete organizational or directly target Hamas members and negligible. operational ties with al-Qa`ida, they government figures.63 This attitude has all show ideological proximity with the been effectively summarized by Kata’ib Various Smaller Groups international jihadist network, and they al-Tawhid’s leader Abu Abdhallah, In addition to these more well- have demonstrated a strong interest in by stating that his group now aims “to established groups, there are also a targeting international targets within overthrow Hamas and set up an Islamic number of smaller, loosely affiliated Gaza. To date, these groups have lacked caliphate in the Gaza Strip.”64 Although cells that adopt a variety of front names the sophistication and strength to the Salafi-jihadi movement lacks the to perpetrate their attacks.57 This conduct large-scale terrorist operations, military strength to implement this makes it more difficult to determine either within Gaza or against Israel. threat, its role in Gaza cannot be with certainty the group behind each underestimated, especially considering operation. Accordingly, a number of This situation may change, however, the ongoing defection of disenchanted important jihadist plots—including if the Salafi-jihadis succeed in Hamas fighters who leave the group’s the attack at the UNRWA-sponsored transitioning from a loose cluster of military brigades to join the new, more festival in the al-Umariya school in groups into a more operationally, radical jihadist formations.65 Rafah in 2007—have been attributed logistically, and strategically inter- to “al-Qa`ida affiliates” without being connected network. In other words, Benedetta Berti is the Bradley Foundation able to fully uncover which cell or these organizations have a limited Doctoral fellow at the Fletcher School group was behind them.58 This data is capacity to coordinate their operations, (Tufts University), and a Neubauer still, however, highly significant, as it and their overall effectiveness is Associate Research Fellow at the Institute shows the ongoing proliferation of the impaired by the proliferation of small for National Security Studies (Tel Aviv Salafi-jihadi movement and the related jihadist cells, the rapid emergence of University). Ms. Berti specializes in rise in the number of active groups. As new militant groups, and the fluid international security studies and Middle late as August 2009, new groups were nature of these organizations. The rise Eastern politics. in fact still emerging in Gaza, including of Jaljalat as a loosely structured group al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, established with represents an interesting phenomenon. the progressive closure of Gaza,59 It has the highest potential to expand and Kata’ib al-Tawhid, which claims and develop into an even broader a cadre of several hundred fighters umbrella organization and co-opt other and an expertise in “RPG rockets, smaller factions, thereby increasing its kalashnikovs, explosive devices, and operational strength and effectiveness. mines, but we are trained in everything, including martyrdom.”60 In analyzing the ongoing trends within the Salafi-jihadi camp in Gaza, it is also important to mention these groups’ 56 “Talk About Presence of Fatah al-Islam in Gaza Ri- increasingly antagonistic relations with diculous Joke, Exposed Scandal for Those Who Support Hamas. In this sense, a clear watershed Embargo,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 6, has been the August 2009 armed clashes 2008. between Hamas and the Salafi-jihadis 57 Walid Phares, “Jihadist Games in Gaza; Western in Rafah. Hamas shifted from an initial Media Must Be Careful,” Washington Times, August 31, tolerance of Salafi-jihadi operations 2006. against Israel to implementing a strategy 58 Jabr, “Al-Ayyam Opens File on Salafi Groups in The of containment based on attempting to Gaza Strip.” Also see, for example, “Jihadist Groups in control Gaza’s religious institutions, Gaza declare Hamas to Be Infidel. Their Loyalty Is to Bin detaining these groups’ most radical Ladin and Their Bombings Reached the Home of Hani- members, and occasionally cracking 61 yah.” down on the operational cells. 62 For example, by ignoring the group’s calls to respect 59 Kifah Zibun, “Abu-Hamzah Al-Maqdisi to Al-Sharq the unofficial cease-fire with Israel, or by openly chal- Al-Awsat: We Are Not Takfiris, and We Are Proceeding In particular, Hamas has become more lenging Hamas’ monopoly of force within Gaza. with the Establishment of an Islamic Emirate,” al-Sharq determined in regulating and controlling 63 “Jihadist Groups in Gaza Declare Hamas to be Infi- al-Awsat, September 5, 2009. these groups in the aftermath of the del. Their Loyalty is to Bin Ladin and Their Bombings 60 Roberto Bongiorni, “Palestinian Salafist Cell Leader January 2009 Gaza war, mostly as a Reached the Home of Haniyah.” Explains Anti-Hamas Objectives,” Il Sole 24 Ore, August 64 Bongiorni. 18, 2009. 61 Spyer, “Al-Qaida-Style Islamism Comes To Gaza.” 65 Ibid.

9 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

The Virtual Jihad: The internet quickly surpassed all other many of the new generation of virtual media forms in becoming the principle media jihadists are “digital natives” An Increasingly Legitimate arena for this frenetic media activity, rather than “digital immigrants.”10 Con- Form of Warfare and by extension the primary platform sequently, for many media jihadists, for the dissemination and mediation of there is little “new” about the new me- By Akil N. Awan the culture and ideology of jihadism.5 dia environment. Rather, it is the only Until relatively recently, much of this media environment with which they are in a letter to Mullah Omar in 2002, “official” jihadist media activity had familiar. Much of their social and other Usama bin Ladin wrote, “It is obvious been hierarchically organized and strict- interaction already takes place within this that the media war in this century is ly regulated.6 Yet the advent of Web 2.0 new media environment, and it is unsur- one of the strongest methods; in fact, platforms such as file-sharing portals, prising that their political activism should its ratio may reach 90% of the total forums, social networking sites, and the similarly take place within this arena.11 preparation for the battles.”1 Supporting blogosphere,7 whose egalitarian and de- this view, Ayman al-Zawahiri stated mocratizing nature are conducive to the This article explores the ascendancy of in 2005, “More than half of this battle “leveling” of hierarchies of knowledge the virtual media jihad over the physi- is taking place in the battlefield of the and power, have facilitated a far more cal jihad, and the mechanisms through media. We are in a media battle in a race diffuse dissemination of autonomous which it has become an increasingly for the hearts and minds of our umma.”2 user-generated jihadist media content credible and legitimate mode of conflict. This staggering asymmetry attributed outside the “official” jihadist spaces.8 In attempts to understand this paradigm to the “media jihad” by al-Qa`ida’s shift and its consequences, the article leadership should be understood in the One of the underlying factors behind also examines the cathartic functions of context of a fervent desire to engage this seemingly exponential increase in the virtual media jihad, and its impact with and mobilize the Muslim masses, autonomous user-generated jihadist on jihadist ideology and the movement which in turn is predicated primarily on media content has been the changing more broadly. the fear of the existential threat posed demographic of the jihadist movement by obsolescence. Indeed, the Muslim itself. Jihadism today is generally un- Sanctioning the Virtual Media Jihad masses, on whose behalf al-Qa`ida derstood to be a phenomenon associat- One of the previous perennial debates in claims to serve as a crucial vanguard, ed with young males,9 and consequently jihadist circles had focused on the status have remained largely immune to of those who fail to physically engage in the cajoling messages of global jihad, 5 The Global Islamic Media Front, a prominent media the “jihad.” In the past, such individuals with large swathes of the Muslim organ of al-Qa`ida, acknowledged in 2005 that it was had been reproached for limiting world having repudiated the message now the only arena available to them: “half the battle of their contribution to words or funds 3 outright. As al-Zawahiri lamented in the mujahidin is being waged on the pages of the Internet rather than deeds. With the increasing 2001, “we should realize the extent of the – the sole outlet for mujahideen media.” This was cited recognition by the jihadist leadership gap in understanding between the jihad in Stephen Ulph, “Mujahideen to Pledge Allegiance on of the critical need for engaging in the 4 movement and the common people.” As the Web,” Terrorism Focus 2:22 (2005). Also see Akil N. “media battle,” however, various jihadist a result, the jihadists’ inordinate focus Awan, “Virtual Jihadist Media: Function, Legitimacy, ideologues have attempted to legitimize on the media jihad in the 21st century and Radicalising Efficacy,” European Journal of Cultural this activity, often by drawing upon has arisen as the primary vehicle to Studies 10:3 (2007). historical or religious precedents. Abu avert the patent failure of jihadist 6 Indeed, specific actors (such as the Islamic State of al-Harith al-Ansari’s categorization ideology to date. Iraq), producers (such as al-Furqan), distributors (such of the types of warfare sanctioned by as al-Fajr), and specific jihadist forum administrators the Prophet Muhammad, for example, control virtually every stage of the media production and cites “media warfare” as a legitimate dissemination process. See, for example, Akil N. Awan endeavor, whereas Muhammad bin and M. al-Lami, “Al-Qaeda’s Virtual Crisis,” Journal of Ahmad al-Salim’s highly popular text, 1 This document is located in the Harmony Database lo- the Royal United Services Institute 154:1 (2009); Daniel “39 Ways to Serve and Participate in cated at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Mili- Kimmage, “The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Jihad,” extols “performing electronic tary Academy, West Point. The document ID is AFGP- Network Behind the Global Message,” 2008. jihad” as “a blessed field which contains 2002-600321. 7 Web 2.0 refers to a wide range of second generation 2 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” GlobalSecu- services on the internet that has signaled a paradigm rity.org, July 9, 2005. This document was released by shift in which web users contribute as easily as they con- Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence in sume. 2008); and Akil N. Awan, “Antecedents of Islamic Politi- October 2005. 8 A roster of Arabic forums (muntadayat) have served as cal Radicalism among Muslim Communities in Europe,” 3 See, for example, “Islamic Extremism: Common Con- semi-official mouthpieces for the global jihadist move- Political Science & Politics 41:1 (2008). cern for Muslim and Western Publics,” Pew Research ment over the years, including a number of forums spon- 10 Marc Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants,” Center, July 14, 2005; “Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. sored by the al-Fajr Media Center (al-Qa`ida’s media On the Horizon 9:5 (2001). Image Around the World,” Pew Research Center, July wing) such as al-Ikhlaas, al-Firdaws, and al-Buraq, as 11 Whether it is social networking, shopping, dating, 23, 2009. well as others such as al-Hesba, al-Faloja, Shumook al- playing videogames, watching movies, reading news, 4 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Islam, and al-Ansar. listening to music, learning—in fact, any activity in the 2001, available online in English at www.tawhed.110mb. 9 Jihadists (ignoring the leadership and ideologues) are “real” world now has a virtual counterpart that may ap- com/books/Knights_Under_the_Prophet_Banner_eng- generally found to be under the age of 25. See Marc Sage- pear to be more appealing to a certain age cohort that rep- lish.pdf. man, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First resents this “digital native.”

10 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 much benefit.”12 This, he suggests, appealing in his seminal The Global Islamic jihad but crucially without engaging in includes Resistance Call.16 Al-Suri conceded the direct violence, cannot be overstated. existence of large numbers of individuals Indeed, the virtual or media jihad following and spreading of news within the jihadists’ ideological support has served an increasingly important between the people, in addition to base who are unwilling to engage in function in subsuming diverse strains a chance to defend and stand up violence themselves. Addressing these of political activism, unrest, and for the mujahidin and spread their individuals directly, al-Suri proposed dissent, thereby providing a conduit ideas and their requests to the a number of alternative modes of non- and framework for its non-violent people. This effort can be divided violent action to support the jihad, expression. Audiences can vent their into two major parts: discussion one of which entailed the “media or anger and frustration at the various ills boards and hacking methods.13 informational battle.”17 plaguing the Muslim world, or perhaps more importantly re-direct their energies Perhaps the most infamous recent As a result of these varying legitimizing in an ostensibly useful way without jihadist ideologue, Anwar al-`Awlaqi, mechanisms, the “media jihad” has resorting to violent means. suggests “fighting the lies of the gradually gained respectability and has Western media,” “following the news of become a legitimate endeavor in itself. There is little doubt that the media jihad and spreading it,” and “spreading In some instances, it has even been held jihadists in these new roles have proven the writings of the mujahidin and their on par with “martyrdom” operations.18 immensely useful to the growth of the scholars.”14 Yet perhaps al-`Awlaqi’s movement and the dissemination of its most interesting contribution is number The Catharsis of the Virtual/Media Jihad ideology. One of the most celebrated 29 on the list: “WWW Jihad.” According The sanction provided to the “media virtual jihadists, Younis Tsouli (also to al-`Awlaqi, jihad” has proven to be particularly known as Irhaabi 007, or Terrorist important as it also helps assuage Some ways in which the brothers cognitive dissonance in the media and sisters could be “internet jihadists themselves: the internal “The ‘media jihad’ mujahidin” is by contributing in conflict arising from an inconsistency has gradually gained one or more of the following ways: between the jihadist’s beliefs and establishing discussion forums actions. Thus, a jihadist who wishes to respectability and has that offer a free, uncensored contribute to the conflict, but is unable become a legitimate medium for posting information or unwilling to partake in actual warfare relating to jihad; establishing (for any number of reasons, ranging endeavor in itself. In some e-mail lists to share information from inaccessibility to the theaters of instances, it has even with interested brothers and conflict, to indolence or cowardice) is sisters; posting or e-mailing given a vindicatory rationale for this been held on par with jihad literature and news; and alterative, entirely legitimate mode of ‘martyrdom’ operations.” establishing websites to cover action. Media jihadists, for their part, specific areas of jihad, such as have responded to these overtures with mujahidin news, Muslim prisoners enthusiasm and unsurprisingly great of war, and jihad literature.15 relief—particularly in the knowledge 007), whose contributions to the global that they are no longer relegated to their jihad may have been confined to media The contemporary jihadist strategist previous roles of voyeuristic passivity. production efforts from a bedroom and a key proponent of a decentralized, computer in the United Kingdom, leaderless jihad, Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, This cathartic function of the jihadists’ nevertheless received considerable even acknowledged the underlying new media spaces, which allows aspiring acclaim from jihadists around the world, reasons why this mode of action may be jihadists to be part of the broader global including from prominent individuals such as Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. 12 Abu al-Harith al-Ansari, Irshad al-Sa’ul ila Hurub al- 16 Abu Mus`ab al-Suri is perhaps best known for this The important role played by media Rasul, 2008. theory of decentralized “leaderless terrorism,” which he jihadists is acknowledged candidly in 13 Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Salim, “39 Ways to Serve describes as nizam la tanzim (system, not organization). Tsouli’s exchange with a fellow forum and Participate in Jihad,” 2003. 17 Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, “Theory of Media and Incite- member, “Abuthaabit,” who attempted 14 Anwar al-`Awlaqi has gained recent prominence due ment in the Call to Global Islamic Resistance,” in The to convince a self-effacing Tsouli of his to his implication in the potential radicalization of the Ft. Global Islamic Resistance Call, 2005. immense contributions to the jihad: Hood shooter, Major Nidal Hasan; the Christmas Day 18 For example, the prominent media jihadist Younis bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab; and the Times Tsouli (also known as Irhaabi007) is frequently lionized This media work, I am telling Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad. These quotes are drawn by fellow forum members for spreading jihadist videos you, is very important. Very, from his popular work, “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad.” and messages, which have been highly instrumental in very, very, very…Because a lot of Al-`Awlaqi’s work is in fact based upon al-Salim’s text, the successful radicalization and indeed “martyrdom” of the funds brothers are getting is with large portions of the text having been plagiarized many others. The implicit suggestion of course is that al- because they are seeing stuff like outright without any sort of acknowledgement or attri- though Tsouli has not “achieved martyrdom” himself, he this coming out. Imagine how bution. has been of far greater benefit to the jihadist cause in en- many people have gone [to Iraq] 15 Anwar al-`Awlaqi, “44 Ways of Supporting Jihad,” abling the martyrdom of many others in his stead. See “A after seeing the situation because 2009. World Wide Web of Terror,” Economist, July 13, 2007. of the videos. Imagine how many

11 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

of them could have been shahid which has curiously continued to prove physical violence and terrorism. The [martyrs] as well.19 irresistible to some. Despite garnering unprecedented attack on jihadist new considerable acclaim in the virtual media environments from September Virtual media jihadists have also world, and being greeted on the forums 2008 onward, which included the increasingly understood that immersion as “The hero – God salutes you,” Tsouli disruption of major jihadist web forums, in the virtual conflict does not necessarily nevertheless harbored yearnings for severely curbed the opportunities for render them immune to repercussions “martyrdom” on the “real” battlefield. “media jihad.”25 One forum member in the real world, such as arrest and Tsouli lamented to his fellow virtual lamented, prosecution under charges of materially jihadists, “Hero? I am only half a man abetting terrorism, encouraging or now…my heart is in Iraq.”22 In fact, with the closure of all our sites, you glorifying terrorism, or disseminating Tsouli’s desire for “real” jihad appears [the Crusaders and their agents] terrorist publications.20 The successful to have led to his eventual demise; he have left us with no choice but arrest and prosecution of a number of was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment to physically join the caravan of individuals in Europe on such charges in 2007 for his involvement in a jihad. With no jihadi sites through have shown these to be genuine decentralized web of terrorist plots.23 which we can support our brother concerns that must be considered by mujahidin, there is no point for media jihadists before engaging in any There exist numerous other examples of us to stay behind. We shall join potentially incriminating activity.21 successful transitions from the virtual them. Your act has shamed us and Similarly, jihadists online have also world to engaging in physical jihad, and caused us to think ‘what is left for long been cognizant of the threat posed include the recent case of Abu Dujana us?’26 by the presence of security agencies al-Khurasani (the alias of Humam Khalil and civilian “spies” within the new Abu Mulal al-Balawi), a well-known Ironically, individuals who may not media spaces of the jihad. Many jihadist administrator of the al-Hesbah jihadist have countenanced actual violence in the forums dissuade individuals from forum. Abu Dujana was at some point past may in the absence of these virtual communicating sensitive information recruited by the Jordanian General arenas feel compelled to relinquish over the internet and encourage users Intelligence Directorate (GID), but their virtual personas in favor of real- to employ methods for masking their who instead, serving as a double-agent, life jihadist operations.27 identities online. For some, these conducted a suicide attack against elements of danger provide further U.S. Camp Chapman near Khost in Conclusion justification that they are engaging Afghanistan in December 2009, killing The virtual or media jihad has not only in a legitimate aspect of the conflict, seven CIA operatives and a member of gained prominence and credibility evident from the “enemy’s” usage of the the GID. In interviews given by his wife as a wholly legitimate alternative to very same spaces and from the personal after the event, al-Balawi is portrayed traditional conceptions of jihad, but hazards to which they are themselves as someone “obsessed with jihad,” but has also progressively outpaced the exposed. whose considerable writings on jihadist militaristic or physical jihad in the forums left him feeling increasingly modern era. While the “real” jihad The Transition to the Real Jihad guilty over his self-induced inactivity.24 continues to hold a certain level of Nevertheless, despite the considerable His experiences clearly resonate aspirational appeal, the catharsis offered means employed to legitimize the media strongly with many jihadists confined to by the media or virtual jihad has proven jihad, it would be imprudent to assume the virtual or media arena, and perhaps sufficiently able to supplant traditional that the media jihad has the power to al-Balawi’s eventual transformation notions of jihad for a new generation completely supplant the physical jihad, may provide some form of vicarious of activists, unwilling or unable to validation for the media jihadists’ own engage in actual violence themselves. 19 Quoted in “A World Wide Web of Terror.” current passivity. Certainly, al-Balawi’s Consequently, while the occasional 20 As proscribed at least in the United Kingdom by the actions have been widely hailed within transitions from virtual to real actions UK Terrorism Act 2006, Part 1, available at www.opsi. the virtual jihadist community, with will remain a distinct and disconcerting gov.uk/acts/acts2006/pdf/ukpga_20060011_en.pdf. “Abu Dujana” quickly immortalized in possibility, they are unlikely to be 21 The case of Babar Ahmad provides one of the earliest videos, photo montages, and even poetry, adopted as praiseworthy precedents by examples of the serious dangers inherent in conducting including an almost farcical ode to al- significant numbers of virtual jihadists, “media jihad.” A British information technology support Balawi entitled “Our James Bond.” despite whatever rhetorical validation specialist, Babar Ahmad was arrested under the UK Ter- they might be accorded publicly. rorism Act 2000 in 2003 in connection with running the Others appear content to remain within Moreover, the uncertain dynamics of “mujahideen news” website azzam.com. He was beaten the virtual media sphere, enjoying the these processes, typically articulated in police custody before being released without charge, catharsis afforded by virtual action, as “radicalization online” or “virtual but then re-arrested shortly thereafter following a U.S. unless of course they are compelled radicalization,” remain uncertain and extradition request on charges of “providing material to leave, which may lead to actual support to terrorists and conspiring to kill persons in a 25 See Awan and al-Lami for a detailed overview of foreign country.” Babar Ahmad has now been held for al- 22 Nadya Labi, “Jihad 2.0,” Atlantic Monthly 297:6 this concerted assault on jihadist virtual media environ- most six years without trial or charge by British authori- (2006). ments. ties whilst awaiting his pending extradition. For details, 23 “Three Jailed for Inciting Terror,” BBC, July 5, 2007. 26 This statement was posted on www.shamikh1.net/ see Richard Ford, “Babar Ahmad Awarded £60,000 24 Adem Demir and Christopher Dickey, “The Bomber’s vb/. Damages for Assaults by Police,” Times, March 19, 2009. Wife,” Newsweek, July 1, 2010. 27 Awan and al-Lami.

12 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 contested, particularly as the linkage Internet Jihadists React to propaganda against al-Qa`ida, similar to between words and acts online and deeds past statements erroneously announcing offline is exceedingly problematic.28 the Deaths of Al-Qa`ida’s the arrest of al-Baghdadi. Leaders in Iraq The nexus between Web 2.0 in This response changed, however, after particular and the media or virtual By Abdul Hameed Bakier the ISI’s Ministry of Religious Affairs jihadist has undoubtedly had important admitted that both al-Baghdadi and repercussions for jihadism in the 21st on april 18, 2010, U.S. and Iraqi forces al-Masri had in fact been killed. The century, rejuvenating its ailing ideology killed al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) chief ISI assured the Islamic world that and facilitating the dissemination of its Abu Ayyub al-Masri (also known as it remained in good hands and had counterculture to new audiences, many Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) and Islamic already appointed new leadership. The of whom are beyond the traditional State of Iraq (ISI) leader Abu `Umar al- statement, signed by Abu al-Waleed scope of official jihadist media organs. Baghdadi.1 The deaths marked another Abdul Hadi al-Mashhadani, reportedly Although the jihadist message is blow to AQI, which also lost its previous said, “If Allah fated that the two increasingly being granted more diffuse leader, Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, to a sheikhs be killed at this particular time, audience penetration, the ideology itself U.S. airstrike in June 2006. U.S. General know that they left a unique generation has been forced to sacrifice a significant Ray Odierno, the commander of U.S. behind, one that was raised before their degree of its coherency and cogency forces in Iraq, said that the killings were eyes.”3 The ISI also released a separate along the way. Marshall McLuhan’s “potentially the most significant blow to statement that read, well-known and prescient maxim, “the al-Qaeda in Iraq since the beginning of medium is the message,” can perhaps the insurgency.”2 Here we accept congratulations help explain how the promotion of a for the martyrdom of the war virtual or media jihad within this new In addition to damaging the lions…Amirs of Jihad. They paid media environment has fundamentally organizational capabilities of AQI, their dues and raised our heads recast the ideology of jihadism in the the deaths caused an immediate high…they put the U.S. and its new century to retain its relevance to a reaction on jihadist internet forums. collaborators in the dirt. We will new generation of “digital natives.”29 Jihadist sympathizers and other forum continue on the same path. No users at first refused to believe Iraqi backing down now. Don’t turn Dr. Akil N. Awan is the current RCUK Fellow government claims that the two leaders away. Be as quiet as death and in the “Contemporary History of Faith, were killed, especially since there had solid as steel. The world is digging Power and Terror,” and Lecturer in both been numerous false reports of their its own grave.4 International Terrorism and Contemporary deaths in the past. Yet when the ISI Islam in the Department of History and the announced the martyrdom of the two After it became clear that U.S. and Department of Politics and International men, it became clear that U.S. and Iraqi Iraqi authorities succeeded in killing Relations at Royal Holloway, University of forces had succeeded in decapitating the heads of AQI and the ISI, jihadist London. His research interests are focused the leadership of AQI and the ISI. forum contributors called for revenge. around processes of radicalization, global One forum member challenged “the jihadism, the new media (particularly Web This article focuses on the online infidels,” warning that jihad would 2.0), and the history of terrorism. He is reaction to the deaths of Abu Ayyub never stop. The user reminded readers currently working on his monograph entitled, al-Masri and Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, of how even the death of Abu Mus`ab “Trajectories of Radicalization: Explaining examining the initial reactions of online al-Zarqawi in 2006 did not quell AQI’s the Rise of Homegrown Terrorism,” to be jihadist forum users, statements on the activities in Iraq. “Will jihad retract?” released next year. His new book on Media deaths from other jihadist groups, and he asked. and Radicalization: Political Violence how jihadist forum users viewed the in the New Media Ecology (co-authored future of the Iraqi jihad in the wake of Previously, when al-Zarqawi was with A. Hoskins and B. O’Loughlin) will be the recent setbacks. killed, some thought jihad would released later this year by Routledge. cease in Iraq. At the time of al- Online Jihadist Reaction to the Deaths Zarqawi’s death, the Iraqi political In response to the Iraqi government’s situation was somewhat stable, but initial announcement on the deaths jihad continued. Presently, Iraq is of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, online in a political vacuum, rendering 28 See, for example, Akil N. Awan, “Radicalization on jihadists expressed disbelief. Members better chances for the mujahidin 5 the Internet? The Virtual Propagation of Jihadist Media on various jihadist internet forums to carry out attacks. and its Effects,” Journal of the Royal United Services Insti- claimed that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri tute 152:3 (2007); Tim Stevens and Peter R. Neumann, al-Maliki’s statement was government Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action (London: ICSR, 2008); Anthony Begin, Sulastri Bte 1 “U.S.: 2 of Al Qaeda’s Top Leaders Killed in Iraq,” CBS 3 Ibid. This statement was posted on www.alboraq.info Osman, Carl Ungerer and Nur Azlin Mohamed Yasin, News, April 19, 2010; “Qaeda in Iraq ‘Names Replace- on April 25, 2010. Countering Internet Radicalisation in Southeast Asia, RSIS– ments for Slain Leaders,’” Agence France-Presse, May 4 This statement was posted on www.muslm.net on ASPI, 2009. 16, 2010. April 25, 2010. 29 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (London: 2 “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Says Leaders Dead,” al-Jazira, April 5 This statement was posted on www.alboraq.info on Routledge, 1964). 25, 2010. April 29, 2010.

13 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

On a separate forum, another user called offering condolences to “the brothers” Users also hoped that the Taliban for revenge, warning that the United in the ISI and to the Islamic world. The in Afghanistan and Pakistan would States “will not dream of or live in safety statement said that al-Masri and al- support al-Qa`ida in avenging the until we [the Islamic community] live Baghdadi were “competent jihadists and recent assassinations in Iraq. On April it in Palestine and in all of the Islamic fighters. They abandoned their world, 27, 2010, for example, the al-Qa`ida- countries from Andalusia to China.” not their religion.” Labayk Media, an affiliated al-Shabab insurgent group outlet of the Taliban and al-Qa`ida, in Somalia attacked an army base in Yet on one jihadist forum, a long issued a statement on April 25 stating, Mogadishu with an explosives-laden exchange between users revolved around “Today we say farewell to two jihadist truck. A spokesman for al-Shabab, Ali questions of tradecraft. “How could the figures…who fought the enemy.”7 The Mahmud Raji, said after the attack, security forces know the whereabouts statement assured that “the war has ups of the most important leaders of the and downs and has not yet ended...God This operation was carried out to Islamic State of Iraq?” asked one user. is our supporter…Our fallen ones are in avenge the blood of our two heroic A number of users in this exchange heaven, while theirs are in hell.”8 martyrs, God willing, Shaykh Abu demanded to know who called the meeting `Umar al-Baghdadi, his minister between al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, as that Another jihadist group that offered the lion Abu Hamza al-Muhajir person was likely a traitor to the Islamic condolences was Jaysh al-Umma, which and the blood of everyone else that cause and was working for the U.S. and is based in the Palestinian Territories. The was with them when the cowards Iraqi governments. Salafi-jihadi group released a statement struck them.12 expressing “condolences and even Other frustrated forum contributors congratulations” over the martyrdom of The statement included a picture of felt that al-Qa`ida’s media wings have al-Baghdadi and al-Masri.9 The message one of the purported suicide bombers, been lying to its adherents concerning warned that anyone who thinks holding a flyer that read, “In revenge of the the success of the campaign in Iraq. “jihad would stop” with the death of a Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq and his war These users argued that the deaths of courageous leader is “wrong.”10 minister Abu Hamzeh al-Muhajir.”13 al-Baghdadi and al-Masri reveal that al-Qa`ida is weak and that its cells Various other Sunni jihadist groups More significant, on May 1, 2010, are not connected through proper across Iraq and elsewhere echoed these Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad communications networks. They argued statements. Members of one Sunni allegedly attempted to detonate a car that al-Qa`ida’s propaganda and lies jihadist group in Iraq, the al-Siddiq bomb in New York City’s Times Square. were aimed at luring more recruits. “If the Army, apparently decided to join the Shortly after the failed attack, a Pakistani news is true, it means one thing,” was the ISI out of tribal allegiance.11 Many Taliban statement appeared on jihadist refrain among users in this camp. jihadist forum participants believe web forums claiming responsibility for that more jihadists in Iraq who belong the attack as revenge for the deaths of al- Al-Qa`ida’s media wing is lying to other groups will join the ISI in Baghdadi and al-Masri in Iraq.14 Despite and spreading false information solidarity in the wake of the leadership the claim of responsibility, however, on the Iraqi arena. It’s holding decapitation. the extent of outside involvement in back the fact that al-Qa`ida Shahzad’s attempted terrorist attack is weak and its members are Outlook for the Future is not yet clear, as other Pakistani living in an incinerator with no The majority of jihadist forum users Taliban factions rejected involvement communication means with other were quick to assure that AQI, yet in the plot, and investigations are not cells. The depletion of al-Qa`ida not necessarily the ISI, would remain yet complete on whether Shahzad acted is imminent. Everybody is tired of strong in the wake of the latest setbacks. alone. Moreover, based on various al-Qa`ida’s stupidity.6 Some of these users, who claimed direct journalist investigations into his past, connection to the physical battlefield, Shahzad himself had reportedly become Another jihadist user, Marzook, who wrote that the new AQI leadership radicalized long before AQI’s latest is known as being against the ISI, said, is more experienced and will take setbacks in Iraq, sending out angry “The death of the ISI’s top two men in advantage of the current political e-mails to friends about U.S. foreign one hole shows the bankruptcy of the vacuum in the country. They believe that policy after the 9/11 attacks.15 organization and the contraction of the AQI and the ISI can be strengthened by Iraqi arena.” exploiting the rivalries between Iraq’s 12 This statement was posted on www.alfaloja1.info on many political groups. April 29, 2010. Reaction from Jihadist Groups on the Deaths 13 Ibid. The picture was posted at www.shamikh1.net/ Various Sunni jihadist groups released vb/. statements concerning the deaths of 7 This statement was posted on www.alfaloja1.info on 14 “Times Square Car Bomb: Pakistani Taliban ‘Claims al-Masri and al-Baghdadi. On April April 28, 2010. Responsibility,’” Telegraph, May 2, 2010; James Gordon 28, 2010, a statement from Ansar al- 8 Ibid. Meek, “Pak-Taliban: Times Sq. Bomb Avenged Qaeda- Islam appeared on jihadist web forums 9 The statement appeared on a jihadist web forum and Iraq Leaders’ Deaths,” New York Daily News, May 2, was dated April 25, 2010. 2010. 10 Ibid. 15 Andrea Elliott, Sabrina Tavernise and Anne Barnard, 6 This statement was posted on www.muslm.net on 11 This statement was posted on www.muslm.net on “For Times Sq. Suspect, Long Roots of Discontent,” New April 21, 2010. April 26, 2010. York Times, May 15, 2010.

14 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Conclusion The Kidnapping and This article provides information On May 15, 2010, the ISI purportedly on the Asian Tigers, and explains announced that it has appointed new Execution of Khalid the significance of the kidnapping leaders to replace those lost in the Khwaja in Pakistan and execution of Khalid Khwaja. U.S.-Iraqi operation that killed al- Khwaja, for example, reportedly once Baghdadi and al-Masri.16 According By Rahimullah Yusufzai maintained contacts with Usama to the statement, the new leaders are bin Ladin and served as a facilitator “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al- on march 26, 2010, two well-known former between the Pakistani government Qurashi, the Emir of the Believers of the officials in Pakistan’s Inter-Services and various jihadist groups. His Islamic State of Iraq” and “Sheikh Abu Intelligence (ISI) and a British journalist surprising assassination reveals the Abdullah al-Hassani al-Qurashi is his went missing in North Waziristan Agency changing composition of the overall prime minister and deputy.”17 The ISI in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Taliban network as a younger and less had already announced a new minister Tribal Areas (FATA). Before heading manageable generation of militants of war, Abu Suleiman, who will replace out to the tribal areas, the men told begins to take control. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who served that acquaintances that the purpose of the role in addition to being the head of trip was to make a documentary on the The Asian Tigers and the Grievances against AQI. Abu Suleiman vowed revenge for Taliban and U.S. drone strikes.1 The men, Khalid Khwaja the killings of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, however, were abducted by a previously Before the recent kidnappings, the warning of “a long gloomy night and unknown militant group, the Asian Tigers. Asian Tigers were an unknown group. dark days colored in blood” and urging The group announced that it was holding It is widely believed to be a front followers not to “become accustomed to hostage Khalid Khwaja, retired Colonel organization for a faction of Pakistani having a loose hand on the trigger.”18 Sultan Amir Tarar (commonly referred militants who previously belonged to to as Colonel Imam), and journalist the anti-Shi`a militant group, Lashkar- Leadership decapitations clearly have an Asad Qureshi. In exchange for the men’s i-Jhangvi. Other reports suggest that effect on terrorist and militant groups. release, the Asian Tigers demanded the Asians Tigers are a faction of the Whether or not the latest killings will that Pakistan’s authorities release from Punjabi Taliban and are composed of put an end to AQI and the ISI remains custody three important Afghan Taliban a small group of 30-40 Punjabi and an open question. Devastating bombings leaders: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Mehsud tribal militants expelled by continue to rip through Iraq, with Maulawi Kabir and Mansour Dadullah.2 their parent organizations, Lashkar-i- militants feeding off tensions between Jhangvi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan the country’s myriad political groups After the 10-day demand deadline (TTP).6 and factions. On May 10, for example, expired, the Asian Tigers executed the bombings, assassinations and ambushes elderly Khwaja and dumped his body Preliminary information on the group tore through the country, killing at on the roadside near Mir Ali in North can be drawn from interactions with its least 119 people and underscoring the Waziristan.3 It repeated its earlier spokesman, Mohammad Omar. Omar pervasive threat.19 It is clear from demand, but also ordered the freedom speaks Urdu, unlike the TTP’s Pashtu- jihadist web forums that many remain of 120 militants held by Pakistan. language spokesmen and commanders, hopeful about the insurgency in Iraq Moreover, the group insisted on $10 suggesting that he is from a group despite the recent setbacks. Whether million ransom for the release of of Punjabi Taliban that has shifted those hopes will be borne out on the Qureshi.4 Subsequently, Asian Tigers operations from Pakistan’s Punjab ground remains to be seen. spokesman Mohammad Omar made it Province to North Waziristan.7 This clear that Colonel Imam and Qureshi group could be operating out of the Mir Abdul Hameed Bakier is the former would not be freed until 160 of their Ali area under the protection of local head of crisis management and terrorist men, all militants, were released by tribal militants. negotiations in Jordan’s Counter- Pakistan’s authorities.5 Terrorism Unit of the General Intelligence Based on Khwaja’s brutal execution, Department. At the GID, he also worked 1 This information is based on a personal interview with the Asian Tigers clearly targeted him on international counterterrorism issues. Khalid Khwaja. Also see Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The specifically. Some analysts believe Currently, he is active in monitoring Kidnapped,” The News International, April 27, 2010. that the group’s motive relates to jihadist internet traffic for counterterrorism 2 Iqbal Khattak, “‘Jehadi Channels’ Opened to Secure Khwaja’s past actions, when he analysis groups. Release of Former ISI Spies,” Daily Times, April 23, 2010. reportedly demanded that TTP leaders There is no concrete evidence, however, that Kabir, the Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur former Taliban governor for Nangarhar and Logar prov- Rahman “get rid” of 14 senior Pakistani inces and now military commander for eastern Afghani- Taliban commanders—mostly Punjabis stan, is in Pakistani custody. associated with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi—for 16 “Qaeda in Iraq ‘Names Replacements for Slain Lead- 3 “Ex-ISI Official Khalid Khwaja Found Dead in FATA,” allegedly being on the payroll of India’s ers.’” Dawn, April 30, 2010. 17 Ibid. 4 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “No Real Effort by Govt, Tribal El- 6 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “‘Asian Tigers’ Kill Khalid Khwaja 18 Anthony Shadid, “Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New ders to Secure Release of Col Imam, Qureshi,” The News on Expiry of Deadline,” The News International, May 1, Leaders,” New York Times, May 16, 2010. International, May 15, 2010. 2010. 19 “Iraq Boosts Security after 119 Killed in Attacks,” CBS 5 This demand was addressed directly to this author 7 This observation was noted during the author’s tele- News, May 11, 2010. over the phone on May 14, 2010. phone conversation with Mohammad Omar.

15 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5 intelligence agency, the Research and Khwaja, under duress, admitted to being and tribal groups in the region against Analysis Wing (RAW).8 If these reports an ISI and CIA agent, and accepted guilt it. Pakistan’s government, for example, are true, Hakimullah Mehsud must for the arrest of Lal Masjid cleric Maulana made a peace deal with North Waziristan have been uneasy over the list since it Abdul Aziz. Khwaja also said that militants led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur contained the name of his cousin, Qari certain jihadist commanders—such as before it moved against the TTP in Hussain Mehsud.9 Qari Hussain is a Fazlur Rahman Khalil, Masood Azhar South Waziristan. Pakistan’s security top Pakistani Taliban leader known as and Abdullah Shah Mazhar, along with forces also do not want to open too many the master trainer of suicide bombers.10 militant organizations such as Jaysh- fronts at one time out of concern of Others on the list included Qari Zafar, i-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, who is thought to be close to the senior Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Jamiatul Mujahidin “By having Khwaja TTP leadership.11 Qari Zafar was wanted and al-Badr—were still operating as for planning the March 2006 attack on proxies for the ISI.15 ‘confess’ to links with the the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, which ISI and CIA, the Asian killed U.S. diplomat David Foy. He was These statements demonstrate the reportedly killed, however, in a U.S. various divisions between jihadist Tigers not only wanted drone strike earlier this year.12 groups in Pakistan. By having Khwaja to justify his execution, “confess” to links with the ISI and The Asian Tigers had other grievances CIA, the Asian Tigers not only wanted but also to discredit against Khwaja. They accused him of to justify his execution, but also to opposing jihadist groups betraying the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) discredit opposing jihadist groups by clerics during their showdown with associating them with the ISI. This by associating them with Pakistani security forces in the heart move also allowed the Asian Tigers to the ISI.” of Islamabad in 2007. The Asian Tigers show its independence from Pakistan’s claimed that Khwaja lured Maulana government, portraying themselves as Abdul Aziz out of the mosque only to more legitimate jihadists. have him arrested. This allegation, stretching the military’s resources and however, was refuted by Abdul Aziz State of Affairs in North Waziristan exposing its supply lines. Nevertheless, himself, and he led the funeral prayers The kidnapping and subsequent at some point the military will have to for Khwaja after his body was returned execution of Khwaja highlights the undertake a military operation in North to Islamabad for burial.13 complexities of the situation in North Waziristan to deny further sanctuary Waziristan. The Punjabi Taliban and for the tribal area’s militants. Nevertheless, the Asian Tigers’ other militant groups are able to operate spokesman denounced Khwaja as an in the tribal agency with the help of The militants’ movement into North agent of the ISI and the U.S. Central local tribal militants. These fighters are Waziristan, however, has not been Intelligence Agency. The Asian Tigers reportedly concentrated in the Mir Ali without conflict. There are reports charged that Khwaja opposed the area, where Mehsud Taliban from South that Hafiz Gul Bahadur is angry over Pakistani Taliban since he had called Waziristan have found refuge with the provocative actions of Punjabi them “terrorists.” The Asian Tigers also tribal militants from the Daur tribe. Taliban groups—such as the Asian alleged that Khwaja and Col. Imam were There have also been reports about the Tigers—and the Mehsud Taliban.16 visiting North Waziristan on the advice presence of Uzbek militants from the Their confrontational actions only of former Pakistan Army Chief General Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, along increase the odds that Pakistan’s Mirza Aslam Beg, retired ISI Lieutenant with other foreigners including Arabs military will spread its offensive to General Hamid Gul and serving ISI linked with al-Qa`ida, in the Mir Ali North Waziristan, drawing Bahadur’s official Colonel Sajjad.14 area. The Afghan Taliban’s Haqqani forces into the fight. Moreover, militant network also maintains a presence in forces in North Waziristan are always Before executing Khwaja, the Asian North Waziristan. subject to possible attack by U.S. drone Tigers forced him to make a number aircraft. of statements on video. In the video, Much of the recent movement of fighters into North Waziristan came as a result Conclusion of Pakistan’s ongoing military offensive The fate of the two hostages still hangs 8 Ibid. in South Waziristan. As Pakistan in the balance. Pakistan’s government 9 Ibid. poured troops into that agency, many is unlikely to release all of the militants 10 Ibid. fighters simply moved north into the demanded by the Asian Tigers, as many 11 Ibid. adjacent tribal agencies. Pakistan has are dangerous or have already been 12 “Pakistani Taliban Confirm Death of Qari Zafar,” been reluctant to undertake military convicted in the court system. The Dawn, March 2, 2010. activity in North Waziristan out of government may agree to release some, 13 Kashif Abbasi, “LJ Killed My Father: Usama Khalid,” concern over uniting all the militant but not necessarily enough to satisfy The Nation, May 1, 2010. Also see “Khalid Khwaja Laid to the kidnappers. Rest in Islamabad,” Daily Express, May 2, 2010. 14 “Confessions of a Spy,” Daily Times Monitor, April 24, 15 Hamid Mir, “What Was the Last Mission of Khalid 2010; Nadir Hassan, “Who Killed Ex-ISI Official?” Ex- Khwaja?” The News International, May 2, 2010; “Confes- 16 Malik Mumtaz Khan, “NWA Taliban Vow to Adhere press Tribune, April 30, 2010. sions of a Spy.” to Peace Accord,” The News International, May 15, 2010.

16 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

A number of conclusions can be drawn The Sources of the Abu the creation of AHAI in 1989 to pursue from this incident. The kidnappings Jihad Fi Sabilillah, defined as “fighting and and Khwaja’s subsequent execution Sayyaf’s Resilience in the dying for the cause of Islam.”2 Yet it show the generational change among Southern Philippines was only in 1993 when AHAI formally militants in Pakistan and the evolving organized with Abdurajak as the amir.3 relationship between the ISI and By Rommel C. Banlaoi Taliban fighters. Khwaja, for example, Since the formal launch of AHAI in was a controversial figure due to his since the launching of the global war 1989, Abdurajak delivered several associations with the ISI and links with on terrorism in the aftermath of the khutbahs or sermons and released several certain militant groups. After he retired September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on fatawa using the nom-de-guerre “Abu from the military, he worked as a lawyer the United States, the Philippines has Sayyaf,” in honor of Afghan resistance and defended suspected militants been engaged in a prolonged military fighter Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.4 While and Islamist politicians.17 He even campaign against the Abu Sayyaf Group Abdurajak idolized this Afghan leader, reportedly once maintained contacts (ASG). Key ASG leaders have been the suggestion that Abdurajak was an with Usama bin Ladin. It appears that killed in this battle, while others have Afghan war veteran is still a subject the Asian Tigers killed him as revenge been imprisoned for various crimes for verification.5 Some living Filipino against the ISI and against the jihadist associated with terrorism. Despite these Afghan war veterans, for example, have groups it believes are still working for successes, authorities have not been challenged the claim that Abdurajak the spy agency. able to eliminate the ASG completely, actually fought in the Afghan war— and the group remains a threat to arguing instead that it was his younger The new generation of militants in Philippine internal security. Even after brother, Hector, who participated in the Pakistan is more independent and is losing key field commanders, the ASG conflict.6 pursuing more radical goals. Moreover, is still able to replenish its membership these domestic militant groups share primarily from affected and influenced Abdurajak’s khutbahs and fatawa became links with transnational terrorist villages in Sulu, Basilan and Tawi- popular not only in Basilan but also in networks such as al-Qa`ida, and they Tawi (BASULTA) in the southern Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga City. are angry with Pakistan’s government Philippines. His popularity caught the ire of police and for aligning with the United States and military authorities because Abdurajak NATO in the “war on terrorism.” It After providing a brief background was associated with the Moro National appears that they want to embarrass of the ASG, this article examines the Liberation Front (MNLF), a group that Pakistan’s government and force sources of the ASG’s resilience in the declared jihad against the Philippine it to accept their demands. Future face of government and international government. Since Abdurajak used the kidnapping attempts of high-profile pressure. It argues that the ASG is pen name “Abu Sayyaf,” the military security officials and other more a product of complex tensions in the described his followers as a group of Abu aggressive tactics are likely as the southern Philippines, where criminal, Sayyaf, which was popularized in media Pakistani Taliban grow more diffuse political and militant groups at times as the Abu Sayyaf Group, or ASG. The and increasingly unpredictable. collaborate to achieve shared goals. popularity of this group spread widely It also shows the limits of countering in Mindanao and was locally known Rahimullah Yusufzai is a senior Pakistani terrorism in the southern Philippines. as Juma’a Abu Sayyaf. In August 1991, journalist and political and security analyst Abdurajak publicly used the name ASG presently working as Resident Editor of the A Deeper Look at the Founding of the ASG in connection with the bombing of the English daily The News International Analysts traditionally trace the MV Doulos, a Christian missionary ship in Peshawar. He is also an analyst for the evolution of the ASG to Abdurajak docked at the Zamboanga City port.7 leading Pakistani Urdu TV channel, Geo. Janjalani, who reportedly founded the He has been reporting on Afghanistan and group in the early 1990s. While there From Islamic Movement to a Bandit Group Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province is no doubt that the ASG’s original From an Islamic movement in the late (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal ideological foundation is attributed 1980s and early 1990s, the ASG received Areas (FATA), and Baluchistan since the to the political and religious ideas of the label of a bandit group from the early 1980s. Abdurajak, what he actually organized was a group called al-Harakatul al- 2 Ibid. Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic 3 Ibid. Movement, whose original members 4 Ibid. were drawn from his followers in Jamaa 5 Personal interview, Noor Muog, former member of the Tableegh, an Islamic propagation group Abu Sayyaf Group, April 8, 2010. that he formed in Basilan in the early 6 There is need to conduct research on the life and sto- 1 1980s. Abdurajak officially declared ries of Filipino Muslim veterans of the Afghan war. Some have died, some have been imprisoned but there are still 1 For a more detailed history, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, remaining veterans all over Mindanao. There are a few “The Abu Sayyaf Group and Terrorism in the South- staying in Muslim communities in Manila trying to make ern Philippines Seven Years After 9/11: Threat and Re- a living peacefully. sponse,” Philippine Institute for Political Violence and 7 “Abu Sayyaf Kidnappings, Bombings and Other At- 17 Mir. Terrorism Research, September 2008. tacks,” GMANews.tv, August 23, 2007.

17 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Philippine government for partaking in From a Bandit Group to a Terrorist Group to an estimated 200 members at the several bombing, extortion and kidnap- The aftermath of 9/11, however, resulted conclusion of the campaign in 2007.17 for-ransom activities. Although the ASG in the redesignation of the ASG from received initial funding from al-Qa`ida a bandit group to a terrorist group. Yet the ASG was able to recover its in the mid-1990s through the activities The United States listed the ASG as a membership when it mounted a series of Muhammad Jamal Khalifah, external foreign terrorist organization, justifying of kidnapping activities in 2008. This funding was cut off when Philippine the deployment of U.S. troops to the allowed the group to amass money, authorities discovered Khalifah’s southern Philippines to assist and train which attracted Muslim youth to join clandestine operations in the country.8 the Philippine military in countering the spree. The massive kidnapping the threat. Since 9/11, the ASG has activities of the ASG started in June To mobilize resources, the ASG resorted engaged in a series of terrorist activities 2008 with the abduction of well-known to a kidnap-for-ransom spree in the such as the Davao International Airport Filipina journalist, Ces Drilon, and her late 1990s. The ASG’s most publicized bombing in March 2003 that killed cameraman. This was followed by the kidnap-for-ransom activities were the 21 people, the Superferry 14 bombing in kidnappings of three workers of the March 2000 attacks in elementary February 2004 that killed 116 people International Committee of the Red schools in Basilan,9 the April 2000 attack and the Valentine’s Day bombing in Cross (ICRC) in January 2009 and two at the Sipadan resort of Malaysia10 and February 2005 that killed 20 people.14 Chinese nationals in November 2009. the May 2001 attack at the Dos Palmas During this period, the ASG engaged In between those dates, several local resort of Palawan.11 These attacks in several bombing activities that were residents were kidnapped, with one local prompted the Philippine government to hallmarks of terrorism rather than teacher in Jolo beheaded in November describe the ASG as a group of bandits banditry.15 2009.18 Indeed, the ASG degenerated interested in money-making through into a bandit group again. kidnapping activities. As a result of ASG’s bomb-making skills were limited foreign funding since 9/11, the acquired through joint training with With money in their pockets resulting ASG has relied on kidnapping activities Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives in the from several ransom payments, the as its major source of funding—this southern Philippines. Dulmatin and ASG was able to accommodate younger continues today.12 Other sources of its Umar Patek, alleged masterminds recruits not interested in ideology, but funding come from extortion activities of the 2002 Bali bombing, have been in guns and money. Muslim parents in (disguised as zakat, or alms giving), identified by Philippine intelligence impoverished villages of BASULTA counterfeiting of goods, illegal drug authorities as key trainers of the even volunteered their sons to join the sales or serving as bodyguards for local ASG on the manufacture and use ASG in exchange for a monthly supply politicians.13 of improvised explosive devices.16 of rice and financial support to the Dulmatin and Umar Patek trained family of around $200.19 Some fathers 8 The discovery is fully described in the report, “The some ASG members with members of even reportedly traded their sons for 20 Islamic Fundamentalist/Extremist Movements in the the Special Operations Group (SOG) guns. There were cases where young Philippines and their Links with International Terrorist of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front recruits joined the ASG as a status Organizations,” December 1994, produced by the Special (MILF). symbol against ordinary gangs in their Investigation Group-Intelligence Command of the Phil- communities. Some entered the ASG as ippine National Police headed by Rodolfo B. Mendoza, From Terrorist Group to Bandit Group Again a result of “pot” (marijuana) sessions 21 Jr. When the Philippine military waged with members. There are a few who 9 For an excellent account, see Jose Torres Jr., Into the Oplan Ultimatum in August 2006 joined the ASG to exact revenge for Mountains: Hostaged by the Abu Sayyaf (Quezon City: Clar- as a counterterrorism offensive to the deaths of their loved ones killed by etian Publications, 2001). eliminate the ASG, it led to the demise police or military forces. There are also 10 For first-hand accounts of this incident, see Roberto of key ASG leaders, particularly members who joined the ASG due to N. Aventajado, 140 Days of Terror: In the Clutches of the Khadaffy Janjalani and Jainal Antel clan conflicts (known as rido), which is 22 Abu Sayyaf (Pasig City: Anvil, 2004) and Werner Wal- Sali, Jr. (also known as Abu Solaiman). prevalent in Mindanao. lert, Hostage Terror: Abducted by the Abu Sayyaf (Singa- The success of Oplan Ultimatum led to pore: Marshall Cavendish, 2009). the drastic decline of ASG membership 11 For a gripping account of her tragedy in this attack, see 17 Rodolfo B. Mendoza, “Updates on Terrorist Organiza- Gracia Burnham, In the Presence of My Enemies (Wheaton, ippines, March 24, 2010. tions in the Philippines,” lecture delivered at the Brunei IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2003). 14 For details on these attacks, see Enrico Antonio Darussalam Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, 12 Rodolfo B. Mendoza, Jr., “The Evolution of Terrorist La Vina and Lilita Balane, “Timeline: The Abu Sayyaf December 3, 2009. Financing in the Philippines,” presented at the Interna- Atrocities,” Newsbreak Online, March 31, 2009. 18 “Teacher Beheaded in Philippines,” BBC, November tional Conference in Countering the Financing of Ter- 15 For detailed analysis, see Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The 9, 2009. rorism at the Sulu Hotel, Philippines on July 7-8, 2008; Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Ter- 19 Personal interview, senior intelligence officer, Armed Personal interview, Major General Benjamin Dolorfino, rorism,” in Daljit Singh and Lorraine Salazar eds., South- Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, Commander of the Western Command of the Armed east Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast March 25, 2010. Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Philippines, Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 247-264. 20 Ibid. March 25, 2010. 16 Dulmatin was killed in Indonesia on March 9, 2010. 21 Ibid. 13 Personal interview, Rear Admiral Alexander Pama, Umar Patek is believed to have left the Philippines, but 22 Wilfredo Magno Torres III ed., Rido: Clan Feuding and Commander of Naval Forces Western Mindanao of the there are reports that he is still in Jolo, Sulu in the south- Conflict Management in Mindanao (Makati City: The Asia Armed Forces of the Philippines, Zamboanga City, Phil- ern Philippines. Foundation, 2007).

18 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Sources of ASG Resilience government has established a Limits of Countering Terrorism in the As of April 2010, the ASG has an commission to dismantle private armies, Philippines estimated 445 members, 79% of whom it remains to be seen if the commission With this grim reality of violence in the are 30-years-old and younger.23 can fulfill its mandate. According to southern Philippines, counterterrorism According to the Philippine government, the Philippine National Police, there measures largely based on the use of Sulu represents the largest membership are more than 130 private armies in military muscle will not put an end to of 200 followed by 130 in Basilan, 90 the entire country, in addition to rebel the ASG. Military offensives and other in Zamboanga City, 20 in Tawi-Tawi groups moonlighting as partisan armed variants of Oplan Ultimatum can kill and five in Marawi City.24 The ASG militias of local politicians.28 ASG ASG members, but not end the ASG as has become a resilient group because members who are not part of the private a resilient group. it is able to replenish its membership army of a local politician offer their from affected and influenced villages services as “thugs for hire,” particularly The ASG is a symbol of the complexities in BASULTA through material during election seasons. of armed violence in the southern inducements. In Sulu alone, 46% or Philippines that interact with issues 115 of its total 251 villages are affected In other words, the ASG has become an of banditry, terrorism, rebellion, by the ASG.25 In Basilan, 25% of its entrepreneur of violence with more of its separatism, clan conflict, ethnic conflict 187 villages are affected by ASG.26 In members interested in pursuing money and warlordism. The continuous entry other words, the ASG has a reservoir of rather than a violent, Islamist ideology. of foreign jihadists to the southern new recruits that provide the group its While other commanders still have the Philippines only compounds these staying power. illusion of waging jihad to establish an issues, as radical foreigners subvert Islamic state in the southern Philippines, the minds of the locals, imbuing them Aside from this reservoir, ASG these individuals are a minority, usually with a violent Islamist ideology. leaders have also mastered the skills those who studied in Islamic schools in Moreover, they also train local fighters of conniving with ordinary criminal the Philippines and abroad. Individuals in sophisticated bomb-making skills. groups in their operational areas to such as Yasser Igasan, Khair Mundos Only effective governance can limit mount kidnapping and other criminal and Isnilon Hapilon fit the description ethnic conflict, banditry and rebellion. activities. The ASG has recognized field of ideological leaders. Yet Igasan, who A strong civilian government sincere commanders who are known bandits is the nominal amir of the ASG, remains a in nation-building is needed to finally in the community. ASG commander jihadist but lacks loyal armed followers put an end to the ASG by resolving the Alpader Parad, who was killed in to promote his mission. Mundos, who is ethnic and political disputes plaguing February 2010, was a known kidnapper leading the ASG in Basilan, also lacks the region. rather than an ideological leader in Sulu. followers who are committed jihadists. Other field commanders of the ASG are Most of Mundos’ followers are bandits Rommel C. Banlaoi is the Executive Director also leaders of notorious criminal gangs who are not interested in pursuing of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence in BASULTA who are engaged in piracy, jihad. Hapilon, who is leading some of and Terrorism Research, an independent arms smuggling, drugs trafficking and the group in Sulu, is overpowered by think-tank. He was former professor counterfeiting of goods. other ASG field commanders who are of political science and international more interested in money generation. relations at the National Defense College Furthermore, some ASG field In short, the majority of ASG members of the Philippines and was a consultant at commanders are protected by local are not motivated by the promise of an the Department of National Defense and politicians who also benefit from the Islamic state or the virtue of jihad, but National Counter Terrorism Action Group illegal activities of the group—using by the allure of money and power that of the Philippine Anti-Terrorism Council. He ASG members as part of their private comes from the barrel of a gun. is currently lecturing at the Command and militias.27 Although the Philippine General Staff College of the Armed Forces of The ASG, therefore, has become a the Philippines and is a Senior Fellow at the 23 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Evolving Threats of Terrorism in resilient group because its existence Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University. Southeast Asia,” lecture presented at the 4th Asia Pacific is enmeshed in a complex situation in He is the author of Philippine Security Program for Senior National Security Officers organized the southern Philippines where rebels in the Age of Terror (2010), Counter- by the Center for Excellence in National Security, Singa- and terrorists connive with ordinary Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia: pore, April 13, 2010. For the estimates on ASG cadre, see bandits, who collude with local How Effective Are They (2009) and War Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Armed politicians. All these various interests on Terrorism In Southeast Asia (2004). Forces of the Philippines, March 2010. perpetrate violence on an island marred He is currently working on a book project on 24 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, by more than 400 years of ethnic the Abu Sayyaf Group. Armed Forces of the Philippines, March 2010. conflict, banditry and rebellion. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Local politicians allegedly received commissions from ransom payments and proceeds from illicit trafficking of arms and drugs. This idea was also articulated by Na- Execs,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 15, 2010. tional Security Adviser and Acting Defense Secretary 28 Jesus A. Versosa, “The PNP’s Role in Upholding the Norberto Gonzales. Also see Jocelyn Uy, “Abu Sayyaf Law Against Private Armed Groups,” Philippine Na- Men Maybe Moonlighting at Private Armies—Defense tional Police, January 27, 2010.

19 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

Recent Highlights in the direction of Basilan Island. – AFP, activity on the ground against Israel.” Terrorist Activity April 5 – Haaretz, April 6 April 5, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): April 7, 2010 (GLOBAL): U.S. April 1, 2010 (UNITED STATES): The Taliban fighters kidnapped four Treasury Department official David U.S. Treasury Department announced Afghan policemen after ambushing Cohen announced that al-Qa`ida “is sanctions against Ahmad Khalaf their convoy in Baghlan Province. The now in the worst financial shape it Shabib al-Dulaymi, who is suspected militants also stole a number of police has been in for years.” He also said, of smuggling weapons to Iraq and vehicles. – Reuters, April 5 “We have seen financial networks having ties to Usama bin Ladin. Al- that were the source of Al-Qaeda’s Dulaymi is a native of Falluja, but lives April 5, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Multiple financing, particularly out of Saudi in London. The Treasury Department militants attempted to storm the U.S. Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf, also placed sanctions on Atilla Selek Consulate in Peshawar. The militants increasingly disrupted.” Cohen who is currently in a German jail detonated a car bomb to destroy warned, however, that the Taliban has for plotting attacks on U.S. soldiers the external security post at the enough financing to pose a threat to and civilians in Germany. Selek is of diplomatic mission, before trying to civilians and international forces in Turkish descent. – AFP, April 1 drive a second vehicle, carrying two Afghanistan. “The Taliban still has the suicide bombers, into the facility. The funding necessary to hold territory, April 1, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): entrance barrier, however, blocked buy allegiance and fundamentally An explosion killed one member of the vehicle, causing the militants to challenge our core national security the NATO-led international force in detonate their explosives prematurely. objective” of bringing stability to southern Afghanistan. – Reuters, April 1 Other fighters dressed in military Afghanistan, he explained. – Bloomberg, fatigues launched rocket-propelled April 7 April 2, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): grenades at the building as well. At Three German soldiers were killed least five people were killed in the April 7, 2010 (UNITED STATES): during fighting in Kunduz Province. coordinated attack. – Voice of America, Various press reports, citing U.S. – Reuters, April 2 April 5; Los Angeles Times, April 6 officials, claim that the Obama administration has “authorized the April 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani April 5, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide CIA to capture or kill a U.S.-born police said that they killed eight bomber attacked an Awami National radical Muslim cleric alleged to be an suspected criminals who had ties to Party political rally in Lower Dir al-Qaida operative.” The cleric has Islamist militants on the outskirts of District of the North-West Frontier been identified as Anwar al-`Awlaqi, Peshawar. Three policemen were also Province, killing at least 43 people. who is believed to be hiding in Yemen. killed in the fighting. – Reuters, April 3 – BBC, April 5 – Voice of America, April 7

April 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani April 5, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide April 8, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): security forces killed 30 militants bomber killed at least two police U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl, who was in Orakzai Agency of the Federally officers in Ingushetia, located in captured by Taliban fighters in June Administered Tribal Areas. Six Russia’s North Caucasus. The bomber 2009, appeared in a new Taliban soldiers were also killed in the targeted a police car in the town of propaganda video posted to Islamist fighting. – Reuters, April 3 Karabulak. Less than an hour after the web forums. It is not clear when the suicide bombing, a car bomb exploded video was filmed. – Telegraph, April 8 April 4, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A in the same area in an attempt to roadside bomb killed four Afghan target first responders, causing April 8, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): civilians, including three women, in several injuries. – New York Times, April 5; Taliban fighters killed a tribal elder, Ghazni Province. – Reuters, April 5 Bloomberg, April 5 Haji Abdul Samad, along with four other people in Marja, located in April 4, 2010 (IRAQ): Three car bombs April 6, 2010 (IRAQ): At least seven Helmand Province. – Reuters, April 9 ripped through Baghdad, killing at bombings tore through mostly Shi`a least 40 people. The bombs targeted neighborhoods in Baghdad, killing at April 8, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): the Iranian and German embassies, in least 35 people. – Washington Post, April 7 Afghan police arrested five members addition to the Egyptian Consulate. of a Taliban bomb squad, preventing Authorities blamed the attack on al- April 6, 2010 (ISRAEL): A leading a terrorist attack in Kabul. According Qa`ida in Iraq. – Los Angeles Times, April 5 al-Qa`ida operative, Salah al-Karawi, to the Afghan Interior Ministry, the accused Lebanese militant group Hizb men, armed with firearms and suicide April 4, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): Gunmen Allah of “protecting Israel.” According vests, were arrested as they tried to possibly belonging to the Abu Sayyaf to al-Karawi, “They [Hizb Allah] don’t drive into the center of the capital. Group abducted a Swiss-born man allow us to act, but they don’t strike – Daily Times, April 9 from his home in Zamboanga, located Israel themselves,” stating that the in the southern Philippines. Charlie Lebanese Shi`a group was “nothing Reith, 72-years-old and a naturalized more than protectors of the Jews. Filipino, was taken away by boat in It is the biggest hurdle delaying our

20 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

April 9, 2010 (UNITED STATES): that is nuclear related. We know have been working on behalf of local According to the Washington Post, “U.S. that al Qaeda has been involved in political figures. – Manila Standard, April District Court Judge James Robertson a number of these efforts to acquire 14; Philippine Inquirer, April 15 ruled that Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a it. Fortunately, I think they’ve been Mauritanian, must be released from scammed a number of times, but we April 14, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. custody because the government was know that they continued to pursue soldiers withdrew from the Korengal unable to prove that at the time of that. We know of individuals within Valley, located in Afghanistan’s his capture he was part of al-Qaeda the organization that have been given Kunar Province. The valley is a or was providing any support to the that responsibility.” – AFP, April 12; Taliban stronghold, and its rugged organization.” Slahi is currently being WhiteHouse.gov, April 12 mountainous terrain caters to the held at Guantanamo Bay. – Washington Taliban’s guerrilla tactics. U.S. Post, April 10 April 12, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide General Stanley A. McChrystal said, bomber in a vehicle killed a policeman “The battle changes, the war changes. April 9, 2010 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s and a civilian in Mosul, the capital of If you don’t understand the dynamics, al-Shabab insurgent group forced Ninawa Province. The bomber targeted you have no chance of getting it right. the BBC off the air in regions they a police patrol. – AFP, April 12 We’ve been slower here [in Korengal] control, accusing the network of than I would have liked.” – BBC, April spreading Christian propaganda. April 12, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A 14; New York Times, April 14 According to the group, the “BBC is suspected U.S. aerial drone killed owned by England and it spreads (a) at least five militants in North April 14, 2010 (IRAQ): A U.S. colonial and Christian agenda in the Waziristan Agency of the Federally counterterrorism official told Muslim world. BBC fights Islam…it is Administered Tribal Areas. According reporters that Iraqi authorities against the Islamic administration in to a Pakistani security official, the uncovered plans by al-Qa`ida to fly Somalia.” Voice of America was also targeted compounds were “owned by hijacked planes into Iraq’s Shi`a taken off the air. – Reuters, April 9; Voice of local Taliban commander Tariq Khan.” mosques. It is not clear how far the America, April 9 – Dawn, April 12 plan had advanced, but the potential targets reportedly included holy sites April 10, 2010 (YEMEN): The April 12, 2010 (PAKISTAN): More in Najaf and Karbala. – AFP, April 14; powerful al-Awaliq tribe in Yemen than 100 Pakistani Taliban militants Christian Science Monitor, April 15 threatened violence against anyone attacked a checkpoint in Orakzai trying to harm the radical, U.S.-born Agency of the Federally Administered April 15, 2010 (UNITED STATES): cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi. According to Tribal Areas. Pakistan’s security Robert Mueller, the head of the Federal Agence France-Presse, “A US official forces managed to repulse the Bureau of Investigation, warned U.S. said on Wednesday that President insurgents, killing an estimated 38 lawmakers about the threat from Barack Obama’s administration had Taliban fighters. Two Frontier Corps unaffiliated extremists, or “lone wolf” authorised the targeted killing of the soldiers were also killed. – New York terrorists. “Al-Qaeda and its affiliates cleric, even though he is an American Times, April 12 are still committed to striking us in citizen.” The tribe, which is heavily the United States,” he said. “Home- armed, is active in Yemen’s Abyan April 12, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani grown and lone-wolf extremists pose and Shabwa provinces. – AFP, April 10 media announced that a fourth suspect an equally serious threat.” According in a plot to bomb New York City was to Mueller, “These terrorist threats April 11, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): arrested in Pakistan several weeks ago. are diverse, far-reaching and ever- Taliban fighters threatened to execute The plot, which involved Najibullah changing, and to combat these threats, two French journalist hostages unless Zazi, targeted New York City’s Grand the FBI must sustain our overseas a prisoner exchange is organized. The Central and Times Square subway contingency operations and engage Taliban are demanding the French stations. – Reuters, April 13 our intelligence and law enforcement government negotiate the release of partners both here at home and prisoners held by U.S. and Afghan April 13, 2010 (UNITED STATES): U.S. abroad.” – AFP, April 15 authorities. – Independent Online, April 12 President Barack Obama announced an executive order blocking any U.S. April 15, 2010 (UNITED STATES): The April 12, 2010 (GLOBAL): President assets of the Somali insurgent group U.S. Treasury Department imposed Barack Obama’s top anti-terrorism al-Shabab. – Reuters, April 14 sanctions on two “high-profile” homeland security adviser, John Pakistani trust fund chiefs who are Brennan, warned that “al-Qaeda has April 13, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): allegedly linked to terrorism. The men been engaged in the effort to acquire a Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) militants were identified as Mohammed Mazhar, nuclear weapon for over 15 years, and disguised as police and military the director of al-Akhtar Trust, and its interest remains strong today.” He troops launched an attack in Isabela Mufti Abdul Rahim, the head of al- also said, “There have been numerous City on Basilan Island in the southern Rashid Trust. – AFP, April 15 reports over the years, over the past Philippines, killing at least eight eight or nine years, about attempts people. Three Philippine Marines were throughout the world to obtain among the dead. Philippine authorities various types of purported material suggested that the ASG fighters may

21 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

April 15, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): April 17, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two male and foreign targets in the capital. Two car bombs exploded in downtown suicide bombers disguised in burqas – Reuters, April 19; AFP, April 19 Kandahar, killing at least two people. attacked a refugee camp in Kohat Early reports suggested that the District of the North-West Frontier April 19, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): second bomb targeted a compound Province, killing at least 41 people. Taliban gunmen shot dead the deputy housing Western workers. – New York – Los Angeles Times, April 17; AFP, April 17 mayor of Kandahar city, Azizullah Times, April 15 Yarmal, while he was praying at a April 18, 2010 (IRAQ): U.S. and Iraqi mosque. – BBC, April 20 April 15, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): forces killed Abu Ayyub al-Masri (also Taliban fighters killed four German known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), the April 19, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A soldiers in a rocket attack in Baghlan head of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), in bomb attached to the back of a donkey Province. – New York Times, April 15 addition to Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, exploded in Kandahar city, killing the head of the Islamic State of Iraq. three children. – Reuters, April 19 April 15, 2010 (IRAQ): Gunmen U.S. General Ray Odierno called the stormed into a home in Mosul, killing deaths “potentially the most significant April 19, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide four people, including three women. blow to Al Qaeda in Iraq since the bomber targeted a crowded market in – Reuters, April 15 beginning of the insurgency.” AQI Peshawar, killing at least 23 people. later confirmed the deaths. According – BBC, April 19 April 16, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide to the Washington Post, “Acting on a tip bomber detonated his explosives inside they received in recent days, Iraqi April 20, 2010 (IRAQ): Iraqi and a civil hospital in Quetta, the capital and U.S. Special Forces descended on U.S. troops killed a regional al- of Baluchistan Province, killing 11 a safe house shared by the leaders of Qa`ida in Iraq leader. Hazim Ilyas people. It appears that Shi`a Muslims the Sunni Muslim insurgent group in Abdallah al-Khafaji (also known as were targeted, as the emergency room Tikrit, in northern Iraq…As the troops Yasir al-Hambali) was killed during was filled with friends and family approached the house, an explosion the morning operation in Ninawa members of a Shi`a bank manager occurred inside, likely the result of Province. – USA Today, April 20; AFP, killed earlier in the day. – Daily Times, a suicide bombing…American forces April 20 April 17 then quickly dropped a bomb on the house, U.S. officials said.” – Los Angeles April 22, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani April 16, 2010 (PAKISTAN): At least Times, April 20; Voice of America, April 25; Taliban militants ambushed a military four militants were killed in a U.S. Washington Post, April 20 convoy in North Waziristan Agency, aerial drone strike in North Waziristan killing seven soldiers. – New York Times, Agency in the Federally Administered April 18, 2010 (IRAQ): General Ray April 23 Tribal Areas. – AFP, April 16 Odierno, the head of U.S. forces in Iraq, said he was confident that he would April 22, 2010 (NIGER): Police in April 16, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): be able to draw down U.S. troops by Niger believe that armed gunmen Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb an end-of-August deadline. “We are… linked to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic (AQIM) released an Italian couple who on target to be at 50,000 [troops] by Maghreb kidnapped one Frenchman has been held hostage since December August,” he told Fox News. “We’re and one Algerian citizen in the north 2009. The couple was kidnapped in at about 95,000 today...our plans of the country. – AP, April 23 Mauritania, but released in Mali. are intact. I feel very comfortable – BBC, April 16 with our plan. And unless something April 23, 2010 (UNITED STATES): unforeseen and disastrous happens, I Taxi driver Zarein Ahmedzay pleaded April 17, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): fully expect us to be at 50,000 by the guilty in a New York court to conspiring According to the Washington Post, “The 1st of September.” – Reuters, April 18 to use weapons of mass destruction, Taliban has begun regularly targeting conspiring to commit murder in U.S. government contractors in April 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide a foreign country and providing southern Afghanistan, stepping up use bomber detonated his explosives- material support to Usama bin Ladin’s of a tactic that is rattling participating laden vehicle near the Belly Tang al-Qa`ida network. Ahmedzay, a U.S. firms and could undermine Police Station in Kohat District of the citizen, is a former school classmate development projects intended to North-West Frontier Province. The of Najibullah Zazi, who pleaded guilty stem the insurgency…Within the past blast killed at least seven people. – The to similar charges in February 2010. month, there have been at least five Nation, April 19; Voice of America, April 18 Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Knox attacks in Helmand and Kandahar also for the first time named the provinces against employees of U.S. April 19, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): senior al-Qa`ida operatives involved Agency for International Development Afghan police and intelligence in the case, identifying them as Salah contractors who are running officials announced that they al-Somali and Rashid Rauf. Al-Somali agricultural projects, building roads, prevented a planned commando-style is the head of international operations maintaining power plants and working raid by Taliban insurgents in Kabul. for al-Qa`ida and was killed in a with local officials.” – Washington Post, Nine would-be suicide bombers were U.S. drone strike in December 2009. April 17 arrested. The militants apparently – Reuters, April 23; AP, April 24 wanted to attack strategic government

22 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

April 23, 2010 (IRAQ): A series of April 26, 2010 (MOROCCO): Morocco’s April 27, 2010 (IRAQ): A roadside car bombs exploded outside Shi`a Interior Ministry announced that bomb killed one U.S. soldier in Diyala mosques in Baghdad, killing at least it had broken up an al-Qa`ida- Province. – Reuters, April 28 69 people. At least 10 bombs were linked militant cell planning attacks detonated. – Washington Post, April 24; AP, throughout the country. A total of 24 April 27, 2010 (SOMALIA): Three April 23 militants belonged to the cell. – Voice of suicide attackers drove a truck filled America, April 26 with explosives toward an African April 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A car Union (AU) peacekeeping base in bomber targeted a prison van in April 27, 2010 (GLOBAL): Anwar Mogadishu. AU forces opened fire on Lower Dir District of the North-West al-`Awlaqi, an American-born the truck, killing all three militants Frontier Province, wounding at least Muslim cleric now based in Yemen, inside. The subsequent explosion, 10 policemen. No prisoners were in appeared in a new video released by however, wounded two AU soldiers. the van at the time. – AP, April 24 al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Al-Shabab claimed responsibility (AQAP). According to CNN, “In the for the attack, and said that it was to April 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A bomb video released to media outlets, al- avenge the recent deaths of al-Qa`ida’s tore through a bakery in the town of Awlaki said the goal of the U.S. leaders in Iraq. – Voice of America, April 27; Sibi, located in Baluchistan Province. military in Afghanistan and Iraq is UPI, April 29 Six people were wounded. – Reuters, to get Muslims to fight each other by April 24 blaming market bombings on Islamic April 28, 2010 (IRAQ): Two suspected militants...A top Yemen government suicide bombers in vehicles attacked April 24, 2010 (PAKISTAN): The official said al-Awlaki met with Umar police checkpoints in southern Pakistani Taliban apparently issued Farouk AbdulMutallab, who has been Baghdad, killing five people. – Reuters, a “last warning” to media to “stop charged in a botched attempt to blow April 28 working as an ally” of the Pakistani up a Northwest Airlines passenger jet government and the army. – Reuters, en route from Amsterdam, Netherlands, April 28, 2010 (IRAQ): A bomb April 24 to Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas Day. on a pickup truck exploded at the The attempt to ignite explosives hidden Electricity Ministry, wounding two April 25, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A in AbdulMutallab’s underwear failed to employees and two bystanders in suicide bomber killed four people in an bring down the plane.” – CNN, April 27 western Baghdad. – Reuters, April 28 attack at a bazaar in Zabul Province. – BBC, April 25 April 27, 2010 (UNITED STATES): April 28, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A Syed Hashmi, a Pakistan-born U.S. suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked April 25, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Militants citizen, pleaded guilty in a New York a police checkpoint on the outskirts of reportedly attacked a checkpoint City court to one count of providing Peshawar, killing four officers. – AFP, in Orakzai Agency of the Federally material support to a foreign terrorist April 27 Administered Tribal Areas, but were organization. Hashmi, a former rebuffed by Pakistan’s security forces. student in New York, admitted that April 29, 2010 (IRAQ): A roadside Local officials say that nine militants while living in London he helped a bomb wounded one U.S. soldier were killed in the firefight. – AP, April friend send waterproof socks, ponchos in Baghdad’s northern Adhamiya 25 and sleeping bags to al-Qa`ida fighters district. - Reuters, April 30 in Afghanistan. According to the New April 26, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): York Times, “Mr. Hashmi could have April 29, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani A NATO airstrike killed a senior received a sentence of 70 years had security officials claimed that Tehrik- Taliban commander and two advisers he been convicted on the four counts i-Taliban Pakistan leader Hakimullah in Kunduz Province. – Voice of America, he originally faced. As part of his Mehsud is alive, despite reports that April 26 deal, the government will drop three he was killed in a U.S. drone strike in other charges and allow him to plead January 2010. – Los Angeles Times, April 29 April 26, 2010 (YEMEN): A suicide guilty to one count of conspiracy to bomber attempted to kill Britain’s provide material support to Al Qaeda, April 29, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide ambassador to Yemen as he traveled prosecutors said. In a letter, the bomber killed two police officers in to work in an armored vehicle. government said both parties agreed Russia’s Dagestan region. – AP, April 29 The ambassador, Timothy Torlot, that 15 years would be a reasonable was uninjured in the attack, which sentence.” – Reuters, April 27; New York April 30, 2010 (GLOBAL): Islamist web occurred a few hundred yards from the Times, April 27 forums hosted a new audio message popular Movenpick Hotel in Sana`a. purportedly containing the voice Yemeni police quickly arrested several April 27, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A of Humam al-Balawi, the Jordanian al-Qa`ida suspects in connection with suicide bomber killed three people doctor who killed seven CIA agents the attack. – Deutsche Press Agency, April 26; near Kandahar Airfield. The attack in eastern Afghanistan in December Christian Science Monitor, April 26; Australian targeted a compound providing 2009. Al-Sahab, which produced the Broadcasting Corporation, April 28 logistical support to NATO forces. audio/video message, announced al- – Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, April 27; Badawi with subtitles, reading, “A CBS News, April 27 message that was delivered on the

23 may 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 5

night before his martyrdom operation CTC Sentinel Staff against the American intelligence in Khost.” – CNN, April 30 Editor-in-Chief Erich Marquardt April 30, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Senior Editor, CTC Prosecutors charged two New York men—Wesam El-Hanafi and Sabirhan Editorial Board Hasanoff—with conspiracy to provide COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. material support to Usama bin Ladin’s Department Head al-Qa`ida network. The men allegedly Department of Social Sciences (West Point) provided computer expertise and purchased seven watches online for al- COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Qa`ida. El-Hanafi was born in Brooklyn, Deputy Department Head while Hasanoff is a dual U.S.-Australian Department of Social Sciences (West Point) citizen. – Reuters, April 30

LTC Reid Sawyer April 30, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Director, CTC Explosives planted on a bicycle wounded five Afghan civilians in Musa Christopher Heffelfinger Qala district of southern Helmand FBI Fellow, CTC Province. - Reuters, April 30

April 30, 2010 (IRAQ): Gunmen threw a hand grenade at a U.S. military patrol in Hawija, north of Baghdad. Contact One Iraqi civilian was wounded. Combating Terrorism Center - Reuters, April 30 U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall April 30, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Khalid West Point, NY 10996 Khwaja, a former official in Pakistan’s Phone: (845) 667-6383 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Email: [email protected] was found dead in North Waziristan Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Agency with gunshot wounds to the head and chest. Khwaja was kidnapped * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 on March 26 by a group calling itself the “Asian Tigers.” Khwaja’s death was greeted with some surprise, as he had deep connections to the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. The group is still holding hostage two other individuals support kidnapped with Khwaja: retired The Combating Terrorism Center would Colonel Amir Sultan Tarar and British like to express its gratitude to its financial journalist Asad Qureshi. – Dawn, April supporters, for without their support and 30; New York Times, April 30 shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1553.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

24