Currenttrends in ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY
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CurrentTrends IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY VOLUME 22 November, 2017 ■ THE RISE OF THE VIOLENT MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD Mokhtar Awad ■ THE COLD WAR-ERA ORIGINS OF ISLAMISM IN TURKEY AND ITS RISE TO POWER Behlül Özkan ■ JAMAAT-UD-DAWA: CONVERTING KUFFAR AT HOME, KILLING THEM ABROAD C. Christine Fair ■ INDIA’S INVISIBLE JIHAD Praveen Swami ■ POLITICAL ISLAM IN POST-CONFLICT ALGERIA Vish Sakthivel ■THE ORIGINS AND ASCENDANCY OF IRAQ’S SHIITE MILITIAS Ranj Alaaldin Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World CurrentTrends IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY VOLUME 22 Edited by Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, and Eric Brown Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World ©2017 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. Contents ISSN: 1940-834X For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publica- The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood /5 tions, please visit Hudson’s website at www.hudson.org/bookstore or call toll free: 1-888-554-1325. Mokhtar Awad ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE The Cold War-era Origins of Islamism inTurkey and /41 Hudson Institute is a nonpartisan, independent policy research organization dedicated to innova- its Rise to Power tive research and analysis that promotes global security, prosperity, and freedom. Founded in 1961 Behlül Özkan by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps man- age strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international re- lations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law. With offices in Washington and New Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Converting Kuffar at Home, York, Hud son seeks to guide public policymakers and global leaders in government and business /58 through a vigorous program of publications, conferences, policy briefings, and recommendations. Killing Them Abroad Hudson Institute is a 501(c)(3) organization financed by tax-deductible contributions from private C. Christine Fair individuals, corporations, foundations, and by government grants. Visit www.hudson.org for more information. India’s Invisible Jihad / 80 Praveen Swami ABOUT THE CENTER ON ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD Political Islam in Post-Conflict Algeria / 116 Hudson Institute’s Center on Islam conducts a wide-ranging program of research and analysis ad- Vish Sakthivel dressed to the political, religious, social, and other dynamics within majority Muslim countries and Muslim populations around the world. A principal focus of the Center’s work is the ideological dy- namic within Islam and the connected issue of how this political and religious debate impacts both The Origins and Ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiite Militias Islamic radicalism and the Muslim search for moderate and democratic alternatives. Through its / 143 research, which includes collaboration with partners throughout the Muslim world and elsewhere, Ranj Alaaldin the Center aims to contribute to the development of effective policy options and strategies to win the worldwide struggle against radical Islam. For more information, visit www.CurrentTrends.org CURRENT TRENDS IN ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY / VOL. 21 ■ 3 The Rise of the Violent Muslim Brotherhood By Mokhtar Awad HE PAST FOUR YEARS WITNESSED A SIGNIFICANT TRANSFORMATION inside the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the impact of which will likely be felt for generations to come. Sudden changes in the group’s fortunes—from seizing power, to quickly losing it in a coup, to subsequently suffering the worst crackdown in its history—have Tleft the Brotherhood searching for answers to chart a path forward. The group’s use of violence as a methodology for change has been a key feature of this forced reevaluation in the new Egyptian context. Although much debate in recent decades has focused on the group’s commit- ment to democracy and electoral politics, the body of the organization has not significantly evolved ideologically. In its early days, the group had no trouble reconciling clandestine violent action through its Secret Apparatus while its leader Hassan al-Banna engaged in politics and even ran for office. The reality is that the Brotherhood in Egypt was never new to electoral politics and democracy for it to have registered as a significant “evolution” in scholarship exploring the group’s attitudes. When President Sadat released Muslim Brothers from prison in the 1970s, they were allowed to rebuild their organization, and eventually, under Mubarak, they once again participated in elections. The group “abandoned” violence then THE RISE OF THE VIOLENT MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ■ 5 because it was unnecessary and futile. Although soldiery and violence is not central to the Muslim Brotherhood’s stated methodology for social and political The Brotherhood’s Rebirth change, at least in the initial stages, it features in Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna’s writings and vision for an ideal Muslim society.1 The group may have been non-violent since the 1970s, but it was never pacifist, and this THE JULY 2013 COUP MAY HAVE SHAKEN THE BROTHERHOOD TO ITS CORE, BUT proved to be key when the Brotherhood faced its first true adversity since the what brought it to its knees were the subsequent months of mass arrests, killings, abrupt end of its decades long détente with the Egyptian state in 2013. and near total breakdown in command and control. However, not all senior lead- There are no more than 900,000 full members of the organization inside ers were imprisoned or fled; some remained operational inside Egypt, including Egypt,2 yet with their families, low level members, and supporters, the Muslim members of the group’s most senior executive body: The Guidance Bureau. Key Brotherhood represents an important minority in Egyptian society. More impor- among them was Guidance Bureau member Mohamed Kamal, an ENT physician tantly, the global nature of the organization and the historical centrality of the and medical school professor from Asyut5 who had overseen the Brotherhood in Egyptian chapter still makes the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood important to the Upper Egyptian governorate before his rise to the senior post in 2011.6 Kamal both Muslim Brothers worldwide and Islamism overall. may have been a largely unknown figure to outsiders, but he exercised enormous For this reason, it is important to carefully examine the relationship between influence inside the Muslim Brotherhood and over its inner workings until he was one of the oldest Islamist movements in the world and violence over the past four killed by security forces in an October 2016 raid at the age of 61. years, and what ideological revisions have taken place. This paper will focus more Magdy Shalash, a senior Muslim Brotherhood leader responsible for key gov- on the latter, specifically related to a recent book authored by a group of Muslim ernorates in the Delta and former professor of Jurisprudence Principles at al-Azhar Brotherhood and allied Islamist scholars, which was sanctioned by the then lead- University, was one of Kamal’s top deputies and explained his significance during ership of the organization inside Egypt, titled The Jurisprudence of Popular Resist- a 2016 interview on Turkey-based pro-Muslim Brotherhood channel Mekamleen: ance to the Coup.3 The book provides a critical insight into how some scholars have successfully attempted to reconcile the group’s methodology with violence. Those “After the clearing of Rabaa al-Adawiya [square], he [Kamal] and who advocate such violence do not call it so, as violence to them has a negative his Brothers left [the square] and reunited the Muslim Brother- connotation. Rather, they deem it to be a form of legitimate defensive Jihad or hood. He managed the Muslim Brotherhood through what was “resistance.” Other leaders in the organization have rejected this approach, favor- called the Crisis Committee, or the High Administrative Commit- ing a more gradualist strategy. Some believe that the time is not ripe for violence, tee, which was seconded by the General Shura Council [of the while others see murders and assassinations as redlines that are not to be crossed. Muslim Brotherhood] in February 2014… [he could be credited The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup and other documents and for] establishing a new generation in the life of the dawah of the statements by Brotherhood and allied Islamist leaders explicitly show how at least Muslim Brotherhood.”7 one major faction of the organization has supported violent action within Egypt. Although there are strong indications that this faction and its associated splinter Kamal gave the green light to limited violent action in early 2014, in what the groups possibly have operational ties to terrorist groups in Egypt today, such as Egyptian government and even some Brothers called “Special Operations Com- Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra, this paper will not discuss the issue of operational mittees.”8 The Muslim Brotherhood internally called it a plan to “disorient, linkages to violence and its implications for a possible terrorist designation of the attrite, and fail [the regime].”9 Kamal oversaw the affairs of the Brotherhood Egyptian chapter. Nor will it focus in detail on the chronology of the dizzying lead- uncontested until Spring 2015, when his detractors attempted to take over the ership disputes within the organization, except where it relates to the issue of vio- leadership of the organization. A year later, he offered his resignation from the lence. Instead, the focus will be on offering context