Religion in Violence and Peace

Religion in Violence and Peace Exploring inter-religious peacebuidling efforts in Kenya WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE DEVELOPMENT FAITHS WORLD August 2016 About the World Faiths Development Dialogue The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) is a not-for-profit organization working at the intersection of religion and global development. Housed within the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., WFDD documents the work of faith inspired organizations and explores the importance of religious ideas and actors in development contexts. WFDD supports dialogue between religious and development communities and promotes innovative partnerships, at national and international levels, with the goal of contributing to positive and inclusive development outcomes.

Acknowledgments Crystal Corman, program manager at WFDD, led the research and activities for this project and is the primary author of this report. Desk review began in September 2014 with travel to Kenya to meet with key informants in November 2014 and April 2015. Additional interviews and meetings were held before and after a workshop held August 4, 2015 in Nairobi with secular and faith actors to explore the roles of religion in peace and stability in Kenya. An event summary is available online at https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/events/peace-and- stability-in-kenya-the-role-of-religious-actors. Various student research assistants supported the research needs of this study including Alex Levy, Sarah Radomsky, and Zachary Karabatak. Katherine Marshall, executive director of WFDD, provided project oversight and direction. WFDD extends our appreciation to Mike Eldon, Daniel Ritchie, Steve Kirimi, and Nicole Bibbins Sedaca for reviewing drafts of this report and providing feedback and valuable critique. This research was deeply enriched and shaped by conversations with more than 40 peace and development practitioners, secular and faith based, in Kenya. Their voices, perspectives, and experiences shaped this research and report, as well as its recommendations. Several, though not all, interviews with these practitioners can be accessed online at https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/themes/kenya. Funding for this project was provided by the GHR Foundation.

Design by Sensical Design & Communication

Cover photo: A minute of silence during an inter-faith service following the attack at Garissa University in April 2015. Centre for Christian–Muslim Relations, St Paul’s University.

This publication uses photographs from the Centre for Christian–Muslim Relations, St Paul’s University; Crystal Corman, WFDD; Mahamud Hassan, AMISOM Photo; Stephine Ogutu, Global Communities; Kenya Women of Faith Network, Inter-Religious Council of Kenya; Fred Bobo, Eastleigh Fellowship Centre; Vincent Kiplagat, Daima Initiatives for Peace and Development; Charles Apondu, Finn Church Aid/REGAL-IR; and the Alliance of Religions and Conservation. Table of Contents

List of Acronyms 4

Executive Summary 5

Key findings 5

Recommendations for those working on development and peace agendas 7

Recommendations for religious actors engaged in development and peace work 7

Introduction 8

Overview of Conflict in Kenya 9

Religious Landscape of Kenya 11

Religion, ethnicity, and geography 12

Religious institutions and international ties 13

Drivers of Conflict and the Intersection of Religion 15

Ethnicity, politics, and violence 15

Religious leaders engaged in politics 17

Inequality and marginalization 21

Challenges for youth 22

Religious intersections of marginalization and ethnicity 23

Violent extremism and separatist groups 24

Religious rhetoric of violent extremists 26

Urban crime and violence 27

Building Peace and Social Cohesion in Multi-Religious Kenya 32

Faith leaders mobilize for constitutional reform 32

Inter-religious organizations active in Kenya 34

Fostering inter-religious relations 37

Christian–Muslim relations 37

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 1 Looking Ahead: Peace and Justice in Multi-Religious Kenya 41

From the angle of development and peace 41

From the angle of religious actors 42

Appendix I. FIOs Working in Underdeveloped and Muslim-Majority Regions 44

Appendix II. Religion at the Development and Peace Nexus in Kenya 46

From humanitarian relief to post-conflict reconstruction 46

Building the infrastructure for peace from the grassroots 47

Conflict-sensitive development and connector projects 48

Peace education and peace clubs 49

Engaging and empowering youth 50

Women, peace, and security 52

2 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Map of Kenya, Counties

Mandera

Turkana

Marsabit

Wajir

West Pokot

Samburu Trans Nzoia Isiolo Elgeyo- Marakwet Bungoma Uasin Baringo Gishu Busia Laikipia Kakamega Nandi Meru Siaya Vihiga Kisumu Kericho Nyandarua Tharaka-Nithi Nakuru Nyeri Homa Bay Kirinyaga Garissa Nyamira Embu Kisii Bomet Murang'a Migori Kiambu Narok Nairobi Machakos Kitui Tana River

Kajiado Makueni Lamu

Kilifi Taita-Taveta

Mombasa Kwale 150 km

100 mi d-maps.com ©

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 3 List of Acronyms

AACC All Africa Conference of Churches LTLT Learning to Live Together Programme ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data MRA Moral Re-Armament AKDN Aga Khan Development Network MRC Mombasa Republican Council AIC African Independent and Instituted Churches NARC National Alliance Rainbow Coalition ATPU Anti-Terrorist Policy United NAMLEF National Muslim Leaders BRAVE Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism NCC National Constitutional Conferences CC Cooperation Circles NCCK National Council of Churches in Kenya CCMRE Centre for Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastleigh NGO Non-governmental Organization CICC Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics NSC National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and CIPEV Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence Conflict Management CIPK Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya OAIC-Kenya Organization of African Instituted CKRC Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Churches Kenya CRS Catholic Relief Services ODM Orange Democratic Movement CYU Chemchemi Ya Ukweli PCEA Presbyterian Church of East Africa EAK Evangelical Alliance of Kenya PNU Party of National Unity ECEP Ecumenical Civic Education Programme PROCMURA Programme for Christian-Muslim Relations FECCLAHA Fellowship of Christian Council and Churches in Africa in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa PTC Pre-Trial Chamber FIO Faith-Inspired Organization RfP Religions for Peace HCK Hindu Council of Kenya SDA Seventh Day Adventists HIPSIR Hekima Institute of Peace Studies and International SHIA Shia Inthna-Asheri Muslim Association Relations SID Society for International Development ICC International Criminal Court SUPKEM Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission TJRC Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission IofC Initiatives of Change UMA United Muslims of Africa IPK Islamic Party of Kenya UNDP United Nations Development Programme IRCK Inter-Religious Council of Kenya UNSC United Nations Security Council ISS Institute for Security Studies URI the United Religious Initiative KANU Kenya African National Union WCRP-Kenya World Conference on Religions for Peace KCCB Kenya Conference of Catholic Bishops Kenya KDF Kenyan Defense Force WFDD World Faiths Development Dialogue KNBS Kenya National Bureau of Statistics YEDF Youth Enterprise Development Fund LRPG Least Reached People Groups

4 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Executive Summary

enya has won recognition for relative stability, set of these practitioners, as well as their partners and colleagues. against the conflicts in neighboring countries. This This report aims to support the work of secular and faith K stability has been threatened in the past decades by actors interested in peacebuilding, as well as inter-religious recurring intercommunal violence (especially around elec- relations, in Kenya and beyond. Coming shortly before the tions), terrorist attacks, high rates of sexual and gender-based 2017 general elections, its timing is propitious. It is also a violence, mistrust of police, significant and visible inequalities, resource for those engaged explicitly in countering violence and reactions to high levels of corruption and a culture of im- extremism in the region. The report provides an overview punity. Regional spillover of conflict affects Kenya, which now of the various types of violence in Kenya and reviews the hosts over 600,000 refugees. Somalia-based Al-Shabaab has religious landscape, pointing to the complex overlapping of expanded into Kenya with attacks increasing in frequency and ethnicity and religious affiliation. The multiple types and scale. The intensity and gravity of violent incidents in Kenya drivers of conflict are explored, highlighting religious roles challenge stability and reveal deep social and economic fault and actors. The study focuses on inter-religious relations in lines. Grievances and tensions are thus deep and complex, with multi-religious Kenya; thus peacebuilding examples where long historical roots. inter-religious cooperation emerged are highlighted, notably In response, a large number of initiatives reflecting aware- the Ufungamano Initiative. Various inter-religious organiza- ness of tensions and efforts to build peace have emerged, and tions operating in Kenya are introduced, including analysis many engage development practitioners and agendas. Conflict of a growing awareness of the potential for collaboration for and violence affect social and economic development, eroding mutual benefit. Christian–Muslim relations as well as historic positive gains, interrupting progress, and causing harm and and contemporary tensions, are also explored. Two appendices suffering. Development actors have begun to adapt strate- feature examples of faith actors, using various approaches and gies in fragile and conflict-affected situations in an effort to focal areas, merging development and peace in Kenya. mitigate these risks or manage conflict dynamics. In Kenya, many religious institutions, faith leaders, and faith-inspired Key findings organizations (FIOs) engaged in development activities are It is impossible to understand the complexity of the drivers among those who have responded creatively, at times urgently, of conflict and multiple efforts to address them without to increasing violence. taking into account Kenya’s many religious actors and be- The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD), with liefs. Grievances and perceptions of marginalization often financial support from the GHR Foundation, selected Kenya fall along religious identity lines. For example, the Coast for a case study to identify and better understand the roles re- and North Eastern regions, with majority Muslim popu- ligion plays in building peace and stability at the country-level, lations, have not received equal development investments with particular attention to inter-religious relations and col- historically; the result is significant inequalities in levels laboration. Kenya offers a unique case given its dynamic peace of development across many sectors. Al-Shabaab has used and development sectors, complex religious landscape, and the this to their advantage when seeking recruits. Some Kenyan longstanding engagement of religious actors in peace work. Muslims have responded with prominent leaders working to WFDD analyzed existing literature; interviewed 40 peace counter extremist narratives, engage with vulnerable youth, practitioners, secular and faith-inspired, working in Kenya; and deal with broader tensions between Christians and Mus- and hosted a workshop in Nairobi in August 2015 with many lims. Religious adherence often aligns with ethnic identity in

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 5 Vincent Kiplagat, Daima Initiatives for Peace and Development (DiPaD) Vincent A trauma awareness and resilience building workshop for religious leaders begins in Mpeketoni town, Lamu County. April 2014.

Kenya due to historic missionary focus in different regions. roles that development work plays in fostering stability and In this complex social milieu religious institutions and lead- sustainable peace (or, in some instances, exacerbating conflict). ers were on the front lines when ethnic clashes erupted in Within this dynamic space, however, there is little purpose- the 1990s, providing safe haven and relief to those displaced. ful or systematic coordination and at times competition for National and international faith-inspired institutions (FIOs) resources. Efforts tend to be coordinated only within highly responded and many shifted their focus beyond development structured religious traditions, under national or regional um- and emergency approaches, endeavoring to understand and brella organizations, or within a given geographic area around address underlying grievances. Religious approaches and a specific agenda. beliefs was also a prime motivation for individuals and or- With so many actors engaged in differing ways, judging ganizations to mobilize for community dialogue with, for impact and effectiveness is exceptionally difficult. Evaluation example, active non-violence training. strategies are only now emerging within the peace field, so Faith-inspired actors are prominent in Kenya’s crowded there is little robust information as to the extent to which the and growing peace sector. They are engaged at the national large number of peace clubs and community dialogue pro- level in advocacy and participate actively in high-level meet- grams achieve their objectives; to foster resilience and social ings with government officials. Perhaps more significant is cohesion that can withstand future tension. Priorities also their involvement at the grassroots level in myriad localized shift based on funding opportunities and the most pressing peace programs. Many have roots in development and there- threat. Various faith actors work deliberately to counter violent fore bring a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the extremism, but poor coordination across agencies or bilateral

6 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE partners and distrust of the government and security tactics Religious leaders have keen interest in and capacity for challenge efforts. Some Muslims exhibit remarkable creativ- reconciliation, healing, and justice. However, their credibility ity in a difficult environment, working discreetly to ensure was severely impaired by failure to respond collectively and neutrality and access. However, as general elections, which effectively during the widespread violence that followed the so often foreshadow violence, approach in 2017, there are 2007 elections. Seen then as partisan and even exacerbating fears that too little has been done to address long unresolved ethnic divides, it is unclear whether they have regained public underlying grievances. trust and thus the capacity to respond effectively.

Recommendations for those working Recommendations for religious actors on development and peace agendas engaged in development and peace work

• Ethnicity is still the primary identity of most • Healing and reconciliation, notably to deal with Kenyans, and religious communities are often unresolved historical pain and trauma, need delineated along ethnic lines. This needs to be more attention. Faith communities can play appreciated and taken into account. distinctive and important roles.

• Development approaches that purposefully • Countering violent extremism is not only an issue and sensitively address grievances of for Muslims to address. They can lead many marginalization, especially those that fall efforts but deserve both support and active along ethno-religious lines, can have important collaboration. benefits. • Women have been key players in strengthening • Conflict-sensitive development demands an Kenya, but few religious institutions explicitly understanding of the religious landscape. Such foster women’s peace participation beyond the an approach could bring traditional development grassroots level. This is an area that deserves and peacebuilding approaches and practitioners attention and action. closer together, in part because they pursue • Dialogue programs are popular but too often common goals and face similar obstacles. lack clear action objectives. Many are viewed • Radicalization of youth adds new urgency. It as too concerned with talk, too little with action. tests the ability of religious institutions to counter Connector projects or exchange trips seem to extremist narratives and advocate effectively for have lasting impact, though evaluation is needed action by public and private actors. Religiously- to bolster confidence in such approaches and inspired youth programs aimed at preventing point to practical entry points. violence and improving education and livelihood • Religious leaders—and some religious opportunities show significant promise but need organizations—have yet to regain trust and support and more ambitious scale. credibility in the wake of scandals, corruption, or collusion with political interests. Recognition of the challenge and purposeful efforts to move forward are needed.

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 7 Introduction

onflict, violence, and instability are increasingly a social relations is one aim. Inter-religious engagement focused focus in both the development and humanitarian on a common goal of ending violence or recovering from it C fields. Costly damage and destruction, both materially looks to the interested parties to collaborate in designing a and in human lives, threaten communal and state stability. way forward. This is not an easy task and has risks. However, Especially in so-called “fragile states” or contexts, develop- such efforts are seen at all levels of society from global inter-re- ment actors are struggling to understand how development ligious peace efforts to community-level initiatives. initiatives can support post-conflict reconstruction and affect The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) has complex contexts, so that they can avoid triggering violence focused on Kenya for a country-level analysis within a larger and, when possible, reinforce social stability. Kenya offers project that seeks to identify and describe the history and countless examples of both the complexities involved in concurrent state of affairs for inter-religious institutions and flicts and underlying tensions (including those with religious movements around the world. The in-depth country-level dimensions) and the wide range of efforts, public and private, analysis aims at better understanding contextual dynamics, to address them. key actors and their networks, collaborative strategies, and The complex challenges involved in building trust or other information valuable to both faith-inspired and sec- social cohesion and seeking justice in the wake of violence ular actors interested in peace and stability in the country involve widely varied stakeholders. Religious leaders and and region. This report is the result of desk research, elab- institutions often play central roles. Religious beliefs and orated through interviews conducted in Nairobi between communities can motivate or mobilize participants to sup- November 2014 and August 2015 with 40 faith leaders, port or enact violence; they can also be involved in calls to peace practitioners, and staff from organizations, many of halt violence. In many conflicts religion is seen most clearly whom work through inter-religious efforts to build peace as an identity marker, simultaneously grouping those who and prevent violence in Kenya. A workshop in Nairobi with affiliate and differentiating those perceived to be outsiders or many of these practitioners on August 4, 2015 expanded “others.” Religious identities used in this way can encourage on this research and provided a space for dialogue and net- social cleavages and enclaves, weakening social cohesion by working.1 This report provides an overview of the types of fostering suspicion of other groups. Whatever the cause of conflicts involved in Kenya and corresponding root causes, conflict or the parties involved, it is important to analyze the describes Kenya’s religious landscape, and profiles various roles religious factors played in the conflict and its potential faith-inspired organizations (FIOs) working for peace. It roles in the peace process and reconstruction of society, in- focuses on explicit inter-religious organizations, projects, cluding social cohesion. and awareness in peacebuilding. In contexts where multiple religious groups or traditions are involved, inter-religious engagement can offer a strategy Notes for peace across divisions. Inter-religious engagement looks 1. “Peace and Stability in Kenya: The Role of Religious Actors,” World to each faith tradition to represent its own principles and Faiths Development Dialogue, August 4, 2015, https://berkleycenter. georgetown.edu/events/peace-and-stability-in-kenya-the-role-of- values, while providing a space to hear and understand the religious-actors. perspective of other traditions involved. Better knowledge and

8 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Overview of Conflict in Kenya

enya’s longstanding reputation as one of East Africa’s 2013 attack on Westgate Mall—with 67 deaths and 175 inju- most stable countries is seriously challenged today. ries—contributed to Kenya’s ranking of twelfth on the 2014 K Many overlapping causes of conflict and grievances, Global Terrorism Index (Kenya’s 2015 ranking dropped to as described below, have deep historical roots. Ethnic intol- eighteenth, though its score increased from 6.58 to 6.66).4 Po-

erance has been stoked for political gain, notably resulting in litical and communal violence has increased since the 1990s, as recurring violence during election seasons. Related violence shown by Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) has displaced many thousands of Kenyans. Inequality, notably Project data from 1997 to 2013 (see figure). ACLED reports REGIONAL REPORT: NORTH AFRICA in land ownership and access, with roots in colonial practices, that militia groups5 have the highest absolute and proportional March 2014 fuels widespread grievances. Rates of crime and violence are rate of violence against civilians in Kenya. These tend to be high, especially in urban centers, alongside Introduction:low levels of po- short-lived militant unitspetrators created of political for violence particular within Kenya purposes, (see Figure 2).as Kenya is the seventh most violent country in the ACLED Nairobi experiences the second highest absolute levels of violence in Kenya, after the Rift Valley, and the highest dataset with just over 3,500 recorded politically violent licing and trust of police. Weak security and high levels of was the case for the largestlevels of spike riots and of protests. militia Nairobi activity is also following the region in events between 1997 and September 2013. Kenya has the which violent events involving state forces are highest, corruption are systematic problems exacerbated12th highestby the rate prolif of reported- the fatalities 2007–08 associated election. with 6 political violence, at over 7,200. Levels of violent events with almost onethird of all violent events involving state forces taking place in the capital. eration of small arms and drug trafficking. peakedImpunity at 341 inand the lack three monthAlongside period of January major to incidence of violence, illicit trafficking of March 2008, the quarter which also experienced the high Subnational and temporal patterns in violence are often of justice at various levels are seen to legitimizeest level ofviolence reported conflict or fatalitiesdrugs (see and Figure small 1). armssimplified add to byKenya’s misleading fragility. narratives aboutA survey conflict incon Kenya- being dominated by electoral violence. Electoral cycles In absolute terms, levels of conflict in Kenya since 1997 are retaliation. Regional instability has spilled over Kenya’s bor- ducted in 2011 by Smallcoincide Arms with some Survey conflict and peaks, Kenya but as this National report will comparable to those in Uganda (3,825 events) and South Africa (3,263 events), although the composition of this detail, Kenya experiences multiple, overlapping conflicts, ders, resulting in an estimated 615,000 refugees in Kenya.1 Focus Point on Small whichArms profoundly and Light shape Weaponsthe nature of conflictreported and vulner that violence by type is markedly different. Unlike Uganda, Ken- ability of civilian populations in particular to violence. Violent attacks by Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia,ya has not have experienced killed an outright21.1 percentcivil war during of household this respondents were victims of a crime period, but data analysis reveals that the use of categories This profile will proceed with an analysis of militia activity many in Kenya. The terrorist group plays offsuch grievances as ‘low grade related violence,’ or ‘communalan act of conflict’violence or overin urban the areas; preceding communal year, violence and in the among Rift Valley those and ‘electoral violence’ can obscure the absolute levels of con elsewhere; conflict in neighbouring Somalia and its impli to discrimination and marginalization, flict experienced by communities across the country. cations for unrest in the northeast; and the confluence of separatism and Islamist mobilisation in the Coast prov Kenya’s conflict profile is relatively evenly split between often targeting disenfranchised youth. Figure 1: Conflict events and reportedince. fatalities, Kenya’s multifaceted Kenya, violence demands discrete types of violence including battles, violence against civil theoretical, interrogative and policy approaches. Kenya’s youth—those aged 18 to 34 Januaryians, and rioting 1997–September or protesting. Nationallevel 2013 trends mask (by quarter-year). dramatic regional variations in the types, tactics and per years make up more than a third of the population—are challenged by limited employment opportunities. Various global statistical measures highlight the prevalence and types of violence that contribute to instability in Kenya. The 2015 Fragility Index, one of the various summary indices of fragility, ranked Kenya in the ‘alert’ category, between Ethiopia and Liberia, in large part due to the ‘very high alert’ status of Kenya’s neighbors.2 Political instability in neighboring South Sudan and Soma- lia affects regional security. Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia, has become increasing Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities, Kenya, January 1997 September 2013 (by quarteryear). 1 active in Kenya.3 The group’s September Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset. Regional Report: Kenya December 2013.

This ACLED Country Report was compiled by James Moody using ACLED data. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting [email protected]. Follow ACLED on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis: @ACLEDinfo

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 9 who were victimized, more than one-third were confronted Notes with a firearm.7 1. See “Kenya,” UNHCR, http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2537#_ga= Deeply rooted corruption in Kenya diminishes public 1.127513485.1639470566.1464203190. 2. J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Hannah Blyth, Kendall trust in many institutions, including police and the judicial Lawrence, Sebastian Pavlou Graham, Felipe Umaña, “Fragile States system. Corruption also foils accountability mechanisms Index 2015,” The Fund for Peace, 2015, http://library.fundforpeace. reinforcing a norm of impunity for those with power and org/library/fragilestatesindex-2015.pdf. means. Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 3. Erin Miller, “START Background Report: Al-Shabaab Attack on released survey findings in March 2016 reporting that 74 Westgate Mall in Kenya,” START, September 2013. https://www. percent of Kenyans believe corruption is rife in their coun- start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/ STARTBackgroundReport_alShabaabKenya_Sept2013.pdf. try.8 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) found Kenya to be the 4. “Global Terrorism Index 2014,” The Institute for Economics and world’s third-most corrupt country in terms of the prevalence Peace,” 2014, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/ of economic crimes.9 Kenya earned a score of 25 out of 100 Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf (with 0 being highly corrupt) in Transparency International 5. ACLED defines the category of militia violence to include private 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index; its rank was 139 out armies for elites and politicians, militant groups whose aims are of 168 countries. Perception by institution ranked police as localized, and do not seek to overthrow, replace or secede from the state; in addition to actions by unidentified armed groups which are most corrupt in Kenya (75 percent), significantly ahead of the not claimed by named militant organizations. second ranking institution, government officials (46 percent). 6. Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, “Regional Report: Kenya,” Judges and magistrates were viewed as corrupt by 33 percent Armed Conflict Location % Event Dataset, December 2013, of respondents; religious leaders (13 percent) and traditional http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ACLED- leaders (12 percent) earned the lowest rankings.10 Perceptions Country-Report_Kenya_December-2013_updated.pdf. of the judiciary have fluctuated, in part boosted by hope for 7. Manasseh Wepundi, Eliud Nthiga, Eliud Kabuu, Ryan Murray, and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, “Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of reforms institutionalized in the 2010 constitution. Ipso polls Security in Kenya: An Assessment,” Small Arms Survey, 2012, reported a decline from November 2013 to April 2015 when http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/ the number of Kenyans expressing “a lot of confidence” in the SAS-SR16-Kenya.pdf. Supreme Court fell from 28 percent to 21 percent, and 21 8. “Corruption deeply rooted in Kenya, says anti-graft body.”Deutsche percent to 12 percent for other courts.11 Welle, interview by Chrispin Mwakideu with Patrick Loch Understanding drivers of violence and conflict is vital for Otieno Lumumba. March 16, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/ corruption-deeply-rooted-in-kenya-says-anti-graft-body/a-19120699. designing peacebuilding or violence prevention strategies. 9. “2016 Global Economic Crime Survey: Kenya Report”. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 2016. https://www.pwc.com/ke/en/assets/ Conflict Management (NSC), with support from UNDP pdf/gecs2016-report.pdf. Kenya, commissioned a national conflict mapping and 10. “People And Corruption: Africa Survey 2015—Global analysis process in 2010 that included 38 focus groups and Corruption Barometer.” Transparency International, December 1725 questionnaires. This survey reported the main causes of 1, 2015. http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/ people_and_corruption_africa_survey_2015. conflict to be related to politics, economics, socio-cultural 11. Maya Gainger. “How Kenya Cleaned up its Courts.” Foreign elements, security, and environmental degradation.12 Politi- Policy, July 9, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/09/ cally motivated violence was reported as most prevalent and how-kenya-cleaned-up-its-courts/. includes one or more of the following: ethnicity, patronage, 12. “A Validated Report of the National Conflict Mapping and Analysis citizenship, and political instrumentation of gangs. Follow- with Recommendations for Actors,” Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, ing this, security triggers of conflict were cited as the most 2012, http://www.npi-africa.org/pages/admin/publications/ upload/A_VALIDATED_REPORT_of_the_National_Conflict_ worrisome including terrorism, cross-border raids, prolifera- Mapping_and_Analysis_with_Recommendations_for_Actors_ tion of illicit small arms, ineffectiveness of security agencies, 1355341667.pdf. and cattle rustling.

10 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Religious Landscape of Kenya

eligious or spiritual language, rituals, places of worship, and prayers can be seen and heard almost R anywhere in Kenya. Scholar Fr. Laurenti Magesa em- phasizes that for most Africans, spirituality is foundational for life’s rhythm and interactions; “it is there as you grow up; you are socialized in it.”1 A survey of 1,500 Christians and Muslims in Kenya, conducted in December 2008, reported that 95 percent of Muslims and 86 percent of Christians claim religion is very important in their lives.2 The same survey reported that 81 percent of all surveyed attended religious services at least once a week. Religiosity is high in Kenya but it is somewhat fluid, making it difficult to measure members by denomination or institution. Kenya is a Christian-majority country and according to the 2009 Census approximately 80 percent of the population Crystal Corman, WFDD identify as Protestant (48 percent), Catholic (23 percent), or A mural at the Desmond Tutu Conference Centre at the All Africa other Christian (11 percent) (see table 1). The Roman Cath- Conference of Churches in Nairobi olic and Anglican Churches are the most established within the country, and other influential denominations include the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA), African Inland Church, and Table 1. Kenyan population by religious affiliation the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA). It is difficult to count the emerging and dynamic Pentecostal and evangel- Tradition Percent of total

ical churches in Kenya, but the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya Catholic 23.4% estimates numbers as high as 11 million members in 38,000 congregations.3 African Independent and Instituted Churches Protestant 47.7% (AICs)—homegrown churches with indigenous worship, the- Other Christian 11.2% ology, and social organization—are also an important part of Christianity in Kenya. Muslims, at about 11 percent of the Muslim 11.2% population, lead minority religious groups in Kenya. The ma- Hindu <1.0% jority are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence, but Shi’a and Ahmadi Muslims also reside in Kenya. Though Traditionalist 1.7% Muslims live in all regions of Kenya, the majority live in the Other Religion 1.4% Coast and North Eastern regions. Other quite small religious communities include Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, and Jews. About No Religion 2.4% ten percent of Kenyans are thought to adhere to traditional Don’t Know <1.0% or indigenous beliefs; these are often mixed with mainstream Christianity or Islam. Source: 2009 Kenya Census, Volume 2 Table 12

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 11 Religion, ethnicity, and geography competition, confusion, and denominationalism.5 For ex- Early Christian missions targeted particular geographic ample, the Anglican Church of Kenya and the Presbyterian areas or tribes in Kenya, but as the colonial administration Church concentrated missionary and education efforts in encouraged expansion to the interior, competition for loca- Central Kenya, attracting many Kikuyu.6 The African In- tion resulted in delineation of geographic boundaries.4 By land Church is historically strongest in the Kalenjin area of the 1910s, Christian missions established an agreement to the Rift Valley. Quakers are most concentrated in Western respect spheres of work (or spheres of influence) to manage Kenya with many Luhya followers. Mennonite missionaries came via Tanzania in the 1940s,

Figure 2: Kenya’s ethnic map gaining many Luo and Suba converts in south-western Kenya. The Kisii are predominantly Seventh Day Adventist. The Catholic Church, in contrast, has adherents throughout the country and is therefore less identified with one particular ethnic group. Ethnic links to religious affiliation are evident today in the language used by particular congregations in worship services or Bibles. The propagation of Islam in Kenya has also led to concentrations of religious communities in particular regions. Along the Coast, the largest population of Muslims consists of Swahilis with a large number of Digo Mijikenda converting as well. The Swa- hilis, a unique community located on the Coast with historic intermarriages with Arab traders, are not a homoge-

nous group but identify as Muslims Source: Kenya Embassy to the UN: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics whose first language is Kiswahili (see

Ethnicity in Kenya

Kenya’s population, estimated at 43 million, is landholdings to British colonists in the early twentieth composed of 42 African ethnic groups and significant century and many migrated to other regions, including minorities of Arab, South Asian, and European the Rift Valley. The Luhya are located mainly in the descent. The largest groups include the Kikuyu at 17 Western region, the Kalenjin mostly in the Rift Valley, percent of the total population, the Luhya (14 percent), and the Luo predominantly in Nyanza. Other groups the Kalenjin (13 percent), and the Luo (12 percent).7 include the Kamba (10 percent), Kenyan Somali (6.2), The Kikuyu traditional homeland is in the former Kisii (5.7), Mijikenda (5), Meru (4), Turkana (2.5), Central Province (see map), but they lost significant Maasai (2.1), Teso, and Embu among others.

12 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Race and status for Swahili Muslims

Muslim solidarity in Eastern Africa has historically primary concern for its residents. In 1952 Swahilis in been splintered between Arab Muslims and African Mombasa were officially recognized as Arabs and tribespeople who converted to Islam. Swahilis, with were registered as such in elections in 1957 and a mix of Arab and African ancestry, have long had 1961. As the end of colonialism seemed imminent, difficulty defining themselves between these groups. would Swahilis side with black Africans or with During the nineteenth century, under Omani rule in Arabs? Swahilis did not have the full support of Arabs Zanzibar, Arabs held sole administrative power and and many African leaders, especially Christians, viewed the Swahilis to be below them. Competition distrusted Swahilis. Some Swahilis and Arabs among the Germans and British for the coastal area supported separation of the coastal strip from Kenya from the 1880s through 1897 preserved the special (mwambao), and they created the Coastal Peoples status of the Arabs and Swahilis. Within the newly Party with hopes to preserve the inhabitants’ special created British protectorate, a double administration rights. Black Africans, including Christians, Muslims, was created with Arabs alongside Europeans. and animists, wanted the province to integrate with In an effort to improve their status, Swahilis sought to Kenya. In 1963 the British government and Sultan of be viewed as Arabs. They also differentiated themselves Zanzibar signed an agreement to annex the coast to from African Muslims, calling themselves Wazaliwa Kenya, compensate the Sultan, and guarantee human (those who were born Muslim).8 Swahilis and African rights and freedom of religion for residents. Ethnic- Muslims had separate mosques and celebrated Maulidi political divisions between Arabs and African Muslim separately. The British also treated the Swahilis as converts persist today, with Swahilis found affiliating superior to Africans converts; the latter were not given on one side or the other. Claims of discrimination land rights in the region from which they came. among Muslims along racial lines have been made On the eve of independence, Swahilis faced a for access to religious leadership posts as well as dilemma as the fate of the coastal strip became the access to jobs.

box). Ethnic Somali Kenyans are an important and distinc- Religious institutions and international ties tive group of Muslims in the country. Most live in North In addition to religious institutions, a large number of Eastern region and are pastoralists, though many have moved faith-inspired organizations (FIOs) are active in Kenya. In- to urban centers. ternational FIOs engaged in development and peacebuild- Kenya’s Muslim community includes other important eth- ing include Catholic Relief Services (CRS), World Vision, nic groups, more dispersed geographically. Though fewer in American Jewish World Service (AJWS), Lutheran World number, Muslims claiming Arab or Persian ancestry are often Federation (LWF), Church World Service (CWS), Aga viewed as having higher status,9 a racial legacy preserved under Khan Development Network (AKDN), Islamic Relief, and colonial administration.10 Asian Muslims, notably Ismailis International Justice Mission (IJM), to name a few. Kenya’s with roots in Pakistan, have played an important role, using reputation of stability and location has promoted many of their economic success to build mosques, but they tend to these, as well as pan-African and East African FIOs, to locate keep a low political profile. The majority of Kenya’s Muslims headquarters in Nairobi. Examples include the All African are members of different Christian-majority African ethnic Council of Churches (AACC), the Fellowship of Christian groups scattered around the country, mostly in Mombasa, Councils and Churches in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Nairobi, Kisumu, and Nakuru.11 (FECCLAHA), and the Programme for Christian–Muslim

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 13 Relations in Africa (PROCMURA). Many national and grassroots FIOs also operate in Kenya, with estimates that FIOs outnumber secular civil society organizations.12 Some national religious institutions have established development departments, such as the Anglican Development Services and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission. Several FIOs are profiled in this report and appendices, especially those engaged in peacebuilding. Kenya’s religious landscape includes many international links. Historical

religious ties—for example with the Mahamud Hassan, AMISOM Photo United Kingdom, South Asia, and the Muslim peacekeepers from Kenya seen reading the holy Qur’an during Ramadan in a Arab world—continue, notably through mosque in Kismayu. July 2014. resources and opportunities for training or exchanges. International partnerships commonly provide 4. Zablon Nthamburi, “Kenya: History of Christianity 1. The Beginning funds for religiously linked activities, including development. and Development of Christianity in Kenya: A Survey,” Dictionary Foreign missionary activities also bring various actors to of African Christian Biography, http://sth-dacb.bu.edu/omeka/ kenya-christianhistory1. Kenya, often linking with Kenyan FIOs or religious institu- 5. “A Discussion with Esther Mombo, St. Paul’s University,” tions. Christian missionary visitors and resources largely come Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, from America, European countries, Nigeria, and South Ko- April 16, 2015, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ rea.13 The Aga Khan has historical ties to Kenya; both the Aga interviews/a-discussion-with-esther-mombo-st-paul-s-university. Khan Foundation and AKDN are active and well-respected 6. David Throup, “Render unto Cesear the Things that are Cesears’,” in development partners in Kenya. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Religion & Politics in East Africa: The Period Since Independence, eds. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, (James Curry, 1995), 160. Iran, for example, have provided philanthropic and develop- 7. Percentages from 2009 Kenya Census. ment support for Muslim communities. After the bombing 8. Arye Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000). of the U. S. Embassy in 1998, however, the government of 9. Hassan Mwakimako and Justin Willis, “Islam, Politics, and Violence Kenya began to monitor funding sources of Islamic NGOs on the Kenyan Coast,” Observatoire des Enjeux Politiques et more closely and has shut down several suspected of links with Sécuritaires dans la Corne de l’Afrique, July 2014, http://www.lam. extremist groups.14 sciencespobordeaux.fr/sites/lam/files/note4_observatoire.pdf. 10. Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya, Chapter 6. 11. Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya. Notes 12. See Benjamin Radley, “The NGO Sector and Civil Society in Kenya: 1. Interview by author. April 17, 2015. A Literature Review.” August 2008. Overseas Development Institute, 2. “Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan London. Africa,” Pew Research Center, April 15, 2010, http://www.pewforum. 13. See Paul Gifford,Christianity, Politics, and Public Life in Kenya (New org/interactives/africa/country/113/. Methology: http://www. York: Oxford University Press, 2009). pewforum.org/files/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-appendix-c.pdf 14. See Cecelia Lynch, “Local and Global Influences on Islamic NGOs in 3. “About Us,” Evangelical Alliance of Kenya, accessed June 21, 2015, Kenya ,” Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 6:1 (2011): 21–34. http://www.eakenya.org/aboutus.

14 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Drivers of Conflict and the Intersection of Religion

Ethnicity, politics, and violence “rehabilitation.” Attempts to convert individuals away from ommunal violence along ethnic lines, especially linked Mau Mau influence in detention camps included, among to politics and patronage, is a recurrent theme in other strategies, encouraging confession of sin and Christian C Kenya’s history and a significant factor today. Ethnic teaching (the Anglican and Presbyterian churches in Kenya tensions are complicated by religious identities in various situ- were largely Kikuyu and were supportive of this approach).2 ations; ethnic delineation is found in many religious traditions The Mau Mau rebellion was crushed in 1959 with a political in Kenya, as mentioned previously. solution emerging shortly after. The first elections in Kenya The Mau Mau movement serves as one of the earliest ex- were held in 1961, followed by independence in 1963. amples of blending religion—or spirituality—with a political Politicians began to use ethnic identity explicitly to rein- agenda. The movement, which started within the Kikuyu force social divisions in the later years of Daniel arap Moi’s ethnic group, developed in the 1940s as a nationalist political presidency (1978–2002). Local pressure, largely led by church movement that escalated to violence in the 1950s. A state of leaders (explained below), and international pressure led Moi emergency was declared in 1952. Colonial authorities initially to agree to multiparty elections that were held in 1992. Var- labeled the movement as a religious cult1 that used spiritual ious politicians also began to call for a return to majimbo, a rituals and oaths to ensure commitment of supporters and Kiswahili term loosely translated as federalism but also nar- warriors. In reaction, European settlers viewed all Kikuyus rowly used to promote ethnic purity and exclusivity. Political suspiciously and thousands were displaced or detained for violence structured along ethnic lines was a direct tool used

Returning to cultural roots: the Mungiki movement

Ethnic identity, blended with spirituality, reemerged especially young men, and in Nairobi’s informal as a political flash point in the 1990s during another settlements. Mungiki transformed into a highly important transition as the state changed from organized and feared group known for extorting taxes single party to multiparty. The Mungiki (multitude for protection. Following a wave of matatu (taxi-bus) in Kikuyu) combined religio-cultural identity with hijackings and murders, the Kenyan government a political agenda. The movement drew from the outlawed the sect in 2002.5 Reports of Mungiki activity Kikuyu tradition, religion, and culture much like the occasionally appear in the media. The group was Mau Mau movement.3 The group organized around implicated for collusion with politicians in the post- a spiritual leader who claimed that the Kikuyu deity election violence of 2007–08 specifically in Nairobi Ngai commanded him to unite the Kikuyu and promote and the Rift Valley. In 2016, suspicious activity, which abandonment of Western and Christian lifestyles; many attribute to Mungiki, has been reported in Nyeri6 the group also advocated for female circumcision and also Nakuru.7 The association of Mungiki with (which the colonial administration had tried to halt).4 violence has influenced public perception of Kikuyu Originally formed in the Rift Valley, the sect drew youth who are consequently accused of engaging in its support from those displaced by ethnic clashes, criminal activities.8

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 15 to stay in power; Moi foiled opposition leader efforts to form confrontations with the police in the slums of Nairobi, a coalition by stoking ethnic tensions. He, a Kalenjin, and his Kisumu, Eldoret, and Mombasa led to revenge killings that supporters used “Kalenjin warriors” to displace opposition targeted representatives of the political opponent’s ethnic base. voters, mostly Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya, from the Rift Valley, Kikuyu, Embu and Meru were violently evicted from Luo and Moi’s heartland.9 This happened before and during elections, Luhya dominated areas, while Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin were with an estimated 300,000 people displaced and 1,500 killed chased from Kikuyu-dominated settlements or sought refuge by 1993 and again around the 1997 elections with 180,000 at police stations. Kalenjin vigilante attacks in the Rift Valley estimated displaced.10 were reminiscent of the state-supported ethnic clashes of the A multiethnic reform coalition, the National Alliance mid-1990s, targeting Kikuyu settlements.13 Rainbow Coalition (NARC), won the 2002 election. How- Serious peace negotiations began in early January 2008, ever, while NARC was built upon the promise of a power-shar- led initially by African Union Chair John Kufuor and later ing agreement, newly-elected President Mwai Kibaki’s advisors by a Panel of Eminent African Personalities. Former UN warned that this would divide Kenyans along ethnic lines. He secretary-general Kofi Annan led this effort, along with Mo- failed to honor the agreement and later dissolved the coalition, zambique’s Graça Machel and Tanzania’s Benjamin Mkapa, preferring instead one strong party to oppose Moi’s Kenya Af- eventually brokering a peace accord signed on February 28, rican National Union (KANU). Reports of unequal public 2008. It involved a power-sharing arrangement between the spending of tax revenues also emerged in 2004, highlighting two main political coalitions that opened space for constitu- superior economic and social indicators in urban areas and tional reform. Kikuyu districts.11 These discrepancies were seen as the results Concurrent peacebuilding efforts addressed long-term of political patronage established under Kenyatta’s presidency. grievances and sought justice for the violence. Following Ethnicity thus played a significant role leading up to the decades of calls for reforms, a constitutional referendum was 2007 election. The opposition Orange Democratic Movement held on August 4, 2010. The revised constitution reduced (ODM) used the perception of Kikuyu favoritism to turn the power of the president and the executive, devolved authority election into a contest of “forty-one tribes against one” with to counties, and formally guaranteed social and economic claims of “Kenya against the Kikuyu.” Kikuyu success was rights for women, minorities, and marginalized communities. blamed for the marginalization suffered by the other groups.12 Meanwhile criminal justice work in the wake of the violence ODM’s ethnic constituencies were Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin, included recommendations for a special tribunal and charges who originate from the then Nyanza and Western Provinces brought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against and the Rift Valley and are found in major towns. ODM also alleged leaders of the violence, both of which had limited suc- had a significant following among the coastal Muslims and cess (see box). The National Cohesion and Integration Com- in North Eastern Province. Kibaki’s new coalition, the Party mission (NCIC) was created in September 2009 to promote of National Unity (PNU), was comprised predominantly of national unity and eliminate all forms of ethnic discrimination Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru who originate from the Central (see more in appendix II). A Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation and Eastern Provinces and are strongly represented in the Commission (TJRC) was also established with a mandate Nairobi area, Coast Province, and the Rift Valley as a result to investigate politically motivated violence, assassinations, of migration. displacement, and economic crimes such as corruption and The election results of December 27, 2007 were viewed irregular acquisition of land.14 Various factors diminished the as fraudulent by national and international observers alike. legitimacy and credibility of the TJRC, including the delayed What followed were widespread protests that escalated into presentation of its Final Report to the Kenyan Parliament riots, repression by security forces, and revenge killings by until after the 2013 elections. Critics also suggest that the supporters of both camps. The violence lasted from Decem- narrow focus on human rights violations directly linked to ber 28 until February 28, 2008, and approximately 650,000 the 2007–2008 violence deflected public attention from vio- people were displaced, with up to 1,300 dead. Protests and lations committed between 1963 and 2002.15

16 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Fearful for repeated violence during the 2013 national elec- violence was avoided, it is widely agreed that inadequate time tions, considerable resources and initiatives were employed to and attention were given to addressing underlying grievances prevent violence in the lead up to the elections. While major (chiefly land disputes, corruption, and lack of accountability

Seeking justice for 2007–08 electoral violence

The Government of Kenya established an international Popular support for the ICC prosecutions dipped Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence as suspects were named and summoned, especially (CIPEV) in February 2008, which became known as in Central Province (73 percent in October 2010 to the Waki Commission. The Commission recommended 42 percent in February 2012) and the Rift Valley (61 that the government establish a special tribunal of percent to 50 percent), and was used by politicians to national and international judges to investigate and gain political support as the 2013 elections neared.17 prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence. A Kenyatta and Ruto put aside the historical Kalenjin bill to establish the special tribunal failed to pass in the and Kikuyu rivalry to form the Jubilee Alliance, Kenyan parliament in February 2009. which framed the ICC trials as unjust, neo-colonial, In November 2009 the ICC prosecutor sought and a threat to Kenya’s sovereignty and stability.18 authorization from Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) II to open Religious imagery and language was often used by an investigation in relation to the crimes allegedly the Jubilee coalition, with some likening Kenyatta to committed during the 2007–2008 post-election the Moses of the Kikuyu nation or the leader anointed violence in Kenya. This was the first time that the or chosen by God.19 The two men described their prosecutor used his propriu motu powers to initiate an reconciliation as God-given, which fueled discourse investigation without first having received a referral of repentance, forgiveness, and peace that would from a state party or the United Nations Security lead to God’s favor. With the highest voter turnout Council (UNSC).16 In March 2010, PTC II authorized in Kenya’s history, the Uhuruto team was announced the ICC prosecutor to open an investigation. Following winners with the narrowest of margins at 50.07 confirmation hearings, two cases moved forward in percent of the vote on March 9. Though rivals reacted January 2012: William Samoei Ruto and Joshua arap with allegations of tampering and irregularities, Sang, members of the ODM, the opposition party at intense and coordinated efforts to prevent violence the time of the elections, were charged with crimes contained frustration. Religion played a role during the against humanity of murder, forcible transfer, and inauguration ceremony on April 9, 2013 when the two persecution, allegedly committed against supporters of men breached security protocol by kneeling during the the PNU. The second case involved Francis Muthaura Christian prayer. and Uhuru Kenyatta, members of the PNU at the time Kenyatta and Ruto worked to delay the trials until of the violence, for the crimes against humanity of after the election, and eventually Ruto and Sang’s murder, forcible transfer, rape, persecution, and other trial was moved to September 2013 and Kenyatta’s inhumane acts allegedly committed against ODM to February 2014. Alleged intimidation or bribery of supporters, partly in retaliation against attacks against witnesses required the court to find new witnesses and the PNU supporters. Charges brought against Henry ultimately led to the termination of the cases:20 charges Kosgey, a prominent ODM politician, and Muhammad against Muthaura were withdrawn in March 2013, Ali, a former police commissioner, were dropped on those against Kenyatta’s in December 2014,21 and January 23, 2012 due to insufficient evidence. those of both Ruto and Sang in April 2016.22

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 17 Stephine Ogutu, Global Communities

A young woman signs a peace mural during the USAID/Kenya Tuna Uwezo-sponsored Community Achievements celebration held in the informal settlement of Eastleigh on March 10, 2016.

for past crimes). Numerous international actors provided history. Churches were identified with the independence logistical, financial, security, and political support in forms movement as well as with colonial rule, with the struggle for ranging from training peace monitors in each district to creat- democracy as well as authoritarian tendencies. Agbonkhian- ing digital tools for early warning systems. However, Kenyans meghe J. Orobator, a Jesuit priest and scholar, identifies three described it as a tense calm or unstable peace, noting that ten- distinct phases of church-state relations following the end of sions remained high with widespread suspicions among parties the colonial era. Under Jomo Kenyatta, the churches assumed and ethnic communities. Citizen dialogues conducted in late a cooperative role, with ecclesiastical bodies such as the Kenya 2013 in ten counties reported that eight months after the Episcopal Conference (now known as the Kenya Confer- election, Kenyans held strong feelings of discontent; “claims ence of Catholic Bishops, KCCB) acting as the “conscience of rigging, botched party nominations, and numerous institu- of society.”25 This came in the form of pastoral letters and tional failures, which contributed to overall heightened levels exhortations to public office holders. With the descent into of fear and anxiety during the electoral period, left commu- authoritarianism under Moi, various individual church leaders nities polarized.”23 Former opposition communities (Kikuyu moved to an oppositional role, publicly denouncing specific and Kalenjin) came together as the Jubilee Alliance, but deep political figures and encouraging emerging civil society and al- distrust between it and the CORD coalition reflect tensions ternative politics. Leaders gave political sermons and called for between Luo and Kikuyu.24 For these reasons, concern for Christian social ethics as a guide to political action. The third potential violence surrounding the 2017 elections is high. phase, beginning as the 2007 post-election crisis unfolded, saw church leaders as part of the problem, supporting political Religious leaders engaged in politics candidates based on ethnicity, and thus playing contradictory The role of Christian churches, especially in politics, is woven roles concerning matters of governance. The current context, in complex ways through Kenya’s pre- and post-independence in important respects, represents a reaction to that turbulent

18 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE period and a response to the ever-present specter of regional the 1992 general elections (Protestant churches were largely terrorism that has shone a spotlight on religious extremism divided along ethnic lines). NCCK and the Catholic Church and put wedges between Christian and Muslim communities. offered information on democracy and trained election monitors to oversee polling stations. Disappearances and repression The oppositional role of religious leaders. Religious were common at that time, and following ethnic clashes that leaders reacted during Moi’s presidency by taking a largely op- began in 1991, the churches challenged Moi and accused him positional role in politics. As it became clear that Moi sought of orchestrating the violence. Catholics assumed a higher to replace Kikuyu leadership, put in place by Kenyatta, with his profile as church leaders, notably Bishop Ndingi, responded own Kalenjin supporters, Kikuyu-dominated church leaders to violence in Nakuru, including providing relief to internally responded in defense. This eventually drove a wedge between displaced people. Protestants were weakened by various inter- the Anglican Church and the Africa Inland Church, of which nal scandals. While leaders were fragmented within and across Moi was a member. Before this degree of tension was reached, traditions, this political activism set the stage for eventual con- religious leaders acted strongly against Moi’s replacing secret stitutional reform and participation of religious actors through ballots with queue voting in 1986. The clergy were concerned the Ufungamano Initiative (detailed on page 32 and 33). that their political preferences would be public, so Moi offered The ability and willingness of various church leaders and them an exemption. Still, Anglican Bishops Henry Okullu, ecumenical bodies to oppose the government stemmed from Alexander Muge, and David Gitari, as well as Presbyterian their popular credibility, institutional strength, and the finan- Timothy Njoya remained vocal opponents.26 Leading up to cial autonomy that afforded them immunity from government the 1988 general elections, the National Council of Churches control.29 Churches that were most active in political debate in Kenya (NCCK) under the leadership of Methodist Samuel during the early 1990s—particularly the Anglicans, the Roman Kobia, coordinated the involvement of churches. In response, Catholics, and PCEA—were largely financially independent of Moi convinced the Africa Inland Church and others to leave— the state, received most funding from outside donors, and had and oppose—the NCCK. In 1989, Okullu, Gitari, and Njoya strong ties with international organizations. African Indepen- pressed for the repeal of the 1982 clause mandating a one-party dent Churches (AICs) were severely hindered in this regard, state, as well as wider constitutional reform. They were joined in part due to their personalism, lack of formal organizational by the Law Society of Kenya and politicians Kenneth Matiba ties or structures, and relative vulnerability.30 In the absence of and Charles Rubia. Other religious leaders opposed multi-par- space for alternative political expression, by the 1980s, only a tyism. Archbishop Arthur Kitonga of the Redeemed Gospel few church leaders were able to criticize the government with- Church of Kenya used theological rhetoric in support of Moi’s out fear of reprisal. Broadly, the right of the churches to engage Presidency, while Lawi Imathiu, the Presiding Bishop of the in political debate was challenged by politicians. Methodist Church in Kenya, claimed that a return to multipartyism would simply fragment Kenya along ethnic lines.27 Contradictory roles of religious leaders. The situa- Catholic leaders, notably Bishop of Nakuru Rafael Ndingi tion changed with the 2007–08 violence when religious actors Mwana a’Nezeki, hesitantly became involved. A pastoral letter lost credibility and neutrality, at times aligning with ethnic in 1992 indicated that the entire Church was involved, stating political interests. One consequence, as Orabator notes, was “If the Catholic Bishops mean business as is now apparent, the that faith-based organizations and religious institutions were Moi government will be hard hit. The bishops speak in one heavily criticized in the wake of post-election violence. When voice and unlike some church denominations, they cannot the violence broke out, religious groups were already compro- be ‘bought.’”28 mised and divided; their reaction to the violence was delayed Religious leaders played a major role and were joined by and tempered. In its report on the post-election violence, the others, bringing pressure that led to the legalization of multi- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights found that party politics in December 1991. Some churchmen, NCCK, the failure of faith-based organizations further compounded and the Catholic hierarchy were prominent in the lead up to a “situation where no single national institution appeared

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 19 neutral enough to offer moral leadership when the country The result of these divisions and different loyalties was a descended into chaos.”31 Religious leaders, divided as they were very mixed response from religious actors to the violence.33 and often highly partisan, lacked the credibility and cohesion Imams in the Coast province and traditional religious lead- to be seen as impartial arbiters. As the situation evolved, earlier ers preached peace and coexistence, and many religious in- polarization of churches along ethnic and regional lines played stitutions provided aid and shelter to those displaced by the important roles. Muslim leader roles were also complex. The violence. Tragically, on January 1, 2008 a group of Kikuyus Muslim imams were divided over a Memorandum of Under- seeking refuge in the Assemblies of God church outside El- standing signed between the ODM and the National Muslim doret were killed when vigilantes set the building on fire.34 Leaders Forum.32 The perceived partisanship of religious lead- Many religious leaders hesitated to call for peace and justice in ership before the election was intensified when some FIOs part because calls for “peace” were seen as an endorsement of openly sided with a particular ethnic community. There were the status quo and Kibaki’s administration. Calls for “justice” instances of religious leaders exploiting their positions to fuel were cast as sympathetic to the claims of the Kalenjin and Luo violence against non-Kikuyu communities. fighters.35 In March 2008, the NCCK formally apologized for

Islam and politics in Kenya, 1992–1994

As minorities, Muslims generally did not criticize the expressing frustration.37 In a public letter to leaders sent government as openly as Christian leaders in the July 6, 1993, IPK asserted that the Christian regime 1990s. Those who did voice grievances tended to had been oppressing Muslims since independence. moderate their criticism. This changed with agitation One grievance was proportional representation and from Muslims for inclusion in democratic spaces when the small number of Muslims in political office. The in January 1992, following the announcement of a only Muslim minister in Moi’s government, Hussein multiparty system, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) Maalim Mohamed, spoke out on February 17, 1993 was established. The government denied registration by calling for Muslims to unite and demand their rights. of the party on the grounds that it was discriminatory Muslim academics also spoke out, claiming that the and required specific religious beliefs of its members. separation of church and state was one-sided in Kenya The religious affiliation of the party was clear from and suppressed the freedom of expression for Muslims. the methods of mobilizing support and spreading IPK was also a reaction against the traditional ulama, political views and the role of its main activist, Khalid many of whom were involved in the Supreme Council of Balala, a conspicuously charismatic Islamic preacher.36 Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), for lack of neutrality toward Tensions boiled over in May 1992 with the arrest of the government.38 seven imams and several activists of IPK inciting mass Moi’s regime and others in positions of power demonstrations in Mombasa that deteriorated into worked to foil IPK. The United Muslims of Africa (UMA) attacks and violence. Those arrested were accused of emerged shortly after IPK, bringing allegations that incitement against the government. Moi’s government was backing the group in an attempt One goal in forming IPK was to focus on the needs to divide Muslims.39 UMA worked to draw support of Muslims in Kenya. IPK’s leaders claimed that all from Muslims of African background and rally against political parties in Kenya were led by Christians and IPK, who drew support primarily from Arab and Asian did not concern themselves with Muslim welfare. The descent. Incumbent Muslim politicians of KANU also initial popularity of IPK reflected long-standing concerns feared that the success of IPK would threaten their of the Muslim minority and provided an avenue for positions.

20 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE

having sacrificed their neutrality before, during, and after the Figure 3: Map of arid and election period. In an interview with the BBC, activist John semi-arid counties in Kenya Githongo commented that “not just the political leadership but also the cultural and religious leaders” were responsible for the violence.40

Inequality and marginalization Unequal distribution of resources—both natural and mone- tary—contribute to structural violence and marginalization; this is especially focused in several regions of Kenya. Patterns of inequality have deep historical roots. As a colonial settler economy was established, white settlers took over land with the highest potential—in Eastern province, Central, and the Rift Valley—which were thus known as the White Highlands. A 1915 ordinance further unbalanced land tenure, creating native reserves divided by ethnic groups. Many were displaced. In parallel, settlers required farm labor, drawing squatters to work in the White Highlands. Many Kikuyu in Central province became tenant famers; as wages declined in the 1940s, the Mau Mau movement emerged among Kikuyu labor tenants on settler farms. Competition and control over this productive land has been at the heart of debates and conflict ever since, with significant economic and political implications.41 The independence political settlements involved land re- Source: National Drought Management Authority, Kenya. forms, including resettlement plans for landless Kikuyu and others. Implementation results were mixed. Reforms wereFigure which 1: Map of comprise ASAL Counties more in Kenya than 80 percent of the country (see particularly complicated in the coast where the Sultan ofSource: figure NDMA 3) and are home to approximately four million people, Zanzibar had been given control of the ten-mile coastal strip many of them pastoralists.44 Under-development and lack of (Mwambao); post-colonial grants of land to politicians exacer- access to resources and opportunities there strains relations th bated landlessness and squatters.42 Controversy surrounds[Revised the 7 Julybetween 2015] herders and farmers, as do practices such as cattlePage 4 use of the discretionary power of the state (by the President’s rustling. The discovery of oil in Turkana County in 2012 and office or Ministry of Land) to allocate large farms, estates, and the re-drawing of administrative boundaries, as part of devolu- forests to those in power or for patronage. Land issues remain tion, complicate conflicts over access to key water and grazing an underlying factor in tensions in Kenya, with efforts to ad- resources between Turkana and Pokot. Serious inter-clan vio- dress them in the 2010 constitution and recommendations lence erupted in 2012 in Isiolo and Moyale, both starting with from Kenya’s TJRC. disputes over grazing land and cattle rustling that transformed The first national development agenda of independent into a fight over county politics. Kenya, articulated in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, directed Economic inequality also fuels grievances and perceptions state resources to so-called “high potential” areas of crop pro- of marginalization. Various measures point to critical issues duction, “overlooking the wealth of lowland livestock-based of inequality and county-level analysis illustrates underdevel- economies and creating the deep inequalities in human development trends (see figure 4). Kenya’s Gini coefficient is 47.7, opment that characterize contemporary Kenya.”43 Very little the second highest in East Africa following Rwanda at 50.8 development investment has gone into Kenya’s dryland areas, and above South Sudan (45.5) and Uganda (44.3).45 At the

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 21 county level, Tana River, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Migori and Busia Figure 4: Proportion of population below counties reported the most income inequality measured by poverty line (headcount index) nationally Gini coefficient.46 Kenya’s unemployment rate was 9.2 percent of total labor force in 2014, comparing regionally with Eritrea (7.2), Burundi (6.9), and Somalia (6.9).47 In Kenya, agricul- ture is the leading occupation type (32 percent), however 44 percent of this group works on family agricultural holdings without pay. People working in urban areas are 2.4 times more likely to get paid than their rural counterparts, however urban areas have more people without work than in rural areas.48 A subnational analysis shows a poverty gap 1.75 times higher in rural areas compared to urban, with the highest percentage found in Tana River County (46 percent) compared to the lowest in Nairobi at 4.1 percent.49 In this same study, Mandera, Wajir, Turkana, and Marsabit counties consistently had poor indicators across nine variables, indicating the lowest access to essential services. On a more positive note, Kenya has been lauded as one of the fast growing economies in Africa (in part due to low oil prices), with a growth rate of 5.6 percent in 2015 and 5.9 percent in 2016.50 As the economy has created jobs, they have largely been low productivity in the informal sector; with an estimated nine million youth joining the labor market in the next ten years, rapid growth in the formal wage sector will not be able to absorb this population.51 A majority Source: “Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling of youth will continue to find jobs in small household enter- Together?” Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and prises or working in the informal sector. Society for International Development (SID), 2013.

Challenges for youth as a priority within the national development strategy, Vision Youth in Kenya are particularly challenged by unequal op- 2030. Strategies target the needs of youth for education, portunities, economic and otherwise. Nearly 80 percent of jobs, health care, information, and participation in politics Kenyans are under 35 years old and more than a third of the and leadership. Recent government mechanisms designed to entire population is between the ages of 18 and 34.52 Economic empower youth include the Youth Enterprise Development growth in Kenya has not been matched with appropriate ed- Fund (YEDF) (launched in 2006), which provides loans ucation or the creation of decent jobs,53 leaving youth with and other support to youth enterprises, and the Uwezo Fund unemployment rates much higher than the overall national (launched in 2013), which provides grants and interest-free average.54 Social problems such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, drug loans to women, youth, and persons with disabilities. The and substance abuse, and crime and violence further compli- YEDF has come under criticism for disbursing the majority of cate the lives of youth. In Kenya, youth are largely perceived funds (more than 80 percent) through financial intermediaries to be perpetrators (though not necessarily orchestrators or (FIs); therefore funding youth who could normally qualify instigators) of crime and violence, most notably during the for a bank loan. Success rates for applicants are also at 50 per- 2007–08 post-election violence.55 cent, revealing challenges accessing the program.57 Analysis of The government has responded to the challenges and needs 2009 disbursements found the more women received funds of youth with policy and programs,56 including featuring youth disbursed through FIs (33,094 compared to 23,981 men). It

22 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE also found regional disparities with North Eastern receiving and 40 percent reporting they would only vote for a candidate less than 1,000 loans beneficiaries.58 In late 2015, an audit who bribes them. Interestingly, when asked what they value revealed YEDF lost Sh180 million; by August 2016 YEDF most, youth placed faith first (85 percent) and religion was boss Catherine Namuye and former board chairman Bruce reported as the second most trusted institution (86 percent), Adhiambo were charged with 12 counts of corruption.59 following family. Only 12 percent identified by their faith first; Despite these opportunities, youth remain concerned 40 percent identify as Kenyans first. about unemployment and are vulnerable to political manip- ulation, concerns highlighted by a national survey of 1,854 Religious intersections of youth conducted by the Aga Khan University.60 The education marginalization and ethnicity rates of participants were a sign of improved access to educa- Ethnic identity tends to be divisive, with tensions focused tion (78 percent had attained post-primary education and 39 on competition for political power, land rights, and access percent had post-secondary education). Youth reported unem- to other socio-economic resources. Given the historical geo- ployment as their top concern (63 percent). Unemployment graphic distribution of religious communities—complicated among youth overall was 55 percent and 32 percent for those somewhat today by urbanization and migration—memories with post-secondary education. Unemployment was highest of past injustices and perceptions of unequally distributed among women (62 percent). As for government-initiated resources often coincide with religious affiliation. youth programs, 52 percent had some knowledge of them and Ethnic and religious affiliation overlaps in many ways with 76 percent reported that they have not benefited from them. historic and geographic interests, political and economic. The study also found that youth are vulnerable to bribery with Central Kenya, for example, was preferred by colonial powers 35 percent reporting they would readily take a bribe in general due to the pleasant climate and fertile land of the highlands.

Somali Kenyans and marginalization

Ethnic Somali Kenyans have a long history of tensions without food or water and executing more than 300. and marginalization. Most live in North Eastern region The government declared a state of emergency, and are pastoralists. Somali Kenyans long engaged in silencing witnesses and banning writings about the commercial activities are found primarily in Nairobi’s event, which were not formally acknowledged until Eastleigh neighborhood and in Mombasa. As Kenyan after 2002.61 independence neared, a movement grew among Conflict in Somalia has brought closer scrutiny of Somalis who sought secession and union with Somalia. ethnic Somalis by the government of Kenya. By 1989, A referendum was eventually passed in 1959 in the rising security risks from the conflict and a growing North Eastern Province calling for secession. When this number of refugees from Somalia led the Kenyan was ignored, groups of armed Somali Kenyans called government to require Somalis (both Kenyan citizens shiftas clashed with Kenyan security forces; beginning and resident Somali nationals) to carry a special in December 1963, the Shifta war ended in 1968. The identification card. Screenings of Somalis lasted until secessionist movement disintegrated but the actions of 2002.62 Following the 2001 terrorist attack in the United Kenyan security forces at Wagalla airstrip near Wajir States, Kenya sided closely with the U.S. global war in 1984 further isolated the Kenyan Somali community; on terror, which included a renewed focus on Somalia. the army moved up to 5000 male Degodia (a Kenyan Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees63 continue to be Somali sub-clan of the Hawiye) to the airstrip for viewed as potential security threats in part due to their interrogation, allegedly holding them for five days religious affiliations and the tactics of Al-Shabaab.

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 23 Stephine Ogutu, Global Communities

Residents watch the activities during the USAID/Kenya Tuna Uwezo-sponsored Community Achievements celebration held in the informal settlement of Dandora on March 17, 2016. The program works to reduce politically-motivated conflict and violent extremism in Nairobi’s informal settlements by strengthening social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances.

Nairobi was established as the colonial capital in 1905. Given It is worth noting that two of these regions have majority the Anglican and Presbyterian ties to colonial powers, Central Muslim populations. Much of this geographic area is arid and Kenya’s religious landscape is strongly Anglican with various semi-arid land with persistent patterns of drought. Histori- other Christian denominations. Preferential development pol- cally, these areas were not a focus of development agendas and icies and investment helped make the area Kenya’s agricultural this neglect lives on in various challenges today. The religious heartland, with coffee, tea, and tobacco plantations. Beyond demographics of the Rift Valley are fairly heterogeneous with Central Kenya, Protestant missions distinguished territory a significant number of Muslims in Nakuru, many Christian according to spheres of work resulting in a large number of denominations (including Catholics, Seventh Day Adventists, Quakers concentrated among Luhya in Western Kenya, Men- and African Inland Church), as well as traditional religions. nonites among the Luo and Suba near Lake Victoria, Seventh Various religious institutions and faith-inspired organiza- Day Adventists among Kisii, and African Inland Church stron- tions are engaged in development activities throughout Kenya, gest among the Kalenjin area of the Rift Valley. The Catholic as mentioned in the religious landscape section, and several Church, AICs, and Evangelicals were more widely dispersed have responded specifically to underdevelopment in the Coast, across the country, resulting in greater ethnic diversity. North Eastern, and the Rift Valley. Motivations for involve- Other regions were relatively neglected during the colonial ment range from existing presence in the area to the ability and post-colonial eras; the Coast, North Eastern, and the Rift to gain access to responding to the greatest need. Appendix I Valley provinces lag behind in many ways, notably in poorly de- highlights examples of FIOs engaged in various development veloped education, infrastructure, and agricultural production. activities specifically in the Coast and North Eastern province.

24 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE The Aga Khan Foundation is a notable FIO engaged in the Al-Shabaab in Kenya.67 Al-Shabaab has recruited in Kenya, region with a long history of engagement in education, health, and suspicion of support or recruitment within Dadaab ref- and rural development in Kenya. Its first hospital in Kenya was ugee camp, with its high proportion of Somali refugees, adds Aga Khan Hospital Mombasa, established in 1944. The Aga fuel to the situation (see box on Dadaab, next page). Attacks Khan responded to education requests from Muslim leaders in Kenya spanning 2011 to 2012 primarily used grenades to in the Coast by launching madrasa pre-schools in 1986; the target churches, bars, and restaurants in Nairobi, Garissa, and program expanded to 203 pre-schools owned and operated Mombasa. The attacks became more severe over time, with by communities in Kenya, Zanzibar, and Uganda by 2008.64 rising numbers of causalities. Most notably in September 2013 The Catholic Church, in partnership with international an attack at Westgate Mall in Nairobi killed at least 69 and Catholic FIOs, also leads initiatives on topics relating to child injured more than 175. Al-Shabaab also claimed credit for protection, education, and food security and drought. Seeing killing 64 persons in two attacks in Mandera County in late the need to blend development and peacebuilding, several 2014 (28 persons traveling by bus for December holidays and FIOs have also focused on conflict-sensitive development, as 36 quarry workers) and again an attack at Garissa University is detailed in Appendix II. in April 2015, targeting Christians and killing 147 students. National, regional, and international security concerns Violent extremism and separatist groups aggravate Kenya’s internal conflicts, notably accentuating Kenya’s stability has been threatened by terrorist attacks and interreligious tensions. Kenya’s 2011 incursion into Somalia strengthening networks linked to extremist movements. The marked a change in tactics toward Al-Shabaab. In October bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998 2011, following a kidnapping in Lamu of foreign tourists and killed 11 Americans and nearly 250 Kenyans and injured some two aid workers in Dadaab refugee camp, the Kenyan govern- 5,000. The attack did not target Kenyans, yet trauma from ment launched Operation Linda Nchi against Al-Shabaab in the event has had a lasting impact on survivors and Kenya’s Somalia.68 In February 2012, Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) security forces and approach. This attack by Al-Qaeda, coor- troops joined the larger African Union Mission in Somalia dinated with a simultaneous bombing in Tanzania, marked and in March helped secure Al-Shabaab’s largest port. The an important shift in U.S. counter-terrorism policy. It also U.S., U.K., and Danish governments have supported the marked a new awareness in Kenya of the reach and violence Kenyan government’s internal security in forms such as hard of global terrorism. Since the attack, the United States and security assistance (hardware and training), legal advice on others have increased counterterrorism investment in East anti-terrorism legislation, and targeting populations consid- Africa and the Horn. From fiscal year 2010 to FY 2014, U.S. ered to be at risk with development aid.69 counterterrorism aid to Kenya totaled US$141 million with The combination of security concerns in Kenya has tested US$100 million promised for FY2015.65 In parallel, a “soft and in many ways revealed the weaknesses of its security forces. power” approach since 2003 has focused on providing human- The weakness of these systems became apparent during the itarian and development assistance especially in the Coast and 2013 attack at Westgate mall, with cross-fire among forces and North East provinces.66 allegations that KDF forces looted the mall after the situation Al-Shabaab, which means “the youth,” emerged as the rad- was brought under control.70 The 2015 attack at Garissa Uni- ical youth wing of Somalia’s now-defunct Union of Islamic versity again highlighted Kenyan security weaknesses, notably Courts, which controlled Mogadishu in 2006, before being the inability of the KDF to mobilize forces and equipment to forced out by Ethiopian forces. Today the group is allied to Garissa quickly (the counterterrorist Recce company of the Al-Qaeda. Its targets have expanded to neighboring countries, paramilitary General Service Unit were stuck at the airport including Kenya. Kenya’s porous borders, significant ethnic with no plane available, while their equipment travelled by Somali minority population, high levels of corruption, and road).71 The KDF’s immediate reaction to the Garissa massacre the presence of some who benefit from the conflict between was to target Al-Shabaab camps in Somalia. The Kenyan An- Somalia and Kenya cumulatively create various openings for ti-Terrorist Police Unit has targeted Muslims, including clerics,

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 25 suspected as sympathizers with raids on mosques and other Religious rhetoric of violent extremists Muslim gathering places in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other Muslim communities are involved in various ways with Ken- places.72 Extrajudicial killings or lack of due process for several ya’s efforts to counter Al-Shabaab and other militant Islamic of these suspects have caused fear and anxiety for Muslims of groups. Al-Shabaab’s agenda blends religion into its political all ideologies in Kenya. aims. It portrays its jihad as a legitimate act of self-defense by Separatist groups exacerbate long-lasting undercurrents a Muslim people militarily occupied by Christian invaders, of instability in Kenya. The Shifta War, mentioned above, who were backed by the “great enemy of the Muslim people,” and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), draw from the United States.76 Largely using social media, Al-Shabaab historical disagreements regarding national boundaries. has exploited the sense of alienation, identity crisis, and lack MRC, founded in 1999, seeks autonomy for areas along of purpose among Somali diaspora in Kenya, encouraging not the coast formerly ruled by the Sultan of Zanzibar. Rallying only jihad but also hijrah (religious migration). wapwani (coast people) in 2010 during the constitutional Al-Shabaab has recruited Kenyan members, and a 2014 referendum, MRC launched a campaign based on the claim study describes Kenyans as playing a leading role in the orga- that the current Kenyan government’s 50-year “lease” on the nization’s intelligence operations and planning.77 Recruitment land of interest would expire in 2012; MRC also called for efforts have capitalized on a strong sense of historical grievance a boycott of the 2013 elections.73, 74 Pointing to decades of and marginalization of Kenyan Muslims (described above) marginalization, they have gained sympathizers. The Kenyan that some describe as feeding a victimization narrative with government attributed the 2014 attacks on Army Barrack in a sense of subordination and subjugation.78, 79 In an attempt Nyali and another on the Administration Police Camp in to better understand why Kenyans would join Al-Shabaab, Malindi to MRC.75 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)—with assistance from

Dadaab refugee complex and security concerns

The Dabaab complex, established in 1992,80 is the Al-Shabaab attacks, namely Westgate (2013) and largest refugee camp in the world today, hosting Garissa University (2015).87 International pressure almost 350,000 people.81 At this size, Dadaab can tempered the demands until recently; in May 2016, be viewed unofficially as the fourth-largest city in the Kenyan Government announced that it would be Kenya.82 Continuing conflict and instability in Somalia closing Dadaab. Kenya’s Vice President, William Ruto and other neighboring countries has made for a argued that the camp “was a security threat, a haven protracted refugee situation, with third and even fourth for terrorism and a conduit of contraband goods as generations born and living in Dadaab.83 Nearly 96 well as a danger to the environment.”88 Many analysts, percent of Dadaab’s population comes from Somalia however, argue that returning refugees to unstable while others come primarily from Ethiopia and South areas could increase the risk of recruitment and thus Sudan.84 regional terrorism.89 To complicate matters, rumors have Various authorities allege that Dadaab is fertile also circulated suggesting that the Kenyan Government ground for Al-Shabaab recruitment 85 in part due to has recruited Somali refugees from Dadaab to fight under-education for a majority of the refugees, legal Al-Shabaab on behalf of the Transitional Federal obstacles that prevent refugees from working or living Government in Somalia. This highlights the complex role elsewhere in Kenya, and very limited job opportunities that the camp plays in Kenya’s security situation as well within the camp.86 Kenyan officials have called for as the large humanitarian threat posed by the prospect the camp’s immediate closure in response to major of abrupt closure of the camp.90

26 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Centre for Christian–Muslim Relations, St Paul’s University Centre for Christian–Muslim Relations, St Paul’s

St. Paul University students in the masters in Islam and Christian Muslim Relations visit an Islamic healing center in Eastleigh.

Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance—conducted interviews with 95 of the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) individuals associated with Al-Shabaab. Religion was cited by and a Muslim leader who condemned radical interpretations 87 percent of respondents as a reason for joining Al-Shabaab.91 of Islam.93 Kenya’s Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) has The study also reports that 34 percent of respondents indicated targeted Al-Hijra since 2012 and raided mosques of alleged they were recruited by a religious figure, the second largest Al-Shabaab supporters.94 Foreign funding has also supported group after friends, and 79 percent indicated that religious the entry of Salafist ideology to Kenya, for example through diversity is not a good thing. a growing funding stream from Arab countries supporting New ideologies promoted by Al-Shabaab and other Salaf- Islamic education and scholarships for tertiary study in the ists complicate existing divisions and tensions within Kenya’s Arab world. New media and expanded religious television Muslim communities. Between 2008 and 2011, the Muslim programming from the Arab world is also increasingly ac- Youth Centre (later emerging as Al-Hijra), Al-Shabaab’s cessible to Muslims in Kenya.95 most active partner in Kenya, published a jihadi newsletter with articles and speeches by leading Salafi-jihadi clerics Urban crime and violence in Swahili and English, encouraging Kenyan Muslims to The combination of marginalization, urbanization, poor gov- provide recruits and financial support to Al-Shabaab in So- ernance, and weak police systems has contributed to high in- malia.92 Disagreements between established clerics and the cidence of crime and violence especially in the growing urban new Al-Shabaab sheikhs became publicly apparent in early centers. In Nairobi, a metropolis of approximately six million 2009 and continue to elicit threats or violence such as the people, about half living in informal settlements. Violence June 2014 shooting of Sheikh Mohammed Idris, chairman is a chronic problem there and takes multiple forms; it has

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 27 increased over the decades. The 2014 Annual Crime Report 2. John Lonsdale, “Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and indicates that Nairobi County has the highest number (6732 Remaking Kenya,” The Journal of African History 31 (1990): 393–421. or 9.7 percent) of all crimes reported nationally,96 even with 3. Margaret G. Gecaga, “Search for Identity: Youth, Culture, and Religion in the Mount Kenya Region,” in Citizen Participation in underreporting due to low levels of public confidence in the Decision Making: Towards Inclusive Development in Kenya, ed. Kimani police service.97 Njogu. (Twaweza Communications, December 2013). Levels of violence in informal settlements, which are char- 4. “Kenya: The Mungiki sect, including organizational structure, acterized by very poor environmental and health conditions, leadership, membership, recruitment and activities,” Research inadequate shelter, unemployment, and insufficient services, Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, October are particularly high. This fragility may have contributed to 2013. 5. See Grace Masese, “Crime and Violence Trends in Nairobi, Kenya,” the fact that the bulk of violence during the 2007–08 post Case study prepared for Enhancing Urban Safety and Security: Global election violence in Nairobi occurred in the slums where eth- Report on Human Settlements 2007. nically homogenous zones had developed.98 In a World Bank 6. Nderitu Gichure, “Fears of Mungiki terror group return as 10 are study conducted in two Nairobi settlements, 44 percent of seized at oathing den,” The Standard, April 19, 2016, http://www. respondents in Nairobi reported victimization in the past 12 standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000198716/fears-of-mungiki-terror- months, with robbery and assault the most common forms, group-return-as-10-are-seized-at-oathing-den. 7. “Mungiki still alive in bus stages and markets in Nakuru town,” and 52 percent said they did not feel safe.99 Additionally, all The Standard, June 25, 2016, http://www.sde.co.ke/thenairobian/ but one in-depth interviews with females reported incidents article/2000206530/mungiki-still-alive-in-bus-stages-and-markets- of domestic violence of which 15 percent had suffered sexual in-nakuru-town. assault twice in the prior 12 months. 8. Gecaga, “Search for Identity: Youth, Culture, and Religion in the Weak policing linked to endemic corruption and access to Mount Kenya Region.” small arms exacerbate urban insecurity. Police are perceived 9. Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, “Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya,” African Affairs 108 to be the most corrupt institution in Kenya, preventing re- (Jan., 2009): 1–26. porting of crimes. A survey conducted by Ipsos in April 2015 10. See table 1 in “Political Conflict and Vulnerabilities: Firearms and found 54 percent of crime victims did not report the crimes. electoral violence in Kenya,” Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 2, Of those who did report, 68 percent were disappointed by December 2012. police response, citing lack of investigations (43 percent) and 11. See “Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya,” SID, corruption (40 percent).100 In the absence of strong policing, 2004. 12. Michael Chege, “Kenya: Back from the Brink?” Journal of Democracy gangs, vigilante groups, and other organized crime can be 19 (October 2008): 125–139. found in Nairobi and small arms are readily accessible, espe- 13. “Kenya in Crisis,” International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 137, cially in the Eastleigh neighborhood.101 Most Kenyans killed February 21, 2008. by gunshots, however, are victims of police shootings: 67 per- 14. “Truth Commission: Kenya,” United State Institute of Peace, July 1, cent of the 1,868 Kenyans who died from gunshot wounds 2009, accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.usip.org/publications/ between 2009 and 2013 were killed by a police officer.102 truth-commission-kenya. 15. Transitional Justice in Kenya: A Historical Perspective and a Synopsis of Following the 2007–08 election violence, the Commission a Troubled Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (The Hague: of Inquiry into the CIPEV and the UN special rapporteur Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2014), 9. report on extra judicial killings both recommended extensive 16. “Cases and Situations: Kenya,” Coalition for the International reforms of the police system, prompting the establishment of Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=kenya. the National Taskforce on Police Reforms in 2009.103 17. See Susanne D. Mueller, “Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, the election and the law,” Journal of Eastern African Notes Studies, 8 (2014): 25–42. 18. See Gabrielle Lynch, “Electing the ‘alliance of the accused’: the success 1. Bruce J. Berman, “Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The of the Jubilee Alliance in Kenya’s Rift Valley,”Journal of Eastern African Paradox of Mau Mau,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 25 (1991): Studies, 8 (2014): 93–114. 181–206.

28 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE 19. Gregory Deacon, “Driving the Devil Out: Kenya’s Born-Again 35. Karuti Kanyinga, “Stopping a Conflagration: The Response of Kenyan Election,” Journal of Religion in Africa 45 (2015): 200–220. Civil Society to the Post-2007 Election Violence,” Politikon: South 20. Mueller, “Kenya and the International Criminal Court (ICC): politics, African Journal of Political Studies 38 (2011): 92. the election and the law.” 36. See Hassan Ndzovu, “Muslims and Party Politics and Electoral 21. “Situation in the Republic of Kenya,” International Criminal Court, Campaigns in Kenya,” Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in 2010, https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20 Africa, Working Paper No. 09-001, March 2009. cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/Pages/situation%20index. 37. See Arye Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, aspx. 2000). 22. “ICC dismisses case against Kenya’s Ruto,” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2016, 38. See more Joseph Wandera, “Muslims, Christians and State: The http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/kenya-ruto-hear-icc-case- Contest for Public Space in Kenya,” Annual Review of Islam in Africa, dropped-160405065408564.html. Issue No. 10 (2008–2009). 23. Claire Elder, Susan Stigant, and Jonas Claes, “Election and Violent 39. Ndzovu, “Muslims and Party Politics and Electoral Campaigns in Conflict in Kenya: Making Prevention Stick,” USIP Peaceworks, 2014, Kenya.” 3, accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ 40. Interview with John Githongo, “Q&A on Kenya Violence,” BBC News, PW101-Elections-and-Violent-Conflict-in-Kenya-Making-Prevention- January 23, 2008. Stick.pdf. 41. See Karuti Kanyinga, “The legacy of the white highlands: Land rights, 24. Brigitte Rohwerder, “Conflict Analysis of Kenya,” GSDRC Applied ethnicity and the post-2007 election violence in Kenya,” Journal of Knowledge Services, 2015, 7, accessed June 2, 2016, http://www.gsdrc. Contemporary African Studies 27 (July 2009): 325–344. org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/KenyaConflictAnalysis.pdf. 42. See Karuti Kanyinga, “Politics and Struggles for Access to Land: 25. Agbonkhianmeghe Orobator, S.J., “Church, State and Catholic Ethics: Grants from Above and Squatters in Coastal Kenya,” The European the Kenyan Dilemma,” Theological Studies, 70 (March 2009): 183. Journal of Development Research 10 (1998). 26. Paul Gifford,Christianity, Politics, and Public Life in Kenya (New 43. “Releasing our Full Potential,” Ministry of State for Development of York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35. Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands, Sessional Paper No. 8 of 2012 27. Terence Ranger, and John Karanja, “Evangelical Attitudes Toward on National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Democracy in Kenya,” in Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Kenya and other Arid Lands. Africa, ed. Terrence Ranger (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 44. “4.0 Kenya.” http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/drought/ 81–83. docs/BLBL_3Kenya.pdf. 28. Mwangi Chege, “In God’s Name,” Society, 6 April 1992, 11. 45. Income Gini coefficient. World Bank, World Development Indicators 29. Galia Sabar-Friedman,“Church and State in Kenya, 1986–1992:The 2013. Accessed August 31, 2016. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/ Churches’ Involvement in the ‘Game of Change’,” African Affairs 96 income-gini-coefficient. (1997): 29. 46. “Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together,” 30. “A Discussion with John Padwick, Organization of African Instituted Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and Society for Churches,” June 12, 2008, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & International Development (SID), 2013. World Affairs, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a- 47. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate), discussion-with-john-padwick-organization-of-african-instituted- 2014. International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the churches. Labour Market database. World Bank Data Bank. Accessed August 31, 31. “On the Brink of a Precipice: a human rights account of Kenya’s 2016. post-2007 election violence,” Kenya National Commission on Human 48. “Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together,” Rights, August 2008. 2013: 28–29. 32. M. Juma, “African mediation of the Kenya post-2007 election crisis,” 49. “Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27 (2009): 411. 2013: 12–13. 33. See Philomena Njeri Mwaura and Constansia Mumma Martinon, 50. Economic Update: Kenya’s Economy Strong in a Challenging Global “Political Violence In Kenya And Local Churches’ Responses: The Environment. World Bank, March 2016. http://www.worldbank.org/ Case Of The 2007 Post-Election Crisis,”The Review of Faith & en/country/kenya/publication/kenya-economic-update-economy- International Affairs 8 (2010): 39–46. strong-challenging-global-environment. 34. Jeffrey Gettleman, “Mob Sets Kenya Church on Fire, Killing Dozens,” 51. Jane Wangui Kiringai et al. “Kenya—Economic update: kazi ni kazi— The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/02/world/ informal should not be normal.” Kenya Economic Update; no. 13. africa/02kenya.html?_r=0. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. 2016.

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 29 52. “Kenya’s Youth Employment Challenge,” UNDP, January 2013, 64. See “The Madrasa Early Childhood Programme: 25 Years of http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20 Experience: A Project of the Aga Khan Foundation.” 2008. http:// Reduction/Inclusive%20development/Kenya_YEC_web(jan13).pdf. www.akdn.org/publication/madrasa-early-childhood-development- 53. According to the International Labour Organization ILO, decent work programme. involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair 65. “U.S. Counterterrorism Aid to Kenya: Focusing on a Military income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, with Motivation and Corruption Problems,” Security Assistance better prospects for personal development and social integration, Monitor, July 21, 2015, http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/ freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate us-counterterrorism-aid-kenya. in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and 66. Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, “Winning Hearts and Minds? treatment for all women and men. Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya,” 54. See Boaz Munga and Eldah Onsomu, “State of Youth Unemployment Tufts University Feinstein International Center, 2010. in Kenya,” Brookings, August 21, 2014, https://www.brookings. 67. Rob Wise, “Al Shabaab,” Center for Strategic and International edu/2014/08/21/state-of-youth-unemployment-in-kenya/. Studies, July 2011, https://www.csis.org/analysis/al-shabaab. 55. See Margaret Wamuyu Muthee, “Hitting the Target, Missing the 68. Shukri Abdulkadir, “Al-Shabaab’s impact on peace in Somalia and the Point: Youth Policies and Programmes in Kenya,” Woodrow Wilson Horn of Africa,” Africa Portal, Backgrounder No. 23, February 2012. International Center for Scholars. 69. See Bachmann, J & Hoenke, J, ‘‘Peace and Security’ as 56. See Munga and Onsomu, “State of Youth Unemployment in Kenya”; Counterterrorism? The Political Effects of Liberal Interventions in also Jacob Omolo, “Youth Employment in Kenya: Analysis of Labour Kenya ,” African Affairs 109 (2010): 97–114. Market and Policy Interventions,” FES Kenya Occasional Paper No. 1, 70. Samuel Aronson, “Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting October 2012. History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism,” African 57. Oduol Stephen Okoth et al. “Effect of the Youth Enterprise Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS 7 (2013), http://stg. Development Fund on Youth Enterprises in Kenya.” International umes.edu/cms300uploadedFiles/AJCJS/Volume_7_Issue_1_and_2/ Journal of Advances in Management and Economics. 2, No. 1 (Jan VOL7.1%20ARONSON%20FINAL.pdf. 2013): 111–116. 71. Andrew McGregor, “After Garissa: Kenya Revises Its Security Strategy 58. Lawrence N. Kimando et al. “Factors Affecting the Success of Youth to Counter al-Shabaab’s Shifting Tactics,”Terrorism Monitor 13 (2015), Enterprise Development Funded Projects in Kenya; A Survey of http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?cHash=b950a7300 Kigumo District Muranga County.” International Journal of Business c3e702fd5fbd449f9045fda&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43807. and Commerce. 1, No.10 (Jun 2012): 61–81. 72. See David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, “Kenya at war: 59. Vincent Agoya, “Suspended Youth Fund pair face 12 counts of Al-Shabaab And Its Enemies In Eastern Africa,” African Affairs 114 corruption charges.” Daily Nation. August 26, 2016. http://www. (2015): 1–27. nation.co.ke/news/Suspended-Youth-Fund-bosses-charged-with- 73. Justin Willis and George Gona, “Pwani C Kenya? Memory, corruption/1056-3358980-e8i7tq/. Documents and Secessionist Politics in Coastal Kenya,” African Affairs 60. Alex O. Awiti and Bruce Scott, “The Kenya Youth Survey Report, 112 (2013): 48–71. Executive Summary,” The Aga Khan University, January 18, 2016, 74. Justin Willis and NgalaChome, “Marginalization and political https://www.aku.edu/eai/Documents/kenya-youth-survey-report- participation on the Kenya coast: the 2013 elections,” Journal of executive-summary-2016.pdf. Eastern African Studies 8 (2014): 115–134. 61. The Wagalla massacre was investigated by the Truth, Justice, and 75. Annual Crime Report 2014, Kenya Police Service, 2015. Reconciliation Commission set up in 2008 and called the worst 76. Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged violation of human rights in Kenyan history. See David M. Anderson, Sword ,” Brown Journal of World Affairs. 20 (Spring/Summer 2014). “Remembering Wagalla: state violence in northern Kenya, 1962– 77 Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile, “Radicalisation and al-Shabaab 1991,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 8 (2014): 658–676. recruitment in Somalia,” Institute for Security Studies, Paper 266, 62. Donovan C. Chau, “The fourth point: An examination of the September 2014. influence of Kenyan Somalis in Somalia,”Journal of Contemporary 78. Mwakimako and Willis, “Islam, Politics, and Violence on the Kenya African Studies 28 (July 2010): 297–312. Coast.” 63. For more, see Elizabeth Stoddard, “Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith,” 79. Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs and the World Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya.” Faiths Development Dialogue, November 2015, http://berkleycenter. 80. David McKenzie and Brent Swails, “Sanctuary without End: the georgetown.edu/publications/refugees-in-kenya-roles-of-faith. Refugees the World Forgot,” CNN, October 2015, accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2015/10/world/ dadaab-refugees/.

30 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE 81. “Kenya: Registered Refugees and Asylum-Seekers as of 01 October 92. “Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home,” International Crisis Group, 2015,” UNHCR Kenya, October 10, 2015. Africa Briefing N°102, September 25, 2014. 82. Adrian Kitimbo, “Is Closing Dadaab the Solution to Kenya’s 93. Joseph Akwiri, “Moderate Muslim preacher shot dead in Security Problems?” Global Risk Insights, June 29, 2016, http:// Kenya ,” Reuters, June 10, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/ globalriskinsights.com/2016/06/closing-dadaab-solution-kenyas- uk-kenya-shooting-idUSKBN0EL0ZQ20140610. security-problems/. 94. For example: Philip Mwakio, “Four mosques closed indefinitely,”The 83. Stoddard, “Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith,” 13. Standard, November 20, 2014, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ 84. “Kenya: Registered Refugees and Asylum-Seekers as of 01 October article/2000141942/four-mosques-closed-indefinitely. 2015.” 95. Abdisaid M. Ali. “Islamist Extremism in East Africa.” Africa Security 85. Michael Ranneberger, “Somalia: Potential Security Risks at Brief. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. No. 32, August 2016. Dadaab,” WikiLeaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, August 96. Annual Crime Report 2014. 25, 2009, accessed July 18, 2016, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/ 97. Douglas Lucas Kivoi, Casty Gatakaa Mbae, “The Achilles’ Heel of cables/09NAIROBI1799_a.html; Andrea Bianchessi, “Education Police Reforms in Kenya,” Social Sciences 2 (2013): 189–194. Against Terrorism: Experience from Kenya,” AVSI, April 2016, 98. Andreas Jacobs, “Nairobi Burning: Kenya´s post-election violence accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.avsi.org/2016/04/01/education- from the perspective of the urban poor,” Peace Research Institute against-terrorism-avsi-experience-kenya/. Frankfurt, Report No. 110, 2011. 86. Stoddard, “Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith,” 23 and Ranneberger, 99. Alexandre Marc and Alys Willman, “Violence in the City: “Somalia: Potential Security Risks at Dadaab.” Understanding and Supporting Community Responses to Urban 87. Stoddard, “Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith,” 13. Violence,” World Bank, September 2010. 88. Kitimbo, “Is Closing Dadaab the Solution to Kenya’s Security 100. “Ipsos’ First Quarter Social, Political, Economic and Cultural Survey: Problems?” Sixth Media Release.” May 13, 2015. Nairobi. 89. Krista Mahr, “Kenya Has Hosted Hundreds of Thousands of Refugees 101. See Owen Greene and Nic Marsh, Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: in the Past Two Decades. Now, it Wants Them Out,”Newsweek, July Global Governance and the Threat of Armed Violence (London: 18, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.newsweek.com/2016/ Routledge, 2012). 07/22/dadaab-closure-host-somalia-refugees-now-kenya-wants-them- 102. Mike Pflanz, “Kenyans five times more likely to be shot dead by police out-481379.html. than by criminals,” The Telegraph, July 3, 2014. 90. See “Kenya: Stop Recruitment of Somalis in Refugee Camps,” 103. Annie Mageka, “Police Reform in Kenya: Challenges and Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/ Opportunities,” Security Sector Reofrm Resource Centre, October 9, news/2009/10/22/kenya-stop-recruitment-somalis-refugee-camps. 2015, http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2015/10/09/police- 91. Anneli Botha, “Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab reform-in-kenya-challenges-and-opportunities/. and the Mombasa Republican Council,” Institute for Security Studies, Paper 265, September 2014.

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 31 Building Peace and Social Cohesion in Multi-Religious Kenya

eligious individuals and institutions have worked to- railway to Uganda. South Asians came to East Africa through gether in different forms and in response to specific trade routes and the British later brought many as laborers to R needs in Kenya. Many faith-inspired actors, institu- build the railway, thus introducing Hinduism and Sikhism tions, and organizations engaged in development work have to Kenya. Alongside the economic and political interests adapted their approaches and programs to address increasing of these parties, Christian missionaries established mission fragility or following violent incidents. For example, those stations in most areas of Kenya, at times taking up residence providing humanitarian relief following ethnic clashes saw in rural areas before district officers arrived. The history the need for healing and reintegration. Appendix II provides and challenges faced by evangelists and local communities examples of FIOs engaged in peacebuilding, mapping their is beyond the scope of this report, but sets the stage for the leadership in the emerging peace field and illustrating the position of the present-day Christian-majority Kenya, with diversity of approaches, partnerships, and level of interven- its diversity and indigenous movements. tion. Many of these peace approaches are purposefully tied to development needs, seeking to address underlying grievances Faith leaders mobilize for constitutional reform while building social cohesion. The scope of involvement, One of the first—and most notable—inter-religious actions in though not mapped fully, also highlights the multiple entry Kenya began in the wake of Moi’s announcement in June 1999 points for faith actors as they work to address various drivers of a constitutional review process that was, however, to be un- of conflict. The following section introduces key historical dertaken solely by Parliament. Following protests from civil movements and inter-religious organizations active at various society and political groups, religious leaders established their levels, including international FIOs. New initiatives have also own review process called the Ufungamano Initiative developed as faith actors have seen the value of improved in- (named after a building jointly owned by National Council ter-religious understanding (as well as the challenges around of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) and the Kenya Episcopal religion-based tensions) and therefore seek to use interreli- Conference—now known as the Kenyan Council of Cath- gious approaches to foster social cohesion. olic Bishops (KCCB)—where the group met). Ufungamano Religion, to varying degrees, has long been entwined ultimately came to encompass 54 different human rights or- with politics and power in Kenya, and it is thus important ganizations, religious groups, women’s rights organizations, to understand how historical interactions between different youth groups, and opposition parties that represented various religious traditions shape the current context. Negotiations conflicting interests.1 The movement sought to create a wider and conflicts between religious communities for territory, base of consultation with civil society and stressed the princi- followers, social influence, and political or economic power ples of openness, transparency, inclusivity, accessibility, and have lasting legacies. The religious landscape of Kenya is dy- accountability as key principles of the constitutional review namic and ever changing, with emerging religious leaders and process.2 In June 2000 the Ufungamano Initiative announced groups challenging mainstream leaders and institutions, at the formation of the People’s Commission, which would draw times with political implications. Historically, Arab traders up its own proposals for a constitution. This pressured the gov- brought Islam to the coast and later the work of European ernment to pass the Constitution of Kenya Amendment Bill in missionaries brought widespread conversions to Christian- July. By June 2001, ten members of the People’s Commission ity. Christian missionaries also established basic (if far from had been added to the official Constitution of Kenya Review universal) social services, especially along the path of the Commission (CKRC).

32 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Charles Apondu, Finn Church Aid/REGAL-IR Mzee Roba from Garba Tulla district peace committee makes his remarks during the peace and reconciliation dialogue meeting in Eldere in June 2016.

In addition to challenges from politicians seeking to retain The draft constitution included and raised the standards power, divisions over several issues with specific religious as- of the Kadhi courts, but their inclusion at all became a point pects challenged (and divided) those involved in drafting the of contention leading up to and during the National Con- new constitution. The Commission held public hearings from stitutional Conferences (NCC) held at Bomas beginning in December 2001 through August 2002 in every constituency, April 2003. A coalition of evangelical/Pentecostal churches receiving 35,015 submissions from individuals and groups.3 reacted by registering as ‘Kenya Church’ and mobilizing to CKRC received several submissions, primarily from Muslim block these courts as well as other clauses in the draft relating communities, requesting the expansion and reform of the juris- to abortion and homosexuality.5 Kenya Church argued that diction and structures of the Kadhi courts. These courts, which Kadhi courts were the first step to transforming Kenya into reviewed cases of family law for Muslims, were first formally an Islamic State.6 This opposition, supported by NCCK and recognized when the coast became a protectorate. The 1967 Catholics, resulted in members of SUPKEM resigning from Kadhi Courts Act extended the courts to all provinces, mak- Ufungamano’s steering committee and withdrawing from the ing eight courts presided over by the Chief Kadhi.4 Muslim initiative in April 2003. communities now asked the review commission to ensure that On September 23, 2003 a motion was brought before the there were enough courts and also to extend their remit to civil NCC to delete sections concerning the Kadhi courts. Op- and commercial matters. During this process, it became clear ponents insisted on Kenya’s secular nature—the draft clearly that there was ignorance and lack of information on the part stated that there is no state religion—and saw public funding of Christians regarding the Kadhi courts. Some Christians for the Kadhi courts and their entrenchment in the consti- were surprised to learn that the existing constitution included tution as preferential treatment of Islam by the state. Some paragraphs on the Kadhi courts, and many did not understand religious leaders decried the unbalanced representation, citing the limits or scope of its jurisdiction. 60 references to Islam, one of Hinduism, and no references

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 33 to Christians, Buddhists, Jews, or Sikhs. The constitutional Members of Inter-Religious Council of Kenya draft eventually approved by the NCC, known as the Bomas Draft, failed to pass the referendum, though not only for this Evangelical Alliance of Kenya (EAK) reason. It was followed by the Wako Draft (named for the Kenya Council of Catholic Bishops (KCCB) attorney general who drafted it). This version retained the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) Kadhi courts but attempted to address the concerns of other Seventh Day Adventist Church (SDA) religious traditions by adding Christian courts, Hindu courts, Organization of Africa Instituted Churches and room for other religious courts. This was seen as a largely (OAIC-Kenya) empty gesture. The Wako Draft was rejected in a referendum Supreme Council for Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) on November 22, 2005. The issue of the Kadhi courts was National Muslim Leaders (NAMLEF) renewed in May 2010 when the Kenya High Court announced Shia Inthna-Asheri Muslim Association (SHIA) its decision on a suit, filed by 24 clergy in 2004, declaring the Hindu Council of Kenya (HCK) courts unconstitutional.7 The Attorney General responded by arguing that the case was inadmissible as the court lacked jurisdiction. The timing of the decision, just two weeks after Intra-religious, as compared to inter-religious, cooperation the 2010 draft had been publicly released for popular review, has a much longer history in Kenya. Christians, Muslims, and is significant but did not prevent approval of the constitution Hindus collaborated within their respective religious traditions with 67 percent of the vote on August 4, 2010. The Kadhi long before working together. Formal collaboration among courts continue to operate in Kenya today. Christians first began as early as 1907 when Protestant missions The Ufungamano Initiative illustrated the potential of committed to ecumenism, despite denominational differences, religious leaders to create a movement for social change, but and formed a federation of missions that would eventually various factors led to its decline by 2005: among them were become the National Council of Churches in Kenya ethnic tensions, leadership failures, disagreement over content (NCCK).9 Today Protestant Christians have multiple organi- of drafts, mistrust among the different actors, and dearth of zations working at different levels in Kenya, many of which are financial resources.8 The process itself pinpointed areas of sen- members of the World Council of Churches. TheAll Africa sitivity and exposed latent suspicions among religious leaders Conference of Churches (AACC) is a fellowship of over and traditions. Division among Christians turned largely on 120 million Christian churches across Africa with its head- the willingness of some to work with Muslims on issues of quarters located in Nairobi. AACC is the largest association of national concern whereas other Christians view inter-faith col- Protestant, Anglican, Orthodox, and indigenous churches in laboration as a betrayal of their task of Christian evangelism. Africa. Its programs include a focus on peace and development, including high-level ecumenical diplomacy. TheFellowship of Inter-religious organizations active in Kenya Christian Council and Churches in the Great Lakes Cooperation or coordination of religious leaders, institutions, and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA) is a regional ecumenical and communities across denominational and tradition lines organization, with headquarters in Nairobi, formed in March has changed and developed over time. Early efforts were largely 1999 and consisting of 11 member churches in the region. The intra-religious. Formal inter-religious collaboration largely platform creates a space for church leaders to share perspectives emerged after 2000 in response to pressing social issues re- on common concerns, especially regarding peacebuilding and lated to good governance, the HIV/AIDS crisis, or security conflict transformation. NCCK and FECCLAHA are members concerns. A growing focus on Christian Muslim relations (and of ACT Alliance, a Geneva-based coalition of 140 churches and tensions between the communities) has also spurred interre- FIOs working around the world. ACT Alliance works with or ligious initiatives. The following section reviews this history supports 25 churches and FIOs in Kenya.10 and highlights key actors who have shaped and continue to The first national level inter-religious organization contribute to the current inter-religious landscape in Kenya. took form in anticipation of the fourth world conference

34 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE on religion and peace that was held in Nairobi in August The head of the Anglican Church of Kenya Arch- 1984. The World Conference on Religions for Peace Kenya bishop Eliud Wabukala on his part said the attacks (WCRP-Kenya) was formed in 1983 and from that point should not be used to pit Christian against Muslims. until 2001 it engaged through ad hoc dialogue, action, and “Kenya isn’t facing a religious conflict and this is what conference participation. In response to the AIDS crisis we are demonstrating today, and we will continue to and the growing number of orphans, WCRP-Kenya for- work together as faith groups to strengthen our insti- malized a Secretariat in 2002 to engage programmatically. tutions so that they can work together in harmony to During strategic planning for 2003–04, the organization overcome these challenges,” Wabukala said. saw a need to act more deliberately on peace and conflict IRCK has responded to rising tensions around the forthcom- transformation.11 WCRP-Kenya became an independent ing 2017 general election. Faith leaders responded after weekly inter-religious network in 2004 with a new name, the protests calling for personnel changes in Kenya’s Independent Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK). This na- Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), began in tional level interfaith mechanism is based on institutional April 2016. KCCB, NCCK, and elders from 13 major tribes representation of all of Kenya’s major religious institutions called for urgent strengthening of the IEBC and other key (see box) working together to deepen interfaith dialogue government agencies and offered to organize county forums and collaboration among members. It has links with the and a national dialogue conference to take stock before the African Council of Religious Leaders and is affili- 2017 general election.14 IRCK met with the IEBC on May 26, ated with Religions for Peace (formerly WCRP), the 201615 and has worked at the center of negotiations with the international interreligious body. Jubilee and CORD coalitions on this issue.16 IRCK joined the Through its Peace and National Cohesion Program IRCK Uwiano Platform for Peace, first organized in May 2010, as it promotes peace, reconciliation, and cohesion through dia- relaunched in anticipation of the 2017 elections.17 The Plat- logue and shared values. Appreciating the various drivers form is a joint initiative of the IEBC, NCIC, and PeaceNet of violence in Kenya, IRCK has engaged at the local level Kenya designed to enhance coordination for conflict preven- in about 23 counties.12 In Marsabit and Isiolo, for example, tion through strengthening early warning and early response IRCK worked locally to identify drivers of conflict and then mechanisms prior to national elections among a wide range of create mechanisms to address those problems. IRCK’s steering partners both at the County and National level.18 committee engages on national issues via consultations with Other Kenya-grown organizations or initiatives that em- each member’s constituent communities, bringing this input phasize an interfaith approach have emerged in response to in- to the table to determine national advocacy messaging. IRCK creasing violence and instability. NGOs in the coast of Kenya also responds to incidents of violence, showing solidarity came together as the Coast Peace Initiative and approached across religious communities, especially following violence religious leaders to identity causes of violence in the area that has targeted religious communities or property. As an following the Likoni clashes of 1997.19 Through this partic- example, IRCK responded in July 2012 after two churches ipation, religious leaders became more aware of the potential were attacked in Garissa:13 for inter-religious approaches and by 2001 agreed to work “We want to tell the cowards … and perpetrators of together as the Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics these beastly and fiendish acts: You will fail. Kenyans (CICC) Trust. After five years of developing trust with clerics will not fight a religious war, and Christians will not from all religious traditions represented in the coast, CICC leave Garissa or any other part of Kenya since we are all formalized as an organization.20 Chemchemi Ya Ukweli one. We shall continue to integrate and live as brothers (CYU) was formed in Kenya in 1997 when a group of Cath- and sisters in all parts of the country and we believe olic Kenyans, concerned about rising ethnic violence, sought the forces of evil shall be defeated,” said Adan Wachu nonviolence training from Filipino activists who were success- council chair and secretary general for SUPKEM. ful in that context. Since July 2000, CYU has engaged at the

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 35 Fred Bobo, Centre for Peace and Nationhood

Participants at a recent youth peace and conflict transformation training program at the Eastleigh Fellowship Centre.

community level, often facilitating inter-religious dialogue and Programme for Christian–Muslim Relations in Af- offering active non-violence training. rica (PROCMURA) is a Christian organization dedicated to The Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi, an area popu- fostering constructive Christian and Muslim relations, with lated largely by Somalis, has also produced local inter-faith headquarters in Nairobi. Its vision is a continent where Chris- initiatives. Mennonites formed the Eastleigh Fellowship tian and Muslim communities, in spite of their differences, Center in 1978 as a place for Christians and Muslims to come work together “for justice, peace, and reconciliation towards together for dialogue. Today the center hosts sports program- the holistic development of the human family and environ- ming for youth, with basketball teams consisting of Muslims ment”. PROCMURA works with church leaders, women, and and Christians, and offers peace training for youth. The youth to raise awareness and capacity for Christian–Muslim center is a popular community venue, especially for Somali relations. In Kenya, this includes working with NCCK and weddings.21 St. Paul’s University in Limuru established the KCCB, as well as Muslims. The Global Network of Religions Centre for Christian–Muslim Relations in Eastleigh for Children secretariat of Arigatou International (a (CCMRE) in 2010 as a platform for its students and academ- global, Tokyo-based, FIO) is in Nairobi. In 2008, it launched ics to learn about and evaluate inter-religious approaches. an interfaith and intercultural program called the Learning To This effort has produced, for example, the book “Mapping live Together Programme (LTLT). This global curriculum for Eastleigh for Christian–Muslim Relations” (Zapf Chancery ethics education22 promotes intercultural and interfaith un- Publishers Africa Ltd, 2013); the work involved 12 teams, derstanding.23 Artigatou International is partnering with the comprising one Christian and one Muslim each, spatially Ministry of Education to pilot LTLT in Tana River County, mapping inter-religious relations. an area particularly affected by interethnic violence that has Global and Pan-African interfaith organizations or disrupted the lives of many schoolchildren.24 The United movements are also active in Kenya. Founded in 1959, the Religions Initiative (URI), a global grassroots interfaith

36 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE network, has its Africa Region headquarters in Nairobi and measures to increase the capacity of staff and partners to work has helped foster numerous cooperation circles (CC) in in multi-religious settings. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is Nairobi, the Coast, and Western Kenya. Each CC chooses developing the capacity of staff and partners to engage in inter- its own action area of focus but must be composed of people religious community action in six African countries, including from at least three different religious traditions. Initiatives Kenya, through connector projects that build social cohesion. of Change (IofC), formerly Moral Re-Armament (MRA), FIOs engaged in protective services for orphans and vulnera- is a worldwide movement of people of diverse cultures that ble youth or refugees in Kenya, such as World Vision, Church seeks to foster healing and reconciliation by strengthening World Service, CRS, HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), moral and spiritual foundations. MRA played an active (al- and American Jewish World Services, engage with people from beit controversial) role in seeking to transform racial tensions any faith tradition. An official of World Vision Kenya cited during the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s, notably at the “do no harm” as motivation for devising programs to train staff Athi River rehabilitation camp.25 Decades later, IofC activists to identify and better respond to the religious dynamics within launched Clean Kenya Campaigns prior to elections in 1997 project settings, including incorporating religious factors into and 2002 to mobilize citizens, through Christian and Muslim conflict-sensitive project design.27 Inter-religious relations also leaders, to sign pledges to avoid bribery and not react to results provide strategic partnership opportunities for FIOs. Finn with violence.26 Drawing inspiration from the reconciliation Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional story of an imam and pastor in Nigeria, IofC invited the two Peacemakers engaged with local Muslim and Christian FIOs men to engage with local communities in Burnt Forest and in the coast to host dialogues for youth, exploring the pull and Eldoret after the 2007–08 election violence. The peace and push factors of radicalization.28 reconciliation work of the two Nigerians was the subject of a documentary film,An African Answer (2010). Christian–Muslim relations Competition between Christians and Muslims has played Fostering inter-religious relations roles in East Africa since Christianity arrived (Islam estab- Organizations that are not inter-religious in nature have rec- lished a strong presence first, in the twelfth century). Both ognized the value of engaging across religious traditions in world religions were ambitious as they propagated themselves Kenya. Many faith institutions see a need to foster religious (at the expense of traditional African religions), and eventu- literacy for a plural society. Several faith-based institutions ally came to compete against one another. Disputes took on for higher education include inter-religious relations as part of political and economic tones. Under British colonialism in the their curriculum or through student life activities. In 2004 St. twentieth century, Muslims lost their political power in the Paul’s University in Limuru established a department of Islam region and eventually their economic privileges. With support & Christian Muslim Relations. Tangaza University College’s from colonial authorities, Christian missionaries came to mo- Institute for Social Ministry offers degrees in peace and justice nopolize general education, which was infused with Western and fosters inter-religious relations within its student body, culture and Christian values. Muslims began to voice concern including a student peace club. The Hekima Institute of Peace that colonial authorities were discriminating against them and Studies and International Relations (HIPSIR), part of Hekima complained that Muslim values were being compromised. For College and founded in 2004, integrates inter-religious rela- example, in 1931 African Muslims from the interior sent a tions into its curriculum, programming, and student outreach. memorandum stating as much to the Joint Select Committee These programs have begun to equip students and produce on Closer Union. In February 1935, Indian Muslims began alumni, many of whom go on to work in peacebuilding and raising funds to initiate a Muslim Missionary Movement to national cohesion in Kenya and throughout Africa. counter Christian missionary activities.29 Various international FIOs operating in Kenya recognize The colonial legacy and the preferences it allowed Chris- the need to integrate inter-religious awareness and sensitivity tian missions are the foundation for many grievances named into their development and peace programming. An example is by Muslims today. Political and socio-economic issues such

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 37 as land ownership often fall along ethnic and religious lines; for many involved at the time with wide repercussions for how Muslims in the coast, for example, face obstacles when Christians, as the majority, view Muslims as Kenyan citizens. “up-country” business people are given preference. Mus- The conflict in Somalia and Al-Shabaab’s activity across lim-majority areas such as the Coast and North Eastern were borders further exacerbate Muslim-Christian tensions and also overlooked for economic development and have far too few stoke ethnic tension. In reaction to attacks and threats, Kenyan schools. Political leaders, since the time of President Moi, have security tactics have targeted Somali Muslims, both Kenyan touted their Christian identity in public,30 accentuating the citizens and non-citizens. Profiling and security checks for So- perception that political power supports Christian interests. mali Kenyans and Somali refugees have resulted in frustration Muslims face closer scrutiny in public spaces and in the media. and resentment. State threats regarding the Dadaab refugee They have also faced discriminatory policies, based on name, camp are another source of suspicion and anger from all sides. when applying for government posts, secondary school, iden- Suspicion has extended to all Muslims in Kenya, regardless tification cards, and passports. When Somalis were required to of ethnicity, due to increasing violent extremism, foreign and carry a second form of identification, some Muslims claimed homegrown, using religious rhetoric and targeting religious that immigration policies and practices were more favorable groups or leaders. Distrust between communities has resulted to Christians. in violent attacks on churches or mosques, though these have Despite many sources of tension over Kenya’s history, until been sporadic and localized. As an example, a Muslim cleric, quite recently the general perception was that interreligious Sheikh Ibrahim Omar, and three others suspected of support- relationships and especially Christian-Muslim relations in ing Al-Shabaab, were shot on the outskirts of Mombasa fol- Kenya were mostly harmonious. However, this situation has lowing the Westgate mall attack in 2013. In retaliation for the changed and tensions are now a central concern. Several events extrajudicial killing, rioters burned a Salvation Army church have brought latent Muslim-Christian suspicions to the fore. in Majengo district in October 2013.35 Growing insecurity Following the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in 1998, the gov- has caused most places of worship to require security checks ernment shut down five Muslim NGOs for suspected links at all entrances. with terrorist networks.31 The Muslim community reacted Attacks by Al-Shabaab explicitly dividing Christians from strongly against targeting only Muslim NGOs, making claims Muslims have further caused suspicion and protectionist rhet- that this fed into the narrative that Islam is a global threat. oric along sectarian lines. Following the Garissa University Muslim leaders and SUPKEM united in defending the NGOs attack in April 2015, church leaders issued a statement: “The for their valuable charity work and planned for a mass demon- systematic profiling, isolation and massacre of Christians in stration in October 1998. The Muslims leadership split, how- different parts of Kenya must stop. While urging our Chris- ever, with the chairman of CIPK, Shaikh Ali Shee, offering tians to be peace makers, we will not remain silent as they anti-government and anti-American resolutions in Mombasa continue to be massacred.”36 They also accused Muslim schol- before a crowd of 10,000. SUPKEM met with Moi to discuss ars and clerics of not doing enough to condemn the attack or Muslim grievances.32 The government used this tactic again counter radicalization. SUPKEM responded with a statement following the attacks on Garissa University in 2014 as the urging the government to address drivers of radicalization bank accounts of three Muslim NGOs were frozen.33 Muslims and assured the public that “Contrary to the impression that also united against the Anti-Terrorism Bill (2003). Muslim has been created, we as Muslim scholars have been tirelessly leaders, lawyers, and human rights activists opposed the bill working through various religious institutions and forums as draconian. Muslims feared that the police would arbitrarily to address radicalisation, the threat of terrorism and other arrest them based on attire. A leader from CIPK spoke out crimes”.37 Months later a group of Muslim bus riders showed against targeting and detaining over 30 Muslims on allega- solidarity by refusing attackers’ demands to separate from tions of terrorism.34 Around this same time, the issue of the Christian passengers during a bus attack in December 2015.38 Kadhi’s courts, discussed above, splintered the inter-religious Proselytism is a dividing force within and between reli- Ufungamano Initiative. Distrust linked to this debate lingers gious traditions. Kenya’s constitution provides for freedom

38 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE of religion and belief, including the freedom to manifest any 4. Chesworth “The Church and Islam: Vyama Vingi (Multipartyism) and religion through worship, practice, teaching, or observance.39 the Ufungamano Talks.” Christians have expressed fear of spreading Islam in Kenya, il- 5. See Gifford,Christianity, Politics, and Public Life in Kenya. 6. Anne Cussac, “Muslims and Politics in Kenya: The Issue of the Kadhis’ lustrated for example in the response to IPK and the inclusion Courts in the Constitution Review Process,” Journal of Muslim of the Kadhi courts in the constitution. Christians have also Minority Affairs 28 (2008): 289–302. targeted proselytism activities at Muslims. Focused evangelism 7. See Rachel Sweet Vanderpoel, “Religious Equality in Kenya? of Least Reached People Groups (LRPG) has become popular Adjudicating the Constitutionality of Kenya’s Kadhis’ Courts,” for African Inland Church and others churches in Kenya.40 Religion and Diversity Project, August 2012. The global movement is supported by Western mission agen- 8. Mati, “Social Movements and Socio-Political Change in Africa: The Ufungamano Initiative and Kenyan Constitutional Reform Struggles cies such as the Southern Baptist Convention and Wycliffe (1999–2005),” 65. Bible Translators. In Kenya, 25 groups have been labeled 9. More on NCCK in Appendix II. See also “A Century of Ecumenism LRPG, of which the vast majority are Muslim. Competition and Mission: The Story of the National Council of Churches of Kenya for followers is strongest from Pentecostal and Evangelical 1913–2013,” NCCK, 2013. church leaders, who seek converts as well as their financial 10. “Kenya,” actalliance, http://actalliance.org/where-we-work/kenya/. donations. South Korean missionaries first came to Kenya in 11. “A Discussion with Francis Kuria, Executive Director of Inter- Religious Council of Kenya,” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & 1981 and now more Korean missionaries come to Kenya than World Affairs, April 10, 2015, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ any other African country.41 Groups such as the Mormons, interviews/a-discussion-with-francis-kuria-executive-director-of-inter- Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Church of Scientology are also religious-council-of-kenya. active in evangelizing work in Kenya.42 Within Islam, Mus- 12. “A Discussion with Francis Kuria, Executive Director of Inter- lims can be found propagating their tradition and promoting Religious Council of Kenya.” a deeper piety. Muslims may seek to win Muslims (from other 13. “Kenya: Inter-Religious Council Slams Garissa Attacks,” The Star, July 4, 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201207050119.html. sects) or counter radical ideology. In the 1980s, funding from 14. “Kenya: IEBC, Supreme Court Need Urgent Reforms for Peaceful Saudi Arabia and Iran established visible networks of Islam- Elections, Say Leaders,” Daily Nation, May 4, 2016, http://allafrica. ization in Kenya.43 This activity has brought closer scrutiny of com/stories/201605050407.html. foreign funds provided to build new schools, mosques, and 15. ECEP Press Statement 27th May 2016,” NCCK, May 27, madrasas for possible ties with supposed Wahhabi groups or 2016, http://www.ncck.org/newsite2/index.php/information/ militant Islamic organizations. Islamic education may also news/516-ecep-press-statement-27th-may-2016. 16. “BREAKING: Statement by Jubilee on CORD’s Proposal for SEVEN emphasize da’wa, or proselytism. Propagation of exclusionary MAN team to Resolve IEBC CRISIS,” Kenya Today, June 9, 2016, interpretation of Islam, including definitive ideas about what http://www.kenya-today.com/news/breaking-statement-jubilee-cords- is and what is not Islamic and who is and who is not a Muslim, proposal-seven-man-team-resolve-iebc-crisis. is a growing concern for Kenyan Muslims leaders, as well as 17. “UNDP Convenes Discussions on Peaceful Elections,” UNDP, July 5, security forces.44 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/undp-convenes-discussions- peaceful-elections. Notes 18. For more, see “Uwiano Platform: A multi-stakeholder strategy for peaceful elections,” UNDP, http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/ 1. Jacob Mwathi Mati, “Social Movements and Socio-Political Change en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/uwiano-peace-platform- in Africa: The Ufungamano Initiative and Kenyan Constitutional project.html. Reform Struggles (1999–2005),” VOLUNTAS: International Journal 19. Violence erupted on August 13, 1997 when a group of raiders attacked of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 23 (2012): 65. a police station and police post at the ferry in Likoni. The raiders killed 2. Mati, “Social Movements and Socio-Political Change in Africa: The six officers, stole guns, and proceeded to target non-locals, killing 104 Ufungamano Initiative and Kenyan Constitutional Reform Struggles people, injuring at least 133 and displacing some 100,000 persons. (1999–2005),” 78. See more at “V. Case Study: Armed Political Violence on the Coast,” 3. See John Chesworth, “The Church and Islam: Vyama Vingi Human Rights Watch, 2002, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/ (Multipartyism) and the Ufungamano Talks,” in Religion and Politics kenya/Kenya0502-06.htm. in Kenya: Essays in Honor of a Meddlesome Priest, ed. Ben Knighton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 39 20. “A Discussion with Stephen Anyenda, Chief Executive Officer of 34. Ndzovu, “Muslims and Party Politics and Electoral Campaigns in Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics,” Berkley Center for Religion, Kenya.” Peace & World Affairs, November 13, 2014, https://berkleycenter. 35. Anugrah Kumar, “Muslim Mob Burns Salvation Army Church After georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-stephen-anyenda-chief- Islamic Cleric Killed in Kenya,” Christian Post, October 5, 2013, executive-officer-of-coast-interfaith-council-of-clerics. http://www.christianpost.com/news/muslim-mob-burns-salvation- 21. “A Discussion with Fred Bobo, Eastleigh Fellowship Centre, Kenya,” army-church-after-islamic-cleric-killed-in-kenya-106012/. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, November 17, 36. Tom Mboya, “Kenya’s Top Church Leaders Declare After al-Shabaab’s 2014, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion- Garissa Attack: ‘Systematic Profiling, Isolation and Massacre of with-fred-bobo-eastleigh-fellowship-centre-kenya. Christians Must Stop’,” Christian Post, April 13, 2015, http://www. 22. “Learning to Live Together,” Arigatou International, accessed June christianpost.com/news/kenyas-top-church-leaders-declare-after- 13, 2016, https://ethicseducationforchildren.org/en/what-we-do/ al-shabaabs-garissa-attack-systematic-profiling-isolation-and-massacre- learning-to-live-together. of-christians-must-stop-137389/. 23. “Teachers from Tana River County attended Learning to Live 37. For example, see Wachira Kigotho, “Churches accuse Muslim scholars Together training workshop,” UNESCO, June 10, 2014, accessed June of ‘inaction’ over attack,” University World, April 24, 2015, http:// 13, 2016, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/ www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story= news/teachers_from_tana_river_county_attended_learning_to_live_ 20150423163242805. together_training_workshop/#.VT3tE9Kqqko. 38. “Kenya Muslims shield Christians in Mandera bus attack,” BBC, 24. “Teachers from Tana River County attended Learning to Live December 21, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa- Together training workshop.” 35151967. 25. “Support during Kenya’s independence struggle,” Initiatives of Change, 39. See more about religious freedom in the “2014 International Religious http://www.iofc.org/history/Kenya. Freedom in Kenya Report,” U.S. Department of State, http://www. 26. “Background,” Initiatives of Change, http://www.iofcafrica.org/en/ state.gov/documents/organization/238438.pdf. background. 40. Paul Gifford,Christianity, Politics, and Public Life in Kenya (New 27. Interview with the national coordinator for peace and conflict-sensitive York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 168. programming at World Vision Kenya, November 14. 2014. 41. Ariel Zirulnick, “Why are Korean missionaries flocking to Kenya?” 28. “Youth dialogue in Kenya on preventing violent extremism,” Finn Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 2014. http://www. Church Aid, August 25, 2015, https://www.kirkonulkomaanapu.fi/ csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2014/1116/Why-are-Korean- en/latest-news/articles/youth-dialogue-in-kenya-on-preventing- missionaries-flocking-to-Kenya. violent-extremism/. 42. See more in Hannah W. Kinoti, “Religious Fragmentation in Kenya,” 29. Ahmed Salim, The Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya’s Coast 1895– in Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa, ed. 1965 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), 165–166. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2009). 30. See Gregory Deacon, “Driving the Devil Out: Kenya’s Born-Again 43. Kai Kresse, “Muslim Politics in Postcolonial Kenya: Negotiating Election,” Journal of Religion in Africa. 45 (2015): 200–220. Knowledge on the Double-Periphery,” The Journal of the Royal 31. See Judith Achieng, “Ruling on Muslim Charities Averts a Major Anthropological Institute 15 (2009): S76-S94. Strike,” IPS, September 18, 1998, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/ 44. See William R. Patterson, “Islamic Radicalization in Kenya,” Joint archives/36/266.html. Force Quarterly 78, July 1, 2015. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/ 32. Oded, Islam & Politics in Kenya, 84–85. News/News-Article-View/Article/607564/jfq-78-islamic- 33. “NGOs lose licenses over terrorism claim,” Daily Nation, May 27, radicalization-in-kenya/. 2015, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/NGOs-lose-licences-over- terrorism-claim/-/1056/2731888/-/3g9v0nz/-/index.html.

40 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Looking Ahead: Peace and Justice in Multi-Religious Kenya

enya was long viewed as one of the most stable at the national level, including advocacy and high-level meet- countries in East Africa. Internal conflicts and the ings with government officials, and at the grassroots level in K spillover affects of regional instability, however, have myriad localized peace programs. Within this dynamic space, changed the situation. One result is a wide range of programs there is little coordination and rising concern from some that and institutions—public, private, and civil society—that unqualified peace practitioners are emerging seeking financial focus explicitly on working to build peace. The peace sector gain but with little experience or training. This has inspired expanded rapidly in the wake of the 2007–08 election violence educational and training opportunities, yet the most skilled and peace practitioners continues to adapt to drivers of con- practitioners are often lured away with higher salaries to large flict and funding opportunities. There is increasing awareness international NGOs, sometimes FIOs. that weaknesses in development outcomes, notably weak gov- As evaluation strategies develop within the peace field, ernance and large inequalities, also contribute to instability. little is known about the most effective approaches or possi- Religious actors are a vital part of the peace sector in Kenya ble unique advantages of faith actors. It is clear, however, that with deep roots and experience merging relief, development, religious actors have a wide reach and long history in Kenya, and peacebuilding. They were among the first responders often in providing services in remote areas. Religious actors during the ethnic clashes 1990s, adapting from immediate also exist within a society that functions largely along ethnic needs to long-term solutions. As other drivers of conflict have lines and using client/patron systems. They are part and parcel emerged, religious actors of various types continue to be in- of these social systems. The credibility of religious leaders was volved, including collaborating across religious traditions and tarnished surrounding the 2007–08 elections and violence, addressing inter-religious tension. when they were seen as partisan and even exacerbating ethnic Focusing attention at the country-level, this study was divides. It is not yet clear they have regained credibility in the designed to identify and better understand the roles religion eyes of the public and thus capacity to engage effectively to plays in building peace and stability, with particular attention heal unresolved underlying grievances, especially in advance to inter-religious relations and collaboration. Kenya provides a of the 2017 general elections. unique case given its dynamic peace and development sectors, This study underscores the many challenges that persist, complex religious landscape, and the longstanding engage- not only for peace objectives writ large, but also within and ment of religious actors in peace work. Its development history among religious communities. The following points highlight and priorities points to the importance of understanding the themes and challenges that emerged and that point to areas for roles development actions can play in exacerbating tension and future engagement. fostering stability. Analysis of existing literature, interviews with peace practitioners, and a workshop held in Nairobi have From the angle of development and peace helped to paint a picture of how the peace sector has developed and religious roles within it. Ethnicity is still the primary identity of most Kenya’s religious leaders, institutions, and organizations are Kenyans, and religious communities are often active within the peace field and many exhibit a sophisticated delineated along ethnic lines. Several religious com- and nuanced understanding of the roles that development munities in Kenya largely comprise one ethnic group, while work plays in fostering stability and sustainable peace (or, in others span multiple ethnic groups. Within this context, some instances, exacerbating conflict). Activities can be found it is wise to understand where and when religion is able to

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 41 The Alliance of Religions and Conservation

In March 2012 more than 50 teachers and faith leaders from Christian and Muslim communities across sub-Saharan Africa came together in Nairobi for a workshop exploring how to integrate religious values into education on sustainable development.

span multiple ethnic groups and where it reinforces ethnic important when extremist tactics include targeting religious boundaries. sites or leaders thus straining Christian-Muslim relations. Much work is needed to build (or rebuild) understanding and Several drivers of conflict can be mitigated trust between these groups. through development approaches that address grievances of marginalization that all too often Peace work and conflict prevention is very much fall along ethno-religious lines. Many religious ac- focused on youth, as they are often the primary tors are keenly aware of historical grievances and the most perpetrators of violence. Increasing concern about rad- pressing development needs, however in-group biases may icalization of youth has added new urgency and continues to exist. There is an increasing awareness and desire for religious test the ability of religious institutions to counter extremist actors to be a part of strategies that foster justice, restoration, narratives and address pressing needs with necessary stake- dignity, and healing. holders. Various religious actors are engaging youth in programs designed to prevent violence and improve Conflict-sensitive development includes under- livelihood opportunities. Innovative approaches by Muslims standing the religious landscape. This is increasingly actors are experimental and demand special care and tact.

42 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE From the angle of religious actors Women have been key players in strengthening Kenya, however few religious institutions explic- Healing and reconciliation, notably to deal with itly foster women’s peace participation beyond unresolved historical pain and trauma, is a vital the grassroots level. Notable exceptions can be found, part of peacebuilding, perhaps particularly so but lack of will and allocation of resources continues to exclude in Kenya given the long and complex roots of this segment of society and perpetuate inequality. today’s conflicts. Faith communities can play distinctive and important roles. Drawing from religious teachings, reli- Action is needed beyond talk. Dialogue programs are gious leaders can rebuild relationships, heal communities, and popular but too often lack clear objectives that lead to sustain- help transform a fragmented society. Religious leaders have able peace. Connector projects or exchange trips seem to pro- embarked on efforts to reshape how Kenyans tell and teach vide a more lasting impact, though evaluation is needed. Issues history, drawing on values and ethics to change mindsets and of evangelism, tribalism, and risk of losing perceived neutrality foster a robust sense of patriotism. Faith actors can facilitate based on participation should be carefully approach but clearly dialogue with central and county government to acknowledge addressed. Intra-faith dialogue to address divisions and chal- past injustices and work toward transparency. lenges is cited by many as a priority, but it is not common; intra-Muslim work by the BRAVE initiative1 shows promise. Countering violent extremism is not only an issue for Muslims to address. Some Christians view Much work is needed for religious leaders—and themselves as primarily victims and pass responsibility to some religious organizations—to regain trust and Muslim leaders when Muslims are targeted. Religious ide- credibility. Scandals, corruption, or collusion with political ology and recruiting rhetoric is seen as an internal debate interests have damaged the reputation of many religious actors within Muslim faith communities. Indeed, Muslims can in Kenya. Beyond managing perceptions of such incidents, lead many efforts but deserve support and collaboration in religious actors can learn from others’ mistakes; articulate many ways. It is possible Christians do not feel comfortable clear strategies for unity, peace, and justice; and slowly rebuild or confident in how to engage with Muslim leaders on the community trust. issue. This calls for creative and determined approaches to interreligious dialogue. Notes 1. See a description of this FIO and its work in Appendix II.

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 43 Appendix I. FIOs Working in Underdeveloped and Muslim-Majority Regions

Table 2: Examples of FIO activities in the Coast and North Eastern regions

Key areas of concern FIO engagement

Poverty In 2013 roughly eight out of every ten people Aga Khan Development Network’s (AKDN) in Turkana, Mandera and Wajir Counties were Coastal Rural Support Program aims to diversify poor. The poverty gap is highest in Tana River livelihood options and to scale up subsistence (46 percent), Kwale (42 percent), Mandera farming and build resilience to erratic rain (32 percent), Wajir (32 percent) and Kilifi (31 patterns. Islamic Relief Kenya is running a percent) Counties.1 Sharia compliant micro credit project that targets vulnerable women, households with orphaned children’s guardians, and widows in Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa.

WASH Drought is a concern in these provinces. Low Islamic Relief Kenya implements WASH rainfall was reported for both in 2011 and programs in North Eastern, constructing wells 2012, straining agriculturalists. and establishing community water resource committees. Caritas Italiana responded to the 2011 food crisis by targeting those affected by droughts. CRS led a Seed System Security Assessment in drought prone areas of the Coast in 2011.

Education The highest rates for proportion of the AKDN works in both the Coast and population with no education can be found North Eastern through the Education for in Turkana (82 percent), Wajir (76 percent), Marginalized Children in Kenya program Garissa (74 percent), Mandera (70 percent), (2007–2014) that aims to improve access and Marsabit (68 percent).2 and retention rates for primary schools. The Catholic Church is very active in the education sector in this region. For example, 80 percent of the public primary schools in Marsabit district were started by the Church.3

44 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Key areas of concern FIO engagement

Nutrition A June 2015 survey of children under five in Islamic Relief, World Vision, IRC, and Save the 23 drought-prone counties found a global acute Children implemented the Enhancing Nutrition malnutrition (GAM) rate of 24.7 percent in Surveillance, Response, and Resilience program Mandera, with a high severe acute malnutrition in Mandera and Wajir to reduce under-5 of 3.7 percent. The percentage of children at mortality (2012–2015). risk of malnutrition in Isiolo was at 19.1 percent and in Wajir at 17.2 percent.4

Maternal Maternal mortality is high; North Eastern UNFPA and the Ministry of Health engaged mortality has the lowest percentage of women with with faith leaders, specifically partnering with antenatal care (66.5) or delivery by a skilled IRCK to work with religious leaders in the provider (32.4) or delivery in a health facility 15 counties with the high rates of maternal (29.2 percent).5 mortality. In 2015 religious leaders signed a call to action and committed to increase resources.6

HIV/AIDS HIV prevention knowledge is low; the 2014 Since policy consultations held in 2003/04, DHS indicates that women in Garissa, Wajir, SUPKEM and KMYA have worked to raise and Mandera counties are less knowledgeable awareness of HIV and AIDS through outreach of methods compared with women from other and education among Muslims. The Council counties; men’s knowledge in Garissa and of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Mandera is also lower than in other counties. based in Mombasa, has also worked to raise awareness. Pathfinder International prioritized relations with religious leaders in its health systems improvement project, including supporting a workshop with Muslims scholars on Islam and health.7

Notes 1. “Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together,” 5. “Demographic and Health Survey,” Republic of Kenya, 2014, https:// Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and Society for dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR308/FR308.pdf. International Development (SID), 2013. 6. “Religious leaders pledge to fight maternal mortality in Kenya,” 2. “Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together,” 26. UNFPA, April 2, 2015, http://www.unfpa.org/news/religious-leaders- 3. See “Educational Marginalization in Northern Kenya,” UNESCO, pledge-fight-maternal-mortality-kenya. 2009, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001866/186617e.pdf. 7. “Increasing Access to Quality Health Services in Kenya’s North Eastern 4. “The 2015 Long Rains Season Assessment Report,” Government of Province,” Pathfinder International, July 2012, http://www.pathfinder. Kenya’s Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG). August 2015. https:// org/publications-tools/pdfs/Increasing-Access-to-Quality-Health- www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/2015%20LRA%20National%20 Services-in-Kenyas-North-Eastern-Province.pdf. Report_Final.pdf.

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 45 Appendix II. Religion at the Development and Peace Nexus in Kenya

ocial conflicts in Kenya are, by many measures, on the southern and eastern parts of Rift Valley. The Catholic di- rise, and they have exploded into violent incidents ocese had established the Catholic Justice and Peace S affecting hundreds of thousands of people. Thus the Commission (CJPC) in April 1991 with a goal of justice topic is a central policy issue for Kenya. In response, a wide education. Partnering with NCCK, CJPC and other de- range of faith-inspired actors, institutions, and organiza- partments of the Catholic Church, such as the Order of the tions have responded, whether to immediate events or in a Franciscan Brothers, provided emergency relief 2 and later restricted area or more broadly to what they understand to resettlement. be key drivers of conflict. Faith actors have often been among Today, the church is still called to be a protector of the first to respond to communities affected by conflict. FIOs the displaced, a minister to the victims of violence, a and faith institutions engaged in development work have provider of relief to those threatened with harm. On also adapted and acquired peacebuilding skills when faced multiple occasions since 1992, the churches in our Di- with local conflict. The following section highlights roles ocese have had to provide safe haven and aid to people of faith-inspired actors and organizations active in Kenya’s fleeing the periodic outbreaks of violence. At one point peacebuilding, which are often combined with development in 2008, even a group of suspected Mungiki militiamen activities. The examples described in this appendix illustrate in retreat ran to the Cathedral to seek sanctuary. We let key actors or engagements at various levels. They do not pur- them in, met with them and called the police to escort port to describe adequately the scale or scope of work across them away. —Bishop Cornelius Korir, Catholic Diocese the country or all of the programmatic areas of operation for of Eldoret3 a given organization. From January 1994 the NCCK program, with financial sup- From humanitarian relief port from Dutch Interchurch Aid, adapted as IDPs sought to post-conflict reconstruction to return home; efforts then were focused on reintegration Faith-inspired organizations engaged in development or and healing. Given persistent ethnic tensions, NCCK part- humanitarian assistance were well positioned to respond nered with Nairobi Peace Initiative–Africa (NPI–Africa) swiftly when ethnic violence broke out in the Rift Valley and to host Good Neighborliness Seminars with the guiding Western province following the first multi-party elections philosophy that reconciliation would be achieved through in 1992. Hundreds of displaced people sought refuge, often constructive dialogue, mutual cooperation, and respect in churches. Notable responders included Christ the King for the rights of individuals and communities. This peace Cathedral (Catholic) in Nakuru and Lamdiac Catholic committee approach—strategically targeting community church in Njoro. TheNational Council of Churches leaders, women, and youth—reached 166 village commit- in Kenya (NCCK), a national ecumenical body of Protes- tees and 24 area committees in nine districts and included tant organizations, was among the first organizations to act. monitoring of violent incidents and joint social activities and NCCK provided humanitarian assistance in the immediate income generating projects.4 NCCK also worked with the aftermath, later reported at the scale of approximately 40,000 government administration, from local chiefs and sub-chiefs, internally displaced people (IDPs) in 136 camps.1 NCCK chairmen of county councils, and district officers, as well as partnered with the Catholic diocese of Nakuru, and agreed parliamentarians. in 1992 that the Catholic Church would take the lead in

46 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Building the infrastructure Rift regions. World Vision Kenya (WVK) borrowed for peace from the grassroots heavily from the peace committee model in the North Rift Mounting conflict between clans over water and livestock in region where it engaged the Pokot, Turkana, and Marakwet the early 1990s, as well as spillover from the failed government communities in the Kerio valley. The POKATUSA Peace in Somalia, prompted Muslim women in Wajir district to or- and Development Project was developed in the late 1990s ganize locally for peace. In late 1993, when safety was an issue in response to a surge in violence among pastoralist groups. throughout the district, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi mobilized other Conflict, largely over cattle, scarce grazing pastures, and wa- concerned women from different clans to prevent violence at ter sources, was marked by a trend of revenge and retaliation. the market.5 Encouraged by their success, the women shifted POKATUSA was designed to improve livelihoods and foster attention to work directly with the elders and chiefs of the co-existence among the four ethnic groups. In partnership three major clans involved in the conflict and worked toward with NCCK, the model combined community peacebuilding a mediation process. They engaged with the district commis- activities through community dialogue and rapid response sioner and a member of parliament to integrate the peace to conflict events. The project employed peace caravans from initiative in the District Development Committee. From this, 2007 to 2010 and religious leaders from 32 denominations the Wajir Peace and Development Committee was collaborated for four “peace crusades” from 2011 to 2013.7 formed, with the district commissioner as chairperson and The project also organized youth and women’s forums and members including the heads of all government departments, drew from traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.8 representatives of the various peace groups, religious leaders, The approach of working through local peace committees NGO representatives, chiefs, and security officers.6 was institutionalized into national policy as the National The bottom-up peace committee approach from Wajir Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Man- served as a model that was initially replicated in North East- agement (NSC) was established in 2001. The NSC, located ern, Upper Eastern, Coast (Tana River district), and North within the ministry of state, was designed to coordinate civil

Coordinating peace efforts

In 1992 Oxfam GB, the Mennonite Central Committee, and peace organizations, diocesan representatives and the Anglican Development Desk were collaborating from Catholic and Protestant churches, international on relief efforts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya. NGOs, ‘Nairobi,’ and ‘upcountry’ people all met Together, they saw a need for coordination and thus in the same room to discuss what was happening in formed the Ethnic Clashes Network (ECN) in 1993. the country.”9 In partnership with International Alert, It grew quickly to include two dozen organizations, ECN gathered 40 peace practitioners from around mostly Nairobi-based and many faith-inspired. Kenya for a five-day workshop in 1995. This event The effort shifted to long-term concerns, namely was pivotal in the development of the peace world in rehabilitation, reconciliation, and human rights. Kenya; research by Janice Jenner and Dekha Ibrahim Initial funding came from Oxfam, ActionAid, and Abdi document how it created a space for relationship Mennonite Central Committee. In its early years, building and knowledge sharing across the country. ECN had limited capacity; however, it played a vital Following this workshop, the ECN changed its name to role in providing space for people from different Peace and Development Network (PeaceNet Kenya). parts of the country and from different bases to meet Today PeaceNet serves as a national networking and and learn from each other. “ECN meetings were partnership-building organization, providing a platform probably the only time in which relief, development for civil society organizations and other peace actors.10

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 47 society peacebuilders and institutions, drawing from key instability by adding programs to foster peace or by building formation and state resources.11 In 2006 the NSC drafted a the peace capacity of their staff and partners. Practitioners national policy framework on peacebuilding drawing from and faith leaders have used their distinctive perspectives and lessons learned through local peace committees from the arid access to address community needs, often learning through regions, particularly the Garissa Declaration,12 to emphasize experimentation. sensitivity to cultural values and build on existing traditional Catholic Church leaders realized that early initiatives conflict resolution methods.13 offering peace seminars, often in hotels or at their pastoral Kenya’s peace capacity was spotty, unable to manage the centers, were drawing the same people repeatedly. Concerned violence that erupted following the 2007–08 elections. As part that peace messages and skills were not being transferred back of the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation chaired by in the villages to the right people, the Diocese changed tactics H.E. Kofi Annan, a key agenda item was to create a national to engage communities more directly. When the Catholic commission to address “long-term issues with regard to pov- Diocese of Eldoret found itself in the middle of violence erty, inequitable distribution of resources, and perceptions of in 1997, it approached Pokot and Marawet elders who asked historical injustices and exclusion of segments of the Kenyan the church to help the two communities talk to each other. The society.”14 Parliament passed the National Cohesion and In- resulting discussions led to the formation of a peace project tegration Act in late 2008; among other things, it established that united people around common needs. The immediate laws on ethnic and religious discrimination and created penal- need was a school; the groups decided to build it on the border ties for hate speech. The government established the National of the two communities to serve children from both. Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) in September Bishop Korir used the same approach following the post 2009 with a mandate to “facilitate and promote equality of op- election violence in 2007–08. He approached the villages portunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful coexistence of Yamumbi (primarily Kikuyu) and Kapteldon (primarily between persons of different ethnic and racial backgrounds.”15 Kalenjin) to initiate discussions and rebuild relationships. Among its activities and reports, the NCIC has called on faith During initial discussions, the group identified several key is- actors to engage in national cohesion efforts to:16 sues. One connector project, possible with funding from CRS and Caritas Australia (supported by AusAID), facilitated the 1. Act as agents of social reconciliation by fostering reconcil- building of an eight-kilometer road between the two villages iation between individuals and communities in conflict. with the intention to provide work and income for the youth.17 Reconciliation must be approached at all levels. Faith-based Communities took the leading role in project development institutions should take concrete steps towards engaging and implementation, focusing their attention on working their constituents in social reconciliation. together on an external problem. Bishop Korir noted that 2. Foster inter-faith reconciliation, first among the different praying, though powerful symbolically, is not always effec- faith-based institutions, in order to ensure credibility as tive. “In addition to worship, God requires us actually to work agents of social reconciliation, and then with the people, for peace—to understand, love, and assist our neighbors. We particularly in regions in the country where conflicts and cannot hide in our pews in the name of piety.”18 tensions exist based on religious differences. Dialogue is a well-known peacebuilding approach, at times further strengthened through collaborative action. TheUnited 3. Undertake clear engagement with politicians, with the aim Religions Initiative (URI) (an interreligious movement of ensuring non-politicisation of faith issues. based in San Francisco) works at the grassroots to bridge differ- Conflict-sensitive development ences through action. URI specifically works to bridge religious and connector projects and cultural differences by bringing people together to work for the good of their communities. In Kenya, URI has helped Many religious institutions and FIOs engaged in development to foster Cooperation Circles (CC) in Nairobi, the Coast, in Kenya have adapted to recurring violence and weakened and Western Kenya. Each CC includes people from at least

48 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Vincent Kiplagat, Daima Initiatives for Peace and Development (DiPaD) Vincent

A traditional Kuria court meets at Mabera Chief’s camp in Migori County, Kenya in October 2015. three different religious traditions. The groups come together countries (including Kenya) in 2013 to build the capacity of around a specific need or goal, making each group distinctive staff and partners to work in multi-religious contexts.21 The and unique. In Kibera, a large informal settlement in Nairobi, first phase focuses on peacebuilding and conflict analysis, fol- one CC gathers Christian and Muslim youth under the name lowed by best practices and lessons learned from inter-faith of udungu (brotherhood) with a goal of neutralizing stereotypes action. Following training, Muslim and Christian partners between ethnic and religious groups. The group formed in 2014 jointly implement a connecter project. Through the project, around World Environment Day so its activities include com- partners have learned that development efforts contribute to munity clean up as well as peace forums through dancing and peace, justice, and social cohesion. In this way, the delivery of football.19 Another CC in Kibera gathers young single mothers the development becomes more grounded in local realities. from different religious and ethnic groups around a common goal of economic development. The women engage in table Peace education and peace clubs banking and support each other in starting small businesses. School children in Kenya can participate in a variety of clubs They make handicrafts and clothes when they gather and also through their school, including peace clubs. Peace clubs teach find partners to teach them about HIV and AIDS, reproductive children and youth—as well as teachers and administrators— health, and other pertinent issues.20 peace skills that are meant to be taken home and spread through- Catholic Relief Services (CRS) also highlights that out the community. The approach was institutionalized in 2008 they work explicitly to integrate peacebuilding into existing through the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology’s development efforts. CRS launched efforts in six African Peace Education Programme.22 The program endeavors to

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 49 increase the capacity of the education sector to promote peace.23 TheMennonite Central Committee (MCC) partners Over 4,500 education officials and teachers have been directly with Grassroots Development Initiative (GDI) to promote trained on areas such as understanding peace, peace education, peace clubs in Kisumu. The partnership with GDI is part of perception and bias, conflict management, and psychosocial MCC’s Global Family Education Program, which supports intervention approaches.24 The Ministry has also developed ma- peace education.33 GDI runs peace clubs in 30 different terials to integrate peace education into the national school cur- schools in Kisumu, with organizational aspirations to create a riculum. While the program started with a focus on addressing comprehensive peace education program.34 The organization inter-community conflict in Kenya, it has shifted to engaging also trains teachers in restorative discipline, conflict resolution, and countering violent extremism. and confronting gender discrimination.35 Monitoring at schools in 2010 revealed that peace educa- NCCK supports peace education both in its work in refugee tion was not being effectively taught in most schools mainly camps and through its member churches. NCCK launched the due to lack of adequate capacity among teachers. To address Refugees Services Project in Dadaab refugee camps in 1995. these challenges, the Ministry is partnering with Arigatou A key area of work there is peace education, which targets International and its pilot “Learning To Live Together both in-school and out-of-school youth, as well as teachers Programme” (LTLT) in Tana River County. Arigatou In- and peace workers. A 2009 report describes peace training ternational, a global FIO committed to building a better for 225 youth out of school, 75 religious leaders, 150 teach- world for children, launched its interfaith and intercultural ers, and 130 peer mediators; 58 peace workers also received program called LTLT in 2008. The program developed a refresher courses on peace building.36 With support from global curriculum for ethics education25 that includes pro- Tearfund, NCCK’s Church and Community Mobilization moting intercultural and interfaith understanding.26 Tana Process (CMMP) has helped 32 congregations in 8 member River County, where the pilot is run, is an area particularly churches with community engagement since 2012.37 Phase affected by interethnic violence that has disrupted the lives of two of CCMP will focus on peace education in the Western many schoolchildren.27 The community is home to a number and North Rift regions.38 of different ethnic groups, including the Pokomo, Orma, and Wardei, who come from different religious backgrounds and Engaging and empowering youth have longstanding tensions over access to land and water.28 In The Kenyan Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA) was the future, the LTLT’s organizers hope to implement it on a formed after youth worked with SUPKEM in 2001 and 2002 national scale.29 on a survey to assess the impact of HIV and AIDS among TheFellowship of Christian Council and Churches Muslims. It highlighted the need for a youth organization for in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA), Muslims. KMYA’s mandate is to empower young Muslims a regional ecumenical organization, provides a platform for jus- through constructive engagement and participation in lead- tice, peace, healing, and conflict transformation and reconcilia- ership, peace and security, gender issues, education, economic tion in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa. With funding from empowerment, and health. KMYA’s peace and security work the Development Agency Cooperation of the Catholic Church spans advocacy, dialogue, and direct engagement with Mus- of Austria, and in conjunction with NCCK and Mukuru lim youth at the local level. The group has worked to enhance Slum Development Projects, FECCLAHA implemented the youth participation in civic engagement in the Coast, the Mukuru Peace Clubs project as part of its Regional Youth Peace North East province, and Nairobi. KMYA has also conducted Building Programme in 2013.30 The project fostered 14 peace listening circles for Muslim youth to better understand radi- clubs with 411 members in a number of area schools, such as the calization and youths’ grievances. For example, the Office of Secondary School Ignatious in Kayaba, Mukuru, Nairobi.31 In the President of Kenya worked with KMYA, Finn Church addition to providing a forum to preach peace to youth, peace Aid, and the Network for Religious and Traditional clubs facilitate youth involvement in community service and Peacemakers to hold dialogues with youth in six coastal create job and networking opportunities.32 counties in 2015 to open lines of communication and build

50 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism

In 2015 a group of Muslims in Kenya launched BRAVE launched a manual and resource guide40 in October (Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism) as a 2015 that provides guidance for early warning Muslim-led intra-faith movement designed to address signs for parents, teachers, religious leaders, and the pull factors to extremism, which they define as communities to identify youth that may be vulnerable ideology, narratives, and counter-narratives.39 It or on the path to radicalization. The resource offers focuses on actions to prevent recruitment, legitimation narratives to counter messages used by extremists, of extremist ideologies, and intimidation by extremist describing misinterpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith groups. BRAVE addresses the misuse of religion for by violent extremist groups. This tool is aimed to violent extremist ends through a strategy centered on address information asymmetries through a range of ideological elements related to violent extremism and media platforms, including social media. The BRAVE terrorism. It also focuses on returnees, young persons program also has plans to prevent division between (including children and youth), and adults in areas Christians and Muslims in Kenya, an objective of considered a hotspot (Nairobi, Upper Eastern, North violent extremists, by working with Christian religious Eastern, Coast, and West Kenya). The organization leaders and opinion shapers. trust between youth and the national and local authorities.41 households and technical skills for youth who were unable KMYA has also engaged with Muslim youth to empower to complete formal education. Over time, participants learn them to stay in school, find employment, start a business, and leadership skills and became mentors for others. CWS was participate in civic activities and decision making. KMYA has working with youth in Mathare informal settlement in Nairobi trained over 1,000 youth in leadership and business skills, as prior to the violence in 2007–08. These youth were able to well as life skills. It leads a youth livelihood project in Kilifi reach out directly to youth involved in perpetrating the vio- focused on agro-economic ventures.42 In Mombasa, KMYA lence in Mathare and convince them to come to the peace table collaborates on a youth employment action research initiative to discuss their grievances, something no other group was able to assess opportunities for growth in youth employment and to do due to mistrust.45 The Giving Hope program also works enterprise, as well as barriers for youth.43 KMYA formed an with drug rehabilitation and provides youth small grants for NGO in Kibera (called Baraza La Waalim Kibera) that gath- income-generating activities. CWS has also trained youth in ers teachers from mainstream schools and madrassas with an Kisumu, Mombasa, and Nairobi’s informal settlements on aim to raise standards of education in madrassas in Kibera peacebuilding skills; this small project also researches drivers specifically, and also across the country. In December 2013 of conflict, training youth participants to design and conduct KMYA held a national youth camp for Muslim girls aged 12 a survey.46 CWS works on various protection projects includ- through 23 focused on motivation in school and aspirations ing safe school zones47 and since March 2014, safe spaces for for university; a similar, separate, camp for boys was held.44 LGBTI persons.48 Church World Service (CWS) established its Kenya The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) is office in 1978, responding to humanitarian and development comprised of clerics from diverse faiths in the coast region, needs in the country and region. One project, Giving Hope, namely Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and African Tradition- focuses on orphans and vulnerable children. It began in alists. Clerics concerned about violence in the region began Rwanda in 2004, working with children whose parents were to meet in the late 1990s and created a formal organization killed in the genocide, and came to Kenya in 2006, working in 2001. It has worked specifically with youth in Kwale dis- with children whose parents had died from AIDS. Giving trict in six locations with the goal of reducing vulnerability Hope supports economic development for child head of to religious radicalization. Supported by the British High

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 51 Commission, youth received training on peacebuilding, en- return to their communities and share their knowledge by trepreneurship, bookkeeping, inter-religious dialogue, and creating “peacemaking circles.” The women train other farming techniques such as bee keeping and goat rearing from women from the neighborhood to act as local mediators. 2006 to 2008. As a result of the project, the Kwale Interfaith One sister reported that the focus begins with building Youth Association (KIYA) was formed and registered; KIYA peace in the family; “If there is no peace in the family, there disburses micro-credit to its members. Following deadly is no peace anywhere. Women are central in peacemaking, riots in Mombasa after the death of Sheikh Aboud Rogo in starting with their own children.” The peacemaking circles 2012, CICC gathered youth to assess drivers of tension and also provide a support structure for those who have suffered draft plans to mitigate future violence.49 With CRS support, traumatic events or struggle with issues like HIV and AIDS. CICC’s People to People Peace (3Ps) project has encouraged The groups also provide economic opportunities for the women to defend their rights and be recognized for their role women. One circle in Kibera gathers 30 women weekly in bridging ethnic and cultural divides in Likoni. The Peaceful for seminars—on conflict resolution, empowerment, and Co-existence project gathered religious leaders, women, and health—and to learn beading techniques to make small youth for outreach in Mombasa, Kwale, and Kilifi prior to the crafts to sell at local markets. 2013 elections; the project also encouraged youth to acquire Muslim women have a legacy of working for peace in national IDs and register to vote.50 Kenya, yet few formal programs or organizations currently focus on empowering Muslim women as peacebuilders. Dekha Women, peace, and security Ibrahim Abdi worked with other women, such as Nuria TheInter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) launched Abdullahi Abdi, to form Wajir Women for Peace in the late the Kenya Women of Faith Network (KWFN) in 1990s. The group later expanded to include community mem- 2003 as a way to increase the involvement of women in IRCK bers, religious leaders, youth, and others, forming the Wajir activities, including peace and national cohesion. KWFN also Peace and Development Committee. More recently Muslim focuses on gender-based violence and female genital mutila- mothers have united, mostly informally, to discuss the risks of tion, training over 150 women since 2007 with support from youth radicalization and strategies to protect their own chil- organizations such as the African Council of Religious Leaders dren. In interviews with KMYA and other Muslim women and UNICEF. Following the election violence in 2007–08, working for peace, they have reported concerns from mothers KWFN trained eleven members on conflict mediation. From and requests for more information and sharing. The sensitive this beginning, the women trained over 30 women in the nature of this work makes it difficult to identify the extent of Isiolo chapter of KWFN in alternative dispute resolution this conversation and key actors. An example of a publically skills.51 These skills were put to use following the destruction known effort isSisters Without Borders. After the attack of a Muslim prayer structure at a secondary school in April on Westgate Mall in 2013, women from the Somali commu- 2014. Accusations and tensions grew as angry youth took to nity gathered to create a consortium of 12 organizations work- the street and social media. KWFN worked with the county ing to counter radicalization. At the community level, Sisters commissioner and religious leaders to call for interfaith soli- Without Borders has worked with mothers of sons recruited darity and peace.52 by Al-Shabaab, persuading them to speak out,54 and training Since 1999, the Association of Sisterhoods of them on prevention and early warning signs.55 SUPKEM also KCCB’s Justice and Peace Commission has trained hosts a new initiative, Engage Jamii Initiative, which will work 340 Catholic women during summer-long intensive with women at the community level on issues such as security, seminars.53 The women trainees come from throughout countering violent extremism, trauma counseling, and bridg- Kenya and include mostly laywomen as well as nuns. After ing the gap between law enforcers and security personnel. The learning tools for defusing small, local conflicts the women young initiative will also use an interfaith approach.

52 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE Notes 13. See Tanja Chopra, “Justice Versus Peace in Northern Kenya,” Justice & 1. William Kiptoo, “Rebuilding Relationships Through Good Development working paper series, 2009, volume 2 issue 1. Neighborliness Seminars in the Rift Valley, Kenya,” Beyond 14. “About NCIC,” http://www.cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us?id= Intractability, November 2013, http://www.beyondintractability.org/ 63#full. kiptoo-rebuilding. 15. “Laws of Kenya No. 12 of 2008. National Cohesion and Integration 2. This report details the areas and amount of aid provided. “Internal Act,” National council for Law Reporting, Article 25 (1), Objectives Displacement in Kenya.” Refugee Consortium of Kenya. 2005. and functions of the commission, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/ 3. “Amani Mashinani (Peace at the Grassroots): Experiences of pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalCohesionandIntegrationAct_ Community Peacebuilding in the North Rift Region of Kenya,” No12of2008.pdf. Catholic Diocese of Eldoret, Kenya, 2009, 11, http://www.crs.org/ 16. Allan Ngari, “Reconciling Kenya: Opportunities for constructing a sites/default/files/tools-research/amani-mashinani.pdf. peaceful and socially cohesive nation,” NCIC, Policy Brief No. 1, July 4. Kiptoo, “Rebuilding Relationships Through Good Neighborliness 2012. Seminars in the Rift Valley, Kenya.” 17. “Amani Mashinani (Peace at the Grassroots): Experiences of 5. “No Failure in Peace Work: The life and teaching of Dekha Ibrahim Community Peacebuilding in the North Rift Region of Kenya.” Abdi, Second Edition,” Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2014, 18. “Amani Mashinani (Peace at the Grassroots): Experiences of http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/ Community Peacebuilding in the North Rift Region of Kenya,” 22. Final-Dekha-book-3-4-14.pdf. 19. See more at “Undugu Family Hope Kibera,” URI, http://www.uri.org/ 6. Paul van Tongeren, “Infrastructures for Peace,” in Peacemaking: cooperation_circles/detail/undugufamily. From Practice to Theory, Volume 2, eds. Susan Allen Nan, Zachariah 20. See more at “Vision Young Mothers,” URI, Cooperation Circle Profile, Cherian Mampilly, and Andrea Bartoli (Praeger, 2011), 400–419. See June 1, 2014, http://www.uri.org/files/resource_files/Profile_ also “A Discussion with Dekha Ibrahim, Founder, Wajir Peace and VisionYoungMothers.pdf. Development Committee, Kenya,” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace 21. “A Discussion with Shamsia Ramadhan, Catholic Relief Services,” & World Affairs, May 29, 2010, https://berkleycenter.georgetown. Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, April 15, 2015, edu/interviews/a-discussion-with-dekha-ibrahim-founder-wajir-peace- https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/interviews/a-discussion-with- and-development-committee-kenya. shamsia-ramadhan-catholic-relief-services. 7. “POKATUSA Peace and Development Program,” Insight on 22. Mary Wanjiru Kangethe, “The Peace Education Programme in Kenya,” Conflict, https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/kenya/ Global Campaign for Peace Education, May 1, 2015, accessed June 9, peacebuilding-organisations/pokatusa/. 2016, http://www.peace-ed-campaign.org/the-peace-education- 8. John Siebert and Kenneth Epps, “Addressing Armed Violence in East programme-in-kenya/. Africa: A Report on World Vision Peacebuilding, Development and 23. “The Peace Education Programme in Kenya.” Humanitarian Assistance Programmes.,” Project Ploughshares, 2009, 24. “The Peace Education Programme in Kenya.” 29, http://www.worldvision-institut.de/_downloads/allgemein/ 25. “Learning to Live Together,” Arigatou International, accessed June Addressing%20Armed%20Violence%20in%20East%20Africa%20 13, 2016, https://ethicseducationforchildren.org/en/what-we-do/ FINAL%20Nov%204.pdf. learning-to-live-together. 9. Janice Jenner and Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, “Voices of Local Peace 26. “Teachers from Tana River County attended Learning to Live Initiatives. Kenya Peace and Development Network, Wajir Peace and Together training workshop,” UNESCO, June 10, 2014, accessed June Development Committee, National Council of Churches of Kenya, 13, 2016, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/member-states/single-view/ and Amani People’s Theatre,” Collaborative for Development Action‘s news/teachers_from_tana_river_county_attended_learning_to_live_ Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, October 2000. together_training_workshop/#.VT3tE9Kqqko 10. See more at http://www.peacenetkenya.or.ke/. 27. “Teachers from Tana River County attended Learning to Live 11. “Background,” National Steering Committee on Peace Building Together training workshop.” and Conflict Management, http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/about-us/ 28. “Learning to Live Together Pilot Programme in Kenya: Second background.html. Teacher Training Workship in Tana River County,” Arigatou 12. The “Modogashe Declaration” peace agreement signed in April International, March 31, 2015, accessed June 13, 2016, https:// 2001 was revised and drafted under the auspices of the Office of the ethicseducationforchildren.org/en/news/latest-news/858-learning- President and bilateral and multilateral donors making it a landmark to-live-together-pilot-programme-in-kenya-second-teacher-training- event in the effort to craft law from the bottom-up rather than the workshop-in-tana-river-county?highlight=WyJwaWxvdCBwcm top-down. The result was the new “Garissa Declaration,” which was 9ncmFtbWUgaW4iLCJpbiBrZW55YSJd. signed by the districts of Isiolo, Garissa, Marsabit, Moyale, Samburu, 29. “Teachers from Tana River County attended Learning to Live Meru North, Tana River, Mandela, Wajir, and Ijara. Together training workshop.”

WORLD FAITHS DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 53 30. “FECCLAHA Regional Youth Peace Building Programme,” 43. http://www.coastwomen.org/coastwomen/CWID_Design/projects. FECCLAHA Youth Newsletter, 2 (2013). php 31. “Youth Peace Clubs Initiatives in Mukuru, Nairobi, Kenya,” 44. Interview with KMYA, November 13, 2014. FECCLAHA Youth Newsletter, 2 (2013). 45. Interview with CWS, November 2014. 32. “Youth Peace Clubs Initiatives in Mukuru, Nairobi, Kenya.” 46. See more at “Youth Participation in Peace Building and Democratic 33. Elizabeth Kessler, “Peace education in photos,” Mennonite Central Principle—Kenya,” NGO Aid Map, https://www.ngoaidmap.org/ Committee, March 23, 2016, accessed June 9, 2016, http://mcc.org/ projects/7818. stories/peace-education-photos-0. 47. “School Safe Zones,” CWS, http://cwsannualreport.org/development- 34. Interview with William Kiptoo, November 11, 2014. programs/school-safe-zones/. 35. “Peace education in photos.” 48. Marie Ramtu, “Counting the Safe Space Milestones in Kenya,” April 4, 36. “Progress Report: January-June 2009,” National Council of Churches 2016, http://cwsglobal.org/safe-space/. of Kenya, 25, http://www.ncck.org/largedocs/PGRJJ2009.pdf. 49. “CICC holds a Youth Forum on MSA Conflict,”Mwito Wa Amani 1 37. “Local Churches Transformed: Becoming the Change for (September 2012): 2, http://www.cicckenya.org/images/1st-edition. Communities,” tearfund, July 2015, http://www.micahnetwork.org/ pdf. sites/default/files/doc/page/transformation_stories_july_2015_ 50. Mary Mwangi, “Women & youths in bid for a peaceful elections,” optimized.pdf. Mwito Wa Amani 2 (October 2012):4, http://www.cicckenya.org/ 38. “CCMP Now To Focus on Peace and Education – NCCK,” The images/2nd-edition.pdf. National Council of Churches of Kenya, May 2, 2014, accessed June 51. “Isiolo Women of Faith Calm Inter-faith Tensions,” Inter-Religious 9, 2016, http://www.ncck.org/newsite2/index.php/information/ Concil of Kenya, http://www.interreligiouscouncil.or.ke/isiolo%20 news/261-ccmp-now-to-focus-on-peace-and-education-ncck. wof%20calm%20tension%20trial.html. 39. “Our Approach,” BRAVE, http://www.braveprogram.org/home/. 52. Email with KWFN representatives. 40. Mustafa Yusuf Ali and Othman Mujahid Bwana,“Training Manual and 53. Melanie Lidman, “If you can train for war, you can also train for peace,” Resource Guide,” BRAVE, October 2015, http://www.braveprogram. Global Sisters Report, March 16, 2015, http://globalsistersreport.org/ org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Brave_manual.pdf. ministry/if-you-can-train-war-you-can-also-train-peace-21516. 41. For example, “Youth dialogue in Kenya on preventing violent 54. Viola Gienger, “’Mothers Schools’ to Working with Police: Women extremism.” Prevent Violent Extremism,” USIP, March 18, 2015, http://www.usip. 42. “Kilifi Youth Empowerment Project,” KMYA, http://kmya.org/ org/olivebranch/2015/03/18/mothers-schools-working-police- index.php/thematic-intervention-areas/82-kilifi-youth-economic- women-prevent-violent-extremism. empowerment-project. 55. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EH5uNP1ekr.

54 RELIGION IN VIOLENCE AND PEACE

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