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Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality in Gitksan at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface By Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality in Gitksan at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface by Tyler Roy Gösta Peterson B.Mus., University of British Columbia, 1999 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Linguistics) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) April, 2010 c Tyler Roy Gösta Peterson 2010 Abstract The aim of this dissertation is to provide an empirically driven, theoretically informed inves- tigation of how speakers of Gitksan, a Tsimshianic language spoken in the northwest coast of Canada, express knowledge about the world around them. There are three main goals that motivate this investigation, summarized below: (1) (i.) To provide the first detailed description of the evidential and modal system in Gitksan. (ii.) To provide a formal semantic and pragmatic account of this system that adequately explains the meanings of the modals and evidentials, as well as how they are used in discourse. (iii.) To identify and examine the specific properties the Gitksan evidential/modal system brings to bear on current theories of semantics and pragmatics, as well as the consequences this analysis has on the study of modality and evidentiality cross-linguistically. In addition to documenting the evidential and modal meanings in Gitksan, I test and work through a variety of theoretical tools from the literature designed to investigate evidentiality and modality in a language. This begins by determining what level of meaning the individual evidentials in Gitksan operate on. The current state of research into the connection between evidentiality and epistemic modality has identified two different types of evidentials defined by the level of meaning they operate on: propositional and illocutionary evidentials. These two types correspond to a distinction between modal evidentials and non-modal evidentials respectively. I show that Gitksan has both modal and non-evidentials. This leads to an analysis where the Gitksan modal evidentials are treated as a specialized type of epistemic modals, and the non-modal evidentials are sentential force specifiers. I also identify various features of the evidential system that bring specific issues to bear upon current theories of the semantics and pragmatics of modality. This has four outcomes: first, I present a novel analysis of variable modal force in modals with fixed quantification: variable modal force in Gitksan modal evidentials is determined by the ordering source. Secondly, I discuss Conjectural Questions: when a modal evidential is added to a question it reduces the interrogative force of the question. This follows from the modal semantics of evidentials. Thirdly, I introduce the notion of Pragmatic blocking: modal and non-modal evidentials interact in discourse contexts, and implicate a speaker’s attitude towards the evidence they have for a proposition. And fourthly, I develop the first formal analysis of mirativity and non-literal uses of evidentials, analyzing them both as cases of conversational implicature. ii Table of Contents Abstract .......................................... ii Table of Contents ..................................... iii List of Tables ....................................... vii List of Figures ....................................... viii List of Abbreviations .................................. ix Acknowledgements ....................................x 1 Introduction ......................................1 1.1 Goals of the Investigation . .1 1.2 Empirical Context . .3 1.2.1 Gitksan and the Tsimshianic Languages . .3 1.2.2 Gitksan Orthography . .6 1.2.3 The Basic Features of Gitksan Morphology and Syntax . .6 1.2.3.1 Morphology . .6 1.2.3.2 Syntax and Clause Types . .7 1.2.4 Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality in Gitksan . .8 1.2.5 Studies on Evidentiality . .9 1.3 Theoretical Context . .9 1.3.1 The Relations Between Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality . 11 1.3.2 The Theoretical Tools . 12 1.3.2.1 Determining Levels of Meaning . 12 1.3.2.2 Static Semantics: Evidentials as Epistemic Modals . 13 1.3.2.3 Dynamic Semantics: Evidentials as Sentential Force Speci- fiers . 13 1.4 Structure of the Thesis . 15 1.4.1 A Description of Evidentials in Gitksan . 15 1.4.2 Modal Evidentials . 15 1.4.2.1 A Challenge: Variable Modal Force . 16 1.4.2.2 Conjectural Questions . 17 1.4.3 Non-Modal Evidentials . 17 1.4.4 Evidentiality and Modality at the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface . 18 1.4.4.1 Pragmatic Blocking . 18 1.4.4.2 Mirativity and Metaphor . 19 1.5 Methodology . 20 iii Table of Contents 2 Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality in Gitksan ............... 22 2.1 The Issues . 22 2.2 The Plan . 22 2.3 Describing Evidentiality . 23 2.4 Describing Evidentiality in Gitksan . 24 2.5 The Reportative =kat ............................... 28 2.5.1 The Evidential Meanings of =kat .................... 29 2.5.2 A Note on the Social Uses of =kat .................... 33 2.6 The Inferential =ima ............................... 34 2.6.1 The Evidential Meanings of =ima .................... 35 2.6.2 The Modal Interpretations of =ima ................... 38 2.7 The Morphosyntactic Distribution of =kat and =ima ............. 39 2.8 The Sensory inferential nakw' ........................... 44 2.8.1 The Evidential Meanings of nakw' .................... 44 2.8.2 The Pragmatic Uses of nakw' : Mirativity and Metaphor . 52 2.8.3 The Morphosyntactic Distribution of nakw' ............... 52 2.9 Interactions . 53 2.10 Summary . 56 3 Evidentiality and Levels of Meaning ....................... 58 3.1 The Issues . 58 3.2 The Plan . 59 3.3 Evidentials as Epistemic Modals . 59 3.4 Formal Pragmatic Approaches to Evidentiality . 63 3.4.1 Speech Act Theory . 64 3.4.2 Evidential Hierarchies and Context Dependence . 66 3.4.3 Evidentials as Sentential-Force Specifiers . 66 3.5 Determining Levels of Meaning: The Tests . 67 3.5.1 Tests Regarding Truth . 68 3.5.1.1 Known Truth/Falsity . 68 3.5.1.2 Assent/Dissent . 70 3.5.1.3 Cancellability of Evidence Type Requirement . 72 3.5.2 Embeddability and Scope . 72 3.5.2.1 Embeddability . 72 3.5.2.2 Scope with Respect to Interrogatives . 74 3.5.2.3 Interaction with Negation . 75 3.5.3 Interim Summary . 75 3.6 Gitksan Evidentials: Propositional or Illocutionary Operators? . 76 3.6.1 Tests Regarding Truth . 77 3.6.1.1 Known Truth/Falsity . 77 3.6.1.2 Assent/Dissent . 80 3.6.1.3 Cancellability of Evidence Type Requirement . 83 3.6.2 Scope and Embeddability . 83 3.6.2.1 Embeddability . 84 3.6.2.2 Scope with Respect to Interrogatives . 89 3.6.2.3 Interaction with Negation . 92 3.7 Summary . 92 iv Table of Contents 4 The Semantics of the Modal Evidentials =ima and =kat ......... 94 4.1 The Issues . 94 4.2 The Plan . 95 4.3 A Modal Analysis of =ima and =kat ...................... 96 4.4 The Variable Modal Force of =ima and =kat .................. 98 4.4.1 The Variability of =ima ......................... 99 4.4.1.1 Context-Conditioned Modal Force . 99 4.4.1.2 Modals in Coordinated Sentences . 101 4.4.1.3 Evidence Type and Modal Force . 103 4.4.2 The Variability of =kat .......................... 104 4.4.3 Default Modal Force . 105 4.4.4 The Ordering Source in Deriving Variable Modal Force . 106 4.4.4.1 Ordering Sources with Fixed Quantification . 108 4.4.4.2 An Emerging Theoretical Typology: Variable Force in St’át’imcets Modals . 112 4.4.4.3 Strengthening and Weakening in Paradigms . 115 4.4.5 Interim Summary . 117 4.5 Modal =ima and Conjectural Questions . 118 4.5.1 The Properties of Conjectural Questions . 119 4.5.2 An Analysis of Conjectural Questions . 121 4.5.3 Conjectural Questions in Other Languages, and with Other Evidentials 123 4.6 Summary . 125 5 The Pragmatics of Evidentiality in Gitksan .................. 127 5.1 The Issues . 127 5.2 The Plan . 129 5.3 The Dynamic Semantics of nakw' ......................... 129 5.3.1 Pragmatic Presupposition . 130 5.3.2 Context Change Potential . 131 5.3.3 Presupposing Sensory Evidence and the Common Ground . 132 5.3.4 The Context Change Potential of nakw' (p) ............... 133 5.4 nakw' as a Sentential Force Specifier . 134 5.4.1 A Case for Evidential Sentential Force . 135 5.4.2 Evidentials as Sentential Force Specifiers (Portner 2006) . 137 5.4.2.1 The Model of Discourse . 138 5.4.2.2 Meanings of the Evidentials as Update Functions . 138 5.4.2.3 nakw' as an Evidential Sentential Force Specifier . 139 5.4.2.4 Interaction Between the Evidential Modals =ima and =kat 140 5.4.3 nakw' is Not an Illocutionary Force Modifier . 142 5.5 Explaining the Interaction Between =ima and nakw' : Pragmatic Blocking . 143 5.6 The Extended Pragmatics of nakw' : Mirativity and Metaphor . 145 5.6.1 Approaching the Category of Mirativity . 147 5.6.1.1 Evidentiality and Mirativity . 148 5.6.1.2 Mirativity and Epistemic Modality . 150 5.6.2 An Analysis of Mirativity as Conversational Implicature . 152 5.6.3 Nonliteral Uses of Evidentials . 155 5.7 Summary . 159 v Table of Contents 6 Conclusion ....................................... 160 6.1 Revisiting the Relations . 162 6.1.1 The Conceptual Relations . 162 6.1.2 The Encoding Relations . 162 6.1.3 The Formal Semantic Relations . 163 6.1.4 The Formal Pragmatic Relations . 163 Bibliography ........................................ 165 Appendices A Gitksan Orthography ................................ 172 vi List of Tables 1.1 Lexically vs. contextually determined modal meaning and force . 16 2.1 A sample typology in Aikhenvald’s categorization of evidential meanings . 24 2.2 The evidential system in Nisgha’a (Tarpent 1987) . 24 2.3 A description of the evidential system in Gitksan . 25 3.1 Test results for St’át’imcets and Quechua . 76 3.2 A Propositional/Illocutionary typology based on the levels of meaning tests. 76 3.3 The Propositional vs. Illocutionary status of the evidential System in Gitksan 76 3.4 The embeddability of =ima, =kat, and nakw' ..................
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