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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

2006 Stipulating Moral Status Elizabeth P. (Elizabeth Peisinger) Kanon

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

STIPULATING MORAL STATUS

By

ELIZABETH P. KANON

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2006

Copyright © 2006 Elizabeth P. Kanon All Rights Reserved The members of the Committee Approve the dissertation of Elizabeth P. Kanon defended on

Peter Dalton Professor Directing Dissertation

Aline Kalbian Outside Committee Member

Maria Morales Committee Member

Approved:

J. Piers Rawling, Chair, Department of Philosophy

Joseph Travis, Dean, Department of Arts and Sciences

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In memory of Cody.

I wish to thank my husband, Gregg Kanon, for his love, honesty, support and deft advice throughout this endeavor. I am appreciative of Peter Dalton’s painstaking assistance in completing this project. A special thanks to John Kanon, Jay Wagoner, Eve Caraveo, Robert Audi, Russ Dancy and Donald Crosby. And a special thanks to my non­human friends: Christopher, Momma Kitty, Buddy, Spatz, Mr. White, Sir William Lucky and Candide.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT v

CHAPTER ONE 1 The Problem 1 Human Uses of Animals 3 Moral Worth and Moral Status 8 Moral Consideration and Treatment 10 Three Approaches in the Philosophical Literature 12

CHAPTER TWO 14 Kant’s Moral Theory as it Relates to Establishing Moral Worth 14 Kant’s Conception of Moral Worth and Its Implications for Animals 18 Why Give Animals Indirect Duties? 23 Is Kant Correct in Making a Distinction Between Direct and Indirect Duties? 28 Conclusion 34

CHAPTER THREE 35 Regan on a Moral Theory 35 Regan’s Rejection of Competing Moral Theories 40 Regan’s Rights View 45 Regan’s Conception of Moral Worth and its Implications for Animals 46 Questions Regan’s Position Raises 50 Conclusion 57

CHAPTER FOUR 58 Singer’s Moral Theory as it Relates to Establishing Moral Status 58 Singer’s Conception of Moral Status and Its Implications for Animals 66 Questions Singer’s Position Raises 67 Conclusion 81

CHAPTER FIVE 82 Feminist Recognition of New Perspectives 82 Perfect­Relationship View: A Hybrid Thesis 83 Durkheim on Division of Labor 91 Objections and Replies to Division of Labor 95 Conclusion 97

CITED SOURCES 99

BIBLIOGRAPHY 101

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 105

iv ABSTRACT

Moral worth is determined by moral agents. How is such a determination made? Western philosophical thought originally demarcated between human and all else. Some contemporary writers seek to extend moral worth to animals, and still others seek to grant ecosystems such worth. This dissertation will consider three predominant writers on the subject of moral worth: Immanuel Kant, Tom Regan and Peter Singer. After consideration of each writer’s strengths and weaknesses, a hybrid view will be presented. The perfect­relationship view extends moral worth to all species. This view utilizes the strengths of Kant, Regan and Singer; as well as, adapting literature of J. Baird Callicott and Emile Durkheim to provide a pragmatic approach to determining moral worth.

v CHAPTER ONE

THE PROBLEM Animals have moral status or moral worth. 1 It is morally acceptable to use animals to further important human needs. Most people agree with both statements. However, these two beliefs seem inconsistent. There are ways to avoid holding two incompatible beliefs. One solution is to abandon one of the beliefs. Another is to clarify what the claims actually mean. What is it to say something has, or does not have, moral worth? What are “important” human needs? By clarifying terms, it may be possible to show that the two beliefs are not inconsistent. One standard philosophical approach resolves incompatibility between beliefs by removing the inconsistency. This is accomplished by either applying the concepts in an attempt to explain away the inconsistency or formulating theoretical support for the concepts which demonstrates an underlying coherence. Immanuel Kant, Tom Regan and Peter Singer attempt to resolve the seemingly inconsistent natures of these two beliefs. I will utilize their previous work in this area to form a more coherent grounding; making these two beliefs consistent. It is important to establish why these two beliefs have an initial prima facie inconsistency. Our usual notion of moral status entails that some moral consideration is guaranteed by its possessor. Our common acceptance of how we put animals to use suggests that animals do not possess moral status. Yet most people, when asked, claim to believe that animals do possess moral worth. There is incoherence in how these two beliefs are commonly held and how most humans, incognizant of many animals’ plights, commonly allow some seemingly inhumane treatment of animals. An approach taken by many animal liberationists on moral status entails the further belief that if a being possesses such status it also possesses natural rights. The term ‘natural’ is used, since rights are grounded in the nature of the being which possesses them. In the Declaration of Independence, America’s founders claimed that these rights were self­evident truths. They professed that all humans were equally endowed with the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This seems to imply

1 In this chapter, I will use the words status and worth as being interchangeable. These terms are technical terms with distinct meanings, each dependant upon the theories in which they are contained. As I establish which theorist uses which term, the technical differences will become clearer.

1 that beings which display certain natures are entitled to these rights; beings failing to do so are denied. Regan’s “No Trespassing” sign is placed upon the bearer of these natural rights. Rights usually entail constraints. Natural rights can be understood as entailing a duty of noninterference. One is expected to restrain himself from interfering with another’s pursuits, unless requested to do so. Seemingly, if moral status is, as Regan suggests, a declaration of noninterference; then animals must either be denied moral status or else granted rights. This dichotomy emphasizes the apparent inconsistency in the two beliefs: that animals have moral status and animals may be used to further important human needs. If animals have moral status then using them for food, clothing, entertainment, education, etc. seems to deny their right to noninterference. Perhaps one might claim that animals have moral status, only not equal to humans. This might permit the continued use of animals. However, most people are unaware of the treatment animals receive; such treatment that seems to indicate that animals have no moral status, particularly animals used for food or science. If made aware, many humans would find the treatment repugnant if not immoral. Once made aware of the plight of animals, many humans would reconsider which products they would choose for food, cosmetics and medicine. This is the reason many organizations, such as the SPCA, PETA and ALF, try to make news, to bring such awareness. These groups’ methods are beyond the scope of this discussion. However, moral status is not exclusively tied to rights. Utilitarian theory denies the notion of individual rights, as these can conflict with the maximizing of utility. This ethical approach may concede that natural rights are a useful fiction, but if the greater good is served by denying an individual’s rights then it is morally justified to do so. For utilitarians, moral status is merely instrumental in maximizing the happiness quotient. Given their conception of how moral status is ascertained, it is apparent that rights are not necessary for the pursuit of utility. Specifics regarding the utilitarian approach to moral status will be offered in the fourth chapter. However, it is possible for a utilitarian position to see the two beliefs as being incompatible. If the utilitarian position takes a strong view that moral status is granted equally to beings capable of suffering, then it follows that animals have moral status equal to humans. This strong stance would

2 preclude using animals in such a way that causes animals to suffer, even if such use would further important human needs. HUMAN USES OF ANIMALS Human use of animals extends from benign to maleficent. Domesticated pets are used for companionship. Wild animals are studied and catalogued to further knowledge. Some animals are used for entertainment. Both domesticated and wild animals are used as food sources. Animals have been used to further knowledge about humans. At what point in this list does the use of animals become more akin to abuse? It seems that if animals possess moral worth, then any use that disrespects their moral worth ought to be disallowed. Using animals for companionship does not seem to be a case of misuse. In this instance, both the human and the animal gain from the relationship. The human is provided with social interaction and unconditional love, basic human needs. Animals, too, receive these benefits, as well as shelter and regular feeding. Yet some humans have domesticated pets, dogs in particular, who are expected to work for their care. These animals do not receive the social interaction granted other pets. Instead, these animals are raised and kept isolated in order to guarantee that they will perform their “job.” These job descriptions range from fighting to security. I am not suggesting that these animals are necessarily ill­treated. I am suggesting that they do not receive the benefits I originally claimed domesticated pets gain from their relationship with humans—namely, social interaction and unconditional love. This comparison of the varying degrees of benefits bestowed upon domesticated pets shows the complexity of our relations with animals. One use is benign. The other, while still social exchange, requires the pet to submit to treatment that, if received by humans, would require justification. Yet we do not require such justification when humans subject animals to the same treatment. Often animals are a source of entertainment. Such entertainment varies from watching wild animals in their natural habitats and zoos to seeing animals perform learned “tricks.” Similar to the distinction between animals that are merely pets and “workers,” the use of animals ranges from benign to maleficent. When I watch a bird outside my window, I am merely catching a glimpse of the bird living its life undisturbed by my actions. If I were to provide feed to encourage this bird to continue “visiting” me,

3 I would perhaps not be intrusively interfering with this bird’s natural lifestyle. But by placing the bird into a cage, or zoo, I would be interfering. Sometimes, as in the case of endangered species, it is argued that zoos provide protection animals cannot provide for themselves. Zoos may merely limit the freedom of animals, but not to such an extent that animals are necessarily harmed. Sometimes, it is epistemically impossible to know whether animals are disinclined to be used in this manner. Some animals arguably thrive in zoos, while others do not. Observation alone cannot answer the question of whether irrevocable harm is done when we cage animals in zoos. Animal entertainers are sometimes expected to perform, as in the case of movies and circuses. Sometimes the learning curve for certain breeds of animals is a hard one. Behavioral modification techniques range from rewards to inhibition. The reward system seems harmless if the animal does what is expected—i.e., the animal receives a treat. Aversion techniques rely upon the infliction of pain or the evocation of fear in order to dominate the animal’s natural inclination. Such techniques implement the use of whips and electric shock. Sometimes, fire is used as an incentive to “encourage” an animal to do what is expected by its trainer. It would be unfair to claim that all performing animals are ill­treated. There are cases of ill­treatment, but also cases of mutual respect and love between animals and trainers. It would be ill­advised to condemn all animal trainers as using animals against their will. It is clear that some animals enjoy pleasing their human companions. It is also clear that some animals would rather not. I mention animals as entertainment to illustrate the complexity of our relationships and how these relationships vary between humans and animals. Human consumption of animals has been practiced for centuries. Granted there are some societies which abstain from this practice. Animal food products range from eating flesh and organs to consuming nourishment of their progeny. We raise cattle for food; others, for milk production. We eat some poultry. Other poultry is used in the production of eggs. In some countries, unlike America, citizens eat dogs, horses and small rodents. Even in our own country, we allow, under law, certain Native cultures to consume the flesh of whales. Killing and eating wild game, likewise, is condoned. Is there a significant factor explaining our acceptance of the consumption of some, but not all, animals? Is this worth grounded in moral considerations? Some argue that the

4 human need for protein can be met through other means, making our dependence upon animals as a food source no longer justifiable. Making distinctions between which animals can, and cannot, be used as food suggests that our practice of eating animals exhibits some complexity. Perhaps understanding the concepts of moral status and moral worth will provide an answer to the question raised by this practice. Furthermore, how we treat our potential food supply is also worthy of consideration. Wild game goes largely ignored until it is time for the hunt. Once hunting begins, the process of finding and killing an animal reflects the state of nature in which the animal exists. Wild game is often prey for other species, not just humans. It seems that killing is no different when instigated by a wolf, or a human. The other concern is that most enjoy hunting for sport, not solely for the acquisition of meat. Yet when we compare how domesticated animals fare as food products, wild animals seem to have a better lifestyle. Wild animals that are hunted are allowed to live their natural life up to the point that they are killed. Some domesticated animals are not so fortunate. Granted milk and beef cattle are permitted to roam a substantial territory prior to being subjected to consumptive practices. However, veal calf, most chickens and fish are confined in small areas and not permitted the limited freedom of their counterparts. Some are lucky and receive a relatively quick death—the wringing of a neck, or decapitation. Other modes of killing—blows to the head and the slitting of throats—are carried out on domesticated animals. Our practices suggest that perhaps our behavior is brutal, bordering upon immoral, if we accept the notion that animals have moral worth. It has been suggested that animals are a suitable source of experimental subjects that will further human knowledge. Some animals are considered physiologically close enough to humans that we can learn more about ourselves by studying the effects of substances, or procedures, upon them. In April of 2001, The Center for Laboratory Animal Welfare “estimated that 4 million animals per year are used to test the safety of cosmetics, household cleaners, pesticides, industrial chemicals, food additives, packing materials, and fabric treatments, as well as drugs and vaccines for both people and animals. This represents about 13 percent of all animals used in U.S. laboratories . . .” [ labanimalwelfare.org/product_testing.] The eyes of rabbits, for example, are found to more closely resemble human eyes than any other animal. For this reason, some manufacturers

5 use rabbits for testing eye sensitivity to beauty products. The experiments involve repeated exposure of rabbit eyes to the product. Some facial creams, eye shadows and mascaras have been tested in this manner before testing on humans. The thought of intentionally putting something into the eye of another seems to contradict our notions of moral treatment. We place a high threshold of justification for experimenting in this manner with humans, yet many seem unconcerned with subjecting rabbits to such treatment. What further complicates this particular experiment is the process by which the product is placed into the eye. It is obvious that the rabbit is not going to react well to this sort of treatment; it would be expected to struggle in an effort to avoid this intrusion. Thus some restraining device is required. Additionally, the rabbit is expected to blink, so its eyes must be open and receptive to the procedure. This requires an additional device to hold the eye open for long periods of time. Again, once the product has passed the “rabbit” test, it is tested on humans. Humans are not restrained in the manner of rabbits; their eyes are permitted to blink and close at will. This difference in treatment suggests that there is something wrong with the restraining behavior, requiring justification if humans were to be so subjected. Yet animals are routinely used in this manner. Consider another experiment using animal models to learn about humans. In this example, the tests are never to be conducted upon humans. It is expected that all possible knowledge to be gained can result from conducting these tests upon animals. I refer to experiments that subject animals to mental and physical trauma. Singer provides a large number of detailed renditions of such experiments in Animal Liberation. One particular example demonstrates the questionable nature of these experiments. In 1953 scientists at Harvard University conducted “learned helplessness” studies in order to further understand depression in humans. . . . placed forty dogs in a device called a “shuttlebox, which consists of a box divided into two compartments, separated by a barrier. Initially the barrier was set at the height of the dog’s back. Hundreds of intense electric shocks were delivered to the dog’s feet through a grid floor. At first the dogs could escape the shock if they learned to jump the barrier into the other compartment. In an attempt to discourage one dog from jumping, the experimenters forced the dog to jump one hundred times onto a grid floor in the other compartment that also delivered a shock to the dog’s feet. They said that as the dog jumped he gave a “sharp anticipatory yip which turned into a yelp when he landed on the electrified grid.” They then blocked the passage between the compartments with a

6 piece of plate glass and tested the dog again. The dog “jumped forward and smashed his head against the glass.” The dogs began showing symptoms such as defecation, urination, yelping and shrieking, trembling, attacking the apparatus, and so on; but after ten or twelve days of trials dogs who were prevented from escaping shock ceased to resist. . . This study showed that it was possible to induce a state of hopelessness and despair by repeated administration of severe inescapable shock. [Singer, p. 45]

Our acceptance of animal use for scientific experimentation continues today. Presently, Columbia University is accused of employing controversial experimentation upon baboons. In a suit filed by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) against Columbia in the New York County court system, PETA charges that the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Columbia’s own internal investigators concluded, “Columbia failed to provide even basic post­surgical care, adequate veterinary care, and euthanasia to animals used in experimentation.” [columbiacruelty.com] Federal and university investigators expressed concerns regarding the treatment animals received after the intrusive medical procedures, but were not concerned about the procedures themselves. One experiment, involving the removal of a baboon’s left eyeball, provided access to a critical blood vessel which is then clamped, thereby artificially inducing a stroke in the animal. The “stroke” is then treated by experimental drugs. Another research technique employed at Columbia implants metal pipes into the skulls of monkeys in an effort to determine a connection between stress and menstruation. The third experiment PETA cites in its suit has been on­going for twenty years. To study the effects of nicotine and morphine upon a developing fetus, pregnant baboons strapped into “backpacks full of instrumentation and tethered inside their metal cages” have nicotine and/or morphine pumped into their bodies while their fetuses are examined in utero. [columbiacruelty.com] Dr. Catherine Dell’Orto, postdoctoral veterinary fellow at Columbia, brought these search methodologies to the attention of PETA. Dr. E. Sander Connolly, et al., published their findings in Stroke:

Methods: Eight baboons (20–25 kg) were enrolled in the hypothermia arm of the study and compared to eight control animals that underwent stroke without placement of the catheter. Hemispheric stroke was created by transorbital occlusion of the left internal

7 carotid and bilateral anterior communicating arteries for one hour. The uniformity and adequacy of the ischemic insult was confirmed with intraoperative motor evoked potentials. Ninety minutes after the clips were removed (150 minutes after the onset of ischemia), the cooling catheter (10 french) was placed into the inferior vena cava via the femoral vein. Hypothermia to 32 C was then induced and maintained for 6 hours. Infarct volume on 72h T2­MRI, survival/self­sufficiency, and neurologic score at days 3 and 9 were evaluated. Animals that were not self­sufficient were sacrificed on day 3. [Stroke 31 (11), 2829­2829 486 Nov 2000]

This report from the “Meeting Abstract” of Stroke suggests that the animals were euthanized, refuting claims by federal and university investigators that the animals were not properly euthanized. But, prior to their deaths, were the animals properly treated? MORAL STATUS AND MORAL WORTH It is obvious that our treatment of animals ranges from decent and respectful to inhumane and barbaric. To understand how it is possible, or even if it is, to use animals in more invasive ways, we must understand what is meant when we claim that animals have moral status. It is also necessary to determine whether all animals, or only some, have moral status. These investigations might allow us to either justify or condemn the more maleficent uses humans have for animals. If possession of moral status entails a being’s inherent worth, it seems that using a being as a means to a further end, regardless of its importance, is unjustifiable. However, if possessing moral status merely indicates that some consideration must be given to the being’s interests, then it seems possible that the being may be subjected to some manner of use. What does moral status entail? Many people have no compunction against using animals for transportation, assisting the handicapped or mere companionship. It is when the use of the animal requires its death or suffering that “the furtherance of human needs” comes into question. I intend to concentrate on the more intrusive human use of animals, disregarding less invasive practices. Can humans cause the death or suffering of animals and remain moral? In the literature regarding moral consideration of animals, it becomes apparent that some writers refer to moral status and others moral worth. Is there a distinction between these concepts? While ‘status’ seems to refer to some factual characteristic

8 about the being, ‘worth’ appears to be an evaluative notion. Yet, ultimately, both terms carry an implication for the degree of moral consideration or resultant moral treatment 2 a being is owed based upon the moral status it is granted. Kant and Regan both write about moral worth and seem to place an emphasis upon the evaluative nature of the concept and its relation to rights and duties. In contrast, Singer refers to status and is more concerned with factual characteristics which establish a being’s claim to moral consideration. The common meanings of ‘status’ and ‘worth,’ as explored in the philosophic literature, can aid in our understanding of these terms. Dictionary definitions, furthermore, show that the two terms are quite distinct. Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary offers the following: status . . . n. 1. the position of an individual in relation to another or others, esp. in regard to social or professional standing. 2. state or condition of affairs . . . 3. Law. The standing of a person before the law.—adj. 4. conferring or believed to confer elevated status’: a status car; a status job.” [Steinmetz, p. 1862] worth . . . prep. 1. good or important enough to justify (what is specified): advice worth taking . . . 2. having a value or, or equal in value to, as in money . . . 3. having property to the value or amount of.—n. 4. excellence of character or quality as commanding esteem . . . 5. usefulness or importance as to the world, a person, or for a purpose, etc.” [Steinmetz, p. 2191]

‘Status’ is defined as a noun, capable of being an adjective, whereas ‘worth’ is normally a preposition used to modify nouns, verbs and adjectives. However, ‘worth’ as a noun is more pertinent for our considerations. Most philosophers, when writing about morality, rely on the first meaning for ‘status.’ However, they allow some fact or feature regarding the second meaning to determine the first. Specifically, a being’s possession of a characteristic, such as sentience, can influence determinations of its moral status in relation to other sentient and nonsentient beings. Worth seems more evaluative in nature, making it distinct from status since status is largely based upon some determined fact. Possession of rationality, sentience or merely life is a fact which can be proven. Worth is less tangible; it seems to

2 For ease of readability, I will drop the term ‘moral’ when referring to moral consideration and moral treatment. If these terms are used in any other context, it will be clearly stated that the consideration/treatment is not intended to be moral.

9 be a matter of an evaluator’s perspective. Worth is more stipulative, someone declares such value. Status is more empirical it can be tangibly verified. Moral literature does not use the two terms interchangeably. Some writers are concerned with status; others, worth. To further complicate matters there are several types of worth referred to in the literature as well as types of status. Briefly, the levels of worth are: inherent, where the value of a being is not comparable to any other value; intrinsic, where the value is based upon internal experiences of the being; and, instrumental, where the value of the being is based upon its function, or usefulness. It is important to realize that inherent worth can only be stipulated; whereas, intrinsic and instrumental are both empirically verifiable. Status, in the literature, is empirically based upon reasoning abilities. Hence, mention of moral agents refers to humans capable of responding to moral reasoning. The remaining levels of status are moral patients and amoral beings. The former are usually judged to be beings deserving of moral consideration/treatment, yet, unable to reciprocate such behavior. The latter beings are given no consideration at all, e.g. sidewalks. MORAL CONSIDERATION AND MORAL TREATMENT The two terms ‘consideration’ and ‘treatment’ while irrevocably tied together when humans act, are quite distinct in meaning. Consideration is a thought process. Consideration can be evaluated by its duration or the actual conscious activity. Treatment is active, the specific action taken. Actions can be evaluated in and of themselves or by the actor’s intentions in acting. Lexical definitions show the intricacies of these terms: consideration . . . n. 1. the act of considering; careful thought; meditation; deliberation . . . 2. something that is or is to be kept in mind in making a decision, evaluating facts, etc . . . 3. thoughtful or sympathetic regard or respect:; thoughtfulness for others . . . 4. a thought or reflection; an opinion based upon reflection. 5. a recompense or payment, as for work done; compensation. 6. importance or consequence. 7. estimation; esteem: he is held in great consideration by the community . . . [Steinmetz, p. 434] treatment . . . n. 1. an act or manner of treating. 2. action or behavior toward a person, animal, etc. 3. management in the application of medicines, surgery, etc. 4. literary or artistic handling, esp. with reference to style. 5. subjection to some agent or action. . . [Steinmetz, p. 2015]

10 Most philosophers refer to the first or third meanings when using the term ‘consideration.’ Yet, meanings six and seven may also be applicable. ‘Treatment’ when used in moral literature is most commonly reflected by meanings one and two. Yet, meaning five could have some moral implications. Usually, philosophical literature focuses upon the relation between moral status and the resultant consideration/treatment moral agents grant others. It seems reasonable to view consideration as resulting in three possibilities: equal, unequal or none. Specifically, a being’s interests can be given either equal consideration, unequal consideration or no consideration at all. Treatment received often follows from the consideration awarded interests. Yet treatment seems to be either equal or unequal. Common sense suggests that ignoring something is still, in some manner, a form of treatment. Therefore, the possibility to receive no treatment is not available, as it is for consideration. It is important to distinguish between consideration and treatment. It seems possible to grant a being equal consideration, but treat it in an unequal manner. In feeding my household pets, I equally consider their need for nourishment, yet the treatment they receive is, strictly speaking, unequal. One pet, a large canine, is fed larger amounts of food than the other, a large feline. Yet the treatment, loosely speaking, is equal, since both pets receive nourishment in accordance with their specific needs. Unequal treatment would consist of feeding one animal but not the other. This last illustration suggests that it is possible to consider needs equally, while the resultant treatment is unequal. An objector might claim that this example does not grant the two pets equal consideration, based upon the unequal treatment received by one. This objection suggests that treatment is necessarily tied to consideration. Thus equal treatment can only result from equal consideration, and vice versa. However, many moral dilemmas result from an inability to meet two being’s needs, with one’s interests being met; the other’s, not. The fact that a moral agent is experiencing the dilemma suggests that equal consideration is given; otherwise there would be no dilemma. The fact that only one’s interests can be satisfied suggests that unequal treatment can result from equal consideration. This being the case, it is important to separate consideration

11 from treatment. Often moral status enters into deliberations regarding consideration and, ultimately, treatment received. The claim that moral status is either granted equally or not granted at all demands that equal treatment be given to all beings that possess moral status. This is Regan’s position, which will be described in chapter three. Sometimes the equality position regarding moral status entails equal consideration. This is Singer’s stance. In chapter four, I will review his utilitarian approach, which concludes that animal needs deserve consideration equal to human needs. Yet he notes that equal consideration may not result in equal treatment for animals. Kant denies animals moral status and yet still claims they deserve moral treatment. I will discuss his approach to the consideration and treatment of animals in chapter two. THREE APPROACHES IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE Justice requires that equal consideration be given to equals. Whether animals ought to receive moral consideration equal to humans is a question underlying this dissertation. I will explore whether two beliefs—animals have moral worth and it is morally acceptable to use animals to further important human needs—are shown by the literature to be either compatible or incompatible. Literature claiming the two beliefs are incompatible denies the truth of one of the beliefs. My approach to the literature will characterize views ranging between two extremes. One extreme grants moral worth only to humans, or rational beings, with moral consideration or treatment due only to humans. This approach denies the truth of the statement claiming that animals have moral worth. This view must ultimately provide justification for denying animals equality with humans, thereby allowing the invasive use of animals. This may be accomplished by denying animals inherent worth, with the resultant effect of denying animals moral consideration. The other extreme grants moral status to all creatures capable of demonstrating sentience or possession of interests and desires. According to this extreme, any creature with moral status must receive equal consideration and equal treatment. This view is forced to deny that animals may be used to further important human needs and seeks to demonstrate that animals have intrinsic worth equal to humans. This position argues that anything with intrinsic worth ought to receive equal consideration of its needs to the exclusion of its use for others. Kant

12 represents the first extreme that only grants moral worth to humans. Regan is juxtaposed to show the other extreme granting equal moral worth to both humans and animals. Singer follows as a moderate view, as he claims animal interests are equal to human interests, but that when an important interspecies conflict occurs animal interests must be thwarted. All three writers are very through and provide excellent ethical insights. The fifth chapter will consider whether traditional western thought has been mislead in the search for establishing moral worth due to such prominent writers as Kant, Regan and Singer. This chapter turns the focus from the individual and its possession of certain characteristics for demonstrating moral worthiness and instead, considers the outward relationships that the individual shares with others to form moral status. This chapter will utilize the works of Aristotle, Aldo Leopold, J. Baird Callicott and Emile Durkheim to establish a hybrid view grounding moral worth in what is dubbed a perfect­relationship view. Aristotle was one of the first ethicists to discuss morality and the importance of relationships. His virtue ethics, sometimes called the perfectionist view, provides the much need grounding of the importance of the individual and said individual’s teleology. Emile Durkheim provides some empirical support. He establishes the interspecies interdependence. Further, he provides a methodology of grounding moral rules in what he calls division of labor. This grounding is supplemented by considerations of Kant, Regan and Singer. In particular, Kant’s methodology of developing duties is a useful tool for the moral agent as is Regan’s methodology of reflective moral stipulation. Singer’s introduction of the replaceability thesis provides a much needed resolution for conflicts of interests.

13 CHAPTER TWO

KANT’S MORAL THEORY AS IT RELATES TO ESTABLISHING MORAL WORTH

Kant argues that only rational beings are capable of making and acting upon moral judgments, and further those rational beings are the only beings worthy of direct moral consideration. His second claim does not necessarily follow from the first; therefore Kant must provide a separate argument to make this claim credible. Kant and his contemporaries had a seemingly dualistic conception of human psychology and its influence upon morality. Humans were either motivated by reason or inclination. Given this perception, Kant was intent upon grounding morality in reason, rather than mere inclination. In Lectures, Kant claims that “the supreme principle of all moral judgment lies in the understanding:” [Infield, p. 36] With this statement he asserts that the grounding of morality must not be confused with the motivation to be moral. He goes on to state that the first principle of morality is the normative aspect; i.e., the establishment of the rules or norms. The second principle, according to Kant, is providing the incentive to be moral and while this second principle might serve human inclination, it cannot provide the grounding necessary for an objective foundation of morality. The grounding of the rules cannot be in inclination since, “Ethics is no analysis of inclination but a prescription which is contrary to all inclination.” [Infield, p. 37] This statement suggests that ethics is not descriptive but rather prescriptive. One does not describe how one acts in order to derive morality, that would merely be a detailed analysis of inclination­based behavior. Instead, Kant views ethics as prescriptive, informing one on how one ought to act by deriving rules through the use of reason. Through morality, reason overrules inclinations. Morality must provide not only instructions for how to act rightly, and why one ought to act rightly; it must also provide justification for determining such notions of right and wrong. This, Kant claims, can only be accomplished through human reason. Kant offers a teleological proof for grounding morality in reason. By establishing the true purpose of reason, Kant denies that ultimate good is an attainment of happiness. If morality is grounded in reason and reason’s purpose is not the attainment of happiness, and morality’s purpose is to establish ultimate good, it follows that happiness is not the

14 goal of morality. In The Categorical Imperative, Paton notes Kant’s assumptions for this argument which he finds in Critique of Pure Reason at B425. (1)that an organic being is a whole adapted to a purpose or end, namely life; (2) that in such a being every organ is adapted to a purpose or end which is an element in the total purpose or end; and (3) that every such organ is well fitted and completely adequate, to attain its purpose or end. [Paton, p. 44]

Reason, in Kant’s estimation, directs will. Reason, he concludes is not well fitted to the production of happiness. In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant offers a reductio ad absurdum to demonstrate reason’s unsuitability as the means to happiness. He begins by assuming that a being, possessing both reason and will, has as its ultimate purpose happiness, which he describes as self­preservation or welfare. He claims that instinct is better suited for achieving this end. If happiness is the end of reason it often falls short of producing this end, and if assumption three is correct it follows that this cannot be the end of reason since every organ is expected to attain its purpose. Kant claims that “the more a cultivated reason concerns itself with the aim of enjoying life and happiness, the farther does man get away from true contentment.” [Paton, p. 63] Since his assumption about the purpose of reason—production of happiness—leads to a contradiction; i.e., it does not always succeed in doing so, Kant rejects the assumption given presupposition three in the above quote. He concludes that reason must have another end, not as a means to something else, but in and of itself. According to Kant, reason’s ultimate end is the production of will, and if it is to be an unconditioned good then the will to be developed must also be good. Kant’s argument in support of his moral system rests upon this supposition that the only unconditioned, or absolute, good is good will. Good will can only exist within a rational being. Such a being can cultivate a good will by choosing to act from a duty to respect the law, which requires the moral agent to create and act upon maxims conforming to this respect for law. These last two claims are intricately tied together. Law can only be comprehended by a rational being and only a rational being can see the necessity of respecting the law. Brendan Liddell succinctly states Kant’s understanding of the relationship between law and good will when he states, “[t]he goodness of the goodwill is its respect for law.” [Liddell, p. 77] Kant must provide a supplemental argument supporting his claim that the only proper moral motive, the only way to

15 cultivate a good will, is the motive of having a duty to respect the moral law. Human behavior has many motivators—feelings, inclinations, dispositions or desires. Kant argues that only duty can provide necessity and consistency required by moral behavior. All other human motivators provide only contingent moral behavior, since these motivators are subject to influences which might motivate the agent to behave immorally. Only duty, personified by respect for law, will undoubtedly generate the good will a moral agent seeks. Kant’s second premise claims that moral judgments can only be based upon the agent’s motive for acting and not the action’s result. This builds upon Kant’s ultimate good, which is the cultivation of a good will. Results cannot develop such a will, only motives. Thus, Kant claims that an agent’s action must be judged by the agent’s motive rather than by the action’s resultant effect. Let an illustration clarify this point: you find a wallet containing a lot of cash and the owner’s driver’s license. In scenario one you return the wallet because the owner might give you a monetary reward. In scenario two you return the wallet because it belongs to the person. In both instances the result is the same, the wallet is returned to its rightful owner. But most people would find scenario two morally superior to scenario one. One more illustration will show how compelling Kant’s claim is. You are walking on a deserted beach when you spot a young woman struggling in the water and calling for assistance. Despite your inability to swim you rush into the water with the intent to offer aid. As you are not a very good swimmer, you do not reach the drowning woman in time to save her, you only manage to bring her lifeless body to shore. Your actions resulted in an ineffective rescue, yet your motive to offer aid shows that you are a moral agent. If the result of an action determines its moral worth, your rescue mission would not be judged moral since you were unsuccessful. Thus, Kant’s claim that one’s motive for acting ought to be the basis for our moral judgments, rather than the effects of our actions, seems intuitively correct. The third premise in Kant’s argument claims that there is only one motive which generates moral behavior. This motive is duty to the moral law, because it is the law. Only reason can generate this motive. His proof for this premise requires a demonstration that shows inclination, whims, or mere propensity to act morally, are not sufficient to generate the good will a moral agent seeks. Inclination can just as easily

16 lead one to act immorally, since inclination is basically seeking one’s best interest. Inclination is very close to instinctual behavior. Instinctual behavior is self­serving. And while it can be successful, it cannot guarantee good works; it is not capable of providing the strength morality requires because if one does not gain from the process one will not act as proscribed by morality. As for good behavior based upon a mere whim, random acts of kindness, while nice, cannot yield the certainty of morality Kant seeks; mere feeling is no basis for morality. Only the recognition of our duties to oneself and others will render Kant’s required necessity. Therefore, moral motivation, Kant claims, lies in reason. This is because reason is the only faculty that can provide recognition of a duty to the law, due to the fact that it is law. In his fourth premise, Kant attempts to describe, or explain, the law of which he speaks. The law, for Kant, is understood as the conception of law itself. The meaning of the word ‘law’ implies a necessity, or universal obligation to obey law. Kant is not referring to any particular law, when he claims that “duty to the law” is the only moral motive. He recognizes that only reason can comprehend the meaning of ‘law’ and impel the will to respect the universal nature of this concept. Thus, according to Kant, reason is where law originates and reason must motivate conformity to law. Kant obviously sees human good as fulfillment of the human capacity for reason, which he characterizes as goodwill. Thus morality must coincide with the development of reason. Kant embeds morality within reason, making reason the origin and justification for morality. Kant’s argument for reason being the origin of morality has strong credibility. However, Kant cannot make the leap from the observation that only humans have reason and therefore can be the only moral agents to the much stronger and important claim that only moral agents are due direct moral consideration, or are owed the respect culminating in moral worth. Kant presents this argument much more subtly in chapter two of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Here, Kant stipulates that something that has a price or an equivalent; i.e.; replacable or tradeworthy, is not something that has dignity. [Kant, p. 102] He argues that only humans have such dignity, and thus only humans are irreplaceable.

17 KANT’S CONCEPTION OF MORAL WORTH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ANIMALS

When Kant considers animals he again appeals to Aristotelian teleology 3 —the belief that everything has a fundamental function particular to that kind of existence and that the fulfillment of this is “good” for that kind of being. Plants having only the ability to grow or wither, an ability sometimes called the nutritive function, reach their good by thriving. Animals possess not only the nutritive function, but also have inclinations due to their possession of a will. This capacity of will allows animals to meet their nutritive function. Given this dual nature, animal good is the fulfillment of inclinations of will. Humans share both the nutritive and the inclination faculties with plants and animals. What sets humans apart is a third capacity—reason. So humans, being rational animals, best serve their function by developing and using their faculty for reason since this function has the potential to assist the other two functions. While it seems true that morality is an aspect of rational minds and if we grant Kant the claim that morality originates within the capacity for reason, some work must still be done to establish that animals, plants and non­living things are not due some respect in and of themselves. Kant’s claim is that these non­human beings may be given moral treatment but only as means to further human ends. This notion is sometimes referred to as indirect duties. Thus the claim is that only humans are owed direct duties while all other things might be granted indirect duties—indirect because the duty is to humans and out of respect for humanity these ‘things’ will be given some moral treatment. Thus an animal ought not to be mistreated because such behavior might culminate in treating humans poorly. Land ought to be respected since it is important to humans and their survival. The difficulty of possessing only second­class status is that indirect duties seem easier to ignore than direct duties. If Bill owes Fido the direct duty not to beat him, Bill would be less inclined to take a swat at Fido. Whereas, a mere indirect duty to not beat Fido since Bill might beat Janice seems less compelling to Bill

3 In the Groundwork at 395, the section titled “The function of reason”; Kant is using a teleological, or functionalist, argument to establish reason’s function is to achieve a good will and not some other purposive end like happiness. This is not the only argument he provides to support his conclusion that only a good will has value without exception. However, the traditional understanding of the Kantian argument it that morality being rational and a priori it is not interested in pursuing goals. [Paton, p. 17 and 62]

18 who knows he would never beat Janice since he owes her this direct duty. Indirectly valuing the importance of land for future human users seems to have led to many abuses of land. If land were granted value in and of itself, many people might think twice before littering or clear cutting mountainsides. Given the less than satisfactory position of possessing second­class moral citizenship, the argument establishing [direct duties as applying only to humans] must be based upon something other than the mere possession of one distinguishing characteristic—reason—which grants such favorable status to humans. Kant claims that animals are incapable of reasoning and unable to make judgments. Furthermore, he claims that they are not self­conscious. [Infield, p. 239] These claims are not supported by proof, but are merely assertions Kant makes. Lack of these abilities in animals, is his basis for granting superior moral status to humans, which seems to rely upon an epistemic limitation of human beings since we cannot know if animals have the ability to reason, make judgments or be self­conscious. However, humans can only truly know what other humans experience and strive for. It seems that Kant’s direct duties to others rely upon reason’s capacity to sympathize with other rational beings. 4 [Gregor, p125] Given Kant’s reliance upon the teleological conception of good, which he refers to as natural perfections, it follows that humans owe one another respect, and sometimes a helping hand, that allows others to develop their natural perfection. Kant claims that humans have a strong, narrow duty to develop their natural perfection. Yet he weakens his claim by noting that humans actually have three natural perfections and that it is therefore an imperfect or wide duty given the right of choice humans have regarding which perfection to develop. The natural perfections Kant conceives are perfections of mind, soul and body. Humans are free to develop either of these. [Gregor, p. 112] This might be viewed as a weakness because a human might neglect the capacity of the mind in favor of the soul or body. This neglect of the mind seems to allow a neglect of the capacity of reason—the faculty that sets humans apart from all other things. Kant may avoid this problem by noting that reason is required in the development

4 The human being’s seeming ability to sympathize with other rational beings seems to make an ontological claim about other minds, namely there are other minds found in humans.

19 of all three powers. If so, the natural perfection of the mind is not equal to the development of reason, since mind development has so many other possible occupations. If Kant is correct that the direct duty we owe ourselves and others is participation in meeting the goal of developing these natural human perfections, it seems that such a duty relies upon the human ability to “know” what other humans experience and desire. Such knowledge seems possible, within limits. But is it the mere ability to sympathize with another enough to ignore the needs of beings with which we are unable to sympathize? Proof that Kant’s moral system is based upon the human ability to make close estimations of other humans’ needs can be found in the description Kant provides for the direct duties we owe each other. He generalizes these duties as being duties of love and duties of respect. ‘Love’ defined by Kant is the maxim of benevolence; whereas, ‘respect’ is the “maxim of limiting our self­esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person.” [Gregor, pp. 116­117] In practice the duty of love will oblige a debt in others while that of respect only obligates oneself. A closer look at the maxims derived from our duty of love for others provides plausibility to a further claim that moral agents need an ability to know the wants and needs of other beings in order to fulfill this duty. The first maxim is that of beneficence, the idea that morality requires our helping others when we are in a position to do so. Granted this help is limited by the acknowledgement that we are not obligated to help someone in pursuing an immoral action. Kant claims that “. . .benevolence is required for its own sake, in order to present the world in its full perfection as a beautiful moral whole, even if we do not take into account the advantage it brings (in the way of happiness).” [Gregor, p. 127] The second maxim derived from the duty of love is gratitude. Gratitude is the honoring of one who has done you a kindness. One can do this actively by verbal acknowledgement of the feeling of gratitude, or one can do it passively by holding affection for the person who has done you a kindness. Accepting assistance without feeling such gratitude is ignoring this moral maxim and undermines human dignity in both oneself and in others. The final maxim resulting for the duty of love is sympathy. Not to be understood as pity, Kant viewed sympathy as the active participation “in the fate of others.” [Gregor, p. 126] Sympathy requires that we as moral agents do not ignore

20 the successes and failures of others; instead we are obligated to express both joy and sorrow as appropriate. All the duties of love seem to indicate that humans cannot achieve a good will by isolating ourselves from one another. One cannot claim to be a moral person based on the fact that one has not directly harmed anyone, because as the maxims founded upon the duty of love indicate we are obligated to get involved with others and by not doing so we fail to pursue our natural perfection as moral agents. Given Kant’s description of duties we owe others, it seems that his implication— that morality is limited to humans and human dignity—follows. Kant states that dignity in other men is “a worth that has no price or no equivalent for which the object of esteem could be exchanged.” [Gregor, p. 132] This notion of dignity has transformed into our current notions of inherent moral worth, the claim that something is valuable in and of itself and is therefore irreplaceable. The difficulty in attributing to Kant’s position a reliance upon the ability to know the minds of other humans is twofold. The first difficulty is addressed by ethical skeptic positions which claim that we can never know the true wants and needs of others, that we are limited in knowing only our own. And given this limitation, when we guess and attempt to help others we create more harm than good in the world. This criticism rests upon an unwritten premise that others are unable to successfully communicate their needs. This is a presupposition that is hard to accept, and therefore it weakens the skeptic’s claim of an epistemic gap between ourselves and other humans. The second difficulty in allowing Kant’s position to rely so heavily upon the ability to sympathize is that such ability need not be limited to other humans. It seems that we can know some of the important wants and needs of non­humans. We can share similar experiences, such as the need for food and shelter. Recalling the three faculties humans possess: nutrition, inclination and reason; it seems that our abilities to empathize can be extended to include others sharing any of these faculties. Granted we can only share at the levels these beings possess and a fully robust understanding of their needs seems limited by an inability to communicate. It is true that understanding animals have needs, or inclinations, does not provide proof that animals reason. 5 Regardless, even if we limit Kant’s indirect proof to

5 Regan argues that scientific evidence exists which proves animals engage in some form of reason and goal setting.

21 allow that only human beings are owed direct duties, it does not seem to hold up to scrutiny, if his direct duties are dependant upon the ability to sympathize with other rational humans. This is because Kant does not offer any argument claiming that it is possible to know if other human minds exist. What is more concerning for Kant is that if he is correct in claiming that we have a duty to benevolence, and, as he notes, it is possible for humans to recognize that sometimes animals need assistance, then why is it that we do not have a direct duty of benevolence to animals? One might argue that direct duties require a reciprocal relationship between beings, that the duties of love and respect must be exchanged between the parties involved. In order to receive benevolence, gratitude or sympathy one must be able to give these. Plants definitely seem to be excluded from this reciprocal relationship, given their nutritive existence. Animals demonstrate a will that is led by inclination. Given Kant’s insistence that morality and duties cannot be grounded in inclination, he would be unwilling to admit that animals can demonstrate any participation in these three maxims. He would argue that we are exhibiting an amphiboly of reason when we grant seemingly analogous behavior—benevolence, gratitude or sympathy—in animals. Kant would insist that his maxims are firmly founded in reason and therefore only beings capable of reason are capable of acting upon the duties of love, regardless of animal behavior that seems to mimic these duties. He might even observe that our ability to sympathize leads us to this error of assuming that animals are capable of such a reciprocal relationship. We tend to anthropomorphize non­human beings because we are prone to accepting the other as an extension of ourselves. Kant would follow this observation with the claim that it is an error in reasoning to do so, since non­rational beings will never possess the ability to participate in a reciprocal moral relationship, given that morality, and reciprocity, are firmly grounded in reason. Kant acknowledges that the similarities in the relationships between animals and humans can lead us to presuppose that they are owed direct duties. But it is their lack of self­consciousness which precludes them from being able to reason. This reply to the criticism that humans seem to be able to sympathize with non­humans therefore non­humans ought to be granted direct duties relies upon a qualification that morality must be a reciprocal relationship. This qualification is not found in Kant’s writings, and thus such a rebuttal is weakened by the lack of textual

22 support. However, Kant does seem to imply that all duties are reciprocal. All moral agents are expected to reciprocate love, benevolence and gratitude when appropriate. It seems that the duties an individual owes to others are also owed in return to the individual.

WHY GIVE ANIMALS INDIRECT DUTIES?

It would be unfair to view Kant as condoning the mistreatment of animals by my placing him on the extreme end of the scale where animals have no moral worth. His views are not understood as justifying inhumane, invasive uses of animals to which some humans succumb. However, his view has a narrow scope since it ostracizes non­ reasoning beings. By grounding morality in reason, Kant has conceived a system of morality that can only owe duties to other duty­bearing individuals. According to Kant, humans are the only beings capable of abiding by the rules, which they create; therefore, they are the only ones worthy of respect. This position raises the question: Why does Kant grant animals indirect duties? Why can we not take Descartes’ position and merely view animals as automatons? This would make our use of animals uncomplicated. Kant’s writing has provided an answer to this question. Kant reasons that since animals exhibit analogous attitudes to humans and provide analogous services, humans have a tendency to treat animals and humans similarly. In other words, if we treat animals badly we will be predisposed to treat humans in the same manner, or vice verse. Kant uses the example of the faithful dog to show the similarities in service. The similar attitude he refers to is in the caring for their young. [Infield, p. 240] There is some credence to his claim considering how many humans tend to anthropomorphize animals, particularly pets. It seems from Kant’s position that animals are close enough to humans, in attitudes and relationships, that we owe them indirect duties; but, not being human excludes them from being owed direct duties. How are indirect duties to be understood? The general notion is that an indirect duty to an animal is constituted as a direct duty to either an individual human or humanity in general. For instance, a moral agent utilizing a Kantian perspective cannot tease or beat her neighbor’s dog because of a duty owed to the human neighbor, not the dog itself. Or, a Kantian moral agent should protect

23 endangered species in order to ensure that future generations of humans can enjoy said species at a later date. The duty is to humans, animals are indirectly served. Kant is often criticized as being “too extreme” for his response that animals are owed nothing directly, as if they were rocks or pencils. The usual complaint is that by focusing upon what separates humans from animals, he overlooks the most basic behavior we share with animals, namely, the capacity to suffer. This shortsightedness on Kant’s part is doubly disconcerting as illustrated by Alexander Broadie and Elizabeth M. Pybus because Kant acknowledges the analogous behaviors between animals and humans and yet ignores the importance of these similarities. The many similarities animals have with humans, like the ability to demonstrate affection and feel pain, are implicitly deemed by Kant unimportant because animals lack the one key moral feature Kant recognizes—reason. Broadie and Pybus, assuming a utilitarian premise that the presence of suffering in the world lowers the greatest happiness quotient, claim that because Kant ignores the importance of animals’ ability to suffer his theory fails to meet the task he, himself, set. 6 They claim that the task most moral theorists, beginning with Aristotle and including Kant, undertake is to demonstrate that their moral system is in compliance with common, ordinary, ask­the­guy­on­the­street­morality. The challenge for this approach to morality is that if there is a variance from common understandings of morality, then the theorist is charged to either (1) show that the inconsistency is in actuality not inconsistent it just seems so prima facie, or (2) stick to his guns and demonstrate that ordinary morality is wrong on this particular issue. [Broadie and Pybus (’74), p. 375] First, recall Kant’s extreme position that animals are not owed any direct moral concern, and then consider your own internal intuitions and the views of some of your friends. Is there a conflict? It seems that there is something that separates us from animals, yet, at the same time it seems that (at least some) animals are deserving of direct moral concern. Many of us are vaguely aware that animals are suffering for our benefit. Yet, in our presence, we would not tolerate the intentional discomfort of animals. Is proximity the only relevant feature for the common, ordinary moral belief? Perhaps Kant is not in such

6 There is some discrepancy here since Kant did not explicitly claim to show how his theory was in compliance with common morality. Instead he claimed that common morality provided the starting point for finding justification for moralities first principle—namely, for Kant, the importance of inculcating a respect for law.

24 discord with ordinary moral attitudes towards animals. For if the gal­on­the­street were made aware of the cruel treatment many animals receive, would she devote any of her time to lessen this suffering? Or would she merely give lip­service to the immorality of mistreatment and say, “that’s horrible,” while she contemplates her next leather­clad step down the street? The sad truth is Kant’s position reflects ordinary moral beliefs very well. At least he seems to recognize that we as humans seem inconsistent in acting upon our duties, if any, to animals. There seems to be something which separates humans from nonhumans making it possible to use nonhumans towards our own ends. Broadie and Pybus seem to suggest that everyone accepts their criterion of the capacity to suffer for granting moral worth. This presupposition requires further proof if their claim that Kant does not reflect ordinary morality is to be deemed a credible criticism. It should be pointed out, against Broadie and Pybus that Kant never claimed that his moral system is, or ought to be, consistent with common morality. His claim was that the search for the fundamental principle upon which to ground morality can begin by examining common morality, in particular obligations common morality imposed upon human action. Perhaps Broadie and Pybus are claiming that any moral system must be consistent with common morality and if it does not so coincide it must be rejected. However, this reading of their argument cannot be accepted since they themselves note that when a moral theory does not agree with common morality there are other avenues for the theorist to take rather than rejecting the theory. One possibility is to explain away the apparent inconsistency, which Kant does attempt, or another is to try to convince common morality to adopt the new precept or theory. So reading Broadie and Pybus’ objecting argument as a modus tollens argument, while a valid form proves to be unsound since the premise—if a moral system is to be deemed correct, then it must directly reflect (be consistent with) common morality—is a false one. Broadie and Pybus ought to take the second challenge against Kant, and ordinary common sense morality; since, in the first challenge, they seem to have been bested by Kant. Instead their argument attempts to show that Kant’s position that animals are only owed indirect duties undermines Kant’s other position that moral agents ought never treat humanity, or the nature of humanity, reason, as a mere means but always as an end. In other words, they claim to have found incoherence within Kant’s system itself.

25 They begin their proof by pointing out that Kant’s inference from animals not being persons, to persons not owing any duties to animals, does not entail that our treatment of animals does not merit moral scrutiny. Kant acknowledges this as well. They state that, “. . .any behavioral expression of rational agency whatsoever is morally assessable.” [Broadie and Pybus (’74), p. 378] This means that all actions committed by moral agents must be “. . .demanded by the moral law, consistent with the moral law, or prohibited by the moral law.” [Broadie and Pybus (’74), p. 378] For Broadie and Pybus “the moral law” is the categorical imperative, in either of its various formulations. Broadie and Pybus restate the ends/means distinction noting that, under Kant’s system, only humans are ends and everything else is a means or a mere ‘thing.’ They further reiterate the lower status of being a means; i.e., not being worthy of moral consideration. Yet, they claim that Kant’s statement, “He who wills the end wills the means,” entails some moral consideration is due to the ‘means’ of the world. They see a moral entailment following logically from this statement. [Broadie and Pybus (’74), p. 378] This statement by Kant, they claim, admits to an existent moral link, bound by logic, between ends and means. The link, as they see it, is that ‘things’ are granted moral consideration because of their relationship to the ends. What sort of relationship exists between means and ends, causal, perhaps? Broadie and Pybus claim that because of this relationship ‘things’ are afforded moral consideration. But Kant has explicitly stated that ‘things’ are not to be afforded such consideration because they are not persons. They so note this explicitness “[i]n The Doctrine of Virtue when he says:’. . .man can have no duty to beings other than men. If he thinks he has such duties, it is because of an amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, and his alleged duty to other beings is really a duty to himself.’” So, Kant’s system causes us to reach a contradiction, if Broadie and Pybus are correct about that logical link. And since Kant’s moral philosophical method is often understood as a reductio ad absurdum, he seems to be hoisted by his own petard. They succinctly state Kant’s absurdity with: His argument, put briefly, is to the effect that if human beings maltreat animals they will acquire a tendency to use rationality (in themselves or in other peoples) as a means. But, according to Kant, animals are, in the technical sense, things, and consequently are precisely what we should use as means. His argument therefore is that if we use certain things, viz. animals, as means, we will be led to use human beings as means. If this argument were generalized, Kant would have to say that using things as means would lead us to treat rational beings as means.” [Broadie and Pybus (’74), p. 382]

26 They claim that Kant cannot escape this absurdity since he does not point to a “morally relevant characteristic” differentiating animals from humans. Kant’s morally relevant characteristic is reason, yet this cannot extricate Kant from his difficulty because his argument forces the conclusion that “using animals as means will lead us to use rationality as a means.” [Broadie and Pybus (’74), p. 383] This conclusion, they claim, further implies that we ought to not use anything as a means, which is not only a logical, but also a physical, impossibility. Regan questions Broadie and Pybus’ account that Kant is incoherent. 7 He concedes Broadie and Pybus’ point that Kant may be at a variance with common morality on the moral consideration of animals. 8 Yet he disagrees with their conclusion that Kant has reached an absurdity, or that Kant is incoherent. Regan understands Broadie and Pybus’ objection as suggesting that maltreatment of animals is logically equivalent to being treated as a mere means. And if this is so, reasons Regan, then using a seeing­eye dog to navigate the streets is a form of maltreatment since the dog is used as a means to and end. [Regan (’76), p. 471] This seems to lead to an absurdity as well, so there must be a problem with the Broadie and Pybus’ objection to Kant. Regan seems to have parried their feint claiming “. . . that Kant does not maintain using animals as means will lead to the effects in question; what he does maintain is that maltreating them will.” [Regan (’76), p. 472] Broadie and Pybus reply by acknowledging that they may have conflated the two concepts, but that regardless, Kant cannot make the distinction between maltreatment and means, since he is committed to such an extreme position regarding animals having no moral worth due to their lacking the ability to reason. [Broadie and Pybus (’78), p. 560] This inability for Kant to make the distinction between maltreatment and means is bolstered by Broadie and Pybus’ pointing out that maltreatment can only be received by ends. Means are treated as means and given that they are owed no direct duties cannot be mistreated, only ends can be mistreated. Therefore, they claim Regan’s distinction between means and maltreatment does not hold for Kant.

7 While Brodie and Pybus’ claim of incoherence is strong and unorthodox, a lesser, more common charge against Kant is that his moral system is implausible, or impractical. Recall the “murderer at the door” objection to Kant’s claim that telling the truth is a perfect duty. 8 This point I do not concede, as most people reach the same conclusion as Kant.

27 IS KANT CORRECT IN MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECT AND INDIRECT DUTIES?

This question is concerned with whether Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duties is either necessary or informative? Kant’s adherence to his belief that only rational agents are owed any duties and his claim that we ought not mistreat animals, forces him to create a distinction between direct and indirect duties. He does not use the terms of direct and indirect duties; instead he distinguishes between ‘duties to’ and ‘duties regarding.’ Both types of duty, according to Kant, are grounded in the categorical imperative, particularly the formulation which states that we ought to act only in a manner that respects humanity, either in ourselves or in others, as an end and never as mere means. This formulation is referred to in the literature as the formulation of humanity or FH. Kant is forced into this distinction since he also claims that his theory can be shown to reflect common moral intuitions regarding duties. One duty that is seen as obligatory to common moral belief is that we ought not mistreat animals. Kant accommodates this belief by claiming that we have duties regarding animals, or an indirect duty, not to harm animals but that we do not have duties (directly) to animals, these duties are reserved only for other rational beings. Thus he has developed a distinction between direct and indirect duties, based upon his earlier argument that only rational beings ought to receive moral consideration. Animals are not to be mistreated because it is an affront to humans. Or, at least shows a possibility that humans could be harmed in a similar fashion. Kant’s solution seems a little ad hoc. In Kant and Direct Duties, Broadie and Pybus argue that Kant need not make his distinction between direct and indirect duties. They begin their argument by repeating their previous objection that Kant is either wrong about his system providing the foundation for ordinary morality or else his theory is inconsistent, because ordinary morality is at a variance with Kant’s position regarding animals and the type of duties owed to them by humans. [Broadie and Pybus (’81), p. 60] In order to be consistent, they claim, Kant must give up his commitment to the thesis that only persons are owed direct duties. [Broadie and Pybus (’81), p. 61]

28 Broadie and Pybus understand Kant’s ‘good will’ as the rational nature of human beings. The two concepts are equal in their view. So when a moral agent behaves morally by acting from a duty to the categorical imperative she is developing her rational nature, or her good will. Kant is committed to this understanding of good will, they argue, because he claims that the good will is the only unconditioned, unqualified good and the way we develop a good will is by acting from and respecting rationality. Broadie and Pybus argue further that since all action is towards some end, and moral action is towards the good, then moral action must be concerned with bringing about the only unconditioned, unqualified good—i.e., good will. Again, for Kant, moral action is rational action, so the end result must have a rational nature. Only humans have shown this rational nature, so only humans can be moral. Kant then goes on to claim that only humans are owed direct moral consideration. This last claim does not necessarily follow from the previous demonstration, however. For Broadie and Pybus, Kant’s conclusion—that we ought not to mistreat animals out of respect for human rationality—conflicts with the ordinary moral intuition that we “ought to treat animals well for the sake of the animals themselves.” [Broadie and Pybus (’81), p. 63] Kant’s solution to the seeming inconsistency in his theory’s conclusion about only owing rational beings moral consideration or duties and the opposing ordinary moral intuition that animals are owed some moral consideration or duties, is to introduce the notion of indirect duties. Yet, Broadie and Pybus see his solution as “merely papering over a large crack . . .” [Broadie and Pybus (’81), p. 63] They attempt to fill this gap by reconsidering the nature of ‘duty.’ Are duties owed to some other being or object? Broadie and Pybus claim that if it is possible to answer “no” to this question, then Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duties is superfluous. His distinction becomes meaningless and his difficulty of being inconsistent with ordinary moral intuition is cleared away. Animals could receive moral consideration, duties and the end of morality could still be the development of rationality as good will. What does a duty without an object entail? Broadie and Pybus illustrate the notion of a duty as “essentially a duty to act, not essentially a duty to an object.” [Broadie and Pybus (‘81), p. 64] They accomplish this illustration by considering a drowning man. When the moral agent sees the man drowning his duty is to act in order to save the

29 poor unfortunate fellow. They claim that the duty is not to the man, or his family, but to the principle of saving life if possible. [Broadie and Pybus (’81), p. 64] Broadie and Pybus claim that owing duties to principles and not to people remains consistent with Kant’s moral system and at the same time meets the common moral intuition that moral agents ought to act from the same motive in their treatment of non­rational and rational human beings. Broadie and Pybus seem confused here since Kant does recognize a duty to act, [but] the duty is not to the principle but to other persons. This duty is found when Kant claims that we must respect ends, meaning rational beings. In so respecting the rational beings, we respect the rule makers who establish the duties upon which we are required to act. So the duties are not to the principles, the rules themselves, but the rule makers. However, Broadie and Pybus realize that they must offer some demonstration that they have remained consistent with Kant’s original construction of his moral system. They note that Kant’s two main premises are: (1) moral action cannot have a material end; i.e., happiness, wealth, etc. And (2) rationality is the only unconditioned good. These two premises, they surmise, do not imply that the only end for moral action is rational nature. [Broadie and Pybus (’81), p. 65] They propose that moral action from a Kantian perspective need not seek a purposive end. Kant judges actions on the agent’s compliance with a duty to the moral law—that an action is right or good because it is commanded by such law. From these considerations, Broadie and Pybus believe they have extricated Kant from of his difficulty by abandoning the interpretation that morality seeks to increase rationality or a good will. Instead morality is merely the internalization of a duty to principles created by rationality, but is not a furtherance of rationality itself. By dismissing the purposive end conception of morality, they have succeeded in showing that the distinction between direct and indirect duties is uninformative as duties are owed only to the principles themselves. How the principles are created and established remains strictly Kantian, what is meant by moral action, too, remains Kantian; however, the notion that morality seeks a goal—ultimate good—has been abandoned. This is very much opposed to Kant’s position given his Kingdom of Ends conception, and yet they

30 offer no support, other than pragmatic, for rejecting the well­established belief that morality has a purposive end. 9 It is compelling to adopt Broadie and Pybus’ solution to Kant’s problem: merely deny the distinction between direct/indirect duties. Broadie and Pybus’ point that duties are owed to principles seems consistent with Kant, since Kant claims that the only correct moral motive is duty to the categorical imperative. So, their insistence that Kant does not need to make a distinction between direct and indirect duties remains appealing even if common moral intuitions fail to yield a need to recognize animals as having inherent moral worth. Since Kant claims that our moral duty is to act in compliance with the principles yielded by our application of the categorical imperative, it seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that our duties are to our principles and not to other beings or objects. Yet, one might wonder if common moral intuition requires that we owe each other something, instead of owing something to intangible abstract principles. If this is the case then Kant still faces a possible inconsistency in claiming that his moral system can yield the same moral claims and judgments common morality creates. Broadie and Pybus actually suggest a stronger opposition to Kant’s distinction when they discuss the priority of owing duties to oneself over duties to others. [Broadie and Pybus, (’74), pp. 380­1] If their observation is correct that duties to others is actually a furtherance of one’s duties to self, then there is in actuality only one duty—the one owed to oneself. At this point we have only established that duties to, or direct duties, have one grounding. It is incumbent upon this objection to establish that duties regarding, indirect duties, are also grounded in one’s duty to self. This is not difficult, since Kant argues this very point. Duties regarding non­rational beings derive from FH, the formulation of the categorical imperative which requires us to respect humanity as an end in itself. When we act in a manner that is inconsistent with our reasoning faculty we fail to respect the dignity of humanity. Thus, when we fail to treat animals in a manner that is

9 Traditionally, the Kantian position is seen as rejecting morality as being ultimately goal seeking. This rejection rests upon Kant’s claim that the right­making feature of an act lies in the action’s motive and not its result. While this is true concerning the internal workings of his moral system, it seems that the larger goal for Kant agrees with Aristotle’s claim that ‘the good is the end of all action.’ Thus, if there is an end to be sought [for Kant this is good will] it makes the larger goal for any system a purposive one. Further, current ‘Particularist’ ethical theorists view all moral systems as goal­seeking, or consequentialist. See the writings of David McNaughton and Piers Rawlings if interested in pursuing this view.

31 consistent with reason; i.e., torture or neglect, we are in actuality failing to respect ourselves. This seems to suggest that it is irrational to cause suffering, or to wantonly destroy non­living things. Yet, Kant seems to suggest that it is possible to justify human inflicted suffering or destruction, if it serves to further the respect owed humanity. Thus, Kant would be committed to allowing some animal experimentation if it will bring about a greater understanding regarding human nature or physiology. He acknowledges that, “[v]ivisectionists, who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as mans instruments. . .” [Infield, p. 240] How does the seeming fact that all duties, direct and indirect, are grounded in our direct duty to ourselves undermine Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duties? This acknowledgement might suggest that Kant’s distinction is obviously supported by such grounding. However, it seems possible to claim that Kant’s moral system ultimately results in one duty, the duty to respect rationality, or as Allen Wood interprets FH as a respect for rational autonomy. All actions which do not demonstrate a respect for rationality are deemed immoral. Thus there is only one direct duty —to rationality. The need to make a distinction between direct and indirect duties is merely further clarification of the one actual duty morally rational agents have. Thus in order to explain the one duty, Kant uses a distinction that is prima facie merely an illumination and not an actual indication of two types of duties. Unfortunately, this reading of Kant as advocating only one actual duty to humanity does render his theory vulnerable to the charge of speciesism. 10 Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duties may not be necessary if such duties are merely the enactment of the single duty to oneself. The further question remains, is his notion of indirect duties informative? J. Skidmore suggests in “Duties to Animals: the Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory,” that indirect duties cannot truly generate any moral protection for animals. Skidmore observes that Kant’s indirect duties to

10 Speciesism is the charge against moral systems that favor one species over another based upon a morally irrelevant feature upon which moral worth is awarded or denied. However, Kant might respond that rationality, being the ground for morality, is not morally irrelevant. The later chapter on Singer will explore this issue further, and make an argument against rationality as being the relevant characteristic for determining moral worth.

32 animals rest upon a contingent connection between how we treat animals and this type of treatment’s relevance to our treatment of human beings. [Skidmore, p. 558] The ability to mistreat animals must lie in the fact that animals seem to suffer. Regan and Singer, and even Kant, claim that animal suffering is analogous with human suffering. Thus, we ought not to cause animals to suffer. This difficulty with this argument is that it is outside a Kantian framework, since Kant does not recognize the absence of suffering as an unconditioned good. Given his adherence to the only unconditioned good being a good will, he need not be concerned with suffering per se. Thus an indirect duty approach to granting animals moral consideration and treatment cannot rely upon a shared ability to suffer. Skidmore points out the contingency of the relationship between how we treat animals and the resultant similar treatment of humans. All it takes to refute Kant’s claim that we ought not mistreat animals because it creates predisposition which could result in mistreating humans is one instance of someone who can mistreat animals without similar results in their human relations. Because it is conceivable that such a person exists, the relationship between animal and human treatment becomes contingent and not necessary. Thus Skidmore concludes that Kant’s indirect duties to animals cannot be grounded in our duties to one’s self, since there is no necessary relationship between how we treat animals and how we treat humans. This lack of necessity undermines Kant’s distinction in that it makes indirect duties uninformative. One further concern for Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duties lies within our duty to rationality itself. According to Kant, and others, our will is guided by reason. Kant notes that we will happiness, and this can be done rationally. He claims we have a duty to assure our own happiness and that of others, when he discusses the man who acts from duty despite his personal sorrow. This man acts morally, because his own psychological state has extinguished his ability to sympathize with others, much less care for himself, and yet he performs acts which help others. [Paton, p. 66] Sympathy seems to be the ground for the duty of benevolence—the obligation to help others. An implication from this duty is that rational agents will against suffering, in ourselves and other humans. Given the similar nature that animals exhibit in their ability to suffer, it seems we should also will that animals not suffer either. So if rationality and

33 benevolence lead to our willing against suffering, why would this exclude animals? Making a distinction between human and animal suffering seems irrational, undermining our duty to rationality. If Kant insists upon making a distinction between human and animal suffering, he must provide a compelling reason to adopt such a distinction. Possession of rationality alone does not seem relevant. Thus the speciesist charge may hold some weight against his position. CONCLUSION

If Kant is taken literally, then his moral system is limited to human beings based upon the human capacity to reason. Yet, the limitations of this position are difficult to ameliorate. A literal understanding that only rational beings are capable of being moral agents and recipients excludes some humans, particularly mentally challenged individuals and very young children. These exceptions show that a less literal translation is needed. However, if the scope of moral recipients can include non­rational humans why can it not be extended further to include animals? Furthermore, Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duties has been weakened by Broadie and Pybus’ relevant questioning. Kant definitely conceived his notion of moral worth after he established his theory of morality. His claim that his system has a limited scope of moral recipients, forced him to introduce the seemingly ad hoc distinction between direct and indirect duties. Kant’s theory of morality’s origin remains highly influential, while his restriction of moral recipients to include only rational beings has lost its allure to contemporary readers. It seems that a moral system based strictly upon reason is self­defeating, since Broadie and Pybus demonstrated that reason itself has shown the weaknesses inherent in such a system. Perhaps morality must encompass more than one aspect of the moral agent. It is true that moral agents have the ability to reason. But moral agents have other abilities as well. These will be explored in the following chapters.

34 CHAPTER THREE Tom Regan advocates for the strongest protection of animals by giving them many of the same rights humans have. He is an abolitionist. From his point of view, animals can no longer be used to further any human interests. He claims that morality requires that we no longer eat, restrict, train or experiment with animals. No more zoos, farms or laboratories can utilize the labor or lives of animals. His is a very strong stance. Thus he presents a more extremist view than Peter Singer [Chapter Four] who strongly endorses vegetarianism. Singer allows animal experimentation, if the need to do so would bring about a greater good. This chapter will provide a summary of Regan’s theoretical defense for his position, but will not directly challenge it due to its complexity. Instead, three questionable points of his position will be addressed: (1) Why does he insist animals must be given equal rights to humans? (2) Why does he narrow his scope of rights to mammals? And (3) does his allowing that sometimes rights can be overridden weaken his position? Another concern, that will not be addressed, where does he stand on owning animals as pets? His theory, when taken to its logical conclusion, ought to disallow this behavior as well. REGAN ON A MORAL THEORY Regan’s overall approach to proving his rights theory is to utilize the inference to the best explanation methodology. His first point is to show that morality must be grounded in our moral intuitions. He notes that ‘intuition’ is a vague term and needs to be further clarified if such grounding is to be accepted. One possible interpretation, which Regan rejects, is that our intuitions are self­evident. If intuitions are self­evident, then these ideas need not be subjected to further proof. Others see self­evidence as an admission that such ideas are incapable of proof. Given this understanding of intuition, it is possible to see why grounding our moral judgments in self­evident ideas is less than satisfactory. The other interpretation for ‘intuition’ sees these ideas as mere ‘gut reactions’, what Regan calls prereflective judgments. Such judgments seem grounded in our upbringing and socialization process, which some refer to as prejudices. Grounding morality in prereflective judgments suggests morality could be grounded upon false principles. Instead, Regan suggests that ‘intuition’, as grounding for morality, is best understood as reflective judgments or considered beliefs. Considered beliefs are ones we

35 subject to scrutiny by utilizing several criteria Regan provides to yield what he terms ‘ideal’ moral judgments. [Regan (83), pp. 126­130] As the best explanation methodology requires, Regan must rule out other possible groundings for morality in order to establish that his hypothesis is the best. The first grounding Regan rejects is that morality is founded upon our personal preferences. He observes that personal preferences, like preferring strawberry to chocolate ice cream, do not require providing reasons for why we hold such preferences. Unlike moral judgments, personal preferences do not conflict with others’ preferences. Preferences are facts about ourselves. Such facts do not need any justification. He notes that such preferences do not “deny what the other affirms.” [Regan (83), p. 122] On the other hand, moral judgments often conflict largely because our moral judgments are not limited to our individual lives, but are extended to others. Because of this extension such judgments do need reasons to support them. Regan next rejects basing morality in our feelings. These are rejected upon similar lines as the dismissal of preferences. Feelings, and preferences, are subjective truths about individuals and cannot provide support for objective truths about the world beyond the individual. [Regan (83), pp. 123­124] The next foundation Regan rejects is that morality is what we think it is. Thinking something is the case, in and of itself, does not make it so. Someone might think himself the king of France, but that does not make him the king of France. Furthermore, asserting what one thinks to be the case is radically different than claiming to know that something is the case. In the first instance, one need not provide support for one’s subjective thought processes; whereas, assertions about the world require such support. Claiming “I think x is wrong,” is not the equivalent of saying “x is wrong.” Asserting the latter needs further support, while the former can stand upon its own. It seems strange to press someone for reasons why they think something, but not so strange to require that someone support claims she want us to accept as the truth. [Regan (83), p. 124] Morality cannot be merely a matter of what the majority claims it to be, argues Regan, because the majority could be wrong. Again, ‘might makes right’ is not sufficient grounding for objective moral truth. Many examples exist throughout history where majority rule actually allowed immoral activity. Instances of slavery have occurred in the

36 majority of societies, not merely in the United States. Some primitive cultures also utilized slavery to achieve its goals. In all instances of slavery, the ruling majority asserted the practice as morally acceptable, but it does not follow from the mere acceptance of slavery that it is moral to subject other humans to such dehumanizing treatment. [Regan (83), pp. 124­125] The final foundation for morality rejected by Regan is the claim that morality can be grounded through an appeal to a higher moral authority. Such grounding claims that our moral rules have been obtained through the process of revelation from a supreme being. The difficulty with such grounding is that these revelations are subjected to various interpretations. Often the same source is used to justify contradictory claims about morality. Some cite the Bible as condemning the use of alcohol, while others find different passages regaling its use. [Regan (83), pp. 125­ 126] This is further complicated by the fact that different sources are also cited. The Koran provides one example. Different founding authorities force us to create some way of choosing which one is preferable. Thus a further standard is required. Regan, having rejected the other groundings, implies that moral intuitions— understood as reflective judgments—are the best foundation for morality. These intuitions, being reflective judgments, must undergo a process of acceptance or rejection. In order to deem our moral intuitions as ‘reflective judgments,’ we must subject them to a reasoning process in which we make “a conscientious effort to satisfy five . . . criteria of making an ideal moral judgment.” [Regan (83), p. 134] He states that ‘ideal’ moral judgments ought not only be based upon valid moral principles but must also reflect further criteria of clarity, information, logic, impartiality, and calmness. The last two criteria listed are concerned with the psychological mind­set of the moral agent. The first three seem more objective. Clarity, similar to precision regarding our principles, requires the absence of vagueness in our concepts. Agreement must be established regarding the actual meaning of the terms we use in making moral judgments. [Regan (83), p. 127] For instance, the term ‘person’ is vague, particularly when moral judgments about abortion or euthanasia are being considered. Some interpret ‘person’ as a rational thinking being, others merely require the presence of human DNA to award the term ‘person.’ Vagueness leads to the need for interpretation, complicating the understanding of the issue under consideration. Once the terminology is carefully clarified and agreement is

37 reached regarding the meaning of the terms, the facts regarding the particular instance must be established. Morality must be consistent with reality; therefore objective facts must be brought to the forefront and examined for their relevancy. [Regan (83), p. 127] It has been observed that many moral disagreements can be resolved once the relevant facts are determined and agreed upon. However, this procedure can be compromised by our personal predispositions causing us to suppress or overemphasize evidence. Thus, it is important that we utilize the remaining three criteria in the collection of said evidence. Logical consistency disallows direct contradictions or the potential for inconsistency. Our moral judgments must also adhere to the rules of logical implications. [Regan (83), p. 127] Regan stresses throughout his writing the importance of impartiality. Thus, it is no surprise that he asserts that an ‘ideal’ moral judgment requires similar treatment for similar beings. He claims that impartiality is a “formal principle of justice.” [Regan (83), p. 129] His final caveat is that ‘ideal’ moral judgments must be determined when the moral agent is calm, that one’s disposition must be emotionally detached from the inquiry. Simply speaking, one cannot make moral judgments in the “heat” of anger or when our other passions—desire, fear or even love—hold reign over our reason. One difficulty is that this requires the moral agent to make such judgments prior to the need of implementation. In order to successfully distance oneself from the situation, one needs to not be in the middle of a moral dilemma. Regan seems to be suggesting that moral agents ought to take the time to make these judgments in a state of equanimity. As many of us have noticed, most moral dilemmas do not afford such a state, thus we are expected to foresee a need to make these judgments for future use. Thus, coolness must be a test for our moral intuitions that we form prior to their implementation. If the moral agent follows Regan’s prescription for developing “ideal” moral judgments, or intuitions, then the process of adopting moral principles will be clarified. The moral agent will be that more adept at creating the much needed principles for others to adopt; however, a further set of criteria are to be used to examine such principles, which are moral “rules.” Such rules must be highly generalized, in order to apply to all moral agents in varying situations; whereas, intuitions guide the agent in the implementation of the principles. Regan utilizes a deontological approach to creating and

38 following moral principles. Moral principles are understood as prescriptions that, “. . . all moral agents are required to act in certain ways, thereby providing, so we are to assume, rational guidance in the conduct of life.” [Regan (83), p. 130] Moral principles are only general concepts to moral agents, which Regan describes as, “. . . individuals who have a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive it requires.” [Regan (83), p. 151] Given these definitions, ‘moral principles’ and ‘moral agents,’ it is clear that Regan must provide a method for such agents to create moral principles. The criteria for testing moral principles seem similar to those for moral intuitions, but in actuality rely on a higher standard for acceptance. Rightfully so, since these are supposed to be principles accepted by others, and thus need more justification than the intuitions of the individual moral agent. Regan suggests that this process involves utilizing criteria reminiscent of criteria used in determining the best scientific theories: consistency, scope, precision, impartiality, coherence and, ultimately, simplicity. In order to ensure clarity regarding Regan’s criteria it is important to reiterate what is meant by the terms, or labels, he suggest we use for scrutinizing moral principles. Consistency requires all the claims, or statements, within the principle itself are capable of being true at the same time, or that it is not possible that a claim can be both true and false. In order to be consistent, the moral principle that obligates moral agents not to kill innocent people cannot apply in one instance and at other times be overridden, if it is to meet this first criterion. [Regan, p. 131] Scope is the criterion which obligates a principle to be powerful enough to cover many instances, and not limited to one particular instance. Thus, the principle that claims “one ought not to kill one’s blond friends,” shows too limited an obligation; and, is therefore, incapable of providing scope. [Regan, p. 132] In order to avoid ambiguities, principles ought to be precise. Precision requires that the terms contained within the normative statements have clarity, or lack vagueness. Vagueness leads to far too much interpretation. Interpretation has previously been shown to lead to subjectivity and ultimately undermining the moral foundation. For example,

39 many moral writers consider ‘moral worth’ to be a vague term. What does ‘moral worth’ actually mean? Further, if one has it, what are the implications of such a characteristic? [Regan, p. 132­133] Regan’s final criterion is coherence. It is understood as requiring the principle to conform to our other basic beliefs, or principles that we have previously accepted as justified. [Regan, p. 133] Coherence theories claim that beliefs are interdependent in their justifications of each other. There is no one belief that is the foundation, justifying all the others, instead, each belief provides interchangeable support. Thus if one belief is found to be false, it can be abandoned while the rest remain, due to the interdependence of all. Regan might be suggesting that by going through the process of examining our moral principles we could reach a uniformity of beliefs, upon which we can rely when any moral decision­making is required. He suggests that Rawls’ “reflective equilibrium” process is the answer to providing a final foundation for morality. This process of equilibrium is the third step in establishing grounding for Regan’s moral theory. First one establishes his moral intuitions, and then adopts his moral principles. After which, through reasoning, he tests his principles and intuitions to see if there are any inconsistencies, for example does he favor the right to life, and yet endorse the death penalty? If any inconsistencies exist, they must be sorted out through revision of one’s intuitions or principles. If we subject our moral intuitions and principles to such a process, we would evaluate our basic beliefs and determine which ought to be employed, revised or abandoned. [Regan (83), p. 134] Again, principles withstanding this process could be deemed “binding on all moral agents [achieving] . . . consensus among ideal judges.” [Regan (83), p. 139] REGAN’S REJECTION OF COMPETING MORAL THEORIES Regan’s next step, remaining true to his methodology of best explanation, is to reject competing moral approaches. His main ground for rejecting them is that they are unable to support direct duties to moral patients. He argues that they cannot be the best approach because they ultimately do not reflect our moral intuitions: (1) that moral patients are deserving of direct duties, or (2) they fail to recognize moral rights. According to Regan, moral theories utilize both moral principles and intuitions within

40 some kind of methodology. This seems a reasonable understanding, so Regan is merely rejecting the methodologies which cannot grant direct duties, or rights, to moral patients. If our moral intuitions and principles result in recognition of such things as obligations and rights, it follows that these obligations and rights are possessed by someone or thing. Regan suggests further investigation of our moral principles will result in the recognition of a distinction between moral agents and moral patients. He identifies moral agents as individuals capable of cognizing impartial moral principles and utilizing these in making judgments for moral action. Such agents are free to choose to act upon these principles, and thus behave morally or fail to act upon these and behave immorally. [Regan (83), p. 152] It is important that moral agents recognize that they are also recipients of moral judgments made by other moral agents, making the moral relationship between moral agents a reciprocal one. Regan claims this interdependence between moral agents constitutes the creation of a moral community. [Regan (83), p. 152] Regan, and others, claim that the other half of the distinction—moral patients— are owed direct duties from the moral community despite their not being full­fledged members within it. Moral patients are unable to conceive, much less put into practice, moral principles. They are incapable of acting either morally or immorally. Some humans are moral patients; e.g., human infants, very young children and the mentally incapacitated. Yet it is clear that as moral agents we are prohibited from abusing these moral patients; further, we must provide them with care and comfort. However, the list of moral patients is usually understood to include nonhumans. It is considered morally reprehensible to mistreat pets and wild animals, we frown upon such behavior when it is made known. Whether our moral intuitions that tell us which creatures are moral patients or which we ought to treat humanely are to result in direct or indirect duties is a subject to be developed later. What is clear at this point is that we do have such intuitions. The difficulty is that some moral agents and some well­known moral philosophers, recognizing this bond of reciprocity between moral agents, use it to exclude all non­moral agents from receiving direct moral consideration, due to their inability to reciprocate like consideration. This leads to the community adopting an indirect method for establishing some moral treatment for those outside the moral community. This method claims that the only direct moral duties are owed those within the community,

41 non­community members can receive moral treatment on the basis that the duty is to the community members. This procedure is characterized as establishing indirect duties to non­community members. Of the indirect views, Regan presents and rejects Jan Narveson’s rational egoism, John Rawls’ contractualism and Kantianism. These are rejected by Regan due to their reliance upon what he views as a morally arbitrary feature that makes non­human, and human, moral patients second­class citizens of the moral community. Further, such indirect views directly contradict some of our moral intuitions, for instance, the belief that it is wrong to abuse a child, even if it is an orphan or severely handicapped. He rejects Narveson’s rational egoism because Narveson only grants rights to beings capable of making claims of possessing such rights. Thus, moral patients, unable to make such claims, would not have rights. This is quite a difficult position to hold since many humans cannot make such claims. Regan utilizes a lot of John Rawls’ methodology but, ultimately, disagrees with Rawls due to an allowance that Rawls provides in the original position behind “the veil of ignorance.” One thing the participants are not “ignorant” of is their species. They know that they are human beings; hence the contract will be “prejudiced” in favor of humans. This predisposition to favor humans makes the principles derived from the original position partial, hence not impartial. In other words, the principles and institutions created in the original position will be created to favor rational beings. Thus, Regan cannot endorse this approach. [Regan (83), p. 174] Regan claims Kant’s position is ill founded, based upon its restriction that moral obligations are owed only to rational beings. He finds Kant’s scope too narrow, as it eliminates human moral patients as well as animals. The problem, as Regan describes it, occurs due to Kant’s system ultimately obligating the moral agent with a direct duty to himself (as a rational being); namely, to be moral—and the only way that can be accomplished is by adopting the categorical imperative. [Regan (83), p. 183] Regan provides a scenario to establish that the Kantian approach is implausible because of its restrictive nature. Regan tests our moral intuitions, claiming that we would deny it is morally acceptable to torture a very small child, since children are not actually rational beings. Kant would want to agree, but only because, Regan claims, it is bad for the

42 development of the moral agent’s (i.e. the one doing the torturing) character. However, most moral agents would want to say it is immoral because the child deserves better treatment due to its own status, and not the status of the torturer. Regan rejects Kant because his system can allow this type of implausible case to occur. However, his strongest reason for disregarding Kant’s moral system is because he sees it as arbitrarily preferring human beings to all other species. [Regan (83), pp. 182­185] Regan also rejects some well known direct duty views despite their granting direct duties to moral patients. Regan is forced to reject direct duty views that do not recognize rights. He begins by considering the “cruelty­kindness” view. This position argues that the mental state of the moral agent determines the rightness or the wrongness of the act. It isn’t what one does to an animal (e.g., inflicting pain on it) that makes one’s act right or wrong. It is one’s state of mind at the time (e.g., does one inflict pain because one likes to see animals suffer, or instead is one trying to help the animal? One can cause animal suffering from either motive—cruelty or kindness. So the motive is what matters. Regan argues that the difficulty for this approach is that no one is due either a cruel or kind mindset; it is merely a trait of the agent whether he or she exhibits cruel or kind behavior. Regan claims, “[n]o view can provide an adequate account of these duties if it requires that we make reference to the mind of the agent (to either the agent’s motive or intentions).” [Regan (83), p. 199] Regan admits that utilitarianism does not have this difficulty, but that it cannot provide an adequate foundation for the direct duty that moral agents are to do no harm. He claims that some forms of utilitarianism—specifically act 11 utilitarianism— can justify secret killings of unattached beings, since only the victim’s suffering is accounted for and measured against the perpetrators’ pleasure, which might be greater than the victim’s pain. [Regan (83), p. 229] Continuing with his rejection of competing direct duty views, Regan denies utilitarianism’s effectiveness for the reason that utilitarianism cannot adequately ground the equality principle. Regan embraces impartiality as being fundamental to the concept of morality when he states, “[o]ne condition of the ideal moral judgment is impartiality, understood as compliance with the formal principle of

11 Rule utilitarianism would not endorse such killings as the GHP is established by having rules in place that would disallow such behavior.

43 justice.” [Regan (83), p. 232] He also claims that, “impartiality is at the heart of what sometimes is referred to as the formal principle of justice, the principle that justice is the similar, and injustice the dissimilar, treatment of similar individuals.” [Regan (83), p. 128] He also understands the formal principle of justice as the claim that each individual is to be given her due. He says it is formal, because it is so vague regarding what exactly “individuals are due.” 12 [Regan (83), p. 232] From this he reaches an implication that impartiality is the key to morality, since “. . . whatever this is, justice will not be done if, without being able to cite a morally relevant difference, individuals are treated differently.” [Regan (83), p. 232] ‘Impartiality,’ as the original formal principle of justice, is redefined by Reagan as “equality of individuals.” [Regan (83), p. 235] Yet, for Regan, “equality of individuals” is distinct from the utilitarian egalitarianism view that “no one individual is viewed as being more or less entitled to the same consideration accorded other relevantly similar individuals.” [Regan (83), p. 233] While both ’impartiality’ and ‘egalitarianism’ encompass the need to treat similar things similarly, Regan suggests that Jeremy Bentham’s one­to­one­ratio ultimately cannot result in “each individual getting her due.” The reason is that, after equal consideration, an individual might be harmed if a larger group benefits. Given that Regan believes in the principle of justice that requires “each individual getting his due,” he must then show the weakness of the perfectionist view which also holds to that principle, but does not extend moral consideration to animals. Perfectionist views equate what one is due to one’s virtue, and since animals are unable to be virtuous, they are excluded from due consideration. Further, he rejects the perfectionist view because it allows moral agents to judge other moral agents as less virtuous, and, hence, due less moral consideration. [Regan (83), p. 263] For Regan, equality is not a matter of degree. Having rejected all other moral theories, Regan now puts forth a positive argument in favor of his rights view. His main defense for such a view is that it provides the best explanation for, or, best meets our moral intuitions and principles.

12 Regan actually makes that claim. But in actuality he is using the concept of ‘formal principle’ to imply the idea that it is the standard upon which all further moral principles will be judged. This understanding is demonstrated when he refutes the possibility that the untilitartian “equality principle,” referred herein as the “egalitarian principle,” can operate as a formal principle. See Regan, p. 214.

44 REGAN’S RIGHTS VIEW For Regan, rights are best characterized negatively. 13 In claiming a right, one claims that others cannot interfere with his liberty. He notes that rights involve making a claim for oneself or on behalf of another. Having a valid claim to said right requires a reciprocal valid claim against another. [Regan (83), p. 271] Regan explains a negative conception of rights as a “No Trespassing” sign, which is to be placed upon all bearers of moral worth. He notes, “[p]ossession of moral rights (by which, again, unless otherwise indicated, I mean negative moral rights) confers a distinctive moral status on those who have them.” [Cohen & Regan, p. 152] He notes that this “moral shield” prohibits two possible methods by which others may trespass. The first harm that is limited by such protection is, of course, physical harm or interference. The other harm prohibited by Regan’s notion of negative moral rights is psychological, interference with a being’s free choices. He is quick to acknowledge that negative moral rights do not prohibit one from acting in self defense. So his “No Trespassing” sign carries a disclaimer—“without justification.” I am emphasizing his “justification” qualification because I think this will become important when considering the implications his view draws. So, in order to avoid misconstruing his point I will provide his disclaimer verbatim: Most people most of the time act in ways that respect the rights of other human beings. But even if the world happened to be different in this respect, the central point would be the same: what we are free to do when someone violates our rights does not translate into the freedom to violate their rights without justifiable cause. [Cohen & Regan, p. 152]

At this point, Regan acknowledges that there are some reasons to violate negative moral rights. Whether these are strictly limited to self­defense will be considered later, in the section of this chapter that questions Regan’s position.

13 Regan’s position utilizes a narrow understanding of rights. He acknowledges that a distinction exists between negative and positive moral rights. Positive moral rights would consist in a right to be helped, or a claim of assistance. Only these do not carry the reciprocal valid claim against another to respect such right. Since he is only interested in establishing the right of non­interference, he does not take on the battle for establishing the claim upon a moral agent’s beneficence. His choosing not to establish the positive moral rights “because it lies outside the scope of our present interest,” [Cohen & Regan, p. 152] might be a weakness in his argument. A case for the importance of positive moral rights might bolster Regan’s position and will be addressed in my final chapter.

45 Regan’s main point regarding negative moral rights is that if an individual possesses such negative rights, then society’s necessities may not “trump” 14 these rights. He illustrates the immorality of “trumping” an individual’s negative moral rights by recalling the Tuskegee Institute’s syphilis experiment. This is one of the many examples that can be called to mind exemplifying how humans are inhumane to other humans, thereby violating the concept of non­interference either physically or psychologically. Details of this Tuskegee degradation need not be repeated here. Regan’s point is strong, if moral negative rights exist, somebody possesses them, and if you are the possessor they cannot be “trumped” unless very strong justification for trumping” is provided. ‘Trump’ is a word that originates with card playing implying that a particular card played at a particular moment, wins the hand. Regan’s use of ‘trump’ in regards to negative rights must mean that “rights” usually override interests. However, sometimes, overriding occurs when one person’s interests are met rather than another’s, or when one individual’s interests are thwarted for the interests of society. An example of the former case would be when only one person can be hired for a position and yet two apply. The latter is exemplified by considering society’s reaction when one person’s interest may consist in receiving social goods without offering reciprocal goods; i.e. stealing. In both cases, strong justification can be offered in support of thwarting the two individuals’ interests. Regan states that in some instances no justification can ever be found which would allow these negative moral rights to be “trumped.” However, later Regan argues that sometimes justification can be found allowing an individual’s life to be forfeited or serious harm inflicted. This possibility will be explored later in this chapter. For Regan, moral worth is best understood as having a right not to be harmed. This right is based in his conception of inherent worth which will be developed in the next section. REGAN’S CONCEPTION OF MORAL WORTH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ANIMALS Regan has introduced his theory of rights and his insistence of equality and impartiality, so the real question becomes, who gets these rights? He seems to offer two suggestions: beings that have inherent worth (or value) and beings that are “subjects of a

14 Regan borrows the notion of trumping from Ronald Dworkin whose writing is mostly concerned with legal rights. Dworkin argues that sometimes individual rights override the needs of the state, thus individual rights politically trump state rights when there is a conflict of interests.

46 life”. The former is hard to justify, it is intangible, not empirical. 15 The latter, is empirical. Inherent value cannot be detected. It may mean nothing more than being a bearer of rights. His notion of “subjects of a life” is a tangible, demonstrable claim. This is where Regan demarcates between animals that receive moral consideration and animals that do not, as he does exclude some animals from his rights view. Regan offers distinguishing features that set moral patients apart from beings that are neither moral agents nor patients. He claims these distinct features are important in establishing what kinds of beings are owed direct moral duties. He acknowledges that some individuals are “conscious and sentient (i.e., can experience pleasure and pain) but lack other mental abilities.” [Regan (83), p. 153] However, consciousness and sentience are not enough to make one a moral patient; Regan argues that further cognitive abilities must be exhibited in order to grant that moral patients are owed direct duties by moral agents. These abilities include the possession of memories and beliefs. More importantly, animals that can demonstrate autonomous action towards meeting self­set goals are moral patients. In other words, animals that can exhibit behavior analogous to human behavior ought to be given direct moral consideration of their needs, those unable to do so will not be given such consideration. It remains vague whether those not similar enough ought to get some moral treatment, or whether they are beyond the scope of moral concern. Recognition of moral patients reflects a limitation of Kant’s when he makes the commitment to only grant indirect duties to animals. Kant does not offer any demonstration that one can know that other human minds exist, it is assumed that since other humans act in similar ways they must be similarly constructed. Yet he acknowledges that animals sometimes act similarly to humans, while still maintaining that animals cannot reason. It is this similar action that convinces Kant animals ought not to be mistreated, yet it does not convince him that they ought to be granted direct duties. Regan credits Kant for providing an explanation for moral autonomy, which can only be exhibited by moral agents. However, Regan claims that moral autonomy is not the only morally relevant autonomy. [Regan (83), p. 86] Some animals demonstrate autonomy

15 Basically, all Regan can do is postulate that such a value exists. It is a stipulative definition. It must be accepted at face value. See the end of Section 7.2 in The Case for Animal Rights. To postulate a point, requires an assumption of truth as it explains other things.

47 and therefore, according to Regan, deserve direct moral duties or consideration. Thus the distinction between moral agents and moral patients is important because both kinds of beings have autonomy, only moral agents are “held morally accountable for the acts he performs or fails to perform, one who can rightly be blamed or praised, criticized or condemned.” [Regan (83), p. 86] Regan uses the term ‘inherent value’ to characterize both moral patients and agents. Inherent value is not, in his view, reducible to intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is based upon internal experiences, like pleasure or pain. So, intrinsic worth requires having the ability to have such experiences. Regan claims that inherent value is not the culmination of a being’s intrinsic experiences. He makes the distinction between these two types of values using an analogy. Intrinsic value is like water, whereas, inherent value is like being a cup. The cup contains the water, but is valued beyond its ability to contain water. He states, “The cup (that is, the individual) has a value and a kind that is not reducible to, and is incommensurate with, what goes into the cup (e.g., pleasure).” [Regan (83), p. 236] Regan next considers whether inherent value can vary by degree or is held equally by all that have it. He argues for the latter, claiming that it would become an arbitrary affair to try to determine varying amounts of worth. This leads to the implication that inherent value cannot be earned or lost, one either has it or does not. Given that inherent value is a postulate by Regan, he is free to define it as being held equally by both moral agent and patients, or as he prefers “subjects of a life.” Regan offers argumentation in support of inherent value by comparing it to intrinsic value. He claims that the “postulate of inherent value” provides a more egalitarian moral approach than the utilitarian perspective. This is so, he claims, since utilitarianism favors the intrinsic values, those that are experienced inside people. The utilitarian view cannot claim that secretly killing a hermit is immoral, since no one will experience any pain over the loss of life and since the hermit is dead, he too, won’t experience any such pain. There is no loss of intrinsic value in this act, hence it is not immoral. Regan notes that our moral intuitions will judge this act is wrong, and that is because there is another kind of worth; i.e., inherent value, possessed by the hermit that is

48 lost with his death. [Regan (83), p. 238] Thus, he believes he has shown the superiority of inherent value. Inherent value is to be found in all beings that are “subjects of a life”, according to Regan. Subjects of a life are, “individuals who have beliefs, desires, memory, psycho­ physical identity, a welfare, etc.)” [Regan (83), p. 186] These abilities are tangible, empirical proof that can substantiate granting the creature capable of such acts rights. He believes that these abilities are the way of empirically detecting who has inherent value. This is indicated when he states: The subject­of­a­life criterion identifies a similarity that holds between moral agents and patients. Is this similarity a relevant similarity, one that makes viewing them as inherently valuable intelligible and nonarbitrary? The grounds for replying affirmatively are as follows: (1) A relevant similarity among all those who are postulated to have equal inherent value must mark a characteristic shared by all those moral agents and patients who are here viewed as having such value. The subject of a life criterion satisfies this requirement. All moral agents and all those moral patients with whom we are concerned are subjects of a life that is better or worse for them, in the sense explained, logically independently of the utility they have for others and logically independently of their being the object of the interest of others. (2) Since inherent value is conceived to be a categorical value, admitting of no degrees, any supposed relevant similarity must itself be categorical. The subject­of­a­life criterion satisfies this requirement. This criterion does not assert or imply that those who meet it have the status of subject of a life to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the degree to which they have or lack some favored ability or virtue (e.g., the ability for higher mathematics or those associated with artistic excellence). One either is a subject of a life, in the sense explained or one is not. All those who are, are so equally. The subject –of­a­life­criterion thus demarcates a categorical status shared by all moral agents and those moral patients with whom we are concerned. (3) A relevant similarity between moral agents and patients must go some way toward illuminating why we have direct duties to both and why we have less reason to believe that we have direct duties to individuals who are neither moral agents nor patients, even including those who, like moral agents and moral patients we have in mind, are alive. . .[Regan (83), pp. 244­245] 16

Regan believes that most mammals are “subjects of a life.” He argues against the view that explains animal behavior as merely responding to stimulus. He claims that this view fails to meet the burden of proof and given that it is theoretically possible that animals are capable of a complex mental life, we ought to regard them as having inherent worth. [Regan (83), p. 81]

16 I include this rather long section from The Case for Animal Rights for two reasons. I wanted to show how strongly Regan states his point of view, but also I wanted his grounds to be presented directly and not merely reinterpreted by another. I include the third ground because it is interesting to note that he does believe that he needs to address why he excludes some animals from having rights. A concern that I will address later.

49 Most often, support for animal mentality is shown through scenarios of animals demonstrating that they possess beliefs and desires, both of which are mental activities which seem to require memory and psycho­physical identity. Most people would agree that animals seem to show preferences for some activities over others, particularly when human and animal interaction occurs. The problem lies in our inability to actually know what goes on inside the minds of animals; so there is an epistemic gap, which forces us to choose one theory over the other. Regan endorses the view that animals have complex mental lives. Others choose the theory that animals are merely responding to external stimuli. Given his choice, it is obvious that Regan would argue that animals are “subjects of a life”. If animals are “subjects of a life”, it follows, for Regan, that they have inherent worth. Further, it follows that they ought to be treated impartially and justly. This means that there are two practical implications of his view. The practical implications are that we can no longer use animals for food or scientific testing. Some might claim these implications to be impractical, as we can no longer use animals to further human needs and would dramatically change the way we live our lives. Regan’s whole project is abolitionism against, “the harmful use of animals in science—in education, in toxicity testing, in basic research.” [Regan (83), p. 394] Furthermore he hopes to influence public policy to accept, “the total dissolution of the animal industry as we know it.” [Regan (83), p. 395] His justification for these strong aims is the claim that animals can be harmed in an equal manner to humans. So it follows for Regan, if humans have a right not to be harmed in these ways, animals, too, have such a right. If moral intuitions can provide justification for establishing a negative moral right for humans, Regan reasons, the similarity of some animals (also recognized through intuition) implies they have this same right. QUESTIONS REGAN’S POSITION RAISES Regan’s position raises three interesting questions: (1) Why are direct duties the only method to afford protection to moral patients? (2) Why does Regan exclude some sentient beings as well as some non­sentient beings and introduce a ‘chordates’ only exclusivity to his position? This question might also be cast as an inquiry into why Regan rejects the sanctity of life position. (3) Does Regan weaken his abolitionist stance

50 by admitting the disclaimer, which allows some trespassing upon the non­interference right if reasonable justification can be offered? Question one is better understood by asking Regan what do we owe animals? Is this duty like Kant’s duty of charity, which is an imperfect duty, where one is allowed to choose when to observe it? Or, is it a perfect duty, one that must be adhered to all the time? If the duty is imperfect, then the moral agent is not required to spare every animal’s life. If it is perfect, then the moral agent is so required. Does this demarcate animals from children? We do feel as if we have a perfect duty to protect human children from harm, even when they are not are own. But we do not have such compunction when it is an animal. For instance, if a baby is wandering down the street, nearly all people would stop it and take it to its mother, but if it is a dog wandering down the street fewer people would take it upon themselves to make sure that it found its way home. If Regan want us to have a perfect duty to animals, the moral agent would be required to prevent all cases of cruelty and neglect to all animals deemed “subjects of a life.” That seems too superobligatory even for the best of the good Samaritans. Hence, if Regan is following common human moral intuitions, he seems to be suggesting that the duty is an imperfect one that when one is able, one ought to not trespass upon the rights of animals. If enough moral agents do so, then eventually his vision would come about. The real question is about the notion ‘inherent worth’, or value. Does this postulate add anything to his theory other than complication? The short answer is “no.” Nothing is added by this postulate since it seems to be a mere equivalent for ‘a being with rights’. The long answer is “yes,” as, humans want to have the belief that “as an individual I am valuable in and of myself, not because I am useful.” Yet, there are some people who do not hold this belief. And so, Regan may be right about the need to examine our moral intuitions and principles. And at some point we are going to postulate that “I am valuable, as an end in itself and not as a means for someone else.” And if this is true about me, then it must be true about you and then the whole equality principle falls into place. The second question for Regan concerns his scope. He limits his “subjects of a life” to beings capable of demonstrating a point of view; in other words, beings that have brains. Regan seems to fall prey to the complaint that he is anthropocentric, despite his

51 stretching the demarcation line for moral worth so that it lies below mammals. For a thing to have inherent moral worth it must be similar enough to humans in order to be deemed worthy. This concern reflects Hume’s position that morality is mere sentimentality. Human sentiments, human attributes are the foundations of morality and moral values. If a being can just demonstrate some similarities, share some commonalities with humans, then it can be granted inherent moral worth. Why does Regan draw the line establishing “individuality” above bugs and plants? Regan claims to be influenced by eastern thought, Gandhi in particular, yet he does not embrace Gandhi’s sanctity of life view. In The Case For Animal Rights Regan devotes two and one­half pages to this position where he states the view, considers an objection and determines that being alive is, perhaps, a sufficient condition for inherent value but not a necessary one. [Regan (83), p. 242] The sanctity of life view has few philosophic supporters; the best known is Albert Schweitzer. Schweitzer, through the use of introspection, discovers within himself a will to live. This “willing,” he notes, is reflected in every living thing therefore all life has worth. This is a brief rendition of the argument, yet it does seem to supply enough rudimentary concepts for Regan, and others, to defeat it. My final chapter will be an attempt to provide further philosophic support for a modified sanctity of life view, so I will not go into great detail here. The skeletal argument above is what Regan considers and opposes, in favor of his own demarcation line. The refutation he offers questions the placement of things into the category of living beings. St. Thomas Aquinas established ‘movement’ as the most basic criterion for life. According to this criterion, in order for a ‘thing’ to become a ‘being,’ the thing had to move under its own power. Therefore, anything that exhibits the ability to move, grow or change its shape was considered alive. The dilemma with this criterion is that crystals, quartz, ice or minerals, grow and change shape. Granted, these objects do so very slowly. Would a reasonable person grant that an ice cube or an amethyst bead around one’s neck has life? So the usual argument against the sanctity of life view is concerned with the fact that its scope is too large, too many “things” get encompassed into that category of having inherent worth. Regan cannot commit himself to this broad view because when it is combined with his formal principle of impartiality the position becomes self­defeating. Furthermore, even if the class of inherently worthy beings is expanded according to a

52 more reasonable concept of ‘life’, living will become problematic. If all living things have inherent worth, and moral agents must be impartial, then no living thing could be interfered with. I can no longer wash my hands because I will be committing mass genocide of microscopic bacteria. I would have to forgo eating toast and drinking coffee in the morning because the wheat plants and coffee trees ought to be left alone to pursue their own growth. Again, it seems like a slippery slope, but slippery slopes are fallacies of relevance. And in this instance the two commitments relevantly lead to this particular slope. Therefore, Regan must draw the line somewhere; otherwise, he would be forced into suggesting the necessity of extinction for moral agents. However, Regan does not deny the possibility that non­“subjects of a life” might have inherent worth. [Regan (83), p. 246] He is, merely, not concerned with their needs. The third question considers what actions can be justified by Regan’s disclaimer that sometimes negative rights can be violated. Regan claims that animals have rights, but what kind? Could not laws be passed that grant some legal rights to animals, thereby providing them protection? For Regan, this is not sufficient because legal rights are dependant upon culture and in order to abolish animal exploitation the protection he seeks must be universal. Therefore, he reasons, only by recognizing that animals possess moral rights may animals gain the protection to which they are entitled. Regan offers some clarification to the conception of ‘moral rights’. First, granting moral rights must be an impartial determination. He notes that, “[if] any individual (A) has such a right, then any other individual like A in the relevant respects also has this right.” [Regan (83), p. 267] Regan notes that certain characteristics like gender, origin and race are not relevant in denying rights to moral agents. He further argues that there is no relevant difference between moral agents and moral patients, given that both are “subjects of a life.” He concludes if moral agents have moral rights then, so too, moral patients. The next bit of clarification for moral rights Regan provides is that moral rights are possessed equally. These rights are not a matter of degree. He expounds, “if any two individuals have the same moral right (e.g., the right to liberty), then they have this right equally.” [Regan (83), p. 268] The final distinguishing feature of moral rights is that they do not have the same grounding as legal ones. Legal rights are either claimed or granted through creative acts.

53 Regan does not explain how moral rights originate at this juncture. Instead he goes on to consider objections to moral rights. Through the objections Regan seems to implicitly argue that moral rights originate and are grounded in moral intuitions. One might think moral rights are merely stipulated, but that would mean that moral rights resemble legal rights. Therefore the best possible grounding for moral rights Regan can offer lies in his earlier methodology of establishing moral intuitions through the process of selecting moral principles through reflection. A moral agent would be persuaded through the reflective process to recognize moral rights, in particular the right not to be harmed, or the right to liberty. If these principles were to be tested, as Regan suggests, they would surely be recognized as acceptable and universally binding. Regan does seem to be arguing that moral rights are an implication of the duty to justice. He argues the duty to justice is an unacquired one. This is distinct from acquired duties. Acquired duties arise from voluntary acts between moral agents, such as promise keeping. If one makes a promise, one has voluntarily acquired the duty to keep it. Unacquired duties, on the other, hand are duties that obligate moral agents without their having entered into any covenant that needs to be respected. Regan seems to be adopting Rawls’s characterization of a “natural duty” in that the duty of justice does not depend upon social institutions or voluntary acts. [Regan (83), p. 274] Regan interprets the duty of justice as the principle of impartiality. So if justice is what one is owed, then what one is owed is the right to be treated impartially. Thus from the natural duty of justice Regan infers the “basic right” to be treated justly. And both the duty and the right are unacquired in that they are not a result of any institution or voluntary act of moral agents. [Regan (83), p. 276] Impartiality requires that similar beings receive similar treatment unless good reasons can be provided, ones which can explain the dissimilar treatment received by an individual. Regan believes this translates into receiving what one is due. From this formal principle, a further principle is generated—the respect principle. This principle states that things with inherent value, “. . . are therefore due, as a matter of strict justice, treatment that is respectful of the kind of value they have, and all are owed this treatment equally . . . .” [Regan (83), p. 277] Having established this further principle, Regan argues that moral patients have no morally relevant difference from moral agents. If that

54 is true, it follows that moral patients have the right to respectful treatment. Respectful treatment basically requires that an individual’s best interests are taken into consideration and respected, unless good reasons can be provided for not acting upon these interests. Ultimately, the respect principle seems to be another unacquired duty or basic right. Further, this principle suggests another unacquired right, namely, the right not to be harmed. Having established impartiality, or justice, within the moral agent’s reflective moral intuitions, Regan has generated inherent worth, the right to respect and the right not to be harmed. He provides a summary of his argument in The Case for Animal Rights in section 8.7. In this section he also seems to suggest that inherent worth is a self­ evident concept. 17 He states, “. . . it follows that individuals who have inherent value also have a valid claim, and thus, in this case, a basic prima facie right not to be harmed, the validation of this right resting ultimately on the respect principle and the postulate of inherent value on which it rests.” [Regan (83), p. 287] Ultimately, however, impartiality also allows for the possibility that the right not to be harmed can be overridden. Regan first considers and rejects two moral principles that hold this right to be an absolute. He refers to these as the pacifist principle and the innocence principle. Both fail, he claims, from either a lack of empirical support for their claims or else they are incompatible with other well­established moral intuitions. He notes that either pacifism or appeals to innocence for rigid, absolute nonmaleficence are appeals to consequences or pure self­evidence. Claiming that more violence, or harm to innocence, will result from current acts of violence is not convincing in and of itself, because no objective evidence can be provided to support such claims. [Regan (83), p. 292.] Claims that these principles are self­evidentially true fail since these principles are inconsistent with other moral principles; e.g. the duty of defense, which allows an individual to use force to protect herself or other innocent beings. Acts of defense sometimes result in harming fewer innocents than the original threat. Many view this possibility as acceptable. If defense is a valid moral principle, then the principles of pacifism and never harm innocence, ever, cannot be valid.

17 Regan admits earlier that self­evidence is not sufficient grounding for moral intuitions. In order to avoid contradiction inherent worth must be a concept derived from a reflective moral judgment.

55 Regan offers a précising definition for the concept of ‘innocent.’ It is not to be understood as the opposite of guilty. Instead, innocents are beings capable of receiving unjust treatment. Innocence requires that one have a right that can be violated and, further, that one has not behaved in any manner which merits such a violation. From this précising definition, Regan notes that, “unlike moral agents, moral patients cannot be anything but innocent.” [Regan (83), p. 295] Regan notes that given that there is the possibility of overriding human moral patients’ valid claims not to be harmed, it is only fair to acknowledge that animal moral patients, too, are at risk under the same circumstances. Regan allows for overriding the right not to be harmed by appealing to two valid moral principles, which he believes provide proper justification for harming innocents. Both, he claims are derived from the respect principle. One he terms the miniride principle, or numbers count. This is basically the belief in saving as many lives as possible when not all lives can be saved. If a threat arises such that many innocents will be harmed, it is acceptable to find a solution that will harm the fewest innocents possible all things considered. This principle seems to suggest that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few. As that is not one of the precepts of any moral theory based upon rights, Regan is quick to point out that sometimes the numbers are not important, but instead special considerations for the few innocents outweigh the many based upon the severity of harm the few are threatened with. This he refers to as the worst­off principle. If the many, as opposed to the few, innocents are faced with a harm that is significantly incomparable to the harm the few will be forced to endure, then the rights of the many are to be ignored in order to help those who are worse­off. The worse­ off principle also applies when conflicts of interest arise between two beings. Whoever will suffer the greatest loss, or hardship, as a result of having one’s interests ignored ought not to have said interests ignored; thereby resulting in a lesser harm done to the other individual. Regan argues that miniride and worse­off principles are not to be equated or compared to the utilitarian principle of minimizing harm. These are distinct since the minimizing harm principle is to affect the aggregate amount of harm to all individuals involved, regardless of the individuals’ rights or value. This is because utilitarians do not value the individual as an individual, nor do they recognize moral rights, as such. Regan

56 notes that rights theories can offer justification, similar to utilitarian views, for overriding innocents’ rights not to be harmed without ignoring their inherent value. The questions raised by Regan’s position have been answered through a summary of his view. No actual criticism has been given, as my objective was to clarify his comprehensive view. The difficulty of accepting his view occurs because of his reliance upon seeming self­evidence in both his postulates of inherent worth and natural rights. His argumentation is very thorough and if you accept his “first principles” 18 his conclusions flawlessly follow. CONCLUSION Regan’s position is strong because of its reliance upon impartiality. If justice is to be understood as impartiality, as Regan suggests, then the burden of proof lies upon those who choose to use animals as a means to human ends. Yet impartiality has yet to be established as the fundamental principle of morality. As long as other principles are in contention for this status, Regan has a battle upon his hands. One possible weakness is the inability of Regan to escape the seeming anthropocentricism of his position. Because if impartiality is the fundamental principle, morally relevant differences between higher functioning animals and lower functioning animals, as well as, plants, ecosystems, etc. will be required. As it stands now, his quick dismissal of the sanctity of life view has the appearance of a straw man fallacy. However, I believe Regan’s real problem lies in his understandings of ‘inherent worth,’ ‘impartiality’ and ‘what an individual is due.’ His argument appears to be self­ referential. An individual has inherent worth because of impartiality, impartiality is what an individual is due, because one has inherent worth. Overall, Regan’s sentiments are to be respected. He is very passionate about ending the senseless abuse of animals; however, his method of argumentation, combined with his extremism makes his argument less plausible.

18 Aristotle noted that in order to begin a discussion one must accept the other’s first principles.

57 CHAPTER FOUR SINGER’S MORAL THEORY AS IT RELATES TO ESTABLISHING MORAL STATUS Singer is perhaps the best known advocate for animal liberation and for human treatment of animals. Singer, like Regan, emphasizes the seemingly logical conclusion that the equality principle 19 leads to the requirement that moral agents acknowledge no morally relevant distinction between humans and animals. Yet he does not seek animal rights, as Regan does, instead he seeks liberation: i.e., discontinuing the use of animals to further human needs and interests, unless morally relevant reasons can be provided that demonstrate their essential sacrifice is necessary to further the greater aggregated­good. He sees liberation for animals as similar to the liberation sought by women and minorities in America, specifically those of African decent, during the early and middle parts of the 20 th century. These groups’ subjugation to white males throughout the centuries is well documented. Civil movements and legal action was required to secure the liberation of minorities in America. Singer seeks the same for animals in the 21 st century. He seeks not only a change in attitude but also a much larger goal—legal status for animals. Singer cannot seek rights, because as a utilitarian he does not actually believe in rights per se; they are merely a useful fiction. Instead, he seeks equal status between humans and animals; as women and minorities succeeded in establishing their claim to receive recognition as equal 20 to the dominant gender and race, so too, animals can be recognized as equal to the dominant species. He claims that our biased favoring of our own species will no longer be allowed to remain unquestioned. Singer seeks an ethical revolution. [Singer (85), p. 9] By using the analogy of liberation movements, Singer has placed the debate regarding moral status within an emotionally charged atmosphere. This appeal to our emotions makes his claims seem all the more plausible, yet it also seems to diminish the importance of the women’s and civil rights movements by claiming that these groups are relevantly similar in their struggle. It seems that there is a relevant difference between

19 The equality principle is the intuitively held belief that “each to count for one, no one for more than one.” [Singer (93), p. 81] In Singer’s version ‘counting’ is a matter of having one’s interests being given equal consideration. This equality principle will be discussed in detail in the chapter.

20 Recognition as equal to the dominant species ought to be interpreted as both, moral and legal.

58 the women and civil right’s movements and the animal liberation movement. In the former case the beings are human, capable of reasoning and communicating their needs to be recognized as equal to white males; in the latter the beings are incapable of communicating their needs and their reasoning abilities are not equivalent to their oppressors. However, Singer believes animals, women, minorities and white males are similar in a morally relevant way because all these groups are composed of individuals who have the capacity to suffer. This emphasis upon the importance of being able to suffer is the underlying consideration of utilitarian thought. 21 Generalized utilitarian theory holds that there is only one principle by which moral agents ought to live. This principle is known as the Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP). Under such a principle all actions are deemed morally correct if the aggregate of happiness is increased by the action; hence utilitarianism is goal­oriented. Happiness itself is defined as either pleasure and the absence of pain, or preference 22 satisfaction; thus it usually centers on sentiments, feelings, desires, pleasures, pains, etc. These definitions of happiness suggest ‘good’ is a matter of attaining all these things and evil is their absence or loss. The scope of utilitarianism is wide, since it bases moral status, and therefore the ability to receive moral consideration, upon one specific trait—the ability to feel pleasure and pain. Jeremy Bentham, one of the first to give the term ‘utility’ prominence in philosophic literature, states in The Principles of Morals and Legislation that, “ The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of sympathy and antipathy.” [Bentham, p. 17] He is alluding to the influence of Hume’s view that morality is mere sentimentality—i.e. based in our passions and modified by reason. Most often morality from this perspective uses human likes and dislikes to determine right from wrong, an approach Bentham attempts to defeat by basing ‘right’ on factual outcomes, rather than mere opinion. He claims that the normative usage of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ has an empirical basis in pleasure and pain. Utilitarians recognize only two facets of human nature that are important in conceiving

21 Suffering is a vague concept. It is not merely understood as an ability to feel pain. Some utilitarians interpret suffering as the thwarting of one’s interests or the denial of one’s preferences. 22 ‘Preference’ and ‘interest’ are used synonymously throughout this chapter, as their meaning is similar in the literature.

59 human morality, reason and passion. These culminate in the notion of feelings. Having reduced two parts of human nature into one morally relevant feature, utilitarians seek the procreation of the most pleasing feeling possible; i.e. happiness. Good, therefore is the aggregation of this feeling, and anything capable of demonstrating the ability to experience such a feeling is deemed morally worthy. Thus, Bentham’s magnanimous question is asked, “Can it suffer?” Ultimately, anything that can exhibit the ability to suffer ought to be granted moral status, if the greatest good is happiness. Singer utilizes Bentham’s arguments for demonstrating that the ability to suffer is the only morally relevant characteristic for establishing moral status. The first move in the argument is to establish that adult animals, when compared to human infants, show more reasoning or communicative ability. This is important because the moral agent must have an ability to determine the preferences of those affected by his actions. Objectors who ground moral status in an ability to reason, or use language, might respond to this by noting that human infants have the potential to become more competent in their reasoning, whereas, the adult animal will never demonstrate a strong skill in either of these capacities. Potentiality, however, is not capable of explaining why unfortunate humans, those born with defective brains or accident victims experiencing traumatic brain damage, are also granted moral status and the protections that accompany such status. Singer notes, “[t]he fact that we do not use them as means to our ends indicates that we do not really see decisive moral significance in rationality, or autonomy, or language, or a sense of justice, or any of the other criteria said to distinguish us from other animals.” [Singer (85), p. 6] It follows for Singer that if all these criteria are not morally significant as the above observations suggest, then denying animals’ moral status and moral consideration is, well, immoral. Actually, Singer calls it speciesism. Singer’s attempts to establish that there is no morally relevant difference between humans and animals through use of the equality principle; yet, he recognizes it as merely a minimal 23 moral precept given that it cannot resolve every moral dilemma. Singer understands the equality principle as requiring moral agents to give equal consideration to

23 He recognizes that in some circumstances equal consideration does not necessarily lead to equal treatment. He considers the notion of declining marginal utility, that sometimes a “set amount of something is more useful when people have little of it than when they have a lot.” [Singer (93), p. 24] This economic principle can prove useful when trying to overcome inegalitarian circumstances, but some contexts override its ability to achieve equal treatment

60 interests. Hence, if there is no morally relevant difference between the individuals and their interests, in a given moral dilemma, each individual’s interests must be given equal weight in the deliberation process. If morally relevant differences can be found, then these will account for the unequal consideration. However, when no such differences exist, then consideration of interests must take the 1­to­1 ratio that Bentham suggests with his utility principle. What makes animals relevantly similar to humans claims Singer, is their ability to have interests. He succinctly states this claim with, “. . . the basic element—the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever those interests may be—must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.” [Singer (02), p. 5] Further, having interests implies having preferences for attaining pleasures and avoiding pains; therefore, animal interests are integral to the overall happiness quotient. If preference satisfaction is good, since it raises the happiness aggregate, and preference thwarting bad, since it lowers said aggregate, then the more preferences met means the GHP is met. Singer claims suffering is to be understood as not having one’s preferences met. Hence animals suffer in a morally relevant, similar way to humans. Singer also acknowledges that there are relevant differences in preferences, differences between humans themselves, as well as interspecies differences. Further, such differences suggest that some preferences outweigh others. To illustrate, consider two brothers, Joe and Ben. Joe has a homework assignment that requires him to watch the 7 p.m. evening news. Ben has no such assignment. The dilemma occurs because Ben has no desire to watch the evening news, instead favoring his favorite television program on Nickelodeon. It seems that in this instance Joe’s preference ought to outweigh Ben’s. Singer believes his view can justify giving more weight to Joe’s preference, since the preferences were not, in fact, equally similar. Ben preferred to be entertained in the 30 minute interval, while Joe sought academic achievement. Mill himself argued that there were higher and lower pleasures, hence it follows that there are higher and lower preferences. Interspecies preference differences are more basic. Most animals, including humans, prefer non­interference with their lives. Yet, Singer seems to indicate that there

61 can be different degrees of suffering when interference occurs. This difference lies in the psychology of the individual being interfered with. Creatures that have some indication of self­awareness and can anticipate the future are thought to suffer more than creatures that do not possess these psychological features. The reasoning behind this claim is two­ fold. One might argue that an individual that is self­aware and perceives a future for itself suffers more when it is interfered with because it projects its current status into the future and determines that the suffering will continue. Further, the non­self­aware, future­non­perceiver does not project long­term suffering of interference. Instead, it merely experiences the moment by moment interference which causes it to suffer. Singer acknowledges that some future­preferences, when thwarted, can have a more negative impact upon the happiness quotient than mere immediate preferences. He claims that, “[f]or preference utilitarianism, taking the life of a person will normally be worse than taking the life of some other being, since persons are highly future­oriented in their preferences . . . [Additionally,] [i]n contrast, beings who cannot see themselves as entities with a future cannot have any preferences about their own future existence.” [Singer (93), p. 95] Furthermore, strength and intensity of preferences are used to determine the final outcome when conflicting interests are involved. [Uniacke, p. 209] These distinctions allow Singer to overcome the utilitarian requirement that each interest gets equal consideration 24 , since these future­preferences carry more weight when compared to immediate ones, as well as, taking into the calculation the intensity, duration and strength of conflicting preferences. However, all things being equal, future­preferences when weighed against other future­preferences are counted equally; so, too, immediate preferences. Hence, it should be the case that “equal weight to like interests of all those affected by action.” [Singer (93), p. 21] The self­aware, future perceiver can also recognize that there is a possibility that the suffering of such interference can and will end; whereas, the non­self­aware and future­non­perceiver can only experience the suffering of the moment and that such suffering is the whole of its experience since it only experiences in the moment. How can anyone suggest that these differences are quantifiable? Yes the suffering shares the name of having one’s preferences thwarted, but the quality and duration considerations

24 Each counts as one, and none more than one, when we are giving consideration to their interests.

62 seem to make the unequal weighting of preferences justifiable. Hence, it follows that the non­interference preference, while similar in kind, is dissimilar in degree. Can establishment of degrees of preferences undermine Singer’s application of the equality principle? He argues no, since the equality principle is understood that relevantly similar interests receive equal consideration. In sum, Singer argues that morally relevant suffering is best characterized as not having one’s preferences met. He further claims that given animals’ ability to demonstrate that they have interests, i.e. [by] seeking food, shelter, warmth, social interaction, etc., it follows that they have preferences, since in Singer’s view interests are simply getting what you prefer. In particular, animals have the preference not to be deprived of these natural goods. Humans share in these preferences. Thus, animals and humans are relevantly similar in interests and the moral agent must grant equal consideration to animal interests when they come into conflict with human interests. Singer reasons that animals have equal moral status to humans, due to their ability to suffer. Such status ought to be acted upon by giving equal weight to their interests. Moral orthodoxy holds that moral judgments, or determinations, must reflect the principle of impartiality. Impartiality is understood as requiring equal treatment of equals; when inequalities do occur reasons must be given, which explain the inequality, based upon relevant differences between the two (or more) disparate parties. Singer claims that abilities such as reasoning, talking, writing, valuing, conceptualizing and autonomy do not relevantly separate humans from animals when it comes to moral status. Therefore, because of the principle of impartiality, it is immoral when humans fail to grant animals’ interests, or preferences, equal consideration. The relevant ‘equal treatment’ impartiality requires is the equal consideration of interests. Therefore, animal interests must be given equal consideration to human interests. This is unproblematic up to a point. As long as there are no conflicts of interests this moral obligation can be met. When conflicts of interest occur, the GHP must be invoked. Thus the interests that bring about the greatest utility, or happiness, will be met; while all others will be thwarted. Singer does not seek equal rights. He notes that humans have political rights but that animals have no use for such rights. Furthermore, he notes that physical harms are

63 not equal either. [Singer (85), p. 6] A cowboy can punch a cow in the haunch, and the cow is not really bothered due its physical structure, but if the same cowboy were to be kicked in his haunch by the cow that would cause the cowboy some great discomfort. Singer observes that human interests are more developed than animal interests and so the harms experienced by humans through loss of autonomy might be greater than animals’ experiences of harm by the same type of loss. So while he claims equal moral status, Singer does not claim that animals have equal interests or pleasure/pain thresholds. Similarly, as it was alluded to earlier, animals cannot demonstrate that they have a conception of the future, and their place in it, as humans seem to. Thus, more often than not, immediate animal preferences will carry less weight than human preferences that entail future wants and needs. Singer does not claim that all living things have equal worth or that all interests are to be given equal weight. He states: The animal liberation movement, therefore, is not saying that all lives are of equal worth or that all interests of humans and other animals are to be given equal weight, no matter what those interests may be. What it is saying is that animals and humans have similar interests . . . those interests are to be counted equally, with no automatic discount just because one of the beings is not human.” [Singer (85), p. 9]

This claim is interesting for two reasons. The first is that a distinction has been made between moral status and moral worth. Furthermore, this distinction occurs with no further acknowledgment that it has actually been made. In the above quote he is explicitly discussing moral worth, yet implicitly alluding to status when he addresses ‘interests.’ Hence, it seems that the two notions ‘worth’ and ‘status’ do not connote the same meaning. Yet Singer has declared animals have equal status, which entitles them to be granted equal consideration of their interests. But, utility stops there. Once equal consideration is given unequal treatment can begin. And in order to make determinations of utility notions of worth and value must creep into to calculations. Yet, Singer may be alluding to other notions of worth rather than moral, such as economic. However, I do believe that he has some inconsistency in his claims because elsewhere he allows the use of animals to further human needs if it can be established that the greater utility is served by such use. And his greater utility count seems to favor humans, since he adds the notion of important human needs must be met to justify such treatment. This all occurs because his underlying principle is the minimization of suffering. [Singer (02), p. 21] As

64 humans are more familiar with human suffering, we will tend to favor humans and their needs, since animals cannot communicate their own such needs. Singer considers a problematic implication of his claim that animals and humans have equal moral status. If scientific experiments are necessary for the greater good and there is no morally relevant difference between humans and animals, then it seems possible that humans could be utilized as test subjects just as easily as animals. He notes that this is a similar problem for theorists who ground moral status in reasoning capacity. It is their capacity for knowledge of what may happen to them that is crucial. If they were not normal adults but severely brain­damaged humans – orphans perhaps, or children abandoned by their parents – then they would be in the same position as non­ human animals at a similar mental level. [Singer (85), p. 7] Furthermore, Singer notes that if his equality principle—that similar beings ought to be treated similarly—is followed to its logical conclusion and we allow his argument—that animals are similar beings because they share the capacity to suffer—then just as we euthanize elderly senile animals, it follows that we are morally obligated to do the same for elderly adults. And if we persist in our use of animals as test subjects and food, Singer continues, then the severely retarded and senile can be subjected to the same treatment. [Singer (02), pp. 19­20] These observations are cogent and need to be examined further. I will consider whether Singer is forced to accept these conclusions in the last section of this chapter, where I ask if Singer’s position lowers the notion of moral status by including animals. What is significant from reading Singer is that by expanding our notions of moral status we challenge our ability to justify causing harm and killing other species, as well as, ourselves. His view while disconcerting in many respects not only requires us to shoulder the burden of proof if we continue to use animals in a manner inconsistent with their status, but also to question our own status as well.

65 SINGER’S CONCEPTION OF MORAL STATUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ANIMALS Through exceedingly detailed empirical research Singer brings the plight of animal sufferance 25 to the forefront of the debate. By doing so, he has forced mainstream morality to question its tacit acceptance of animal experimentation, commercial hunting, agricultural practices and animals as educational and entertainment tools. Singer claims that: “The 1980s will be remembered as the decade in which the defence of animals began to make headlines around the world. In Britain, the United States, Canada, France, Australia and West Germany, activists took the law into their own hands. They broke into laboratories and took away the experimental animals they found there. When these masked raiders appeared on television, a wide audience learned for the first time that animal liberation was now a cause attracting the kind of commitment and political outlook more commonly associated with struggles for human rights than with the cosy conservatism of the older and more traditional animal welfare organizations.” [Singer (85), p. 209] His implication is that moral agents have a moral obligation to end the sufferance of animals. Many successes have been achieved. Animal testing for cosmetics has been reduced. Now some cosmetic manufacturers notify consumers that no animal testing was used in the preparation of their product lines. Many endangered species have gained legislative protections. More stringent rules for humane treatment of experimental and factory farm animals have been proscribed and enforced. However, the ultimate goal of liberation movements is to end the subjugation of the group as a whole. This has not occurred. Animals are still found in zoos, circuses and movies. They can still be used for experimental testing, as long as the ethical standards are met. And I can still go to MacDonald’s and buy a hamburger for consumption, if I so choose. Singer claims that consumption of animals for food is not morally permissible, since utility is not served by this practice. In particular, he is concerned with the suffering animals undergo prior to their death. Additionally, he argues that there are other food sources, which meet the basic consumptive needs and are more cost effective

25 The archaic word ‘sufferance’ is used because it conveys much more information than ‘suffering’. Sufferance carries the connotation of long suffering, patient endurance and passivity. It also contains the idea of being a mean towards another’s end.

66 to produce, than animals. He notes that utilitarian logic will allow the painless killing of animals, as long as their lives, prior to slaughter, were spent free of suffering. Yet he claims that it is an inconsistency to claim concern for animals while continuing to eat them, because one is using the animal as a means to an end. [Singer (02), pp. 159­160] This claim no longer seems utilitarian. So, Singer seems to adopt a notion of inherent moral worth when it suits him. Singer also seems to be going against the utilitarian conception of morality when he advocates the discontinuation of using animals for scientific experiments, even if it serves utility. He admits that some scientific gains may be lost, but in his view the only justifiable method of obtaining test subjects is if it is accomplished by gaining informed consent. This is because “the ethical principle of equal consideration of interests will rule out some means of obtaining knowledge.” [Singer (02), p. 92] It seems that animals will never be able to provide such consent and therefore can never be used as test subjects. QUESTIONS SINGER’S POSITION RAISES Singer’s position can be questioned on several grounds but two questions are sufficient in examining his fundamental claims. His first claim is that the animal liberation movement is relevantly similar to other human liberation movements. Therefore, the first question will be concerned with whether this claim is justified. Christine Pierce and David Lamb demonstrate that Singer is misconstruing the notion of [liberation], when he applies it to animals. Secondly, Singer’s full position on moral worth, as explored through his writings on the wrongness of killing, demonstrates a preference for self­conscious beings—i.e., humans—indicating that he, too, is guilty of speciesism, the very thing he seeks to eradicate. Michael Lockwood provides an indictment of Singer’s position, showing that he cannot coherently hold a belief in preference utilitarianism and advocate the ‘replaceability thesis.’ Both Pierce and Lamb offer serious objections to Singer’s characterization of his work as a liberation movement. Pierce rejects Singer’s analogy to liberation movements on the grounds that liberation is distinct from rights, that while animals might have rights they cannot seek liberation in the manner that other humans can. David Lamb concludes that Singer’s movement is clearly reformist since it “appeals to the conscience of the

67 oppressor group” but that liberation movements are concerned with the oppressed and “its own objectives and moral well­being.” [Lamb, p. 216] Pierce believes Singer’s ‘animal liberation’ is a misnomer. Instead, his is a civil rights movement. She states, “Singer talks as if liberation is no different from gaining equality; as if classical liberalism, which has no concept of liberation, would be up to the task of giving an account of animal liberation.” [Pierce, p. 67.] She points out that while Singer is correct in rejecting moral status—i.e., moral consideration or possession of moral rights—based purely upon membership in the species homo sapiens, he is wrong in comparing animal liberation as equal to that of women and blacks. Speciesism is not the same as sexism and racism, as far as she is concerned. Pierce notes that classic natural rights theories have a burden of proof to demonstrate that only humans are entitled to natural rights such as liberty, life, and noninterference. If the only relevant characteristic is being human, then that is speciesism. If we are not going to be speciesist, then we ought to adopt another relevant characteristic such as Regan and Singer suggest. She recommends that rights ought to correlate to the morally relevant characteristic. Her examples are, “if rationality is the basis of the right to vote, and the capacity to suffer is the basis for the right not to be tortured, animals can possess the right not to be tortured without possessing the right to vote.” [Pierce, p. 70] Pierce is critical of extending the classical notion of a right to liberty to animals. She dismisses James Rachels arguments against zoos because the solution to his problem lies in eliminating suffering, rather than initiating rights. Furthermore, if the classical liberal conception of the right to liberty is one of autonomy with an allowance of constraint only with informed consent, then animals clearly cannot benefit from such a right. Singer, however, is not as concerned with rights for animals as he is for equal consideration. Pierce sees this as the distinct difference between women’s and blacks’ liberation as compared to animal liberation. Equal consideration is not what women and blacks seek; they seek equal rights because they are capable of benefiting fully from the possession of such. Seeking equal consideration does not entail the resultant equality of rights, a point which Singer admits. [Pierce, p. 71] The example both Singer and Pierce use is the current right to abortion. While men and women have equal rights it does not follow that men have the right to an

68 abortion, in the same way as women have this right. Mostly because, women are capable of bearing children and since the abortion debate is mostly concerned with autonomy, men are not faced with this right to choice. Pierce takes exception to Singer’s claim that “[t]he basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration.” [Singer (’02), p. 2] Because Singer is not distinguishing between equal and identical treatment, she believes his conception of equality is confused. Feminists, she notes, are concerned with women and men having equal basic rights, yet circumstances differ allowing different treatment, but not unequal treatment. Therefore, both men and women have the right to autonomy as far as their own bodies are concerned, but in application, the treatment is different. [Pierce, p. 72] Pierce argues that animals’ morally relevant capacity to feel pain entitles them to equal consideration, but not liberation since “relevant capacities for liberation are the ability to construct one’s own sense of oneself and one’s own purpose, not simply a capacity to feel pain.” [Pierce, p. 72] The remainder of Pierce’s argument is concerned with clarifying liberation for women, but there are a few other points that are applicable to her criticism of Singer. First, she notes that oppressed people tend to accept the values of their oppressors, thus part of being liberated is being able to establish one’s own values. She notes that, “Some animals do take on the values of humans, but it is not obvious that they suffer from a poor self­image as a result.” [Pierce, p. 74] Her main conclusion is that there is a distinction to be made between liberation and the right to liberty, a distinction she argues Singer fails to acknowledge. Liberation requires us to resist and restructure a whole system of social and psychological pressures, whereas the right to liberty is given to us within that system. [Pierce, p. 74] Pierce claims that liberation is not the answer to the problem Singer is highlighting, namely animal sufferance. Furthermore, she states that by drawing parallels between animal and women’s liberation, Singer “shows a lack of insight into women’s liberation rather than the necessity of animal liberation.” [Pierce, p. 74] Lamb’s criticism of Singer’s ‘liberation’ characterization is similar to Pierce’s in that it recognizes the defining criteria of liberation as the oppressed group’s members coming to terms with themselves, as they see themselves and not as others see them.

69 Reformist movements are actions by the oppressing group seeking to change the treatment received by the oppressed. Liberation movements are accomplished by the oppressed themselves. Therefore, Singer can seek reformation, not liberation, simply because humans and animals lack the ability to fully communicate in order for animals to achieve liberation. Lamb says quite simply, “It is this inability to “stand up and organize against oppression” which strains the credibility of an animal liberation movement.” [Lamb, p. 218] Lamb attributes three stages to liberation. The first stage is ‘pre­liberation’ where the oppressed are subject to the values and discourse of the oppressors. The oppressing group may feel moral obligations towards the oppressed without recognizing them as having moral worth or status. According to Lamb, reform is the second stage where the oppressed may gain an elevated status, yet all discussion and policy occurs utilizing the values of the oppressors. Lamb’s third stage is ‘liberation’ where the oppressed group’s values begin to gain recognition culminating into either an amalgamation with or total obliteration of the originally oppressing group. [Lamb, pp. 219­220] Lamb allows Singer’s movement to progress from stage one to stage two, but argues that stage three is beyond the possibility for nonhumans. He questions that animals could ever achieve such conceptualization of themselves, and furthermore ever be able to communicate it to humans. Lamb equates conceptual and linguistic productivity to achievements in work and culture. He states, “[h]uman language has developed as humans have developed the means of transforming the world, producing the means of subsistence and reproducing them in symbolic form.” [Lamb, p. 222] Citing one of Hegel’s insights, Lamb observes that animals unable to achieve productivity fail to achieve liberation. One might respond that animals, simply by living their lives achieve some productivity; e.g., by building nests or gathering nuts and thereby express their values; i.e., natural ends. Further, animals have no need to communicate these values to others. Singer might counter Pierce and Lamb’s objections to the possibility of true animal liberation by noting that ‘liberation’ is different for animals. While it is true that human liberation requires the third stage as suggested by both Pierce and Lamb, animals unaware of human values whatsoever need not seek to revise said values. Furthermore,

70 he might object that liberation is relative to the nature of beings liberated and Lamb and Pierce, being members of the oppressing group, are forcing their evaluative nature upon the subordinate group; i.e., animals. While Singer might be able to counter Lamb and Pierce, their point is well stated and reflects many people’s response to Singer, namely, that there is something significantly different between humans and animals and by equating the liberation of animals to the women and blacks’ movements Singer is lowering the status of women and blacks to that of animals, rather than the other way around. The Second question, while it is concerned with whether Singer has underlying speciesist tendencies, also exposes the seeming lack of respect Singer holds for human beings. 26 Singer claims he avoided the subject of the “wrongness of killing” throughout his book Animal Liberation because he was writing for non­philosophers. [Singer (79), p.145] Yet in many other writings, such as those anthologized in his Practical Ethics, he discusses the wrongness of killing. In these writings he makes some troubling points about the comparative moral worth of humans and animals and, as well, normal and abnormal humans. Singer claims that one classic utilitarian position on ‘killing’ argues that it is wrong because of the bad effects: grief, fear, insecurity experienced by everyone, not just the individual killed. But opponents of this utilitarianism deny the importance of these “side­effects” as the defining characteristic of killing, illustrating their position with the imagery of someone killing a hermit. Their opposition is that even if no one experiences the loss, besides the hermit, something ‘wrong’ has occurred. So the feelings of grief, fear and insecurity are by­products of the wrongness, and not the wrongness itself as utilitarians claim. [Singer (79), pp. 145­6] Singer worries the fantastic example of the hermit might be misleading our ethical instincts. But he agrees that these “side­ effects” cannot demonstrate the wrongness of killing non­human animals because these animals lack the sensibilities to have these “side­effects” and, by the way, some humans might lack these same sensibilities. [Singer (79), p. 146] So he agrees that the opponents to this utilitarian account of the wrongness of killing are on to something.

26 Singer is infamous for his claims that severely malformed infants can morally be euthanized, as well as, adults lacking higher brain function.

71 Singer goes back to the basics of utilitarianism, pleasure and pain. He does this by citing the ‘simple utilitarian view’, which determines whether an act is right and wrong by considering the amount of pleasure and pain it leads to. This simple view aims at maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. On this view killing is wrong because it stops the individual from experiencing further pleasure, thereby reducing the aggregate pleasure the individual will experience. He states, “. . .what this amounts to is that we should not cut short a pleasant life.” [Singer (79), p. 146] Singer worries that the “wrongness of killing” may not simply be explained by the claim that because pleasure is good, killing possessor’s of pleasant lives is bad since it eliminates the possible pleasure they might have experienced had they not been killed. What complicates this position is that future pleasure can be reduced in two ways, the first is listed above—kill the possessor of the pleasant life—while the second way is merely denying the experiencing of pleasure, making life unpleasant. Singer agrees that all of us would object to the latter, since we prefer pleasure to its absence. But he is not sure if the simple view can explain our objection to the former. Singer claims that “. . . we cannot move automatically from a preference for a pleasant life rather than an unpleasant one, to a preference for a pleasant life rather than no life at all.” [Singer (79), p. 146] For ceasing to exist does not work against the individual’s pleasure/pain quotient, since one cannot experience anything after death. In other words, one has no such quotient if one doesn’t exist; so a comparison of a pleasant life to no life may be impossible. However, Singer does not address that prior to death the individual can experience pain from being able to anticipate losing future pleasures, and, further, that not wanting to die can be an increase in the pain quotient. So while, after death it is true one cannot experience anything, up until death one can experience many pains brought on by knowing that one will soon cease to exist. Admittedly, Singer will later address these concerns when he discusses and endorses the ‘prior existence’ view. Singer further argues that the simple view is problematic in establishing the wrongness of killing because it seems to imply that the moral agent is obligated to increase the aggregate quotient of pleasure by increasing the number of beings capable of

72 experiencing pleasant lives. 27 Singer cites Sidgwick’s solution as endorsing the simple view and its implications that the right, or good, act is to increase the amount of beings capable of experiencing pleasure; the bad act, the opposite. This view is difficult to accept because it would morally obligate men and women to procreate as much as possible. Singer refers to this as the ‘total’ view since it is expected to increase the total amount of pleasure either by increasing the number of being’s experiencing pleasure or by increasing the number of pleasurable experiences of such beings. Hence Singer thinks that neither the simple nor the total utilitarian view can explain why killing is wrong. An alternative, Singer considers and rejects as implausible, to the total view is called the ‘average’ view. It is so named since it advocates one to increase the aggregate total’s averages for various pleasures and pains, such as those associated with basics like diet, housing, and health. One sees the influence of the average view in concerns about raising average life­spans or income levels, and in reducing average breast cancer rates or fatal accidents. On this view, killing is wrong since it hurts the averages one wants to raise and helps those one wants to decrease. But Singer worries that this isn’t always so. For one way to raise averages is to have a policy of eliminating all those below average, in order to raise the relevant averages. This approach is seen as an endless pursuit of ‘average’ fixing, since now that there is a new, higher average there are now new beings below average needing to be eliminated in order to raise the average. This process is expected to go on ad infinitum. Further unacceptable implications from this view are that one would be doing wrong by bringing into the world a being whose existence is below average or the even stranger commitment that bringing a being into the world with the expectation of a miserable life, albeit not as miserable as others, is preferable to not bringing such a one into existence. Due to these implications, Singer rejects the average view. However, the average view claims that it is not a commitment to eliminating the below average. Such a view might allow elimination, but instead is interested in raising the pleasure level of the below average, as this is easier to accomplish than maintaining

27 He attributes this consideration originally to Henry Sidgwick, with further development provided by Jan Narveson and Derik Parfit.

73 the status of the higher given the problem of diminishing returns. Thus, Singer’s quick rejection of this view does not take into account the full “average” view. Singer at one point favored what he calls the ‘person­affecting’ view. He claims that this is more plausible than both the total and average views. This view is limited to consider only “persons” in existence at the time of the determination. ‘Persons’ is quite loosely used, as it includes all beings capable of experiencing pleasure or pain. But because it excludes all beings who would or merely could exist at some future time and concentrates on those existing now. Singer prefers to call this view the ‘prior existence’ view. [Singer (79), p. 148] This view eliminates the difficulty of the total view, the one which requires the moral agent to bring into existence as many pleasure­bearers as possible. Singer notes that this relieves couples from the obligation of having children, an obligation that was grounded in the belief that increasing the amount of happiness in the world required increasing the amount of beings capable of experiencing pleasure. However, Singer further observes that even though one cannot be so obligated, one cannot escape the obligation of bringing a possibly genetically defective child into the world because of the painful experiences that will result from this birth. This is so because it is assumed that the ‘child’ already exists and thus its interests must be considered if we are to apply the prior existence/person affecting view. This obligation is antithetical to the usual utilitarian stance on abortion and infanticide. Yet the ‘person­ affecting view would protect the lives of many animals, since they can experience pain and pleasure’. Singer provides three reasons for this change in his thought. The first reason touches on an idea discussed earlier, the notion that it seems wrong to be responsible for bringing into existence a being that will only experience an unpleasant life because it carries the further implication that it seems right to bring a happy being into existence. Singer notes that Parfit has convinced him that his prior­existence (person­affecting) argument cannot readily reject the companion commitment to the above, namely that it is right to bring beings into existence, if their life will have a large measure of pleasantness. Part of the problem lies in the impersonal form of the statement “we ought to increase happiness” being rephrased into a person­affecting, personal, claim that “we ought to do what affects people for the better.” [Parfit, p. 100] Parfit sees this change as leading into

74 the Total view, that we ought to create happy people, a conclusion Singer does not want to endorse. So, this concern leads to a weakening in his support for the person­affecting, prior existence view. Furthermore, Parfit in a note of this paper recalls conversations with Narveson where such difficulties suggested to him that life cannot be compared to non­existence. [Parfit, p. 110] Singer attributes the second reason for his no longer supporting the prior­ existence view to R.I. Sikora’s Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations? While he is still inclined to claim that it is wrong to bring into existence a person who is undoubtedly going to experience a miserable life, it does seem acceptable for an under populated country to encourage a higher birth rate in order to increase the population. He speculates that if the goal of this country is to increase its population by one million, it is highly probable that at least one miserable life will be the result. He concludes that the risk of creating the one miserable life is worth taking since the other nine hundred and ninety­nine thousand and nine hundred and ninety­nine have the potential for a full and happy life. He concludes this by considering that despite the one bad act of bringing a miserable person into existence, the other lives, being happy, result in a good action. Thus given the utilitarian calculus more happiness is generated than unhappiness, despite the one individual’s plight. Finally, Singer rejects the plausibility of a prior­existence position by noting that existence cannot account for the demarcation between being valuable and non­valuable. More precisely, when does actual existence become valuable? He is concerned about the arbitrariness of using the moment of birth as the indication of value. [Singer (79), p. 150] Due to the lack of agreement upon this point, Singer suspects it cannot provide the morally relevant feature for valuing a being. He notes that anti­abortion positions claim value for the fetus, while pro­abortion positions claim that if abortion is wrong, contraception ought to be rejected as well, since they both have the same outcome, i.e. a baby does not get born. After demonstrating the inability to demarcate value based upon mere existence, he considers the consciousness or sentience position. He defines consciousness as the capacity to feel, and is still committed to this capacity as the essential feature for value. However, he notes that this criterion is not relevant to the

75 question regarding the wrongness of killing. This concern is bolstered by the possibility of killing sentient beings painlessly. The wrongness of killing, Singer believes lies in a combination of the replaceability thesis with the importance Michael Tooley attributes to the distinction between beings who are merely conscious and those capable of self­consciousness. [Singer (79), p. 151] The replaceability thesis claims that there can be no utilitarian objection to killing a sentient being as long as one later replaces it with another sentient being who will experience as much or more pleasure; for in that case the aggregate happiness is unaffected. According to both Tooley and Singer, self­consciousness is demonstrated by a being’s ability to conceive of its own distinctness, as existing with a past, present and future. Singer notes that the replaceability thesis is implausible when it is applied to self­conscious beings with desires to continue living, but in the case of beings incapable of self­consciousness the thesis holds. He claims creatures lacking self­ consciousness are, “. . . in a sense, impersonal.” [Singer (79), p. 151] This observation implies that the killing of an “impersonal” being carries with it no personal wrong, despite the fact that its death reduces the happiness quotient. The happiness quotient is affected since the being was capable of feeling pleasure and pain, the personal culpability is reduced because the being was incapable of knowing that it was the one doing such experiencing. He notes further that the replaceability thesis can eliminate even the slight wrongness of the act because a similar creature can be brought into existence. Singer points out that he has abandoned the classic utilitarian stance in favor of Hare’s preference utilitarianism and its focus upon universalizability. For Hare, universalizability is applicable to moral concepts. For Singer, it is merely a reflection of the need for impartiality, the idea that similar beings ought to be treated similarly if no relevant difference provides a reason not to do so. According to Singer, preference utilitarianism values preference­bearing individuals—i.e. self­conscious, personal beings—over non­self­conscious, impersonal beings. Thus this distinction can allow the replaceability thesis of the total happiness view to be plausible in relation to non­self­ conscious beings. And the same thesis is not plausible in reference to self­conscious beings. In other words, preference utilitarianism is not inconsistent with the replaceability thesis, which would allow self­conscious, personal beings to use non­self­

76 conscious, impersonal beings as means to an end an allowance that strict adherence to classic utilitarianism would not endorse. Singer notes that replaceability does not suggest that the non­self­conscious beings’ interest do not count in the utilitarian calculus, only such interests carry less weight than self­conscious, preference­bearing individuals’ interests. Sentience, he claims, grants a being equal consideration of its interests, but sentience cannot indicate a being’s interest in living. Only self­conscious beings can have an interest in living and therefore an interest in not being replaced by a similar being. Thus Singer thinks he has reached a compromise in the utilitarian perspectives. The total view, with its replaceability thesis applies to our “dealings with beings that do not exist as individuals living their own lives.” [Singer (79), p. 152] At this point it seems acceptable to consider the total happiness generated. Yet, at the same time he feels justified in utilizing the prior existence view in dealings with self­conscious beings existing now, thereby granting them priority in our moral considerations. He goes further to eliminate obligation to create more self­conscious beings by noting that, “We are therefore justified in giving priority to self­conscious beings who exist now or, independently of our decisions, will exist at some future time, rather than to the creation of possible extra beings.” [Singer (79), p. 152] Singer notes that he has only suggested a utilitarian solution to the problem of killing; he has not addressed the nature of priority or its ramifications. But he has established that it is possible to have unequal value, if a relevant difference can be demonstrated justifying such unequal treatment. Singer thinks he has avoided the criticism of being speciesist himself, since he is not denying equal treatment to some animals grounded in membership within a species; rather the denial is based upon the animal’s lacking the capacity “to desire to go on living.” [Singer (79), p. 153] Finally, Singer notes the further consequence of his revised view. If replaceability is applicable to non­self­conscious beings infants, and adults in semi­vegetative states have the same status as animals who are merely conscious—i.e. they, too, are replaceable. He notes, “[i]n real life we are not likely to want to kill and replace normal babies. . . [i]n the case of defective infants, however, replacement could be a desirable option.” [Singer (79), p. 153] He sees this as a practical solution, similar to inspection of the amniotic fluid of the

77 fetus which can provide information regarding the health and development of the fetus. If the fluid indicates serious genetic defect, the child is usually aborted, why then should the “defective” infant upon birth not also be similarly treated, he concludes. Singer has reached what he considers a non­speciesist compromise. He can maintain his utilitarian foundation but make allowances for granting some interests more weight because they are interests of preference­bearing individuals. This compromise claims that non­preference­bearing individuals are replaceable, since they cannot anticipate a future, nor fear its loss. Michael Lockwood’s Singer on Killing and the Preference for Life provides a strong criticism against preference utilitarianism’s ability to support the replaceability thesis. Lockwood begins by noting that classical utilitarianism progression into “some form of pluralistic consequentialism” has weakened the utilitarian position. He views pluralistic aggregates—where happiness and well­being must be balanced with notions of equality, justice and/or autonomy—as complicating the basic simplicity of the classical theory. [Lockwood, p. 158] Impartiality should also be added to this pluralistic list. Regardless, Lockwood accepts the fact that by adding to the calculations, these revised utilitarians have knowingly jettisoned the simplicity of their position, in favor of fruitfulness. 28 Singer, Lockwood complains, should have made a stronger case for his conclusions, that non­self­conscious beings are replaceable. Lockwood notes that Singer is rather loose with his reference to preference utilitarianism. Preferences can be viewed either as forward or backward. Forward looking preferences are for something existing in the future, as when one wants to graduate from college next year. Backward looking preferences are for what existed or might have existed in the past, as when one is glad one’s parents paid for one’s college expenses or angry that they did not do this. Lockwood exemplifies this distinction with the case of a doctor charged with a life and death choice. The doctor is helping a pregnant woman facing a difficult birth. The situation is such that only the mother or the child will survive the process. This doctor is forced to choose one life over the other. Singer’s preference utilitarianism would recommend that the doctor save the mother’s life, given her ability to demonstrate self­

28 ‘Simplicity’ and ‘fruitfulness’ are criteria for judging strengths of hypothesis and theories. For more on these criteria I direct the reader to writings of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper.

78 consciousness and her various forward­looking preferences. But the doctor might want to consider the child’s backward looking preferences, e.g., its judgment years later that it was glad its mother did not have an abortion. Lockwood questions whether the child’s backward­looking preferences could carry much weight in Singer’s calculations. Backward­looking preferences are held by Singer’s beings who have ‘prior existence’ they are glad to have been given the chance to mature into beings that have forward­ looking preferences. If such backward­looking preferences are to be considered, Singer’s non­replaceability thesis cannot assist us in this case, nor quite possibly in similar cases where forward and backward preferences conflict. [Lockwood, p. 159] It also complicates his position that holds fetuses and infants as less entitled to moral consideration due to their lack of self­consciousness and the ability to have preferences. Lockwood supplies a possible rebuttal, of which Singer might avail himself. The most obvious defense would be to deny the importance of backward­looking preferences by giving them less, or no weight, in the utilitarian calculation. [Lockwood, p, 160] Lockwood notes that this would be difficult to justify, and is actually beside the point. It is beside the point, Lockwood explains, because backward­looking preferences are merely instrumentally backward­looking and not essentially so. This is so, he argues, because there is a causal; or logical necessary condition between both the future and past preferences. In reference to the doctor’s choice between the child over the mother Lockwood states, “The backward­looking preference is one he has largely in virtue of a host of forward­looking ones, and it is all the preferences that the child would come to possess—or such, at least, as stand a good chance of being satisfied, given that he lives— whose fulfillment is at stake in the doctors’ decision. [Lockwood, p. 160] Basically, Lockwood is claiming that because we have future preferences that require our continuing to live, we are necessarily forced to have a backwards preference for life. 29 Thus, Singer’s acceptance of the replaceability thesis seems incompatible with full preference utilitarianism. Lockwood determines that Singer’s preference utilitarianism is not about the non­replaceability of the preference­bearers, but the preferences

29 Some objectors to backward­looking preferences claim such preferences are illegitimate due to the presupposition that one values one’s life as it is now, rather than what it might have been give different circumstances. Furthermore, backward­looking preferences are dependant upon the individual already being alive, which is seen as being partial to already existent beings.

79 themselves. [Lockwood, p. 162] Lockwood notes that Singer’s disinclination to clarify how conflicts are resolved when different kinds of interests conflict—i.e., preferences or happiness—allows him to merely stipulate that self­consciousness preferences outweigh mere happiness. As Lockwood succinctly states, “. . . in the kind of interpersonal conflict of interests which we are considering, preferences trump happiness.” [Lockwood, p. 166] The remainder of Lockwood’s article is concerned with showing the weaknesses of preference utilitarianism, yet he does provide one further argument against Singer’s claim that the replaceability thesis is consistent with preference utilitarianism. Lockwood’s main concern is to reject Singer and other preference utilitarians’ view that the “the direct wrongness killing of a perfectly normal, healthy newborn infant is no greater that that of deliberate failure to conceive one.” [Lockwood, p. 168] In confronting this position, Lockwood has provided an added bonus of showing Singer’s view to be guilty of an underlying speciesism. This is based upon his acceptance of the replaceability thesis and his basic belief that preferences trump happiness. Lockwood adapts Chistina Hoff’s example of ‘Disposapup Ltd.’ to illustrate the difficulty of accepting the replaceability thesis, not only for humans but for animals too. The scenario is that given the cuteness and pliability of puppies and kittens, many humans prefer to have these young animals around. However, holiday traveling and long­term maintenance causes the keeping of pets to be somewhat of a hassle since one must make arrangements for the care and feeding of these creatures. Disposapup Ltd. offers a service which allows a family to have their pets painlessly euthanized and replaced upon demand. The idea is that everyone is happy, the family is happy, the animals are happy (albeit briefly) and the company is happy. Since kitties and puppies cannot demonstrate any long­term preferences for life, Singer’s compromised view must certainly conclude that Disposapup and its clients are acting morally. [Lockwood, p. 168] Lockwood has shown that Singer’s revised view, which grants more weight to prior­ existing, preference­bearing beings, is still speciesism. Singer might reply that Lockwood’s objection is a revised version of Henry Salt’s. Salt objected to the replaceability thesis because it ignores the fact that in order to value existence, one must already exist. Lockwood is similarly claiming that in order to value preferences, one must have them. Singer’s response to Salt was to temper the

80 importance of prior existence by characterizing it as important only if such existence incorporated the ability to have preferences. He might similarly respond to Lockwood by incorporating yet, another, valuable trait self­conscious beings possess. However, by doing so, Singer will become caught in a vicious circle, constantly having to find the next property which makes some beings non­replaceable. He seems to beg the question in favor of self­conscious beings, which seems speciesist against non­self­conscious, sentient species. CONCLUSION Singer’s work is very useful in that it questions our common understandings of moral worth, moral status, moral consideration and moral treatment. He has brought the debate to the forefront, and for that he must be congratulated. He has also initiated the possibility that moral worth is distinct from moral status. Further, and perhaps more importantly, he has set the debate to consider the possibility that moral status may be a matter of degree rather than the original conception that one either had it or did not have it, and in having moral worth one has it equally to all others. Singer does not, however, convince his reader that it really is immoral to kill animals for food or to use them in scientific experiments. This is because he accepts the replaceability thesis, albeit with a caveat about not being applicable to self­conscious beings. Yet, he does not fully establish that having preferences entails self­ consciousness. Hence, preference­bearing individuals, that are not self­conscious, morally could be used for food or scientific experimentation.

81 CHAPTER FIVE

It occurred to me while I was searching through the traditional literature on moral worth looking for that specific feature that makes a being worthy of moral treatment that maybe, since no real agreement has been reached on the subject, humans, or moral agents, have been looking in the wrong place for it. Later, I came across some feminist epistemology that targeted four assumptions in western literature that had led, according to the feminists, our thinking astray. This made me reconsider my observation that traditional western thought was perhaps looking at the problem of moral worth from the wrong direction. Most philosophers have been looking inward, inside the individual; perhaps looking outward is a plausible approach to finding why some beings receive moral treatment and others do not. This new direction has been explored by others, but their work has been largely ignored. FEMINIST RECOGNITION OF NEW PERSPECTIVES To give credit where it is due, I want to reiterate the four assumptions feminist epistemology claims runs through traditional western thought. The generic humanity assumption, assumes there is one paradigmatic point of view, experience etc. that is universally held by all humans. They explain this with an analogy of ducks declaring “there is only one standard for all well­formed water birds and describing this universal standard in such a way that it just happens to fit the description of a typical duck.” [Lawhead, p. 173] Obviously, swans, herons and seagulls will have a problem fitting the standard set by the ducks, just as many individual humans cannot fit the paradigm view point or experience. Another assumption feminists describe is that of the view from nowhere which holds that the “ideal knower” is free from all relationships and commitments. In other words, a sort of disembodied figure without ties to people, places or time. This “ideal knower” is not only physically impossible, but strictly speaking, illogical as well. In other words, feminists are claiming that one cannot deny one’s personal bias and background when pursuing any project. This “view from nowhere,” claim feminists, leads to the ability to develop “pure, impersonal reason”—the third assumption—such reason is the explanation for many of the dichotomies we see today in philosophy. It is as if thought, must be subjected to choosing between reason and

82 emotion, objective and subjective, mind and body, logic and intuition, intellect and imagination. It is either one or the other, never both. [Lawhead, p. 174] These dichotomies, also known as dualism, are rejected by the American pragmatists as well. Finally, the “Robinson Crusoe Assumption” assumes that the search for knowledge is at best, a solitary affair, where the individual is free from social or political involvement. The point is that knowledge results from a community, not an individual. There must be something in the sharing and comparing that makes the process a social one, and not individualistic and isolated. It is this last assumption that interests me. The others are well stated, and understood, but realizing that knowledge comes from others and can be for good or for ill is quite striking. PERFECT­RELATIONSHIP VIEW: A HYBRID THESIS In Politics, Aristotle, claimed that the basic relationship began as two pairs: master and slave, man and wife. I disagree. The real relationship is many faceted. Neither the master, nor husband, could provide anything for the other, without first establishing a relationship with the land. This is Aldo Leopold’s position when he states in The Land Ethic,”[w]e are commonly told what the human actors in this drama tried to do, but we are seldom told that their success, or the lack of it, hung in large degree on the reaction of particular soils to the impact of the particular forces exerted by their occupancy.” [Leopold, p. 141] In other words, a man needed to establish a relationship with the environment around him, prior to bringing in any other mouths to feed. In reality, it is a communal relationship between man, woman and environment, where the numbers of individual participants are really irrelevant. The bottom line is without the resources to survive, human beings are not going to be successful. The best advocate for the view that moral status is based upon relationships is J. Baird Callicott, and is termed the biosocial view, but I will refer to it as the relationship view. Callicott’s grounding for this approach to morality is based in Darwinian theory. The idea is that sentiment, as Hume suggested, is the basis of morality. Evolutionary theory has shown interdependent relationships are successful; and human sentiment is basis of such relationships. Callicott argues that “we must have become ethical before we became rational.” [Callicott, p. 151] Hume’s view held that sentiments informed reason. So it seems possible that two faculties, sentiment and reason are the suggested

83 groundings. The question of priority is not my immediate concern. But, observation seems to suggest that humans first develop their sentiment and then reasoning develops, finally, sentiment seems to be the last faculty left when we become older. Nature is best understood when individual species are looked at, not in isolation, but as dependent on other species with whom they form a community. Thus, humans, being natural creatures might best be understood from the same perspective. Callicott relies on what he deems a wholistic approach, rather than the individualistic approaches of deontology or utilitarianism. This implies that duties are not owed to individuals, but to whole communities. Callicott states that, “[i]ts logic is that natural selection has endowed human beings with an affective moral response to perceived bonds of kinship and community membership and identity; that today the natural environment, the land, is represented as a community, the biotic community; and that, therefore, an environmental or land ethic is both possible. . . and necessary. . .” [Callicott, p. 153] This relationship view does open the scope of moral concern to not only animals but to plants and ecosystems; hence it encompasses the sanctity of life view. This seems to suggest that human needs, as a species and as individuals, have less importance in the larger scope of the needs of the world in which we live. Yet, Callicott is not an extremist, as he wants to introduce the social aspect of humanity into his larger theory. He claims, “[p]rior moral sensibilities and obligations attendant upon and correlative to prior strata of social involvement remain operative and preemptive.” [Callicott, p. 158] Our duties are derived from the structure of the communities in which we find ourselves living, granting that there are larger communities outside our own with which we also have obligations. Yet, he emphasizes that duties to our local communities outweigh those to the further, similarly, interdependent communities with which we have relationships. This is expressed by an analogy to the growth of a tree where each, “social unit is layered over the more primitive, and intimate, ones.” [Callicott, p. 158] The relationship view has enlarged the scope for the moral agent when making moral judgments. This view does not automatically deny using any species to further another species’ needs, as it acknowledges that such use is a natural process. It does however; try to place constraints upon humans to require that moral consideration be given to all beings involved prior to acting. It seems to be a consequential view, in that

84 what is best overall for the biosocial community is the right action. However, how are conflicts of interests resolved? This suggests that the relationship view can describe human moral behavior, but it cannot prescribe such behavior. Something more is needed. Sentiment has provided the beginnings of a moral system, and as Hume suggested reason must lend a hand in order to provide prescriptions. Aristotle’s virtue ethics relies upon reason. Contemporary writers refer to it as the perfectionist view. Confucius is also understood as having a perfectionist view. Theoretically, it is a functionalist view. Everything serves a purpose, goodness derives from serving their purpose well. The hitch is finding what the essential purpose a being is supposed to serve. For Aristotle, the basic idea is finding a balance between the extremes. There are two vices one of deficiency and the other of excess, the middle is where virtue lies. As a moral agent, one is instructed to see which extreme one tends toward and to strive towards the other extreme in order to reach as close to the mean as possible. Basically, reason is required to determine what is virtuous. What is distilled from this view is that the virtuous agent is the successful being and hence lives well. In living well, this view believes, one serves their community by discovering what one’s talents are and then pursing perfection in one’s function; and, in doing so is reciprocally awarded. I am merely suggesting that we extend this functionalism into the “biosocial” community. The relationship view coupled with the perfectionist view, a wholistic, individualistic amalgamation might provide a method for resolving conflicts of interest. I will dub this the perfect­relationship view. I propose that the perfect­relationship view can, by borrowing some of the suggestions from Kant, Regan and Singer, offer a plausible conception of moral worth, or value, and provide a method of resolution for moral dilemmas. Further, I believe such a view reflects the ordinary view of most moral agents. Dumas said it best, “All for one, and one for all.” This line from The Three Musketeers packs a lot of wisdom. Is it possible that moral worth is simply a matter of stipulation by the moral agent? And once stipulated it becomes viable? “I am valuable.” The next step is easy, “Things that I interact with that make my life possible also have value.” Is there a difference? Is one more valuable than the other? Some say “yes”, others say “no.” But if one really thinks about it, where are you without all your

85 connections to people, places and things? Granted many things are artificial, man­made and replaceable. Many are not. Even the replaceable ones have significance to you. Now consider living things. Ok, Bugs. Mosquitoes. Everybody hates them. I do. They are irritating creatures. What possible worth could those beasts have? Well, they serve as food for frogs, lizards, birds and other small animals. So, when you enjoy watching the swallow fly by your window, you might remember that the mosquito gave it the energy to do so. I guess the next time I scratch myself I can smile and think about the bird, which fed upon the beastie which fed upon me. Does that mean I am morally obligated to not kill the mosquito? Well, now we can recall that “replaceability thesis” that Singer brought to light. While we might not be obligated to not kill the single annoying creature, we can at least not exterminate them to such a degree that the creatures that we do enjoy seeing cannot rely upon them as a food. Recall that the replaceability thesis claims that there can be no objection to killing a being as long as another replaces it, one who will experience as much or more pleasure. If we added another stipulation that required giving some weight to the consideration of such a being’s expected life­span, then the replaceability thesis would allow us not to be obligated to preserving the life of every misquito. Plants are the next unlikely beings that one would consider as needing some moral consideration. Yet, we spend millions of dollars cultivating some plants and discouraging others. To tell you the truth, I cannot conceive of a relationship with weeds. Regardless, it is a fact that the more green space humans have around them the healthier they are, this is based upon the fact that trees and plants produce oxygen. Oxygen, by the way, is something we humans need every minute of the day. Even weeds could serve a purpose. The truth is that we have relationships with people, places and things. This is the wholistic part of the view. The individualistic part is that we have a will to live, as does every living thing. The successful ones are so because they form interdependent relationships. What makes humans different from all the other members of our “biosocial” community is that we recognize this. The other thing that makes us different is that we, like other species, can cause detrimental problems to the whole, which is another thing that we recognize. And, because, we can reason, we are then charged with

86 having to place restraints upon ourselves, unlike our fellow “biosocial” cohorts. Hence, morality is strictly for moral agents, but it does not exclude moral patients or amoral beings. So the problem that conflicts of interests cannot be resolved exclusively by a relationship view could also be enhanced by utilizing the suggestions of Kant and Regan. In the Regan chapter it was suggested that moral intuitions and principles could be carefully constructed and Kant offers a very systematic way of creating such duties. So with these tools in hand it is possible to conceive of how through the recognition of relationships and abilities of various members within the community a moral valuing system can be established. An example might illustrate this point. A small beach community would like to build a large grocery store, rather than driving 45­minutes to the nearest supermarket. The residents have selected to live in this beach area because it is so isolated and pretty. The best available spot has been located, convenient to all. Yet, it happens to be right beside a natural wetland, utilized by many migrating birds throughout the year. These beach­dwellers chose this place because they enjoy living with nature, otherwise, they would live closer to the city. If the impartiality principle is applied—that all beings concerned ought to have their interests considered in this decision—then the migratory birds interests must be given consideration as well as the humans. The humans maintain the land and try to keep beach erosion to a minimum. The birds are dependent upon the wetlands for survival during their migration and are an attraction for many tourists that come to watch birds. Both parties are beneficial. However, the humans are actually gaining more from the presence of the birds than they would if the birds were not present; through enjoyment and tourism. By modifying Kant’s categorical imperative into “one should never be treated as a mere means, but also as an end in itself.” The moral agents would have to conclude that they will need to forgo building the new grocery store. This is because the birds not only are instrumental to their livelihoods, but are also deserving of protection. The interdependent relationship between the two groups requires some sacrifice on the part of both species. The humans must restrict their building to protect the flora and fauna, and the wildlife must be resigned to staying in the areas provide them, or suffer the consequences of being harmed by human machinery.

87 The real question becomes one of equality. Utilitarians require that every member be given equal consideration of their needs. Impartiality requires that unless there are good reasons for doing so, every member ought to be given their due. These principles are very important. This is where the hybrid perfect­relationship view might falter, because it cannot provide a reason for why human needs may ‘trump’ any other species’ needs. If Singer’s replaceability thesis is true of some beings such as minerals, plants, some bugs and small animals, then the trumping of some species’ needs might be acceptable. The replaceability view needs to be tempered with the perfectionist view’s claim that the best function ought to be given priority when conflicts occur. Additionally, some consideration must be given to average expected life­span of the species when questions of replaceability occur. If stipulation, tempered by reflective equilibrium, is acceptable, then it might come down to mere stipulation that whatever being can succeed in an area than it has possession of it. But possession is itself a relationship. When one possesses an item such as a car, one must maintain it to keep it running properly. A watch requires winding, or replacing batteries. Homes must be cleaned and repaired, lawns watered and maintained. Wild animals, too, “keep” their territories. Hence it comes full circle, in possessing something one has to care for it. If one fails to care for its possessions, one risks losing them. At this point it seems that moral worth/value is strictly instrumental worth. Something has value because it serves a purpose to the community. Restricting moral worth to pure instrumentality has traditionally been avoided. Kant says it best “persons are to be treated as ends, not as mere means.” In saying this Kant recognizes that we cannot help but use one another, it is when we do so without acknowledging the value of the other it is immoral. Yet, the perfect­relationship view seems to only establish instrumental value. The truth is inherent value has always been a stipulation; instrumental value can be empirically verified, not so inherent value. So if inherent value adds something to morality, why can it not be stipulated again? As I said before, humans have the ability to value themselves independently of any relationships. Maybe this ability can be extended to other beings as well, but the trouble lies in where such stipulation ends. Regan noted how arbitrarily such demarcation is. Further, most humans do determine their individual worth by their usefulness. So, the real question lies in

88 deciding if inherent worth adds more to the process, or can pure instrumental worth suffice for a moral code? Valuing beings purely instrumentally can help in making determinations when there are conflicting moral obligations. One gives equal consideration to all individuals involved and makes determinations by meeting the needs of the individuals that will best benefit the community. Sometimes human needs will outweigh non­human needs, and sometimes vice verse. It seems that in most instances this is how most moral humans act. So the next concern becomes the is/ought gap. Hume asks just because something is, does it necessarily follow that it ought to be this way? In many instances the answer is “yes.” But, when morality is the issue it cannot be so easily answered. In the past there were many instances, by today’s standards, of what would be deemed immoral behavior. It goes to show that “is” does not imply “ought.” So how can the perfect­relationship view avoid following our forefather’s missteps in behavior? It seems that one could from this view justify slavery and human sacrifice if it served the larger community interest. The best response to such concerns is to note that the larger community is best served when the principle of justice is followed. History has shown how injustice has undermined the success of a community. For example, the American Civil War has the distinguishing fact that more Americans died in that battle than in any other war Americans have fought. This war was ostensively for justice, the abolition of slavery. Slavery is unjust because the individual is giving to the community and not getting reciprocal social goods in exchange. The injustice of slavery caused not only the suffering of black Americans before the war, but the suffering of the war itself and the long struggle for reformation afterwards. However, justice, understood as granting each individual his due, would not permit such behavior. The next problem lies in determining what individuals are actually due? This seems to play right back into the perfectionist view. Individuals that serve the community will receive the same from the community. Hence, beneficial behavior will be awarded whereas detrimental behavior will be thwarted and punished. Individuals that have no instrumental value to the community are due nothing from it, neither reward; nor punishment, unless the individual threatens the community.

89 The perfect­relationship view can explain why some moral agents find abortion immoral, while at the same time allowing some cases of capital punishment to be moral. The perfect­relationship view can explain why just war is sometimes acceptable. The perfect­relationship view can explain why some moral agents do not help some people, and yet help others. The only other view that comes close to explaining how most ordinary moral agents think is utilitiarianism. Yet utilitarianism has too limited a scope when it comes to the moral agent’s required moral considerations. Further, utilitarianism is based on aggregating feelings of happiness among beings that can experience such, how are these to be measured? The perfect­relationship view is based on the well­being of the "biosocial” community, which requires that the individuals composing such a community have a high level of well­being. Well­being is more easily verifiable than; happiness, preference satisfaction. That is because well­being can be equated to success. To prove the point, one only need look at an individual, family, community, city, etc to know how functional they are. The question is what is the measure of success? That is best answered by each community itself. The community decides what functions are needed for it to be successful. However, a few clues might be: health (both physical and mental), a modicum of possessions or personal property (i.e.; clothing, shelter), useful skills and the desire to use them towards one’s own benefit and the benefit of the community. This view is not denying the value of the individual that is because (for without the individual there is no community) what it does deny is that the individual is more valuable than the community. This is a possible problem for strong individualists, but I ask you how far can you go alone? My answer is not too far. The struggle between the interests of the individual versus the interest of the community has been a long one. All political and ethical theory has been concerned with finding the limits of constraint for both parties. The perfect­relationship view provides some answers. When the relationship between the individual and the community becomes strained the individual must decide if it is worth conceding to the larger community, if not she is free to go to form new relationships and bond with a new community. However, the community must keep in mind that it, too, has obligations to its individuals and if it fails to meet them the individuals that comprise the community will go elsewhere.

90 The phrase, “you get out of it, what you put into it,” is very apropos. This should apply to all beings that comprise the community, not merely humans but the flora and fauna, as well. Some flora and fauna are beneficial to the community as food sources; some are aesthetically valuable, others are down right necessary for mere survival. Moral agents’ obligations are based upon these levels of use. The more necessary the being is to your success, the more binding your relationship to such a being; this goes for humans as well as non­humans. Thus special obligations are made. Some theorists decry special obligations, since impartiality is a key component of moral considerations. Yet, most humans accept the notion of special obligations. We fall back into the is/ought concern. DURKHEIM ON DIVISION OF LABOR The perfect­relationship view is pragmatically feasible when one considers the fact of interdependence. Emile Durkheim’s study of successful group functioning proves such interdependence. Durkheim suggests that groups are bound together by the division of labor (DOL). According to Durkheim, DOL is a natural law, a phenomenon that occurs within organisms. Organisms participate in an outward instantiation of this same phenomenon. Consider the human body. Its various systems operate interdependently toward a successful goal; i.e., the survival of the organism. Humans also work cooperatively towards a larger goal—the survival of society. [Durkheim, pp. 2­3] Durkheim observes that as society requires more specialization to accomplish its goals, the bond between individuals becomes more complex and easier to break. At one time in history, social goals were limited to mere survival, which utilized a very limited DOL. All members essentially carried out the same task of providing food and shelter. Although there was inevitably some gender­based DOL, labor was nevertheless towards the same goal. Men were concerned with providing protection and hunting meat. Women were restricted to gathering other foods and rearing the very young. This illustrates the interdependence required for the successful attainment of societal goals. As societal goals are now more sophisticated, DOL is no longer based upon gender but instead upon education. The more complicated the goals—e.g., space exploration—the more specialized the roles become among group members. If everyone carries out the exact same task, progress is slow. If labor is divided, granting equal importance to the various chores, a goal becomes not only more likely, but more quickly attainable.

91 Allowing Durkheim's claim that DOL is a natural law is not too difficult, since it does appear that organisms function through interdependent systems. It also seems that current societies function upon a wide DOL, whereas older human societies operated upon a very narrow DOL. What are the implications of DOL? Why is it important and how does it relate to “biosocial” communities? The concept of DOL is important for Durkheim, because it is that which determines the method of solidarity within a community. Communities are bound by their norms or rules. The rules provide a framework for both society and individuals to interact. They inform the individual of what are acceptable and unacceptable methods of interrelating. Without rules, there is no cohesion among members, disallowing one to know how to act. The nature of norms and their enforcement vary according to Durkheim. Some rules are repressive, restricting certain behaviors; others are merely restitutory in that they are applicable only when needed to reestablish the status quo. In order to work together, rules must be in place that permit or restrict behaviors. Without restrictions or agreed upon ways of doing things, societal goals cannot be reached. As goals become more intricate, so too norms. When survival was the only goal, the rules were solely concerned with promoting survival. Once society adopted more goals that were difficult to attain, rules increased in number and complexity. For example, Durkheim suggests a continuum between mechanical and organic solidarity. [Durkheim, pp. 104­106] It seems plausible to assume that Durkheim viewed society evolving from a completely mechanical mode of solidarity into a completely organically bound mode. The majority of current society resides somewhere between the two extremes of the continuum. 30 The differences between Mechanical Solidarity and Organic Solidarity are based upon the complexity of the community. In a more primitive community mechanical solidarity provides cohesion for the group. Here the individuals are more homogenous, there is less DOL among the members, it is easier for an individual to attain membership and yet group solidarity is more easily lost. Mechanical solidarity norms are more repressive, utilizing punishment to ensure adherence. Organic solidarity is based upon more complex communities. Here individuals are more diversified, there is more DOL

30 I have dubbed this mechaorganic solidarity.

92 among the members, it is more difficult for an individual to attain membership making group solidarity at its strongest. Organic solidarity norms are less repressive and maintained in strictly restitutory manner with more voluntary compliance. [Durkheim, p. 102] At first glance it seems that non­human membership within a “biosocial” community cannot be accomplished utilizing Durkheim's DOL and its influence upon solidarity. However, closer scrutiny reveals that provisional membership can and has occurred. Durkheim's consideration of primitive groups in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life illustrates that while animals were sometimes killed to feed humans, it was still done with moral consideration. Without delving too deeply into his analysis of primitive groups, it is important to consider some key points. Animals were considered part of the clan; the totem animal was usually revered and eaten only in sacred ceremonies (if at all). However, contact between humans and animals was limited, making the rules regarding animals at this level very simplistic—eat or do not eat. Additionally, other animals were seen as part of the clan. Non­totem animals were often granted special treatment, since they were viewed as members of other clans. Animals used towards the goal of survival were often treated with respect for their function. Thus, mass slaughter did not occur, nor was any part wasted. The group took life only when necessary and utilized every scrap. An animal was seen as sacrificing itself for the others—humans. Under mechanical solidarity, it is possible to see that animals were seen as homogenous with humans. Ancient human cosmology included all of nature within the system, with humans occupying a small portion of the whole. Animals worked with humans toward the same goal—survival. Animals could be members despite their inability to consciously participate within the group norms, although many of the group norms were reflective of the totem animal's natural behavior. Under mechanistic solidarity, the norms were restrictive, concerned with what could and could not be eaten, touched, or utilized. The punishment for not adhering to these norms was repressive, resulting in censure, banishment or even death, if the offence was particularly severe. It was quite possible for an animal to adhere to the norms, with or without conscious effort on its part. It seems that if an animal were found guilty of eating a taboo plant or fellow

93 creature, it could be punished. Yet it is clear that animals were not knowingly adhering to group norms. It was coincidence and instinct that gave early humans the impression that their animal clan members were conforming to their rules. It is also possible under this mode of solidarity for an animal to have a limited role within the group. Dogs, for example, helped protect the clan. Horses helped in transportation. Other creatures served as sacred objects, which allowed the group to focus its energy towards the societal goal. However, one problem in appealing to mechanical solidarity as the method to bind humans to animals is that Durkheim dismisses primitive cosmology as erroneous in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. The primitive group's way of carving up the universe was, in his view, based upon bad science or false notions. This error is the primitives' belief that an external force provides the method for determining membership and that this same force authors norms for the group. Durkheim claims that the group itself is responsible for both effects; thus the force is internal regardless of the appearance that societal constraints are external. The constraint is from within the group itself, and not suprahuman. Durkheim thus argues that the source of the norms and the method for determining clan membership were misunderstood. Yet it does not necessarily follow that mechanical solidarity has lost its usefulness. Current understanding of the world will allow the claim that the resources of this planet are limited. If resources are not carefully utilized, the survival of the human species is at risk. So we could create a cosmology that recognizes the interdependence of humans, animals and plants, without making reference to external divine beings. Such a cosmology is based upon a pragmatic observation: humans must conserve the world's resources, including animals and plants, in order to survive. Under an organic system sameness is not prized; difference is the key to successful attainment. This solidarity is maintained through restitutory—not repressive—laws. Thus, interdependence is contractual in that interdependent relationships are entered into willingly and established through contractual agreements; e.g. if Tom agrees to paint Sam’s house for $1,500, Sam expects his house painted while Tom expects to be paid for his services. As each individual becomes more specialized, the need for others is enhanced. One agrees to participate within the group because doing

94 so ensures success for the individual, as well as the group. Organic solidarity is stronger due to the interdependence of group members. How could animals and plants find a place within such a group? The dependence upon animals and plants is clear. They are a resource, as well as a delight to humans. We utilize them to meet many of our goals. Such solidarity might prove useful in binding humans to norms that respect the interests of animals and plants, but it would be a one­sided interaction, since animals and plants could not adhere to the pure organic method of rule adherence. They cannot bargain, nor contract. But they can serve a specialized function; they can provide humans with food, clothing and companionship. So an organic solidarity would provide a method of reparations to which humans could be subject if they failed to acknowledge the moral worth of all “biosocial” members of the community. This would allow fines and confiscation against humans if they proved themselves incapable of adhering to the norms that protect non­humans. While organic solidarity will not provide an avenue for non­humans to participate within norms, it does provide a method of affording animals and plants more protection from inhumane treatment. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES TO DIVISION OF LABOR Membership within a “biosocial” community does carry rights as well as responsibilities. The reasoning members of a “biosocial” community will have the task of determining what functions are integral to the overall success of the community and which are less so. Such determinations will be the basis for establishing duties and sanctions. Necessary functions will be given higher status. It seems that higher status of moral agents will ultimately be owed and incur more restrictive duties and obligations. Non­necessary functions, but culturally pleasing functions will more likely have a lower status than the necessary functions and will thus be owed and have fewer restrictive duties and obligations. Non­functioning beings must also be given some value, and thus, be owed some duties. However, these beings will have no responsibilities or duties themselves. Some allowance for potential functioning must be made too. Children are not functioning members of a community, but have the potential to become so. It seems that “biosocial” membership is a matter of degree—a strong objection to tying moral worth to DOL. Degrees of moral worth have traditionally been rejected.

95 Moral worth, or membership within a moral group, is considered by traditionalists to be an either­or proposition, not a matter of degree. Acceptance of variances within moral worth, or a hierarchical approach to moral worth, is necessary to adopting membership based upon DOL. DOL supports the perfectionist view, that one is rewarded for the one’s efforts that benefit the community. If one's worth were determined by one's role within an interdependent “biosociety,” it would be possible to account for higher and lower status. If some functions are determined to be higher functioning, does it follow that humans could also be assigned a lower moral status, like that of animals and plants? Can humans be sacrificed to serve the greater good? This is problematic. It seems quite easy to deny non­humans full­fledged status, since these beings do not have the capacity to recognize that they are members. Yet can we deny humans full­fledged status based upon this same criterion? Would mentally impaired members not be entitled to full moral worth? Can they receive the rights without the responsibilities of repressive laws? If an Alzheimer's patient failed to honor a norm that was deemed punishable, would they be subject to punishment? No, they would not, yet non­humans can be. It seems that the Alzheimer's victim is not functioning within society, while some animals are. Perhaps a case could be made for past functioning. When someone (human or animal) can no longer serve her role, it does not follow that she is no longer deemed of moral worth; she is deemed merely incapable of participating within the norms. It is clear that this is still problematic, but the mentally diminished person would be entitled to rights without responsibilities. What about humans who have never functioned within the group, those born with mental incapacities who have never worked for social goals or were socialized to follow group norms? A case could be made that these humans serve an indirect function toward society in that they teach us to be benevolent without requiring anything in return. While this would free us from excluding any non­functioning humans from “biosocial” membership, it weakens the claim that animals and plants belong only because they can serve a function. Why not define non­functioning beings function as teaching humans to be benevolent? Many would find this convincing; believing that the manner in which one

96 treats animals is symptomatic of how one treats humans. This would free animals from seeking membership by functioning directly in attainment of societal goals and, instead, receiving their membership through an indirect function, like teaching humans how to be benevolent. Benevolence is an important moral principle. Learning to be benevolent to the non­functioning members of a “biosocial” community might ensure that a benevolent sentiment is developed within the community and its individual members. Such a sentiment might help in defeating the opposite sentiment sometimes vented by humans, cruelty and anti­socialism. It is quite a difficult problem allowing some non­functioning members to have indirect function, while insisting that other non­humans, yet functioning members serve directly. It seems inconsistent, but perhaps it could be resolved by stipulating that if a member can serve a direct function they should do so and, if not then, an indirect function will serve to provide them with “biosocial” membership. It can be claimed that the perfect­relationship view and implementing DOL, is a kinder, gentler inhumanity to non­humans, and perhaps a lessening of human dignity. But it seems that this is better than naively ignoring two facts: (1) humans do dominate the world at this time, and (2) through this dominance, it is possible for non­humans to be regarded as not worthy of moral treatment. The proposed solution to providing solidarity between species requires that animals and plants receive some rights, but also responsibilities, without their awareness. At the same time, humans will receive benefits from the “biosocial” interdependence by participating within DOL, but will also be held to stricter laws and punishments concerning their treatment of these non­human members. CONCLUSION The hybrid perfect­relationship view bolstered by input from Kant, Regan, Singer and Durkheim is plausible. It actually reflects most ordinary moral agents’ moral judgments when it comes to interaction between humans and their surroundings. It does go a little further, with the introduction of mechaorganic solidarity, in requiring moral agents to give consideration to the interests and needs of wild animals and plants. This further requirement does not reflect the general populations view. The is/ought gap was brought up but never resolved. Some consideration must be given to this problem.

97 The problem is best understood as claiming that one cannot imply an evaluative claim from a purely factual one. There must be an additional evaluative claim, bridging the two, in order for the inference to stand. The perfect­relationship view might be accused of not having such a bridge. Much was offered for empirical support, which described the feasibility of the view. In other words, the claim was that this is how humans usually act. Only through stipulations of various principles were any prescriptive claims made. Yet, it seems that this could be said for most moral theories. That ultimately it comes down to stipulation, postulation and reflection upon the practicality of the view and its implications.

98 CITED SOURCES

CITED SOURCES FOR CHAPTER TWO Broadie, Alexander and Elizabeth M. Pybus. "Kant's Treatment of Animals." Philosophy. 49 (1974): 375­383.

Broadie, Alexander and Elizabeth M. Pybus. “Kant and the Maltreatment of Animals.” Philosophy. 53 (1978): 560­561.

Broadie, Alexander and Elizabeth M. Pybus. "Kant and Direct Duties." Dialogue. MR81; 20: 60­67.

Gregor, Mary J. Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Infield, Louis. (trans.) Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Ethics. London: The Century Co, 1930.

Liddell, Brendan. (trans.) Kant on the foundation of Morality: A Modern Version of the Grundlegung. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.

Paton, H. J. (trans.) Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper Tourchbooks, 1964.

Regan, Tom. “Broadie and Pybus on Kant.” Philosophy 51 (1976): 471­472.

Skidmore, J. “Duties to Animals: The Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 541­559.

CITED SOURCES FOR CHAPTER THREE Cohen, Carl and Tom Regan. The Animal Rights Debate. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.

Regan, Thomas. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1983.

CITED SOURCES FOR CHAPTER FOUR Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1963.

Parfit, Derik. “On Doing the Best for Our Children.” Ethics and Population. Ed. Michael D. Bayles. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co. Inc., 1976.

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002.

99 Singer, Peter. In Defence of Animals. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1985.

Singer, Peter. “Killing Humans and Killing Animals.” Inquiry 22 (1979):145­156.

Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Lamb, David. “Animal Rights and Liberation Movements.” Environmental Ethics 4 (Fall 1982): 215­233.

Lockwood, Michael. “Singer on Killing and the Preference for Life.” Inquiry 22 (1979): 157­170.

Pierce, Christine. “Can Animals be Liberated?” Philosophical Studies 36 (July 1979): 69­ 75.

Uniacke, Suzanne “A Critique of the Preference Utilitarian Object to Killing People.”

Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Je 02; 80(2): 209­217.

CITED SOURCES FOR CHAPTER FIVE Callicott, J. Baird. “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic”. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001. Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic”. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Durkheim, Emile. The Rules of Sociological Method: and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method. Ed. Steven Lukes. Trans. W.D. Halls. New York: The Free Press, 1982. Kanon, Eli. “Can Animals Attain Membership Within a Human Social/Moral Group?” Essays in Philosophy (June 2004) Vol. 5 No. 2.

Lawhead, William F. The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach. 3 ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2006.

100 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Ackerman, Diane. An Alchemy of Mind. New York: Scribner, 2004.

Bentham, Jeremy. An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1963.

Callicott, J. Baird. “The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic”. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Clark, Stephen R. L. Moral Status of Animals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.

Cohen, Carl and Tom Regan. The Animal Rights Debate. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.

Durkheim, Emile. The Rules of Sociological Method: and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method. Ed. Steven Lukes. Trans. W.D. Halls. New York: The Free Press, 1982.

Gregor, Mary J. Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.

Francione, Gary L. Animals, Property and the Law. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995.

Hare, R. M. Essays on Bioethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Infield, Louis. (trans.) Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Ethics. London: The Century Co, 1930.

Kant, Immanuel. “Rational Beings Alone Have Moral Worth”. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Leopold, Aldo. “The Land Ethic”. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Liddell, Brendan. (trans.) Kant on the foundation of Morality: A Modern Version of the Grundlegung. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.

Lovejoy, Arthur O. The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961.

101 Lorenz, Konrad. On Aggression. New York: Bantam Books. 1970.

Maslow, Abraham H. Toward a Psychology of Being. 2 nd . Ed. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1968

Paton, H. J. (trans.) Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper Tourchbooks, 1964.

Parfit, Derik. “On Doing the Best for Our Children.” Ethics and Population. Ed. Michael D. Bayles. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co. Inc., 1976.

Regan, Thomas. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1983.

Regan, Thomas. “The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights.” Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Regan, Thomas and Peter Singer, eds. Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice­Hall, Inc., 1976.

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002.

Singer, Peter. In Defence of Animals. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1985.

Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979

Singer, Peter. “A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation.” Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Searle, John R. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press, 1995.

Tompkins, Peter and Christopher Bird. The Secret Life of Plants. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1989.

Taylor, Paul W. Respect For Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Warren, Mary Anne. “A Critique of Regan's Animal Rights Theory.” Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001.

Warren, Mary Anne. Moral Status, Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

102 JOURNAL ARTICALS

Benson, John. "Duty and the Beast." Philosophy 53 (1978): 529­49.

Broadie, Alexander and Elizabeth M. Pybus. "Kant's Treatment of Animals." Philosophy. 49 (1974): 375­383.

Broadie, Alexander and Elizabeth M. Pybus. “Kant and the Maltreatment of Animals.” Philosophy. 53 (1978): 560­561.

Broadie, Alexander and Elizabeth M. Pybus. "Kant and Direct Duties." Dialgue. MR81; 20: 60­67.

Callicot, J. Baird. "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair." Environmental Ethics 2 (Winter 1980): 311­38.

Castaneda, Hector­Neri. “Imperatives, Oughts, and Moral Oughts.” The Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 44 (D 66): 277­300.

Connolly, E. Jr., Judy Huang, William Mack, Szilard Kiss, Marcello Oppermann, Sulli Popilskis, Beck Inderbitzen, Jaun Lasheras, John Dobak and John Perl II. “Neuroprotection in a primate reperfused stroke model by delayed mild hypothermia induced using a novel intravascular cooling catheter.” Stroke 31 (11) (November 2000): 2829­2829: 486.

Darby, Derrick. "Two Conceptions of Rights Possession." Social Theory and Practice. 27 (3) (July 2001): 387­417.

Darby, Derrick. "Grounding Rights in Social Practices: A Defence (sic.)." Res Publica 9 (2003): 1­18.

DeGrazia, David. "Equal Consideration and Unequal Moral Status." Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (1) (1993): 17­31.

DeGrazia, David. "The Distinction Between Equality in Moral Status and Deserving Equal Consideration." Between The Species: A Journal of Ethics (Spring 1991): 73­77.

Duran, Jane. "Domesticated and Then Some." Between The Species: A Journal of Ethics (Fall 1990): 176­80.

Gunn, Alastair S. "Traditional Ethics and Moral Status of Animals." Environmental Ethics 5 (Summer 1983): 133­54.

Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning." Yale Law Journal (1913­1914):16­59.

103 Lamb, David. “Animal Rights and Liberation Movements.” Environmental Ethics 4 (Fall 1982): 215­233.

Landman, Willem A. "On Excluding Something from Our Gathering: The Lack of Moral Standing of Non­Sentient Entities." South African Journal of Philosophy (Fall 1991): 7­19.

Lockwood, Michael. “Singer on Killing and the Preference for Life.” Inquiry 22 (1979): 157­170.

McKenna, Erin. "Pragmatism and Primates." American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 22 (3) (Spring 2001): 183­205.

Pierce, Christine. “Can Animals be Liberated?” Philosophical Studies 36 (July 1979): 69­ 75.

Singer, Peter. “Killing Humans and Killing Animals.” Inquiry 22 (1979):145­156.

Skidmore, J. “Duties to Animals: The Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 541­559.

Regan, Tom. “Broadie and Pybus on Kant.” Philosophy 51 (1976): 471­472.

Rowlands, Mark. "Contractarianism and Animal Rights." Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3) (1997): 235­247.

Thomas, Birch H. "Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration." Environmental Ethics 15 (4) (Winter 1993): 313­32.

Uniacke, Suzanne “A Critique of the Preference Utilitarian Object to Killing People.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Je 02; 80(2): 209­217.

WEBSITES

http://www.columbiacruelty.com/introduction.asp

104 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Elizabeth ‘Eli’ Kanon EDUCATION

Florida State University • Tallahassee, FL 2002 – Present Ph.D. Candidate [Defense date 08/04/06] University of Nebraska • Lincoln, NE 2001­2002 Graduate Work towards Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Mississippi • Oxford, MS 2000­2001 Master of Arts in Philosophy Texas State University • San Marcos, TX 1981­1985 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy

Post BA • See Work Experience

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Ethical Theory and Applied Ethics

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

Logic and Symbolic Logic

PUBLISHED AND PRESENTATED PAPERS

“Can Animals Attain Membership Within a Human Social/Moral Group?” Presented Spring 2003 University of North Florida Student Conference Florida State University/University of Florida Student Conference Published Spring 2004 Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 2 • Humboldt State University

“Dewey’s Concept of Society: Its Instrumental Setting” A Thesis for the Master of Arts Degree Rebel Press • University of Mississippi • Oxford, MS

105 TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Assistant Professor Flagler College Introduction to Philosophy I • Spring 2006 Symbolic Logic • Spring 2006 Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics • Spring 2006 Senior Paper Seminar • Spring 2006

Instructor Florida A&M University Introduction to Philosophy • Spring 2005 and Fall 2005

University of North Florida Reasoning and Critical Thinking • Fall 2004 Ethical Issues & Life Choices • Fall 2004 and Fall 2005 Introduction to Philosophy • Fall 2005

Florida State University Reasoning and Critical Thinking • Summer 2004 Ethical Issues & Life Choices • Fall 2004 and Spring 2005

Teaching Assistantships Florida State University Introduction to Philosophy • Ms. Tina Huggins • Fall 2002 and Spring 2003 Philosophy of Law • Dr. Maria Morales • Fall 2003 Reasoning and Critical Thinking • Mr. Stephen Morris • Spring 2004

University of Nebraska Medical Ethics • Mr. Tom Kiefer • Summer 2002 Philosophy and Current Issues • Dr. Mark Van Roojen • Spring 2002 Introduction to Philosophy • Dr. Robert Audi • Fall 2001

University of Mississippi Logic: Critical Thinking • Dr. William Lawhead • Fall 2000 and Spring 2001 Introduction to Religion • Dr. Laurie Cozad • Spring 2000

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT Florida State University Program for Instructional Excellence • Fall 2002 Florida State University Program for Instructional Excellence • Fall 2003

PUBLIC SERVICE Reading Tutor • Lafayette County Literacy Council • Summer 2000 Director • Arctic Community Theater • 1996 ­ 1997 Founder and Chair • ACT Creative Arts Scholarship Committee • 1996 ­ 1997

106 GRADUATE COURSEWORK

Florida State University Wittgenstein Gert Core Course Ethics McNaughton Modern Philosophy Roberts Ethics McNaughton, Rawling Environmental Ethics Hanowell Philosophy of Science Maslen Plato’s Theory of Forms Dancy Kant: Transcendental Deduction Barker Modern Logic I Gert Ethics Dalton Philosophy of Mind: Irrationality Mele Introduction to Philosophical Methods Dalton, Dancy, Mele, Ruse

University of Nebraska Theory of Knowledge Casullo Philosophy of Science Von Eckardt John Rawl’s Political Theory Van Roojen W.D. Ross Audi Ancient Philosophy Ide Metaphysics Mendola

University of Mississippi Symbolic Logic (Independent Study) Lawhead Wittgenstein Lawhead Kant Westmoreland Early Analytic Philosophy Barnard Philosophy of Language Lawhead Contemporary Philosophy: Metaphysics Lynch Biomedical Ethics Westmoreland

WORK EXPERIENCE

Achievements: Project Management Managed Capital Improvement Funding Application to State DOE Produced Annual Six­Year Facility Plan Coordinated Annual School Report Card Organized Annual New Hire In­Service Oversaw Purchasing and Completion of Computer Systems Data­Base Management Analyzed Utility Usage for School Facilities Assembled Historical Overview for Improvements Funding Customized Office Forms

107 Maintained Student Records Office Management Managed Employee Benefits Program Arranged Appointments and Travel Purchased Supplies and Materials Managed Petty Cash Accounts Created and Maintained Filing Systems Generated Correspondence Computer Expertise Dreamweaver Webpage Design Adobe Photoshop Windows Office Futuras Team Management Document Manager 9000

History: Southwest Vermont Supervisory Union • Bennington, VT Director of Personnel • 1998 ­ 1999

North Slope Borough School District • Barrow, AK Records Manager • 1997 Administrative Assistant, Maintenance & Operations • 1996 ­ 1997 Administrative Assistant, Curriculum • 1995 ­ 1996 Secretary, Technology & Distance Delivery • 1994 ­ 1995 Secretary, Maintenance & Operations • 1991 ­ 1992 Secretary, Barrow High School • 1990 ­ 1991

Systems Design, Inc. • Reno, NV Purchasing Agent and Quality Control • 1994

KFAN Radio • San Antonio, TX Copywriter/Receptionist • 1989 ­ 1990

American Can Company • San Antonio, TX Accounting Clerk/Management Trainee • 1985 ­ 1988

108