Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2006 Stipulating Moral Status Elizabeth P. (Elizabeth Peisinger) Kanon Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES STIPULATING MORAL STATUS By ELIZABETH P. KANON A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2006 Copyright © 2006 Elizabeth P. Kanon All Rights Reserved The members of the Committee Approve the dissertation of Elizabeth P. Kanon defended on Peter Dalton Professor Directing Dissertation Aline Kalbian Outside Committee Member Maria Morales Committee Member Approved: J. Piers Rawling, Chair, Department of Philosophy Joseph Travis, Dean, Department of Arts and Sciences The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In memory of Cody. I wish to thank my husband, Gregg Kanon, for his love, honesty, support and deft advice throughout this endeavor. I am appreciative of Peter Dalton’s painstaking assistance in completing this project. A special thanks to John Kanon, Jay Wagoner, Eve Caraveo, Robert Audi, Russ Dancy and Donald Crosby. And a special thanks to my non­human friends: Christopher, Momma Kitty, Buddy, Spatz, Mr. White, Sir William Lucky and Candide. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT v CHAPTER ONE 1 The Problem 1 Human Uses of Animals 3 Moral Worth and Moral Status 8 Moral Consideration and Treatment 10 Three Approaches in the Philosophical Literature 12 CHAPTER TWO 14 Kant’s Moral Theory as it Relates to Establishing Moral Worth 14 Kant’s Conception of Moral Worth and Its Implications for Animals 18 Why Give Animals Indirect Duties? 23 Is Kant Correct in Making a Distinction Between Direct and Indirect Duties? 28 Conclusion 34 CHAPTER THREE 35 Regan on a Moral Theory 35 Regan’s Rejection of Competing Moral Theories 40 Regan’s Rights View 45 Regan’s Conception of Moral Worth and its Implications for Animals 46 Questions Regan’s Position Raises 50 Conclusion 57 CHAPTER FOUR 58 Singer’s Moral Theory as it Relates to Establishing Moral Status 58 Singer’s Conception of Moral Status and Its Implications for Animals 66 Questions Singer’s Position Raises 67 Conclusion 81 CHAPTER FIVE 82 Feminist Recognition of New Perspectives 82 Perfect­Relationship View: A Hybrid Thesis 83 Durkheim on Division of Labor 91 Objections and Replies to Division of Labor 95 Conclusion 97 CITED SOURCES 99 BIBLIOGRAPHY 101 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 105 iv ABSTRACT Moral worth is determined by moral agents. How is such a determination made? Western philosophical thought originally demarcated between human and all else. Some contemporary writers seek to extend moral worth to animals, and still others seek to grant ecosystems such worth. This dissertation will consider three predominant writers on the subject of moral worth: Immanuel Kant, Tom Regan and Peter Singer. After consideration of each writer’s strengths and weaknesses, a hybrid view will be presented. The perfect­relationship view extends moral worth to all species. This view utilizes the strengths of Kant, Regan and Singer; as well as, adapting literature of J. Baird Callicott and Emile Durkheim to provide a pragmatic approach to determining moral worth. v CHAPTER ONE THE PROBLEM Animals have moral status or moral worth. 1 It is morally acceptable to use animals to further important human needs. Most people agree with both statements. However, these two beliefs seem inconsistent. There are ways to avoid holding two incompatible beliefs. One solution is to abandon one of the beliefs. Another is to clarify what the claims actually mean. What is it to say something has, or does not have, moral worth? What are “important” human needs? By clarifying terms, it may be possible to show that the two beliefs are not inconsistent. One standard philosophical approach resolves incompatibility between beliefs by removing the inconsistency. This is accomplished by either applying the concepts in an attempt to explain away the inconsistency or formulating theoretical support for the concepts which demonstrates an underlying coherence. Immanuel Kant, Tom Regan and Peter Singer attempt to resolve the seemingly inconsistent natures of these two beliefs. I will utilize their previous work in this area to form a more coherent grounding; making these two beliefs consistent. It is important to establish why these two beliefs have an initial prima facie inconsistency. Our usual notion of moral status entails that some moral consideration is guaranteed by its possessor. Our common acceptance of how we put animals to use suggests that animals do not possess moral status. Yet most people, when asked, claim to believe that animals do possess moral worth. There is incoherence in how these two beliefs are commonly held and how most humans, incognizant of many animals’ plights, commonly allow some seemingly inhumane treatment of animals. An approach taken by many animal liberationists on moral status entails the further belief that if a being possesses such status it also possesses natural rights. The term ‘natural’ is used, since rights are grounded in the nature of the being which possesses them. In the Declaration of Independence, America’s founders claimed that these rights were self­evident truths. They professed that all humans were equally endowed with the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This seems to imply 1 In this chapter, I will use the words status and worth as being interchangeable. These terms are technical terms with distinct meanings, each dependant upon the theories in which they are contained. As I establish which theorist uses which term, the technical differences will become clearer. 1 that beings which display certain natures are entitled to these rights; beings failing to do so are denied. Regan’s “No Trespassing” sign is placed upon the bearer of these natural rights. Rights usually entail constraints. Natural rights can be understood as entailing a duty of noninterference. One is expected to restrain himself from interfering with another’s pursuits, unless requested to do so. Seemingly, if moral status is, as Regan suggests, a declaration of noninterference; then animals must either be denied moral status or else granted rights. This dichotomy emphasizes the apparent inconsistency in the two beliefs: that animals have moral status and animals may be used to further important human needs. If animals have moral status then using them for food, clothing, entertainment, education, etc. seems to deny their right to noninterference. Perhaps one might claim that animals have moral status, only not equal to humans. This might permit the continued use of animals. However, most people are unaware of the treatment animals receive; such treatment that seems to indicate that animals have no moral status, particularly animals used for food or science. If made aware, many humans would find the treatment repugnant if not immoral. Once made aware of the plight of animals, many humans would reconsider which products they would choose for food, cosmetics and medicine. This is the reason many organizations, such as the SPCA, PETA and ALF, try to make news, to bring such awareness. These groups’ methods are beyond the scope of this discussion. However, moral status is not exclusively tied to rights. Utilitarian theory denies the notion of individual rights, as these can conflict with the maximizing of utility. This ethical approach may concede that natural rights are a useful fiction, but if the greater good is served by denying an individual’s rights then it is morally justified to do so. For utilitarians, moral status is merely instrumental in maximizing the happiness quotient. Given their conception of how moral status is ascertained, it is apparent that rights are not necessary for the pursuit of utility. Specifics regarding the utilitarian approach to moral status will be offered in the fourth chapter. However, it is possible for a utilitarian position to see the two beliefs as being incompatible. If the utilitarian position takes a strong view that moral status is granted equally to beings capable of suffering, then it follows that animals have moral status equal to humans. This strong stance would 2 preclude using animals in such a way that causes animals to suffer, even if such use would further important human needs. HUMAN USES OF ANIMALS Human use of animals extends from benign to maleficent. Domesticated pets are used for companionship. Wild animals are studied and catalogued to further knowledge. Some animals are used for entertainment. Both domesticated and wild animals are used as food sources. Animals have been used to further knowledge about humans. At what point in this list does the use of animals become more akin to abuse? It seems that if animals possess moral worth, then any use that disrespects their moral worth ought to be disallowed. Using animals for companionship does not seem to be a case of misuse. In this instance, both the human and the animal gain from the relationship. The human is provided with social interaction and unconditional love, basic human needs. Animals, too, receive these benefits, as well as shelter and regular feeding. Yet some humans have domesticated pets, dogs in particular, who are expected to work for their care. These animals do not receive the social interaction granted other pets. Instead, these animals are raised and kept isolated in order to guarantee that they will perform their “job.” These job descriptions range from fighting to security. I am not suggesting that these animals are necessarily ill­treated. I am suggesting that they do not receive the benefits I originally claimed domesticated pets gain from their relationship with humans—namely, social interaction and unconditional love.