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"Finlandization" in Action: Helsinki's Experience with Moscow

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: MAY 2001 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE ltFINLANDIZATION1'IN ACTION: HELSINKI'S EXPERIENCE WITH MOSCOW_. (Reference Title: ESAU -LVI) -w August 1972 RSS .No. 0059/72 ” F INLANU I ZA?’I ON“ IN ACT ION : HELSINKI ‘S EXPERIENCE WITH PlOSC,OW Ml!iMORI\NLlUP.I FOR RECIPIENTS ‘I‘liis study documents the elements of Finland’s unique relationship with the USSR, important in itself but especially in its illumination of what a “Finlandiza- tion” of Western Europe might rescmblc in practice -- at least in Soviet expectations. This study finds that the Finns have ingeniously maintained their in- depcndcncc, but a limited one indeed, heavily influenced by the USSR’s proximate inilitary might, a preconditioned prudence not to offend rloscow, and the existence of various Soviet capabilities to complicate Finland’s domes t ic 1i f e . Iloubtless in the Soviet view these limiting forces would transfer in some measure to a broader Western Liuropean scene, to the degree that any future ‘‘1~inlandization”there should obtain. And Moscow may coiisidcr that thosc factors which presently permit a greater assertion of Finnish independence -- chief among them MOSCOW'S regard not to undercut its peace of- fensive in Europe -- might bc of lesser force in a situa- tion where some progress toward a broader "Finlandiza- I tion" had been registered. The judgments of this study have met general agreemcnt within the Central Intelligence Agency. The paper incorporates information available through 20 August 1972. Comments on this study are welcome, and sliould be addressed to its author, Carolyn II. Ekedahl, ol' this staff. Hal Ford Chief, UI)/I Special Research Staff 1 i "FINLANDIZATION" IN ACTION : HELSINKI'S EXPERIENCE WITH MOSCOW Contents Page PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS. ..............i 1. FACTORS SHAPING FINLAND'S POLICY A. Finland's Postwar Predicament. .....1 A. The 1948 Mutual Assistance Agreement . 4 C. The Thwarted 1948 Communist Coup . , . 5 D. Kekkonen and the Finnish Presidency. ..7 11. THE SOVIETS AND FINLAND'S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS A. The Soviet Veto over Finnish Governments ............. .13 B. The Soviet Effort to Apply "Unity of I Action" to Finland. .........-18 1. Finland as a European Test Case. .19 I 2. Communists and Social Democrats ! Enter the Government. .......23 C. Czechoslovakia - Trauma and Turning Point. ............... .27 I 1. Soviet Efforts to Restore FCP Unity .............. -31 2. Soviet Disenchantment with "Unity of Action". ........... .33 3. The Soviets Undo the 1970 Finnish Election Results. .........36 4. Stalinists Precipitate Government Crisis. ..............39 D. The Soviet Dilemma of December 1970. .42 1. The Belyalcov Saga. ........ .43 I contents continued Page--- i 2. The Communist Withdrawal from the Government and its Aftermath. ...49 3. The Soviets Renew Their Bet on Kekkonen. ............ .54 111. THE SOVIETS AND FINLAND'S FORElGN AFFAIRS A. The Peculiar Nature of Finnish I Neutrality. ..............55 1. The Soviet Withdrawal from Porkkala. ............ .56 2, The 1961 Soviet Challenge to Finnish Neutrality. ........58 3. Kekkonen' s Proposals Favoring Soviet Interests. .........61 4. Conflicting Fenno-Soviet Views of Finland's Status ....... .64 B. The Soviet Impact on Finnish Economics .69 1. The Soviet Veto of Finnish Marshall Plan Participation ....69 2. The Finns Contrive EFTA Association ........... .71 3. The Soviets Veto NORDEC. ..... .73 4. European Communities -- The Finnish Dilemma ............. .76 i C. Finnish Efforts to Buy Soviet EC Blessings .............. .80 I 1. Finnish Economic Concessions ....80 2. Finnish Flirtation with CEMA ... .83 3. The Second Renewal of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty ...... .85 4. The German Bugbear and the Finnish 1971 Initiative ......... .88 5. The Question of Soviet Approval. .92 ---contents continued ! Page-- D. The Finnish Role Regarding CSCE. ....94 1. The Soviet Desire for a European Conference. ............94 1 May .97 ! 2. The Finnish Inittative of 1969 3. The Finnish Stake in Procrastination ..........98 4. The Soviets Express Dissatisfaction. ........101 5. Finnish Hopes and the Finnish Dilemma .............104 Finland-~ < Territory transferred to U.S.S.R.-1947 ' ~ I 0 I' <)\\ Finland I I 1 - 0 farnperc , ! "FINLAND1 ZATI ON" IN ACT I ON: IICLSINKI S EXPERIENCE WITH IIOSCOW I PR I NC I PA L OB S ERVAT I ONS 'I'he phrase "Finlandization of Europe" has been Iieard with increasing frequency in recent months as the Soviets have pursued their peace ofrensive in Europe. 'The term is often employed loosely to describe the potential transformation of Western Europe from alliance with the Lnited States to a somewhat vague neutrality; in practice, however, the concept would imply not mere neutrality, but a relationship in which tlie Soviets pos- sessed a large measure of hegemony. To appreciate what some such "Finlandization" of Europe would actually en- tail, the model itself must be examined. By understand- ing the elements which have created the Finnish situa- tion and what in fact that situation is, the implications or the extension 01 a somewhat analogous status to West- ern Europe may become more clear. i 'I'hc most significant factor in the Finnish equa- tion is, of course, Finland's military hclplessness vis- a-vi s the Soviet Union. This obvious vulnerability was rcinforced in Finnish minds by tlie failure of the West to extend its protection to Finland in the postwar years. 'l'lie Finns were disillusioned by what they considered to be tlie West's inability to provide meaningful assistance to them against Soviet aggression in 1939-1940, as well as by Westcrn unwillingness to aid them in mitigating the litirsli demands made by the Soviets following the war. 1-1 Fccling that they had been virtually assigned to tllc Soviet sp,liere of influence, the Finns pursued a course by wliicli they hoped to secure their survival as an indepcndent nation. Choosing to believe that Sovict iiitcrcst in Finland was defensive in nature and to ac- cept as legitimate Soviet concern that Finland might be used as a staging are3 for an attack on the USSR, they ;doptetl a policy of providing perpetual reassurance to tlie Soviets that tlicy would never become anti-Soviet nor allow theniselves to be used by an anti-Soviet al- liance. 'I'he pursuit of this pol icy of reassurance demanded of the Finns a highly developed sensitivity to Soviet wishes on a wide range of subjccts and the ability arid willingness to voluntarily restrict their own courses oC action. They hoped to keep their independence by sigiiilYcantly limiting it, to secure their neutrality by gcnei-ally leaning to one side, and to maintain their deinocratic privileges by restricting them in certain key areas. I3y monitoring themselves and continually reassur- ing tlic Soviets, they hoped to deny thc USSR either a I x-cason or pretext for using force against Finland. Jn practice, this policy has meant thc frequent I sacririce of Finland's economic interests and political I prei'crences to the needs of assuaging Soviet suspicions and mecting Soviet demands. In tlie first postwar years this meant the costly rejection of an invitation to i participate in the Igarshall Plan; as recently as 1970 this iiicant a last-minute withdrawal from negotiations to join a customs union with the other Nordic countries, 111 doniestic politics the policy has led to the fall of I govcrnnients not acceptable to the Soviets and to the granting to the Soviets of a virtual veto over which ! pcrsons and parties may participate in government Within these major limits, the policy has also cna111ccl the Finns to run their own country and select i tlicjr own leaders, a contrast to the fate of other i 1 I European peoples bordering the Soviet linion. Compared to the tight control mechanisms which the Soviets main- tain in the East European countries, Soviet entree into the Finnish system is fairly limited. Finland, with its iiiultipaity, parliamentary system, is a far cry from the typical East European state dominated by a single party which in turn is closely monitored at several levels by the Soviet security, military, and party meclianisms, While the Finnish Communist Party functions as one of the four main parties in Finland, it has been rigorously excluded from control over the vital functions of inter- nal security and defense. In addition, Finland is not a member of either the Warsaw Pact or the East European economic grouping -- CEMA. Most importantly, there are no Soviet troops in Finland. But the considerable leverage which the Soviets do have within the Finnish system stems not from any direct controls within the country, but from the com- l~inedfactors of the omnipresent threat of hostile Soviet reaction and of a more-or-less preconditioned Finnish state of mind. Since the war the Finns have become accustomed not to ask what the Soviets would do in a given instance, but to accept as inevitable a high level of Soviet influence. Clearly, in the immediate postwar years the threat of military attack was the most oiriiiious club hanging over the Finns, But the actual lil<elihood of a Soviet punitive invasion has steadily declined since that time. Similarly, the threat of economic reprisals, while still strong, has decreased in the past decade. True, Finland's exports to the USSR are concentrated in vital industries, giving the Soviets an obvious lever which they have at times used to great effect. 'I'his has nonetheless declined, for since 1960 the Soviet sliarc of Finland's total exports has dropped Prom about 18 percent to about 12 percent, while its trade has become incrcasingly Western-oriented, I I The Soviets have a variety of means of malting their desires known and applying pressure to gain their ohjectives, Tlieir most direct and probably most ef- lcctive line 01 communication is their frcquent high- level meetings with Finnish President Kekkonen.
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