DOCSLIB.ORG

The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System Author(S): Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System Author(S): Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System Author(s): Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 215-247 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706931 . Accessed: 09/01/2012 01:58 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization. http://www.jstor.org Understandingchange in internationalpolitics: the Soviet empire'sdemise and the internationalsystem ReyKoslowski and FriedrichV. Kratochwil This article sets out a conceptual frameworkfor understandingchange in internationalpolitics by analyzingthe fundamentaltransformation of the internationalsystem occasioned by perestroikaand the revolutionsin Eastern Europe. We argue thatthe internationalsystem was transformedby the rapid successionof mostlynonviolent revolutions that replaced Eastern European communistgovernments in 1989 and by the lack of any action by the Soviet Union to stop these changes. The revolutionsof 1989 transformedthe internationalsystem by changingthe rulesgoverning superpower conflict and, thereby,the normsunderpinning the internationalsystem. Practically speak- ing,the collapse of communismin Eastern Europe hollowedthe WarsawPact and led to its disintegration.Revolution also spread fromEastern Europe to the Soviet republics,resulting in the collapse of the formalSoviet empire, whose demiseconfirmed the transformationof the internationalsystem. At firstblush the transformationconcerned only a limited area of the internationalsystem. Given the centralityof the cold war to the international system'sbipolar configuration, however, the transformationof one of itsblocs, evenif geographically circumscribed, had system-wideimplications. Hence, the changesof 1989 presenta crucialtest case forneorealism and its "systemic" approach to internationalpolitics.' Since we believe the dominantschool of internationalpolitics, structuralneorealism, does not provide a coherent This and the otherarticles in thisSymposium were preparedfor International Organization and forRichard N. Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds., International Relations Theory and theEnd of the Cold War,forthcoming. For reading earlier draftsand providinghelpful suggestions, we thankDaniel Deudney,Avery Goldstein, Joseph Grieco, Deborah Larson, RichardNed Lebow, Susan McKenney,John Odell, KennethOye, Michaela Richter,Thomas Risse-Kappen,and David Spiro. Rey Koslowski thanks Vladimir Tismaneanu for guidance in previous research that contributedto this project. FriedrichKratochwil gratefully acknowledges the support of the LawrenceB. SimonChair in the Social Sciences. 1. See JohnLewis Gaddis, "InternationalRelations Theoryand the End of the Cold War," InternationalSecurity 17 (Winter1992/93), pp. 5-58. InternationalOrganization 48, 2, Spring1994, pp. 215-47 ? 1994 byThe IO Foundationand the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology 216 InternationalOrganization explanation for these transformations,the developmentof an alternative theoreticalframework becomes necessary.2 Takinga constructivistapproach, we argue thatin all politics,domestic and international,actors reproduceor alter systemsthrough their actions.3 Any giveninternational system does not existbecause of immutablestructures, but ratherthe very structures are dependentfor their reproduction on thepractices of the actors. Fundamentalchange of the internationalsystem occurs when actors,through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutiveof internationalinteraction. Moreover, reproduction of the practiceof interna- tionalactors (i.e., states) depends on the reproductionof practicesof domestic actors (i.e., individuals and groups). Therefore,fundamental changes in internationalpolitics occur when beliefsand identitiesof domesticactors are alteredthereby also alteringthe rules and normsthat are constitutiveof their politicalpractices. To the extentthat patterns emerge in thisprocess, they can be tracedand explained,but they are unlikelyto exhibitpredetermined trajectories to be capturedby general historical laws, be theycyclical or evolutionary. To develop our argumentfurther, we take the followingsteps. First,we criticizeneorealism's theoreticaltreatment of change by showingthat the changesof the recent past did notoccur in accordancewith its propositions and that the assumptionsof neorealismare significantlyat odds withthe actual practiceof states.Then, we develop a constructivistapproach to change that emphasizes the institutionalnature of social systems,domestic as well as international.In the next section,utilizing the constructivistapproach, we analyzethe transformationwithin the Sovietbloc and treatit as a case studyof internationalsystem change. We argue thatMikhail Gorbachev'sdecision to end the Brezhnev doctrinereversed the tactics of communistconquest of domesticpolitics. This changein the practiceof one of the major actorsin the internationalsystem led to the developmentof certainconventions similar to those of the classical European state system,which were in turn rapidly surpassed by the generationof new ones.4 In the article's conclusion,we recapitulatethe mainsteps of our discussion. 2. On structuralneorealism, see KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979); and Robert Gilpin,War and Changein InternationalPolitics (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981). For a good reviewof the problemsrealism encounters when explainingchange, see R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and InternationalPolitical Theory," InternationalStudies Quarterly 31 (March 1987),pp. 65-86. 3. We use the term"constructivist" in the sense elaborated by Nicholas Onuf, Worldof Our Making(Columbia: Universityof SouthCarolina Press, 1989), especially part 1. See also Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Constructionof Power Politics," InternationalOrganization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. For a furtherdiscussion see Alexander Wendt,"The Agent-StructureProblem in InternationalRelations Theory," International Organiza- tion41 (Summer1987), pp. 335-70; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" InternationalOrganization 43 (Summer1989), pp. 441-73. 4. By "conventions,"we mean all typesof normsand ruleswhich constitute and regulatepractices ratherthan only those norms which alleviate problems of coordination.For an extensivediscussion see FriedrichKratochwil, Rules, Norns, and Decisions:On theConditions of Practical and LegalReasoning in InternationalRelations and DomesticAffairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Symposium 217 Neorealismand change Three thingsare takenfor granted by the neorealist orthodoxy. The firstis that internationalpolitics is an autonomous realm followingits own logic; the second is thatthe internationalsystem is onlya shorthandfor the organization of force; and the thirdis that the dynamicsof the "anarchical" systemare determinedby the distributionof capabilities. Given these assumptions, neorealiststook it for grantedthat the Soviet Union and the United States wouldremain in a bipolarworld by virtue of theircapabilities, regardless of any changes in domestic politics. Therefore, it is not surprisingthat many neorealists continued to maintain that the internationalsystem had not changedeven afterGorbachev introduced perestroika and the "new thinking." Focusing solely on capabilities,this argumentcould even be "proved" by pointingto the continuationof the Sovietarms buildup under Gorbachev.5 The end ofthe cold war,however, undermined neorealist theory in twoways. First,contrary to the expectationsof the persistenceof bipolarity,the Soviet bloc disintegrated.Second, and even more damagingto thisapproach, change did not follow a path derived from any of the neorealism's theoretical propositions.The change in questionwas not the resultof a "hegemonic"or system-widewar. It was not the result of differentalliance patternsor the emergenceof another"superpower," as in the case of China in the 1970s. It was not the outcome of a sudden gap in militarycapabilities, or of U.S. compellenceas envisagedby John Foster Dulles's "rollback." Gorbachev'sactions confounded neorealist expectations when he discarded the BrezhnevDoctrine, allowed revolutionsoverthrowing Eastern European communistregimes, and accepted the demiseof the WarsawPact. Neorealism failed to explain these unilateralconcessions and conciliatorypolicies of the Soviet Union because this approach concerns itselfwith neither internal structuresof the "units" nor questionsof legitimacy.Below we show not only that domestic politics mattersbut also that Gorbachev's strategywas to counteractthe loss oflegitimacy of the CommunistParty in the EasternBloc as well as the SovietUnion. As opposed to NikitaKhrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Yuri Andropovbefore him,Gorbachev realized that reformcould only succeed ifboth domestic and externalactors could be motivatedto collaborate
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1 Joseph Stalin: Power and Ideas
    Cambridge University Press 0521616530 - Stalin: A New History Edited by Sarah Davies and James Harris Excerpt More information 1 Joseph Stalin: power and ideas Sarah Davies and James Harris Stalin, like the other ‘evil dictators’ of the twentieth century, remains the subject of enduring public fascination.1 Academic attention, however, has shifted away from the study of ‘Great Men’, including Stalin, towards the little men and women, such as the now celebrated Stepan Podlubnyi, and towards Stalinist political culture more generally.2 Ironically this is at a time when we have unprecedented access to hitherto classified material on Stalin, the individual.3 The object of this volume is to reinvigorate scholarly interest in Stalin, his ideas, and the nature of his power. Although Stalin certainly did not single-handedly determine everything about the set of policies, practices, and ideas we have come to call Stalinism, it is now indisputable that in many respects his influence was decisive. A clearer understanding of his significance will allow more precise analysis of the origins and nature of Stalinism itself. 1 Note the interest in several recent publications aimed primarily at a popular readership: Martin Amis, Koba the Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002); Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003); Donald Rayfield, Stalin and his Hangmen (London: Viking, 2004). 2 Podlubnyi has been made famous by Jochen Hellbeck in a number of publications, including ‘Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi, 1931–1939’, Jahrbucher fu¨r Geschichte Osteuropas 44 (1996), 344–73.
    [Show full text]
  • The Brezhnev Era (1964–1982)
    Name _______________________________________________ Date _____________ The Brezhnev Era (1964–1982) Next to Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union longer than any other leader. Brezhnev and his supporters stressed the ties with the Stalinist era by focusing on his good points and ignoring his crimes. 1. What is the KGB? Brezhnev strengthened the Soviet bureaucracy as well What was its as the KGB (Committee of State Security)—formed in purpose? (list 2) 1954; its mission was to defend the Soviet government from its enemies at home and abroad. The KGB suppressed dissidents who spoke out against the government at home and in the satellite countries. The Soviets also invested in a large military buildup and were determined to never again suffer a humiliating defeat, as happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet Brezhnev proceeded cautiously in the mid-1960s and sought to avoid confrontation with the West. He was determined, however, to protect Soviet interests. Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) 2. What was the Prague In 1968, Alexander Dubček (1921–1992) became head of the Czechoslovakia Spring? Communist Party and began a series of reforms known as the Prague Spring reforms, which sought to make communism more humanistic. He lifted censorship, permitted non-communists to form political groups, and wanted to trade with the West, but still remain true to communist ideals. Brezhnev viewed these reforms as a capitalistic threat to the socialist ideologies of communism and, in August of 1968, sent over 500,000 Soviet and Eastern European troops 3. How did Brezhnev to occupy Czechoslovakia. In the Brezhnev Doctrine, he defended the Soviet react to the Prague military invasion of Czechoslovakia, saying in effect, that antisocialist elements Spring? in a single socialist country can compromise the entire socialist system, and thus other socialist countries have the right to intervene militarily if they see the need to do so.
    [Show full text]
  • Colloquium Paper January 12, 1984 STALINISM VERSUS
    Colloquium Paper January 12, 1984 STALINISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM? A Reconsideration by Robert C. Tucker Princeton University with comment by Peter Reddaway London School of Economics and Political Science Fellows Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Draft paper not for publication or quotation without written permission from the authors. STALINISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM? A Reconsideration Although not of ten openly debated~ the issue I propose to address is probably the deepest and most divisive in Soviet studies. There is good ground for Stephen Cohen's characterization of it as a "quintessential his­ torical and interpretive question"! because it transcends most of the others and has to do with the whole of Russia's historical development since the Bolshevik Revolution. He formulates it as the question of the relationship "between Bolshevism and Stalinism.'' Since the very existence of something properly called Stalinism is at issue here, I prefer a somewhat different mode of formulation. There are two (and curiously, only two) basically opposed positions on the course of development that Soviet Russia took starting around 1929 when Stalin, having ousted his opponents on the Left and the Right, achieved primacy, although not yet autocratic primacy, within the Soviet regime. The first position, Which may be seen as the orthodox one, sees that course of development as the fulfillment, under new conditions, of Lenin's Bolshevism. All the main actions taken by the Soviet regime under Stalin's leadership were, in other words, the fulfillment of what had been prefigured in Leninism (as Lenin's Bolshevism came to be called after Lenin died).
    [Show full text]
  • Empire and English Nationalismn
    Nations and Nationalism 12 (1), 2006, 1–13. r ASEN 2006 Empire and English nationalismn KRISHAN KUMAR Department of Sociology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA Empire and nation: foes or friends? It is more than pious tribute to the great scholar whom we commemorate today that makes me begin with Ernest Gellner. For Gellner’s influential thinking on nationalism, and specifically of its modernity, is central to the question I wish to consider, the relation between nation and empire, and between imperial and national identity. For Gellner, as for many other commentators, nation and empire were and are antithetical. The great empires of the past belonged to the species of the ‘agro-literate’ society, whose central fact is that ‘almost everything in it militates against the definition of political units in terms of cultural bound- aries’ (Gellner 1983: 11; see also Gellner 1998: 14–24). Power and culture go their separate ways. The political form of empire encloses a vastly differ- entiated and internally hierarchical society in which the cosmopolitan culture of the rulers differs sharply from the myriad local cultures of the subordinate strata. Modern empires, such as the Soviet empire, continue this pattern of disjuncture between the dominant culture of the elites and the national or ethnic cultures of the constituent parts. Nationalism, argues Gellner, closes the gap. It insists that the only legitimate political unit is one in which rulers and ruled share the same culture. Its ideal is one state, one culture. Or, to put it another way, its ideal is the national or the ‘nation-state’, since it conceives of the nation essentially in terms of a shared culture linking all members.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Europe EN
    Understanding Europe A portrait of the European Union in 50 pages "The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein." Understanding Europe A portrait of the European Union in 50 pages We did not choose the easy way: Many discussions, different views on the world, Europe, migration during the 4 project meetings led to this product. The unifying band was the ambition to develop a good product and thus contribute to the understanding of Europe and to a successful integration. We are convinced that we can provide teachers with a didactic compilation that does not yet exist. We will endeavour to ensure that the manual is distributed as widely as possible: inside and outside the project. Thanks and appreciation go to the authors Angelika Brechelmacher, Regina Wonisch, Heike Kölln-Prisner and Jan Karadas. The 4 chapters can be found here: History 3 Institutions 13 Democracy 32 Living in Europe 39 All the best! Herbert Depner Vienna, march 2018 The project partners were: - PoleskiOśrodekSztuki, Polen - Hamburger Volkshochschule, Germany - Nevo parudimos, Romania - EU Warehouse, Belgium - Sprachendienst Konstanz, Germany - Bulgarian Development Agency, Bulgaria - Die Wiener Volkshochschulen, Austria coordinating the project Impressum / Legal notice Herausgeber, Medieninhaber: Die Wiener Volkshochschulen GmbH, Lustkandlgasse 50, 1090 Wien Für den Inhalt verantwortlich: Herbert Schweiger, Geschäftsführer; Herbert Depner, Projektmanager Druck: onlineprinters.com Erscheinungsort: ?? 2 History Ideas of European unity before 1945 Large areas of Europe had previously been united by empires built on force, such as the Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, Frankish Empire, the First French Empire and Nazi Germany.
    [Show full text]
  • A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement Stephen W
    Marshall University Marshall Digital Scholar Theses, Dissertations and Capstones 1-1-2011 A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement Stephen W. Mays [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/etd Part of the Other Political Science Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Mays, Stephen W., "A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement" (2011). Theses, Dissertations and Capstones. Paper 73. This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT A thesis submitted to the Graduate College of Marshall University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Sociology by Stephen W. Mays Approved by Dr. Richard Garnett, Committee Chairman Dr. Marty Laubach Dr. Brian Hoey Marshall University Huntington, West Virginia December 2011 Table Of Contents Page Acknowledgements ................................................................................ iii Abstract .................................................................................................. v Chapter I. Introduction ................................................................................... 1 II. Methodology ..................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989
    FORUM The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989 ✣ Commentaries by Michael Kraus, Anna M. Cienciala, Margaret K. Gnoinska, Douglas Selvage, Molly Pucci, Erik Kulavig, Constantine Pleshakov, and A. Ross Johnson Reply by Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana, eds. Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014. 563 pp. $133.00 hardcover, $54.99 softcover, $54.99 e-book. EDITOR’S NOTE: In late 2013 the publisher Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & Littlefield, put out the book Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989, edited by Mark Kramer and V´ıt Smetana. The book consists of twenty-four essays by leading scholars who survey the Cold War in East-Central Europe from beginning to end. East-Central Europe was where the Cold War began in the mid-1940s, and it was also where the Cold War ended in 1989–1990. Hence, even though research on the Cold War and its effects in other parts of the world—East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, Africa—has been extremely interesting and valuable, a better understanding of events in Europe is essential to understand why the Cold War began, why it lasted so long, and how it came to an end. A good deal of high-quality scholarship on the Cold War in East-Central Europe has existed for many years, and the literature on this topic has bur- geoned in the post-Cold War period.
    [Show full text]
  • The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies
    1 The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies Vladimir Tismaneanu The revolutions of 1989 were, no matter how one judges their nature, a true world-historical event, in the Hegelian sense: they established a historical cleavage (only to some extent conventional) between the world before and after 89. During that year, what appeared to be an immutable, ostensibly indestructible system collapsed with breath-taking alacrity. And this happened not because of external blows (although external pressure did matter), as in the case of Nazi Germany, but as a consequence of the development of insuperable inner tensions. The Leninist systems were terminally sick, and the disease affected first and foremost their capacity for self-regeneration. After decades of toying with the ideas of intrasystemic reforms (“institutional amphibiousness”, as it were, to use X. L. Ding’s concept, as developed by Archie Brown in his writings on Gorbachev and Gorbachevism), it had become clear that communism did not have the resources for readjustment and that the solution lay not within but outside, and even against, the existing order.1 The importance of these revolutions cannot therefore be overestimated: they represent the triumph of civic dignity and political morality over ideological monism, bureaucratic cynicism and police dictatorship.2 Rooted in an individualistic concept of freedom, programmatically skeptical of all ideological blueprints for social engineering, these revolutions were, at least in their first stage, liberal and non-utopian.3 The fact that 1 See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 157-189. In this paper I elaborate upon and revisit the main ideas I put them forward in my introduction to Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) as well as in my book Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: Free Press, 1992; revised and expanded paperback, with new afterword, Free Press, 1993).
    [Show full text]
  • PERESTROIKA, GLASNOST, and INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: a Behavior Analysis
    Behavior and Social Issues, SpringfSummer 1991 t Vol. 1, Number 1 PERESTROIKA, GLASNOST, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: A Behavior Analysis Richard F. Bakos Department of Psychology Cleveland State University ABSTRACT: Gorbachev's perestroika has altered the behavioral contingencies governing the responses of the Soviet people by instituting a dominant metacontingency intended to foster economic efficiency_ The program consists cI a domestic initiative, glasnost, and an international agenda or increased cooperation and interdependence. A behavior analysis of perestroika reveals that glasnost is an environmental program designed to teach controlling and countercontrolling skills while international cooperation is designed to maintain and increase the environmental resources necessaryfor sustaining high rates of productive behavior. Perestroika is an economic policy that attempts to increase the efficiency of material production through "market socialism", the introduction of selected capitalistic economic relations within a foundation ofsocial ownership ofthe natural resources and means of production. It thus establishes one dominant metacontingency (Glenn, 1988; see introduction to this section)' with the desired cultural outcome of enhanced economic efficiency. The efficiency that is the goal of perestroika involves improved quality rather than quantity of goods, increased cost-effectiveness in production, and a reduction of resource consumption. Major political initiatives to achieve this goal include the implementation of price reforms, the alteration of the capital investment process, the development of new banking and credit systems, the utilization of emergent science and technology, the introduction of wholesale trade among suppliers, the establishment ofa uniform tax rate on profits for all. enterprises in a given industry, the imposition of direct responsibility for output on both management and labor, and the encouragement of some private enterprise and ownership.
    [Show full text]
  • The Legacy of Neutrality in Finnish and Swedish Security Policies in Light of European Integration
    Traditions, Identity and Security: the Legacy of Neutrality in Finnish and Swedish Security Policies in Light of European Integration. Johan Eliasson PhD Candidate/Instructor Dep. Political Science 100 Eggers Hall Maxwell school of Citizenship and Public Affairs Syracuse University Syracuse, NY 13244-1090 Traditions, Identity and Security 2 . Abstract The militarily non-allied members of the European Union, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, have undergone rapid changes in security policies since 1999. Looking at two states, Finland and Sweden, this paper traces states’ contemporary responses to the rapid development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to their historical experiences with different types of neutrality. It is argued that by looking at the legacies of different types of neutrality on identity and domestic rules, traditions, norms, and values, we can better explain how change occurred, and why states have pursued slightly different paths. This enhances our understanding broadly of the role of domestic institutions in accounting for policy variation in multilateral regional integration, and particularly in the EU. In the process, this study also addresses a question recently raised by other scholars: the role of neutrality in Europe. Traditions, Identity and Security 3 . 1. Introduction The core difference between members and non-members of a defense alliance lie in obligations to militarily aid a fellow member if attacked, and, to this end, share military strategy and related information. The recent and rapid institutionalization of EU security and defense policy is blurring this distinction beyond the increased cooperation and solidarity emanating from geopolitical changes, NATO’s expansion and new-found role in crisis management, or, later, the 9/11 attacks.
    [Show full text]
  • CF-130--Chapter 13
    166 13. On the Future of the “Post-Soviet Region” Dmitrii E. Furman* Contradictory trends and events appearing after the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union five years ago present analysts with a weighty challenge in attempting to anticipate the political future of the former Soviet region. Will the new states solidify their independent status, or will they tend towards convergence, cooperation, and even reunification? The decision of Russia’s State Duma to denounce the Belovezhsky Agreements and make new agreements on the “extended integration” of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus strongly contrasts with the Russian president’s assignment of nearly independent status to Chechnya.1 These apparently contradictory actions demonstrate the indefinite political borders and instability of the post-Soviet region. Neither in Russia, nor in the other countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), is there yet a sense of “naturalness” or stability in the present political situation. In almost every republic, separatist movements, and some self-proclaimed (i.e., “illegal”) states have emerged. Meanwhile, all manner of integrationist ideas and initiatives are proposed simultaneously. It could take decades for the region to assume a stable form, and there is no guarantee that by then all of the present states will still exist. In 1989–1991, anti-Soviet feelings were on the rise. Politicians, publicists, and scholars strove to harness these feelings and express them in compelling terms. At that time, while various “anti-imperial” thoughts and phrases filled newspapers and magazines, nobody was concerned with consistency or logic. The idea of sovereignty for the republics was presented side by side with the idea of ethnic minorities’ rights to independence from Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • ALL-ROUND DEVELOPMENT of VLADIMIR LENIN's PERSONALITY Javed Akhter, Khair Muhammad and Naila Naz M.Phil Scholar, Department Of
    International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research Method Vol.3, No.1, pp.23-34, March 2016 ___Published by European Centre for Research Training and Development UK (www.eajournals.org) ALL-ROUND DEVELOPMENT OF VLADIMIR LENIN’S PERSONALITY Javed Akhter, Khair Muhammad and Naila Naz M.Phil Scholar, Department of English Literature and Linguistics, University of Balochistan Quetta Balochistan Pakistan ABSTRACT: The study investigates the personality of Vladimir Lenin, in the light of Stephen R. Covey’s suggested habits, expounded in his books, “The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People” and “The 8th Habit: From Effectiveness to greatness”, following the most eminent Russian physiologist and psychologist I. P. Pavlov’s theory of classical behaviourism. Stephen R. Covey’s thought provoking and trend breaking book: “The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People” suggests seven habits and paradigms to become highly effective personality. He introduced the eighth habit in his innovative and challenging book “The 8th Habit: From Effectiveness to Greatness.” Therefore, his suggested eight habits, and paradigms, which are based on I. P. Pavlov’s theory of classical behaviourism. This paper would use the popped up chunks of I. P. Pavlov’s behaviourist theory to analyse how the process of habit formation influenced the effective and great personalities of the world. Therefore, the present study will enable the readers to confront Pavlov’s classical behaviourist theory of habit formation through stimuli and responses. The readers are also expected to abandon the bad habits and adopt the good ones. These infrequent but subtle hints serve as a model of effective as well as great personality of the world.
    [Show full text]