Understanding Change in International : The Soviet 's Demise and the International System Author(s): Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 215-247 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706931 . Accessed: 09/01/2012 01:58

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http://www.jstor.org Understandingchange in internationalpolitics: the 'sdemise and the internationalsystem ReyKoslowski and FriedrichV. Kratochwil

This article sets out a conceptual frameworkfor understandingchange in internationalpolitics by analyzingthe fundamentaltransformation of the internationalsystem occasioned by perestroikaand the revolutionsin Eastern . We argue thatthe internationalsystem was transformedby the rapid successionof mostlynonviolent that replaced Eastern European communistgovernments in 1989 and by the lack of any action by the to stop these changes. The revolutionsof 1989 transformedthe internationalsystem by changingthe rulesgoverning conflict and, thereby,the normsunderpinning the internationalsystem. Practically speak- ing,the collapse of communismin hollowedthe WarsawPact and led to its disintegration. also spread fromEastern Europe to the Soviet republics,resulting in the collapse of the formalSoviet empire, whose demiseconfirmed the transformationof the internationalsystem. At firstblush the transformationconcerned only a limited area of the internationalsystem. Given the centralityof the cold to the international system'sbipolar configuration, however, the transformationof one of itsblocs, evenif geographically circumscribed, had system-wideimplications. Hence, the changesof 1989 presenta crucialtest case forneorealism and its "systemic" approach to internationalpolitics.' Since we believe the dominantschool of internationalpolitics, structuralneorealism, does not provide a coherent

This and the otherarticles in thisSymposium were preparedfor International Organization and forRichard N. Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen,eds., Theory and theEnd of the ,forthcoming. For reading earlier draftsand providinghelpful suggestions, we thankDaniel Deudney,Avery Goldstein, Joseph Grieco, Deborah Larson, RichardNed Lebow, Susan McKenney,John Odell, KennethOye, Michaela Richter,Thomas Risse-Kappen,and David Spiro. Rey Koslowski thanks Vladimir Tismaneanu for guidance in previous research that contributedto this project. FriedrichKratochwil gratefully acknowledges the support of the LawrenceB. SimonChair in the Social Sciences. 1. See JohnLewis Gaddis, "InternationalRelations Theoryand the End of the Cold War," InternationalSecurity 17 (Winter1992/93), pp. 5-58.

InternationalOrganization 48, 2, Spring1994, pp. 215-47 ? 1994 byThe IO Foundationand the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology 216 InternationalOrganization explanation for these transformations,the developmentof an alternative theoreticalframework becomes necessary.2 Takinga constructivistapproach, we argue thatin all politics,domestic and international,actors reproduceor alter systemsthrough their actions.3 Any giveninternational system does not existbecause of immutablestructures, but ratherthe very structures are dependentfor their reproduction on thepractices of the actors. Fundamentalchange of the internationalsystem occurs when actors,through their practices, change the rules and norms constitutiveof internationalinteraction. Moreover, reproduction of the practiceof interna- tionalactors (i.e., states) depends on the reproductionof practicesof domestic actors (i.e., individuals and groups). Therefore,fundamental changes in internationalpolitics occur when beliefsand identitiesof domesticactors are alteredthereby also alteringthe rules and normsthat are constitutiveof their politicalpractices. To the extentthat patterns emerge in thisprocess, they can be tracedand explained,but they are unlikelyto exhibitpredetermined trajectories to be capturedby general historical laws, be theycyclical or evolutionary. To develop our argumentfurther, we take the followingsteps. First,we criticizeneorealism's theoreticaltreatment of change by showingthat the changesof the recent past did notoccur in accordancewith its propositions and that the assumptionsof neorealismare significantlyat odds withthe actual practiceof states.Then, we develop a constructivistapproach to change that emphasizes the institutionalnature of social systems,domestic as well as international.In the next section,utilizing the constructivistapproach, we analyzethe transformationwithin the Sovietbloc and treatit as a case studyof internationalsystem change. We argue thatMikhail Gorbachev'sdecision to end the Brezhnev doctrinereversed the tactics of communistconquest of domesticpolitics. This changein the practiceof one of the major actorsin the internationalsystem led to the developmentof certainconventions similar to those of the classical European state system,which were in turn rapidly surpassed by the generationof new ones.4 In the article's conclusion,we recapitulatethe mainsteps of our discussion.

2. On structuralneorealism, see KennethWaltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1979); and Robert Gilpin,War and Changein InternationalPolitics (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981). For a good reviewof the problemsrealism encounters when explainingchange, see R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and InternationalPolitical Theory," InternationalStudies Quarterly 31 (March 1987),pp. 65-86. 3. We use the term"constructivist" in the sense elaborated by Nicholas Onuf, Worldof Our Making(Columbia: Universityof SouthCarolina Press, 1989), especially part 1. See also Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Constructionof ," InternationalOrganization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. For a furtherdiscussion see Alexander Wendt,"The Agent-StructureProblem in InternationalRelations Theory," International Organiza- tion41 (Summer1987), pp. 335-70; and David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" InternationalOrganization 43 (Summer1989), pp. 441-73. 4. By "conventions,"we mean all typesof normsand ruleswhich constitute and regulatepractices ratherthan only those norms which alleviate problems of coordination.For an extensivediscussion see FriedrichKratochwil, Rules, Norns, and Decisions:On theConditions of Practical and LegalReasoning in InternationalRelations and DomesticAffairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Symposium 217

Neorealismand change

Three thingsare takenfor granted by the neorealist orthodoxy. The firstis that internationalpolitics is an autonomous realm followingits own logic; the second is thatthe internationalsystem is onlya shorthandfor the organization of force; and the thirdis that the dynamicsof the "anarchical" systemare determinedby the distributionof capabilities. Given these assumptions, neorealiststook it for grantedthat the Soviet Union and the wouldremain in a bipolarworld by virtue of theircapabilities, regardless of any changes in domestic politics. Therefore, it is not surprisingthat many neorealists continued to maintain that the internationalsystem had not changedeven afterGorbachev introduced and the "new thinking." Focusing solely on capabilities,this argumentcould even be "proved" by pointingto the continuationof the Sovietarms buildup under Gorbachev.5 The end ofthe cold war,however, undermined neorealist theory in twoways. First,contrary to the expectationsof the persistenceof bipolarity,the Soviet bloc disintegrated.Second, and even more damagingto thisapproach, change did not follow a path derived from any of the neorealism's theoretical propositions.The change in questionwas not the resultof a "hegemonic"or system-widewar. It was not the result of differentalliance patternsor the emergenceof another"superpower," as in the case of in the 1970s. It was not the outcome of a sudden gap in militarycapabilities, or of U.S. compellenceas envisagedby 's "." Gorbachev'sactions confounded neorealist expectations when he discarded the BrezhnevDoctrine, allowed revolutionsoverthrowing Eastern European communistregimes, and accepted the demiseof the WarsawPact. Neorealism failed to explain these unilateralconcessions and conciliatorypolicies of the Soviet Union because this approach concerns itselfwith neither internal structuresof the "units" nor questionsof legitimacy.Below we show not only that domestic politics mattersbut also that Gorbachev's strategywas to counteractthe loss oflegitimacy of the CommunistParty in the EasternBloc as well as the SovietUnion. As opposed to NikitaKhrushchev, , and Yuri Andropovbefore him,Gorbachev realized that reformcould only succeed ifboth domestic and externalactors could be motivatedto collaborate in the politicaland economicarenas withoutthreats of repressionand force. The (neo)realist tenetof forcebeing, in KennethWaltz's words,the "ultima ratio" in domestic politics and "in internationalpolitics ... the firstand

5. Until 1988,the conceptualizationof perestroikaas peredyshka(a "breathingspell") in which to rechargefor more of the same competitionwith the United Stateswas verypopular. See Ernest W. Lefeverand Robert D. Vander Lugt,eds., Perestroika:How New is Gorbachev'sNew Thinking (Washington,D.C.: Ethics and Public PolicyCenter, 1989), especiallyRichard Nixon, "Challenge and Response," Henry Kissinger,"A Threat to Global Balance," and Jeane Kirkpatrick,"A Returnto LeninistOrthodoxy." Also see Simon Serfaty,ed., "Symposium:Old Adversaries,New Ground," SAIS Review 8 (Summer-Fall 1988), pp. 1-40, and especially the contributionsby ZbigniewBrzezinski and WilliamHyland, pp. 10-11 and 20-22, respectively. 218 InternationalOrganization constant one" had lost its utilityfor guiding policy.6Maintaining Soviet predominancein EasternEurope throughmilitary intervention was counterpro- ductivebecause the growthof civilsociety and organizedresistance made such a course of action exceedinglycostly and threatenedthe verycontinuation of perestroikaat home. Seen fromthis perspective,the concessions that are unexplainableor irrationalwithin the realistframework become deliberate, thoughrisky rational policy moves, even thoughthey ultimately failed. Once communismcollapsed in Eastern Europe, it was generallyaccepted that the cold war was over, but many neorealists still denied that a fundamental transformationof the internationalsystem had occurred. Since the end of the cold war had the potentialof representinga crucialcase forthe corroborationor refutationof the structuralrealist research program, itsexponents have resortedto variousgambits to shelterneorealism's theoreti- cal core. Thus, the recenttransformation is treatedas an anomaly,while it is suggestedthat the internationalsystem is, accordingto JohnMearsheimer, on itsway "back to the future."7Second, it is assertedthat the changesare indeed the resultsof shiftsin militarycapabilities.8 Third, there remains the epistemo- logical excuse of arguingthat single cases cannot prove general theories wrong.9This argumentis dubious, however,because one must implausibly aggregateall eventsof a periodcomprising several years into one "data point." A fourthfallback position is that no fundamentalchange has occurredsince internationalpolitics is stillcharacterized by anarchyand bipolarity.10Finally, thoughtheoretically inconsistent with the notionof the persistenceof anarchy, thereis the argumentthat the presentsystem is unipolar,but will "inevitably" evolvetoward multipolarity.11 Such neorealisttheoretical gambits have been furtherrefuted by events since the collapse of Eastern European communismin 1989. , ,the Soviet Union, and the United States behaved contraryto neorealistexpecta-

6. The quotationsare fromWaltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 113. 7. See JohnMearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instabilityin Europe afterthe Cold War," InternationalSecurity 15 (Summer1990), pp. 5-56. 8. For a criticaldiscussion of thisargument and a statisticalanalysis demonstrating that Soviet behaviorwas unaffectedby increasedU.S. spending,see Fred Chernoff,"Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the U.S. MilitaryBuildup," InternationalAffairs 67 (January1991), pp. 111-26. Furthermore,for an argumentthat increasedU.S. arms spendingdid not lead to major concessionsin the periphery,see Richard K. Herrmann,"Soviet Behaviorin Regional Conflicts: Old Questions,New Strategies,and ImportantLessons," WorldPolitics 44 (April 1992),pp. 432-65. Similarly,Garthoff credits a new generationof Soviet leaders ratherthat the Reagan military buildupfor the end of the cold war. See RaymondL. Garthoff,"Why Did the Cold War Arise,and WhyDid It End?" in Michael J.Hogan, ed., TheEnd ofthe Cold War:Its Meaningand Implications (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 11. 9. This was the argumentmade by Robert Keohane at a conferenceon multilateralismin La Jolla,California, 6 December 1990. The same pointwas reiteratedby Steve Walt and Kenneth Waltz,among others, at a conferenceat CornellUniversity, Ithaca, N.Y., in October 1991. 10. KennethWaltz, "The EmergingStructure of InternationalPolitics," International Security 18 (Fall 1993),pp. 44-79. 11. ChristopherLayne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," Interna- tionalSecurity 17 (Spring1993), pp. 6-51. Symposium 219 tionsby reaffirmingthe normsof multilateralismthrough their actions.12 Such actions demonstratethat the classic imageryof the internationalsystem characterizedby poles and shiftingalliances is notvery useful in understanding contemporaryinternational politics. First, the Soviet Union persisted in its aberrantbehavior when viewed throughthe lens of neorealism.The Soviet Union, and then its successors, wished to join the "communityof nations" and, more particularly,what Gorbachevtermed the "commonEuropean home." The communityof nations was, forhim-and thatis significant-notsimply the sum of statesrecognized in accordance with internationallaw, but rathera collectionof states that participatedin the multilateralinstitutions of thepostwar era.'3 As Coit Blaker pointsout, For Gorbachevand thoseclosest to him,the game in worldpolitics had changedprofoundly in the fouryears that separated his electionsas CPSU [CommunistParty of the SovietUnion] generalsecretary and the collapse of Sovietpower in Europe; ifprior to 1985 the overarchingobject of Soviet foreignpolicy had been to strengthenthe "positionsof "at the expenseof the West,by 1989 a new goal-to secure Sovietadmission to the elaboratecollection of institutionsthat constituted the Western economic and politicalsystem-had arisento take itsplace.14 As we explain below, the Soviet embrace of multilateralismbecame most obvious in the acceptance of a multilateralframework for the solutionof the Germanproblem.15 We also demonstratebelow thatFrance rejectedbalancing alliancesagainst a reunifiedGermany and thatGermany opted fora deepening European integrationinstead of neutrality. Second, events since German reunificationhave demonstratedthat the present cannot be understood in terms of a trend back to the futureas Mearsheimerhas suggested.'6Germany has neitherdeveloped an independent nuclear force nor pursued an assertive foreignpolicy, and there are no indicationsthat these trendsare about to change in the foreseeablefuture. Indeed, severalempirical indicators suggest otherwise. Germany possesses the strongestantinuclear movement in Europe and no significantsegment of the German polityhas suggestedthat Germanydevelop a nuclear capability.A

12. For a discussionand conceptualclarification of multilateralismas an organizationalform, see JohnRuggie, ed., MultilateralismMatters (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1993). 13. RobertLegvold was one of the firstto argue thatGorbachev's commitment to multilateral- ismwas genuineand shouldnot be dismissedby the West. See "The Revolutionin SovietForeign Policy,"special issue,, vol. 68, no. 1, 1988/89,pp. 82-98 and particularlypp. 97-98. 14. Coit Blaker,Hostage to Revolution:Gorbachev and SovietSecurity Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Councilon ForeignRelations, 1993), p. 188. 15. A Bush administrationanalyst with major responsibilityfor U.S. policy on German unification,Condoleezza Rice, has come to a similarconclusion in an unpublishedwork entitled, "SovietPolicy Toward German Unification: Implications for Theories of InternationalNegotiation." See Blaker,Hostage to Revolution, p. 188,note 3. 16. Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future." 220 InternationalOrganization

similarbroad consensusexists against the use of force.The establishedparties, as well as thepublic at large,have been veryreluctant to deployGerman troops forother than defensive purposes within the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organiza- tion (NATO), or even for peacekeeping operations under (UN) auspices. While Germany'sstance is certainlyat variancewith neorealist prescriptions and historicalantecedents, a policy-relevantspeculation about futuretrends has to take note of the presentpolitical realities, irrespective of whetherthose realitiesare in accordancewith the traditional models of politics. The fatalflaw of Mearsheimer'sanalogy consists in the systematicelimination of domestic politicsthat historicallyhad led to expansionistforeign policies. Given the entirelydifferent domestic political realities of the Federal Republic of Germany,the neorealist predictionof a resurgentGermany assertingits hegemonyon the European continentis hardlyplausible. A much more realisticscenario seems to be that of an internallypreoccupied Germany. Unable to "digest"the acquisition of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and hamperedby the structuralproblem of its ,Germany is preventedfrom playing the role of the engine of the European integration processor of an ascendinghegemonic power.17 Finally,according to neorealistassumptions, the United States should have taken advantage of Soviet weakness with an aggressiveforeign policy and effortsto compoundSoviet difficulties so as to make the SovietUnion as weak as possible. Instead, the United States extended to the Soviet Union an invitationto join multilateralinstitutions, offered large-scale financial for economicreform, and even supportedGorbachev's efforts to hold the Soviet Union together.It stretchesthe imaginationto explainthe supportivebehavior of the United States toward the Soviet Union as one of "balancing" in neorealistterms. Realists may argue that the United States' supportivebehavior does not contradicttheir theory because great powers tryto preventthe opening of powervacuums that might lead to theemergence of small, aggressive states and tryto preserveessential actors in the balance of power.This line of argument, however,contradicts the neorealistpostulate of powermaximization and that of relativegains concerns.Moreover, at what point would the United States determinethat the Soviet Union was no longera threatand was to be preserved forbalance-of-power reasons? The Soviet Union was the onlyother country thatpresented a seriousthreat to U.S. securitywhen the United States began its supportivemoves and, with its intercontinentalnuclear missiles, the Commonwealthof IndependentStates is stillthe onlypower that could present a threatto the United States.

17. For an earlyrecognition of these facts,see Eckart Arnold, "German Foreign Policy and Unification,"InternationalAffairs 67 (July 1991), pp. 453-71. Symposium 221

Even afterthe Soviet Union's collapse, the United States did not deviate fromits multilateralcourse. While the initialdraft of the Defense Planning Guidance for the 1994-99 fiscalyears had advocated that the United States should "prevent the emergence of a new rival" and convince "potential competitorsthat they need not aspire to a greaterrole or pursue a more aggressiveposture to protecttheir legitimate interests" the reviseddraft states: It is not in our interestor those of the otherdemocracies to returnto ear- lierperiods in whichmultiple military powers balanced one anotheroff in whatpassed forsecurity structures, while regional, or even global peace hungin the balance.... One of the primarytasks we face todayin shaping the futureis carryinglong standingalliances into the new era, and turning old enmitiesinto new cooperativerelationships. If we and the otherleading democraciescontinue to build a democraticsecurity community, a much saferworld is likelyto emerge.If we act separately,many other problems could result.18 U.S. actions in response to Soviet collapse and declared foreignpolicy objectivesdemonstrate that even actorswith the greatestpotential for relative gainsin the reconstitutedinternational system are not followingthe neorealist logic. Rather,the United States and other actorsin the internationalsystem are assessingsecurity threats in a way thatgoes farbeyond the distributionof capabilitiesand reachesdeeper intothe domestic politics of all the actorsin the system.One thingseems to be clear: the United States is not respondingto these new forms of securitythreats by balancing throughinternal arms productionor byforming external alliances against potential opponents. Indeed, the U.S. response to the collapse of Soviet communismhas been motivatedprimarily by the potential consequences of civilwar within the Soviet Union. In response to 's August 1989 declaration that Soviet annexationwas illegal,the Bush administrationreemphasized that the United States never recognized incorporationof the into the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,President Bush, National SecurityAdvisor Brent Scow- croft,and otherofficials worried about civilwar within the SovietUnion and its potentialeffect on the controlof nuclearweapons. As Scowcroftput it, "It is notnecessarily in the interestof the UnitedStates to encouragethe breakup of the Soviet Union.... It's in our interestthat the nationalistdebate be tempered.Perhaps some kind of federationwould be betterthan havingall these republicsarc offand go theirown ways."'19 The perceivedsecurity threat to NATO of such a civilwar includespolitical destabilization of neighboring Eastern European countries,mass migrationof refugeesto WesternEurope,

18. This documentis quoted in PatrickE. Tyler,"Pentagon Drops Goal of BlockingNew :Policy Document Revised," TheNew YorkTimes, 24 May 1992,p. A14. 19. Michael R. Beschlossand StrobeTalbott, At theHighest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of theCold War(Boston: Little,Brown and Company),pp. 102 and 109. 222 InternationalOrganization and mostdramatically, the possible loss ofcentral control over strategic nuclear weapons. In lightof standardrealist theory, these are indeed startlingdevelopments: virtuallyall actors rejected the generativelogic of the systemthat made a balance-of-powerpolicy with shifting alliances the paramountpolitical maxim. Instead all states,whether great, middle-sized, or small,opted forsome formof .They also have preferredsolutions predicated on a certain typeof integration-bothin the areas of low politics(economics) and in the vital area of security-to solutionsbased on "internalbalancing." Finally, states have responded to nontraditionalsecurity threats arising from other states'domestic politics rather than from their foreign policies. Whateverthe merits of neorealist theory might be in illuminatingthe periods beforeWorld War I or duringthe cold war,most of its tenetsand theoretical termsdo not seem to correspondto presentstate practice. Preoccupied with a largelymisguided epistemological ideal of parsimonyand elegance, structural realistshave neglectedthe examinationof actual practiceas well as a critical appraisal of the fitbetween their model's theoreticalassumptions and the actual internationalgame.20 Ironically, in the attemptto meet the ideal of "science," neorealistshave cut themselvesoff from some of the important insightsof George Kennan and other realist practitionerswho had shaped nineteenth-and twentieth-centurypolitics.21

The constructivistapproach to systemchange

Instead of conceivingthe internationalsystem in termsof distributionsof tangibleresources and of"invisible" structures working behind the backs of the actors,constructivism views this system as an artificeof man-madeinstitutions, such as, but not limited to states. In general, institutionsare settled or routinizedpractices established and regulatedby norms.22 As to theproblem of change,it is usefulto distinguishamong different types ofprocesses characterized as change.On theone hand,we can thinkof changes withinthe frameworkof well-establishedconventions. Thus, the availabilityof and differentialaccess to new resourceswill create new distributionalpatterns withoutnecessarily changing the parametersof the system.Reproduction of systemicstructures is not affected.Changes in the balance of powerwould be the typicalexample of thisprocess. On the otherhand, a more fundamental

20. See David Dessler, "What's at Stake in theAgent-Structure Debate?" 21. For a furtherelaboration on thispoint, see FriedrichKratochwil, "The Embarrassmentof Changes: Neo-realismas the Science of RealpolitikWithout Politics," Review of International Studies,vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 63-80. 22. For a furtherdiscussion of institutionsand the importanceof the normsconstituting them, see Kratochwil,Rules, Norms, and Decisions,chaps. 3 and 4. Symposium 223 type of change occurs when the practicesand constitutiveconventions of a social systemare altered. The second processof changeis centralto our analysisbecause it showshow actors can fundamentallytransform the internationalsystem. Since the internationalsystem is an ensembleof institutionsand since institutionsare practicesconstituted by norms, the analogyof a game thatis determinedby its rulesproves helpful for understanding the system'spersistence and changes.In other words, fundamentalchange in the internationalsystem occurs when some (or all) of itsconstitutive norms are altered. Below, we argue that the Soviet Union under changed a constitutiverule of the classicalEuropean statessystem and thatthe originsof the cold war lie in the fact that Stalin was unwillingto accept the previous norms of interaction.Similarly, U.S. universalismand the emphasis on liberal openness violated the exclusivityassociated with the traditionalnotion of sovereigntyin importantrespects. The resultof both of these changes in the constitutivenorms led to the emergenceof the bloc politics that dominatedthree decades of postwarhistory. It was only with Gorbachev's initiativesat the end of the 1980s that the temporarydetente betweenthe blocs was overcomeby a morefundamental transformation. So farwe have discussedactors whose interactions make up theinternational system,that is, states. However, states are themselvesinstitutions whose existenceand characteristicsare dependenton the reproductionof particular sets of practices.The state is not just a legal entityor a formalorganization. Rather, it must be understoodas an ensemble of normativelyconstituted practicesby which a group of individualsforms a special type of political association. If one understandsboth the internationalsystem and the state in termsof normativelyconstituted practices, international and domesticpolitics are not hermeticallysealed withintheir own spheres.Given thatpolitical practice is divided into these two realms only by the historicalfact of the state as the institutionalsetup that organizes politics,it becomes clear why change in domesticpolitics can transformthe internationalsystem. The rise of modernnationalism provides an exampleof such a fundamental systemtransformation through a change in norms of both domestic and internationalpolitics. denotes a changein theway in whichpeople thoughtof themselvesand theirrelationship with existing institutions. With the emergenceof nationalism,people stopped definingthemselves primarily as membersof a certainreligious belief or of a familiallineage but ratheras a distinctivegroup that spoke a particularlanguage, practiced certain customs, and possessed a historyof its own. This intangiblechange in identification induced a shiftin normativeconceptions of allegiance.People no longerpaid allegianceto the local noble or familyelder but to an entitybased on language and culturaldistinctions. Such a new identityconstituted and regulatedvery 224 InternationalOrganization real practices,as the FrenchRevolution and theconcomitant emergence of the nation-statedemonstrate. The changein identificationintroduced new conven- tionsfor the legitimizationof stateauthority. The reconstitutionof domesticpolitics in France in turnradically altered practicesamong states. For example,with the levee en masse,the conventions engenderedby nationalismreconstituted the practiceof war. It created new conceptionsof rightsand dutiesof the population by transforming subjects into "citizens." Regardless of whetheror not other states in the international systemunderwent nationalist transformations of theirdomestic politics, the levee en masse immediatelychanged the way in whichinternational politics was conducted.The new conceptionof war promptedother states to adopt the practiceof conscriptionbased on new normsof national securityand citizen obligation.Thus, a change in the conventionsof politics withinone state changedthe conventionsof both domesticand internationalpolitics through- out the system. This examplehas severalimportant implications for a theoryof international change. One, the principlesaccording to whichunits are differentiatedare of extremeimportance for the characterizationof the system.Nationalism, for example,not only changed the tone of politicsas Furstvon Metternichand Lord Acton perceivedbut also made it increasinglyimpossible to resortto territorialconcession as a means of maintainingthe balance of power.As soon as the inhabitantscared whether or not they were French, German, or Austrian,their sovereignscould no longer manage the balance by simply transferringterritory.23 Two, it demonstratesthat international change is a multilevelphenomenon in which precedence cannot be accorded a priori to either domestic or internationalstructures. Rather, what is importantis theway in whichchanged practicesarising from new conceptionsof identityand politicalcommunity are adopted byindividuals and the wayin whichthe interactionsamong states are therebyaltered or vice versa. "Second image reversed"interpretations, which are oftentendered against structuralist (that is, thirdimage) approaches,point to an importantneglect of systemictheory.24 But the point is not simplyto assertthe importanceof internationalstructures for domesticchange but to examinesystematically the interactionof internationaland domesticstructures withina conceptuallydeveloped framework. The factthat "causal arrows"can go bothways might make fora morecomplicated analysis, but thisis disturbing

23. See Friedrich Kratochwil,"On the Notion of Interest,"International Organization 36 (Winter1982), pp. 1-30. 24. On second image reversed interpretations,see Peter Gourevitch,"The Second Image Reversed:The InternationalSources of DomesticPolitics," International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-911. For an example of a structuralistanalysis, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry,"The InternationalSources of Soviet Change," InternationalSecurity 16 (Winter 1991/92),pp. 74-118. Symposium 225 onlyto analystswho have alreadyopted forthe primacyof one or anotherlevel of analysis and who are wedded to a particularand mostlyinappropriate concept of causality.Instead of reifyingone typeof structure,we should be makingpolitical practice and the reproductionof the systemour centralfocus. Three, the relevanceof normsfor the constitutionof politicalaction and its appraisalbecomes visible. Constructivists and rationalistsshare, therefore, the focuson choice. Constructivists,however, insist not onlythat choices mustbe meaningfulin termsof the actors' preferencesbut also that intersubjective standardsmust serve an importantfunction by providingyardsticks for the classificationand appraisal of action. What qualifies as self-determination rather than sedition? What is a case of interventionrather than lawful assistance?What is a case of self-defenserather than an unauthorizedresort to force? These are all highlycontested issues in internationaland domestic politics. It is not possible to reduce this problem of appraisal to merelya questionof pure descriptionor of an empiricalfit between a phenomenonand a theoreticalterm.25 It is equallynot advisablesimply to accept the actors'own characterization(precisely because of the incentivesfor deception and strate- gic behavior). Rather, it is the contested,but neverthelesspartially shared, understandingsthat illuminate these interactions and help us in our analysis. For some this constructivistargument might not seem controversial,but othersmay contendthat such an approach cannot demonstratewhat caused the constitutiverules themselvesto change. Consequently,one could further arguethat an adequate explanationnecessitates the reductionof theserules to some incontrovertiblelast fundamentthat serves as their"cause." Beforewe are readyto dismissthe constructivistapproach as pure idealism, we had betterremember that rational choice theoryand economicreasoning startprecisely with this conceptionof the autonomousactor and his or her conceptionsand/or preferences. In thisway, all otherfurther events can be shown to be caused by the actor even if his or her choice is made under constraints.In otherwords, there is no reason automaticallyto deferto some materialfactors that can serve as ultimatefoundations for our explanations. Nevertheless,giving an accountof preference formation through the analysis of theprocess of interaction in whichidentities are formedand interestsemerge is partof theconstructivist research program.26 What constructivism,and forthat matterany theoryof social action, is unable to deliver is a consistentand coherentreduction of action to some ultimatefoundation that supposedly causes everythingelse. Attemptsto demonstratethe superiorityof materialor structuralcauses resultlargely from clever historiography rather than from causal determinism.

25. For a furtherexplanation of essentiallycontested concepts, see WilliamE. Connolly,The Termsof Political Discourse (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1974). 26. See Wendt,"Anarchy is WhatStates Make of It." 226 InternationalOrganization

Of course ex post facto,every action can be shownto have been determined, and the observerof complexpatterns might be able to imputefunctional or evolutionarysignificance to certain events. For instance,in contrastto our constructivistaccount of systemicchange concomitantto the rise of national- ism,functional and evolutionaryarguments compatible with a realistperspec- tive are usuallyadvanced. Thus, it has been argued that securityimperatives caused the changesin domesticstructures particularly in the aftermathof the FrenchRevolution.27 Providingsuch a functionalaccount, however, does not explainthe original shiftin the self-identificationof the inhabitantsof France fromthe king's subjects to citizens duringthe revolution.It also does not tell us why this particular form of organizationwas adopted by other states given that alternativeswere available and given that citizen armies were against the interestsof the militaryelites of absolutism,as and Prussia quickly realized after1815. AlthoughNapoleon discoveredthe militarypotential of citizen armies for warfare, the changes in identificationof the French revolutionarieswho broughtdown the ancienregime did notoccur because of a functionalimperative of "security."As a matterof fact,one of the decisive repercussionsof this revolutionwas that the concept of securityitself was fundamentallyaltered. Instead of the securityof the kingand his dynasty(God save theking, the king is dead, longlive theking), "national" securityemerged. Only afterwe observe,historically, that nationalist politics was victorious,do functionalistarguments concerning security imperatives make sense. Evolutionaryarguments implicitly contain the belief that survivinginstitu- tions and organizationalforms are successfulanswers to some optimization problem.28But institutionsdo not existin fixedenvironments, since institutions often can change environments.Consequently, no equilibriumin rational choice terms mightexist; if it exists, it mightnot be achievable; or the availabilityof multiple equilibria makes the evolutionarypath argument indeterminate.29Constructivism therefore focuses on practicesinformed by rulesand norms.As JamesMarch and JohanOlsen pointout: the advantageof treatingbehavior as rule drivenis not thatit is possibleto "save" therebya beliefin historicalefficiency. Rather that it leads more naturallythan does treatingbehavior as optimizationto an examinationof the specificways in whichhistory is encoded intoinstitutions ... and more

27. See Otto Hintze, "The Formationof States and ConstitutionalDevelopment: A Studyin Historyand Politics"and Otto Hintze,"Military Organization and the Organizationof the State," bothin Felix Gilbert,ed., TheHistorical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1975). 28. See, forexample, Robert Axelrod,The Evolutionof Cooperation(New York: Basic Books, 1984). 29. This pointis eloquentlymade byJon Elster in Ulyssesand theSirens (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1979), part 1. Symposium 227

likelyto generateinteresting predictions about multipleequilibria or long timepaths. In fact,the assumptionof historicalefficiency becomes mostlya matterof faith... ifit is impossibleto identifythe precisemechanisms by whichhistorical experience is transformedinto current action.30 Thus, historyand politicalchoices enter as importantfactors for theorizing. Neithercan be understoodin termsof functionalnecessity or instrumental relationshipsin an overarchingsystem or historicalwhole. Preciselybecause political action can transcendprevailing practices and establishnew begin- nings,it cannotbe reduced to functionallogic or historicallaws, as even Karl Popper has nevertired of pointingout.31 Large-scale historicalchange cannot be explainedin termsof one or even several causal factorsbut throughan analysisof conjunctures.Although a coveringlaw forthis historical process is unlikelyto be found,elements within thatprocess do formpatterns that can be perceivedand analyzed,since even overallchaotic processes are not simplyrandom. While thislast pointhas been made byconstructivist and nonconstructivistscholars alike,32 the constructivist researchprogram identifies institutions as both elementsof stabilityand as strategicvariables for the analysisof change.Institutional underpinnings help in the reproductionof systems(i.e., stability)and become the parametersfor routine(i.e., non-system-transforming)choices. For example,markets could notfunction unless property rights have been assignedand theproperty system remainsstable duringtransactions. But even the scope and directionof radical changedepends to a largeextent on the existenceof an institutionalstructure. Thus, the classical revolutionswould not have been possible if therehad been no state to be captured.33An explanation of change will have to blend conjunctiveanalysis with an understandingof rule-governedactivity and the variousprocesses by whichinstitutions are continuallyreproduced and modi- fiedthrough the actors'practices. In the followingcase study,we demonstratehow a new internationalsystem is being constitutedby the changed practicesof one of the major actors and their system-widerepercussions. By focusingon normativechanges in the legitimacyand the constitutionof internationalpolitics within the Sovietbloc, we explainwhy and howthe conventions of international politics changed much more rapidlythan the distributionof capabilities.While the relativecapabili- ties of the European Community,the SovietUnion, and the United States did notchange very much during the years leading up to 1989,international politics was fundamentallytransformed in just thatone year.

30. JamesMarch and JohanOlsen, RediscoveringInstitutions (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 56. 31. Karl Popper,The of Historicism (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1957). 32. See forexample, Gabriel Almond and StephenJ. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks,and the Studyof Politics," Politics 20 (July1977), pp. 489-522. 33. J.P. Nettl,"The State as a ConceptualVariable," WorldPolitics 20 (July1968), pp. 559-92. 228 InternationalOrganization

Reconstitutingthe international system

Just as the cold war began over Eastern Europe, it ended there. Stalin's rejectionof freeelections for Eastern European countriesstarted the process wherebythey became an informalpart of the Sovietempire. Gorbachev ended thisinformal empire with the revocationof the Brezhnevdoctrine. Contrary to neorealisttheory, this decision was not drivenby systemicconstraints. Rather, itwas a foreignpolicy choice made in thecontext of crucialdevelopments in the domesticpolitics of both Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion. The resultwas that Gorbachev's decision to end the Brezhnev doctrinereconstituted the internationalsystem by changingthe constitutivenorms of bloc politicsand therebythe rulesgoverning superpower relations. We developthis case studyin threesubsections below. We beginby sketching theconstitutive norms of bloc politicsthat emerged in theearly postwar era and underpinnedsuperpower relations from the late 1940sto the end of the 1980s. We thenanalyze Gorbachev's revocation of the Brezhnevdoctrine and explain howit transformedthe patterns of domesticand internationalpolitical practice withinthe Pact as well as relationsamong the superpowers. Finally, we examinethe rapidand unexpectedspread of revolutionwithin Eastern Europe that led to the end of the CommunistParty's monopoly on power, the dissolutionof the WarsawPact, Germanreunification, and the collapse of the SovietUnion itself.These unexpectedchanges confirmed the transformation of the internationalsystem, since a returnto bloc politicsbecame increasingly difficultand a new set of norms governingsuperpower and great power relationshad emerged.

The emergenceof thepostwar internationalsystem: the constitutionof bloc politics To understandthe crucialnature of the Brezhnevdoctrine, it is necessaryto examine the developmentof the constitutivenorms of postwarinternational politics.Here, contraryto neorealistanalysis, the close connectionbetween domesticand internationalinstitutions was particularlyimportant. This fact was recognizedby Kennan in his "Long Telegram,"as it was by Stalin. Both were aware thatfundamentally different conceptions of domesticpolitics had dramaticconsequences for international politics. Stalin told Milovan Djilas in spring1945, "This war is not as in the past; whoeveroccupies a territoryalso imposeson it his own social system.Everyone imposes his own systemas faras his armycan reach.It cannotbe otherwise."34 Typically,Stalin could imaginethe propagation of the socialistsystem only by force,opting for imperial expansion rather than hegemonicleadership, or an

34. Stalinis quotedby Alvin Z. Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy Since WorldWar II: Imperialand Global,3d. ed. (Glenview,Ill.: Scott,Foresman, 1989), p. 73. Symposium 229 even more limited "." After World War II, when Britain, France, and the United States attempted to return to previous conventionsof state-to-staterelations and were preparedto discussspheres of influence,they soon realized that Stalin's conceptionsof such a sphere in Eastern Europe entailed total controlof domesticpolitical processes and the radical eliminationof civil society.While Stalin certainlywas aware of the traditional form of a sphere of influence,as the Finnish arrangement demonstrated,he did not choose thatoption for Eastern Europe. In consideringthe impositionof the Soviet model on Eastern European societies,one has to understandthe dramaticimplications of thisnew formof domination.35It radicallybroke with the traditionsof nineteenth-century European ,including the czaristone. As JohnGray noted in 1987: The conventionalwisdom among Western scholars in seekingto explain awaythe horrorsof the Sovietsystem as inheritancesfrom a barbarousRus- sian politicaltradition, neglects the role of Marxiantheory in constituting and reproducingthe Sovietsystem and the relentlesshostility of bothto the traditionsand achievementsof the Russian people. The so-calledRussian empireof our timehas, in truth,few points of similaritywith the empiresof nineteenth-centuryEurope.... In projectinginto Soviet reality the con- cepts and imagesof the past,western observers fail to graspthe radicalmo- dernityof the Soviettotalitarian system.36 In contrastto the attemptsof the Holy Alliance,which was designedto deny the populationan influenceon politicsbut whichleft civil society intact, the Soviettransformation made people,willy-nilly, participants in thereproduction of the totalitariansystem. Adam Michnikeven noted a distinctionbetween Nazi and Sovietoccupation of . The Nazi occupiers could not be botheredto create politicalorganizations for the conquered people, whomthey wanted to transforminto a race of slaves.... Their ex- ecutionsquads were accompaniedneither by dreams of a bettertomorrow norby servile declarations from Hitler's Polish fans. The Sovietconquista- doreswere different.They systematically destroyed all social ties,political and culturalorganizations, sports associations, and professionalguilds, and abrogatedcivil rights and confiscatedprivate property. In contrastto the Nazis, the Sovietsimposed their own organizationalstructures on the Poles.... Imitatingthe spiritof the Crusades,they came to spread the New Faith.They left the door open byallowing everyone-in principle-to choose to convertto the religionof the ProgressiveSystem.37

35. This pointwas eloquentlymade byHannah Arendtin Originsof (New York: Harcourt,Brace, Jovanovich,1973). A similardistinction is drawnbetween traditional and the Sovietcase in Vaclav Havel, "The Powerof the Powerless,"in JohnKeane, ed., ThePower ofthe Powerless: CitizensAgainst the State in Central-EasternEurope (London: Hutchison,1985). 36. JohnGray, "The Politicsof CulturalDiversity," Postliberalism (New York: Routledge,1993) chap. 18; the quotationis fromp. 257. 37. See pp. 43-44 of ,"On Resistance,"in Adam Michnik,Letters From Prison and OtherEssays, trans. Maya Liatynski(Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1985) pp. 41-63. 230 InternationalOrganization

This formof participation,however, left the populationwithout any influence on policy while at the same time deprivingthem the protectionof law.38 Similarly,as the controversysurrounding the filesof the formerGDR indicate,every tenth person was, in one way or the other,working for state security.This "security"apparatus not only operated totallyoutside of any legal accountability,its verygoal was the disruptionof the trustthat allows membersof civilsociety to go on withtheir lives, form friendships, and engage in cooperativeenterprises. The problemwith the Sovietmodel was that-and thisdemonstrates the inadequacies of therealist paradigm that identifies social orderwith the existence of hierarchy-it produced Hobbesian "diffidence"and a state of nature among the membersof societyprecisely because a central governmentexisted. Althoughthere is some debate as to the rootsof Sovietpolicy in the czarist imperial tradition,the analogy with previous occupied societies withinthe European state systemquickly loses its persuasiveness.Two furtherexamples drivethis point home moreclearly. While by the turnof the centurythe czarist had some 160 full-timepersonnel supported by a corp of gendarmesof about ten thousandmen, its successor,the Checka, amountedin 1921 to 262,400 men, not countingthe NKVD and militia.39Similarly, no traditionalEuropean empirefound it necessaryto resortto large-scalemurder of an officercorps as Stalindid in the case ofPoland (the Katynmassacre). It is importantto realize thatthe radicaltransformation of domesticstructures and theinternational system resulted not just fromStalin's pathologies but from the veryextension of the Sovietmodel. Consequently, the cautionof Stalinvis-a-vis the West,seemingly in accordancewith prudential realism, cannot be used as prooffor the traditionalnature of Sovietsecurity interests. Althoughattempts to exertinfluence beyond the generallyaccepted norms of the European state systemwere not withoutprecedent, they were usually checkedby the otherpowers, if not bythe limitedmeans of coercionavailable to governments.Both factorsfostered the pursuitof more moderatesecurity interestsand of consensual procedures within a concert framework.For example,Henry Kissinger demonstrated that Metternich wanted "security" to include controlover domesticpolitics but failedin his effortsbecause Britain resistedthat interpretation. Metternich relented and compromisedon a more moderate version,which then allowed the Concert of Europe to function duringmost of the nineteenthcentury.40

38. For a depictionof the perversionof law in totalitariansystems, see The Experienceand the Future Discussion Group,Poland Today: The Stateof theRepublic (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1981), pp. 18-43. This reportwas based on an independentsurvey of prominentprofessionals, scholars,and writersfrom a broad rangeof politicalviews conducted to make policyrecommenda- tionsto the Polish Communistgovernment in 1979 and 1980. 39. On the czarist secret police, see , underthe Old Regime (London: WidenfeldNicolson, 1974), p. 301. On the Checka, see JohnJ. Dziak, Chekisty:A Historyof the KGB (Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1988). 40. HenryKissinger,A World Restored (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 1964), chap. 5. Symposium 231

However,when a similarissue arose afterWorld War II concerningSoviet influencein EasternEurope, particularlyin Poland,Stalin did notmoderate his position. Thus, irrespectiveof whetherStalin's actions were a reaction to Westerninitiatives, as revisionistshave claimed, the question of legitimacy cannotbe reduced to the observationof who acted firstand who reactedlater withoutaddressing the issue of the qualityof the acts in question.41The fact remains that the impositionof the Soviet model on Eastern Europe was illegitimatenot onlyin the eyes of the SovietUnion's wartimeallies but also in those of the so-called liberatedEastern European populations.42The Czech coup removedall doubtthat Eastern Europe would become partof the Soviet informalempire. Consequently, Stalin's intransigence meant that the classical statesystem could notbe restored.Communist tactics of conquestchanged the rules of the internationalgame by subvertingthe European state system's conventionsvery much in the same way that the levee en masse had changed internationalpolitics in the nineteenthcentury. When the West had been convincedby Kennan's long telegramthat Stalin was unlikelyto play by the rules,it took countermeasures-firstwith contain- mentexpressed in the TrumanDoctrine and the MarshallPlan and thenwith the foundingof NATO. As Waltz described it, this action-reactionprocess institutionalizedthe bipolar world: Communistguerrillas operating in promptedthe TrumanDoctrine. The tighteningof the SovietUnion's controlover the statesof Eastern Eu- rope led to the MarshallPlan and the AtlanticDefense Treaty,and these in turngave rise to the Cominformand the WarsawPact. The plan to forma West Germangovernment produced the Berlinblockade. And so on throughthe 1950's,60's and 70's. Our responsesare geared to the Soviet Union's actions,and theirsto ours,which has producedan increasingly solid bipolarbalance.43 Ironically,Waltz's historicalaccount challenges the logic of his argument, which holds that the bipolar world is a functionof the distributionof capabilitiesin the internationalsystem rather than the outcomeof a succession of choices on the part of the actors.According to Waltz, the overwhelming capabilitiesof the superpowersentail a competitiverelationship of the type thatemerged in the postwarperiod: In a bipolarworld there are no peripheries.With only two great powers capable of actingon a worldscale, anythingthat happens is potentiallyof concernto bothof them.Bipolarity extends the geographicscope of both

41. For a good reviewof morerecent (revisionist) cold war ,see LynnEden, "The End of U.S. Cold War History?A ReviewEssay," International Security 18 (Summer1993), pp. 174-207. 42. For an elaborationon thispoint, see JohnLewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future,"in Hogan, TheEnd ofthe Cold War,pp. 21-38. 43. Waltz,Theory of International Politics, p. 171. 232 InternationalOrganization

powers'concern. It broadensthe rangeof factorsincluded in the competi- tionbetween them.44 The problem with Waltz's conception of bipolarityis that the nature of U.S.-Soviet competitionis nota generalcharacteristic of anybipolar configura- tionbut ratherthe resultof a certainset of practices.It was preciselyStalin's preoccupationwith controlling domestic politics that "broadened the rangeof factors" and was later geographicallyexpanded and projected onto global politics. Hence, the distributionof capabilities seems to matter less than the incompatibilityof particularconceptions of political communityand their concomitantpractices. Waltz treatsthe postwarconventions of superpower interactionas ahistoricalgivens. But just as these conventionsdeveloped after World War II in action-reactioncycles, they are subject to change if these incompatibilitiesbecome negotiable.Therefore, old conventionscan be resur- rectedand new conventionscan develop.With such changes in conventionsthe internationalsystem is transformed. East-West tensiondecreased afterStalin's death, as firstKhrushchev and then Brezhnevbegan to develop more extensivestate-to-state relations with theUnited States.Stalin's subjection of EasternEurope, however,had become institutionalized.Neither Khrushchev nor Brezhnev was preparedto relinquish the Eastern European empire Stalin had built. Essentially,a two-pronged Soviet foreignpolicy consisting in subversionof domesticpolitics paired with state-to-staterelations had become so well-establishedthat it seemed impos- sible to alter. Althoughthe Soviet policyof ""of the late and early1960s ostensibly denoted a nonaggressivestance for the sake of establish- ing agreementon the limitationof conflict,it actuallymeant the avoidance of nuclear war while continuingclass struggleby supportingwars of national liberation.45Even duringdetente, Brezhnev and his successorsretained the two-prongedapproach of pursuingstate-to-state relations with the United States whilemaintaining the informalempire. Jack Snyder demonstrated that Brezhnevalso retaineda "correlation-of-forces"theory of detente.In a curious analogyto the Western"peace-through-strength" theory of change in Soviet behavior,Brezhnev's correlation-of-forces theory held that "the West would accept a relaxationof tensiononly when increasesin Sovietpower demanded i.1146 Despite the various episodes of reduced tension,the communisttactic of conquestby subversion had become a constitutivenorm of postwarbloc politics

44. Ibid. 45. Adam Ulam,Expansion and Coexistence:The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger,1968), p. 448. 46. See p. 15 of Jack Snyder,"International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," World Politics(October 1989), pp. 1-30; the quotationis fromp. 15. Symposium 233 that bounded the practice of politics throughoutthe internationalsystem. Initiated by Stalin's insistencethat countrieswithin the Soviet sphere of influenceadopt the Soviet model, the constitutivenature of this normwas reinforcedby the Westernresponse of containmentand by the acceptance of the divisionof Europe-most notablyby the lack of Westernresponse to the Hungarianrevolt in 1956. Finally,this norm was formallyreconfirmed by the Brezhnevdoctrine, announced on the occasion of the WarsawPact invasionof Czechoslovakiain 1968. The articlejustifying that invasion argued that a threatto socialismin one countrywas a threatto the entiremovement.47 Given the natureof the Soviet empire,subsequent events proved this analysis correct.

Systemtransformation initiated: the end of the From the day in January1989 on which Gorbachev approved of General Vojciech Jaruzelski'splan to liftthe ban on Solidarityand ask its leaders to participatein governingPoland to 27 October 1989, when the Soviet Union renouncedthe invasionof Czechoslovakiain a WarsawPact communique,the Brezhnev doctrinewas in a process of disintegration.48With Gorbachev's revocationof thisdoctrine and withhis acceptanceof "reasonable sufficiency" in armaments,a ratherdifferent foreign policy emerged.49By allowinghis clientsgreater autonomy in the definitionof domesticand eventuallyeven of foreignpolicy, Gorbachev relied on a substantiallychanged image of the adversary,a considerablynarrower conception of the nationalinterest, and a reconceptualizationof securityitself, which questioned the exclusivereliance on militarymeans and stressedthe link between national and mutualsecurity.50 The end of the Brezhnevdoctrine also indicatedthat Gorbachev had opted for

47. See Rubinstein,Soviet Foreign Policy Since WorldWar II, p. 119. 48. The Polish Communistgovernment, the ,and Solidarityannounced the beginningof "roundtable discussions" to negotiatepolitical reform on 27 January1989. "Jaruzelski told the U.S. ambassador in Warsaw, John Davies, that he was consultingfrequently with Gorbachev,who fullysupported his policies of conciliation."See Beschloss and Talbott,At the HighestLevels, p. 53. 49. On the importanceof reasonable sufficiency,Thomas Risse-Kappen,"Ideas Do Not Float Freely:Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in thisissue ofInternational Organization. 50. For an explanationof Gorbachev's changed image of the adversaryin termsof learning theoryand cognitiveattribution theory, see Ted Hopf, "Peripheral Visions: Brezhnev and Gorbachev Meet the ," in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., Leamingin U.S. and SovietForeign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: WestviewPress, 1991), pp. 586-629; fora moreorganization-based model stressingthe impactof academicsand policyresearch institutions, see JeffCheckel, "Ideas, Institutions,and the GorbachevForeign Policy Revolution, World Politics 45 (January1993), pp. 271-300. For an informativediscussion of the nationalinterest, see Stephen Sestanovich,"Inventing the SovietNational Interest,"The National Interest no. 20 (Summer1990), pp. 3-16. On the reconceptualizationof security,see Legvold,"The Revolutionin SovietForeign Policy,"pp. 84-87. 234 InternationalOrganization state-to-staterelations as the only acceptable mode of operation. This abandonmentof the Soviet Union's traditionaltwo-pronged approach to foreign policy meant that the emergingset of rules reconstitutingthe internationalsystem became more like those of the classical European state systemthan those of the cold war or even of detente. At this point, a more detailed assessmentof perestroikaand the "new thinking"in foreignpolicy becomes necessary.It can be provided by the constructivistapproach, which analyzes the links between domestic and internationalchange without subscribing to the idea ofthe historicalinevitabil- ity of liberal .51Eastern European observers such as Michnik suggestedin 1987 that Gorbachev'sreforms should not be interpretedas the harbingersof liberalor ;rather, underlying these effortswas the agenda of socialist counterreformation.52Essentially, Gorbachev at- tempted to retain control over Eastern European foreignpolicy through allowing,and theneven encouraging,reform of communismdomestically with the expectationthat his own model of perestroikawould prevailand bringto power similarlyminded leaders in the Soviet bloc. The need forGorbachev's counterreformationwas provokedby the legitimization crisis of the , which had an internal and bloc dimension. This crisis not only underminedSoviet claims to imperialcontrol in EasternEurope but also made theleading role of the CommunistParty contestable at thecenter. Gorbachev's Eastern European strategywas to encouragereform of all CommunistParties in order to avert popular revolts in Eastern Europe, which would have repercussionson the SovietUnion itself.Although this was a high-riskstrategy, the Sovietleadership recognized that military intervention was hardlypossible in anyEastern European countrywithout aborting reforms in thebloc and even threateningperestroika at home.53As will be discussed in the next section, Gorbachev'sexpectations proved to be mistaken,and the processof changehe initiatedquickly went beyond his abilityto controlit. Given that the Brezhnev doctrinehad been instrumentalin definingthe Soviet Union's Eastern European empire,an analysisof empireis usefulfor

51. FrancisFukuyama, "The End of History?"The NationalInterest no. 16 (Summer1989), pp. 3-18. 52. Counterreformation,for Michnik, characterized and perestroikaas a responseto delegitimizationof Soviet communismand as an attemptto retain control throughreform: "[Counterreformation]is a self-criticalshow of strengthwith the aim of incorporatingthose values createdagainst the will of [theestablished orthodoxy], and outsidethe social institutionsin orderto stop them [from]becoming antagonisticand subversive."See Adam Michnik, "The Great Counter-reformer,"Labor Focus on EasternEurope 9 (July-October1987), p. 23. 53. In resistingmilitary intervention in Eastern Europe, Shevardnadzeexplicitly rejected the scenariosof 1956 and 1968by arguing that, "Leaving aside the impossibilityof operatingin thenew conditionswith the old methods,we could not sacrificeour own principlesregarding the rightto peoples to freedomof choice, noninterferencein internalaffairs, and the ." See ,The FutureBelongs to Freedom(New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 120. Similarly,when referringto the Baltics, Gorbachev stated that the use of force "would be the end ofPerestroika" see Beschlossand Talbott,Atthe Highest Levels, p. 164. Symposium 235 understandingthe transformationof bloc politics.54Postwar Soviet controlof Eastern Europe can be definedas formalas well as informalimperialism. Formal empire in Michael Doyle's termsis the "annexation and rule by a colonial power,"often with the collaborationof local elites.55Soviet Republics such as , , Lithuania,and Moldavia had been part of the Soviet empirein the formalsense. Postwarcontrol over the rest of Eastern Europe had been informal.According to Doyle, "Informalimperialism can ... effect the same resultsas formalimperialism; the differencelies in the process of control,which informalimperialism achieves throughthe collaborationof a legallyindependent (but actuallysubordinate) government in theperiphery."56 This characterizationof Eastern Europe as part of an informalempire had been accuratesince communist regimes first were installed by Stalin. Neverthe- less, Sovietcontrol over Eastern Europe underwenta rapid transformationin just a fewyears. This change can be conceptualizedas a processinvolving the stagesof "Ottomanization,""," and "Austrianization." As TimothyGarton Ash initiallyconceived it, Ottomanizationis the slow decayof the Sovietempire enabling "an unplanned,piecemeal, and discontinu- ous emancipation,both of the constituentstates from the imperialcenter, and of societies fromstates."57 Ottomanization suggests a transformationfrom formalempire to a typeof dependencythat was formerlycalled "suzerainty." In Doyle's words,"Having alreadyencountered the formwith the reality(in formalempires) and the realitywithout the form(in informalempires), we should not be surprisedto findthe formwithout the reality.In suzeraintythe metropole'spower lacks weightin muchthe same way as a feudal sovereign's political power over vassals would often lack effect."58A trend toward suzeraintycharacterized imperial decompositionin the 1970s and 1980s, particularlyin Hungaryand Poland. There, communistgovernments retained theirform while attemptingto pursue market-basedeconomic reformand pluralistpolitics within the CommunistParty. As thistactic failed, compromise arrangements,like thosemade at the Polish roundtabletalks in April1989, left the CommunistParty in nominalcontrol and keptthe appearance of informal empireso as not to provokethe metropole. Althoughgradual Ottomanization best describedthe initialperiod fromthe late 1970s until January1989, Gorbachev's relinquishingof the Brezhnev doctrinemade Finlandizationthe dominantmode of transformationthrough

54. Doyle defines empires as "relationshipsof political control imposed by some political societies over the effectivesovereignty of other political societies.They include more than just formallyannexed territories,but theyencompass less than the sum of all formsof international inequality."See Michael Doyle, Empires(Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, 1986), p. 19. 55. The quotationis fromibid., p. 130,Table 3. 56. Ibid.,p. 38. 57. TimothyGarton Ash, "The Empire in Decay," New YorkReview of Books 29 September 1988,p. 56. 58. Doyle,Empires, p. 42. 236 InternationalOrganization the restof theyear.59 Gorbachev essentially opted forthis radical restructuring of Soviet-EasternEuropean relationsover the slow transformationbrought about byOttomanization or militaryintervention. Since the SovietUnion had itsprimary security interests in ,it was this countrythat providedthe hard test for the repeal of the Brezhnev doctrine.If Gorbachevhad notwanted popular pressure to be exertedagainst the Honecker regimehe could have intervenedlong beforethe East German governmentbecame inviable. Instead, he gave implicit approval to the Hungarianopening of the Iron Curtainthat started the mass exodusfrom East Germanyand triggeredEast Germany'spolitical crisis. He also orderedSoviet troopsnot to interveneto save Honecker. As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbottnote, The Hungariangovernment had obtainedthe Kremlin'stacit consent in advance.As the SovietForeign Ministry spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, coylyput it,'s action was "veryunexpected, but it does not directly affectus.... [Gorbachev]privately told his aides thatHonecker would have to go, as soon as possible:"The [East German]leadership can't stayin control."He orderedhis General Staffto make sure thatSoviet troops sta- tionedin East Germanydid notget involvedin the strifethat was sureto envelopthe country.60 Rather than intervenewith force,Gorbachev went to and lauded Soviet-Finnishrelations as a model for the Soviet Union's relationswith its neighbors.Passing the hard test of East Germany,Finlandization seemed to have been establishedas the new normof Soviet-EasternEuropean relations. Finlandization entails autonomous domestic politics in concert with a foreignpolicy that does not conflictwith Soviet interests.Finlandization signifiedthe transformationfrom into a more conventional sphere of influencein whichonly the foreignpolicy of the subjectcountry is regulated.Practically speaking, Finlandization as applied to the meantthat bloc stateswould have to stayin the untilthe Soviet leadershipfelt secure withanother security arrangement. Given thatFinland was not a memberof the Warsaw Pact, however,and that it had no Soviet troopsstationed on its soil,Finlandization implied eventual autonomy outside of theWarsaw Pact butwith Soviet consent. To understandthe dynamicsof this change it is necessaryto furtherconsider the "domestic"sources of changein the Easternbloc. Followingthe construc- tivistapproach, this entails the explicittheoretical treatment of the interaction effectsbetween internal and external conceptions of order that separate

59. Finlandizationoriginates in Jacek Kuron's 1976 essay,which outlined a programfor the newlyformed democratic opposition in Poland. He borrowedthe termof Westernanalysts for Sovietobjectives in WesternEurope and postulatedit as an objectivefor Poland. See JacekKuron, "Reflectionson a Programof Action," The Polish Review, vol. 22, no. 3, 1977,pp. 51-69. 60. Beschlossand Talbott,At theHighest Levels, pp. 132-33. Symposium 237

domestic and internationalpolitics. In this context,the question of the autonomyand the legal natureof the state and its powersbecomes a crucial issue. Preciselybecause the state is the gatekeeper between domestic and internationalinteractions, constructivist analysis stresses the importanceof institutionsand normativeunderstandings for appraisal. The explanationof change musttherefore focus on the state's autonomyvis-a-vis civil society, on its sovereigntyvis-'a-vis other powers, and on its legalityin the exerciseof its powersinternally. As argued above, modernnationalism was initiallyan intangiblechange in theway people thoughtand felt,and thisin turnundermined the legitimacyof the dynasticorder. This changebecame observableonly when the practicesof obedience changed. In the same way, the antitotalitarianmovements in Eastern Europe changed the way people thoughtand felt.This new attitude underminedthe legitimacyof ,which had as an observableresult new formsof civildisobedience.61 Gorbachevhad to contendwith the opposition'santitotalitarian tactics that developedin thelate 1970s.These tacticswere aimed at attainingsome formof suzerainty,that is, greaterdomestic and internationalautonomy but stillwithin socialistparameters. Jacek Kuron's conceptionof "social self-organization," Michnik's"open but illegal activity,"Va'clav Havel's "livingwithin the truth," and George Konrad's "antipolitics"were designedto developa sphereof social existence,activity, and initiativeindependent of the CommunistParty state- whatwas traditionallycalled "civilsociety."62 The idea was to bypasscommu- nist social institutionsand make them obsolete by robbingthem of their functions;as Doyle put it,leave "the formwithout the reality." The tacticbore itsfirst fruit in 1980,with the riseof Solidarityand the hostof independentassociations that developed duringthe sixteenmonths of its legal existence.When 90 percent of Polish workersparticipated in a nonviolent against the workers' state, formedtheir own independenttrade union, and began to manage productionon theirown, what littlelegitimacy communismhad quicklyevaporated.63 Even thoughGeneral Jaruzelski reestab- lishedcontrol over the countrythrough a typeof putschin December 1981,the

61. For discussions of the collapse of legitimacysee George Schoepflin,"The End of Communismin Eastern Europe," InternationalAffairs (London) 66 (January1990), pp. 3-16 and especially pp. 5-7; and Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimationfrom the Top to Civil Society: Politico-culturalChange in EasternEurope," WorldPolitics 44 (October 1991), pp. 49-80. 62. See Kuron,"Reflections on a Programof Action"; Michnik,"On Resistance"; Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," and George Konrad, Antipolitics(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,1984), respectively.On civil society, see Jacques Rupnik, "Dissent in Poland, 1968-1978: the End of Revisionismand the Rebirthof the Civil Society,"in RudolfTokes, ed., Oppositionin EasternEurope (Baltimore,Md.: The JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1979), pp. 60-112; and AndrewArato, "Civil SocietyAgainst the State: Poland 1980-81," Telos 47 (Spring 1981),pp. 23-48. 63. JadwigaStaniszkis, The Self-Limiting Revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). 238 InternationalOrganization unprecedentednecessity for calling on a militaryleader to head the govern- mentdemonstrated the collapse of the CommunistParty's authority. Even as Jaruzelski'scrackdown ended the legal existenceof civilsociety, the new tacticsof civildisobedience spread firstthrough Polish societyand then were emulated throughoutEastern Europe. The spread of new tactics consisted of firstlearning about the successes and failures of opposition activitiesin other countriesfrom and foreignradio broadcastsand then adoptingthe successfulmodels.64 By the late 1980s,direct international contactsbetween opposition groups began to flourish.65 The growthof civil society presented the Soviet Union with peculiar difficulties.In askingthe rhetoricalquestion of whether force effectively would have resolved the Soviet predicament,Eduard Shevardnadze points to the exampleof Poland. He came to the conclusionthat imposition of martiallaw in 1981 did not end but ratherstimulated the internalferment, "So thereis no reasonto hiss at Perestroikaand cheerfor military force. It would notbe a bad idea forus to learn the lessons of martiallaw in Poland ourselves."66That this pointof view was sharedeven amongmore conservative leaders is evidencedby MikhailSuslov's repeated explicit refusal, "There is no waythat we are goingto use forcein Poland."67Instead of dealingwith these problemsby usingforce, Gorbachevadopted the counterreformationstrategy. Gorbachev's revocation of the Brezhnevdoctrine could be understoodas a means of retainingat least minimalcontrol over Eastern Europe throughreform. By not interveningto save communism,he triedto increase his chances of savingthe one structure that seemed most importantto the newly circumscribedSoviet security interest:the Warsaw Pact, redefined as a classical(though hegemonic) alliance. The policyof nonintervention,however, developed a dynamicof its own, particularlyin Poland. Seven years of graduallyincreasing open but illegal social self-organizationand a new round of strikesin 1988 finallyforced the Polish Communiststo compromisewith Solidarity in April 1989. By accepting one of Solidarity'sfirst demands, freedom of association,the Jaruzelskiregime legalized the latentcivil society that had developed over the years.Jaruzelski also agreed to hold partiallyfree in June.Solidarity candidates won nearly every seat open to competition.Unable to form a Communist-led government,Jaruzelski asked Solidarityleaders to put togethertheir own coalitiongovernment. Communist Party leader MieczyslawRakowski refused to go alongwith Jaruzelski until Gorbachev telephoned him on 22 Augustand

64. Hungariandissident George Konrad made thispoint in an interviewwith Rey Koslowski,14 October 1988,Colorado Springs,Colo. 65. See "JointEast European Statementto Commemoratethe TwentiethAnniversary of the Warsaw Pact Invasion of on August 21, 1968," and the " Declaration" issued on 10 July1988 by membersof Polish-CzechoslovakSolidarity after a clandestinemeeting on theborder between the twocountries, both in theEast EuropeanReporter 3 (Autumn1988), pp. 59-62. 66. Shevardnadze,The Future Belongs to Freedom,pp. 120-21. 67. Ibid.,p. 121. Symposium 239 told him to accept the firstnon-Communist-led government in the Warsaw Pact.68 Gorbachev'smove to toleratethis development,however, also meant that the CommunistParty's leading role in society could now be challenged. Nevertheless,Solidarity accepted a silentcompromise: it maintaineda long- standingpolicy of not threateningSoviet securityinterests.69 The Solidarity leadershipoffered reassurances that Poland would remainin the WarsawPact, left the Ministryof Defense under Communistcontrol, and agreed that Jaruzelskishould become President and commander-in-chiefof the armed forces. By retainingimplicit control of Polish defense policy, Gorbachev seeminglymaintained Soviet securityinterests. In this way, he avoided a potentiallyviolent rebellion in the Soviet Union's clientstates, since popular demands could now be directedat Solidarityrather than at the Communist Party.Originally Poland's economic crisishad threatenedto bringdown the Communistsystem and leave a powervacuum forcing Gorbachev's hand. After his move, Poland's economic crisis threatened instead to bring down a Solidaritygovernment. Whereas the springwas considered heresy in 1968, Gorbachev welcomedthe same reformsin 1989 because reformsreduced the chances of popular revolts.Initially, by not interveningto save communismin Poland, Gorbachevaccomplished this goal. But bysummer 1989 it also became evident that,quite ironically,nonintervention now yieldedthe goal forwhich interven- tion in 1968 had been undertaken-the conformityof domesticsystems with the Sovietmodel. However,the modelwas now one of perestroikarather than Brezhnev'sorthodoxy. Gorbachev'srenunciation of the Brezhnevdoctrine changed the practicesof the WarsawPact, whichin turntransformed it into an alliance morelike those of the European state system.This transformationwas markedby a changein the practiceof diplomacy.During the period of what Shevardnadzetermed "Partydiplomacy," decisions were made (or instructionsgiven) duringmeet- ingsof CommunistParty General Secretariesof Warsaw Pact countries.70With the end of the Brezhnev doctrine,intrabloc relations could no longer be conductedwithin the CommunistParty because, beginningwith the Mazo- wieckigovernment in Poland, non-Communistshad real decision-makingroles in foreignaffairs as prime ministersand foreignministers. The nominal ""that Eastern European states enjoyed duringthe postwarera was nowgradually becoming real. As Gorbachev ended the imperialrelationship with Eastern Europe, new normsof superpowerrelations emerged. After the Sovietleader toleratedthe

68. Beschlossand Talbott,At theHighest Levels, p. 102. 69. On the opposition's tactics and Soviet securityinterests, see Adam Michnik,"A New Evolutionism,"(originally written in 1976), in Michnik,Letters from Prison and OtherEssays, pp. 143-44. 70. For Shevardnadze'sterm, see TheFuture Belongs to Freedom, p. 114. 240 InternationalOrganization

HungarianCommunist regime's decision to allow the formationof indepen- dent political parties (February 1989) as well as the Polish roundtable agreement(April 1989) to hold electionsin Poland, PresidentBush recipro- cated in May by statingthat it was "time to move beyondcontainment" and "seek the integrationof the SovietUnion in the communityof nations."'71Bush set as a conditionfor this movement a "significantshift in the Soviet Union," and a "lightening-upon the controlin Eastern Europe," whichwould allow these countries"to move down the democraticpath much more." Bush also added itwas "partof [his]responsibility" to make surethat the West would not threatenthe Soviets.72 The U.S. public stance on not exploitingchange in Eastern Europe emboldened the Kremlinnot only to allow more such changes but also to reconceptualizethe U.S.-Soviet relationship.Gorbachev and his advisers decided on "the wordpartnership. This suggestedthat the two nationswere movingfrom 'negative peace'-that is, the effortto avoid nuclear conflagra- tion-to jointefforts that could makethe entireworld more secure."73 It was on his tripto Hungaryand Poland in July1989 thatPresident Bush made good on his commitmentto refrainfrom taking advantage of the acceleratingchange in Eastern Europe. He even promoted continuityof leadershipover rapid democratizationin the wake of the Polish Communists' landslidedefeat in electionsto freelycontested parliamentary seats. Since the Communists'defeat meant that Jaruzelski'selection to the presidency,as agreed to by Solidarity,was no longercertain, Jaruzelski decided not to run ratherthan face a humiliatingsetback. Bush's public bestowal of respecton Jaruzelskiand hisprivate counsel to Jaruzelskithat he continueto playa role in Poland's "evolution," however,helped encourage Jaruzelskito change his mind.74In Hungary,Bush told CommunistParty leaders, "We're withyou.... We're not goingto complicatethings for you. We knowthat the betterwe get alongwith the Soviets,the better it is foryou."75 The trip to Hungary and Poland convinced Bush that he should meet Gorbachevbefore theirtentatively scheduled 1990 full-scalesummit. Unbe- knownstto the public,on 18 July1989 he invitedGorbachev to meetwith him at whatwas to become the Malta summit.76Setting a precedentfor superpower relations,Bush envisioneda meetingwith only minimalstaffs and a more informalatmosphere for discussions of an open agenda. Gorbachevviewed the invitationas evidence that Bush was finallyprepared to engage in serious negotiationson various Soviet arms reductionproposals. In the meantime, Gorbachevaccepted the U.S. invitationto "join the communityof nations"by

71. PeterHayes, ed., "Chronology1989," special issue,ForeignAffairs 69 (1990), p. 231. 72. Beschlossand Talbott,At theHighest Levels, pp. 82-83. 73. Ibid.,p. 82. 74. Ibid., pp. 88-89. 75. Ibid.,p. 90. 76. Ibid.,pp. 93-94 and 126-31. Symposium 241 sendinga letterto leaders at the Group of 7 summitmeeting in Paris stating that the Soviet Union was willingto increase its integrationin the world economy. Thus, fairlyearly in the process of the Brezhnev doctrine'sdemise, the changes in Eastern Europe fosteredthe developmentof new practices of superpowerrelations. These new practicesincluded the supportof communist leaders by the AmericanPresident, an understandingof U.S.-Soviet relations in termsof partnership,and less formaland more frequentcommunications between the two, that is, relationsmore characteristicwithin alliances than acrossblocs.

Systemtransformed: the end of the CommunistParty's monopoly ofpower, ,and the collapse-of the Soviet Union If the Hungarianand Polish revolutionsproved to Bush thatGorbachev was serious about change, the Czechoslovakian,East German, and Romanian revolutionsproved that the cold war was trulyover and thatthe international systemhad been transformed.The subsequentrebellions by Soviet republics confirmedthis transformationby makinga reimpositionof externalempire extremelydifficult if not impossible.Moreover, the new normsof superpower relations reminiscentof those of the European state systemwere quickly challenged by novel situations,the most incongruousbeing the essentially nonviolentbreakup of a superpoweritself. It was clear that Gorbachevhad miscalculatedthe breadth,depth, and speed of the changeshe had initiated. As FyodorBurlatsky put it, Gorbachev'soriginal hope was to have "mini- Gorbachevs" come to power.77As is now clear, he had overestimatedthe degree of legitimacyof communistreformers in Eastern Europe. While his counterreformationmight have worked in 1968, communistrevisionism was longdead by 1989.A civilsociety had developed,and withit legitimateleaders had emerged with their independentpolitical base. They could therefore demand greater concessions from the revisionistcommunists who were espousingthe perestroikaline. But beyond the domesticsources of foreign policyarguments, we argue thatthere was an importantcontagion effect that explainsthe dynamicsof the Easternbloc. It is best exemplifiedby the formal restructuring(new constitutions!)of everypolitical system in the area.78 As suggested above, the rapid change of domestic structuresthrough emulationchanged the conventionsof internationalpolitics within the Warsaw Pact, which in turn furtherchanged the rules of the game between the superpowers.When Czechoslovakiaand Hungaryeliminated the leading role

77. FyodorBurlatsky, speech at the Universityof Pennsylvania,Philadelphia, 28 January1991. 78. For a discussion of emulation among bloc members, see Schoepflin,"The End of Communismin Eastern Europe," p. 9; and Adam Przeworski,"The East Becomes the South?The Autumnof the People and the Futureof EasternEurope," PS 25 (March 1991), pp. 20-24. 242 InternationalOrganization

ofthe CommunistParty from their constitutions in thefall of 1989,they quickly wentbeyond the accepted boundariesof perestroika.79When Czechoslovakia began to assert an independentforeign policy, Finlandization rapidly disap- peared fromthe Soviet foreign policy agenda. The Polishformula of opposition- led governmentdeferring to Soviet securityinterests was overtakenby Jiri Dienstbier'sannouncement on 14 December 1989 thatthe agreementwith the SovietUnion on stationingits troops was invalid. The acceleratingdevelopment of civilsociety across Eastern Europe and the Czechoslovak moves beyond Finlandization both had implications for Gorbachev's reforms.Czechoslovak demands occasioned a new round of debates about Soviet securityinterests. Here Gorbachevhimself opened the discussion of what constitutedSoviet securitywhen he agreed to begin negotiationson Soviettroop withdrawal within a week afterthe Czechoslovak demand. He agreed fiveweeks later to a withdrawalwithin the contextof overallconventional force reductions in Europe. By allowingthe eclipse of the leading role of the CommunistParty withinthe bloc and then at home, Gorbachev,probably unwittingly, not onlygave up one of its most powerful means of controlbut also defeatedthe rationalefor the veryexistence of the bloc and its domestic institutions.When socialism was not automatically accordeda privilegedposition in theconstitutions of anybloc state,the Warsaw Pact had lost one of its fundamentalreasons for existence, making its continuationas an effectivealliance less likely. Also, the contagion of civil society,which spread throughthe informal empireof EasternEurope in 1989,repeated itself within the boundariesof the formalempire, the SovietUnion itself,the next year. As AndreiSahkarov's call foran end to the CommunistParty's leading role in Soviet societyindicated, Soviet dissenterswere inspiredby Eastern European examples.80Since it had been the CommunistParty and not strongautonomous state institutionsthat had served as the empire's integrativeforce, the demise of the Soviet CommunistParty had tworepercussions.8' One was that the lack of loyaltyof Soviet citizensto the federationhad become obviouswhile bringing to thefore more nationalist identifications. The long-suppressednational identities of the constituent republics quickly emerged amongthe populationas well as the Communistelite and the military.Politics in the Baltics, in which Communistsaided and even joined national fronts,

79. The HungarianNational Assemblyvoted to delete the "leading role" fromthe Hungarian constitutionon 18 October 1989. The Czechoslovak parliamentfollowed suit on 11 November 1989. 80. See the discussionof repealingArticle 6 of the SovietConstitution that appeared inPravda, 8 December 1989,p. 1. 81. On the weaknessof state institutionsrelative to the CommunistParty, see Don Van Atta, "The U.S.S.R. as a Weak State: AgrarianOrigins of Resistanceto Perestroika,"World Politics 41 (October 1989), pp. 129-49; and Rey Koslowski,"Market Institutions,East European Reforms, and Economic Theory,"Journal of Economic Issues 26 (September 1992), pp. 673-705. For an argumentthat the CommunistParty was the force that held the republicstogether, see Jerry Hough,"Gorbachev's Politics," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter1989-90), pp. 26-41. Symposium 243 suggested that such abrupt turns were not just a functionof individual opportunism.82In a way,these eventsshowed the same dynamicsof "national communism"observed earlier in Eastern Europe with cases rangingfrom Wiadyslaw Gomulka to Janos Ka'dair,Alexander Dubchek, and Jaruzelski. Similarly,just as in Hungary,Czechoslovakia, and East Germany,where nationalistCommunists espousing the perestroikaline became transitional figures,so Communistleaders like Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania were bypassedby noncommunists who emergedfrom civil society. As self-identificationalong nationallines fundamentallyaltered practices in postrevolutionaryFrance, so nationalself-identification among young men in the Soviet Union affectedconscription in the .While conscripts were ready to fightfor the of their republic, they were increasinglyunwilling to servein the Sovietarmed forces. This was made clear by large-scalenoncompliance with the 1990 draft.83Republics enhanced their legitimacyby appealingto theircitizens, assuring them that troops would not be used to suppressnational movements. This contestfor legitimate authority began with 's instructionsto Russian soldiers not to use force duringthe Lithuaniancrackdown and the movementto establisha Ukrainian armyin February1991.84 The second repercussionof the CommunistParty's demise also arose out of the issue of self-identification.Given the lack of individualand group rights, serious minorityproblems emerged within the republics,such as the Gagauz independencemovement within Moldavia, the South Ossetiansin ,the Tartarsin Russia and, perhapsmost critically, the twenty-fivemillion Russians outside of Russia. These tensions and centrifugaltendencies are probably manageable onlywithin a complexfederal constitutional arrangement. How- ever,such an arrangementpresupposes strong state institutions and, above all, the acceptance of a that would limitthe excesses of Communist Partyrule as wellas thoseof "popularsovereignty." Here the importanceof the stateas a protectorof rightsbecomes clearlyvisible. The end of the CommunistParty's monopoly on power in Eastern Europe and then in the Soviet Union rapidlychanged the practice of international politics,continuing the transformationof the internationalsystem that had begun in springof 1989. For example,the Bush administrationresponded to East German, Lithuanian,and Romanian revolutionswith furthersteps to reassurethe Soviets.Secretary of State Baker set a precedentby travelingto East Germanyto meetwith Premier Modrow and offeringeconomic assistance

82. Philip Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,"World Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 320-22. 83. On the springdraft, see Andrei Krivov,"Many Young Soviets Bid Earnest Farewell to Arms,"Russian Thought, 27 July1990, reprinted in GlasnostNews and Review(October-December 1990), pp. 14-19. In the falldraft only 78.8 percentof those conscriptedreported for service. See Stephen Foye, "Crackdown Ordered to Enforce MilitaryDraft," Report on the U.S.S.R. 3 (18 January1991), p. 7. 84. Kathleen Mihalisko,"Ukrainians Ponder Creation of a National Army,"Report on the U.S.S.R. 3 (22 February1991). 244 InternationalOrganization to the GDR. In response to the violence in , Baker went beyond respectfor Soviet security interests by sayingthat the United Stateswould not oppose Soviet intervention.85Only two years before,Romania had enjoyed preferentialU.S. treatmentbecause of its independence fromMoscow. In responseto the Lithuaniandeclaration of independence,the U.S. administra- tionrefrained from recognizing the new government,even thoughit had never recognizedthe Soviet annexationunder Stalin.Bush imploredGorbachev not to use forceand made clear thatdoing so would set back U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time he reassuredGorbachev that the United States would not pressthe issue of Baltic independence.86 Moreover,the accelerationof revolutionsacross Eastern Europe duringthe winterof 1989 usheredin Austrianizationas a possible mode of transforming the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe.87 Austrianizationoriginally meant neutralitythrough great power agreement as exemplifiedby the 1955 Austrian settlement.Unlike Finlandization,Austrianization could not be a unilateral measurebecause it requiredagreement with the West. Hence, a morecomplicated transformation toward some formof multilateral arrangementbegan. This was evidencedby the February1990 agreementto beginthe "two-plus-fourtalks" on the statusof Germany.The introductionof multilateralconcerns would have been minimalhad the Germanproblem been solved by Austrianizationof East Germany.The collapse of East German communismand the 18 March 1990 victoryof the electoralcoalition Alliance for Germany,however, prompted the accelerationof German reunification. This raised the possibilityof Austrianizationof all of Germanyand, in the absence of thatoption, made it necessaryto confrontGermany's alignment. Although the Soviets initiallyrejected German membershipin NATO, NATO's declarationat the London summitthat the Soviet Union was no longeran enemyand SecretaryBaker's proposal to transformNATO froma primarilymilitary to a primarilypolitical institution prompted the Soviets to changetheir position.88 Eventually, in July1990 Gorbachevofficially agreed to Germany remainingwithin NATO, thereby moving beyond a neutrality analogous to Austriaand furtherestablishing Soviet acceptance of the web of Western multilateralinstitutions. The evolution of the Soviet position on multilateralarrangements as a solutionto the Germanproblem and to Soviet securityinterests in Europe has been detailed in the day-by-dayaccount of ChancellorKohl's foreignpolicy adviser, Horst Teltschik,89and consequently onlyits implications need some furtherdiscussion.

85. Interviewwith James Baker on NBC's Meetthe Press, 24 December 1989. 86. Beschlossand Talbott,At theHighest Levels, p. 164. 87. Austrianizationwas advocated in the early 1960s by the editors and contributorsof the emigrejournal Studiesfor a New CentralEurope and developed by Hungariandissident, George Konrad inAntipolitics. 88. Shevardnadze,The Future Belongs to Freedom, pp. 138-41. 89. HorstTelschik, 329 Tage:Innenansichten derEinigung (Berlin: Goldmann, 1993). Symposium 245

By accepting reunifiedGermany's integration within NATO, the Soviet Union abandoned its old dream of separatingAmerica fromits allies and eliminatingthe United States as a political and militaryforce from the Continent.The Sovietsalso abandoned theirpolicy of givingthe Germansthe choice betweennational independenceand neutrality,on the one hand, and divisionand Westernintegration on theother. Having failed to create withintheir sphere of influencea viable political orderthat could instillloyalty and weatherchanges, Soviet policymakers were not obtuse to the fact that the political and militaryintegration of had successfullydealt withimportant problems of European politics thathad eluded previousadherents of and peacemakersalike. It had solvedthe Franco-Germanproblem by making both states part of theWestern alliance. It is oftenforgotten that the stationingof Americantroops on the European continentwas largelydesigned to reassurethe French(and possibly other Europeans) that a rearmed Germanywas not going to be a renewed securitythreat. Gorbachev expressed his desire to see U.S. forces stay in Europe at the30 May-2 June1990 Washington summit, saying to Bush,"I want you to knowthat I regardthis as in yourinterest and in our interest."90By the end of the summit,the Sovietsoffered no objectionsto an Americanstatement that both leaders were" 'in full agreement'that alliance membershipwas a 'matterfor the Germansto decide.' "91 By optingfor a united Germanywithin Western European structures,the Sovietleadership decided thatsuch a solutionwas likelyto serveSoviet security interestsbetter than a neutral Germany.Obviously, such a policy was not unopposed,as the debate withinthe Soviet leadershipindicated.92 Neverthe- less, the factremains that Gorbachev and Shevardnadzemade theirdefinition of Sovietinterests stick, thereby contravening the traditional "realist" positions espoused bytheir opponents. Westernmultilateral institutions also had solved the problemof prosperity forwhich only insufficient provisions had been made at Versailles.This lesson was not lost on Sovietleaders as theyactively sought Soviet membership in the verymultilateral institutions the SovietUnion had once opposed, not onlyfor ideologicalreasons, but on the "realist"basis of preservingits autonomyand sovereignty.Soviet foreignpolicymakers' expressed desire to become part of Europe and, in particular,to profitfrom the emergenceof a singleEuropean marketsuggests that they considered the maintenanceand developmentof the European multilateralinstitutions preferable to weakeningthem.93

90. Beschlossand Talbott,At theHighest Levels, p. 220. 91. Ibid., p. 227. 92. Ibid.,p. 239. 93. See "General SecretaryMikhail Gorbachev'sAddress to the " 6 July 1989, in Lawrence Freedman,ed., Europe Transformed:Documents on theEnd of the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 322-32 and especiallypp. 327ff.Also see "Eduard ShevardnadzeSpeaks to the European ParliamentCommittee," The CurrentDigest of The Soviet Press,vol. 41, no. 51, 1989,p. hlf. 246 InternationalOrganization

The importanceof the existingmultilateral institutions in WesternEurope is notonly evident in the effectsit had on Sovietdecision making. It also provided Westernleaders witha frameworkwithin which a reunitedGermany could be accepted. This enabled European statesto avoid a returnto balance-of-power politics,which had servedneither their security nor theirwelfare interests in the interwarperiod. French policy planners brieflyconsidered such a returnto a balance-of- power policy after both Francois Mitterand and had privatelyshared their misgivingsabout German reunificationin December 1989. Despite Thatcher's suggestionof an Anglo-Frenchaxis and renewed effortsat reducingGermany's influence in Eastern Europe, France rejected such a course of actionby the end of January1990.94 This choice was publicly enunciatedin March by FrenchForeign Minister Dumas, who advocated the deepening of European integrationin order to restructurerelations with Germany.He even suggestedon that occasion a continent-wide"European confederation."95 Similarly,Germany once more opted against neutralizationand against becominga "wandererbetween East and West," a role playedwith bravado by Bismarckbut ultimatelyending in disaster.This concernwas particularlywell- conceptualizedin the Genscherplan announcedin January1990, which tried to bothassuage Sovietfears of a resurgentGermany by accepting limitations on German forces and by attemptingto persuade the Kremlinthat a neutral Germanywas not in Soviet securityinterests. At the end of April 1990, East German Prime MinisterLothar de Maiziere echoed Genscher's argument againstneutralization.96 Once Eastern European countriesalso attempteddiplomatic forays toward NATO, the wider implicationsof going beyond Austrianizationbecame apparent.97Justifying its stance in termsof maintainingstability, the West initiallyrebuffed these advances in deferenceto the SovietUnion, insisting that transformationoutside of East Germanyshould be limitedto Austrianization. In thewake of thefailed Soviet coup, however,Germany and the United States proposed in October 1991 thatNATO organizethe NorthAtlantic Coopera- tion Council as a forumto air securityissues among officialsfrom Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the West. The councilfirst met on the day the SovietUnion dissolvedand soon includedall the Sovietsuccessor states except Georgia. The rapid transitionfrom Ottomanization to Finlandizationto Austrianiza- tion and theneven beyondAustrianization showed that the processof reform

94. MargaretThatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins,1993), pp. 796-99. 95. See "Articleby M. Roland Dumas, FrenchMinister of Foreign Affairs, published in TheNew YorkTimes, March 13 1990,"in Freedman,Europe Transformed,pp. 508-509. 96. Beschlossand Talbott,At theHighest Levels, p. 207. 97. An exampleof such a foraywas Poland's settingup a liaison officein Brusselsin 1990. See Jan B. de Weydenthal,"Rapprochement with the West Continues,"Report on EasternEurope, 20 December 1991,p. 23. Symposium 247 had escaped effortsto control its scope, speed, and direction.The conse- quences of thisincreasingly broad-based transformation can best be appreci- ated by its impacton the Sovietpolitical system itself, which made a returnto eithera Finlandizationor even an Austrianizationof the Eastern bloc all but impossible.In July1990, declared the supremacyof the republic'slaw over Sovietlaw, thatis, declared "sovereignty."This meantthat the reimposi- tion of Soviet controlover the informalempire in Eastern Europe became improbablesince had to contendwith maintaining the integrityof the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, once the movement for an independent Ukrainian armybegan, Moscow could no longer count on participationof "Soviet" armedforces in such intervention.

Conclusion

This articleoffered a new approachfor the analysisof fundamentalchanges in worldpolitics. It outlinedan alternativeto neorealismfor the conceptualiza- tionof system-transformingchanges. For thesepurposes, the revocationof the Brezhnevdoctrine and perestroika'sdomestic and internationalimplications servedas a case study.By examiningthe importanceof civilsociety, national- ism,and self-identificationwithin the processesof glasnostand perestroikawe showedthat international politics is not an autonomoussphere but alwayspart of a largerendeavor, that is, of institutionalizingboth identitiesand political communitiesas well as theirinteractions. We argued that the rapid and fundamentalchange of the international systemfrom 1989 to 1991 demonstratesthe inadequacyof analyzingpresent internationalpolitics in termsof its anarchicalstructure and its distributionof capabilities.The recentchanges that reconstitutedthe internationalsystem werenot the resultof a shiftin capabilities,even thoughthey have led to such a shift.Roughly speaking, the totalnumbers of WarsawPact weapons and forces did not change much fromFebruary 1989 to February1991-the political contextof theirpotential use did. It was thispolitical change thatresulted in the deteriorationof Soviet capabilities.To thatextent, systemic theories that use balancingas an explanansdo notexplain change; at best,they only describe itsoutcome. Rather than derivingpolitical practice frommilitary capabilities, military capabilitiesthemselves must be understoodin termsof the politicalpractices and their underlyingconventions. In this sense, changes in conventions eventuallyare reflectedin changedcapabilities. This has been demonstratedby the rise of nationalismand the leve'een masse afterthe FrenchRevolution, by the delegitimizationof Eastern European communismin 1989 and the hollowingof the Warsaw Pact, by the subsequentdelegitimization of Soviet communismand ,and finallyby the rebirthof nationalismand movementsof self-determinationin the SovietUnion.