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Home , Revolutions of 1989, Romanian Revolution, Silviu Brucan, Vremya

FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H

TITLE : THE EXTERNALIZATION OF REFORM : SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS UNDER GORBACHE V

AUTHOR : RONALD H . LINDE N

CONTRACTOR : UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURG H PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : RONALD H . LINDEN

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 803-1 7 DATE : APRIL 1990 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : "The Externalization of Reform : Soviet-Romanian Relations Under Gorbachev "

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Ronald H . Linden

The principal aim of this research was to determine i f the under was applying th e same standards and employing the same practices in it s reactions with the non-reforming East European states, as ha d previous regimes for different purposes . Specifically, th e investigation sought to determine if the USSR was using it s hegemonic position to promote change, in the form o f , and reform of regional institutions, i n the same way earlier regimes had acted to prevent reform .

While an answer to this question can be offered, th e events of 1989 made this more of a historic than a curren t question . A broader approach to which this research wa s amenable was to look at existing Soviet policies in light o f the of 1989 and determine what, if anything , remained of post Soviet policy . The question of how i t reacted to the recalcitrance of the Ceausescu leadership an d how it has reacted to the changes in and elsewhere i n the region since the revolutions remains central . The mai n context of the research was Soviet-East European relations ; that context remains but the dynamics changed dramaticall y enough to extend the research focus in time and breadth . - 2 -

In sum, 1989 did see the abandonment by the Sovie t leadership of the main premises of Soviet policy toward Eas t . These had been Soviet political, economic an d military investment in : 1) maintenance of the monopoly o f power in each of the states ; 2) maintenanc e of civil peace and ; 3) maintenance of at least minimu m participation in the . During 1989 the USSR made no move to intervene to prevent the elimination of communis t party dominance or ensure a "stable" public order . Nor did i t act to prevent steps which have led to the effective erosio n of the Warsaw Pact . In fact the changes and the s of 1989 were verbally encouraged by the Gorbachev policies . Until 1989 such encouragement had still included caveat s about "the common interests of ." But during 198 9 Soviet acquiescence to the change of regimes in an d then in the rapid revolutions in East , , and finally, violently, in Romani a made it clear that the was dead .

Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu rejected the principle s and path of reform underway in the USSR and during 1989 eve n moved to try to stifle the change in Poland . The Gorbachev leadership did little to hasten the end of Ceausescu despit e his clear rejection of reform . It cannot be said tha t extensive or even substantial pressure, beyond a few critical comments, was brought to bear to force Ceausescu into th e reform camp . But support for the when i t occurred was clear and followed quickly by diplomatic an d economic assistance .

Since the revolution in Romania and East Europe, Sovie t policy has been both low key and unformed . Reactions ar e intermittent and to certain events, such as the banning o f the communist party in Romania, or possible reunification o f Germany, but are often ad hoc and even contradictory . Partl y this is a function of the representation of a more divers e range of views in the Soviet press and partly it is th e result of 's preoccupation with severe domestic , economic and political problems . A clear policy line which i s continuing, however, is the Soviet desire to improve th e econonomic relationship with the East European states by placing them on a more realistic and favorable basis .

United States policy of pressing Romania to move a s quickly and directly as possible to a pluralistic, democrati c system has been in evidence since the revolution . Despite criticism from the new Romanian government and possibl e temporary losses of economic opportunity, this policy shoul d be continued . 1

I . PREMISES OF POSTWAR SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROP E Since War II Soviet policy in has bee n based on the pursuit of three kinds of security : physical , political, and economic . These goals apply to Southeaster n Europe as part of the East European region and to it s relationship with Romania . In most recent times the Sovie t view of how best to secure those goals has changed, as thi s report will indicate, but it bears reviewing the premises o f Soviet policy until the momentous changes of 1988 and 1989 , stimulated in large part by the change of regime in Moscow .

Physical Security The USSR has invested immense political, economic, and military resources to keep its western free fro m potential attack by hostile conventional and, to a lesse r extent, nuclear forces . This goal has little to do with the Communist nature of the Soviet government or with th e existence of any actual current threat . The Soviet Unio n absorbed the brutal lessons of the past and, given the scop e of the country's destruction and suffering in World War II , the maintenance of an adequate buffer in the west took on a life of its own as a foreign-policy given . 2

The threat emanating from Southeastern Europe, however , has clearly been perceived to be much less than the threa t from Central Europe, a view that accurately reflects at leas t twentieth-century European history . Soviet troop-stationin g patterns show a much greater emphasis on the central an d northern regions of Eastern Europe than on the souther n region . No Warsaw Pact troops were stationed in Bulgaria , and such troops were withdrawn from Romania in 1958 . Outside the Warsaw Pact, neither nor Yugoslavia has accepte d Soviet troops .

Political Security Political security has been a goal dating from the time o f the Bolshevik Revolution and the period between the worl d during which the USSR was the only . The operative premise has been that the Soviet Union must have i n this region friendly states which in their domestic an d international policies will be cognizant of and responsive t o Soviet interests . This was certainly not the case during th e interwar period, when large and small powers alike eithe r ignored Soviet desires or were hostile to them . Politica l security since the late 1940s had until very recently bee n guaranteed in Eastern Europe by the dominance of Soviet - supported Communist parties in these states . 3

At a maximum, such as during Stalin's time, th e Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sought th e duplication of its own forms and policies in each of the Eas t European states . Such an approach both provoked and wa s reinforced by the split with Yugoslavia of 1948 . After Stalin's death the policy of the Soviet leadership was t o press for general adherence to, if not exact mimicking of , Soviet domestic and international initiatives . At a minimum , political security in this region meant resisting th e influence of countries seen to be the key Soviet adversaries , primarily the but also, during the 1960s an d early 1970s, . Chinese diplomacy was very active i n Southeastern Europe during the 1970s ; Beijing succeeded i n attracting a vocal if small ally in Albania and i n maintaining full and supportive ties with Romania .

Since 1948 the Soviet Union has seen greater threats t o its political security in Central Europe . The challenge in Southeastern Europe was complicated, however, because of th e varied environment, which included WTO member Bulgaria , nonaligned Yugoslavia and hostile Albania . During the 1960' s and 1970's Romanian pursuit of a distinctive foreign polic y was also problematic but not directly threatening to Sovie t goals . (See below) 4

Economic Security The Soviet Union has clearly viewed Eastern Europe as a region whose resources are available to be used to satisf y Soviet needs . As a result, for the first fifteen or s o years after World War II, the Soviets extracted by variou s measures (reparations, joint stock companies, unequal trad e relations) immense material resources to build and rebuil d the Soviet .1 During the next twenty years, however , the relationship shifted to one in which the Soviet Unio n provided the raw materials and fuel and received in exchang e more complex manufactured goods . Owing to declining terms o f trade and increased involvement of several East Europea n countries with the West, this relationship turne d increasingly unfavorable for the USSR . The USSR, as Michae l Marrese and Jan Vanous have shown, subsidized the Eas t European , including those of Southeastern Europe , 2 in order to keep the alliance politically cohesive and, t o the extent possible, to support the ability of some of th e regimes to buy peace at home with better economi c performance .

More recently, the Soviets began to call attention t o the need to "restructure" the trade relationship more t o their advantage and in a way that serves their greatest need : better-quality machines, equipment, technology, and technological know-how to help the Soviet economy . 3

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Historically, the Soviet search for economi c security in particular has provoked greater conflict i n Southeastern Europe than in other regions . Postwar attempt s to force Yugoslavia to develop its economy along line s dictated in Moscow contributed to the 1948 break . Later , Khrushchev's move to "perfect" the Council for Mutua l Economic Assistance (CMEA) -- in a way that would hav e increased the spcecialization, and thus the advantage, o f the more industrially developed northern-tier countries - - drove Romania to search for other economic partners and t o accompany this search with a foreign-policy reassessment . 4 Bulgaria, in contrast, consistently demonstrated it s willingness to accommodate itself to the dominant premise o f Soviet-East European economic relations and generall y benefited from its extremely close ties with the USSR .

II . PRACTICES OF SOVIET POLICY After Stalin's death the Soviet Union attempted to keep th e domestic and international behavior of the East Europea n states within certain behavioral parameters . Thes e boundaries were not rigidly applied over time, nor were the y applied uniformly throughout the region . They were not eve n explicitly delineated, although some indicators are derive d from authoritative pronouncements, such as that of Septembe r 1968 defining what became known in the West as the Brezhnev 6

Doctrine . 5 In general, by forceful intervention of al l types Moscow had, until recently, regularly indicated th e following three boundaries of acceptable behavior : 1 ) Communist party dominance of the political and economi c system ; 2) at least minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact ; and 3) maintenance of civil peace .

Communist party dominance of the political and economi c system meant, in part, Soviet, and usually local regime , hostility to and suppression of challenges to the politica l structure, which ensured that the Communist Party maintaine d a monopoly on political power . Whether threats to this monopoly came from outside the political elite, as in th e case of Solidarity in Poland, or from within the part y itself, as in Czechoslovakia during 1968, the Soviet reactio n had been, sooner or later, to brand such movements a s "anti-Soviet" or "anti-socialist" and to link them t o "counterrevolutionary" support from the West . All challenge s were seen as threats to the goal of political and, in some instances, physical security, and were either directly o r indirectly suppressed .

Minimum participation in the Warsaw Pact was enforce d differentially, as might be expected, given the greate r Soviet emphasis on northern and central Europe . For example , Soviet fears about breaching of the alliance b y Czechoslovakia or Poland have been more pronounced, even 7

exaggerated, than those over Romania's deviance, despite th e fact that 's participation in the Warsaw Pact wa s the least supportive over the past two decades . The USSR tolerated a low and sometimes declining level of defens e expenditure by Romania and Bulgaria, consistent Romania n nonparticipation in maneuvers, and often some distance fro m Warsaw Pact foreign-policy pronouncements and initiatives . However, Romania remained a member of the Pact, renewed it s bilateral and multinational treaties, and proclaimed it s loyalty to the alliance and the necessity of keeping it i n force .

Critical to the Soviet view of events in in 195 6 and Poland during 1980-1 was the perception that the part y was losing not just its "leading role" but the politica l initiative and the ability to maintain the order on which th e postwar system - and their regimes - were built . The party was losing control of events in the streets . 6 Especiall y because the original "revolutions" occurred in times of chao s and upheaval, the increasingly conservative Soviet leadershi p was sensitive to the appearance of situations that migh t allow popular disaffection and disruption to threaten eithe r of the other two parameters .

In this regard the pace of change was an importan t factor, because a more moderate pace allowed the local regim e to appear to be in charge, to avoid the uncontrolled growth 8 of "antisocialist" forces (and to execute tactical crackdown s against certain opposition groups), and to demonstrate th e continued leading role of the party (and to try to reassur e those who might be nervous in Moscow) .

In establishing and enforcing these behaviora l boundaries, the Soviets did not insist on uniform practice s throughout the region . Even before the sensational change s of the past two years, the Soviet Union had tolerated a rang e of diverse social and economic phenomena both of a mor e capitalist nature (such as private agriculture in Poland) an d a more retrograde character (such as in Romania) . Externally, states such as Poland and Romania pursue d extensive contacts with Western countries before Moscow an d other members of the alliance did, while Romania maintaine d good relations with China as well as a number of countrie s with whom the USSR had either few or hostile ties . For Warsaw Pact members, as long as the basic three boundarie s were respected, the Soviets did not insist on duplication o f the Soviet system and tolerated some diversity in domesti c economic and social structure and on international issues . 9

Old Threats For the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe as a whole, th e greatest threats were those posed to the dominance of th e political system by the Communist Party . Such threats wer e present in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and carrie d dangerous implications for other Soviet goals in the region . The possibility of full-scale overthrow or even radica l reform of the political system was seen by the pre-Gorbache v leadership as potentially allowing a more fluid, les s predictable domestic political situation, or even th e possibility that antisocialist and anti-Soviet forces woul d take power . In addition, in Hungary and Poland durin g previous episodes the threats of were real an d growing . Foreign-policy adjustments or even major change s that might have eroded the Soviet power base in the regio n were not inconceivable .

Before 1989 these threats occurred most often in th e northern tier . Indeed, in Bulgaria and Romania, except for a coup attempt in the former in 1965, communist party dominanc e and domestic tranquility were never really in question . In ideological terms, Ceausescu's rule in Romania undermined the role of the party, in that the party was replaced by a n individual, a return to the days of the . And various aspects of behavior by Romania (e .g ., its relations with China) clearly provoked displeasure in Moscow . But neither its domestic deformations nor its various acts 1 0 breaking ranks internationally, such as unilaterally an d loudly announcing a cut in defense expenditures, wer e perceived as actionable threats against the three main Sovie t goals . For its part, Romania was careful not to directl y challenge Soviet security interests either in the region o r globally.7

III . SOVIET "NEW THINKING" AND THE REGIO N Soviet "new thinking" on Eastern and Southeastern Europe ha s to be viewed in the context of overall Soviet foreign-polic y changes . The Gorbachev era has seen demonstrable and significant revisions in Soviet foreign-policy conception s about the world and, more important, about actions towar d that world . Clearly, the Gorbachev leadership team has bee n striving to reduce Soviet exposure abroad, in order to cu t the costs and consequences of an overextended foreign policy . This effort has involved several overtures toward China, th e most important of which were Soviet withdrawal fro m , the reduction of troops along the Sino-Sovie t border, and the withdrawal of troops from . Thes e efforts produced visits to China by Foreign Minister Eduar d Shevardnadze in 1988 and in 1989 by Gorbachev himself . The Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan and pressure on Vietna m to do the same from Cambodia have served both the immediat e Soviet goal of reducing the costs of those involvements an d of warming the environment for improving relations with China 1 1 and the United States . Toward the latter, the continuou s concessions on medium-range missiles followed by th e intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty were bot h preceded and followed by pressure for renewed and mor e vigorous strategic arms control measures -- both marke d switches from the late Brezhnev-Andropov-Chernenko perio d Soviet feelers for improved relations with , as well a s with a number of Arab states with whom the Soviets did no t previously have relations, and support for an agreement i n southwestern have been complemented by a rapid growt h of interest and opportunity for expanding economic relation s with the West . This policy has been directed at privat e capital (e .g ., through joint ventures), increasing bilatera l trade, and capitalist global institutions, such as th e International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement o n Tariffs and Trade . 8

These moves and numerous others should not b e interpreted as some kind of Soviet desire to "behave " according to standards determined in the West . Nor shoul d they be seen as coming primarily in response t o Western pressure . These policies stem from the Sovie t leadership's perception of the needs of the country itself , its economy, its society, and its socialist system . The Gorbachev team explicitly recognizes that the Soviet econom y is in desperate straits . Far from competing internationall y with the advanced West, it is falling behind even the newly 1 2 developing countries of the Pacific rim and cannot eve n effectively provide what the country itself needs to functio n properly in manufactured goods, communication and informatio n technology or computers ; in food production, processing o r distribution ; in housing, health care or most areas of socia l welfare . In their discussions of these problems the Soviet s acknowledge that the question may not be one of production ; sometimes it is a problem of the application, distribution , and utilization of technology, goods, and resources . Thes e problems are seen to be related to questions of investment , prices, and the social/cultural issues of initiative , incentive, and labor productivity. Finally, Gorbache v himself, more than any other of the current leaders, insist s that without reform of the political system, very little o f what is needed will be accomplished . 9

On the international plane, Gorbachev has also mad e clear the link between domestic perestroika and new thinkin g in foreign policy . He and his supporters recognize the nee d to ease the pressure on the Soviet economy - and in som e cases on the political system - stemming from globa l involvement and conflicts . Doing this allows both attention and resources to be devoted to the compelling domestic tasks .

With respect to Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the ne w thinking is directly related to a critical assessment of th e international role of the Soviet Union and to its domestic 1 3

needs . First, there is the question of whether the Sovie t Union should and will seek to maintain this increasingly costly sphere of influence, by following the earlier policies . In their public statements, Gorbachev and othe r Soviet leaders have gone out of their way to cast out "ol d thinking" on this score, rejecting the notion that the y arrogate to themselves a monopoly on truth or that they wan t to duplicate Soviet systems in the region . 10 Such statement s have been cast as rejections of the "Brezhnev Doctrine, " though at first they were not combined with acknowledgment s of its existence . 11 Long-time heretics such as Yugoslavi a were assured that the Soviet Union accepts the idea of man y and independent paths of socialist development . 12 Nothin g spoke as loudly on this score as the Soviet toleration of - and even reportedly granting of permission for - the installation of a non-Communist government in Poland i n 1989 . 1 3

The significance of this forbearance cannot be overstated . After more than forty years of insisting an d insuring that only a Communist-dominated political system could provide the necessary reassurance, Moscow recognized the need to see if its goals could be secured through another arrangement . It was this action which marked the change i n deed as well as word of Soviet policy in East Europe . It signified the jettisoning of one of the three key practice s outlined above : the maintenance of communist party monopoly 1 4 of domestic political power . This action -- or nonaction - - indicated the threshold of new thinking in Soviet polic y toward East Europe and gave a strong fillip to movements fo r change, which became revolutions throughout the region .

Even before this, however, Moscow ha d signaled its desire to reduce its political and economi c exposure . The troop cuts and withdrawals announced b y Gorbachev in 1988 included significant reductions in force s in Central Europe ; several of the states then followed wit h cuts in their troops . 1 4

Soviet new thinking toward the region has also involve d a rethinking of the role and function of CMEA . It is clear from Soviet writings on the subject that they are displease d over what is seen as an unfavorable economic relationship, i n which the Soviets supply raw materials and fuel at grea t opportunity costs and sometimes lower than world prices i n return for more expensive but often poor-quality manufacture d goods . 15 Aside from the price and cost factors, the benefit s of such trade - including the ability to improve an d diversify the national economy and trade profile - are see n as disproportionately accruing to the East Europea n countries, especially the more advanced ones . 16 1 5

Under Gorbachev, Moscow also began to push for th e organization itself to function better, to begin to act mor e as a genuine economic union, with more effective mechanisms for price formation, currency exchange, and specialization o f production . The Soviets began to demonstrate increasin g impatience with CMEA, particularly compared with the loomin g counterexample of the European Community . Finally, Sovie t pressure to change CMEA has been driven by the Sovie t commitment to perestroika, which has taken the form o f pressure for the member states to restructure their ow n economies in a way that will allow more direct productio n ties between Soviet and East European enterprises, thu s facilitating the spread of advanced science and technolog y throughout the region . 1 7

But until it was clear that the Soviet Union was indee d abandoning its hegemony, there was a tension between th e Soviets' pronouncements and actions ; for example, between a stated willingness to let each state go its own way and th e clear desire to get the region to improve its economi c performance and change its relationship with the USSR . As ha s been clear since the , if in fact all th e states pursue what they see as their own best economi c interest, they would likely want to continue to rely on cheap Soviet raw materials and fuel, payable with goods, not hard currency . For their part, the CMEA junior partners' 1 6 incentives to accommodate the USSR on the issue o f restructuring the trade relationship and to improve their ow n domestic situation conflicts with the evident advantages o f continuing the current system, with their desire not t o aggravate their already difficult economic situations, an d with their desire to trade their more complex goods to th e West . Such conflicting directions were already evident i n the first.18 post- CMEA summit i n Sofia

For the Soviet Union, the problem now will be how to ge t the East European states to satisfy at least some of it s economic needs without relying on "old thinking" (i .e ., hegemonic interference from Moscow) and without pressin g these states economically so much that their domesti c situations become even more difficult or as unstable as i s the case in .

Until 1989 there was also the question of whether "ne w thinking" and "new acting" were really to be applied t o Eastern Europe . While Soviet declarations and actions seemed to reject the notion of intervention, a change in leadershi p in the USSR or in the perceived "security" situation in th e region could have put this option back on the table . Before the emergence of the Solidarity government in Poland , statements by Soviet leaders made in Eastern Europe wer e always hedged by admonitions that the leaders of thes e parties had responsibility not only to their own nations but 1 7 to the "common interests of socialism . " 19 Soviet writing s did not explicitly reject the basic premise of the Sovie t invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 . Instead, Moscow essentially accepted the assessment of that period made by the regime in , acknowledging mistakes but continuin g to point to "antisocialist forces" and extensive Wester n influence . 2 0

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union, new thinking o r not, will rapidly, or ever, abandon the desire for physica l and political security in a region it sees as vital . Th e means of achieving these ends, however, clearly has change d and include a substantial broadening of the Soviet notion o f what kind of regimes and what kind of region serves these interests . Even if the Soviet Union were to become a non-communist country, a scenario less fanciful now than a t any time since the revolution, its great-power imperative s would continue to operate in this region . A new leadershi p in Moscow is still likely to work to protect its nationa l security, very broadly defined . Moscow would still fret about and work against any military presence or threat in th e area, and can be expected to react negatively agains t political developments in the region that make this threa t more likely . 1 8

IV . SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS BEFORE THE FALL OF CEAUSESC U During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Romanian-Sovie t relations cooled . Under Georghiu Georghe- and, after 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian party began to pursue a pattern of foreign economic relations quite distinct fro m those of the Soviet Union . This policy was aimed at securin g for the country the wherewithal to achieve rapid and broa d industrial development -- goals which had been enunciated a s early as the 1950s and never renounced . In 1964 the Romanian s rejected Nikita Khruschev's attempt to strengthen CMEA' s international coordination, and argued that relinquishin g planning and control of the economy would be inconsisten t with national security - proletarian internationalis m aside . 2 1

Over the next decade Romania greatly expanded its tie s with the west, both economic and political . Western trade grew rapidly and by 1967 constituted 40 percent of Romania n trade . Nearly three-fifths of its imports of machines and equipment came from the west . 22 By 1974 the country's trad e with developed capitalist countries was greater than it s trade with CMEA states .

Trade relations expanded to broader economic ties suc h as with the European Econmic Community (1973) and membershi p in GATT (1971), the IMF and (1972) . Such ties 1 9 were part of and supported by a growth of distinctiv e political relations between Romania and non-East Europea n countries . In 1967 Romania became the first East Europea n country to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany and th e same year refused to break relations with Israel after th e Six-Day War, something each of its allies, plus Yugoslavia , did . In 1968 Bucharest did not take part in and criticized the pressure on Czechoslovakia during the "" an d condemned the Soviet-led invasion to end that reform i n August of that year . 2 3

During the 1970's Romanian-Soviet differences were les s spectacular but Nicolae Ceausescu did continue to follow a distinct course . He expanded trade ties with the Unite d States, including acceptance of MFN in 1975 under the term s of the Jackson-Vanik amendment . US-Romanian trade grew vigorously as did Romanian trade with West Europe, despit e the occasional fluctuations due to Western oil price adjustments and resulting recession in mid-decade . 24 Romani a significantly expanded its ties with third world countrie s during this period, redefining itself as a "socialis t developing" country and engaging in active diplomacy with th e Nonaligned Conference Group of 77 .

During this period Bucharest did not directly challeng e Soviet security interests . Rather it asserted its adherence 2 0 to the general principle of economic and political sovreignt y and was not above occasionally toning down its differences , for example, over Afghanistan, or sending mixed signals, a s it did during the Solidarity period in Poland . 2 5

Romania's international economic and political tie s underwent some change in the early and mid- . Belated recognition and adjustments to increasing energy costs an d mounting debt led the Ceausescu regime to severely cu t imports from the West and try to expand exports . The domestic market was brutally squeezed, especially o f foodstuffs, in order to satisfy Ceausescu's stated goal o f rapidly paying off Romania's debt, which by 1981 exceede d $ 10 billion . Similarly, Romanian trade shifted eastward . Trade with socialist countries which accounted for one-thir d of Romania's trade in 1980, counted for three-fifths in 198 6 and fully two-thirds of the country's imports . Trade wit h the Soviet Union grew as well, with especially marke d increases in Romanian imports of Soviet oil (From 350,00 0 tons in 1979 to more than 6 million tons in 1986) .

Romania's political ties with the west eroded as well . As increasingly severe measures were used to squeeze th e economy and retain tight political control in the wake o f developments in Poland, the country's practice s drew attention and criticism . In particular the annual MFN hearings in the US congress provided an opportunity for

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broader and sharper attacks on the regime's civil right s practices and treatment of religious and ethnic minorities . When in 1987 the congress included in its draft a provisio n calling for the suspension of MFN the following year, Romani a unilaterally renounced MFN . 26 In April 1989 the Europea n Coumunity suspended negotiations with Romania on a comprehensive trade agreement because of the country's poo r human rights record .

The Romanian Rejection of Reform Under Nicolae Ceausescu the Romanian regime categorically and comprehensively rejected the reforms being implemented i n the Soviet Union . Romanian rejection took on various forms .

The Ceausescu regime rejected the idea of reform i n principle on various grounds . First, the RCP denied there wa s anything wrong with socialism or its tenets, only it s application . 27 Second, the regime outlined an elaborat e theoretical argument reiterating the idea that there was n o single unique model of socialism which would apply in al l cases . Ilie Ceausescu, the President's brother, for example , argued in Era Socialista that

Of course, as the problems of improvement are , in an objective way, different from country t o country and the solution which one party o r another chooses -- drawing from certai n concrete conditions -- will carry in their ver y substance, their mark of the specifi c situations of respective countries, of th e stage of development to which socialist societ y has come, of the accomplished experience o f each governing party . This makes it necessary

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to act in such a way . However, so as to no longer revive harmful practices or "uniqu e models" dressed in "new' clothes of some improvement with pretension to genera l validity . 2 8 This argument complemented the longstanding Romania n position that the fullest expression of national sovereignt y did not allow the application of a form of socialism whic h did not fit Romanian conditions . "Socialism gives th e principle of sovereignty a new and better framework fo r expression, . . ." the argument ran, "underscoring the righ t of each socialist state, of each socialist nation to choos e its own forms and ways of socialist construction -- socially , politically, economically, culturally, etc . -- to develop it s own model of socialist society through a creative applicatio n to the principles of scientific socialism ." 29 As it had earlier, this aspect of rejection of a "model" of socialis m was accompanied by vigorous assertions of the need fo r foreign policy sovereignty in general . 3 0

At the same time, Ceausescu and those around hi m rejected the very need for reform, since they saw their brand of socialism as having brought Romania to a "golden era . " Anyone, friends and - to put it this way - als o those who do not find to their liking the socialist development of our homeland and the development of socialism in general, can see what the socialist way of development has mean t to Romania - industrialisation, development o f agriculture, science, education, culture, the steady raising of the people's living standard , materially and spiritually, a rationa l distribution of the productive forces an d harmonious development of all zones of th e country, of the counties, the creation o f several economic and social centres in every

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county, vast socio-economic constructions , houses, schools, hospitals and other establishments that, all together, have a decisive role in raising the degree o f civilisation and development of our homeland . 3 1 Failings, which were not only acknowledged but attacked unde r Ceausescu, were laid at the feet of individuals who failed t o properly execute directives ; they were not the fault of th e system itself .

Ceausescu's rejection was also specific . That is, he did not refrain from explicitly disdaining those measures being urged in the Soviet case by Mikhail Gorbachev . Speaking of the moves to allow small scale privat e enterprises in the Soviet economy, Ceausescu sai d In no way can one speak of improving socialism by looking back, by speaking of the so-calle d market socialism, of free enterprise, and al l this by invoking objective laws . There canno t be improvement of socialism through th e so-called development of the small privat e property . Capitalist property, big or small , is still capitalist property . One cannot speak of socialist economy without basing it on socialist ownership of the productive means . This is an objective law, without which on e cannot speak of the building of a better and more just social system . Our practice ha s demonstrated to the full that socialis t ownership, as ownership of the whole people, n o matter its form - state or co-operative -, its consolidation and development make the only wa y of translating into life the principles o f social equity and , of powerfu l development of the productive forces o f ensuring every nation's welfare and . 32

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Increasing the autonomy of state enterprises was rejected . 3 3 Politically, suggestions that the role of the party ; of planning or of the control of the state be weakened wer e ruled out . 34 In short, Ceausescu rejected the general nee d for reform and the specific measues being enacted in th e USSR .

In some cases, however, while not accepting the need fo r thorough reform, Ceausescu tried to increase domesti c pressure to insure better performance . He did this in way s which were occasionally not that different from thos e utilized by Gorbachev, for example by urging clos e association between the party and the people . Speaking to the Political Executive Committee of the party in Octobe r 1988, Ceausescu sai d . . all leaders of social economic units -- local and central -- of all economic-socia l sectors must understand that to talk abou t self-management, self-administration, o f improving and modernizing activity, presuposse s putting into practice a new mode, to put an en d entirely to attitudes of indolence, o f tolerance, lack of exactingness . It is necessary to proceed from the necessity tha t each one in his area of activity -- both i n collective arenas and in his own activity - - have in mind that he is responsible before th e people, before the organs of worker s revolutionary , before the party fo r any kind of unfulfilled tasks that come due . 3 5 In practice, the regime's idea of reform was t o increase rather than reduce state control . For example , restrictions were increased on small scale production , production from private plots and use of resources . 36 2 5

Other aspects of reform stimulated by the Gorbachev tea m were met with silence . This applies especially to the kin d of political behavior which began to emerge in the USSR a s well as to the greater openness in the press and newe r political forms encouraged by glasnost . Ceausescu did not shrink from indicating that he held little in common wit h those who were raising questions about Soviet history . As Tass reported during Gromyko's visi t Ceausescu said that the Soviet Union' s achievements are thought highly of in Romania . Over a short time the USSR has become a grea t industrial power, he noted, pointing also to the high appreciation in this country for wha t he described as the exceptional role played b y the Soviet Union and the war against Nazis m and in its routing . "We do not understand those attempting to pu t these fact in doubt," Ceausescu continued . 3 7 Rather than abate as in the USSR, pressure continued and even increased against Romanian who spoke out , such as and Cornea . 38 Access to some Soviet publications was restricted .

While not acknowledging the Soviet political reforms , the Romanian regime frequently asserted that it was alread y doing what some other socialist states, now needed to do . Greater democracy and full participation were already features of th e Romanian scene, Ceausescu argued . A similar two-sided strategy -- denying or ignoring reform while asserting that the necessary improvements were already in place -- had been applied by the

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Romanian regime during the first Solidarity period in Poland i n 1980-1981 . 39 At that time the Romanian government also too k steps to try to improve the living standards of key sectors o f the population, such as oil workers . In this instance als o nominal quotas for key provisions, such as meat, mea t products, and sugar were raised . 40 This time such actions wer e even more important because despite their best attempts th e regime could not keep the population from knowing about change s and reforms in the USSR and later throughout Eastern Europe .

With regard to external issues, Romania also explicitl y rejected the Soviet attempts to move CMEA in the direction o f reform . Part of this was due to a rejection of the Sovie t externalization of its own reform through CMEA . For example , Soviet leadership stressed the need to shift CMEA coordinatio n from the state level to that of the enterprises, as it ha d tried to move the direction of the domestic economy away fro m the central state level . The Long-Term Program of Scientifi c and Technical Cooperation, presented in 1985, was the centerpiece of this aspect of CMEA reform . 4 1

While Romania signed this document, its views on implementation were quite distinct from those of its allies . 4 2 In presenting the state plan for 1986 soon after the CME A summit, Stefan Birlea, Chairman of the State Planning Committe e barely mentioned CMEA . Prime Minster Dascalescu's report of th e next year similarly gave only the briefest obligatory

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reference . 43 Compare this with 's statement to th e Bulgarian party congress that "Bulgarian electronics must b e united to maximum degree with the similar industries of the CMEA member states . "44 In fact, Romania signed very few agreement s for direct enterprise ties under Ceausescu, though they did sig n an agreement for long-term scientific and technical cooperatio n

with CMEA member states . 4 5

As they had during the 1960s, the Romanian regime als o

rejected explicitly the notion that CMEA reform should mea n restriction of national prerogatives 46 or specialization . The improvement of co-operation and specialisatio n and the establishment whre it seems necessary, of joint companies must be based on and must tak e into consideration the independent development o f each national economy . Under no circumstances should we follow the example of the multinationa l imperialist societies, which as a matter of fact , have become means of oppressing other people . Co-operation, I repeat, specialisation, when i t seems necessary and is possible, must be based o n the national property of each country and on the fact that the product or part of the nationa l product should belong to each country and nation , in accordance with that country's participation i n this activity . We cannot establish any kind o f supra-national companies . 4 7

The RCP view was that the CMEA should do a better jo b in assisting the development of those members who wer e further behind the others . 4 8

Soviet discussion of reform of CMEA made it clear tha t

reform of CMEA was linked to reform of the economies of it s

member states . Yuri Shiriaev, the Director of the CMEA

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Institute of International Economic Research, said, fo r

example, "However perfect CMEA might become, we canno t expect to be successful if conditions are not created in eac h country for enterprises and branch agencies to conside r participation in the integration as being in their ow n interest . This will require the creation of suitabl e incentives within national economic mechanism ." 49 Gorbachev himself made it clear during Ceausescu's visit to Moscow tha t he saw the alliance's common goals achieved through th e forward movement of each national economy . 5 0

Thus Romania's rejection of this aspect of Sovie t reform was based on a mixture of old and new rejections :

rejecting as they had in the past any form of CMEA organizatio n which would remove or reduce national prerogatives, such as th e greater use of direct ties, plus rejecting the kind of domesti c

reforms that the USSR clearly wanted the CMEA member states t o begin implementing .

Romania had no objection to improving and expandin g

bilateral ties with CMEA partners, in particular the Sovie t Union itself ; trade increased substantially for 1986 (23% ) and in 1987 and 1988 was still nearly 15% above the 198 5 level . And, as noted, Bucharest signed long-term bilatera l agreements on cooperation with both the Soviet Union an d

other CMEA members . The rejection, rather, was directed a t

the CMEA having increased power and/or acting as a vehicle

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for Soviet reforms . In July 1988, when the member state s pledged as a goal the creation of conditions for a fre e market of goods and services among themselves and toward a united market, Romania did not sign the declaration . 5 1

The Problem of Soviet Foreign Policy Action s Soviet new thinking essentially outflanked Romanian foreig n policy as Moscow's policy initiatives took shape . Many o f the issues upon which Romania had based its deviant foreig n policy were removed by Soviet actions . For example, Romani a had been more receptive to proposals by the United State s regarding the question of nuclear weapons in Europe . 52 Then when repeated Soviet concessions culminated in the INF treat y in 1987, the issue was effectively removed from the Romania n platform . Similarly, Bucharest had been consistently mor e vocal in support of conventional force cuts, and occasionally engaged in oblique polemics with Moscow . 5 3 Romania announced unilateral reductions in its own defens e budget in 1986 and 1987, the latter, backed up by a highl y publicized national referendum . 54 But when Gorbache v announced the unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal in Europe i n 1988, this issue too lost what little play it had for th e .

Soviet initiatives to improve relations with Beijing , initiatives in the Middle East which included improvin g relations with Israel, the Soviet withdrawal from

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Afghanistan and even its calls to strengthen the Unite d

Nations, effectively moved Moscow past positions held by Bucharest and offered as unique . In some cases in apparen t attempts to retain distinct positions, the Romanians espouse d increasingly strident views on issues on which there wa s otherwise international consensus, such as chemical weapon s and the final document of 's meeting of the CSCE o n human rights . 5 5

But perhaps nowhere was Romania so shouldered out o f the picture by Soviet initiatives and by its own policies a s in its relationship with the West . Here Romania had occupie d a favored position for more than a decade as the US tried t o erode the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe . US-Romania n

trade had greatly increased with the granting of MFN in 1975 ; US Presidents Nixon and Ford had visited Romania and a t various times the US had gone out of its way to publicl y support what it saw as an independent state in the region . 5 6 This was of course predicated on a continuous cold, or a t least cool, US-Soviet relationship . Hence, when unde r Gorbachev that relationship began to improve, simultaneou s with the serious deterioration of conditions in Romania, it s "value" to the West declined . This was demonstrated by open US criticism of Romanian human rights practices voiced b y

administration officials, in the US Congress during MFN

hearings, and the proposed suspension of MFN for Romania fo r six months in 1987 . 57

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Bucharest also moved further in a direction opposit e from that of the USSR by cutting or reducing other ties wit h Western economic institutions . Ceausescu was increasingl y critical of Western financial institutions and with the deb t paid off, a law prohibiting new foreign credits wa s enacted . 58 Romania, once the only East European member o f the IMF, with special privileges and arrangements with the U S and the EEC, found itself left behind in a warming East-Wes t economic atmosphere .

Before the dramatic events of 1989 which swep t aside the one-party communist regimes in Eastern Europe , Soviet attitudes toward Romania and its rejection of refor m were mixed, but by no means completely negative . As noted , trade did increase significantly, though Soviet-Romania n trade remained the lowest between the USSR and any CME A member . In addition, in accordance with Romanian views o n direct enterprise-to-enterprise ties and specialization, few such arrangements were signed .

After Gorbachev became Soviet party leader he did visit Romania, but it was last on his tour and occurred mor e than two years after he became General Secretary . Durin g this visit in May 1987, Gorbachev was not shy about offerin g criticism . In his very first speech in Bucharest, whic h like most Romanian cities was having its old center destroyed

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to make way for gigantic new buildings, he urged th e Romanians to preserve the historical architecture and sai d whenever this had not been done in Moscow "we now regre t it ." 59 Gorbachev complained that mutual trade was i n low-quality products while the best production went to th e West . 60 Even more pointedly, in reviewing Soviet progress o n reforms, he noted the problem of "the removal of those wh o are not coping with the matter in hand ; who cannot keep up with the times ; and furthermore, who have tarnished themselves with dishonesty, lack of principles, and and who in pursuit of profit have sacrificed th e moral image proper to a party member . We all need to learn to work in conditions of democracy ." 6 1

Disagreements had evidently emerged also in privat e sessions between the two as Ceausescu indicated that ther e was an identity of views only on a "majority of issues " 6 2 Other visitors such as Soviet President Andrei Gromyko an d member Mikhail Solmonstev had offered indirect bu t critical assessment of Soviet-Romanian relations 63 and o f the unilateral arms policy pursued by Romanians . 64 Pressur e was kept up to develop direct ties between enterprises, i n accordance with CMEA's new approach . 6 5

The Soviet view, made explicit during Gorbachev' s visit to Bucharest in May 1987 and Ceausescu's visit t o Moscow in October 1988, was that indeed relations were based

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on mutual respect and sovereignty but also "internationa l solidarity, responsibility before the workers of eac h country and to the common interests of socialism and peace ." 66 As he had during his own visit to Bucharest , Gorbachev stressed to Ceausescu when he came the need t o improve the quality of products in Soviet-Romanian trade . He also drew attention to the fact that "common ideologica l achievements become successes for each of us and , unfortunately, common loses can turn into failures ." 6 7

During this period occasional slights were offered . When Ceausescu visited Moscow in October 1988 Gorbachev di d not meet him at the airport, though both men were thei r country's heads of both party and state . The Soviet pres s gave scant recognition to Elena Ceausescu -- despite he r position as First Deputy Prime Minister and member of th e party's permanent bureau -- during their arrival and referred to the couple simply as Ceausescu "and wife ." The next month , a former party leader and critic of th e Romanian regime who had signed an open letter agains t Ceausescu in the spring of 1988, visited Moscow . He was no t officially received however .

In general the Soviet press was not especiall y critical of Ceausescu or the situation in Romania . Many articles on the country were positive . 68 Most reportag e either did not report on the country's overall situation or

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attributed any difficulties to the debt burden . 69 In some discussions the conclusion was drawn that the difficultie s were derived from Romania's determination to repay the debt by the end of the decade but this usually was seen a s necessary and successful . 70 Whatever may have been said abou t him in private , 71 press treatment of Ceausescu, virtuall y right up until his overthrow,, was restrained and, if anything , only obliquely critical . 7 2

On a concrete level, Soviet Romanian trade increase d during the first three years of Gorbachev's rule and woul d have increased further had Romania been able to pay for al l the Soviet oil they wanted . Romanian cooperation in Sovie t energy production grew during this period with Romania n involvement in the "Progress" gas pipeline . In October 1988 , 30 new cooperation agreements were signed of which 16 were t o be enacted in the USSR . 73 At the time of Gorbachev's visit , there were more than 140 such projects operating i n Romania . 74 Before the Romanian revolution there was littl e evidence of pressure on Romania, apart from some publi c chiding, to fall in line with Gorbachev' s perestroika/glasnost' approach . During 1989 Moscow did include occasional items which bore on reforms in its broadcasts, but it was hardly a propagand a campaign . 75 Occasionally Romania would be reminded of th e Soviet contribution to its well-being, most notably through its oil exports . 76

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V . THE YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY

In 1989 Soviet intentions toward Eastern Europe were tested ; the question was called as to whether or not th e Brezhnev Doctrine was really dead . Specifically, the Polis h in the spring of 1989 revealed the abject weaknes s of the communist party there . The inability to form a government then produced the first noncommunist government i n Eastern Europe since 1948 . While some critical comment wa s evident, the Soviet Union did not intervene to stop th e process . Indeed, Soviet press comment on the Mazowieck i government was cautious but supportive . Moscow, in a phon e call to acceded to the communist loss o f power and the creation of a Solidarity government . 7 7

At this point it could be said that both i n practice and in rhetoric the Brezhnev Doctrine was relegate d to the dustbin of history . Of the goals indicated above a s being central to Soviet policy in the region, the maintenance of the communist monopoly of power, Moscow clearly saw, could no longer be defended in Poland . Nor evidently could it be saved elsewhere in the region . In th e next few months communist power was destroyed in Hungary , East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and ultimately an d and violently in Romania itself . In October Gorbachev

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traveled to East Germany to celebrate the 40th anniversary o f the state and indicated that East Germany's communists to o might find themselves out if they did not cooperate with "al l forces in society ." Soviet spokesman, Gennady Gerasimo v reported that Gorbachev warned that "he who i s late is punished . " 78 Indeed Honecker found himself out o f power ten days later .

His successor, , lasted only long enough t o open the country's and start it down the road t o unification with . Moscow approved the forme r action, supporting the new government and tried to slow the momentum toward reunification 79 but Gorbachev's eviden t acceptance of the inevitable reunification of Germany durin g a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister in Januar y 1990 seemed to offer a green light to reunification on Wes t German rather than on East German terms . 80 Subsequently, th e Soviet position seemed to be equivocal on whether or not a united Germany could remain in NATO . 81 In the face of th e rapid movement toward de facto integration, the USSR ha s displayed a degree of forbearance which borders o n resignation .

While Moscow was not as visible in the Czechoslovak "gentle revolution" it was no more inclined to act to preven t it or the to the presidency soon after of forme r , Vaclav Havel . called the

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events of November, which toppled the Czechoslovak part y leadership, "natural" and a " of society . " 8 2 Nor did the changes in Hungary and Bulgaria bring the kind o f heightened concern and warnings which had characterize d Soviet reaction to developments in Eastern Europe at numerou s times in the last four decades .

In fact, in an ironic reversal of position it wa s Romania that tried to organize allied action against change . In a desperate move to try to stop the formation of a Solidarity government in Poland, the RCP proposed to it s Polish and Hungarian counterparts that they take "join t action" to defend socialism . Both parties rejected thi s move . 83 Apparently in the Romanian view the doctrine o f limited sovereignty had some merit after all . As this tacti c failed and change began to engulf East Europe, the Romania n party sought allies elsewhere, among those regimes settin g themselves against reform such as , and sought t o bolster remaining East European conservatives . 84 The Romanian press gave scant or selected coverage of developments in th e

region . 8 5

VI . SOVIET REACTION TO THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTIO N In comparison to the reactions of Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, all of which had by this time undergone thei r own revolutions, the Soviet reaction to the revolution wa s at first distinctly hesitant . As late as the 3 8

Romanian service of Radio Moscow was still only indirectl y calling attention to the lack of changes in Romania b y offering brief reports of changes in other East Europea n countries . 86 On December 19 Radio Moscow did go so far as t o report the demonstrations in Timisoara and elsewhere , pointing out that no mention of these events was being mad e in the Romanian media . 87 Meanwhile, other parts of the Sovie t media became very active in reporting the demonstrations i n Timisoara and Bucharest ; they even reported to the Sovie t audience Hungarian accounts of death tolls of from 300 to 40 0 in Timisoara . 8 8

Nevertheless, the Soviet government withheld officia l comments on developments in Romania . Speaking to the second session of the Congress of People's Deputies on December 2 1 -- after four days of demonstrations -- Mikhail Gorbache v said information was as yet insufficient to allow comment, a sentiment echoed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry . Politburo member Lev Zaikov did make statements about the need for th e Romanian government to establish a dialogue with its people ; in comments broadcast by the Romanian service of Radi o Moscow, the historian Roy Medvedev called the regime "totalitarian . " 89 On December 22 the congress of People' s Deputies expressed its "resolute support for the just caus e of the Romanian people . 90 The congress spontaneously burs t into applause when Mikhail Gorbachev reported that Nicola e Ceausescu had been overthrown . 3 9

During the subsequent fighting between Ceausesc u loyalists and supporters of the revolution, the USSR offere d humanitarian aid to the new regime but denied report s circulated on December 23 that it was prepared to support th e government militarily . 91 Moscow did acknowledge that it ha d discussed with its Warsaw Pact allies the possibility o f convening an emergency meeting of the pact's foreig n ministers, but this idea was put aside as events stabilize d in Romania . The Soviet media continued to provide extensiv e coverage of the battles in Romania, especially those i n Bucharest, and Tass also reported heightened concern over th e fate of Soviet nationals during some of the fiercest fightin g on December 23 . It said that "The Soviet Union cannot remai n indifferent to the fate of Soviet citizens and demands tha t those who have unleashed . . actions endangering the lif e of the should immediately stop them ." 92 The next day an unidentified "senior Soviet official" said tha t while a victory for the Romanian people would be "a hundre d times more valuable" if the people themselves won it, "w e would definitely act to prevent Ceausescu's return -- by no w that has been made clear to all ." 9 3

The Soviet Union was assured publicly that militar y intervention would have met with very little unfavorabl e reaction . On December 23 an official in the British Foreig n Ministry said that Soviet intervention in Romania would be 4 0

"understandable ." The next day French Foreign Minister Rolan d Dumas said explicitly that his government would support suc h action as well as the use of volunteer brigades in Romania . 9 4 Then, in a complete reversal of post-war US policy toward th e region, Secretary of State James Baker commented in a television interview that Washington would be "inclined t o follow the example of ." When asked directly whethe r that meant that the USA would not oppose militar y intervention in Romania by members of the Warsaw Pact, Bake r responded : "That womuld be my view, yes . " 95 While the Bus h administration later sought to diminish the significance o f these remarks by declaring them "hypothetical," even a "hypothetical" suggestion by an American administration tha t it would not oppose the USSR's use of force in Romani a represents a remarkable about-face in the US view of th e Soviet role in Eastern Europe .

The overthrow of the Romanian government relieve d Gorbachev of a recalcitrant ally who publicly criticize d perestroika and even ridiculed Gorbachev's domestic an d foreign policies . But it also increased pressure on Moscow t o respond to the demands of the well-organized Moldavian Popular Front, which showed itself highly attentive to developments in Romania from the beginning of the trouble s there . Aided by the extensive coverage given the Romania n developments in the Soviet media and by information from their own contacts, officials of all types in were

4 1

especially critical of Ceausescus' actions . The Moldavia n party's Central Committee, Presidium, an d republican government issued their own statements expressin g solidarity with the Romanian people . 96 Coincidentally, a resolution passed by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputie s on December 24 declared that protocols to the 193 9 Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact illegal, although a simila r resolution had failed to gather enough votes for passage th e day before . 97 These protocols had opened the way for the USS R to incorporate the and annex parts of what were then Poland and Romania ; out of the annexed Romanian land wa s created the Soviet Republic of Moldavia .

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Perhaps in recognition of the sensitivity and complexit y of Soviet-Romanian ties, Gorbachev went out of his way t o make a good start with the new Romanian leadership . Recognition was extended on , the same day th e Ceausescus were executed . Soviet reaction to this event wa s not even mildly critical . At a regular press briefing a foreign ministry spokesman said this constituted "part of th e internal affairs of Romania" and that "the decision t o execute the President has probably been made, taking int o account the aspirations and will of the Romanian people . " 9 8 On Gorbachev spoke by telephone with the President of the National Salvation Front, . The same day he sent his personal congratulations to the ne w Romanian government, signing the message only "M . Gorbachev ." This warm message complemented that sent to Prim e Minister by the Soviet government . 99 Finally , on December 31 Moscow announced that Soviet Foreign Ministe r Eduard Shevardnadze would visit Romania at the end of th e first week in January . Shevardnadze did visit on January 6 . He promised continuing economic and humanitarian aid , announced the end of Soviet importation of Romanian foo d products and said the USSR would respect the Romanian people's decision on political parties .10° For its part, th e new Romanian government strongly affirmed that it woul d respect its foreign commitments, including its membership i n the Warsaw Pact . 101

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VII . SOVIET POLICY IN EAST EUROPE SINCE THE REVOLUTIONS

What is Moscow left with in East Europe and how is i t reacting to the new situation? While the situation itself i s too new to offer an in-depth analysis, some patterns from th e first months can be discerned .

First and most significant is that Moscow's reaction s seem only to be intermittent . Having let the regions' state s go their own way, the Soviet leadership now seems unwillin g or unable to articulate a coherent vision of its new relationship with these states . Partly this is the effect o f the appearance of a broader range of views on all subjects i n the Soviet press . But is also a result of the fact that th e reforms of glasnost and perestroika have unleashed change s within the USSR itself of a scope and breadth well beyon d that which seems to have been anticipated . Thus the leadership has all it can do to try to manage interna l change . Indeed it was the very pace and degree of that change that made Soviet forbearance during 1989 a policy o f necessity as well as choice .

Now Moscow seems only to react episodically, whe n developments in the region cause it particular concern . The most prominent example is its attitude toward Germa n reunification . This process has sped along faster than any

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of the leaders of the concerned states foresaw, spurred b y the spectre of economic collapse and virtual desertion o f East German territory by its own population . Most states , but in particular the USSR, have been scrambling t o articulate clear policies and effect the process in way s favorable to their goals . For Moscow this has meant tryin g to be firm about what it will accept in a new Germany, e .g . neutrality, and what it will reject, e .g . NATO membership . But this has been done in a contradictory form and apparentl y only when pressed by the immediate onset of negotiations , such as unexpectedly at the Ottawa "open skies" meeting .

An example of this with regard to Romania was th e sharp Soviet reaction to the banning of the communist part y announced by the Council of National Salvation when faced with a mob in downtown Bucharest . 102 Though this was promptl y overturned by the Council after meeting, Radio Moscow wa s quick to point to the possible negative implications of thi s act, possibly having in mind the infection of this idea into the USSR itself . 10 3

Indeed the most significant new aspect of Soviet-Eas t European relations since the revolutions has been th e "rebound" affect these changes have had on the USSR . Though the impetus for reform clearly belongs to Gorbachev and th e reforms his team unleashed, developments in the region soo n went beyond reforms to revolution . The creation of

4 5

noncommunist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia, th e prospect of elections throughout East Europe and th e blossoming of political parties in anticipation of thes e elections has reverberated through an East European an d Soviet media now free of most political controls . The Balti c states have moved most quickly in this respect, with formally recognizing noncommunist parties an d holding open elections in March 1990, which led to a reassertion of Lithuanian independence . The CPSU and Gorbachev at the beginning of 1990 similarly supported th e ending of the party's constitutional monopoly and multipl e candidate -- though not multiparty -- local elections bega n to take place throughout the country .

One way in which the Romanian experience contribute d to these developments was by negative example . During the discussion of the removal to the party's guaranteed monoply , frequent references were made to the need to avoid a "Romania" in the Soviet Union : that is, the explosion o f violence against an unyielding regime leading to a murderou s struggle and the death of the regime as well as its chie f actor . 10 4

In a few respects Soviet post-revolutionary polic y resembles that before 1989 . One of these is a continuing interest on the part of Moscow for reform in the Eas t European economies . The Soviet Union still needs a "better"

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relationship from its point of view ; it still needs to ge t more value for what it sells to the East European states , chiefly raw materials . Thus its apparent willingness t o support the idea that inner-CMEA trade be put on a har d currency, world price basis . 105 At the same time it needs t o have the economies of these states operate efficientl y because it needs more than ever to be relieved of the burde n they constitute . 106 Evidence of this is seen in announcement s of reduction in Soviet oil supply to several East Europea n states.107 More effective economies in East Europe wil l presumably both improve the quality of supplies to the Sovie t Union and underpin a stable political environment thus preventing further turmoil or the emergence of more hostile governments in the area . In this respect there is a continuation of Soviet interest in a degree of stability i n the region and in having the renewed communist parties .108 continue to play a role

But on balance Soviet policy in the region i s characterized by more reversals than continuities . Sovie t acquiescence to the changes of course is the most significan t example.109 Another key component has been Soviet willingnes s to negotiate and actually begin troop withdrawals from thos e states where Soviet troops remained : Hungary , Czechoslovakia and Poland . While developments in the last case will likely be affected by the pace and effects o f , in the first two instances, troop

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withdrawals began in early 1990 . Given that these Soviet troops played a relatively marginal role in defense against a putative Western attack and that their major role was t o enforce respect for the existing parameters of behavior i n the region, Soviet abandonment of those parameters bot h mandates and is confirmed by these withdrawals .

With regard to Romania, Soviet troops are not the issue , but ironically the question of security may be greater no w than it was under Ceausescu . First, there is the prospec t that, given changes both in Romania and in the USSR , turbulence in Moldavia could lead to clamor for changes i n that republic's status . This could take the form of pressur e for increased Moldavian sovereignty and reduced centra l control, full separtion from the USSR, or even union wit h Romania . There is little evidence that the last is a stron g factor, but the Moldavian Popular Front is proving a n effective political actor and Moldavian absorption into th e USSR, like Lithuania's, was a product of the 193 9 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.110 Thus both the legal and politica l basis for a challenge to Soviet rule are present . It i s perhaps not accidental that just after the revolution it wa s announced that Moldavian party and government leader Peta r Luschinsky would accompany Eduard Shevardnadze to Bucharest , but he did not .

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The second cause for concern, which had been dorman t previously is the reappearance of the issues of the Hungaria n minority in Romania and indirectly, the territory o f . Serious tensions continue over the minority issue and new, more open , in both countries allow s the voicing of various and sometimes more nationalisti c views, expecially during elections . The possibility exists , that this issue could seriously provoke tension in th e region, and even conflict, and undermine what had been a relatively secure area for the USSR .

Finally, there is the situation in Romania itself . The revolution is barely three months past and despite th e promise of elections, and a transition to greater democracy , there is uncertainty and instability in the country . Already the National Salvation Front has offered itself as a , a competing political party and the n as a member -- the most powerful one -- of a new Council o f National Unity . Numerous political parties have emerged o f uncertain heritage, program and allegiance . 111 Observer s cannot be as sanguine about the steady movement towar d popular democratic rule in Romania as is possible, fo r example in Czechoslovakia . This very uncertainty and lack o f movement could provoke further action and possibly violence by those who feel the revolution has been "hijacked" . Thi s would be worrisome to Moscow, especially since this feeling 4 9

is directed at communists who were once powerful in th e Ceausescu regime and who remain in the new government . Thi s "second stage" of the revolution could thus take on an eve n more radical and decidedly anti-Soviet character than that o f December .

VIII . UNITED STATES POLICY

The United States promptly recognized the new government i n Romania and offered some economic assistance . But the US quickly became displeased with the pace of democrati c development and began to publicly pressure Bucharest t o move more effectively and quickly . US concern wa s demonstrated both by statements and by visits of US Secretary of State James Baker and Assistant Secretary of State fo r Human Rights Richard Schifter . 112 Washington has indicated that restoration of MFN will not be immediately forthcomin g unless the rudiments of democratic rule are established i n the country . 113 This posture, plus what is seen as a lo w level of US aid, has provoked some criticism in Romania and relations at the beginning of 1990 could only be described a s correct .

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Economic constraints and perhaps past practice ha s caused the US to take a low profile in the Romanian scene . This is consistent with US policy in the last years o f Ceausescu as the US tried to distance itself from an odiou s regime, and moreover conforms to the spirit if not th e letter of the ammendments to the trade law .

It is in US interest, however, that democracy take root an d flourish in Romania and US public pressure should continue . The United States is not the most significant political o r economic actor in the country, which has strong cultural tie s to France and economic links to Germany . But it is the mos t prominent western democracy whose actions are seen as a key international indicator of the country's acceptance by th e international community . The US is seen as having the mos t successful experience with a pluralist society, popula r political representation, open media and market mechanism . With this authenticity and a prominence which guarantee s international attention to whatever it says about Romania o r any other country, Washington can bring to bear significant influence on Romania's leaders not to wander too far from th e path toward democracy .

MFN should eventually be restored, assuming policy maker s can satisfy themselves that basic human rights, includin g those for minorities are being observed . At the same time,

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this should be accompanied by extension of protection by th e Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Export-Import ban k loans and encouragement of private economic activity . I f holding off on these policies means that other more eage r partners will take the field, the economic loss to the U S will not be great, while the satisfaction of seeing response s to US desires for the implementation of democratic principle s will provide compensation .

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NOTES (1) Paul Marer, "Has Eastern Europe Become a Liability to th e Soviet Union? The Economic Aspect," in Charles Gati, ed . , The International Politiccs of Eastern Europe, (New York : Praeger, 1976), pp .59-81 . (2) Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization o f Trade with Eastern Europe : A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley : University of California, Institute of Internationa l Studies, 1983) . (3) Iu . Shiriaev, "SEV : Kurs na perestroiku mekhanisma mnogostroennovo sotrudinchestva" [CMEA : The Way to Restructure the Mechanism of Multilateral Collaboration] , Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, No .12 (1987), pp .21-29 ; L . Yagodovsky, "Reforms call for more reforms," New Times No . 3 January 17-23, 1989 . (4) Ronald H . Linden, Bear and Foxes : The Internationa l Relations of the East European States (Boulder, CO : East European Quarterly, 1979), pp .177-203 . (5) S .Kovalev, "Suverinitet i internatsional'nye obiazannost i sotsialisticheckikh stran" ["Sovereignty and th e International Obligations of Socialist Countries"], , September 26, 1968, p .4 . (6) During the 1956 Hungarian revolution one dramati c illustration of this concern was Khrushchev's remark t o Tito just before the Soviet invasion : "They are cutting Communists' throats there," he said . Reported by Veljko Micunovic in his Moscow Diary (Garden City, N .Y . : Doubleday, 1980) cited in Brian McCauley, "Hungary an d Suez, 1956 : the Limits of Soviet and American Power," i n Bela Kiraly, Barbara Lotze and Nandor Dreisziger, eds ., The First War Between Socialist States : The Hungaria n Revolution of 1956 and Its Impact (New York : Brookly n College Press, 1984), p .306 . (7) See Ronald H . Linden, Communist States and International Change (Winchester, Mass : Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp . 28-32, 54-60, 76-84 ; and Ronald H . Linden, "Romania n Foreign Policy in the 1980's : Domestic-Foreign Polic y Linkages," in Michael J . Sodaro and Sharon L . Wolchik , Eds ., Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in th e 1980s (London : Macmillan Press, 1983), pp .47-80 . (8) By the beginning of 1990 over 1200 joint venture agreement s had been signed with western companies, though less tha n 200 were in operation, Financial Times, February 1, 1990 . In March, 1990 the USSR formally applied for observe r status in GATT .

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(9) In his own explication of the process, Gorbachev writes : Politics is undoubtedly the most important thing in an y revolutionary process . This is equally true o f perestroika, therefore we attach priority to politica l measures, broad and genuine democratization, th e resolute struggle against red tape and violations of law , and the active involvement of the masses in managing the country's affairs . All this is directly linked with th e main question of any revolution, the question of power . M .Gorbachev, Perestroika : New Thinking for our Country and the World, New York : Harper and Row, 1987, p .54 . (10) See e .g . Gorbachev's speech on the 70th anniversary of th e Soviet revolution, Moscow TV, March, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, Marc h 4, 1987, pp .22-4] ; , June 15, 1988, p .5 . (11) See e .g . the interview with Vyachelsav Dashichev, head o f the foreign policy department of the Institute of th e Economics of the World Socialist System, in Der Spiegel , July 4, 1988 [FBIS-Sov, July 8, 1988, p . 18-21] ; "East-West Relations and Eastern Europe (An American-Sovie t Dialogue)" Problems of , XXXVII, 3-4 (May - August), 1988, pp . 55-70 . See also Gorbachev's statement in Helsinki, , and spokesman Gerasimov's suggestio n that the Brezhnev Doctrine had been replaced by th e "" ; i .e . "Hungary and Poland are doing i t their way," New York Times, October 26, 1989 . (12) Pravda, May 19, 1988, p .l .

(13) See the discussion in Michael Shafir, "Soviet Reaction t o Polish Developments : Widened Limits of Tolerated Change " Radio Free Europe Research, September 20, 1989, esp . pp .6-7 . (14) Data can be found in US Information Agency release , September 17, 1989 . (15) See e .g . the statement by Prime Minister Ryzhkov "Strategi a uskoreniia," ["The Strategy of Acceleration"] Pravda , November 4, 1986, pp . 1-4 ; Yuri Shiriaev, "Mekhanis m sotrydinchestva i novie kriterii," ["The Mechanism o f Collaboration and New Criteria"] Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta , #3, July, 1986, p .20 ; see also the article by Yevgeniy e Chernov (a Novosti writer) "About Sad Paradoxes" in th e journal Nedelna Pravda, #8, February 27, 198 7 [FBIS-Sov, March 12, 1987, p.F1-3] . As early as 1986 some Soviet writers explicitly accepted the subsidy argument of Marrese and Vanous . See E .Sheynin, "Sotsialisticheskay a ekonomicheskaya integratsia ; real'nost' i vymysli ' ["Socialist : reality and falsehoods"] . Vneshnaya Torgovlaia, #3, 1986, p . 38-42 .

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(16) See the remarks by Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov at th e 44th CMEA session ; "Osnova Sotsialistichesko i ekonomicheskoi integratsii" [The Basis for Socialis t Economic Integration"] Izvestia, July 7, 1988, p .4 . See also Iu . C . Shirayev, "Mekhanizm sotrudinehestva : Novyie kriterii" ["Mechanism of Collaboration : New Criteria"] , Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta 30 (July) 1986), p . 20 . (17) See e .g . Gorbachev's statement in October 1987, before th e 43rd (extraordinary) session of CMEA, Pravda, October 15 , 1987 ; the statement of the Soviet permanent representativ e to CMEA, Deputy Prime Minister A .K .Antonov, Novoe , October 16, 1987, pp .2-3 ; "CEV: po puti intensifikatsi i sotrydinchestva" [CMEA : on the path of intensification o f collaboration] Vneshnaya Torgovlaia, #2, 1987, p .11-12 ; "CEV : Nauka, promyshlennost', - rynok" ["CMEA : science , industry, market"] Izvestia, June 1, 1987, p . 2 (18) RFE correspondent's Report, June 10, 1990 ; Mark Bernikev , " Moving Toward Market-Based System," Journal o f Commerce, January 11, 1990 ; NYT, January 10, 1990 . (19) See, for example, Gorbachev's statement in Prague, Sovie t TV, April 10, 1987 [Summary of World Broadcasts, April 13 , 1987, p . EE/8541/C/0] . Gorbachev voiced a similar sentimen t to Karoly Grosz when the Hungarian leader visited Moscow i n July 1988 ; Pravda, July 6, 1988, p .2 . See also the comment s of Aleksandr Yakolev in Hungary, Pravda, November 13, 1988 , p .4 . (20) Aleksandr Kondrashov, "Ob antichekhoslovatskoi kampanii na Zapade" ["About the Anti-Czechoslovak Campaign in th e West"], Izvestia, August 22, 1988, p .3 ; Tass, August 19 , 1988 [FBIS, August 22, 1988, p .41] . But somewhat divergen t assessments were offered by the Soviet Ambassador to Ital y (Financial Times, September 12, 1988, p .12) and Ole g Bogomolov, Director of the Institute for the Study of th e Economics of the World Socialist System (Financial Times , June 27, 1988, p .2) . (21) See the "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers ' Party Concerning the Problems of the Internationa l Communist and Working Class Movement," text in William E . Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-65, (Cambridge : MIT Press, 1967, pp . 269-96 . (22) John M . Montias, "Romania's Foreign Trade : An Overview," I n Joint Economic Committee, Eastern European Economie s Post-Helsinki, 95th Cong ., 1st Sess . (Washington, DC : US Govt . Printing Office, 1977) . (23) Linden, Bear and Foxes, pp .53-197 . (24) In 1974 developed market economies took 45% of Romania' s exports . In 1975 that figure fell to under 39% and t o under 33% in 1977, before rebounding . United Nations , Yearbook of International Trade (New York : United Nations , 1981) p . 80 0 (25) See the discussion in Linden, Communist States, pp . 81-82 .

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(26) See US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe , The State of , 100th Congress, 2n d Session (Washington, DC : US Govt . Printing Office, 1988) . For Romania's renunciation see Bucharest Home Service , February 27, 1988 [Summary of World Broadcasts, February 29, 1988, p . EE/0087/A1/1] . (27) See Ceausescu's speech to the CC plenum of October 1989 , Radio Bucharest, October 24, 1989 ; see also Agerpress , November 19, 1989 . (28) Era Socialists, June 30, 1988 . See also Agerpress on the 117th anniversary of Lenin's birth , April 22, 1987 ; Ceausescu's remarks during the visit of Soviet President Andrei Gromyko, Tass, May 11, 1988 [FBIS-Sov . May 12, 1988 , p . 38] . (29) Agerpress in English, July 15, 1988 . (30) Agerpress, September 20, 1989 . (31) Agerpress, January 26, 1987 [SWB, January 28, 1987, p EE/8477/B/9] .

(32) IBID ; see also Agerpress, September 10, 1989 . (33) Era Socialists, #2 January 25, 1987 [JPRS, June 30, 1987] . (34) On the role of the party see Agerpress, September 30 , 1989 ; Cronica, November 13, 1988, pp . 1,2 ; see als o Ceausescu's speech to the 14th Party Congress, Radio Bucharest, November 20, 1989 ; on planning, Era Socialists , January 25, 1987 [JPRS, June 30, 1987] ; Era Socialists , July 10, 1987, [JPRS, December 3, 1987] ; Agerpress , November 8, 1989 ; on the role of the state, see Ceausescu' s CC plenum speech, Radio Bucharest, October 24, 1989 .

(35) Romania Libera, October 4, 1988, p . 3 . (36) Revista Economics, #13, March 1987, pp . 1344 [JPRS, Jun e 10, 1987, pp . 109-13] ; Radio Free Europe Research, November 9, 1988, pp . 21-3 ; Era Socialists, #19, October 15, 1986 , #20, October 30, 1986, # 21 November 10, 1986 [JPRS, Jun e 22, 1987, pp . 34-50] .

(37) TASS, May 10 , 1988 . (38) AP, September 28, 1989 . (39) Linden, Communist States, pp .74-75

5 6

(40)Radio Bucharest, September 22, 1989 . (41) Text in Pravda, December 19, 1985, pp .1,4 . (42) This can be seen for example by comparing Soviet Premie r Ryzhkov's speech to the 43rd CMEA session which emphasize d direct ties with that of Constantin Dascalescu, th e Romanian premier, who emphasized the role of the party . Both in Pravda, October 14, 1987, pp .4-5 . Compare the statement by Marion Marinov, a Bulgarian deputy secretar y of CMEA, Tass in English, March 25, 1987 [FBIS-Sov , March 27, 1987, p .BB14 ] (43) Scinteia, December 18, 1985 [SWB, December 31, 1985, p . EE/8144/C/l] Agerpress, December 10, 1986 [SWB, Decembe r 13, 1986, p . EE/8444/C/2] . (44) BTA, April 2, 1986 [SWB, April 4, 1986, p . EE/8224/C/7] . (45)See Ceausescu's statement during Gorbachev's visit as the y both toured a factory in Bucharest . While he acknowledged the need for cooperation in production, Ceausescu stresse d that "Implementation of these accords should be carried ou t by the workers' councils, the directors of enterprises , ministries, .and - including party organizations . Otherwise, our accords simply won't be implemented . " [Soviet TV, May 26, 1987 . SWB, p . EE/8580/C/11, May 29 , 1987, emphasis added] See also the favourable discussion o f a bilateral agreement with the GDR, ADN, May 30, 198 8 [FBIS, June 3, 1988, p . EE/O/68/A2/1] .

(46)At the last congress of the RCP Ceausescu spoke in favor o f "strengthening collaboration in the framework of CMEA , which does not affect the national independence of eac h country ." Radio Bucharest, November 20, 1989 . (47)Bucharest Home Service, September 4, 1980 [SWB, p . EE/8358/B/4] . (48) See statement of the Political Executive Committee, Octobe r 1987 (Agerpress in English, October 17, 1987 [SWB , p . EE/8702/B/6, October 19, 1987]) ; Era Socialista, # 12 , June 30, 1988, pp . 19-21 . (49) Magyar Hirlap, February 21, 1987, [FBIS, March 6, 1987 , p .BB3] . See also interview with Oleg Bogomolov i n Nepszabadsag, September 13, 1986 [FBIS, September 18, 1986 , p .BB4] . (50) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p . 2 . (51) Pravda, July 8, 1988, p .5 . (52) See, for example, Scinteia, March 22, 1981, p .l .

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(53) See Scinteia, November 25 and 26, 1978 and Pravda, December 7, 1978 . (54) Scinteia, September 7, 1986 [FBIS, September 11, 1986, p . H5-6] ; Scinteia, November 23 and 24, 1986 . (55) See Vladimir Socor, "Romania Rejects Human Rights Clause s of Final Document Adopted by CSCE," and "Romania an d Chemical Weapons," in Radio Free Europe Research, February 2, 1989, pp . 19-24, 25-29 . (56) See the statements by then Deputy Assistant Seretary o f State Mark Palmer before Congress, in Hearing before th e Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, US Senate, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 8 August , 1984, p .4 and Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade o f the Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 1st Session, serial 98-22 , 14 July, 1983, p . 56 ; see also Vice President George Bush' s speech at the Austrian Foreign Policy Association , September 21, 1983 (Vienna : US Information Service, 1983) . (57) See, for example, the statements by Deputy Secretary o f State John Whitehead, Washington Post, February 12, 1988 , Reuter, October 18, 1988 . AP, October 27, 1988, Washington Post, October 28, 1988, and by Secretary of State to the US Senate, Reuter, June 10, 1988 . (58) Buletinul Oficial, April 25, 1989, p .2 ; Glasul Patriei , September 30, 1989, Agerpress, October 1, 1989 . (59) Pravda, May 26, 1987, p . 1 . (60) Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, # 9, 1987, p . 132 . (61) Soviet TV, May 26, 1987 . [SWB, May 28, 1987 , p .EE/8579/C1/9, emphasis added] .

(62) TASS, May 26, 1987 [SWB, EE/8580/C/7, May 29, 1987] . See also Gorbachev's statement, Soviet TV, May 26, 1987 [SWB, p .EE/8580/C/10, May 29, 1987] . (63) Tass, May 11, 1988 [FBIS-Sov, May 12, 1988, p .39] ; Moscow TV, September 20,1988 [FBIS, September 21, 1988, p .43] . (64) Pravda, May 16, 1988, p . 5 . (65) See Gromyko's statement during his visit, Izvestia, May 1 4 1988, p . 1 . (66) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p . 1, emphasis added . (67) Pravda, October 6, 1988, p . 2 . (68) See Sotsialisticheskaia Industria, May 12, 1987, p .3 ; Pravda, August 23, 1986, p .5 .

5 8

(69) See, e .g . Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, # 9, 1987, pp . 128-33 . (70) See, e .g . Komsomolskaia Pravda, August 23, 1987 , p .3 ; Agitator, August 16, 1989, pp .49-51 . (71) See Sergei Volovets, "The USSR Had No Illusions About Ceausescu," Moscow News, January 28, 1990, p .1 3 (72) See, for example, the comments by Oleg Bogomolov in an interview in Komsomolskaia Pravda, July 23, 1988, p .3 ; Albert Pin, "Bucharest's silent music," New Times, #36 , 1989, p .26-7 . Radio Moscow did express some skepticism a t Romanian harvest claims made during the last RCP congress , pointing out that this was especially encouraging new s considering the continuation of domestic . Radio Moscow in Romanian, November 26, 1989 . (73) Radio Moscow, October 5, 1988 [SWB, October 6, 1988 ] (74) Pravda, May 25, 1987 . (75) For example, in September this service reported Polis h party leader Mieceslaw Rakowski's remarks about th e persistence of support for "socialism of the old type" . Radio Moscow in Romanian, September 25, 1989 . Also reported were the demonstrations in Germany, October 29 , 1989, and the replacement of Bulgarian party leade r Zhivkov, November 18, 1989 . (76) Pravda, May 25, 1987, p . 5 ; Krasnaia Zvezda, August 23 , 1987, p . 3 ; Sovietskaia Kultura, August 22, 1987, p . 7 . In fact, Moscow was quick to point to the sacrifice it made t o keep its commitments and that "difficulties in th e provision of the Romanian economy and population with fue l and power" were not its fault . Tass in English, February 27, 1987 [FBIS-Sov, May 3, 1987, p .Fl ] (77) Shafir, "Soviet Reaction to Polish Developments . "

(78) AP, October 7, 1989 . Later both Soviet and East germa n officials confirmed that Moscow had tried to push Honecke r toward reform . See the statement by Nikolai Portugalov, a CC member and advisor to Gorbachev on German affairs , Reuter, January 24, 1990 and that by Horst Sindermann , former speaker of the East German parliament, AP, Decembe r 27, 1989 . (79) See David Remnick, "Moscow Affirms Borders," International ` Herald Tribune, November 11-12, 1989, pp . 1-4 ; see also Shevardnadze's statement at NATO headquarters, Washington Post, December 20, 1989 . (80) Tass, January 30, 1990 .

5 9

(81) Compare statements by various Soviet spokesmen : on February 6, 1980, (N . Portugalov, AFP same date) ; February 9, (A . Tolpegin, Reuter, same date) ; (V . Churkin, RFE News an d Curent Affairs, same date) and February 17 (V . Falin, AP , same date) with those of Foreign Minister Shevardnadz e before and after the Ottawa "open skies" meeting at whic h reunification was discussed (Reuter, February 7, 1990 ; February 14, 1990 ; February 19, 1990) . (82) Interview with L'Unita, reported by Reuter, November 28 , 1989 . See also Pravda, November 27, 1989 . On November 24 , the day that Milos Jakes resigned, the Soviet Union hosted , the Solidarity Prime Minister of Poland in Moscow . For Soviet message of congratulations to Havel , see Tass in English, December 30, 1989 . (83) Radio Warsaw, September 29, 1989 ; Radio , Octobe r 2, 1989 . The Soviet paper Trud, reported the Hungarian confirmation of this action, October 6, 1989, p .3 . (84) See Scinteia, October 6, 1989, p .6, and October 7, 1989 , p .5 . Radio Bucharest, November 14, 1989 . (85) See, for example, the report of the last congress of th e Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Scinteia, October 4 , 1989, p .6, and of the resignation of the Bulgarian part y leader Todor Zhivkov and his replacement by . Scinteia, November 11 and 12, 1989, p .6 . Coverage also typically emphasized the difficulties evident in thos e states already engaged in reform ; for example, inflatio n and the growing disparity between rich and poor in Polan d were treated by Scinteia, October 5, 1989, p .6 and Novmeber 15, 1989, p .5 (which reprinted an article from The Times of London) . In October Romania Libera ran a front page cartoo n from le Monde which showed Polish Head of State Wojcec h Jaruzelski with a cane and tin cup begging for help for th e Polish economy (Romania Libera, October 18, 1989, p .1) . (86) Radio Moscow in Romanian, December 17, 1989 . (87) IBID ., December 19, 1989 . (88) Izvestia, December 20, 1989 ; Tass, December 21, 1989 ; Baltimore Sun, December 21, 1989 . (89) Radio Moscow in Romanian, December 21, 1989 . (90) Tass, December 22, 1989 . (91) Radio Bucharest, December 23, 1989 ; Budapest Television , December 23, 1989 ; Tass, December 25, 1989 . For a discussion of Moscow's reported involvement with th e National Salvation Front before the overthrow, see Michael i

6 0

Shafir, "Ceausescu's Overthrow ; Popular Uprising o r Moscow-guided Conspiracy?" Report on Eastern Europe, No . 3, 19 January 1990, pp . 15-19 . (92) Tass, 23 December 1989 . (93) Times, 24 December 1989 .

(94) AFP, 23 December 1989 ; UPI, 24 December 1989 . (95) , 25 December 1989 .

(96) Tass, 23 December 1989 . (97) Reuter, 24 December 1989 . (98) AP, 26 December 1989 . (99) Tass, 26 December 1989 . (100) Rompres, January 7, 1990 . (101) See the interview with Minister State Secretary Corneli u Bogdan in Izvestia, 1 January 1990 . (102) Radio Bucharest, January 12, 1990 ; Rompres, January 13 , 1990 ; Bucharest Domestic Service, January 13, 199 0 [FBIS, January 17, 1990, p . 73 ] (103) Radio Moscow in Romanian, January 15, 1990 . Whe n authorities began to demolish a statue of Lenin i n Bucharest, Moscow called for "more tactfulness in order not to hurt the feelings of many people, including thos e in neighboring countries ." Radio Moscow in Romanian , March, 3, 1990 . (104) See reports of this in New York Times, February 7, 1990 ; The Independent, February 7, 1990 ; The Times, February 7, 1990 .

(105) See Hungary's call for this, MTI in English, October 10 , 1989, and Soviet support at the CMEA summit, Tass , January 9, 1990 . (106) On debts owed to the USSR by all socialist countries, se e Tass in English, March 2, 1980 . Romania has no debt , according to these figures . (107) Reuter, March 2, 1990 . (108) Tass, December 10, 1989 ; Reuter, December 19, 1989 .

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(109) As a group the Warsaw Pact member states condemned thei r own 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Soviet Union issued an additional statement calling the ac t "unfounded" and "erroneous" . See texts in New York Times , December 5, 1989, p . A14 . (110) In what can only be seen as a desperate attempt to us e as a pillar of support one more time , Ceausescu unexpectedly raised the Moldavian issue at th e 14th congress of the RCP . He called for the annulment o f all agreements concluded with Nazi Germany and of "al l consequences of those agreements ." [Radio Bucharest , November 20, 1989] . Moscow did not respond directly but instead criticized western media for seeming to suggest that the border was being challenged . "No seriou s politician can raise, and in reality, raises the question of borders, including those between the Sovie t Union and Romania," said Tass (November 23, 1989) . (111) See Vladimir Socor, "Political Parties Emerging," Report on Eastern Europe, vol .l, No .7, 16 February 1990, pp . 28-353 . (112) See Washington Post, January 31, 1990 . (113) See the statement of US Secretary of State, James Bake r in Bucharest, Rompres, February 11, 1990 .