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Soviet-Romanian Relations Under Gorbachev FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : THE EXTERNALIZATION OF REFORM : SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS UNDER GORBACHE V AUTHOR : RONALD H . LINDE N CONTRACTOR : UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURG H PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : RONALD H . LINDEN COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 803-1 7 DATE : APRIL 1990 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY : "The Externalization of Reform : Soviet-Romanian Relations Under Gorbachev " PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Ronald H . Linden The principal aim of this research was to determine i f the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev was applying th e same standards and employing the same practices in it s reactions with the non-reforming East European states, as ha d previous regimes for different purposes . Specifically, th e investigation sought to determine if the USSR was using it s hegemonic position to promote change, in the form o f glasnost, perestroika and reform of regional institutions, i n the same way earlier regimes had acted to prevent reform . While an answer to this question can be offered, th e events of 1989 made this more of a historic than a curren t question . A broader approach to which this research wa s amenable was to look at existing Soviet policies in light o f the revolutions of 1989 and determine what, if anything , remained of post war Soviet policy . The question of how i t reacted to the recalcitrance of the Ceausescu leadership an d how it has reacted to the changes in Romania and elsewhere i n the region since the revolutions remains central . The mai n context of the research was Soviet-East European relations ; that context remains but the dynamics changed dramaticall y enough to extend the research focus in time and breadth . - 2 - In sum, 1989 did see the abandonment by the Sovie t leadership of the main premises of Soviet policy toward Eas t Europe . These had been Soviet political, economic an d military investment in : 1) maintenance of the monopoly o f communist party power in each of the states ; 2) maintenanc e of civil peace and ; 3) maintenance of at least minimu m participation in the Warsaw Pact . During 1989 the USSR made no move to intervene to prevent the elimination of communis t party dominance or ensure a "stable" public order . Nor did i t act to prevent steps which have led to the effective erosio n of the Warsaw Pact . In fact the changes and the revolution s of 1989 were verbally encouraged by the Gorbachev policies . Until 1989 such encouragement had still included caveat s about "the common interests of socialism ." But during 198 9 Soviet acquiescence to the change of regimes in Poland an d then in the rapid revolutions in East Germany , Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and finally, violently, in Romani a made it clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead . Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu rejected the principle s and path of reform underway in the USSR and during 1989 eve n moved to try to stifle the change in Poland . The Gorbachev leadership did little to hasten the end of Ceausescu despit e his clear rejection of reform . It cannot be said tha t extensive or even substantial pressure, beyond a few critical comments, was brought to bear to force Ceausescu into th e reform camp . But support for the Romanian revolution when i t occurred was clear and followed quickly by diplomatic an d economic assistance . Since the revolution in Romania and East Europe, Sovie t policy has been both low key and unformed . Reactions ar e intermittent and to certain events, such as the banning o f the communist party in Romania, or possible reunification o f Germany, but are often ad hoc and even contradictory . Partl y this is a function of the representation of a more divers e range of views in the Soviet press and partly it is th e result of Moscow's preoccupation with severe domestic , economic and political problems . A clear policy line which i s continuing, however, is the Soviet desire to improve th e econonomic relationship with the East European states by placing them on a more realistic and favorable basis . United States policy of pressing Romania to move a s quickly and directly as possible to a pluralistic, democrati c system has been in evidence since the revolution . Despite criticism from the new Romanian government and possibl e temporary losses of economic opportunity, this policy shoul d be continued . 1 I . PREMISES OF POSTWAR SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROP E Since World War II Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has bee n based on the pursuit of three kinds of security : physical , political, and economic . These goals apply to Southeaster n Europe as part of the East European region and to it s relationship with Romania . In most recent times the Sovie t view of how best to secure those goals has changed, as thi s report will indicate, but it bears reviewing the premises o f Soviet policy until the momentous changes of 1988 and 1989 , stimulated in large part by the change of regime in Moscow . Physical Security The USSR has invested immense political, economic, and military resources to keep its western border free fro m potential attack by hostile conventional and, to a lesse r extent, nuclear forces . This goal has little to do with the Communist nature of the Soviet government or with th e existence of any actual current threat . The Soviet Unio n absorbed the brutal lessons of the past and, given the scop e of the country's destruction and suffering in World War II , the maintenance of an adequate buffer in the west took on a life of its own as a foreign-policy given . 2 The threat emanating from Southeastern Europe, however , has clearly been perceived to be much less than the threa t from Central Europe, a view that accurately reflects at leas t twentieth-century European history . Soviet troop-stationin g patterns show a much greater emphasis on the central an d northern regions of Eastern Europe than on the souther n region . No Warsaw Pact troops were stationed in Bulgaria , and such troops were withdrawn from Romania in 1958 . Outside the Warsaw Pact, neither Albania nor Yugoslavia has accepte d Soviet troops . Political Security Political security has been a goal dating from the time o f the Bolshevik Revolution and the period between the worl d wars during which the USSR was the only socialist state . The operative premise has been that the Soviet Union must have i n this region friendly states which in their domestic an d international policies will be cognizant of and responsive t o Soviet interests . This was certainly not the case during th e interwar period, when large and small powers alike eithe r ignored Soviet desires or were hostile to them . Politica l security since the late 1940s had until very recently bee n guaranteed in Eastern Europe by the dominance of Soviet - supported Communist parties in these states . 3 At a maximum, such as during Stalin's time, th e Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sought th e duplication of its own forms and policies in each of the Eas t European states . Such an approach both provoked and wa s reinforced by the split with Yugoslavia of 1948 . After Stalin's death the policy of the Soviet leadership was t o press for general adherence to, if not exact mimicking of , Soviet domestic and international initiatives . At a minimum , political security in this region meant resisting th e influence of countries seen to be the key Soviet adversaries , primarily the United States but also, during the 1960s an d early 1970s, China . Chinese diplomacy was very active i n Southeastern Europe during the 1970s ; Beijing succeeded i n attracting a vocal if small ally in Albania and i n maintaining full and supportive ties with Romania . Since 1948 the Soviet Union has seen greater threats t o its political security in Central Europe . The challenge in Southeastern Europe was complicated, however, because of th e varied environment, which included WTO member Bulgaria , nonaligned Yugoslavia and hostile Albania . During the 1960' s and 1970's Romanian pursuit of a distinctive foreign polic y was also problematic but not directly threatening to Sovie t goals . (See below) 4 Economic Security The Soviet Union has clearly viewed Eastern Europe as a region whose resources are available to be used to satisf y Soviet needs . As a result, for the first fifteen or s o years after World War II, the Soviets extracted by variou s measures (reparations, joint stock companies, unequal trad e relations) immense material resources to build and rebuil d the Soviet economy .1 During the next twenty years, however , the relationship shifted to one in which the Soviet Unio n provided the raw materials and fuel and received in exchang e more complex manufactured goods . Owing to declining terms o f trade and increased involvement of several East Europea n countries with the West, this relationship turne d increasingly unfavorable for the USSR . The USSR, as Michae l Marrese and Jan Vanous have shown, subsidized the Eas t European economies, including those of Southeastern Europe , 2 in order to keep the alliance politically cohesive and, t o the extent possible, to support the ability of some of th e regimes to buy peace at home with better economi c performance . More recently, the Soviets began to call attention t o the need to "restructure" the trade relationship more t o their advantage and in a way that serves their greatest need : better-quality machines, equipment, technology, and technological know-how to help the Soviet economy .
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