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LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY the Wise Prince in the Defiant LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY The Wise Prince in the Defiant Sayyed A comparative study between The Prince of Niccolo Machiavelli and Hassan Nasrallah’s behavior By MANAL N. SARROUF Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs School of Arts and Sciences June 2011 Thesis approval Form (Annex 111) StudentName: b&.hl& S&?ROOF I.D. #: 2004 004 1 8 Thesis Title : . I, I, b.h~ePjk.ad I-Lsw-I k~c3~dh'5bh~'i8-l Program : %te(n&~l &ns DivisionDept : QUmn &es & -( School School of Arts and Sciences Approved by: rhesis Advisor: D1. &lid Moubak Member : &. &bib r'Jbkk- Member : a bayhb Date (This document will constitute the first page of the Thesis) ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This research would not have been possible without the help and assistance of many persons. First I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Walid Moubarak who devotedly guided me throughout the whole process of producing this thesis. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Habib Malik and Dr. Marwan Rowayheb for being members of my thesis committee. Thanks go also to the Lebanese American University for all the support this institution has offered me throughout my graduate studies. Finally special thanks go also to Nicholas-Georges Matta, my friends, and family for their continuous support and for being a source of motivation. v To my beloved mom and dad vi The Wise Prince in the Defiant Sayyed A comparative study between The Prince of Niccolo Machiavelli and Hassan Nasrallah’s Behavior MANAL N. SARROUF Abstract Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has proved to be one of Lebanon’s most influential political and religious figures in the country’s modern history. His influence has even surpassed Lebanese territories as people rallied in the streets of Egypt, Syria, Iran and other countries glorifying him for the 2006 “Divine Victory” over Israel. While he is adored by many, and even worshiped by some; his political rivals remain skeptical of him, detest him, fear him or at least fear his ideology and his party’s rising power in a weak state like Lebanon. Nasrallah has closely watched the development of Hezbollah since its formation and has contributed to its progress and disputed successes. Given the party’s ascending power and emergence as a major regional military player facing Israel, Nasrallah has become a leader with domestic, regional and international influence since he succeeded assassinated Secretary General Abbas al-Moussawi in 1992. This study delves into all the details of Nasrallah’s biography as well as his religious, ideological and political beliefs and practices. It aims to examine to what extent Nasrallah’s leadership traits resemble those of one of the well-known leadership models, The Princeof Niccolo Machiavelli. The comparison is made between Nasrallah as a person and the fictitious Prince in Machiavelli’s book. The study is aware of the limitations to this comparison such as the difference in time when The Prince was written, back in the 1500s, and modern times. It is also aware of another limitation which is the difference in the type of rule between Machiavelli’s principalities and Lebanon’s republic and as such between the position of Machiavelli’sPrince –as a country ruler- and that of Nasrallah- as a party leader. The study moves from the premise that Hezbollah is the principality ruled by Nasrallah. The study encompasses the following main sections: the acquisition of power, the qualities, the actions and achievements, and the military aspect. It concludes with the limitations to Nasrallah’s leadership which renders it impossible for him to have absolute power without any constraints. Keywords: Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah, Lebanon, The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli, Machiavellian, Leader, Ideology, Wilayat al-Faqih, Jurisdiction Of The Jurist-Theologian, Iran, Syria, Israel, Armed Group, Paramilitary, Weapons, Shura Council vii Table of Contents Chapter page I - INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1-6 II - A Strong Hezbollah in a Weak Lebanon .................................................................... 7-22 III - Who is Hassan Nasrallah, why Hezbollah? ............................................................. 23-34 IV - Machiavelli’s Prince ................................................................................................ 35-40 V - Power in hand, ideology at heart .............................................................................. 41-67 VI - The “Princely” Sayyed .......................................................................................... 68-125 6.1. Part I ....................................................................................................................... 68 6.1.1. Virtue against fury .......................................................................................... 70 6.1.2. Liberality versus Parsimoniousness ................................................................ 77 6.1.3. Feared or Loved .............................................................................................. 84 6.2. Part II ...................................................................................................................... 93 6.2.1. How to keep faith ............................................................................................ 93 6.2.2. Avoiding hate, overcoming conspiracy ........................................................ 100 6.2.3. Acquiring a reputation .................................................................................. 109 VII - Keeping an Army in the field ............................................................................. 126-141 VIII - CONCLUSION:Limitations to Nasrallah’s leadership .................................... 142-149 IX - BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.-162 X - APPENDIX ................................................................................................................... 162 viii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION “We are nobler, higher, grander, purer, more sincere, more virtuous, more faithful and more eminent than that one would dare issue accusations against our patriotic background,” says1 the leader of the Lebanese Shiite militant-political group Hezbollah Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in one of his 2005 speeches, conveying a clear notion of superiority vis-à-vis his Lebanese counterparts. Nasrallah even goes further in the same speech and challenges the other Lebanese groups inquiring of them about their identity, their past, previous positions, and alliances. Similar rhetoric has been reiterated by the Hezbollah chief on several occasions. This holier-than-attitude has incited abundant responses from various Lebanese political leaders who felt offended by Nasrallah’s words and considered his recurrent statements insulting to their leadership and their masses. When a Shiite leader like Nasrallah addresses his majorly Shiite audience with such words, he is clearly denoting that the times have changed and that his historically marginalized community is no longer the same. It has rather accumulated some sort of power, basically military and political, which Nasrallah relies on in attributing grandeur to his people and in motivating them with such arrogance. One could easily deduce that Nasrallah is bluntly warning everybody that his previously dispossessed community should be dealt with differently, always citing its “honorable” past and hence its uprising power. In an attempt to 1 Retrieved from: http://www.10452lccc.com/hizbollah/nasrallah25.11.05.htm 1 prove this abovementioned “honor”, Nasrallah is always keen on emphasizing the role of the party, which he intentionally refers to as the Resistance, in preserving Lebanon. As it is known, the Shiite community has not played any significant political role in Lebanon’s history before the emergence of Imam Moussa al-Sadr in the 1970s. Neither in the formation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 nor in the establishment of the Maronite-Sunni National Pact of 1943 did the Shia have a say in determining the distribution of power in the sectarian country Lebanon although they were only given the position of the Speaker of Parliament which was insignificant at the time. Amidst the Maronite-Sunni dominance, the Shiite community in Lebanon ranked last among others in terms of education, social, political and economic standards which led to Sadr’s formation of the Movement of the Deprived [Harakat al-Mahroumin]. Today,Nasrallah takes pride that his people have liberated south Lebanon from the Israeli occupation in May 2000 and thus claims that no one is more devoted to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and freedom than his own people. One cannot but ask: what factors make Nasrallah adopt such a tone and why does he allow himself to consider his people superior to others? What changes have occurred in Lebanese politics to make him gain such confidence? Or, do these words only intend to keep his supporters’ morale high while matters differ when it comes to actions? Lebanon is a weak state which is not in full control of all its territory. Given the case, the “Party of God” [literal translation of the Arabic word “Hezbollah”] imposes itself as a predominant non-state actor which has established its own military power and welfare 2 system and has become a state-within-the-state. For instance, the Lebanese army cannot practice its
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