Securing Haiti's Transition
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International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume I Drug and Chemical Control March 2017 INCSR 2017 Volume 1 Table of Contents Table of Contents Common Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. iii International Agreements .......................................................................................................................... v INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Policy and Program Developments ......................................................................................................... 17 Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 18 Methodology for U.S. Government Estimates of Illegal Drug Production ............................................... 24 (with dates ratified/acceded) ................................................................................................................... 30 USG Assistance ..................................................................................................................................... 36 International Training ............................................................................................................................. -
The Election Impasse in Haiti
At a glance April 2016 The election impasse in Haiti The run-off in the 2015 presidential elections in Haiti has been suspended repeatedly, after the opposition contested the first round in October 2015. Just before the end of President Martelly´s mandate on 7 February 2016, an agreement was reached to appoint an interim President and a new Provisional Electoral Council, fixing new elections for 24 April 2016. Although most of the agreement has been respected , the second round was in the end not held on the scheduled date. Background After nearly two centuries of mainly authoritarian rule which culminated in the Duvalier family dictatorship (1957-1986), Haiti is still struggling to consolidate its own democratic institutions. A new Constitution was approved in 1987, amended in 2012, creating the conditions for a democratic government. The first truly free and fair elections were held in 1990, and won by Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Fanmi Lavalas). He was temporarily overthrown by the military in 1991, but thanks to international pressure, completed his term in office three years later. Aristide replaced the army with a civilian police force, and in 1996, when succeeded by René Préval (Inite/Unity Party), power was transferred democratically between two elected Haitian Presidents for the first time. Aristide was re-elected in 2001, but his government collapsed in 2004 and was replaced by an interim government. When new elections took place in 2006, Préval was elected President for a second term, Parliament was re-established, and a short period of democratic progress followed. A food crisis in 2008 generated violent protest, leading to the removal of the Prime Minister, and the situation worsened with the 2010 earthquake. -
Investigation by the Office of Special Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice Dmg Enforcement Administration Office of the Administrator Springfield, VA 22152 April 5, 2019 MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL if.)1.-- THROUGH: THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ~,0. ~ c}:<i..li-\~ei1\' FROM: Uttam Dhillon( I) O Acting Administrator SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority PURPOSE: To obtain a delegation of authority pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1213 in order provide response to request for investigation by the Office of Special Counsel TIMETABLE: Immediately DISCUSSION: By letter dated May 15, 2018, the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) has requested the Attorney General to investigate allegations from two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) employees that DEA failed to assist Haitian law enforcement with implementing basic seaport security measures and failed to properly conduct its investigation into what was alleged to be the only significant drug seizure in Port-au-Prince in the past 10 years. Under 5 U.S.C. §1213(c) and (g), upon the receipt of such a referral, the agency head is required to conduct an investigation and prepare a report. Under 28 U.S.C. §510, and consistent with agency practice implementing 5 U.S.C. §1213, as recognized by the OSC, you may delegate the responsibilities under section 1213 to conduct an investigation and prepare the related report. This includes delegation of the authority to take actions as a result of the investigation pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1213(d) (5). On May 22, 2018, the Department of Justice Executive Secretariat (ES) sent the OSC letter to DEA under ES Workflow ID number 4033252 "for appropriate handling." Based on the ES tasking, the DEA conducted the investigation and, on September 6, 2018, I signed a cover letter addressed to SA Counsel Hemy J. -
PEACE by COMMITTEE Command and Control Issues in Multinational Peace Enforcement Operations
PEACE BY COMMITTEE Command and Control Issues in Multinational Peace Enforcement Operations HAROLD E. BULLOCK, Major, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 93–94 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama February 1995 Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii ABSTRACT . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . 1 Notes . 2 2 COMMAND AND FORCE STRUCTURE . 3 Dominican Republic . 3 Somalia . 9 Summary . 19 Notes . 21 3 POLITICAL IMPACTS ON OPERATIONS . 27 Dominican Republic . 27 Somalia . 35 Summary . 45 Notes . 47 4 INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES . 53 Dominican Republic . 53 Somalia . 59 Intelligence . 63 Summary . 68 Notes . 70 5 CONCLUSION . 75 Notes . 79 Illustrations Figure 1 Map Showing Humanitarian Relief Sectors (Deployment Zones) . 12 2 Weapon Authorization ID Card . 18 3 ROE Pocket Card Issued for Operation Restore Hope . 36 iii Abstract The United States has been involved in peace enforcement operations for many years. In that time we have learned some lessons. Unfortunately, we continue to repeat many of the same mistakes. -
Haiti: Fact Sheet
Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 07/09/2021 11:33:58 AM HAITI: FACT SHEET 2016 Election • President MoYse received 32.8% of votes in the first round of the 2015 elections held on October 25, 2015, qualifying for a runoff with the second-place finisher, Jude Celestin. • Jude Celestin subsequently raised, without evidence, allegations that the votes for President MoYse in the October poll were fraudulent. Violence was instigated by his supporters and in turn caused the cancellation of the second round. o These claims emerged despite the Organization of American States, who had "125 observers from 27 countries present from the opening of the polls up to the counting of the votes in all 10 departments of the country, visiting 487 voting centers", officially declaring that "in spite of some isolated instances, Haitian citizens with the will to vote were able to cast their ballots." o "Schools that serve as election centres and voting stations in various towns have been attacked and set on fire in recent days, and election materials in a border town were hijacked by gunmen" Haiti cancels presidential election as violence erupts. Associated Press, Jan 23, 2016 • Following the cancellation of the 2015 elections due to the violence, the former head of Haiti's Senate and National Assembly, Jocelerme Privert, was elected interim president by Parliament following a vote that took nearly 12 hours on February 14, 2016. • Fresh elections were re-run on November 20, 2016 and overseen by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). President MoYse won 55.6% of the popular vote and was inaugurated on February 7, 2017. -
La Situation Politique Et Institutionnelle HAITI
HAITI 4 août 2016 La situation politique et institutionnelle Avertissement Ce document a été élaboré par la Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière. Il ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra ou des autorités françaises. Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) [cf. https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lignes_directrices_europeennes.pdf ], se veut impartial et se fonde principalement sur des renseignements puisés dans des sources qui sont à la disposition du public. Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées. Elles ont été sélectionnées avec un souci constant de recouper les informations. Le fait qu’un événement, une personne ou une organisation déterminée ne soit pas mentionné(e) dans la présente production ne préjuge pas de son inexistence. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. 335-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Haïti : Situation politique et institutionnelle Table des matières 1. Panorama institutionnel, administratif et politique ................................................. 3 1.1. Les institutions .......................................................................................... 3 1.2. L’organisation administrative et territoriale ................................................... 3 1.3. Les principaux partis politiques .................................................................. -
Foreign Policy Decisions Which Led to United States Military Occupation of the Dominican Republic
Portland State University PDXScholar Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 1971 Foreign policy decisions which led to United States military occupation of the Dominican Republic Bert Lewis Junior Farrar Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Farrar, Bert Lewis Junior, "Foreign policy decisions which led to United States military occupation of the Dominican Republic" (1971). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1463. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1462 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. Ali ABSTRACT 01' TBB ftBS1S OF Bert. Lewis JUIlior Parrar for the Master of Arb in History pre••at.ed April 14, 1971. TlUel Poreign Policy Deei.lou Which Led to Uaitad State. Milit.ary Occupation of the DoaUnican Republie. APPROVED BY MBMBBRS 01' THE TBBSIS COMMlftBB I Preclerick NUDA, CbalrJ1lall '1'0 achi... in4epen4ence, the Doa.inican Republic had 1:0 tint endure three centw:1ea of haavy-hancled SpaD iah rule and. period. of Haitian domination that. laated for twenty-two yean. !'ear of Haitian reconque8t., how...r, conviDce4 the leacting Doaaiaican politicians that the new aatiOD could not 10n9 endure without forelta protection. Bncouraged by Domia1can offers of a naval ba••, the UDited State. -
Jocelerme Privert Président Pour 12O Jours
challengesnews.com N°27 // FÉVRIER 2016 SEM. 8 - 120 HTG HAÏTI / 4 USD USA JOCELERME PRIVERT PRÉSIDENT POUR 12O JOURS DOSSIER L’INVITÉ GRAND FORMAT Attention Monferrier Le parlement mines ! Dorval haïtien MAINTENANT À S’abonner sur challengesnews.com/sabonner SOMMAIRE N°27 // FÉVRIER 2016 // SEM. 8 TOURISME L’ÉVÉNEMENT GRAND FORMAT L’INVITÉ Monferrier Dorval L’ATH une nouvelle fois sur le pont Jocelerme Privert, président provisoire 7 Politique en 2016 46 Droits et devoirs du Parlement haïtien 20 De l’esprit du droit 36 EN COULISSE 12 INTERNATIONAL PORTRAIT DOSSIER Le pape François demande un « examen PEOPLE Mgr Pierre-André Dumas 14 Attention mines ! 24 de conscience » pour les torts infligés Au Palais national 48 Un centre pour la mémoire aux peuples indigènes 40 LA PHOTO DE LA SEMAINE géologique 28 LE REGARD Un fauteuil pour 120 jours 16 DIASPORA Carine Roenen Laroche 50 REPORTAGES Caroline du Nord : le parcours LE MONDE DES AFFAIRES La BOID : une nouvelle unité de santé de Jean Orélien 41 9 120 emplois au Parc industriel de la PNH 31 de Caracol en 2015 18 E-Power : modèle d’entreprise Le directeur des opérations de l’OCHA CULTURE en Haïti 19 sociale 34 Carnaval : la fête quand même 42 7 42 20 24 36 48 50 4 5 L’ÉVÉNEMENT POLITIQUE L’ÉCHARPE PRÉSIDENTIELLE Adyjeangardy epuis dimanche de l’Etat qui, à la fin de son mandat, remet- 14 février, la République tait, pliée en quatre, son écharpe présiden- d’Haïti a, en cinq jours, tielle… à celui qui allait finalement lui succé- réussi à se doter d’un der. -
Haiti: a Case Study of the International Response and the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis
HAITI: A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE AND THE EFFICACY OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRISIS by Leslie A. Benton* Glenn T. Ware** I. INTRODUCTION In 1990, a military coup ousted the democratically-elected president of Haiti, Jean- Bertrand Aristide. The United States led the international response to the coup, Operation Uphold Democracy, a multinational military intervention meant to restore the legitimate government of Haiti. The operation enjoyed widespread support on many levels: the United Nations provided the mandate, the Organization of American States (OAS) supported it, and many countries participated in the multinational force and the follow-on United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worked with the multinational force and later the UNMIH to restore the elected government and to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti. This article focuses on the latter aspect of the international response–the delivery of humanitarian aid. It closely examines the methods of interorganization coordination,[1] with particular attention given to the interaction among NGOs and the United States military. An examination of that relationship indicates that the infrastructure the military used to coordinate with the NGO community–the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)–was critical to the success of the humanitarian mission. Because both the military and the humanitarian community will probably have to work together again in humanitarian assistance operations in response to civil strife, each community must draw on the lessons of past operations to identify problems in coordination and to find solutions to those problems. II. THE STORY A. Haiti’s History: 1462-1970[2] Modern Haitian history began in 1492 when Christopher Columbus landed on Haiti near Cape Haitien on the north coast of Hispaniola.[3] At first, the island was an important colony and the seat of Spanish government in the New World, but Spain’s interest in Hispaniola soon waned. -
Haiti Country Report BTI 2018
BTI 2018 Country Report Haiti This report is part of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2018. It covers the period from February 1, 2015 to January 31, 2017. The BTI assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of political management in 129 countries. More on the BTI at http://www.bti-project.org. Please cite as follows: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2018 Country Report — Haiti. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Contact Bertelsmann Stiftung Carl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 256 33111 Gütersloh Germany Sabine Donner Phone +49 5241 81 81501 [email protected] Hauke Hartmann Phone +49 5241 81 81389 [email protected] Robert Schwarz Phone +49 5241 81 81402 [email protected] Sabine Steinkamp Phone +49 5241 81 81507 [email protected] BTI 2018 | Haiti 3 Key Indicators Population M 10.8 HDI 0.493 GDP p.c., PPP $ 1784 Pop. growth1 % p.a. 1.3 HDI rank of 188 163 Gini Index 40.9 Life expectancy years 63.0 UN Education Index 0.447 Poverty3 % 51.0 Urban population % 59.8 Gender inequality2 0.593 Aid per capita $ 97.3 Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2017 | UNDP, Human Development Report 2016. Footnotes: (1) Average annual growth rate. (2) Gender Inequality Index (GII). (3) Percentage of population living on less than $3.20 a day at 2011 international prices. Executive Summary After the cancellation of the second round of the presidential elections in 2015, Haiti is finally starting 2017 with an elected president, Jovenel Moise, a functioning parliament, and for the first time in more than ten years, elected local officials from the lowest public offices, Conseils d’Administration des Sections Communales or CASEC, to those of mayors. -
Florida's Refugee and Entrant Arrivals
Florida's Refugee Population Statistical Report October 1st, 2003 – September 30th, 2004 Federal Fiscal Year 2004 Courtesy of the US Coast Guard Prepared By: Florida Department of Children & Families Refugee Services State of Florida Arrivals and Clients Receiving Services Federal Fiscal Year 2004 Immigration Status Status Clients Served * Percent Asylee 2,949 21.21% Entrant 554 3.99% Parolee 9,827 70.69% Refugee 571 4.11% Total 13,901 100.00% Status Arrivals Percent Entrant 1,740 8.48% Parolee 15,914 77.56% Refugee 2,865 13.96% Total 20,519 100.00% Status Clients Served and Arrivals Percent Asylee 2,949 8.57% Entrant 2,294 6.66% Parolee 25,741 74.79% Refugee 3,436 9.98% Total 34,420 100.00% * Excludes clients in FFY 2004 arrivals. Refugee Services ARRIVALS AND NON-ARRIVALS REPORT - FFY 2004 1/6/2009 1 State of Florida Arrivals and Clients Receiving Services Federal Fiscal Year 2004 County by Origin and Status Refugees Entrant Parolees Asylees COUNTY Cubans Haitians Others Cubans Haitians Cubans Haitians Cubans Haitians Others Total ALACHUA 003 00 70 00 0 10 BAY 002 00 30 00 0 5 BREVARD 000 01 70 01 0 9 BROWARD 54 4 34 57 73 639 8 2 185 324 1,380 CHARLOTTE 100 10 20 00 0 4 CITRUS 000 00 70 00 0 7 CLAY 000 31 40 00 0 8 COLLIER 61 2 1 28 19 492 8 0 27 15 653 COLUMBIA 300 00 00 00 0 3 DADE 1,445 16 45 1,305 401 20,594 70 74 346 911 25,207 DUVAL 31 0 417 10 7 145 1 0 25 42 678 ESCAMBIA 003 00 20 00 2 7 FLAGLER 0027 00 10 00 0 28 HENDRY 000 20470 00 0 49 HERNANDO 000 10 50 00 1 7 HIGHLANDS 000 00140 00 0 14 HILLSBOROUGH 163 1 198 70 6 1,477 -
The Influence of Paramilitary Culture on Disaster Response Organizations in the 2010 Haiti Earthquake
SPEEDING INTO ACTION: THE INFLUENCE OF PARAMILITARY CULTURE ON DISASTER RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE Jeffrey D. Stern Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Public Administration/Public Affairs Patrick S. Roberts, Chair Anne M. Khademian Matthew Dull James F. Wolf October 27, 2014 Alexandria, Virginia Keywords: Haiti earthquake, disaster response, paramilitary, FEMA, Coast Guard, SOUTHCOM Copyright © 2014 Jeffrey D. Stern Speeding into Action: the Influence of Paramilitary Culture on Disaster Response Organizations in the 2010 Haiti Earthquake Jeffrey D. Stern ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the influence of paramilitary professional cultural attributes on the speed at which disaster response organizations (DROs) recognize, respond, organize, and take action in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Three agencies are examined: the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. military’s Southern Command/Joint Task Force- Haiti. The 2010 Haiti earthquake is used as a case study to explore the influence of three independent variables: (1) paramilitarism; (2) career ladders (i.e., recruitment and professional development of staff); and (3) workforce autonomy. The purpose is to determine if paramilitary cultures help or hinder an agency’s speed into action, thereby helping improve the disaster response organizations of the future. In the case of Haiti, it finds that the combination of thick paramilitary culture, insider career ladders, and high workforce autonomy best enabled responders’ speed into action. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................