Nothing New Under the Setting Sun: , , and the Death and Afterlife of the

by Frank Fazio

B.A. in History, May 2018, Villanova University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

May 17, 2020

Thesis directed by

Dane Kennedy Elmer Louis Kayser Professor of History

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 1

2. Castles Made of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Central African Federation, 1950- 1963 ...... 7

3. “Wrapped Up in the Union Jack”: UDI and the Right-Wing Reaction, 1963-1980 ....32

4. Stoking the Embers of Empire: The Falklands and the Half-Life of Empire, 1968- ...57

5. Bibliography ...... 77

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Introduction

After being swept out of Parliament in the winter of 1966, Julian Amery set about writing his memoirs. Son of a famous father and son-in-law of a former Prime Minister, the 47-year-old felt sure that this political setback was merely a bump in the road.

Therefore, rather than risking offending his once and future peers by writing “with candour,” Amery chose to write his memoirs about his early life and service during the

Second World War.1 True to his word, Amery concluded the first and only volume of his memoirs with his election to Parliament in 1950. However, his brief preface betrayed a crucial aspect of how he perceived Britain’s place in the world in the late 1960s.

Reflecting on his youth, he wrote that “the Britain of my boyhood…[seems] very far removed from the present age. Our material environment has been transformed. Our social and even our personal values have undergone deep changes. Our role and influence in the world [have] sadly, though perhaps only temporarily, declined.” He thought back wistfully on a “British Empire and Commonwealth” that “ranked as a great power in its own right,” and harshly criticized “the failure of British officialdom to adjust to the realities of a rapidly changing scene.” Even so, he placed his hope in his firm belief that, if Britain’s “leaders gave a strong enough lead, our people would respond.” 2 Amery yearned to return to Parliament and resume his fight for the Britain of his memory.

Indeed, Amery was one of a number of British politicians, largely of the

Conservative Party, who were devoted to restoring Britain, in attitude if not in fact, to the position of power and influence it had once enjoyed. The work that follows will focus on two of the more distinguished of these individuals: Amery and Patrick Wall. As

1 Julian Amery, Approach March: a venture in autobiography (: Hutchinson of London, 1973), 16, The Internet Archive. 2 Amery, Approach March, 17. 1

mentioned briefly above, Amery’s father was a distinguished politician in his own right, and a staunch imperialist of the old school. had been Colonial Secretary from

1924 to 1929, and in that position became one of the foremost advocates for a

Chamberlainite system. Under this system, pioneered by Joseph

Chamberlain and fervently adopted by Leo Amery, Britain, its colonies, and the

Commonwealth would be tightly bound together by a broad series of tariffs, and a common market, a scheme which resembled in very real ways Leo Amery’s vision for Europe. The younger Amery, educated at Eton and Balliol College, Oxford, inherited his father’s devotion to these causes, and carried on the family’s political mantle.3 After several years of eventful service in World War II, Amery’s life was also shaped by tragedy, as his elder brother John was hanged for collaboration with the Nazis in

December 1945. Amery took time out of an ultimately unsuccessful parliamentary bid to go to Spain in an effort to prove John had become a Spanish citizen, thereby trying and failing to save him from execution.4 In the 50 years that followed John’s death, Amery almost never spoke of his brother in public.5

Patrick Wall’s pre-Parliamentary life was not nearly so dramatic. An alumnus of

Downside School in Bath, Wall joined the in 1935. Serving during the

Second World War with distinction, he received the Military Cross and the US Order of

Merit for his wartime service. After 15 years with the Marines, he retired in 1950 as a

3 Wm. Roger Louis, "Leo Amery and the Post-War World, 1945-55," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30, no. 3 (2002): 78; the younger Amery was sufficiently devoted to the cause of imperial preference that he wrote the last three volumes of a six-volume biography of . 4 Louis, “Leo Amery and the Post-War World,” 73. 5 George Rosie, "Rear Window: : The traitor whom Britain politely forgot,” The Independent, February 12, 1995; an unpublished chapter of “Approach March” on John Amery can be found at The Papers of Julian Amery, Churchill Archive Centre, Cambridge, 8/3/48.

2

major, and commenced a political career. Like Amery, Wall was unsuccessful in his first bid for a seat in Parliament, prior to his eventual entrance in 1954.6

The project will closely examine two instances of in which Wall and Amery held a particular interest. Firstly, Amery was a persistent advocate for the creation of the Central African Federation (CAF). Intended as an exercise in the continuation of British power, its “velvet glove of power sharing” concealed an iron grip on the African majority under its rule.7 Amery, joined by Wall in 1954, did their best to support the Federation, even as it became less and less functional. Ultimately, when it became clear that the CAF no longer pleased any faction under its aegis, Wall and Amery turned their attention to maintaining white minority rule in . Therefore, the second episode of decolonization this thesis will study is the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). With Britain requiring that Rhodesia have a clear plan to transfer power to the black majority prior to receiving independence, the Ian

Smith government, feeling betrayed by their “kith and kin,” declared Rhodesia independent of the on its own authority.8 Amery, Wall, and their allies fought a rearguard action in Britain to, at the very least, smooth Rhodesia’s path towards independence. Wall became so intensely associated with the Smith regime that he was derisively called “The Honourable Member for Salisbury,” and was considered by some to be, as he put it, a “ beast.”9 Like the Federation, however, the white Rhodesian

6 Wall, Patrick Henry Bligh, 1916-1998, politician, Papers of Sir Patrick Wall MP, 1890-1992. Hull University Archives, Hull History Centre. GB 50 U DPW. https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/data/gb50-udpw. 7 Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The of Decolonization," in Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 463. 8 J.R.T Wood, 'So Far and No Further!': Rhodesia's Bid for Independence during the Retreat from Empire, 1959-1965 (Bloomington, IN: Trafford, 2012), loc. 23838 of 25856, Kindle. 9 , "Patrick Wall and ," South African Historical Journal 52, no. 1 (2005): 103.

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cause was a losing one. In 1980, Rhodesia became independent under black majority rule as the newly named . As senior members of the Party, Amery and Wall then carved out hawkish positions on the , the third incident this project will discuss. Britain’s defeat of Argentina, and robust defense of kinsfolk in the South

Atlantic, gave the political firepower needed to reshape the Party in her image, even as the notion of British revival she associated with the Falklands victory was more aspirational than factual, papering over “the cracks beneath the surface of

British political culture.”10 Nonetheless, the Thatcherite view of Britain’s state, which closely resembled that which Wall and Amery argued for, was infused in the

Conservative Party in ways that continue to reverberate.

Before delving more deeply into what this thesis will discuss, it would be worthwhile to briefly address two works that were impactful in conceptualizing what follows. Bill Schwarz’s The White Man’s World, the first in a planned series of three volumes, argues that the political crises of the settler-colonies helped to trigger a major ideological crisis in the homeland.11 He explicitly takes a stance against Bernard Porter’s

“absent-minded imperialist” theory, suggesting that imperial memory is melded into the metropole in ways both great and small.12 Schwarz’s formulation demonstrates with clarity the surviving connections between the empire and modern Britain. His emphasis on the politics of memory is particularly germane to my treatment of Wall and Amery’s reaction to affronts to their “kith and kin.”

10 Ezequiel Mercau, The Falklands War: An Imperial History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 15. 11 Bill Schwarz, The White Man's World. Memories of Empire, vol. 1(Oxford: , 2011), 25. 12 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 4

On the subject of “kith and kin,” Ezequiel Mercau’s The Falklands War: An

Imperial History is, as its title suggests, an examination of the Falklands War through an explicitly imperial lens.13 He believes that the historiographical debate that had surrounded the conflict cried out for re-assessment. In Mercau’s estimation, the deliberation over to what extent the Falklands War was an “imperial atavism,” meaning the evocation of – or regression to – the memory of imperial glories past, is no longer one based on cold fact, but instead an arena for “polemic.”14 He argues instead that it must be considered transnationally, as a reflection of a greater British world.15 Wall and Amery considered such a framework to be self-evident and regarded the Falklands War as yet another manifestation of their efforts to protect such a British world.

In sum, through Amery and Wall, this work will demonstrate the ways in which members of the Conservative right wing reacted to the decolonization of the British

Empire, with a focus on the rhetoric they deployed. The concepts that Schwarz and

Mercau discuss underwrite my analysis of Wall and Amery’s political language in crucial ways. Wall and Amery were at the heart of the first wave of politicians to grapple with the protracted decolonization process while representing the white settler point of view in

London. As this thesis will show, their loyal pro-settler stance, bolstered by the rhetoric emanating from Welensky and Smith in the Federation and Rhodesia, helped to develop the infrastructure upon which would launch his populist movement. The idea that those settlers were Britain’s “kith and kin” and therefore in many ways co- partners to the Empire’s bounty was also deeply retained in Wall and Amery’s thinking.

Their great concern that the settler populace should be a high priority of British decision-

13 Mercau, The Falklands War, 1-17. 14 Mercau, The Falklands War, 5, 7. 15 Mercau, The Falklands War, 17. 5

making animated their actions from the Central African Federation’s formation to, as

Mercau convincingly argues, the Falklands War.

While the British Empire no longer exists as a temporal force in world affairs, the imperial idea at its heart lives on in modern Britain, as part of the continuing legacy of

Wall, Amery, and the Tory right wing. In particular, the notion of “kith and kin” was an articulation of imperialism in which high imperialists, such as Wall and Amery, could find common cause with Powell, who deemed the continuation of an actual Empire highly unrealistic. From Powell, this imperial relic passed to Thatcher, who placed it at the center of her nationalist philosophy.16 During the 11 years of her premiership,

Thatcher, bolstered by great electoral success, reshaped the Conservative Party in her image, remnants of which exist in the Party even to the present day. “Kith and kin,” in other words, endures as a direct connection from the golden age of British empire, surviving the era of decolonization to be inherited by Thatcher. She put her particular twist on the idea of “kith and kin” with her focus on the Anglo-American relationship, which she regarded as cultural as well as political. Her embrace of the more neutrally phrased “Anglosphere” went hand in hand with Euroskepticism, which remains one of her most potent political legacies and bears within it the imprint of “kith and kin.”17 As

Britain navigates a post-Brexit world, it is clear that the memory of empire still holds purchase in British politics. Although Wall and Amery were unable to preserve the

Empire, their creed remains a lingering echo in British political discourse, with a half-life of indeterminate length.

16 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 30. 17 Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce, Shadows of Empire: The Anglosphere in British Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 78, ProQuest.

6

Castles Made of Sand: The Rise and Fall of the Central African Federation, 1950- 1963

When Julian Amery and Patrick Wall began their political careers in earnest, it was still possible to imagine that the British Empire had many years ahead of it. If it was no longer in its heyday, if India, once its crown jewel, had been plucked from the firmament, the Empire nonetheless was preparing to enter the post-war era fulfilling its old role as Britain’s great vitalizer. The British government was determined to, at the very least, maintain some level of control over the course of events, remaining the master of its own fate by “presiding… over the rebirth of the Imperial system rather than its dissolution.”1 In Africa, the short-lived attempt to arrange a regional federation out of the former colonies and protectorates of Nyasaland and Rhodesia (established 1953, also known as the Central African Federation or CAF), was part of this attempt to maintain an indirect control that would be short of full independence. However, the period from

Amery’s entry to Parliament in 1950 to the final dissolution of the CAF, one of Amery’s chief legislative causes, in 1963 saw the United Kingdom’s ability to exercise that control slowly but steadily mitigated. After helping to birth the Federation, Amery fiercely advocated for aggressive action over the Suez Canal, an instance of imperial overreach that laid the groundwork for Macmillan’s sober policies. In addition, Amery’s handling of the Nyasaland emergency contributed to its radioactivity and triggered the chain of events that would ultimately put paid to the Federation. From the back benches, Wall would do his best to advance the Federal line and mobilize what forces he could in

Parliament to preserve the CAF, and, in particular, the power of white settlers within it.

1 Wm. Roger Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire," in The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century, ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 329. 7

By the end of the Federation’s lifespan, Wall was considered one of the most formidable friends of the white settlers to sit in Parliament.2 As this chapter will demonstrate, both

Amery and Wall played various critical roles in the end of the British Empire in Africa that are illustrative of the ways in which right-wing Conservatives of the period reacted rhetorically to the fading of imperial power, and amended their rhetoric as this fading intensified.

Amery entered Parliament as part of the class of 1950, serving as MP for Preston

North. A “marginal” Conservative constituency, he had lost it as the Tory candidate in the 1945 general election, a crushing defeat for the party in the aftermath of World War

II, before finally being returned five years later. His class, which also welcomed Iain

Macleod, Enoch Powell, , and , is remembered as one of the most distinguished Tory classes of the post-war era.3 Amery delivered his maiden speech before the House of Commons on March 28, 1950, in the midst of a debate on foreign affairs. The parliamentarian’s maiden speech is intended to be their grand introduction to the body, an opportunity for them to expound on a non-controversial subject of importance to them.4 Amery began his speech by announcing his intent to disregard that custom.5 The address that followed, however, did live up to the maiden speech’s primary function, leaving no question of the issues and priorities that would preoccupy Amery through his two stints in Parliament. His view of foreign affairs was

2 J.R.T Wood, 'So Far and No Further!': Rhodesia's Bid for Independence during the Retreat from Empire, 1959-1965 (Bloomington, IN: Trafford, 2012), loc. 6408 of 25846, Kindle. 3 Sue Onslow, "Julian Amery: The Ultimate Imperial Adventurer," in Ultimate Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain, ed. Wm. Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 211; Dick Leonard, A Century of Premiers: Salisbury to Blair (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 269. 4 "Maiden speeches: guidance for new Members," House of Commons, last modified December 2019, https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/executive/Commons-Briefing-Note_Maiden- Speeches_2019.pdf. 5 473 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) col. 218. 8

centered on what he considered the practical reality of “a war with Communist Russia,” which he believed was not being prosecuted to the fullest extent by the Attlee government.6 Amery prescribed two courses of action that he felt would improve

Britain’s conduct of the Cold War: being a leading member in a United Europe that could stand up to the ’s predations unilaterally; and embracing an offensive strategy that would take the fight beyond the Iron Curtain via initiatives aimed at kindling resistance movements in Soviet-influenced countries. The ultimate aim was to force a settlement that would restrict Russian power to its “proper bounds,” on

Britain’s terms, while also bypassing the United Nations, a body for which Amery rarely had use in his long career.7 Though his maiden speech did not touch on matters of empire, his deep dislike of the Soviet Union would appear often when questions of decolonization were raised.

A few months later, on November 9, 1950, Amery made his first contribution to a colonial debate on the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill. The Bill was the legal mechanism by which money was disbursed to the respective colonies for internal development and advancement of “such schemes as [they] may ask help for.”8 Amery viewed it as both a useful anti-Communist tool and, more centrally, as a way to fulfill

Britain’s primary function as colonial steward, shepherding their subjects along the path to civilization. With this standard in mind, he invoked Cecil Rhodes to advocate for a

“culture bar instead of a colour bar,” particularly in Rhodesia, leading one Member of

Parliament to exclaim that he was a “chip off the old block.”9 While steeped in the

6 473 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) col. 219. 7 473 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) cols. 220-3. 8 480 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) col. 1136. 9 480 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) cols. 1235-8. 9

paternalistic imperial rhetoric so often used by his father and others, Amery couched issues of race in terms of culture and civilization, leaving them merely strongly implied.

Such wording would become emblematic of Amery and those who shared his belief; Sir

Roy Welensky, Federal Prime Minister for the majority of its history, would use nearly identical phrasing to support the “multi-racialism” by which the CAF would be governed.10 Tellingly, when confronted by Dr. Hyacinth Morgan, Labour MP for

Warrington, about a possible definition of the term “civilized,” Amery was unable to provide an answer.11

The debates over the formation of the CAF would provide Amery further opportunity to employ these phrases. While serving as Colonial Secretary, L.S. Amery had been an early and persistent advocate of federation in Africa. 12 Following in his footsteps, his son was more than willing to rise to its defense in Parliament when the concept was on the verge of becoming policy. The younger Amery first weighed in on the subject in Parliament on March 4, 1952. At this time, the second Churchill ministry was seeking to bring the federal project over the finish line and was facing serious doubt from the white settlers. Conservative politicians needed to make it plain to them that their interests were being considered as well, a task Amery performed with alacrity.13 In keeping with his previous focus on civilization as a yardstick for political maturity, he conceded the truth of James Griffiths’ observation that “the Africans are growing up,” but

10 Bill Schwarz, The White Man’s World. Memories of Empire, vol. 1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 366. 11 480 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) col. 1238. 12 He prominently advocated it in “Future policy in regard to East Africa, July, 1927,” Cmd. 2904. 13 Ronald Hyam, "The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1948-1953," The Historical Journal 30, no. 1 (March 1987): 163; Richard Whiting, "The Empire and British Politics," in Britain's Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 188. 10

warned that “one must not mistake adolescence for maturity.”14 The federation Amery envisioned would allow for the African population to develop and mature, but at the slow pace the white settlers demanded. He also stressed that the responsibility for this decision must lie with the British Parliament, not the populations of the or Nyasaland.

Amery backed this point by extending his imperial metaphor, saying that “if one has a son, one could ask him whether he would like to go to this school or that, but one would have to take the decision oneself.”15

Deploying these ideas to the last, he used them as a concluding benediction in his final remarks on the Federation’s formation, delivered on July 27, 1953. Expressing victory over the CAF’s parliamentary opponents, he stated his belief that it was the responsibility of all concerned (from Britain to the CAF) to cooperate and bring about the

Federation’s ultimate aim, which was a society “founded on Cecil Rhodes’s conception of equal rights for all civilised men.”16 The rhetorical devotion of Amery and his cohorts to the vague and charged concept of civilization, paired with Whitehall’s concessions to settler opinion in , served to reassure those in power in the Rhodesias that they would be able to extend their over the black majority for years to come. While Amery was then able to gloat that Labour’s opposition to the Federation had been a “losing game,” the CAF ultimately satisfied no one, being remembered as a “quite extraordinary mistake, an aberration of history.”17

In 1954, shortly after the federal issue was resolved, Patrick Wall entered

Parliament as the MP for Kingston upon Hull Haltemprice (called Haltemprice from 1955

14 497 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1952) cols. 216, 290. 15 497 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1952) cols. 291-5. 16 518 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1953) cols. 939-43. 17 515 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1953) col. 78; Hyam, “The Geopolitical Origins of the Central African Federation,” 145. 11

on). As a former Royal Marine representing part of one of the largest ports in Britain, he chose to make his maiden speech during a March 1954 debate on the naval estimates, focusing it predominantly on maritime affairs. By choosing to present himself with his naval rank of Major, Wall emanated a certain authority on the topics under discussion. He presented three concerns: the wellbeing of the men who manned the ships, their readiness to practice “amphibious warfare,” and the need for increased attention to the Royal

Marines.18 Having adhered to tradition more scrupulously than Amery, there is little truly worth noting about Wall’s maiden speech, except for his choosing to mention the

Falkland Islands as a theater where Royal Marines might one day be deployed.19 While the Falklands were certainly not a prominent concern for the British Empire in the mid-

1950s, disagreement with Perónist Argentina left their fate as an imperial possession an open question. Post-war meat rationing in Britain had made them dependent on Argentine supplies, a fact insulting to imperial pride, and one that Perón was willing to use as leverage to reclaim what Argentines called the Islas Malvinas. This newly skeptical eye cast Argentina-ward led the Admiralty to seriously consider the deployment of Marines to the Falklands, to deter Argentine aggression.20 This crisis was doubtless on Wall’s mind in some form, and his choosing to discuss that at all in his maiden speech foreshadows his attentiveness to the Falklands lobby in the years to come.

Shortly after Wall’s entry to the House, in the summer of 1956, tensions with the

Egyptians began to rise over control of the Suez Canal. In particular, Amery’s imperialist bona fides would come into stark relief during this crisis, as he was one of the leaders of the so-called Suez Group, a collection of MPs that promoted a hawkish attitude towards

18 524 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1954) cols. 1976-7. 19 524 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1954) col. 1981. 20 Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 45-8. 12

Egypt over the dispute. Those Members of Parliament, colloquially known as the “Suez rebels,” would often be hosted by Amery at his father’s home.21 At first privately encouraged by Churchill while he was Prime Minister, the rebels were ultimately disappointed when he chose to withdraw British forces from the Canal Zone in order to avoid a war with . ’s accession to the prime ministry after Churchill’s resignation meant that the chief advocate of what they termed “” of Egypt was now ruling the roost.22 Amery personally challenged Eden on March 5, 1956, exhorting him to stand firm in defense of British interests after the firing of Major

General John Glubb as head of the Jordanian Army. The Prime Minister, also incensed by

Glubb’s removal, grew increasingly receptive to the calls of Amery and the other rebels to “not…accept these reverses lying down and restore the [British] general position in the

Middle East.”23 The summer saw the Suez Group continuing its campaign to keep Eden’s foot on the pedal. In a July 30 letter to , Amery called for the government to be willing to use force, accepting those risks rather than the “certain and disastrous consequences of cowardly submission to Colonel Nasser’s act of aggression.”24 Amery continued to pressure Eden on August 2 in Parliament, framing it as an imperial restoration of sorts. What he deemed necessary action in Suez would be “a gleaming

21 Sue Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 1948-1957 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), Google Read, 109; Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 376. 22 Wm. Roger Louis, "Prelude to Suez: Churchill and Egypt," in Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 622; Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 166. 23 Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 191; 549 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) col. 1713. 24 Julian Amery, "Seizure of the Suez Canal: To the Editor of the Times," The Times, July 30, 1956, 9. 13

opportunity… to redeem what has been lost and to re-establish British influence in the

Middle East on firm and permanent foundations.”25

The Suez rebels were also consistent in their expectation that the United States would not back whatever action Britain took against Egypt. Amery was more than ready to “go ahead without them,” making clear that he felt this was well within British right, as the stakes of Suez could not be higher.26 However, this rhetoric did not translate to reality. When British and French (as Amery had hoped) boots went on the ground in Suez on November 5, 1956, joining forces with Israeli forces that had deployed a week earlier, their combined effort quickly came up against implacable American resistance. A phone call to Eden from the American President, Dwight Eisenhower, made clear that American financial support would be jeopardized should Britain continue on its chosen course of action.27 Furthermore, the British public was fiercely divided over the Suez question. On

November 4, anti-war rallyers at Trafalgar Square, riled up by Labour firebrand Aneurin

Bevan, attempted to protest at Downing Street and were countered by mounted police.

The Cabinet made the final decision to land troops in the Suez while serenaded by the chaotic sound of clashes on Whitehall.28 These combined forces overwhelmed the beleaguered Eden and drowned out the Suez Group’s cheerleading.

On November 7, a ceasefire was declared, news that was crushing to the rebels.

Amery never forgave Eden for his approving the ceasefire, as he felt that Nasser had been

25 557 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) col. 1701. 26 557 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) col. 1701. 27 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988), 212. 28 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 470, ProQuest. 14

mere hours from deposal.29 To be sure, he devoted his energies to persuading the government not to withdraw entirely, stressing that to do so could lead to Britain

“humiliated to the level of a satellite” and forever barred from imperial influence in the

Middle East.30 At this point, however, the Suez Group’s histrionics bore very little impact on government decision-making. Withdrawal took place nonetheless, and after Eden’s resignation, Heath, then the party Whip, was able to avert civil war within the

Conservative Party. Amery, for his part, was muted by the front bench, being appointed to the government as Undersecretary of State for War by the new PM, his father-in-law,

Harold Macmillan.31 Even so, he recalled Suez as “Britain’s Waterloo” for the remainder of his life.32

Wall’s involvement in the was far more ancillary than Amery’s. Sue

Onslow classifies him as merely a sympathizer to the Suez Group, and his only significant parliamentary contribution on the topic was to back the call for force in Egypt on September 12, 1956.33 However, many of the Suez rebels were also supporters of the white minority governments in the CAF, finding common ground with Wall as the

Federation began to struggle. The CAF was constructed on a tenuous division of powers, and by 1957, forces in its constituencies began to agitate for a shifting of those powers in anticipation of the 1960 federal review. A proposed amendment to the federal constitution would expand its assembly, an act that would further suppress African political activity. Wall, future Prime Minister , and several other MPs

29 Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Impact on British Foreign Policy, 203. 30 560 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) col. 841. 31 Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Impact on British Foreign Policy, 205- 10. 32 Louis, "The Dissolution of the British Empire,” 343. 33 Onslow, Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Impact on British Foreign Policy, 297; 558 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1956) cols. 47-52. 15

were dispatched to the Federation to canvass opinion for the measure. Their report indicated that African opposition to the bill was (unsurprisingly) severe, and left some believing that its passage was in jeopardy.34 While the report was strongly influenced by the views of Callaghan and Labour, Wall privately expressed skepticism as well, communicating to Welensky through intermediaries that something needed to be done by way of apology to the Africans. If not, he suggested, Tory misgivings might have prevented the Bill from passing.35 Private doubts aside, when Labour attempted to get the amendment dismissed in Parliament, Wall joined the vast majority of his party in its defense. Indeed, he publicly rejected whatever qualms he may have harbored about what the Africans might think of the change, declaring that “the European in Southern

Rhodesia- and… the Federation- must be the senior partner,” and that any suggestion otherwise was directly from “cloud-cuckoo-land.”36 The amendment was passed with minimal Conservative opposition, effectively dismissing the African concerns.

Predictably, the constitutional changes inflamed African opinion, leading to increased agitation against the Federation’s oppressiveness. The return of Dr. Hastings

Banda to Nyasaland (the federal colony with the highest percentage of Africans) provided the Nyasalanders a figure to rally around, and the appointment of Welensky correspondent Lord Colyton to head a constitutional review committee did little to offer optimism.37 As tensions mounted in the dying months of 1958, Amery was transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office, becoming Undersecretary of State for the

34 Philip Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 172. 35 Kenneth O. Morgan, "Imperialists at Bay: Labour and Decolonization," in The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays in Honour of Wm. Roger Louis, ed. Robert D. King and Robin W. Kilson (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), 247; Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 172-3. 36 578 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1957) col. 895. 37 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 270; Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 165-6. 16

Colonies. Shortly thereafter, tensions came to a head in dramatic fashion in Nyasaland.

Reports reached the government in February 1959 of potential violence in Nyasaland.

Circulated by the CAF’s security service, the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau, the memo detailed plans for a mass insurrection against British and Federal rule, and the assassination of key regime officials.38 While the Devlin Report would later find this intelligence to be seriously flawed, it was the excuse Welensky, Nyasaland governor Sir

Robert Armitage, and their allies needed to declare a state of emergency, and brutally crack down on the African populace. Under the auspices of the colonial government, 51

Africans died and 79 were injured. Amery had carved out an extremely hawkish position on the matter of Nyasaland in governmental circles and seized on the opportunity to take the Welensky line.39

Indeed, he had been doing his part in London for days prior to the emergency’s imposition on March 2, 1959. In a cabinet meeting on February 27, Amery described in graphic detail rumors of a plot in Nyasaland, deeply frightening the gathered officials.40

On the same day, he received an assist on the matter from Wall, who during Amery’s brief update on Nyasaland, asked the Undersecretary at what point Nyasaland might declare a state of emergency. While leaving it up to the Governor, the exchange between

Wall and Amery took for granted that a state of emergency would be declared.41 March 3 saw Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd and Amery on the floor of the House, ready

38 Murphy, Philip, ed., British Documents on the End of Empire, B/9, Central Africa: Crisis and Dissolution, 1959-1965, vol. 2. London, TSO, 2005, 10-5. 39 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 10. 40 Alan Lennox-Boyd, in whose stead Amery was presiding over the meeting in question, would later imply that he and others had been given a “sexed-up” version of events by Amery; Philip Murphy, "A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence," Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (December 2010): 772. 41 600 Parl. Deb H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) cols. 1460-1. 17

to defend Armitage’s decision. It bode ill for the orderliness of the proceedings that, within minutes of Callaghan’s raising the topic, the Colonial Secretary was haranguing the Labour benches to “calm down.”42 Amery was tasked to wind up the contentious debate, and aimed to call attention to what he characterized as the “definite matter of urgent public importance” ongoing in Nyasaland.43 He then proceeded, through frequent interjections from the opposite bench, to forcefully support the CAF’s version of events, and project confidence in the future of the Federation, with all parts intact. Indeed,

Amery argued that had the Nyasaland government not acted when it had, a “blood-bath” of white settlers might have occurred, comparable to what the Mau Maus had done in

Kenya.44 The language Amery used to describe what had been averted was so lurid as to surprise even Armitage.45 Amery’s hyperbole aside, under the auspices of the colonial government, 51 Africans died and 79 were injured. This level of bloodshed forced the

Macmillan government’s hand, and in order to separate the scandal from growing criticism of the Federation in general, it created the Devlin Commission to release a report focused solely on what had occurred in Nyasaland.46

As Devlin prepared his report, the government, believing it would be vindicated, maintained that the Federation was fulfilling its intended purpose.47 While Amery was doing his part to toe that line, Wall and other members of the party’s right wing were sorely tempted to disavow multi-racialism. At a March 5 meeting of the Conservative

42 601 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) col. 279. 43 601 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) col. 336. 44 601 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) cols. 335-42. 45 Murphy, Philip, ed., British Documents on the End of Empire, B/9, Central Africa: Closer Association, 1945-1958, vol. 1. London, TSO, 2005, lxxiii. 46 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 270-1. 47 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 620. 18

Commonwealth Council’s Commonwealth Affairs Committee, Wall pronounced

Nyasaland to be predominantly African; if so, F.M. Bennett, a staunch Welenskyite who served as Maudling’s parliamentary private secretary, suggested the Federation should abandon it. Although this was not the Council’s public-facing position, it makes clear that, for Wall and his allies, the Federation was to remain a white-dominated entity.48 The whispered doubts engulfing the Federation were amplified tremendously by the July conclusions of the Devlin Commission. The report flatly denied that there had been any truth to the rumors of planned violence in Nyasaland and described the colony as a

“police state.”49 Whilst preparing the report, Devlin displayed an interest in the role

Amery played in disseminating the intelligence that had led to the state of emergency.

Although he had made inquiries into what Amery and Lennox-Boyd had based their described “massacre plot” on, Devlin ultimately refrained from condemning them in his conclusions, training his ire primarily on Armitage and the Nyasaland government.50

With his role in the lead-up looking likely to escape public scrutiny, Amery became a key player in the government’s defense, being one of a select few officials to weekend at

Chequers, the Prime Minister’s formal retreat, that July, and prepare a rebuttal to Devlin.

This was published under Armitage’s name; it challenged the legitimacy of the report itself, subjecting it to “merciless ridicule” on Macmillan’s orders.51

The Devlin Report, along with the government rebuttal, was released on July 22,

1959. Labour leader took advantage of the date to launch a salvo against the Federation as a construct, while it was in the spotlight’s glare. He accused the CAF of

48 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 159. 49 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 352. 50 Murphy, “A Police State?,” 767-8. 51 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 71-2. 19

failing to live up to the expectations its supporters had placed on it; as he neatly summarized, “the Government in the Federation and the three territories comprising it rests today even more upon force and less upon consent than in 1953; the relations between Africans and Europeans are…worse than they were; and African opinion is…strongly opposed to federation.”52 Wall was among the Conservative MPs to come to the CAF’s defense during the debate that followed. His argument centered on a question of focus, asking the House whether the Federation’s aim was to create an “independent multiracial member of the Commonwealth” or an “African state” on the order of Ghana or Nigeria.53 In Wall’s view, a predominantly African state was doomed to collapse, and he publicly shared his view (previously stated on March 5) that Nyasaland had become such a state. This line of thought then led him to extol the racial he believed the

Federation had made, little of it equating to political progress. Wall finished by playing spokesman for his “friends” in the CAF who felt “frustration” at the way in which certain

London politicians treated them.54 Lennox-Boyd, in his winding up of the debate, acknowledged the concerns of Wall’s correspondents, and used them to advance some of his own arguments.55 This was merely a foretaste of the acrimonious debate that followed on the Devlin Report’s conclusions. The full scope of the blowback helped lead

Macmillan to the realization that standing in the path of African populism was a losing battle.56 The Federation, and the remainder of British imperium in Africa, were in mortal peril.

52 609 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) cols. 1283-5. 53 609 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) col. 1324. 54 609 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) cols. 1326-33. 55 609 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1959) col. 1397. 56 John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 370. 20

As the contours of the new reality took shape, Macmillan planned a tour of Africa for the first months of 1960. The tour’s chief aim was to assert control over the evolution of a “multi-racial Commonwealth,” propelled by the of a decisive victory in the general election of 1959.57 It was to culminate in South Africa, where the piece de résistance would be a speech to be delivered to South African Prime Minister Hendrik

Verwoerd and the South African Parliament, in which Macmillan would detail the future direction of the Commonwealth in Africa. While Amery is believed to have been involved in the speech’s composition, it is deeply unlikely that he was pleased with its central thesis.58 Macmillan informed the South African Parliament in no uncertain terms that “the is blowing through this continent,” and the developing African

“political consciousness” could no longer be denied.59 The speech’s impact in the British

Isles was to toxify the political atmosphere for the Federation and its supporters. Wall was among those to confront the Prime Minister after he returned from his African sojourn. By challenging Macmillan over Southern Rhodesia on February 18, he sought to underscore the success the white-dominated federal territory had had with cultivating racial relations.60

As the temperature rose in Britain, and the Monckton commission, which after

Nyasaland had been tasked broadly with reviewing the CAF constitution, continued its work, Wall continued to praise the benefits of the white Federation in Parliament. When

John Stonehouse, Labour MP for Wednesbury, opened a discussion on the state of

57 Saul Dubow, "Macmillan, Verwoerd, and the 1960 'Wind of Change' Speech," The Historical Journal 54, no. 4 (December 2011): 1089. 58 D.R. Thorpe, : The Life of (London: Chatto & Windus, 2010), Kindle, loc. 10736 of 21344; Dubow, “Macmillan, Verwoerd, and the 1960 ‘Wind of Change’ Speech,” 1098. 59 Harold Macmillan, "The Wind of Change Speech" (speech, Parliament of the Union of South Africa, , February 3, 1960). 60 617 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) cols. 1417-8. 21

Southern Rhodesia on June 3, 1960, Wall rose to hail its virtues, claiming that the

Southern Rhodesians could be treated as “equals.”61 He went on to acclaim them for the advances they had made towards racial equality, and expressed his belief that, although they moved at their own pace, things were going the right way.62 Wall’s optimistic portrayals aside, the findings of the Monckton Commission came in October, and like those of Devlin, they represented the Federation’s worst-case scenario. Put simply,

Monckton recommended a complete restructuring of the Federation, including African majorities in the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland legislatures, essentially granting them the right to secede.63 Unsurprisingly, this was unacceptable to Welensky and his supporters. Indeed, he argued to Macmillan that the right of secession was not within

Monckton’s authority to bestow. Welensky also made clear to his surrogates in London that the choice before the government in London was binary. Either the Federation continued more or less as it was, or it was to be dissolved.64

The debate over the Queen’s Speech of November 3 offered Wall the opportunity to go to bat for Welensky on the House floor. Careful to praise Monckton personally, he essentially toed the line the Federal Prime Minister had drawn. Wall presented the government with Welensky’s binary: “Either the Federation can never work for racial or other reasons and must, therefore, be broken up now, or it must be made to continue in

61 624 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) col. 1825; a fascinating figure in his own right, Stonehouse’s political career was halted when he attempted to fake his own death in 1974; posthumously, it was revealed that he had been a Czechoslovak spy, one of the highest-ranking British officials to spy for the Communist bloc; Lauren Niland, "From the archives: the rise and fall of John Stonehouse," , April 26, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2013/apr/26/john-stonehouse- faked-death. 62 624 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) cols. 1825-31. 63 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 273. 64 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 162-4; Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 184. 22

some form.”65 The decision, Wall stated, lay with Britain. He went on to propose a continued federation that focused on the “maintaining of standards,” hewing to the script

Amery had used at the Federation’s beginning by describing Britain as the “trustees” of the African majority.66

Even so, events began to move at a faster pace, as the Monckton Report precipitated a conference in December 1960 to review the Federal constitution, which in turn was quickly adjourned in favor of reviewing the constitutions of each territory.

Although Wall did compel Macmillan during Question Time to state his commitment to preserving some federal structure, it was becoming clear to the Tory right wing and

Welensky’s sympathizers (groups with very similar memberships) that the wind of change had been firmly aimed at the CAF. Indeed, Wall had already written Welensky to inform him that, in his view, the Federation “had had it.”67

On January 1, 1961, Paul Bristol, a young Tory employed at a ship-broking firm, and a few associates founded the Monday Club, a group intended to force policy discussion back to revolving around “conservative principles.” 68 While this was its broader aim, its very first target was Britain’s policies in Africa, which the Club regarded as deplorably hasty. The Monday Club’s “raison d’etre,” as one founding member recalled it, was to “fight a rearguard action to preserve the Central African Federation and maintain a British presence in Southern Africa.”69 In furtherance of those aims, Bristol, reaching high, acquired the endorsement of the arch-conservative Robert Gascoyne-

65 629 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) col. 435. 66 629 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) col. 436. 67 632 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) col. 1063; Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 183. 68 Patrick Seyd, "Factionalism within the Conservative Party: The Monday Club," Government and Opposition 7, no. 4 (Fall 1974): 467-9. 69 Seyd, “Factionalism within the Conservative Party,” 468. 23

Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury and Macmillan’s bosom friend turned steadfast rival. While not his highest priority, Lord Salisbury led the way for many notable Conservatives to join the Monday Club, including Wall and Amery, rapidly making it a fixture of the

Conservative right wing.70

Of the three Federal territories, ’s constitutional review was by far the most rancorous. Welensky listened in a relatively subdued manner to Macleod’s detailed plan, which would provide African leaders the appearance of a majority in

Northern Rhodesia’s congress. Upon his return to the Federation, however, he launched total war upon Macleod and Macmillan, making full use of his intermediaries in

London.71 To the degree that Welensky’s actions can be considered an attempted political coup against the Macmillan government, aimed at preventing an African majority from dominating the Federation, Wall’s sympathies and efforts clearly lay with the proto- rebels. Indeed, Welensky’s PR firm, Voice and Vision, arranged for Wall to tour the

Federation on its dime, to boost his loyalties by reminding him what he was fighting for; their efforts were rewarded.72 Wall was signatory to a February 8 motion by Robin

Turton, Conservative MP for Thirsk and Malton, urging Macleod to stand down from his policies and allow Northern Rhodesia to revert to its 1958 constitution. It was quickly disseminated throughout the party and helped to create an atmosphere in which Wall felt confident in projecting, in a letter to Welensky, that Parliament would stand against an

African majority government in Northern Rhodesia.73

70 S.J. Ball, "Banquo's Ghost: Lord Salisbury, Harold Macmillan, and the High Politics of Decolonization, 1957-1963," Twentieth Century British History 16, no. 1 (2005): 88-9. 71 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 183-4; Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 377. 72 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 342, 376; Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 84. 73 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 185. 24

February 11, 1961 saw the Prime Minister writing Welensky to offer him terms much more in line with Federal preferences. Macmillan forecast that his proposal would leave the African nationalists within the Federation “very hostile and very bitter.” 74

However, the pendulum swung drastically away from Welensky when Macleod, famously derided by Salisbury as “too clever by half,” threatened to resign should

Macmillan cave to Federal demands. To retain his Colonial Secretary, Macmillan acquiesced to Macleod’s refusal to modulate his original offer, which Welensky rapidly rejected.75 The parliamentary debate on the proposal, when circulated on February 21, saw many Tories who had signed the Turton petition returning to the Macmillan whip.

While Wall remained a steadfast supporter of Welensky, his only major contribution during the debate was to disparage the level of civilization attained by the CAF’s African population.76

The Northern Rhodesian constitution again became a topic of fevered debate in

June 1961. Wall wrote Welensky to inform him that sympathy for the settler cause was beginning to rise again in Parliament.77 On June 22, Wall pressed these issues on the

House floor, in the midst of a debate over the Southern Rhodesian constitution. His chief concern for Southern Rhodesia, he claimed, was that it be administered responsibly; while he professed that his vision did not depend on race, the clear implication of his words was that the settler-dominated status quo was Southern Rhodesia’s best bet for such governance. Wall segued these remarks into an underlining of the importance of an equitable solution for Northern Rhodesia. Should “responsible government” not be

74 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 197-8. 75 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 185-6; for the entirety of Salisbury’s famous diatribe against Macleod, see 229 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1961) cols. 305-15. 76 635 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1961) col. 547. 77 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 189. 25

preserved in Northern Rhodesia, the Federation would collapse, and its territories would pass from “responsible hands.”78 Macmillan and his government, seriously concerned that Welensky would come to London and force the issue in dramatic fashion, were already in the process of constructing a proposal that moved away from Macleod’s

February white paper. When revealed a few days after Wall’s speech, he wrote to

Welensky again, stating that this battle, at least, had been won.79

Shortly thereafter, Macleod was out of the Colonial Office, replaced by Maudling.

With the zealous Macleod seeming to be irrelevant, Wall thought Maudling, who was

Macmillan’s third Colonial Secretary, was likely to represent a course correction for the government. 80 On his third day heading up the Office, Maudling vowed “continuity” with the policies of his predecessors.81 With that promise fresh in his mind, Wall was more than happy to sing the praises of the June white paper. He maintained that it must be “the final answer” on the Northern Rhodesian question, lest the Federation collapse, while praising Maudling’s sagacity and (he hoped) commitment to promoting a

“Christian and democratic way of life” in the CAF.82 However, Maudling, who had been close with Macleod since the start of their careers in politics, quickly concluded that his old friend had been right to oppose the June proposal, and that it could never be accepted by the Africans.83 He made very clear to the Cabinet, in a January 4, 1962, meeting, that he did not feel Britain was bound, legally or morally, to the June white paper. Indeed, “it

78 642 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1961) cols. 1756-65. 79 Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., British Documents on the End of Empire, A/4, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964: Economics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth, Part II (London: Stationery Office, 2000), 560-2; Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 190. 80 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 194. 81 646 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1961) col. 345. 82 646 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1961) cols. 423-33. 83 Hyam and Louis, The Conservative Party and the End of Empire, part II, 562. 26

seemed… necessary” that a vote allotment based on population percentage was the only viable option, the exact proposal Welensky so dreaded.84 Even as he spit venom at

Maudling in his correspondence with Salisbury, his proxies in London were more or less out of options to advance Welensky’s political will. Wall was limited to making stark claims about handing over Northern Rhodesia, and by extension the entire Federation, to

“racialists,” a line of inquiry that Maudling dispatched with relative ease.85 On the whole,

Maudling’s efforts to keep the party’s moderates in line with his stance were successful, further limiting the right wing’s room to maneuver. The proposal he announced in March

1962 unequivocally provided for an African majority in Northern Rhodesia, dealing a mortal blow to the CAF.86

Even so, the appointment of to oversee the Federation’s affairs that same month gave some brief hope to Welensky et al. The Federal Prime Minister took it as an indication that he was getting the better of Macmillan.87 This burst of optimism – one of the last – was quickly dispelled when, on the question of Nyasaland, Butler indicated that he was open to any and all courses of action with regard to the colony’s future. While he regarded secession from the Federation as an extreme measure, telling

Parliament that “the financial and economic problems which would arise from…withdrawal would be considerable,” he told Dr. Hastings Banda, the leader of the largest African party in Nyasaland, that he would be willing to allow secession if he felt

84 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 289. 85 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 380, 384; 654 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1962) col. 1345. 86 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 195; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 275-6. 87 Wood, 'So Far and No Further!', loc. 5096-5102 of 25846, Kindle; Wood has been described as “Welensky’s man in the field of history”; his histories would be best described as extremely detailed versions of the Rhodesian view of events; Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 377 27

the Party would back him.88 A June 1, 1962 cable from Welensky to Butler, intended to explicate the Federal government’s position on Nyasaland, proved deeply revealing of his actual fears and concerns. Welensky stressed his dismay that the British representatives in the CAF continued to press the notion that “any settlement of the problems of the

Federation is dependent on the consent of the governed.”89 Gone from this memo were any claims to be striving for a non-racial or multi-racial society. In Welensky’s exchange with Salisbury, Butler was derided as a weak man spoilt by the malaise of the British government, unable to rise to an occasion that required bold action.90

Salisbury, from his perch in the , marshalled Welensky’s forces against the government in December 1962. Backed by several of his more distinguished peers, he stated- not without evidence- that the Macmillan government had not dealt honestly with Welensky, ignoring the promises made by its Conservative predecessors at the time of the CAF’s creation. Speaking from his privileged position, Salisbury deployed bluntly racial rhetoric, accusing Macmillan’s government of choosing to “break their word to their own kith and kin,” fomenting a new American Revolution, and allowing

“the wind of change [to] blow us all away.”91 Smith, Amery, and Wall would later use much of this rhetoric in their defense of UDI. While Salisbury’s display, backed by former Colonial Secretaries Lords Boyd and Chandos, was mildly humiliating to the government, it proved no more substantial than previous protests against its African policy.92 Northern Rhodesia was to come under majority rule.

88 659 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1962) col. 242; Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 319-21. 89 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 322. 90 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 381. 91 245 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1962) cols. 1165-70. 92 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 198. 28

With the status of the territories settled, 1963 saw the long-promised review of the

Federal constitution commencing in earnest. With Nyasaland formally preparing to leave the CAF, Wall strongly suspected that its fate was sealed. He complained in the House on

February 28 that it may well be the last time he would be able to opine on “the future of so many millions of people in Central Africa.”93 Wall, beginning to withdraw from the multi-racial principles he had been professing, turned his rhetoric against the Africans.

Their , he felt, was laden with “tribalistic tendencies” that would cause any country they ran to be plagued by tension.94 Wall also delivered an ominous warning about the tenor of feelings in Southern Rhodesia. If Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were to gain their independence, the Southern Rhodesians wanted it as well, and were prepared to seize it.95 In his conclusion, he urged the House to use what influence it possessed to preserve some sort of over-arching structure in the former Federation. “The future of Central Africa,” he stated, depended on this occurring.96

Ultimately, there was to be no lingering association where the CAF had once been. Wall’s discussion of Southern Rhodesian views was mirrored in Africa by the victory of the Rhodesian Front party, which had swept into power on a platform of independence from the Federation and Britain- and of white dominance.97 All three territories having politically invested in charting their own course, the Federation’s end was now simply a question of logistics. Macmillan urged Butler to exercise as light a hand as possible as the Rhodesias worked out their separation (Nyasaland already being ticketed for independence.) In Macmillan’s ideal scenario, “the Federation will dissolve

93 672 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1497. 94 672 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) cols. 1500-1. 95 672 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1507. 96 672 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1509. 97 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 412. 29

of its own accord.”98 Butler was able to persuade the new Southern Rhodesian Prime

Minister, Winston Field, to attend a conference at Victoria Falls arranged to dissolve the

Federation. Butler’s promise to establish a framework by which Southern Rhodesia could hope to become independent would later become a cudgel in its efforts to achieve said freedom.99 With Field the final puzzle piece, all parties were able to come to the table and map out the Federation’s demise. Wall, having by now turned his attention primarily to the Southern Rhodesian cause, did not miss the opportunity to get a few licks in when the dissolution bill was first read in the House on July 11, 1963.100 Echoing Amery on the

Suez Crisis, he used the opportunity to cast the government’s dealings with African nationalists as “appeasement” on the scale of , a dramatic claim that only served to underscore the existential nature of the war he was waging.101

The final reading of the dissolution bill took place on December 17, a mere fortnight before the Federation was scheduled to dissolve. Wall, steadfast until the end, continued to pursue his polarized rhetorical turn. Invoking Munich once again, he swiftly eulogized the Federation’s “multi-racialism,” and then offered Parliament the stark choice between a “white-ruled Africa and a black-ruled Africa.”102 The clear implication was that this was to choose between order and chaos. The government, then, had charted a course that would lead inexorably to the latter. Wall, clarifying for whom he felt concern, felt it “rather unfair to condemn a large European minority to live in such

98 Hyam and Louis, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, part II, 591; while Macmillan drafted the memo, it was never sent as he was able to express his wishes in a personal meeting with Butler. 99 Murphy, Central Africa, part I, xcix-c. 100 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 6406 of 25856. 101 680 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1534. 102 686 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1100. 30

standards.”103 While he continued for the next several minutes to discuss other issues that would arise from the CAF’s termination, all stemmed from his final rhetorical thrust, which also served as a neat entry into the debate over Southern Rhodesia’s fate that would continue to roil for years to come.

At the end of the day, the Central African Federation represents one of the great failures of the “imperialism of decolonization.”104 It had been intended to preserve some semblance of British imperial power in its territories. Instead, it alienated, in differing ways, all three. Amery and Wall, from the Conservative front and back benches, did their parts in order to preserve it, either through word or deed. However, the fight ultimately was a losing one. Indeed, this entire chapter has represented, on the whole, a steady backsliding. Amery’s success in fostering the CAF as policy and then actual political entity was quickly countered by the Suez Crisis, which exposed Britain as no longer capable of wielding the immense power it once had. Wall in particular fought a losing war on behalf of Welensky and the Federation. While there were occasionally battles won, Wall frequently retreated to more and more dogmatic positions, mirroring the radicalization of politics in Rhodesia. By the Federation’s final days, he had thoroughly abandoned the pretense of racial enlightenment and liberal empire. The Tory right wing also grew firmer in its convictions. As the Empire lost its grip, Wall, Amery, and their ideological cohort shifted farther to the right, laying the groundwork for what would be an explosive and long-lasting confrontation over Rhodesia’s reach for independence.

103 686 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1099. 104 Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization," in Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).

31

“Wrapped Up in the Union Jack”: UDI and the Right-Wing Reaction, 1963-1980

The dissolution of the Central African Federation represented an undeniable defeat for the Conservative right wing. Unchastened, Patrick Wall, Julian Amery, and their allies were able to reposition themselves in defense of the lone Federal territory that remained predominantly white. They seized the opportunity to do what they felt would be right by their “kith and kin” in Rhodesia, a relatively prosperous and loyal example of, as they saw it, the benefits of white leadership. When Rhodesia’s Prime Minister, , declared independence from the British government, Wall and Amery, among others, launched an effort to aid the Rhodesians in Parliament, and, with luck, awaken British public opinion to the rightness of their cause. While they played key roles in transforming

Rhodesia into “an open wound” for the Tories and Britain in general for over a decade, the Rhodesian conflict was ultimately a losing one.1 However, the forces it unleashed within the Conservative Party were formidable, and laid the groundwork for an eventual resurgence of fervently jingoistic British pride.

At the early stages of the interminable review process that ultimately ended the

CAF’s brief existence, Southern Rhodesia presented to the British government the least difficulty of the three Federal territories. Their negotiations with the Southern Rhodesian

Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitefield, were far simpler than those with Northern

Rhodesia, and rumors that the South would secede from the Federation on its own accord came (then) to nothing. In May 1961, Colonial Office functionaries even bandied about the idea of allowing Southern Rhodesia to leave the Federation, allowing the government

1 John Ramsden, The Winds of Change, Macmillan to Heath, 1957-1975. A History of the Conservative Party, vol. 6 (London: Longman, 1996), 288. 32

to shift the blame for Federal collapse away from itself.2 Wall, as shown earlier, had no qualms whatsoever about holding up the white-dominated Southern Rhodesian government as an example of ways in which the Federation was working. He considered it to be a nation filled with Britain’s “equals” and felt they should be treated accordingly.3

However, Whitefield went down to electoral defeat in December 1962, losing to Winston

Field and the Rhodesian Front Party. The Front’s firmly racialist policies included a demand for independence from the Federation, under white domination. Lord Alport, the

British High Commissioner to the Federation, attributed their victory to the distaste of the white settler populace for Whitefield’s belief in the inevitability of integration. Sir Roger

Stevens, deputy undersecretary at the Foreign Office, immediately foresaw the grave difficulties Southern Rhodesian independence would bring. In a memo to Rab Butler, he explained that granting independence “would raise a tremendous howl in many quarters at home and abroad,” yet to withhold independence would require Britain to continue to be responsible for “Southern Rhodesia’s racial policy…for an indefinite period.”4 Both, to Stevens, were unpalatable options.

While Wall was warning the House about the Southern Rhodesian resolve for independence, Field was singing a similar tune to Butler and his Central Africa Office.5

The Southern Rhodesian PM made clear to Butler that he would not agree to participate in the dissolution of the Federation without guarantees that his state would join Northern

Rhodesia and Nyasaland in independence. The North, for its part, refused to partake in

2 Murphy, Philip, ed., British Documents on the End of Empire, B/9, Central Africa: Closer Association, 1945-1958, vol. 1. London, TSO, 2005, lxxxi; Murphy, Philip, ed., British Documents on the End of Empire, B/9, Central Africa: Crisis and Dissolution, 1959-1965, vol. 2. London, TSO, 2005, 229-32. 3 See in particular 624 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1960) cols. 1825-31. 4 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 344-7. 5 For Wall, see 672 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1963) col. 1507. 33

any dissolution conference if such a guarantee was delivered. British negotiators launched efforts to convince the Southern Rhodesians to moderate their stance by, at the very least, agreeing to come to the table for Federal purposes while independence was worked out. Their tactics were meant to be non-committal, so as to “retain our freedom of action.”6 While the Southern Rhodesians did not bite on Butler’s initial proposals, Field ultimately decided to attend the conference. He believed that, if he were not completely alienated from Britain and the Commonwealth, he could exploit the very real fissures in the Conservative Party over the Southern Rhodesian question.7 Whether this was a valid political tactic or an example of the “cautious, almost fearful attitude” that would later lead Field to be deposed by the Rhodesian Front, his decision to attend Victoria Falls proved fiercely consequential, allowing the Federation to be dissolved with no ironclad guarantee of Southern Rhodesian independence.8

Indeed, the political and international appetite for another white-majority nation in Africa was decidedly slim. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who had succeeded Macmillan as

PM in , and Commonwealth Secretary made clear to Field that independence for Rhodesia would require concrete advances for the African majority, a proposition that Field was fairly skeptical of. The British negotiators remained painfully conscious of the possibility that Rhodesia might unilaterally declare its

6 Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., British Documents on the End of Empire, A/4, The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964: Economics, International Relations, and the Commonwealth, Part II (London: Stationery Office, 2000), 600-3; quote Harold Macmillan’s. 7 J.R.T Wood, 'So Far and No Further!': Rhodesia's Bid for Independence during the Retreat from Empire, 1959-1965 (Bloomington, IN: Trafford, 2012), loc. 8245-50 of 25856, Kindle; in a letter to Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, Macmillan claimed 200 or more Conservative backbenchers were prepared to back Southern Rhodesian independence; Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 367. 8 Wood, ‘So Far and No Further!’, loc. 8260 of 25856. 34

independence.9 Those fears were only deepened by the rise of Ian Smith to power as

Prime Minister of Rhodesia. Smith had been serving as Field’s Treasury Minister and deputy PM; in Alport’s estimation, he was “an earnest and conscientious” member of the

Cabinet, a first-rate minister who served his leader well.10 However, by ,

Smith no longer had faith in Field’s leadership, believing him to lack the gumption necessary to see through the quarrel with Britain. He, on the other hand, would not allow himself to be dictated to by Britain, especially regarding questions of race. The

Rhodesian Cabinet fell in behind Smith, and Field was forced to resign on April 13.11

In the midst of the upheaval in Rhodesia, Wall, “Rhodesia’s doughty supporter,” continued to advocate the Rhodesian line.12 That April saw him focused on gaining a seat for the Rhodesian Prime Minister at the Commonwealth meeting, which was, at the time, a primary goal of the Rhodesian Front. To sit with the other Commonwealth Prime

Ministers at their scheduled July meeting could only bolster their legitimacy, and as Wall observed to Home in Parliament, precedent was on Rhodesia’s side.13 However, of far greater concern to Whitehall was the attitude of Commonwealth leaders towards the

Rhodesian regime. The African members in particular felt that the Commonwealth must take a strong stance on Rhodesia, insisting on majority rule before independence could be considered. The state of things were such that allowing Smith to attend the summit on equal footing could have dealt the Commonwealth a mortal blow.14 With a general

9 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 399-402; with Northern Rhodesia becoming independent as , and Nyasaland as Malawi, there was no longer a need for the appellation “Southern.” 10 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 370. 11 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 10654-829 of 25856. 12 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 7617 of 25856. 13 694 Parl. Deb. H.C. (1964) col. 584. 14 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988), 315-6. 35

election looming, the Home administration wished to avoid taking any drastic steps until it was either returned to power or cast into the role of the Opposition. Home’s Cabinet secretary, Sir Burke Trend, put it best in a memo to the Prime Minister, suggesting that ideally Britain would “be seen to be doing something than to be doing nothing, provided that we do it as slowly and deliberately as possible.”15 Home more or less lived by those lofty watchwords for the remainder of his brief ministry.

The Commonwealth meeting only underscored the depth of feeling on both sides of the Rhodesian debate. In his introductory speech, Kwame Nkrumah, President of

Ghana and talisman of the anti-colonial movement in Africa, called for majority rule in

Rhodesia, and urged that the Cold War be kept out of “Commonwealth politics.”16 In

Parliament, Wall and his right-wing allies took quite the opposite tack, firmly maintaining that a Southern Africa under “white domination” was essential to British security interests.17 The day after the conference concluded, Wall pressed Home on the

House floor. After he answered a question asking simply that he report on the conference’s conclusions, Wall supplemented his question with an additional inquiry on the upcoming meeting with Smith. Home affirmed that no constitutional changes would be imposed on the Rhodesians without governmental cooperation.18 This opened a

Pandora’s box, with Labour leader and Liberal leader Jo Grimond taking the opportunity to attack Home on his recent handling of Anglo-Rhodesian relations.

Grimond in particular urged Home to involve the leaders of African parties in any

15 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 428. 16 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 11457-62 of 25856. 17 696 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1964) cols. 1394-6. 18 698 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1964) cols. 1425-6. 36

deliberations on the future of Rhodesia. Ultimately, the Speaker was forced to put a halt to the questioning so that the House could return to its business.19

Home’s talks with Smith did not amount to very much, in large part due to the looming general election, made necessary by Harold Macmillan’s 1963 resignation due to ill health. Labour’s victory did not come as a tremendous surprise to the Rhodesians;

Rhodesian High Commissioner to the UK Evan Campbell had acknowledged its overwhelming likelihood in conversation with Wall and others during a February 1964 visit.20 Harold Wilson, the new Prime Minister, had publicly positioned his party against the Rhodesian cause while leader of the Opposition. Although, in private conversation with Home’s private secretary, he claimed to regret certain positions he had staked, the

Rhodesians correctly perceived him as someone who would maintain a hard line against them, further souring relations.21 For Wall, becoming the opposition allowed him significantly greater room for confrontation with the government. His first interaction with the new Prime Minister naturally revolved around Rhodesia, as he urged him to invite Smith to return to London. Wilson, otherwise cordial, betrayed a note of the tension the subject generated by challenging Wall’s definition of the “Rhodesian electorate.”22

Where Wall had been given slightly more freedom to maneuver, Amery found himself entirely unshackled in Parliament by the Conservative defeat. Having served as

Secretary of State for Air and then Minister of Aviation since 1960, his ability to speak on matters other than those in his portfolio was greatly curtailed. While Amery did not

19 698 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1964) cols. 1426-31. 20 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 10345, 10839 of 25856. 21 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 418-9; Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 12427-32 of 25856. 22 702 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1964) cols. 193-4. 37

speak specifically on Rhodesia until after UDI, he was no longer constrained by a seat on the front bench. February 1965 found him asking for details on Labour’s handling of the

Federation of South Arabia.23 In what is today , this federation was created for much the same reason as the CAF had been, to maintain British control over the region.

Of particular importance was the fortress of Aden, which Amery had long viewed as “the keystone in the new imperial system.” 24 Without Aden, he felt that Britain’s military capability in the Indian Ocean would be more or less nonexistent. Clinging to the dream of the British navy as a global fighting force, Amery remained a sturdy opponent of relinquishing British authority there.25 Though he was still more than willing to engage in federal schemes and other imperial tactics, Amery would come to be identified in the public eye as a staunch right-wing supporter of Smith and Rhodesia.26

This rightward shift in Parliament was reflected in the larger policies of the

Monday Club. Although it had been founded primarily to support the policy of “multi- racialism” that had existed in the Federation, the Club itself began to actively advocate for policies resembling South African within Rhodesia. Harold Soref’s appointment to lead its Africa Group in late 1963 signaled the Club’s increased radicalization.27 In the 1930s, Soref had been a staunch blackshirt, one of the zealous supporters of British Fascist leader Sir . The remainder of his political career was spent espousing similarly far-right views.28 The Club would evidence their

23 706 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 537-8. 24 Craig A. Harrington, "The Colonial Office and the Retreat from Aden: Great Britain in South Arabia, 1957-1967," Mediterranean Quarterly 25, no. 3 (July 2014): 14. 25 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air, May 29, 1961, NA, CAB 129/105/20. 26 Sue Onslow, "Julian Amery: The Ultimate Imperial Adventurer," in Ultimate Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain, ed. Wm. Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 211. 27 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 205-7. 28 Stephen Dorril, Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British (London: Thistle Publishing, 2015), 622, Kindle. 38

shift to the right by endorsing the openly racist platform of , who would become MP for in the 1964 election that swept Labour to power. His defeat of former Commonwealth Secretary only raised the profile of the

Monday Club.29 It is worth noting that Wall was willing to express public contempt for apartheid, never disavowing his 1962 UN address at which he called it “morally abominable, intellectually grotesque and spiritually indefensible.30 However, much of his rhetoric in later years went to support South Africa; indeed, his claim was further undermined by his being so closely associated with the Monday Club that David

Goldsworthy, writing in 1971, confused him for its founder.31

As the summer of 1965 faded into fall, negotiations with Rhodesia, already unfruitful, turned entirely barren. Wilson’s government considered UDI more and more likely as the weeks wore on and aimed to “spin things out” for as long as it possibly could.32 The prospect of Rhodesia’s claiming independence loomed over the

Conservative Party Conference in October, Edward Heath’s first as Tory leader. Heath had only narrowly beaten Reginald Maudling for the title and, ergo, was not entirely secure in his title.33 Wall and Lord Salisbury, aware that Heath was cool to the Rhodesian cause, sought to put pressure on their new leader in dramatic fashion, by presenting a motion declaring the Party opposed to imposing sanctions on Rhodesia, in the event of

UDI. While the Conservative Steering Committee struck down the motion as its own resolution, it was ultimately presented as an amendment to the party platform. Only the

29 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 205-7; Bill Schwarz, The White Man's World. Memories of Empire, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 431. 30 John Major, "Patrick Wall and South Africa," South African Historical Journal 52, no. 1 (2005): 106. 31 Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization, 204. 32 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 531. 33 John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), 202. 39

intervention of Home, now shadow , prevented its passage. Heath was made to appear ineffectual by this challenge, a reputation that would haunt him in the debate over oil sanctions.34

Parliament spent significant portions of the first ten days of November

1965discussing aspects of the rapidly developing Rhodesian crisis, with Wall acting as the settler regime’s leading voice in the House of Commons. On November 2nd, he pressed Commonwealth Secretary to acknowledge that Smith, in the midst of negotiating with Bottomley, had offered to make “concessions” to British demands, in an attempt to make the Wilson government appear unreasonable. Bottomley, to his credit, did not take the bait.35 On the following day, Wall went after Wilson, asking whether the Prime Minister really thought the differences between Britain and Rhodesia were “as great as all that”; Wilson, unsurprisingly, confirmed that he did.36

Conspicuously, however, Wall did not speak during the debate over the Queen’s Speech on the 9th, in which she had expressed her hope that the “government would maintain their unremitting efforts to bring about a peaceful and honourable situation in Rhodesia on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole.”37 Why Wall kept stony silence at this pivotal hour is unknown. In his verbal absence, the chief Conservative voice to speak on the matter was Heath, who made clear his belief, soon to be tested, that the full House was united against UDI.38

34 Mark Stuart, "A Party in Three Pieces: The Conservative Split over Rhodesian Oil Sanctions, 1965," Contemporary British History 16, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 54-6. 35 718 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 847. 36 718 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 1033. 37 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 4. 38 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 24. 40

The moment of truth came less than 48 hours later. Smith, evoking “the course of human events” a la the American Declaration of Independence, declared that Rhodesia no longer acknowledged Britain’s authority, accusing it in fearsomely stentorian terms of betraying its Rhodesian brethren, who had “demonstrated their loyalty to and to their kith and kin…through two world wars.”39 Smith was careful to profess his continued loyalty to the Queen, and admiration for the British people, and the trappings of Britishness.40 With the Commons planning to debate UDI on the 12th, it fell to the

House of Lords to fire the first oratorical shots. Still preoccupied with debating the

Queen’s Speech, the Rhodesian matter stood as an intrusive shadow in the upper chamber. While Salisbury refrained from expressing anything more than regret for UDI, some of his fellow Conservative peers were not so circumspect. In particular, Lord

Coleraine, who had preceded Wall as MP for Haltemprice before being ennobled in 1954, could not restrain himself from offering impassioned commentary.41 His tirade began in earnest with a very telling remark. While he deplored Rhodesian “rebellion” as “a very ugly thing,” he continued, “I know of only one thing uglier, and that is when a people surrenders, under the threat of force, its convictions, its traditions, and its heritage.”42 He went on to declare his empathy for the position in which the Smith government had been placed, and sought to lay much of the blame on what he deemed a “problem of the most appalling difficulty” in Rhodesia, and potentially, Britain: multi-racialism.43 Coleraine’s racially charged and fiery speech establishes the tenor of the Conservative far right’s

39 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 23827-38 of 25856. 40 Wood, So Far and No Further!, loc. 23893-98 of 25856. 41 London Gazette, no. 40108 (February 16, 1954), 1008. 42 270 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 189. 43 270 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 190. 41

stance on Rhodesia (and many other matters) as well as any speech Wall or Amery could give.

On the following day, November 12th, 1965, the members of the House of

Commons had their first formal debate on the topic. Wall, unsurprisingly, took the tack most sympathetic to the Rhodesians. While he joined the chorus of regret for how the situation had developed, he sharply questioned the idea of sanctions, which he felt could have a deleterious effect on the citizens of Rhodesia. Before speaking directly on

Rhodesia, he raised a matter pertaining to white settlers in Kenya, and, echoing Smith’s

Dilkean rhetoric, asked the Parliament, “Is this the way we treat our kith and kin?”44 Wall was not the first to invoke “kith and kin,” with Bottomley urging the House to think of

“kith and kin” in places other than Rhodesia during his opening of the debate. This rhetorical remnant of high imperialism remained in the vocabulary of both major parties.45 Though it was virtually impossible for Wall to defend the actual act, he took the opportunity to fiercely express his opposition to heavy sanctions against Rhodesia. His concern that Britain not go too far in punishing Rhodesia led cries of appeasement to be turned against him, most notably immediately following his speech by the venerable

Philip Noel-Baker, Labour MP for Derby South and Nobel Peace Prize winner.46

The Wilson administration promptly set the wheels in motion for a formal condemnation of UDI. Their proposed bill declared that “Southern Rhodesia continues to be part of Her Majesty’s Dominions” and more or less refused to acknowledge Rhodesian

44 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 570. 45 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 532. 46 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 575; Noel-Baker also won an Olympic silver medal in 1912, making him as far as I can tell the only individual to be both an Olympic medalist and Nobel laureate. 42

independence as reality.47 The second reading of the proclamation in the House saw

Amery finally entering the fray for the pro-Rhodesian crew. He was opposed to the broadness of the powers the bill would bestow upon Wilson, and questioned how far

Britain would dare to go in bringing Rhodesia to heel. Paradoxically, Amery believed that sanctions were ineffective if not onerous, and that Rhodesia ought not be treated as a great enemy of the British state. Making his sympathies plain, he described UDI as

“certainly…a rebellion, but a rebellion wrapped up in the Union Jack,” and hardly injurious to Britain.48 Like Wall had been three days prior, Amery found the specter of appeasement turned against him. William Shepherd, Tory MP for Cheadle, accused

Amery of treating “the black Africans” in the same way the Jews had been treated in Nazi

Germany.49 The fissures this displayed in Conservative opinion, again, would play out devastatingly for Heath over the course of the following month.

UDI had repercussions throughout the international community as well. On

November 12, both Wall and Heath raised an issue that would become particularly toxic during the weeks to come: that the Rhodesian crisis was a British affair, and therefore was no place for United Nations intervention.50 This issue was brought to a head on

th November 20 , when the UN Security Council voted unanimously to issue a resolution against Rhodesia, which, among other things, imposed “an embargo on oil and petroleum products,” and enjoined all nations to “enforce with vigour all the measures [they have]

51 announced.” A number of the Conservative lobby in Parliament felt that the UN was

47 Richard Whiting, "The Empire and British Politics," in Britain's Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 194. 48 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 713-20. 49 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 784. 50 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 536-7, 574. 51 Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces,” 57. 43

interfering in matters that were within Britain’s purview. Furthermore, many of them,

Amery especially, questioned its general competency. In his maiden speech, Amery had lambasted the United Nations for failing to talk the USSR down from its war footing, calling their efforts “the carcass of a dead policy.”52 The United Nations’ interference against British interests in the midst of the Congo crisis in 1960 further soured Amery and the right wing against them. Resultantly, on the 22nd, while the Foreign Secretary fielded questions on his visit to the UN in New York, most notably from Reginald

Maudling, the Monday Club held a meeting at which it formally condemned British endorsement of the UN’s call for oil sanctions.53 The Club’s declaration hung as a shadow over Parliament’s debates the following day.

While Wilson dismissed the Monday Club’s statement as distasteful rumblings from “irresponsible members of a responsible party,” Heath demonstrated keen awareness of the brewing discontent on his right, challenging the Prime Minister to remember his promise that Rhodesia would be “exclusively the responsibility of the

British Government.”54 Lord Home, who would on numerous occasions lend his prestige to the Monday Club throughout the 1960s, also expressed concern.55 Amery, taking full advantage of the chance to hit Wilson and the UN, piled on, accusing Wilson of acting in bad faith by seeking international intervention, and warning that “further support from this side of the House” was jeopardized by Wilson’s acquiescence to international intervention.56 The Parliamentary session of December 1 saw Wall and Amery working in tandem on another UDI-related issue. Both were fiercely opposed to the deployment of

52 473 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) col. 226. 53 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 24-6; Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces,” 57. 54 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 256-7. 55 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 413; 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 252-3. 56 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 254. 44

British troops to Zambia, a cautionary measure that Heath’s had endorsed.57 Wall ominously noted that a clash between Rhodesian and British soldiers, even a crossing into Rhodesian territory, would be “an act of war”; Amery further clarified that such a conflict would be a “British civil war,” and ended his peroration by praying for a settlement “based on conciliation, not coercion” that acknowledged

Rhodesian independence.58

Right-wing hackles were raised still more when Britain itself took up oil sanctions against Rhodesia. Although the UN resolution explicitly mentioned oil as a target of their sanctions regime, Wilson’s government had delayed imposing their own. On December

1, Amery lamented the degree to which sanctions had advanced from the government’s initial proposal of November 12, suggesting that Wilson’s latest list of sanctions was a verse worthy of Tom Lehrer’s “Elements Song”.59 When, on December 17, an order-in- council set oil sanctions in place, the fault-lines in the Conservative Party splintered apart completely. The Tories divided into three factions: those who supported sanctions against

Rhodesia, those adamantly against them (Amery and Wall being among this number), and those who followed Heath’s line and abstained.60

The December 21 debate would be one of the more contentious in the House’s modern history. Debate on Rhodesia consumed the entirety of a scheduled debate on foreign affairs, which then segued into the matter of an oil embargo. The proceedings were colored by a motion deploring the use of any forceful measures against Rhodesia, to

57 Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces,” 58. 58 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 1437, 1473, 1477. 59 721 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 1470. 60 Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces,” 52, 57. 45

which Amery was one of the principal signatories.61 Wall’s address was relatively restrained, and broke little new ground. In short, he doubted sanctions’ efficacy, disdained the use of force to impose them, and was “opposed to it and [would] vote against it.”62 Several MPs, such as Emmanuel Shinwell, rejected Wall’s statement, none more contemptuously than , Labour MP for Baron’s Court. In high dudgeon,

Richard accused several members of the Rhodesia lobby of attempting to drag out the

Rhodesian issue with semantics and minor peccadillos. Amery, returning to the chamber after stepping out for a time, became the subject of Richard’s venom, as he strongly suggested that Amery’s concern for what sanctions might cause the Zambians to suffer was “a lot of nonsense,” a cynical ploy.63 Wall, in Richard’s estimation, was “at least honest” in attributing his actions to an abiding mistrust of the Prime Minister, and he firmly defended Wilson against Wall’s charge of dishonesty. Richard concluded by stating his strong suspicion that the “Rhodesian lobby” were motivated merely by partisan distrust and an “anxious” desire that “Smith should succeed.”64

At about midnight, the House finally divided, concluding its tense debate.

Although the sanctions were passed by a great margin (276 to 43), Tory unity was sorely tested. Seeking to ameliorate the deep divisions within his party, Heath, with help from

Home, had persuaded the Conservative leadership to abstain from the sanctions bill, and hoped to get the majority of his Party to follow.65 During the early foreign affairs debate on the 21st, Heath alluded to this by expressing his faith that a “middle way” could be found in dealing with the Rhodesians, an idea Home laid out with significantly more

61 722 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 1956. 62 722 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 2028-30. 63 722 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 2040. 64 722 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 2041. 65 Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces,” 60. 46

aplomb as “a third alternative,” a “positive proposal on which independence can be based within the law.”66 Much to leadership’s chagrin, the party did not fall wholesale behind this proposition. Thirty-one Conservatives voted for the measure, and Wall, Amery et al. cast their votes against it. It was the greatest rebuke to either party’s whip since 1945.67

Ironically, given the vigor with which Labour MPs, like Richard, had condemned

Conservative partisanship, Wilson was elated for weeks afterward by the disaster that had befallen Heath and his Whip, William Whitelaw. The split would pose a problem for

Heath throughout his tenure at the head of the Conservative Party.68 Seeing his chief political opponents in disarray, and with a decisive by-election victory in Hull also under

Labour’s belt, Wilson called a general election in March 1966, hoping to improve his untenably thin parliamentary majority. Although Heath tackled his duties as Leader doggedly, Labour’s triumph was virtually complete. Wilson’s party expanded its majority from 4 to 96.69 Among the Conservative casualties was Julian Amery, who had never been fully secure in his seat of Preston North. The height of the Wilson years, therefore, would see Amery sidelined from the opposition in the House.70

With that said, the final weeks of his first tenure in the House saw Amery speaking frequently on Rhodesia, in thoroughly provocative style. In one particularly contentious debate on February 16, 1966, he was shut down by the Speaker exactly six times during the course of his twelve-minute address, and a seventh time shortly

66 722 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 1884-5, 1991. 67 Philip Norton, ed., Dissension in the House of Commons: Intra-Party Dissent in the House of Commons Division Lobbies, 1945-74 (London: Macmillan, 1975), 256. 68 Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces,” 78. 69 Campbell, Edward Heath, 207-9; D.E. Butler and Anthony King, The British General Election of 1966 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1966), 1. 70 Onslow, “Julian Amery,” 211. 47

afterward, when he interrupted .71 Setting aside the pettier side of things,

Amery did resort to ploys that would become standard-issue for Rhodesia’s defenders on the House floor, not least of which was his comparing the Wilson government to that of

Lord North. If Ian Smith wanted to play the role of George Washington, Amery and the

Rhodesia lobby were more than willing to cast Wilson as the PM Washington defeated.

While the Speaker was none too interested in receiving history lessons in the course of his duties, the specter of Lord North would re-appear periodically in the lobby’s protestations on Rhodesia.72

Indeed, several broad tropes recurred throughout Wall and Amery’s orations regarding Rhodesia. Particularly, as shown above, they made much ado about the potential harm lying in wait for British “kith and kin” in Africa, should the crisis not be resolved speedily and smoothly.73 The implication, which was sometimes only a scratch below the surface, was that the native African population were demanding white blood as recompense for what had been done to them, evoking deep-seated fears of racial violence that dated back to the Empire’s height. The day after UDI, Wall attempted to drive that point home by suggesting that soon the British might become the minority in the

Commonwealth, subject to the whims of those they had once ruled.74 Furthermore,

Amery, as demonstrated earlier, did not hesitate to bring up the Mau Mau at the slightest provocation emanating from Nyasaland, even as he accused the opposition of raising a hue and cry as a political tactic.75 His exit from the House, although temporary, is as good a time as any to veer off the chronological track this project has thus far followed,

71 724 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1966) cols. 1450-4, 1457. 72 724 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1966) cols. 1453-4. 73 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) cols. 547-9, 587, 599-601, 608-9. 74 720 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1965) col. 572. 75 Murphy, Central Africa, part II, 37. 48

and conclude this second chapter with an analysis of three recurring themes in Wall and

Amery’s rhetoric on the Rhodesian crisis.

Much as Amery had promoted Aden as the lynchpin of imperial defense in the

1960s, so too did he identify the white states of Southern Africa as key fronts in the fight against the Soviets, whom both he and Wall identified as a mortal enemy. In their view, the USSR was the single greatest threat to peace and good order in the world and felt that

Britain could and ought to play a central role in the struggle against them; as Wall put it,

“the rulers of the Kremlin are after ‘…complete and final victory…on a world scale.” 76

Amery, never abandoning his belief that the Cold War was “the central fact of the international situation,” frequently set Rhodesia’s struggle in anti-Communist terms.77 To his mind, the Soviets were boosting African independence movements in Rhodesia- and elsewhere on the Continent- to advance their influence. The Labour government in

Britain, and the American Carter administration, were partaking in nothing less than

“collusion with Soviet imperialism” to undermine Smith’s government.78 Amery held that it was a question of ideology, not of race, protesting, “I do not see this picture in terms of colour; I see it much more in terms of the threat of Soviet imperialism.” 79 While he acknowledged the potential utility of African states to the cause, such as Zambia and

Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), he held a much higher view of the capability of South Africa and Rhodesia.80 Resultantly, Amery argued that Southern

Africa must be maintained as a bulwark. For the discord there to continue would be catastrophic, a disaster compounded by the likelihood that white men from Britain and

76 943 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1978) col. 1064. 77 473 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1950) col. 218. 78 973 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1978) col. 1053. 79 908 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1976) col. 1370. 80 906 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1976) cols. 227-8. 49

elsewhere around the world would go to take up arms “for- to use that much despised phrase- their kith and kin.”81

In that same February 24, 1976 session in which Amery had invoked “kith and kin,” David Ennals, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, suggested that Amery was allowed to pursue more fanciful ideas by virtue of being a member of the

Opposition. When he had been in office, Ennals believed, Amery “surely must have been restrained.”82Indeed, having returned to the House in 1969 as MP for Pavilion, he was brought into the government by Heath after the Conservative victory in 1970.

Amery and Heath had had an amicable relationship since their days together at Oxford, and Amery served first as Minister of Housing, then in the Foreign Office as Minister of

State.83 Heath, rather than bowing to the wishes of his party’s right wing and unable to devise a solution that would appeal to both Africans and Europeans, opted to “maintain the status quo and sustain sanctions.”84 Again muzzled by the front bench (as he had been by Macmillan), he was now required to stand and represent a government that maintained policies he had strenuously opposed in 1965. In a foreign affairs debate, when called out by Ivor Richard, he ostentatiously proclaimed, “I withdraw nothing; I qualify nothing…a great deal of water has flown under the bridge since then.”85 A convincing endorsement of the sanctions regime this was not. However, one point in particular which Amery largely abandoned upon returning to the Opposition was observing any comparison between Rhodesia and the fledgling United States. He instead preferred to allude to

James I calling himself King of , a legal fiction even less compelling than it

81 906 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1976) col. 230. 82 906 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1976) col. 329. 83 Edward Heath, The Course of My Life: My Autobiography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), 46. 84 Heath, The Course of My Life, 46. 85 858 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1973) col. 1854. 50

sounds.86 Wall, on the other hand, resorted to the “Lord North” line of attack on multiple occasions. He warned Wilson that if he punted on negotiations with Smith, “history would condemn him almost as much as it condemned Lord North.” 87 Conservative administrations were not spared Wall’s ire. In 1973, the seventh year of sanctions against

Rhodesia, he lambasted the government as having “beaten Lord North’s unenviable record.”88

This rhetorical tactic was echoed in Rhodesia by the Smith government, which, as mentioned earlier, had consciously modeled its UDI after America’s Declaration of

Independence. Indeed, the Rhodesian settlers understood themselves as playing the same role that the Americans had almost two centuries prior.89 Although it is often tempting to impute some degree of cynical motivation into what political figures say and do, Smith believed devoutly in the cause of whiteness. The idea that he was fighting to maintain the high standards of imperial Britain frequently appeared in his rhetoric. Famously, he proclaimed in 1966 that “if Churchill were alive today I believe he would probably emigrate to Rhodesia,” a proposition fueled by Smith’s cherished belief that Rhodesians were “more British than the British.”90 Inadvertently, this idea of a purer Britishness itself parallels with the American Revolution. A growing number of historians, led by John

Murrin, argue the American Revolution required an American identity to bind the thirteen colonies together; this was forged out of a process of “anglicization,” meaning that “the colonies had to grow consciously more English before they would ever

86 880 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) col. 1432. 87 737 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1966) col. 1684. 88 863 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1973) col. 1265. 89 David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), loc. 1073-6 of 2350, Kindle. 90 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 414; Graham Boynton, "Ian Smith has sadly been proven right," The Telegraph, November 22, 2007. 51

recognize themselves as American.”91 While the theory of anglicization is often used to refer to the liberal tenets by which the colonists expected to be governed as Englishmen, its dark corollary, one could argue, would be the Rhodesians’ staunch belief in their role as, to borrow Bill Schwarz’s phrasing, the last white men.92

Underwriting both of the preceding arguments was Rhodesia’s position as one of the few white settler states remaining in Africa. As has been described throughout this work, both Wall and Amery generally took care to avoid outright racism in Parliament, qualifying their thinking when necessary. Yet, to engage in fervent pro-Rhodesian politicking was to endorse a settler-colonialist state that had as its animating principle a fervent belief that white government was the right government for Rhodesia. Their concern for the “Rhodesian,” moreover, was often concern for the white Rhodesian, and when encompassed to include the African population, was merely a paternalistic argument for the order that Smith alone could provide. Wall, for example, wanted

Africans “eventually” to be “the predominant race” in Rhodesia, but only once the

“chaotic conditions” there had subsided.93 Overwhelmingly, however, Amery and Wall’s sympathies lay with the white man, both at home and abroad, and as a result they found natural safe haven for their views in the Monday Club, to which this paper now turns.

UDI was a godsend to the Monday Club, in the sense that it provided them with a concrete cause around which to rally and galvanize support. Members of the Club believed that its membership doubled in the aftermath of UDI, though Schwarz, who

91 John M. Murrin, "England and Colonial America: A Novel Theory of the American Revolution," in Anglicizing America: Empire, Revolution, Republic, ed. Ignacio Gallup-Diaz, Andrew Shankman, and David J. Silverman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 11-2, JSTOR; essay originally published in 1974. 92 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 394. 93 737 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1966) col. 1681. 52

recorded this, says he could not corroborate this claim.94 Wall and Amery, for their parts, were already proud members of the Club, and were quickly positioned as two of its most august supporters. In addition, their prominence (among others) was sufficient to keep

Heath from straying too far from right-wing principles, at least while in the Opposition.95

As shown above, the three-way split on oil sanctions resulted from his needing to keep the party’s major factions in some semblance of amity. In the months immediately following UDI, Amery in particular became a face of the Club’s response. At a pro-

Rhodesian rally in February 1966, at which both he and Wall spoke, Amery was exhorted by a member of the audience to “speak for England as your father did.”96 Wilson was never less than disparaging of the Club’s activities, sternly informing Amery that it was delusional to think that “people attending [the] Monday Club in any way represent the people of this country.”97 Little though Wilson liked it, the explosive statements of Enoch

Powell in the spring of 1968 demonstrated the degree to which many in England were inclined to stand by the Club’s cause.

When Powell famously proclaimed that, as a result of unchecked immigration into

Britain, he, “like the Roman,” saw “‘the River Tiber flowing with much blood,” it instantaneously produced a firestorm in public opinion.98 Heath, who already thought

Powell to be troublesome and obstinate, found the speech, as he recalled it, “deplorable… deceitful and disgraceful,” and promptly fired him from the Shadow Cabinet.99 While

94 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 428. 95 Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 66- 7. 96 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 562en147. 97 723 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1966) col. 692. 98 “Immigration, at the West Midlands Area CPC AGM, ,” The Papers of J. Enoch Powell (The J. Enoch Powell Literary Trust, 2018), http://www.enochpowell.info/speeches/; POLL 4/1/3. 99 Heath, The Course of My Life, 290-3. 53

many Britons doubtlessly agreed with Heath, a significant number felt emboldened by

Powell. Several strikes in solidarity with Powell occurred on April 23, 1968, three days after his speech and the day on which Parliament debated the Race Relations Bill to which Powell was opposed. , arguably the most prominent newspaper of Tory bent, heavily criticized Heath’s decision to remove Powell from shadow office. By April 24, Powell had received approximately 20,000 letters, virtually all of which supported his stance.100 Crucially, the Monday Club’s leadership saw in

Powell a kindred spirit that it could use to further spread its message. As it had with UDI, the Monday Club saw a membership boom unrivalled in its history.101 Wall in particular saw in Powell’s speech bold opportunity. Writing in the Club’s newsletter for April 1968,

Wall argued that the “Rivers of Blood” speech could be the catalyst for revitalizing a white Commonwealth. To Wall, Powell represented the ideal figurehead, presenting “a genuine programme of a return to patriotism and self-discipline [that] could sweep the nation.”102 Wall, as a devout Catholic of middle-class background, could well understand what it was like to be looked down upon by the party establishment. Whether or not he saw something of that struggle in Powell’s predicament, it is undeniable that Wall’s ties to the Monday Club only grew stronger in the aftermath of “Rivers of Blood.” Indeed, he would become the Club’s president in 1978.103 The comparatively well-heeled Amery too sympathized with Powell’s cause. In a private letter, Amery let him know that he felt him

100 , Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 459- 63. 101 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 432. 102 Patrick Wall, The Monday Club Newsletter (April 1968), as cited in Daniel McNeil, "'The rivers of Zimbabwe will run red with blood': Enoch Powell and the Post-Imperial Nostalgia of the Monday Club," Journal of Southern African Studies 37, no. 4 (December 2011): 736. 103 McNeil, “‘The rivers of Zimbabwe will run red with blood,” 736. 54

to be “as right as [] was” in the 1930s.104 While Amery and Powell disagreed publicly on the nature of Britain’s commitment to empire, Amery did not shy away from the Monday Club, even as it became more overtly associated with Powell’s politics. In fact, he co-wrote, with Wall, John Biggs-Davison, , and

Soref, a pamphlet for the Club called Rhodesia and the Threat to the West, in 1976.105

As the title of said pamphlet indicates, Wall and Amery’s rhetoric grew more apocalyptic when it became increasingly clear that Smith was going to lose his fight and be made to transfer power to the majority. When they described the Rhodesian crisis as a

“threat to the West,” Wall and Amery were, as Smith was in Rhodesia, in deadly earnest.

In 1976, as a potential settlement was being negotiated under the auspices of Henry

Kissinger, then American Secretary of State, Wall warned that chaos in Rhodesia could lead to “an exodus of the whites,” which would in turn trigger further deterioration of

“law and order” in Southern Africa.106 When the Kissinger plan foundered and the sanctions regime stayed in place, Amery accused Callaghan’s government of willingly being an “accomplice of terrorism against the Rhodesian régime.”107 The stakes of the struggle for Rhodesia truly could not have been higher for these warriors of the right. As

Amery observed in 1974, shortly after returning to the Opposition, the “Rhodesian problem” was tied to Britain in many very real ways; the “ties of blood,” perhaps most importantly, made it all the more worth fighting for.108

104 Paul Corthorn, "Enoch Powell, Julian Amery and debates over Britain's world role after 1945," in The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Political Animal, ed. Olivier Esteves and Stéphane Porion (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2019), 120. 105 Julian Amery et al., "Rhodesia and the Threat to the West," Bodleian Archives & Manuscripts, published November 1976, https://archives.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repositories/2/archival_objects/119299; marked PUB 117/39. 106 917 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1976) col. 1567. 107 930 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1977) col. 1687. 108 880 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) col. 1438. 55

Ultimately, of course, the struggle for Rhodesia was a fight that was- and almost had to be- lost. It was a great irony that the Monday Club, which saw Margaret Thatcher as their ideal leader, and celebrated her prime ministry accordingly, were made to watch as she passed the death sentence on Rhodesia.109 Thatcher, pragmatically, felt that

“political and military realities” on the ground there tilted heavily in favor of Robert

Mugabe and his militia.110 Amery, who had stood by the white settlers of Southern Africa since his earliest days in Parliament, eulogized Rhodesia, and, though he named the final outcome a retreat of historic proportion, welcomed what was now Zimbabwe to the

Commonwealth. His valediction did not direct terribly great vitriol at Thatcher’s government and was aimed largely at packaging South Africa as a worthy cause.111 Wall, on the other hand, chose not to produce a lengthy tribute at all, containing himself generally to following up on concerns regarding British nationals with monies in

Zimbabwe.112 In the end, Mugabe’s lengthy left Smith, (verbally) abetted by

Amery and Wall in Britain, the author of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Amery, in his diary on his 70th birthday, professed that he considered himself to have failed the Rhodesians.

However, shortly after Zimbabwean independence, he and Wall were given the chance to do right by their kith and kin in another corner of the world. Argentina’s invasion of the

Falkland Islands, the primary topic of the final chapter, represented an opportunity to restore pride in Britain while also preserving the right of the “kith and kin” in the

Falklands to autonomy. Wall and Amery, at this point senior backbenchers, would play small but critical roles in the crisis’ unfolding.

109 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 433. 110 Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and (London: Routledge, 2013), 110. 111 984 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1980) cols. 467-72. 112 984 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1980) col. 504W. 56

Stoking the Embers of Empire: The Falklands and the Half-Life of Empire, 1968-

The Falklands War often appears in British historiography in one of two ways. It is either an “epilogue” to the history of imperial Britain, a final incident before the

Empire ceased to be a going concern, or, as E.P. Thompson put it, “a moment of imperial atavism” that re-vitalized the Empire for a new generation.1 This project has thus far traced the views of Julian Amery and Patrick Wall as they dealt with the fading of

Britain’s imperial power. As this chapter will show, both men saw the war as the opportunity to revitalize Britain, in both the strategic and spiritual sense. Although

Amery especially attempted to use the conflict as a springboard to extending British power throughout the South Atlantic, the Falklands War truthfully prolonged empire in a more subtle way. By proving that even a diminished Britain could defend its “kith and kin” abroad, it helped to re-package that crucial idea into a form more suitable to

Britain’s new circumstances. Though Thatcher was not herself a great booster of empire, through her person this remodeling of the imperial idea entered the DNA of the

Conservative Party more substantially than ever before.

The question of sovereignty over the Falklands remained an unresolved, if secondary, issue for British politicians, from the years immediately following the Second

World War. As mentioned in the first chapter, relations between Britain and Argentina were rocky enough in the post-war period that the Royal Marines were very nearly deployed to the Falklands, a mission which Patrick Wall referred to in his maiden speech.

In 1948, with the Argentines agitating off the coast, the islanders sent an extraordinary

1 For the former, see, for example, Anthony Clayton, "Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," in The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Twentieth Century, ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 304; the phrase originates from E.P. Thompson, "Why neither side is worth backing," The Times, April 29, 1982, 12. 57

petition to London, requesting the removal of their governor, Geoffrey Miles Clifford, who they believed was grievously mismanaging their finances. At the crux of the petition was their firm belief that as a “British community, 100% white, and noted for its loyalty to the Crown,” they were entitled to the freedoms that other predominantly white colonies were allowed.2 The petition was never made public in the United Kingdom, and their requests made little political headway in 1948, as the Falklands were then essentially irrelevant to broader British interests. However, their plea speaks in its own way to the relationship that “kith and kin” in other parts of the Empire felt they had with the mother country.3 When the Falklands again became a political issue, some twenty years later, such rhetoric from the islands had far more impact, playing neatly into the hands of those who already had serious concerns with the way white settlers were being treated by

Britain.

The United Nations, after years of Argentina’s putting pressure on Britain, finally took up the dispute over the Falklands in December 1965. By overwhelming consensus, the UN asked that Britain and Argentina commence negotiations to resolve their differences and settle the Falklands question.4 This was, of course, far from the only issue

Britain was dealing with at the United Nations. The UN, which had as one of its founding principles the belief that colonial possessions must eventually attain self-government, began to take an increased interest in Britain’s colonial affairs, a development for which, in a January 1966 memo, the permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office, Sir Hilton

Poynton, blamed his former boss, . Poynton considered it a point of

2 Ezequiel Mercau, The Falklands War: An Imperial History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 26-7. 3 Klaus Dodds, Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 119. 4 D. George Boyce, The Falklands War (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 11. 58

emphasis to “resist any attempts…to ‘involve’ the United Nations in our colonial affairs.”5 In this way, the bureaucratic establishment mirrored the Monday Club’s severe disgruntlement with the United Nations. The Clubbers, in the aftermath of UDI, were incensed that the UN was interfering with colonial matters that ought to be the province of Britain alone.6 The Wilson government too had Rhodesia on the mind when the

Falklands resolution was passed. It was the view of British officials in New York that, should they cooperate with UN wishes on this relatively minor matter, the UN support on issues of greater concern would be more steadfast.7 In December 1965, there were few issues of greater import to the British political world than Rhodesia’s UDI.

With these issues in mind, the Wilson government entered into protracted negotiations with Argentina. As the outline of an agreement began to form, the

Falklanders’ distrust of British intentions reached new heights. The notion that Argentine sovereignty over the islands might be acknowledged rankled the Falklanders, who almost uniformly considered themselves British.8 The islanders found natural allies on the

Conservative right wing, who were deeply sensitive to the plight of all their “kith and kin.” Those MPs sympathetic to the Falklander cause joined forces with business interests and supportive individuals in the UK, and the islanders themselves, to form what was colloquially known as the Falkland lobby. Its chief aim was to counter the forces

5 S.R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., British Documents on the End of Empire, A/5. East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964-1971: Europe, Rhodesia, Commonwealth, vol. 2 (London: TSO, 2004), 58. 6 Mark Stuart, "A Party in Three Pieces: The Conservative Split over Rhodesian Oil Sanctions, 1965," Contemporary British History 16, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 57-8. 7 Martín Abel González, "Missed Opportunity? The Anglo-Argentine Negotiations over the Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, 1966-1968," Universidad de Belgrano - Documento de Trabajo, no. 241 (October 2009): 4. 8 Dodds, Pink Ice, 128-30. 59

seeking Britain’s acquiescence to Argentine demands.9 Wall was reasonably attuned to the lobby’s needs nearly from its inception, asking for clarity on the Falklands’ future as early as April 9, 1968. He and several other MPs sought to secure the government’s promise that it would respect the wishes of the islanders.10 By the time Wall revisited the issue in October 1968, the feelings of Falklands supporters were at a boil. Furthermore, public opinion at large had swung very much in their favor.11 The Wilson government was forced to definitively concede that no decision would be reached concerning the rule of the Falklands without the islanders’ direct consent. The Falklands lobby had won a decisive victory for their cause, and, though events such as the oil crisis of the mid-1970s occasionally jarred Britain’s commitment, its Falklands policy would remain effectively in thrall to the demands of the islanders until the outbreak of war in 1982.12

While at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) during Ted Heath’s ministry, Amery was involved to at least some degree with the Falklands question. In

October 1972, the UN began to press again on Britain, urging them to seek a compromise with Argentina post-haste.13 Amery, who was of course predisposed towards “kith and kin,” assured inquiring MPs that Argentine sovereignty remained off the table. Indeed, it remained the case that there would be no change in rulership “against the wishes of the islanders.”14 Amery, however, had to balance his well-established ideology with the pragmatic demands of statesmanship. When the notion of dual sovereignty, or condominium, between Britain and Argentina was broached by Heath’s government, it

9 Clive Ellerby, "The Role of the Falklands Lobby, 1968-1990," in International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict, ed. Alex Danchev (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 85, 88-9. 10 762 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1968) cols. 203-4W. 11 770 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1968) col. 770W; Aaron Donaghy, The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 6. 12 Donaghy, The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 6, 8, 64-6. 13 Donaghy, The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 24. 14 848 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1972) col. 18. 60

was Amery they planned to send to meet with Perón (recently restored to power in

Argentina), at the inauguration of the Brazilian President, and gauge his receptiveness. In any event, the Tory removal from power in the 1974 general election precluded Amery’s voyage, and Labour quickly abandoned the idea when it became clear the islanders were uninterested.15

Wall remained mindful of the Falklands during the Callaghan years. For example, as MP for a constituency in Hull, one of England’s chief fishing ports, Wall was intrigued by the island’s capacity for fishing.16 While undeniably a good play for the constituency, this issue took clear second fiddle to the pressing question of Falklander sovereignty. On that score, displeasing news emerged in the late spring of 1978, when it was revealed in

The Observer that the Argentines had occupied the island of Southern Thule some 16 months prior. The author made a point to mention that British protests were disregarded by the Argentine government.17 Although 1300 miles from the Falklands, their presence was nevertheless considered a grave threat to the archipelago’s security. The lobby was even more deeply disturbed by the news that the government had been aware of the occupation and chose not to act.18 Wall, on June 28, asked to know precisely what actions were going to be taken to counter Argentina’s apparent aggression. He received in return a vague commitment to pursue diplomatic avenues that would deter a repeat performance.19 Although clearly interested, Wall restricted himself to written questions in this period, on the whole a far less showy approach than the righteous bluster he brought forth on the Rhodesian crisis. There is no doubt where, at this time, Wall’s priorities lay.

15 Donaghy, The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 27, 36-8. 16 938 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1977) col. 118W. 17 Hugh O'Shaughnessy, "Argentinians take over British island," The Observer, May 7, 1976, 7. 18 Donaghy, The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 191-2. 19 952 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1978) col. 553W. 61

Events in 1979-1980, however, changed the calculus for Wall, Amery, and their allies. As described in the previous chapter, Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister in

1979, beginning over a decade of right-wing rule in Britain. However, within the first eighteen months of her ministry, Thatcher presided over the transfer of Rhodesia to

African majority rule. The Mugabe regime’s rise to power in the newly christened

Zimbabwe represented the total defeat of the cause to which Wall and Amery had devoted much of their political careers. At the close of 1980, members of the British

Government, particularly Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the FCO, began to push for some form of settlement with Argentina. In order to achieve this end, the notion of leasing the Falklands back to Argentina (which had previously been suggested by

Labour) was bruited about again in the FCO.20 Years later, Thatcher claimed to find leaseback distasteful, yet the idea was, nevertheless, brought to Buenos Aires. The

Argentines were generally receptive to the idea; however, its reception in the Falklands was poor, and it received an even more negative reception by their allies in London.21

When Ridley arose to explain himself in Parliament on December 2, 1980, he was roundly condemned by MPs from all sides of the political divide. Among the

Conservatives, Amery made one of the harsher interventions.22 He found the proposal

“profoundly disturbing” and, calling on his years in the office Ridley now held, accused the FCO of a longstanding desire “to get rid of this commitment.” Amery argued forcefully for the Falklands’ value to Britain, and compared it to the loss of Aden,

20 Mercau, The Falklands War, 54-5. 21 Domenico Maria Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 23-4. 22 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 24-5. 62

another pet project of his.23 The stridence and breadth of criticism more or less killed

Ridley’s scheme, but its ramifications would last for years to come. While visiting

Argentina and the Falklands, Ridley left the impression- with both Falklanders and

Argentines- that Britain was less than interested in preserving the Falklands.24

The Thatcher government’s actions in 1981 did little to dispel that notion. The

PM sought to re-orientate British defense towards Europe and against the Soviet Union, and she actively endorsed deep slashes to the defense budget in other parts of the world.

This re-alignment served to place Britain more in line with NATO’s defense priorities, and represented a gesture of good will towards the United States, which Thatcher treasured above all other allies.25 Among the planned cuts was the HMS Endurance, which had been stationed in the South Atlantic for over a decade and was now scheduled to be decommissioned. Laden with significance to the Falkland Islands and its supporters, a less-than-enthused Falklands lobby joined the opposition to the defense budget.26 Wall, ever loyal to the Royal Navy, cautioned against taking for granted its reach. Without mentioning the Falklands specifically, he observed that tensions were rising in South

America and elsewhere. This led Wall to trot out what could credibly be called the warhawk’s mantra: “It is not the time to reduce our defences; rather is it the time to increase them.”27 He then pleaded to Thatcher, of whom he very much wanted to believe the best. Comparing her to “Queen Boadicea,” Elizabeth I, and Queen Victoria, Wall proclaimed that the “Iron Lady” surely would not wish to be remembered as the Prime

23 995 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1980) col. 131. 24 Mercau, The Falklands War, 56-7. 25 Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 9-10; Andrew Gamble, "Europe and America," in Making Thatcher's Britain, ed. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Kindle, loc. 5115 of 9004. 26 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 27-9. 27 5 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1981) col. 203. 63

Minister who imperiled Britain to save a few pounds.28 A prototype of Powell’s famous exhortation of Thatcher at the outbreak of the Falklands War, Wall’s goading was far less successful. Her defense budget passed, and the Endurance was scheduled for decommission in the summer of 1982. The Argentine junta, which came under the rule of the ultraconservative General Galtieri in December 1981, saw the warship’s planned withdrawal as an open invitation to invade the Falklands in April.29

Despite the years of increasing tension, Britain was not nearly as prepared as it could have been for an Argentine invasion.30 Hyper-alert to escalating danger, Amery asked the government whether they were prepared for “a surprise attack.” Richard Luce, the FCO Minister of State responding to Amery, described that interjection as “not helpful.”31 Even during the last days of March 1982, there was prevalent malaise in the

Thatcher government at the prospect of armed conflict. The Foreign Secretary, Lord

Carrington, went away for visits to Brussels and Israel on March 28, and the Defence and

Overseas Policy Committee did not meet until April 1 to discuss the impending threat.32

While they were not taken utterly by surprise, Thatcher and her government did not truly expect Argentina to act until Argentine boots were on the ground, forcing Rex Hunt, the

Falklands governor, to evacuate. With an eye towards history, he made his exit in full formal regalia. Parliament was promptly called to extraordinary session the next day,

Saturday, April 3.33 The Prime Minister’s opening words set the tenor of the debate. In what was “a situation of great gravity,” “British sovereign territory [had] been invaded by

28 5 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1981) col. 206. 29 Boyce, The Falklands War, 27. 30 Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War, 37. 31 19 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 264. 32 Boyce, The Falklands War, 34, 43. 33 Mercau, The Falklands War, 72-3. 64

a foreign power.”34 In the dramatic debate that followed, Amery’s speech was short and sharp. He felt that Britain had been thoroughly disgraced by the ease with which the

Falklands, British soil, fell to conquest; “the third naval power in the world” he proclaimed,” …has suffered a humiliating defeat.”35 Little though Amery wanted to play

Cassandra, he was free to carp on the many times he and his allies had warned against precisely such an embarrassment. Even so, Amery was confident that Britain would prevail, and he would settle for nothing less than the Falklands’ reconquest. Only this would “restore the credibility of the Government or wipe the stain from Britain’s honour.”36 Prior to Amery’s speech, Enoch Powell addressed the House similarly, stating plainly Britain had no other choice but force. Directing his culmination at Thatcher, he memorably informed the “Iron Lady” that soon the nation “will learn of what metal she is made.”37

Powell’s oft-quoted challenge to Thatcher is widely regarded to have steeled her resolve for the coming fight.38 However, the British war machine did not reach its highest gear for some time after Argentina’s incursion. After Carrington resigned in disgrace on

April 5, Thatcher gave some thought to naming Amery Foreign Secretary in his stead, but was dissuaded by William Whitelaw, once Heath’s Whip, now . She chose instead , who was more open to the possibility of a negotiated settlement.39 His message to Argentina, put plainly, was that, should they withdraw from the Falklands, everything was on the table. The moderate course Pym charted was an

34 21 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 633. 35 21 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 647. 36 21 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 647-9. 37 21 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 644. 38 Simon Heffer, Like the Roman: The Life of Enoch Powell (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 856; Mercau, The Falklands War, 152. 39 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 43, 48; by all accounts, Thatcher deeply disliked Pym. 65

easy target for pushback from Thatcher and the right wing.40 One chance arose on April

21, when the Foreign Secretary was questioned on his planned journey to Washington to meet with Secretary of State , the US having offered its services as a neutral mediator. Though skeptical that a peaceful settlement could be reached, Amery seized the opportunity to attempt another piece of high imperial strategizing. He suggested that Pym push for a “South Atlantic community” that could accommodate

Britain, , , and other states with Antarctic rights for the frozen continent’s “development.” Pym politely dismissed Amery’s idea.41 That evening, a delegation of Conservative MPs, led by Sir Patrick Wall, went to the Chairman of the

Party, , out of suspicion regarding Pym’s aims. The Chairman assured them that Thatcher’s government had no intention of allowing the Argentines to maintain possession of the Falklands. In addition, British troops would soon be on the ground in

South Georgia, an island relatively close to the Falklands that the Argentines had also occupied.42

Parkinson’s promise regarding South Georgia was soon kept, as Britain took the island back virtually effortlessly on April 25. However, with the commencement of military operations, time itself was now an enemy of Britain’s. A protracted engagement in the South Atlantic would be logistically challenging, to say the least.43 Amery, for one, quickly grasped this challenge. He urged Thatcher in session on the 26th to avoid leaving the British soldiers to “tread water indefinitely.” Thatcher, agreeing, lobbied his salvo in turn at the Argentines, stating that the operation was a message they would do well to

40 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 48-9. 41 22 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 273-4. 42 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 54; Wall was knighted in June 1981. 43 Freedman, Britain and the Falkland Islands, 50. 66

heed.44 On the 29th, the Prime Minister rejected appealing to the United Nations or protracting diplomatic negotiations with Argentina. If they refused to withdraw in short order, Thatcher would act in “self-defence.”45 Amery hailed Thatcher’s decision and spoke firmly of the need to preserve British sovereignty over the Falklands by any means necessary, as per the wishes of the islanders. He also raised his South Atlantic scheme again, in a slightly more developed form. As Amery explained it, he envisioned an alliance in the South Atlantic that would be “dedicated to the protection of sea routes and airways,” while simultaneously developing Antarctica’s resources.46 Speaking directly afterward, sarcastically referred to his outline as an off-brand NATO and

Pym, wrapping up the debate, again let Amery down gently.47 While not nearly on the

CAF’s level of seriousness, SATO (paraphrasing Benn) was yet another imperial dream that Amery could not get to stick.

In a deeply controversial episode, the British navy sunk the Argentine General

Belgrano on May 2, taking the lives of 360 Argentine sailors. While there has been considerable debate over whether the attack was justified, it undeniably provoked a feeling of unease in the international community.48 The General Belgrano was followed in short order by the sinking of the HMS Sheffield on May 4. The deaths of 20 British sailors on board the ship proved another point of division in the Conservative Party, as the reality of British blood actually being spilled for the Falklands handed ammunition to the advocates of peaceful settlement.49 Although the previous negotiations with Haig had

44 22 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 673. 45 22 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 982. 46 22 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 1016-8. 47 22 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 1019, 1059. 48 Lawrence Freedman, "The Falklands War and the Concept of Escalation," in International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict, ed. Alex Danchev (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 180-1. 49 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 58. 67

reached a dead end, the Secretary supported a new peace deal brokered by the President of Peru. The twin incidents at sea led Thatcher to consider peaceful alternatives once more. More hawkish MPs, on the other hand, kept the pressure on her to press ahead on counter-invasion. Among them was Wall, who sponsored a motion to use “whatever measures should prove necessary” against the Argentine military.50 Amery challenged

Pym on the topic in Parliament, asking him to guarantee that the British armed forces would “in no way be held back” should military means be needed; the Foreign Secretary gave this assurance unreservedly.51 The right wing Thatcherite position became more tenuous after the Argentine government offered to allow the British to set the language of any agreement, under the auspices of the UN. As a result, another debate on the Falklands was scheduled for May 13.52

Amery was one of several Tory MPs to interrupt Pym as he opened the debate. In particular, he asked Pym to disavow the Peruvian proposal, which Argentina had rejected several days prior.53 The chief speech for a peaceful settlement, however, was not delivered by Pym, but by Edward Heath. The former Prime Minister had held his fire until this moment and delivered at length a forceful endorsement of Pym’s conduct.54

Most explosively, Heath suggested that the government could no longer allow the views of the Falklanders to hold a “veto” over dealings with Argentina.55 Impactful though

Heath’s speech was, Wall would speak for seventeen minutes without once making reference to it. He preferred instead to launch a detailed examination of what the

50 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 60. 51 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 398-9. 52 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 62. 53 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 955. 54 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 63. 55 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 966. 68

Falklands meant for British defense generally. Wall believed that the Falklands could well be a teachable moment for NATO on several counts.56 At the conclusion of his address, he urged the government not to hesitate to use force when required, hopefully

“without the bloodbath that the press is so eager to talk about.”57 This was, of course, quite typical for Wall and his allies; the near-biblical pitch of his final sentences was decidedly less so. The Kremlin, Wall felt, would learn that “aggression” would not stand, a lesson “that [would] do much to prevent the outbreak of World War Three.”58 This apocalyptic rhetoric, once so potent, gained very little traction that evening, as even

Wall’s natural allies barely engaged with his major points. Although Thatcher would make much of the significance of the Falklands War once it was over, in the sober days of the conflict itself, even those deeply sympathetic to Britain’s cause hesitated to attach earth-shattering importance to what they were undertaking.59 Powell’s words were more representative of right-wing views of the Falklands. Notoriously skeptical of the international community, the aim he described was simple: “to restore British administration of the islands and ensure that the decisive factor in [their] future should be the wishes of the inhabitants.”60 Speaking immediately after Wall, the contrast between the two was jarring, in reaction as well as execution. Eight MPs dealt with Powell’s points, as opposed to three who spoke to Wall’s comments.61

At a meeting of the on the evening of the 13th, Amery, who had largely restrained himself in Parliament, let Ian Gow, Thatcher’s Parliamentary Private

56 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 972-5. 57 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 975. 58 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) cols. 975-6. 59 Mercau, The Falklands War, 154. 60 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 976. 61 For illustrative examples, Powell: 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 1007; Wall: 23 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 983. 69

Secretary, know precisely how he felt about Pym’s views. To Amery, standing down on the issue was anathema. Not entirely inaccurately, he felt it “vital for the destiny of the

Party” to stay the course, a line which won him applause from the other Tories gathered.62 Ultimately, Thatcher came down on the side of the hardliners. This final round of negotiations ended with a firm rejection of Argentina’s proposals, and with

British troops landing on the Falklands themselves on May 20, the government essentially ignored further diplomatic overtures.63 Amery, cheering on Thatcher’s decision, spoke glowingly of the consequences this war would have on British morale.

Comparing the general nationwide attitude to that in 1940, Amery felt that the unifying

“feelings” the war would engender might well be “the key to [Britain’s] national revival.”64 He, like E.P. Thompson, saw the war as an exercise in imperial atavism.

However, Amery’s views of the consequences was far less dire. Where Thompson had argued that the war would “[stir] up… ugly nationalist sediment that will cloud our political and cultured life,” Amery envisioned the re-vitalization of “the basic values of our society…‘honour, justice, patriotism’” rather than “jingoism and war hysteria.”65 If the fact of empire had not truly returned, he could at the very least embrace the feeling of it.

At any rate, the campaign itself, once begun, was a relatively simple affair.

Although the Argentines fought hard, the British steadily progressed across the island chain and for all intents and purposes ended the war on June 14, when they accepted

62 Ian Gow notes (1922 Committee meeting), May 13, 1982, Thatcher MSS, Personal and private papers, Cambridge, THCR2/1/4/28 f67; the quote is Gow’s summary of Amery’s remarks. 63 Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 342-3, JSTOR. 64 24 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 494. 65 Thompson, “Neither side,” 12; 24 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 494; Amery is quoting . 70

Argentine surrender in the Falklands capital, Stanley.66 Britain’s relatively efficient military victory in the Falklands was a source of much celebration for Amery, Wall, and their allies. On June 17, Powell followed up on his challenge to Thatcher. Addressing her at Question Time, Powell informed her that she had proven to be made of “ferrous matter of the highest quality…highly resistant to wear and tear and to stress,” to “be used with advantage for all national purposes,” words intended as the highest of praise.67 Thatcher certainly received the message, as she hung a print of both this statement and his original statement to her on April 3rd in her office.68 Amery, striking a somewhat more mixed tone in July, strongly encouraged the government to use the conflict as an opportunity to re- assess and strengthen British defense. He viewed it as important that, going forward,

Britain be ready “not [only] to secure victory but to prevent the threat from developing.”69 While aware of what it could teach, Amery too did not doubt the righteousness of Britain’s cause. The Falklands, he said, “are British islands…stocked by

British people,” and well worth the fight.70 Wall was deeply impacted by the British victory as well. When he delivered his final speech in the House, on February 2, 1987, he spoke nostalgically of the glories of the Royal Navy, especially his own Marines. Wall felt a deep sense of pride over the way they had conducted themselves in service in the

Falklands.71 In his maiden speech in 1954, he had praised the valor of the Royal Marines, and proclaimed they were ready to serve “from the Rhine to the Falkland Islands.” 72 It was fitting that he should conclude his parliamentary career in much the same way.

66 Dodds, Pink Ice, 171. 67 25 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 1082. 68 Heffer, Like the Roman, 861. 69 27 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 171. 70 34 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1982) col. 991. 71 109 Parl. Deb. H.C. (6th ser.) (1987) col. 728. 72 524 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1954) col. 1981. 71

Most consequentially, Thatcher had very good reason to celebrate the victory in the Falklands. Triumphant in wartime, her authority over the Conservative Party was virtually complete. This positioned her to take full advantage of the overwhelming

Conservative success in the election of 1983, and afterward, reshape the government in her image.73 Admittedly, there has been some debate as to whether the Falklands did in fact play a major role in said election. While historians such as Stephen Howe cite David

Sanders’ famous study, which concluded that the war did not play nearly as big a role as was believed, Ezequiel Mercau challenges this argument, citing both deficiencies in

Sanders’ work and the demonstrable impact the Falklands had on Britain’s culture and worldview in the 1980s.74 What is incontrovertible however, is that Thatcher felt she had received a clear mandate, and that the Falklands War, fought on behalf of “a people of

British stock, who were…very loyal British, and wished to remain British in a British

Island,” had been the turning point that brought her to victory.75

In the end, the period this project has covered saw the collapse of the British

Empire as a geopolitical entity. While both Wall and Amery remained steadfast defenders of British imperial power and what it represented, a great many of the causes they fought for came down to defeat. The Central African Federation, rather than preserving some form of British power in Africa, proved too unwieldy to function, and imploded in excruciating fashion. In the aftermath of the CAF’s fall, Wall and Amery set themselves to defending the cause of Rhodesian independence. As the true extent of Britain’s

73 Bruni, The British Political Parties and the Falklands War, 171. 74 Stephen Howe, "Decolonization and imperial aftershocks: the Thatcher years," in Making Thatcher's Britain, ed. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Kindle, loc. 5498 of 9004; Mercau, The Falklands War, 151. 75 Peter Clarke, "The Rise and Fall of Thatcherism," Historical Research 72, no. 179 (October 1999): 316- 7; Thatcher, cited in Mercau, The Falklands War, 165. 72

influence (or lack thereof) in Africa sunk in, Rhodesia stood for the best of what its “kith and kin” could be and do. While Wall, Amery, and their allies were able to keep the

Rhodesian issue a live wire in Britain for some time, ultimately that cause too was a losing one. However, the Falklands War, fought in 1982, presented the perfect opportunity to defend “kith and kin” in an unproblematic way, to borrow from Mercau.76

While the idea of the Falklands War as entirely unproblematic can certainly be complicated, its aftermath saw Thatcher the ascendant figure in British politics, and through her many of the ideas that Wall and Amery championed were repurposed to fit the realities of Britain’s new role.

Taking the full sweep of Wall and Amery’s rhetoric into account, one sees two central and often intertwining threads: a desire to maintain British power and relevance wherever possible, and a firm belief in the capability of Britain and those of British stock.

Frequently, Wall, Amery, and their right wing allies identified a distinct lack of the latter in the British metropole. Much of Wall and Amery’s time in politics was spent in pitched battle with political figures, who, for one reason or another, did not share their devotion to all Britain’s “kith and kin.” If the metropole were in fact “profoundly compromised,”

Rhodesia, especially, represented a purer Britishness, progeny of which Great Britain could be proud.77 However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, it was the loss of

Britain’s temporal power and consequent need for allies that persuaded Thatcher to commit to handing over Rhodesia to majority rule for good and all. Britain had, in fact, passed under the shadow of the United States far earlier than Amery or Wall would ever have cared to admit. For example, America could afford to allow Britain to flagrantly

76 Mercau, The Falklands War, 182. 77 Bill Schwarz, The White Man's World. Memories of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 430. 73

breach the Monroe Doctrine in the Falklands solely because Britain meant more as a symbolic power than as an actual power.78

Thatcher, for her part, was devoted to the United States, especially during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. At a dinner at the British Embassy in Washington DC, she famously proclaimed, “There is a union of mind and purpose between our peoples which is remarkable and which makes our relationship truly a remarkable one. It is special. It just is, and that’s that.”79 This was not mere hyperbole to flatter the Reagans at dinner.

Thatcher cherished the “special relationship” for two reasons, closely related to the guiding principles of Wall and Amery listed above. Firstly, she was keenly aware of

Britain’s inability to rival the United States on the world stage; furthermore, Thatcher truly did feel a special closeness with the United States. Britain and America were bound together by, as her hero Churchill once said, ties “of the same language, of the same faith, of the same fundamental laws and the same ideals.”80 The “special relationship,” as

Thatcher understood it, rested fundamentally on their shared kith and kinship.

As this project comes to its conclusion, it seems worth remarking upon that, much though Thatcher represented the apotheosis of the right wing, she laid the groundwork for the final destruction of another cherished dream of Amery’s. It had been Amery who, in

1946, met with noted pan-Europeanist Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, and then acted as his messenger to Churchill. Out of this lunch with Churchill, Leo Amery, and other

78 Gamble, “Europe and America,” loc. 5125-9 of 9004. 79 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech at British Residence (banquet, British Residence, Washington DC, February 20, 1985). https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105971. 80 Gamble, “Europe and America,” loc. 5257-67 of 9004; Winston S. Churchill, The Unrelenting Struggle (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1942), 239.

74

grandees emerged the United Europe Movement.81 From that point forward, Amery was one of the staunchest pro-Europe voices in Parliament. In December 1972, when Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community was imminent, Amery, then at the

Foreign Office, hailed Europe as Britain’s future. He argued that it was “as significant a diplomatic achievement” as any in the 20th century.82 However, when Thatcher vowed at

Bruges in 1988 to resist the subordination of British “nationhood” to a “European super- state exercising… new dominance from Brussels,” Euroscepticism became legitimized in

Britain in a way that its previous champions, such as Powell, could never hope to achieve. She instead, as explained above, prioritized the Anglo-American alliance.83

Thatcher would endorse the Eurosceptic movement fully after she entered the

House of Lords in 1992. This set her firmly against Amery, who was himself elevated to the Lords with Thatcher as Baron Amery of Lustleigh. She gave her maiden speech in the upper house in opposition to the Maastricht treaty, arguing that its consequences would be precisely what she had cautioned against at Bruges: British “powers and rights” would be “given away to the centre in Brussels.”84 In June 1993, when Maastricht was actually up for a vote, she stated that to surrender sovereignty to Europe in that manner, without first giving the people an opportunity to speak their minds in a referendum, was “to betray the trust…they have placed in us.”85 Speaking the following day, Amery spoke in support of Maastricht, in what was his final significant speech in either House of

81 Sue Onslow, "Julian Amery: The Ultimate Imperial Adventurer," in Ultimate Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain, ed. Wm. Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 213. 82 848 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) (1972) col. 753. 83 Margaret Thatcher, "Speech to the College of Europe" (speech, Bruges Belfrey, Bruges, September 20, 1988). https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332; Anthony Forster, Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative and Labour Parties since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2002), Kindle, 77-8. 84 538 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1992) col. 898. 85 546 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1993) col. 566. 75

Parliament. He did not venture to guess whether it would become federal, in the way that some of his colleagues feared, but felt it vital that Britain have a voice in the continent’s evolution. Britain needed to be “‘one of them’” in order to bring about the vision he had had in 1946.86

Amery won the battle over Maastricht, but would, as recent events have shown, lose the war over Europe. He spoke one more time in the House of Lords later that month, and then was more or less absent for the remaining three years until his death on

September 3, 1996. Wall would outlive Amery by two years. After his retirement in

1987, he pursued a lifelong passion by chairing the British UFO Association.87 Suffering a large stroke in 1993, Wall spent the last several years of his life in an assisted living home, dying in May 1998. Between the passings of Amery and Wall, the United

Kingdom surrendered sovereignty of Hong Kong to China, with the transition becoming official on July 1, 1997. A writer for the New York Times saw fit to memorialize the

British Empire, quoting Kipling: “Lo, all our pomp of yesterday is one with Nineveh and

Tyre!”88 The article struck a somber tone, and yet, when considered with what precedes it here, its appearance in the American paper of record is suffused with some irony.

Doubtless, however, Amery and Wall both would have keenly felt the sting of those words in that moment. To America, the first and foremost of Britain’s “kith and kin,” they might have raised as well the words of Tennyson: “Hollow, hollow all delight!”

86 546 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) (1993) cols. 736-8. 87 Schwarz, The White Man’s World, 433. 88 "The Crown's Last Jewel," The New York Times, July 1, 1997, A20.

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