Financing War in the Roman Republic 201 BCE-14 CE François Gauthier Department of History and Classical Studies Mcgill Universi
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Financing War in the Roman Republic 201 BCE-14 CE François Gauthier Department of History and Classical Studies McGill University Montreal July 2015 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy © François Gauthier 2015 Abstract This dissertation is concerned with the financing and evolution of the Roman army after the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE). For several decades, most scholars thought that the second century BCE witnessed a demographic decline that ultimately led to a shortage of citizens possessing enough property to meet the minimum threshold for military service. This would have led to the so-called ‘Marian reform’ that supposedly created a professional army. This study challenges several well-established ideas concerning this theory and other hypotheses related to the development of the army in the late Republic. By looking at the financial and social realities of military service for Roman citizens, this dissertation aims to provide a more nuanced picture of the transformation process between a militia and a standing army. Instead of looking at Marius as a reformer, this study argues that it is the period of the civil wars that most decisively altered the traditional structure of the Republican army, a development that was finalized under Augustus. i Résumé La présente thèse traite du financement et de l’évolution de l’armée romaine dans la période postérieure à la Deuxième Guerre punique (218-201 av. notre ère). Depuis plusieurs décennies, la plupart des historiens ont pensé que le deuxième siècle avant notre ère fut marqué par un déclin démographique qui amena éventuellement à une pénurie de citoyens possédant un avoir suffisant pour être considérés éligibles à la mobilisation. Cela aurait amené à la soi-disant « réforme de Marius » qui aurait selon certains créé une armée professionnelle. Cette étude remet en question plusieurs idées reliées à cette théorie ainsi que d’autres hypothèses ayant trait au développement de l’armée romaine à la fin de l’époque républicaine. En examinant l’impact social et économique du service militaire pour les citoyens romains, cette thèse propose une théorie plus nuancée du processus de transformation entre une armée de milice et une armée professionnelle. Loin de percevoir Marius en tant que réformateur, cette étude propose plutôt que c’est la période des guerres civiles qui fut la période charnière qui modifia de façon décisive la structure traditionnelle de l’armée républicaine. Ce fut ensuite Auguste qui compléta et officialisa ce développement. ii Zusammenfassung Diese Dissertation behandelt die Entwicklung und Finanzierung der römischen Armee nach der Zeit des Zweiten Punischen Krieges (218-201 v.Chr.). Seit einigen Jahrzehnten geht die Mehrheit der Forscher davon aus, dass im zweiten Jahrhundert ein Bevölkerungsschwund in Italien stattgefunden habe. Dieses Phänomen soll letztendlich einen Mangel an vermögenden Bürgern ausgelöst haben, die genug besessen hätten, um wehrpflichtig zu sein. Das Ergebnis dieser Krise war dann die sogenannte Marianische Reform, die, in Antwort auf die Krise, ein Berufsheer geschafft haben soll. Die folgende Untersuchung ficht viele Voraussetzungen dieser Sichtweise sowie eine Reihe von weiteren Hypothesen an, die mit der Entwicklung der spätrepublikanischen Armee verbunden sind. Durch die Erforschung der sozialen und ökonomischen Auswirkungen des Militärdiensts für römische Bürger schlägt diese Dissertation eine nuancierte Interpretation des Wandlungsprozesses vom Milizheer in ein Berufsheer vor. Statt Marius als grandiosen Reformer zu sehen, zeigt diese Studie, dass es erst das Zeitalter der Bürgerkriege war, in dem die republikanische Struktur der Armee entscheidend verändert wurde. Dieser Prozess wurde unter Augustus abgeschlossen und in Form einer neuen Heeresordnung institutionalisiert. iii Acknowledgements À tout seigneur tout honneur, I would thus first like to thank my Doktorvater Hans Beck for accepting me as his student and for helping me throughout the whole PhD process. He generously supported my academic endeavours and allowed me to profit from his wide- ranging connections in the academic world. Among these, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Martin Jehne for his warm welcome in Dresden last fall and his comments on a draft on one of the chapters in the present thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Christoph Lundgreen and all the team involved in the Lehrstuhl für Alte Geschichte at the Technische Universität Dresden. I express further gratitude to Profs. Tanja Itgenshorst (Université de Champagne-Ardennes) and Wolfgang Blösel (Universität Duisburg-Essen) for giving me the opportunity to present at their respective institutions. I also own many thanks to Professor Michael Fronda of McGill for his many comments on various drafts of the thesis. Those were challenging and often difficult years on both an academic and personal level. Adapting to a foreign language and a different academic culture was an arduous but rewarding process. I am quite fortunate to have a family that let me study what I was interested in instead of pressuring me to go to Medicine or Law School. I thank all those who encouraged me to continue and supported me during the more difficult periods of the PhD. If my work can help stimulate further research and interest in ancient history, then it will not have been in vain. iv Table of Contents Abstract/ Résumé/ Zusammenfassung i-iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Financing War and the Financial Attractiveness of Military Service 12 1-Sources and Figures for Property Qualifications 13 1.1 Ancient Evidence 15 1.2 Reduction(s) in Property Qualifications? 18 1.3 Monetary Evolutions and Property Requirements 22 2- Financial Obligations and Sources of Income of assidui 28 2.1 Cost of Weapons 28 2.2 War-Tax and Military Pay: tributum and stipendium 34 2.3 Other Possible Sources of Income for assidui: Plunder and Cash Handouts 42 3- Citizens' Attitudes towards Military Service 54 3.1 Deciding for War: Communication between the Aristocracy and the People 54 3.2 Reactions to Military Service 61 Conclusions 68 v Chapter 2 Population Change in the Second Century 69 1- Population Developments and Property Qualifications 69 2- Consequences of Population Increase for assidui 76 2.1 Colonization and Access to ager publicus 76 2.2 Warfare and Landlessness 78 3- The Gracchi 80 Chapter 3 The Abolition of Tributum and the ‘Reform’ of Marius 85 1- War Indemnities as a new Type of Military Funding? 85 2- Marius 87 2.1 Marius' Use of Volunteers 88 2.2 Tactical Reform? The Development of the Cohort 91 2.3 The Disappearance of Roman citizen cavalry 93 2.4 The Disappearance of uelites 96 2.5 Reasons for Using proletarii 97 2.6 The Roman Army after Marius 103 Conclusions 113 vi Chapter 4 The Social War (90-88) 115 1- Socii as Cheap Manpower for Rome 115 2- The Outbreak of the Social War: Economic and Military Emergency 119 2.1 War without the socii 119 2.2 The Recourse to Auxiliaries as an Expedient 121 2.3 Financial Consequences of the War 123 Conclusions 126 Chapter 5 The Late Republic: The Return of Private Warfare? 128 1- The Roman Nobility and Military Service after the Social War 129 2- The New Financial Reality of War after the Social War 132 2.1 Private Funding 132 2.2 Plunder and donatiua 137 2.3 The Emergence, or the Persistence of Private Warfare? 142 3- The Financing and Recruitment of Armies in situ 144 3.1 Funding On-Site 144 3.2 Recruitment in situ 154 4- The Last Civil Wars and the Breakdown of a Precarious System 165 vii 4.1 Donatives 165 4.2 Towards the End of the Citizen-Militiaman 171 4.3 Breaking the Bank through Desperate Expedients 176 Conclusions 180 Chapter 6 The Military Reforms of Augustus 182 1- Context of the Military Reforms 183 2- Demobilization and the Establishment of Fixed Conditions of Service 185 2.1 Discharging Veterans 186 2.2 Establishing New Conditions of Service 188 3- Military Service and Citizenship after Augustus 194 Conclusion: Army and Society: from Community to Empire 197 Sources 204 Bibliography 208 Tables Table 1: Evidence for Property Qualification Ratings 17 Table 2: Monetary Evolutions 218-211 25 Table 3: Cash Handouts to Soldiers, 201-167 BC (in denarii) 52 viii Table 4: Census Figures, 179 BCE - 14 CE 71 Table 5: Cash Handouts to Soldiers 69-29 BCE 139 ix Introduction Nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam The sinews of war, a limitless supply of money (Cicero Philippic 5.5) The army that allowed Rome to subjugate the entire Mediterranean basin has captured the imagination of both ancient and modern writers. As early as the mid second century BCE, the Greek historian Polybius tried to explain to his readers how the Romans managed to conquer the world in which he was living in a period of only 53 years.1 Such success is indeed impressive, if not unique, in history. Polybius praised the Roman military and political institutions for their superiority over those of their adversaries, notably the Carthaginians and the Hellenistic monarchies. The Romans themselves liked to think that their superior uirtus and their ability to adapt to their enemies gave them an edge over them.2 Modern scholars have proposed explanations that are more complex to address the rich topics of Roman expansion and the motives for Roman war-making, as well as the reasons for Roman martial success. The Army of the Republic in Modern Scholarship The army of the Imperial period was highly professional and was effectively separated from civil society, yet the military of the Middle Republic was a people in arms. In this 1 Polybius 1.5-6; FGrH 839 F 1.