221.

emptv threats. He plundered Pushkar and Ajmer and descended

upon Jaipur like a storm. ’’Tne reduction of that predatory

power” wrote Welleslev, "thereTore, was manifestly a measure

of not only of just policy and necessary security, but of

ultir&ate economy with reference to the finances of the Conpany.

Wellesley had curefullv prepared a plan for war with Holkar.

Th«* basic of that plan wan u combination of the novements and

operations of the British troops and those of Oaulatrao Shind«

and the Gaikwad, acting against the forces and territories of

Holkar from Gujarat, Kalwa and the Deccan, while the main army,

under the personal direction of General Lake was to pursue

the enemy from north India.

In the South General Wellesley had realised that he was

unable to advance ae^ainst Holkar. He suggested that Colonel

Murray should advance from Gujarat into Kalwa. The main

reason for his inability lay in the fact that there were

famine conditions in the Ueccan and due to lack of rains, there

was no fodder available for animals. If the operations could

have been delayed until after the rains were over, he himself

would have marched from the south with his own army and at the 29 head of Murray*s force.

On 2 3rd M a rc h , i S o u , Lake marched to Ballahira, Yashwant

Rao*s policy was to avoid a pitched battle against Lake,but

at the same time to devastate the Company’s provinces. That

the euerilla tactics were effective is obvious from a letter

written by Lake to Wellesley, in which he expresses that he 225 wan in a most awkward situation the initiative was with

Holkar, who wa3 expert Pt fruerllla v;arfare. If Lake d«cld«di to take tV\p offensive the n.oment he advancud Itaving an oi'enirr for Holkar, he would ret into British tarritoriaa with hl'j horse and burn and destroy the territory.

Marathi Records reveal that '^Yeshwant Rao was caaping near

Sambhar Take near Jaipur. He devastated Jaipur diatrict, col'^ected I.s. P5 lakhs and with « force of one lakh infantry end one and a Quarter lakh cavalry force reached Kota. U« wanted to advance towards the t;ast and collcct taxes froa Bengal

'f he was chased by the tnpllsh, he planned to retire through

Bhosle’s territory and descend on the Niaam’s territory and f^o south via Arcot, Chennapattan and Shrlrangapattan. If the

Enrliih ill nof chase him, he planned to camp either at Kota or Cadh Mandala district. fhe families and heavy artillery were

to be kept «*t Marwad where harnath iingh and Nago Jeewa.ji were caraplnf^ with troops, f'lrkhan Kohilla was camping in Aimer district with ?o,rnr Patnans. Jlvlal had attacked

Kashlrao Holkar who was caiujjint!: near Tnalnera with two thousand soldiers. As a result Kashlrao was captured end the army was dispersed.

!ord Take started his forward movement, early in February

In rntlcl^atlon of a var with Holkar. He sent his heavy artll’’erv par^ to A«^ra ani hlmaelf started froni liavana on tne

9th of the month. After a strenuous journey over bad roads he reached fiindaur on the 2^th of February. Aftor a few days j. 2.^ M Map N( WAH AGAINST m iU \( 1604-05 9

RAMPOOft^ !

• V .

APPIWXlMATe » f SUNDRY-« I I / yf1^4 9'ff JULlffo4

\ / N y ouglin CUPPSI^UWGEE

JU H 1 ^ 4 « fNDOR-E

/'X

' „ „ /' • • <" NAaPOoP^ V ' i . ✓ ✓ N f T 4 ^ u i . e ' 0 ) .905 t:,-CAH9Ay ^ CHAN PORE • • A S S ^ ■i OCT. W#4'' ^ ' r « AURAMfrABAP 226

rei^L, Lhe ar:r.v starLei off arain on the ®th y.arch and reached iiamp-ai via \ani;.v)i' ani halted there until the 22nd. He reached Ballar.ira on the next JaV.

On thf 0th /.pril , lake croaaei the >.tt33 of iialliijiilra and and ercuiii; e 1 at ''.arnaVi. vi.en I ori .I'elleale/ issued orders to comr.ence war arairat Holkar in the middle of April, 1^04,

Take was in camp sore 25 miles northeast of Tonk. On 17th

April, lake marched to Jowsah.^ Next day a detachment consist­ in g of the two battalions of the 12th (tejs!:lment and th o fe c o n d battalion of the Second Kerin,ent of native infantry under the con.ir,and of l ieutenant Colonel I-.onson se t o u t for J a i p u r . On

A p r i l 27, Take advanced to Drianah and continuing his march on 32 the day followinp: reached i‘one:a, about 15 miles from Jaipur.

He reached Nawai or; **th of Kav.

On li^th of Mav-, Tt. Col. Jon with 2/f^th Regiment, 2/21st

Ret^iment and Third Reeiirr.ent Native infantry with artillery proceeded towards Tonk Hampurd, 6^ miles south-east of Jaipur.

As he had no sies^e train, Don decided to capture the place by a direct attack. On 15th .'.av a t 2 a.a., uon marched with eight com,>anie3 of infantry ahd a 12 pounder Pun. Captain Habar, with one twelve and four six-pounders ani three companies of 2/21at

Repiment was piven the task of dealine with any force coming froa. Tonk. .’'.alor joveton was in charp:e of reserves w h ic h c o n ­ sisted of 3 Regiment of *'ative cavalry. K i s task was either to reinforce the main body or to pursue the enemy in case he was defeated. Althon(?h Don carried out a silent march when he can* 227

to thp main paLewa/, a ^licouet of the Tonk battalion op«n«d fire. This alerted the rarrl^on. Jon brok« the gatawa/ by uslnF hi*! 1? povinder whlltt his Infantry kept u steady fire on the enpmv crowilnr on the rampart. Don’ s stornlng party entered the first Pate, found the second pate open and brok* Ch« third and the fourth f>;ates with artillery. The Garrison tried to escape but, were charired by Wajor Doveton with the 3rd Caralry and thus Tonk '

3eins: the r.onth of Kay, the heat in Rajasthan was unbear­ able to &\iropean soldiers* General Lake now decidcd to suspend the operations for a few months until after the rains and leaving a strong fo,rce behind withdrew to the permanent canton- raents at Arra and Kanpur. A force of five battalions was detached under Colonel Monson, which was deemed sufficient to contain Holkar in Kalwa and even deal with him if he decided to advance. 'General Lake chose Colonel Monsoon because he had distinguished himself in the battle of Aligarh against the

Marathas. He had loncrer experience of the Indian Army than

General Lake h i m s e l f . Besides, as General Ware and Colonel

Vindeleur were killed in earlier actions, Monson was now the seniormost since General St. John had retired. Unfortunately,

Monson though phvsically biave lacked brains and had no judfe- ment. Knowing hlni General Lake should have given him cleercut and orders/not left the decisions to him. ?2^

Mccordlnp' to Baawan Tal In rtmlrnaii.ah, lak* l«ft six battalions and Captain Iucan with hla newly raised Native

cavalry, two thousand n.en, Bapu Shlnde's an&y, the Baherich

sowars and 1oro men from Jaipur Horse making altogether one

force of ten thousand cavalry and Infantry.

Tashwant Pao Holkar's position was no better. His urmj

also suffered terriblv due to heat and lack of water in their

retreat from Jaipur. On 2Vth of May, an action was fought at

Bailor Khery between Captain Gardiner's detachsenc and latya,

a partisan of Holkar. The ;-.arathas surrendered. Another fore*

of two battalions under Oomajl Shlnde also was defeated by

It. Iucan and surrenJered. Tashwant Rao now retreated to

Mandasaur. On the way Harnath Singh Joined him with his force

and Tashwant. FUio collected U5 lakhs of rupees from that district*

Mlrkhan RohiHa who was operating with his caralry on the

frontiers of Bundelkhand in February ^ot into a skimish

with Colonel Shepherd and retreated. On 22nd Kay he attacked

two British Battalions beslefring Aminta Kulaya, a fort near

Koonch. Mlrkhan killedi fifty punners and carried off all the

artillery conslsLln^ of tvo twelve pounders, one six pounder, 37 two howitzers and forty timbrlls.'^ But on the 2Uth June,

Mir ’Chan suffered a rey«»r?je. One of his officers with a party

attacked Colonel jhepher* Bear Koonch but was defeated. The

officer and one hundred Karathas were killed; many were wounded 33 and many horses were captured.

Jaswant who knew the weakness of the British am y 229

appreciated that Treneral Take ?/il] not operate in Suauner.

He called a war conncn «>nd the consensus of opinion was

'Trofii dalTv runnir*’, our atr nrth Is e^one. Relyini; on the

p'race of Ool, we onp-ht now to fif^it a pitched battle, b«caus« wherever we retreat, the enemy will hasten behind ua and •stab*

lish their rv;lt in the Kahala and i’aluqas. If the battlt la IQ put off, all c'.r troopa will disperse without striking a blow."

As coni/>arei to the Company's army Holkar had aevtral advantages. His army consistins: of local Indians from Ottar

Pradesh, Haryana, '^ajaathan, Malwa and the D e cca n was wall acclimatised and could stand the rip-ours of sunmer. Tha same was thte case with the »ntm«ls such «s horses and ox«»n who wara hardv beasts. Vhe enuv subsisted on looting and marauding.

It had no administrative tall to tie it dov;n. Tashwant Rao boasted with lustlficatlon that his empire was i n his saddla.

Moreover, as compared to Lake's army which had cone from far awav cantonments in Httar Pradesh, 'tashwant Hao's men wez*a

fightine in their own territory and they knaw tha ground wall. His generals like Harnath and Mirkhan ware past maatara in tha art of iruerllla warfare and wera willinr to fight proTidad

thev were allowed to loot. Holkar's armv was lightly aquippad and as he had a 1 ready sent his fansily and haavy bagejage away

to Jodhpur. This /naraudinR force was highly mobile. fha dis- advantaeres of Holkar's army w ere that he lacked artillery and his 3ardars were free lancers who did not obey orders and tha

en had u loose kind of discipline, ihe morale of his a m y 230

could fluctuate accoriinp to the monetary gains* If the troops w ere n o t p a id f o r a lon<^ tim e th e v used to go away. Whsn there were prospects of loot even the local villagsrs jolnsd to loot the territory. The men owed their loyalty to their own chiefs. But Tashwant Hao Holkar was a d s r e d s T l l and his aims were clear. His renerals also exhibited plenty of physi* cal courap’e where tactics proved successful at times, bub irrem lars cannot stand up against trained and diaciplinsd armies in pitched battles. Vhenever the British CoBmandsrs hesitated and showed a lack of offensive spirit, bhsy wsrs defeated. If a comirander made a mistake of splitting his fores, he was defeated in deti^ll by the Iiarathas who fsll on his detachments like a puck of wolves. But when the English a r a y advanced with fixed bayonets with a determination, the Marathas broke up and ran. If pursued by tne English Cavalry t h s y wsrs mowed down and died running he Iter skelter. They did not b a r s fall back posltlcnf ind strongly held forts where thsy could 40 withdraw and regroup.

M o n s o n ’ s R e t r e a t

On 1 2 t h May, 1^ 0 4 Lake had souf'^t permission of ths k l Oovernor Heneral to suspend operations due to excessivs hsat.

The Governor General issued orders for th e suspension of ths operations and on 25th Mav orders for ths withdrawal wsrs issusd

>^en Lake had already reached Kus.ialgad. He withdraw to Hindaun the next day and reached Agra on 5 th June fro m whers ths araf . 231 dispersed to other cantonments.

The orders issued to Colonel y.onson were to occupy the passes of Bundi and I.akherl south of Tonk Ra«pur« and north of Kota with a view to preventini^ Holkar frooi advancinf froa

Kandasaur to the north. These passes were tha gatawaya to north India from Mtilwa.

lake has beer criticised for susptnding the oparations midwjy and retreating to A^ra and Kanpur laaTlng tha taak of c?ntalnin^ Holkar to Konson. Later Lake hiniaelf adaittad that it was a mistake to withdraw at that junction. Had ha praaaad and attacked Holkar, he would have defeated his advaraary*

However, it was not easy to bring Holkar to a pltchad battla as he n&d not adopted the methods of i>hini« and Bhoala* Ha believed in hit and, run tactics. Lake wrote to Ganaral Wallaalay complaining that Holkar hiws ^nd runs and doas not give battla. k 'i He had laid waste the wnolo country. ^ The aray would hava found it difficult V? ottalT supplies as was arident latar whan

Konson*3 army was pra*>Icallv starved. Moreover the Suropaan soldiers would rot have been able to stand the haat aapacially if thev had to rvarch and fieht covering long diatancaa day after day, bein^ harassed bv the enemy. Kvan during tha paaca- ful orPianised tiiarch back to the cantonments» Kajor thorn who marched back with the army writes that young tiien who aat out in the mnrnlne full of spirits and in all the vi^iour of health, droppel dead inunedlately on reaching the encampment ground. 44

On the averatre ten to fifteen Europeans ware buriad avary day. 232

The wretched plieht of the troops was further incr««8«d by the scarcity of watnr. Had Lake withdrawn all European troops and left the field to the Native aruies, he would have nerer had

sufficient confidence in heri., as throughout his correspondence one finds that he has a finr. convicwion that Indians ar« not

capable of fifrhtinp and onlv htiropean troops perfor« CTMt

feats of valour. In fact, he had left no Europeans with Konson and this was attributed as one of the causes of Nonson's d i s a s t e r .

One cannot deny the fact that Lake made a strategic error

in withdrawinf? fr o m Ha.lasthan. He nad adequate experience of the Maratha method of warfare. In "uerllla warfare one of

the techninues ia to retire wlien the enemy advances and to advance when he ret^reu harasslnt; hin. all the way and to fall on him when he is on his last le?s. In this respect Oeneral

Welle**lev had a better underatandins: of the pattern of warfare i n I n d i a . V/hen he saw w hat was h a p p e n in g i n north India he had sugf^ested th£t Lake should himself follow Holkar and push him as hard as he could. If this were not done, It would be 46 difficult to brin? the w«r to a close. By adopting a defen­

sive attitude Take was net only letting himsalf In for a pro- 47 longed war but a3kin^?' I'or trouble. Although Arthur Wellesley realised that i'olkar cannot be n^de to stand and fight, he

felt that Take should cor.tlnue his pursuit of Holkar even though he shorl1 have no hope3 of bringing him to action*

One finds that Lord Wellesley has failed here In not co-ordlnatiM 233

the operations in uhe Deccan» Gujarath and Rajasthan* Oantral Wellesley had washed his hands off Colonel Murraf froa Ouja* rath who n.ade a half-haarted effort to support tht opsratioaa and lake withdrew lei^yini? Monson to face Holkar slnglsbandsd*

It i s the experience that the interformatlon boundry !• always a weak line as it is no one’s responsibility. Had Lord Wsllsslsy coordinated the operation, General Wellesley could bars cap­ tured Chandor and threatened Malwa while Murray could b a r s a d va n c e d on Ujjain and !.ake could h a /e slmultansously attackad

Holkar advancing frow Kota in a southern direction. In fact lord Wellealev did prepare a p la n I n August of the same y«ar after Monson had retraatad in svanmer. Hud this been done earlier

Holkar would have found th

Council doea .r

Auru3t, I.ako'3 anfly haii returned to Hftra and Kanpur and M onson had b e a t «> hasty retreat disi^racing the iinglijh arxty. It can 23k

be safelr conclndei thbt. the BrlLl3h und«r«8Clmated Uolkar and

Wellesley did not show an/ forejij^t In planning a war against

Holkar as he dla in his war aealnst Shlnda and B h o a la In IS 03.

The decision to suspend the operations during suajser waa takan b y Wellesley on the advise of his Conunandar-ln-Chlaf.

Once Major General .yelleslay expraatad tha opinion that a war ap:alnst Taahwant Rao should not ba nora than a Polygar 52 war and should not last a fortnight. Hia oonfid'inoa m bs aharad by Lord Walleslayi who full of axaltation oausad by tha trliraph af^alnst Shlnie and Bhoale, alno thou^t that ona aetioD was sufficient to annihilate the ar.ny of Yashwant Rao.^^ 5k William Hickey rlcihtly points out that it had long baan tha practice of the British M ilitary experts to hold Taahwant Rao

In the titmost contes^.pt and to spaak o f him aa a aara fraa bootar<

Mon^ion was entrusted with the task of holding tha paaaaa at Bundl and Lekherl In order to keep Holkar away fro« Hindu­ stan, a purely' defensive task. Lieutenant Colon,al Don joinad him with his force leavlnir a aoall garrison at Rampura* Monaon thus reinforced, now decided to advance on Kota, which ia aouth o f t h e p a s s e s .O n 23 rd April Holkar had alreadyi l r i ratraatad 56 from Jaipur when pursued by British cavalry.

On his arrival at Kota, the Haja of K o ta raeaivad Monaon in a friendly manner and offered hlra supplies and avan gava a detachrrent of his own forces hoping that the Britiah will destroy Yashwant Rao once for a ll. a plan was drawn to advanea upto a place Khatowll beyond Mokandara paaa aituatad 30 ailaa south of Kota (see Map 10). The Raja of K o ta proniaad logiatic ROUTE Of WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWED BY COLONEL MONSON JULY-AUG -1004 DELtli N

l a s w a w o „^^ PEEG O BHARATPOR,^

B A Y A N A j O''

H iN D O y # K W 5 H A i ^ 0

. f ''* ' / " O GWALIOR

'VI

/ o m o v =-a m p a r a / "OKlN<&iAj&AD i5 0 N A R A r a m p u r a o p i m p a l a

G 0 ^ \

o O j j A l K

O I H O O R E o NAMAD 235

support to Monson’3 force.

Monaon thus either did not underatand Lake's ord*ra or

decided to i'more them out of sheer braTado, undarastlMtinf

Holkar. He did not realise that the further he want ha waa

cutting; hlaaalf away from his source of supply and ralnforo**

ment. Ha perhaps hoped to join Murray at Ujjaln and coMplata

Lake’ s task of destroylnR Holkar.

Generp.l Wellesley had ordered Colonel Murray to procaad

to Kalwa to cooperate with Lake in his oparatlona asainst Holkar*

Me.advised him to leave sufficient troops for tha dafanea of

Surat and Bharoch. He was to move with four battalions and

prevent the entry of Holkar in Oujarat* In caaa ha daoidad to move towards n.ijain, Murray in coopar«tion with tha foreaa of

Shinde ;as to attaclc Holkar. To deal with Holkar'a cavalry

he was advised to ma-ke usa of the Gaikwad'a cavalry* 57 Naithar

Lake nor Monson established direct liaison with Murray. Oanaral

Wellesley wt

He admitted "it i» impossible for me to say what tha oparationa of the Commander-in«Chiaf will be but Holkar*s powar appaara

to consist principally in a considerable ar«y in tha fiald.”^^

With Vindhya and Satpura ranges and Narmada rivar and Tapti

intervening; Hyneral Wellesley was not in a position to taka any active part in the war against Holkar. The task given to Murray was to stop Holkar, embarass and impede his flight as aueh aa possible.However,59 he had wamad him that •*.. you should

not think of attacking any strong placa (excepting such as nay 236

n«c«93arilY f..ll In vour way) till Hollcar’a aniy will h a T « been defeated.With ouch instructions Colon«l Murray, • mediocre officer was ceitalnly not eoing to stick h i s n se k out.

His hesitation later on is understandable. His task iias Jast a show o f force.v/ellesley left Murray a frae hand, aiaply bidding him to march immediately, more rapidly and attack U o l k a r wherever he could find an opportunity. Wollasley did not aTan 52 tell niic where he should march in the first placa. Murr/.f vas n o t a resourceful person, he had been coaplainin^ to Wallington that he was short of troops and supplies, although ha had a lat'c'er number of British troops ttian General Wellaslay bad.^^

It is not surprising therefore chat his haart was not in tbo task before him. *fhen he reached UJ.iain, ha recelTad two latt-^r* from Konaon infonrtpr him that Lord Lake’ s main ar«y had gona back to the cantonments. As M onson was left p.lona in Rajasthan,

Murray should have stayed in Ujjain to support Monson but in­ stead he withdrew behind Mahi river as ha fearad tha daatruc- CiU tion of his own army as well. Oefendinj; his action ha wrota to Ia<6 that ''General .i/ellesley sometime ago diractad ma to avoid exposin^l' my corps to the sole operation of Holkar'a ara/i and as it appears that your Lxcellency had found it necaaaary to center the troops, and as it will be some months befora you coirjnencf* a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s , I s h o u ld be during tha whola tiaa in the verv situation the Majcr Heneral diractad ma to avoid.^^

Murray was later replaced by another officer, but tha daaapia was done. General Wellesley should have appraised General Laka 237

of the vieokness of Murray ii3 a commander, but he washed his h^n ds o f t h e affairs in ^^alwa.

HoIVrar who was watching the aevc-lopiBents with ths of an hawk was too (^ood a reneral to miss such « goldtn opportu* n itr. Here »#as Monson des6rt«>d both by Lake and Murray and disowned by General Wellesley. Instead of reoiainlng on the defensive durinf; the suauuer months in the h illy area of Bundland

T.akheri, he had engaged hiojself in a foolhardy Tenbure of adyancinsr to Mokandara, far av^y frou. any adainistrative base like Khushaleaih or i'onk ftaxcj^ura. He liad trusted the Raja of Kota and sone soutn 3*' o.ilb3 frou. Kota.

As Hoon as I^ke hfcard of .uonson's intentior. to aivance he warned hioi of the danj^ers of sucn a ui0Te» but, Ihe waminji came to o l a t e as Mon^son was a lr e a d y a t yto ku n d& ra . La k e d id not order him back Dut allowed him froedoaa of action end

l a t i t u d e .

had iMonaon stayea lI Mokundari. aa Mould hate been oafe aa holkar was still far awhy but after utaying at Kukundara and beinf; eoiboldened by the D;ct that he wad not molested by Kolkar*

Klonson u^ade bold to advance 50 u.ilbs i^oru to hingl sgad on

2*^th Jone. He captured the fort by atoru* on 2nd July.^^ As there was not much opposition, he advanced to Fipla two days later and finally camped at Gurrotfc -

from lijjain.

I«ke uK<«ip warnod i^.onjon that if ixa advanced at thi:i rata, he woui i not bu abl,j to

• drancinp from Oujarat upon n.ijain and had reachad Dohad la

June and w&a at Budnawar on 3<^th Juna. Monson should havr nent a force to establish contact with Colonal Murray, trtiieh he failed to do, nor did Murray make any efforts to liesa with Monson. Holkar in the meantime ratraatad to Pratapgad sovtb of n.Hain. He was now between Colonal Murray and Monaon and kept manoeurrini; between Colonel Murray and Monaon looking for an opportunity to s t r i k e . ^han he haard that Monaon was campini; at Ourrote, Holkar adranced to Mandaaaur. By this tiaa

Murray had come near Ujjein. Looking at tha a^p, it will ba observed that Holkar had kept Chambal rirar in batwaan hiaa^lf and the British troops. Unfortunately although Monaon and

Murray were moving, towards U jjain, they did not know aach others whereabouts.- «Then Murray heard that Holkar was at

Mandasaur he f««red that ne would be cut off from Gujar&th fey

Holkar and in i.ake'« words: ”...... for reasons which ha^® n c .’s r been satisfactorily explained to me,” Colonel Murray after had advanced within s short distance of Ojjain, fomed tha 6 9 extraordinary resolution of retreating behind tha Mahaa rlTaro

But after communicating this decision to Monaon, Murray cbAOged his mind and racrossed Mahee river on lat July and raaehad

Uj.lain on ^th July; but it was too late. Monaon had alraady decided to retreat. Thus these two poor Commanders blundarad*

They showed a complete lack of any tactical sense whatsoever.

I'hev vacilaced and kept movinfr up and down without securing 239 their lines of communication or paying th« iMSt atttntlon to their loi'istic problems which would be created by eaeh

Tieneral Wellesley's orders to Colonel Murray which wara ▼agvta, to say the least, were partly responsible for Murray's bafii- tancy. The orders amount to adrance but do not attack* To« are only to hinder him. As I do not know irtiat is in tba m l u L of the Commander'in-Chief, I cannot tell you irtiat to do and where to e^o, but remember that Holkar has large aray ao do not try to attack him.

The decision of Murray to retreat was a goldan opportoaity for Holkar. He could now deal with Monson, for which taak ha had been collecting f o r c e s . On 6th July Uolkar oroaaad tha

Chambal rirer and came west. When Monson got the nawa ha aent a reconnaissance patrol to confirm it. Monson now planned to adrance and attack iiolkar. He advanced 7 alias and hia apiaa informed him that Holkar with a large forca was waiting for him and the morale of his troops was rery hLg^» The diatanoa between them was 12 miles. Monson had two days rationa with him. Had ho boldly cerriod out his plan the issue would hav& been settled one way or the other in two days. But had Monson not succeeded then Holkar would have cut his route of with* drawal and starved him out. Thus discretion being the battar part of valour, Monson gave up his plan to attack and dacidad to withdraw to Mokundara pass. He should not hava advanead from the pass in the first place. Having advanced, it waa very wrong to withdraw when he was already in contact with tha 240

enemKonson's intelligence was faulty. According to Toddi

Konaon ordered his advance in "... utter ignorance of th«

rapid advance of Holkar > with what object ia unknown; but ^

8)on as he learned the vicinity of the foe, without AWiltifkg " hiiB, he ordered a retrograde DOTement to gain th« Nokundara

P.i.-IS--

It is obvious that Monson did not understand Marathi

tactics. Both Wellesley and General Wellasley had elaftrlf

fta;ei that offensive action alone will aueoaad against tha

Marathas. In a letter to Colonel Murray datad 1st $apt«Bb«r

1^0l», General Wellesley describes Maratha taetiea thus: ”Th«y

follow the enemy with their cavalry in his aarchea and •arrooad him and attack bin with their infantry and harsaa when ha hi'lts and he can scarcely escape froa thsa. That, tharafors, which I consider absolutely necessary in an operation agaiust a .’labratta power - is such a quantity of provision in your 72 camp as will enable you to command your magasine." Thaa

>ffensive action and logistic selfsufficiancy wars ths two lardinal principles of war againat the Marathas and Nonson

Lrnored both. Monson sent his heavy baggage from Garrote to Sonmara aarly

Jli* the morning on the ^th July and leaving a rear party with

!.t. "ucas, consisting of 1500 horse, and two guns, ths eon- ■»2 siitg^nt commandsd by Bapuji Shinde. The plan to ssnd ths

’.nfar.try back to organise a defence at Mokandara and Isaving

t rear guard of mobile cavalry was m§ds on ths advies of 2kl

Bapi'jl Shindt. Althouj^ Baawan Lai in hia Waqai Uolkar M i l s

It "deceitful counsel** it was sound adrica fron a taeh aieal point of view.

Tha officer choaan by Monaon for tba r« « r ffuardi Li.LoM Bf fa a a rar/ brara paraon with war axparianea* In fact, ing to a letter written \>j one Narayan Lai was • spy in Bipjji Shinde*a force, to Holkar, tha adrlet glTMi was, **if you put Lucan to death and adyanca, you w ill eonquar tha wholt country without a battle.Thia Narayan Lai uaad eoHaa* nicate between Holkar, aeyeral lanindara in tha Doab and th« 7k Raja of Bharatput. According to *Holkaranchi K a lfiy a t*,

Tashwantrao ordered Hamath Singh to join hia aftar eollaet* ing five battaliona, Sn piecea of artillary with 30 tv a b r ilt of imnunition drawn by oxen. Tashwant Rao h ia a a lf bad SO thouaand awift light cavalry. The Kaifiat atataa that Nonaon 75 WAS routed on 7th July. The Sngliah recorda do not daa- cribe any action on this day. It is a fact that Nonaon who «*as only a few milea from Raapura had taken a daciaion to with­ draw without encountering Holkar. According to Colonal MMlleson, Monaon took this daciaion onthe aola advica of Bapiji Shinde. The cownandanta of tha native ragiaanta orgad iipcn him to advance and attack Rampura. Lt» Lucan who co— an» ded the native cavalry leviea offered to lead the attack, but Monson having once taken a decision to withdraw, did not change hia mind. He curtly told Lucan that, if ha choaa, 7ft Lu(an could atay to encounter the whola Haratha aray* 242

As soon as th« Karathas f;ot th« Information that Nonsoa was recreating, ther took up tha pursuit ind soon 20,000 cavalry man aatablishadi contact with Lucan. Ltte Lucan had with him a continuant from Kota couiandad by a iiajput 77 named Anar Singh, the Chief of Palait who wmr dataralMd hold his ground with Li*c»n. On Holkar'a aide t,^ra eoaaandara like Wahid Alikhan and Bakshi Bhawani Shankar. Whila tha akinaiahing waa going on, Vahid Ali Khasi and Bakahl Bhawani

Shankar charged at the full gallop into tha anaKf'a forea before than and pliad their aworda and lanoaa ao wall that 7B Lucan's soldiers took to flight. HowaTar, Lucan and Aaar

Singh fought back until Aaar S i n ^ fall on tha battlafiald along with 400 to 500 of his gallant nan who wara aithar killad or taken prisoners. The Chief of Kota alao nanod Aaar Sinfjh and Afial Khan, the brother of a niniater of Kota Raja diad in this battle. Amongst those taken prisoners wara Akhafram

Pachali, the Faui Bakshi of Kota, and Fail Tallb Khani tha

Nawab of Baharaich.^^

The fate of Lucan was nerar posltlToly known. Orant 0«ff I atatee that he heard froai Muhaaaod Khan Baniaah that Loaan waa wounded, taken prisoner and later died dua to aoaa atoaaeh ailnent.^^ Baswan Lai claina that Taahwant Rao hlaaalT ehargad upon Lucan and beheaded hia; which appaara rathar roaantlo* a According to Holkar'a Kaifiat, Luoan waa killad on hia alapteiit*^

Taahwant Rao captured three thouaand horaaa, four alaphaata and two guns belonging to Lucan's force. Thna Nonaon loat all 2U}

his i ,"*r®)8:ul&r cavalry under Lue«n. B »p o Shlnda brou^t th« n's.Kfs of Holkar’ a rlctonr «t Pipalya to Konaon* Monson rei.ched Mokundra Pass on % July wher« he wao by

Ms j o r Sinclair w ith h is battalion 2/2 Infnn^ry t r ^

Minfl«jgad. He h«d left b»hlnd « Garrison At Hingisjf«d «indar tvo British officers, but tb« Oerrison revolted, beheadod tb« officers on order* of Hamath Slnsrh and joined Holkar^e anay.®^

Soon Holkar «st9b2i.<;hed contact vlth Honson And sent hist a U tter askinr hi« to surrender hl« j?un» and •■vail arwe 1e exchange for n safe pa*»«»«. Moneon refused* ta«hwasit ifeao th«n attacked ^tonson'e forces on three sides with h is e^'tnXiy but as th«> GoaspanT*.^ ’^r%y fowfJiit back HolKar brbire and conce.itrated hi s 'jrces four «lles hmy*

When Monson tried to enter KotSi Zalin Sln^h reftxsed hi!S enti*y as he was afraid to inrite the wrath of Holkar. Bain am. acute shortage of food reduced Monson to a aiserablct s’;at*. As Oauron« Nadi rlT«r* '»^as i n ?5|>at8 he could not cross

.t either. His |?5jne fot- atisck in the mud; so he was forc«wl to sbandon th«fn. Altho’i^h J3ii?«rlish authors like Thom, Peare® uni Duff sH? that the n'mf. spiksd, it i« not true as

'.ater in the battl« of D«ef, mt&

1 rd€ " and had b«sen firing &% the En«?;Tl9h forces.

yionson managed to cro«s Gigaama river on the 15th and

'*«i5tch«di Cha®fc^^: on the 17th. Th« river was not ford»feI«?

,her<^ was •r

This was partly due to carelessness of the Sardar in oharffe of the cavalry who did not watch Dunal*a ■oTeaanta e a r a f a l l y *

On 23rd July, 2/21 Refiment crossed the Chaabal^^ Baklac use of some rafts provided by the local Chief of Indarfad.

2/12 followed the next day. In the mean time Lieutenant

Colonel Don w i t h 2/^ Regiment proceeded down the rlTar in order to find a .crosslnf place. Holkar attacked Monson's eaap which was now reducedi n 'strength by t h r e e batta}iona« The an^tgo- ment was broken at 'sunset with moderate losses on either a id e *

On the 25th, 2/ 2I which 1 croaaed Chambal vas ordered to proceed to Lakhari Pas^ with a view to aacurinis the entrance to R^eipura. Lieutenant Colonel Don waa reinforced by 1/12 Ref^lment. Monson himself crossed the Chambal on the

25th and proceeded Hampura with 2/ 2I Regiment and 2/l7.

Regiment. He r^achei R&mguru on the 27th in a moat exhausted condition.

Konson who {rjin«)ii^t»d to get.some supplies, aent a aupply column to Lieutenant C o l o n s l Don who joined Monson on the 29th*

Some o f his men drownecJ in c r o s s i n g the Chambal. The locals now realised that, her® was a retreating army. They now took 2U5

' u

fantrv, fotir six pounder enins and two howitzers and soaae .V-. vv-j,,;. irrffeTular cavaln/ under Ma^^or Firth, he ftad aljready reached

‘tan.pura when Monaon reached that place. Monson rested his

forcH.5 at Kaa.pura fot' a month frou. 27th July to 22nd Auj;ust,

In the mean time Yashwant Hao had crossed the Chambal -’i-fc-.-S. and was moving on to Bundi which is south west of Kampura. He

had the Banas river on his western flank. There was no obstacle

between him and Monson now. It was not in Holkar’s interest

to allow tht vnemy time to rest and recuperate. Moreover if

Monson received further reinforcements from Agra he would be

in a position to t-ak«' the offensive. Holkar therefore aetached

a force to guard the baggage at Bundi, and set out to hunt th«

enemy. His progress was slowed due to heavy raina.

During the month's halt at Ran.pura, Monson'a army had

consumed the supplies sent by General Lake. Monson therefore

decided to fall back on Khushalearh wnere he hoped to get

supplies locally. Moreover, six battalions of Shlnde’s arsry

^ with twentv one cuns were located at Khuahal«:ad under Sada-

shiv Rao bakshl. Leavins' a garrison under Captain Hutchinson

at Kampura, Monson set out with five battalions and six com­

panies of sepoys and with two howitzers and reached Banas

river on the 22nd August, but the river was in floods end

could not f'rossed. Monson collected some local boats and 2k6 crosatd one battalion and the treasure under Capt* Nieholaon, which was ordered to proceed to Khushalgad* lasbwant Rao

Holkar followed close on Monson’s heels and r«achad B«nas the next day. He pitched a camp four miles away froa that of

Monson.

When Monson started crossing the baggage th« next d a y ,.

Holkar ordered Najib khan and other cavalry Captains to

■ount and attack Monson's force. At the saae tin*, Bbftwani

Shankar, Shushaba Bakshi, Chinna Bhau and the Pindharls

Banas on both flanks of Monson's army. By this tlno, Monsec had crossed four battalions and greater part of tha bfisgag9»

He had left Major Sinclair under 2/2nd Bengal Sepoys as ro&r guard. In the afternoon when the rearguard was preparing to withdraw Tashwant R^o opened artillery fire. Sinclair charged the f'uns. The gunners withdrew, leaving the guns which vrers taken by Sinclair. Jaswant Rao bi*ought in eight other guns and opened fire and recovered the lost guns* Sinclair with­ drew under covering fire provided by the 14th Regiment froe the opposite bank. In this desperate action Sinclair and 13 officers died. Many soldiers were either killed or dro^mad*

Tashwant Rao now started harrying Monson*s force, until Monsc!^ was forced to abandon his baggage and retreat towards Khushal'* ggd fighting his way out. As per Waqal Holkar Konson, in spite of such a great king being in pursuit of him, out of intoxication of valour did not in the least looas but kept up a hot fight. From our side charge after charge «nia 247 made, but owlne; to the enemy’s shower of grapt and shot» no success could be gained, rather manjr of our men wer«

Monson reached Khushalgad on 25th August* The fort was attacked the previous day by Sadashir Bhau but the attack was repulsed bv Captain Nichols. Holkar concentrated his aray on the 26th and held a council of war with Bapuji Shinde.^® Sob« of Monson's Indian officers, seeing that the position was hope­ less entered in correspondence with Holkar and although Monson tried to prevent it, two companies of infantrf «nd a larga proportion of irregular cavalry went over to join Holkar*s amy*

Mohan Singh writes: ”As terror and despair seised the troops of Monson, Anlfkhan, the brother of Janglikhan, with 200 horss- men and 300 musketeers sought our protection, entered Jaswant% camp, received a ^unty of Rs. 2/* per head and was sent to

Harnath Singh., « Having realised that staying in Khushalgad was not safa

Monson once again set out on nls retreat. He spiked the howitsers and forming a hollow square the retreat commenced.

Holkar kept on attacking the force for the next two days but could not penetrate the hollow square formation. Monson raacbsd

Hindaun fort on the 27th night. After a few hours rssti hs recommenced his march in the middle of the night towards Agra*

Due to the darkness there was confusion on both sidas. The

Eniriish kept the attackers at bay by firing grape and shot.

Casualties were mounting on both sides.

When Monson*8 army came out of the ravines near Hindaun 2kB which provided coverf Tashwant Rao fornad hia caTalry in thraa dlrlsiona and charged but the Indian sepoya withstood th« charge bravely and fought back. They allowad the cavalry to close in, held back their fire, and after firinf volleys on ^ the advancing cavalry charged them with the bayonet thus dis- 92 playing cool courage and discipline.

Monson reached Bayana on the 2^th In the evening. Hia troops were tired out and he wanted to rest thaa that nl|^t.

But the never tiring Holkar's aray^^ closad in and opanad hMvy artillery fire on Monson*s force. This raaultad in eonfuaion*

The camp followers got aixed up in the lina and a rout atartad*

Every man for hinaelf and devil taka the hindaoat waa tha m l « until the retreating army reached Fatehpor Sikri. Molkar kapt on attacking them throughout the retreat, it Sikri itaalf

Holkar nearly succeeded in encircling the English army and tha locals of Fatehpur also opened fire from within the fort.

Monson now sent a message to Holkar that ha waa willing to surrender if a aafe passage was guaranteed to hia ansy but thia was only a ruse and Holkar was taken in. He slaekanad hia purauit giving Monson a chance to withdraw by night, who by a forced march reached tha safety of Agra on tha 31tt Aufuati

Holkar showed no mercy to the stragglara and out thair right hands, noses or ears. These stragglara kept coadng in 95 Agra camp for days later.

This is the story of six weeks of retreat. Tha nuabara of casualties was never correctly ascertained aince aany daaax*tad. 2k9

manv just went home or got lost but it is estlmatad tfesife battalion lost three to four hundred men. Almost all and euns were lost.

Throughout this arduous retreat the aopoys ® degree of courage and firmness of mind, and ropulesd attack with coolness and intrepidity which speaks very V t d l l them. Lake himself has praised them in these words; f detachment never marched, and sorry am I to aay - I baira five battalions and six companies, the flowor of the how they are to be replaced at this day God only knows.”

The British government not only suffered in men and rial during the retreat, but the effect on the noralo of troops all over the country was disastrous. Later when Holk^.r was 200 miles from. Mathura, the garrison fled leaving the e and bagtrage standing. ”The best of the business was th e .%

Holkar was runnine off one way while we were going enotbar-.'^

This is how Skinner has described this episode in fei3 s«fe’rsf>lnSo

Had the garrison met even a thousand men of Holkar would have surrendered. Suchv«s the panic caused by name of Holkar. The official despatches, of coursa, o®lt sill such details and conceal the state of affairs.

The political consequences of this retreat % and lamentabl.e. Arthur Wellesley wrote that ”I treesbla fos* 9 7 political conseouences of these events." It nullifl©d th® past successes of British forces in the Deccan and Hlndnsti2.r4o

Holkar again appeared on the horizon of Hindustan as a h«ro ifenil 250

the Raja of Bharatpur and other minor princes op«n«

pondence with him. 3hinde and Raja of Berar began to think of

reeaininc their lost possessions. Thus a great danger \t&3 posed

to the British possessions threatening to undo the work of the

Tiovernor General. The retreat was a disgrace to British m ili­

tary reputation as a whole. It was not only a tactical defeat,

but General Lake's strategy and logistics had failed. The enessy

had been underestimated. Lord Wellesley had failed in not co­

ordinating the details of the plan between Lord Lake and General

Welleslev and the blgt'est omission in the execution of the pl?a

was the lack of cooperation between Murray and Monson. General

lake comiiiitted a blunder in withdrawing the main am y leaving

a small detachment behind, and Monson made matters worse by

foolishly advancing.from the passes without assuring his logis-^

tic support. There was a difference of opinion between General

Welleslev and Lake on this point. Arthur Wellesley thought

that Monson's force was never strong enough to engage Holkar.

He had also forbidden Murray to attack Holkar. He urged Lake

to continue pursuit of Holkar with rapidity even though there

was v e r v little chance of bringing him to battle. Instead

Lake broke contact with Holkar. He was not rery alarmed by

Monson's retreat itself and was confident that he could

still succeed in getting a treaty signed with Holkar, but the

price paid was very high.

On 2^th July the Governor General warned Lake that a

defensive war might prove disastrous and the forces of Murray S i'r l.:; ;

251 :>V

gtf and Monson wer* not strong enough to m««t Uolkar. H* there­ fore sugi^ested posting of another senior officer in that area, but Lake did not take any action on this suggestion*

An Analysis of Monson*s Retreat j

General Wellesley has summed up the causes of Monsoon's retreat as follows:

(1) The British should never employ a corps in a eerriee for which It Is not fully equal.

(2) They should take care of their proTisions againet all enemies and the Marathas in particular.

(3) They should not depend upon the Rajas or allies for supplies of provision.

ik) All the forts in British possession should be filled up with necessary provisions.

(5) When they are likely to cross a river irtiich is likely to be full during the rainy season, they ought to have a post OQ and boats upon it.

Lord Wellesley however does not consider that the strength 1 was Inadequate. In his report to the Sucret Committee of the

Court of Directors dated 24th March ld05» he confints that the

Commander-ln-Chlef judged the strength of the detachment under the Command of Lieutenant Colonel Monson to be sufficient to exclude Holkar from Hindustan and accordingly directed Lieute- nant Colonel Monson to form such a disposition of his force ae should completely obstruct the return of Holkar from the 100 south. 2 5 2

General Lake had kept the following factor* In vlsw, i*. detailing the force. Holkar had withdrawn frons th a

H i s men were deserting th e service daily as they ssst psiltf.

Their morale was low. He expected Murray to ongcgj Hclkar Is,

Malwa and Gujrath in an offensive manner keeping him

This was not possible partly because General Wellesley

forbidden Murray to engage Holkar’s army and secondly bscaugs of the "General distress o f the country in which it would reouired to act.”

When one considers that the task allotted to Konson w&s to block the entry of Holkar in Hindustan, six battalions oJ^ sepoys, a few places of artillery and two bodies of irrsgular horse were adeauate. He was not expected to go forward and destroy Holkar*s anny which was exactly what Monson set out to d o . Unfortunately Lake failed to give j p e c i f i e orders to Konson, althoufi;h later he tried to c a u t io n against risking his neck.

The second criticism refers to Monson*a failure i « gtiarding his lines of communication and ensuring a eo2tir:5re;sa; flow of logistics. Although Monson was entirely rcsspes!S

Monson was winning, he could get provision from the countryside and the Raja of Kota also helped him. It was only later when 253

the local chiefs realised that helping the British %fiiX iis-

vlte the wrath of Holkar that they refused shelter «nd

sions. General Wellesley remarked that the detachasn^

have been lost even If Holkar had not attacked with his infa^jliry

and artillerv" as thev had no locjistic backing*

Failure on the part of Lord Wellesley to coordi?iatfi

plans of General Wellesley and Lake has been one of th^i»

causes for Monson’s disaster. The bad stats of coBi&unie&tiocf^

is partly responsible for this calamity. Although Lord Ltk‘$

started his movements against Holkar on the 17th April,

General Wellesley in the Deccan did not gat coplee of the

till 6th May. He never believed in the plan and his in

it. In fact, he ridiculed Lake's depandenc* "upon tha axer<*

tions of the troops to the southward to defeat Holkar.

Writing to Major Malcolm he pointed out that Lake

the nature of our tenure, and our present state in the D«cc«a,

the distance we are from Holkar, and the difficulty, esovjit-

ing almost to an impossibility, of subsisting an aray to %bfs

north of Poona, owing to the famine. I can certainly Utkn

Chandore," he wrote, ”but I can not venture to mov« ths

from the Deccan." Had he moved troops from the Deccan

Marathas would have risen again. That Lord Well«gl®y*g

was not clear to Wellington is obvious from the remstrkff: ’*’1

should have no difficulty about a plan for the war, if I hari

an idea what the Governor General intended to do respGCliiiflg

a subsidiary force for Shinde. But a total silence from 254

upon every point that has been referred for renders it Impossible to produce with confident**

General Wellesley believed that the task m s §ftp8a® bilities of Lake. He wrote to Malcola that ought to move upon Holkar vrith «11 celerity, IsariBiig i® a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f h is i n f a n t r y , ^ t h soiae o f h i &

Having thus provided for the security of Hindustani fe® follow Holkar,'and push him as hard as he can.

However, promptly the next day after receipt of orders

General Wellesley issued orders to Murray to procttd to Multra ft from Oujrat leaving adequate troops for the defence of Surat £ILi 4

Bharoch and providing security to the Galkwar. General

Wellesley estimated that a force of four battalions could spared for this task, They would try and push Holkar cut of

Gujarat and Malwa. He was to deny Ujjaln to Holkar help of Gaikwar's cavalry. However, General Wsllt®!*;? that he did not know what the Command«r-*in-Chii^f to d o . I It is interesting to note tbs way the the ComiLander-in'-Chief shioldsd Monson \nspi%^ of f ful performance. In a letter to General Lak® s*afe«s;r

11, l8ou, Wellesley writes: ’’Grievous and disastrous as tfe* e v e n ts a re .... the extent of the calamity does not exc«®d sty expectations; from the first hour of Colonel Monson's ratr§?5.t[>

I have always augured the ruin of that detachment, and if any part of it be saved, I deem It so much gain.** He feared that 255

Monson was killed. He continues '^whatever may hare been him fate, or whatever the result of his misfortune to my owa fame, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloqtrf, nor will I attempt to mean purpose of sacrificing his reputa­ tion to save mine. His former services and his leal entitle hiiT> to induli^ence; and however I may lament or suffer for bis errors I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his character, if he survives."

General Lake informed Wellesley in his letter ^ t e d

September 26, 1801» that Monson was alive "to answer fdr him­ self. " He had planned to resume operations after the ■on-’ soons but he writes; "unfortunately, my views were defeated by

Colonel Monson*s departure from the plan «rtiich I intended for him to pursue."* 1 O f t ^

To 3um up Monson’ s disasters proved to be the greatest and most disgraceful blot on the military character of the

British in India. It must be said in his favour that Monson took the full blame on himself and General Lake stood by hfx,

Caapaim Against Holkar in Winter of l^Ok ’

Lord Wellesley realised from Monson*s retreat that Uolker was not to be underestimated. The prestige of the British and that of the British army had suffered a serious .jolt and a proper campaign was now being planned to defeat Holkar. One thing which is noticeable is that there was no mutual incrial- nation. Lord Welleslev upheld Lord Lake*s decision to leave 256

look after HolVcar during the summer. Colonel

Monson was not made a 3cape'~>oat and punished for his nor was he sent on pension to England. Lord Lake the loss of the flower of his army but added **In of it I shall Bove every men I poesiblyjcan to encounter war, and I trust, under the protection of dlTln®

I shall once more have the satisfaction of r e p o r t i n g mv dear lord, that we have been successful. I will not at present sav anything more upon this disgraceful and disjastrous event, as my feelings are for many reasons too much agitatei to enter into the misfortunes and causes for i t ”««. (I) "a s s u r e you that no exertion of mine shall be wanting to crush t h i s freebooter whose force is not I believe, by any meant) what it has been represented, or at all formidable If attacked*

The first object is in my opinion, to destroy Holkar, I shall therefore do everything in my power to bring him to action a t an early period, which by his bringing his guns and having 10 6 met with success, I think very probable may soon take place.”

(guns make armies less mobile). In order to do this, Lf-ke had to denude places in Hindustan but he decided to risk. "The whole of India is at stake, some risk be to accomplish this our principal object.He w a n te d

Colonel Murray to advance once again from Gujarath.

Planning the campaign against Holkar commenced in Atigusi^

1^01*. Lord Wellesley sent detailed notes to Lord Lake.^^

In his appreciation about enemy's strength and disposition, 257

Wellesley states that Holkar’s army consists c;

o f horse and infantry, and a very large p r o p o r t© f s:^

lery. The cavalry men were Rohilla Pathans collse^sd trm

Rohilkhand, areas around Delhi and fro« Khandeah. Ira

there were Mussalmana driven from Mysore country and

soldiers of the Nisam and the Nawab of Arcot. There m

few Marathas and Pindharies. As compared to this fin® cs'ff

Holkar’s infantry was inferior, eve n when it was eoasftndidd

European officers earlier. There was a lack of diaelplitto

and discontent prevailed, as the soldiera war* in arraara of

pay. As compared to the cavalry, the infantryman did not

much of a chance to collect loot. The ranka were reinfore^l

by deserters from Shinde's army which had baen earlier

in.the South by' General Wellesley. Their morale was not vm j hii^. They were mercenary soldiers. However, tbo er:$f flushed with the recent victory against Colonel Moa*ta sad

lot of loot had been collected. Yeshwant Rao Holkaif

hero and the officers were willing to follow hie

contingents wherever he lead thee. The British aney

fared well either in Malwa or Bundelkhand* Murray had cowardice by withdrawing without a fight although h@ lator H advanced to Ujjain. Holkar’s artillery consisted of guns mostly captur«d by him from Shinde’s army in the battle near Poona in early ld03* He also carried off guns belonging to the Peshwa. Later in August IdOU he had captured Monson's artillery. Thus, he 25^

« fairly strong artillery.

Holkar's amy conslstad of contingents r«erait«d bf

Sardars like Mlrkhan. It was not a cohesiTe force paid by

Holkar. It was a loose organisation which subsisted on loot and fou?ht while the chances of success were b r i ^ t and deserted when the e^oing got tough. They were there not from any patri­ otic motive but it was a mode of living for then, k decisiTe blow would cause a force of this nature to disintegrate.

Knowing this, however, Holkar would engage in guerilla warfare and avoid pitched battles. Lord Wellesley therefore adTised

Lake to plan bearing this aspect in mind, which means a new strategy and tactics were called for. Sending a strong aobllt column against Holkar would not serve the purpose as mere speed was not enough. Unless the force has logistic backing it will not stay in the field long. Holkar would attack with his artillery and infantry and destroy it. The lesson was well learnt. New tactics laying stress on aobility were to be evolved. Mobile forces were to be created which would be self contained and which would outdistance Holkar's cavalry.

As the morale of the English troops was low after Monson*s debacle, care had to be taken to ensure that Holkar did not succeed in forcing retreat on small detachments or on garrisoas by surprise attacks with overwhelming strength. Otherwise, this would further demoralise the army and boost up the reputation of Holkar.

The plan in outline consisted of the following elements: 259

(a) A mobile anny, not v«x*y large in strength was to b« assembled and it was to set out immediately to contact

Holkar's forces. This army was to consist of regular and irregular cavalry, European and native Infantry and artillery*

The force was to be comitanded by the Commander-In-Chief

General Lake himself and its task was to bring Molkar to and destroy him. If Holkar avoided action, "this aray to porsua

Holkar to the last extremity. This army should be equipped for li^ht movements; it must, however, be of sufficitnt strength to defeat the main body of Holkartroopt." t (b) Detachments were to be formed which would oporata independently but in conjunction with the main plan. Tha aost important task of one of these detachments was to guard the passes into the* company's territory in Hindustan. Tha task of the detachments was to preserve tranquility and protect the flanks of the main force. These detachments were to be foraed somewhere between Delhi and Agra towards the passes, and nan- power to strengthen them was to be drawn from the garrisons at Delhi, Agra, Mathura and so on. If necessary, a reserve was to be created by the Commander-intChief, but the garrisons were not to be unduly reduced in strength. Although Holkar was not likely to attack strongly held garrisons, he might try to capture Delhi and secure the person of the Mugal Saperor*

Delhi had to be, therefore, strongly held. Another detachment under a senior officer was to operate in Bundelkhand.

(c) In Gujrat, Colonel Murray was to move towards the 260 frontier of Ou,1rat with a view to denying tntry to Uolkar't army. Holkar thus occupied would indirectly help Lak«*s am y.

For this task six battalions which were earmarked as aubaidiary force for Shinde were to be detached from Hindustan. Thla forea was to operate under the command of the Commandar-in-Cbiaf

(and not under Cleneral Wellesley as waa done prayioualy).

This detachment was to occupy and hold Ujjain* It was anti* cipated that when pressed by Lake, Holkar might fall back on

Iljjain. If Lake found it difficult to detach s^.x battalions at this stage, Colonel Murray was to more from tbs frontier of Gu.lrat and occupy Ujjain. If Holkar withdraw in tba direction of Gujrat, Colonel Murray was to mora from Ujjain and stop Holkar.

Thus, the plan, envisaged bottling up Holkar'a anay batwaan the detachments at Gujrat, Delhi, Agra, Mathura, Bundalkhand and Ti jiain, while he was being pursued by Lake forcing him to give bf^ttle. However, the possibility of Holkar's army deluding all these detachments and entez*ing British territory was not altogether ruled out, but Wellesley was prepared to accept this risk. In his opinion it was much better to be mobile and take the offensive rather than occupying dafansira'' positions and waiting to be attacked. ”The active purauit of the enemy's main force is the most efficient plan of dafanea» and this plan steadfastly pursued, constituted the principal source of our triumphs of the late war under any defansiva not system, the war must/be protracted, with a repetition of tha 261 ;;

1 1 0 misfortunea which har« already occurred. 3 ^ 'i' Logistic Planning . - ■; 1;! One of the lessons learnt froB Monson*a retrM t liis that- ''

> y. the British amy must ensure that their supplie* «r« miff "W 'i ■ J interrupted and must be independent of the local condltioBS* ■■•V' General Wellesley had also stressed this point. Lord V«llt«l«y giyes detailed instructions in his Notes dated 17th Aufoat, 111 180<». A aupply department, commissary of grains to b« made responsible for this task. They were to obtain th« grmitt" partly by local purchase'from the local market and partly froii the Banjaras, the nomads who mored with thouaands of bolloelca»

* horses and camels carrying grain to supply tha amad foreaai be they Marathas or English. Camp baaart were to ba aat up *fV * and the traders were to obtain supplies from the hinterland in the area of operations. , '

As Holkar devastated areas and looted ifrtiaterer he could i'i carry away , it was not wise to depend too much upon local sup- ply. Even Banjaras may fall. However, a cartain raqoiramiaBt 1,;,

- * • ’ i ' would be met by these two sources of supply. The collactora v in the various districts of Doab, on the right bank of Juana and Bundelkhand were to be asked to purchase and craata stocks of grains. They were to make arrangements for transport of - the grain to the armies in the field. Special officers were ;J,| to be appointed who would take over the grain from the collectors and convey it to the armies. Thus a supply and transport department was to be raissd. Oenaral Laka had baaa

■ ^ '..V 262

Riven full powers to issue orders to collectors and appoint officers for this task. Full use was to be made of forts in

this area for stockinf; and issue of grain. The garriaon in the forts would automatically provide security. Ovtachaents of civilian staff were to be located inside the fort to con­ trol the procurement, storage and issue of grain.

Bullocks were to be used by the commissary to transport th9 grain. For this purpose government animals or thoss of ths traders were to be engaged. Banjaraa «tr« also to b« «ng»g«d for this task. All grain convoys were to bs sscortsd by amsd guards from the army.

Confrontation between Holkar and the English

Holkar routed ^onson during the months of July and August and entered Hindustan with his formidable am y. Hs marchsd northwards and encamped a short distance from Mathura. Ht received letters from many Rajas of the surrounding areas promising support and obedience. However, Holkar was wiss enough to realise that his army was not in a fit stats to con­ front the English in an open battle. The men were tirsd, ths horses were in poor condition and there was no money. He now decided to' concentrate hia forces around Fatehpur Sikrl.

He put to death four or five Englishmen who showsd signs of % disloyalty. He sent a message to the Raja of Bharmtpur extending a hand of friendship and asking for shelter for his camp and the baggage in the fort. But Bhaskar Bhau ths Vakil 263

brought a disappointing reply. The Raja advised him to nake peace with the English and expressed his inability to help nim. feshwant Rao aeain sent Bhaskar Bhau with a pleading message. ’"’.Vnen a man chooses a place for his asylum and beps to take np his residence there, it is not worthy of a kinr and a friend to show bad behaviour." This satisfied the ero of Han.iit Sint^h and he acquiesced to the demand.

Yeshwant Rao moved out from Fatehpur with 60,00 0 horse, 112 15,000 infantry and 192 guns. He advanced on to Mathura.

The garrison at Mathua consisted of four battalions of sepoys, two battalions of native cavalry and several guns. The fore® was commanded bv Major Skinner. The effect of Monson’ s re­ treat was so deraoralisinp’ that Skinner retreated to Agra on

15th September wit^hout giving a Tight and Yeshwant Rao walked in and took possession of the bag age and grain left behind bv Skinner's army. Five to six hundred native cavalrymen changed sides and joined Holkar. Yeshwant Rao stayed in MattHP^ for a month. Unfortunately, instead of making preparations for war he spent the time in drinking and amusing himself with dancing skirls. He tried to win over the locals bv issuing various parwanas and promisini^ jahagirs to any one who joined his side. He sent parties deep in Doab trying to extend his hold. However, he did not succeed as the garrison from Agra reacted and patrols were sent out to push back Holkar's men.

Holkar sent a force of 1000 horsemen under Sardar Allah Meer who surrounded the fort of "ligarh and demanded its surrender* 26U

The parrison was commanded by iMa^or Wood who bided his time bv pivln." evasive replie3 and promlaed to surrender the fort within a fortni'*ht, knowing f"llv well that General Lake was to resume the offpnsive soon.

The planning for the campaign against Holkar was now complete and General Lake left Kanptir with his army on 3*^

September, l‘*04. He had, however, been cautioned by Lord

Wellesley: "I am convinced that you will not allow him to attack YOU, but that you will attack him with all practicable despatch. ^ Offensive action was the only answer to Holkar* lake’s armv consisted of f^th, 27th, 9th Regiments of Dragoons, the flank companies of His M ajesty’ s 22nd Regiment, the 76th Ilk Regiment and horse artillery. General Lake planned to hare his base at Agra. As tue rains were still heavy the progress was slow. The army reached the Jumna on the 22nd September and began to cross the river using local boats. They concent trated at a place between Agra and Sikandara where a base was established bv Captain Macan. The concentration was completed bv 27th September and the brigades were formed. *■

Holkar who was planning to send a force under Bhawani

Shankar, Murtaza Khan, Bahadur Khan, Gomaji Shinde and Kushaba

Bakshi to proceed towards Kanpur to confront Lake, had lost valuable time in frivolous amusen.ent and was now surprised to find General lake’s armv so near Mathura. Instead of giving a battle here-, Holkar conceived of a better strategy. He

formed a force under Hamath Singh, Shaikh Qudratulla and 265

Papn Shinie to capture Delhi. He himself vacated Mathura =

and withdrew northwest along the Jumna with Lake in hot pur­

suit. lake now had the problem of fighting the enemy on two

fronts. Holkar’s armv had already reached the outskirts of

Delhi and the place was attacked on October ^th. Delhi was

defended by Burn and Ochterlony who repelled the attacks*

When lake approached Jelhi, Holkar lifted the siege and rstlrsd

towards Deag, a fort thirty miles west of Mathura which was in

the territory of the Raja of Bharatpur. He split his fores

here. He left his slow moving Infantry and heavy guns and

bageage at Deeg and set out himself with his light mobile

cavalry to raid British territory in the Doab. ’ His plan was

to advance towards Oudh or Rohilkhand. This forced Lake to

split his force too. He formed a brigade under Colonel Frassr

consisting of the British infantry regiments, the artillery

and two native cavalry regiments. His task was to attack

and capture Deeg fort and destroy Holkar’s infantry and guns.

lake himself set out to pursue Holkar with his cavalry

regiments. It was absolutely essential to prevent Holkar

from ravaging the country occupied by the British and their a llie s, the local princes. When Holkar found that his passags across the Ganges was blocked and he could not enter Rohil­ khand, he turned South East and flew down along the Ganges and arrived at Farukhabad on November l6th. Lake who was in hot pursuit covered fifty eight miles in twenty four hours

and caught up with Holkar. 266

As stated earlier Holkar had dispatched a force to attack

Delhi under Harnath Slntrh. Lake knew that the garrison &t

Delhi was weak in regular troops and the morale of the local people was low.^^^ Therefore Lake left Slkandara on the let '

October, If^OU and marched to the relief of Delhi. Holkar^s

cavalry kept shadowing Lake’ s marching column but did not attack. Whenever they dared to come too close Lake fired £

shots from his galloper guns and dispersed them. However,

Holkar did succeed in attacking the baggage train and L*k« lost

some men, animals and baggage. On the 4th, another convoy of

100 camels was looted near Aurangabad, which was coming froa

Agra to Join I^ake's array escorted by some convalescent soldiers.

Holkar who also left Mathura tried to attack Lake's column.

Although the attack,failed, Holkar looted some carts carrying wine near Keola. Wh«n Lake camped at Aurangabad, Holkar camped at Madhuvan, four miles away from Lake's camp. Lake now decided to launch a surprise attack on Holkar's camp. He divided his force into three columns, the 76th and three bat­ talions of native infantry formed the left column under Maijor

General Fraser, the horse artillery was deployed on the right

flank. The third column was under Colonel Macan i^ich acted as the reserve and marched‘in the rear leaving some dietence

from the infantry column. The camp was protected by the picquets and the rest of the force under Colonel Horsford. lake concentrated his troops on 7th October by first light having advanced at night. The artillery opened up but before 267 . ■ •■ .r- -••'■’I'- .r.-"/ ---w ••■■... -'iV ‘ , the Infantry launched the attack, Holkar's aray brok* and withdrew. They must have had some inkling of the Attsek.

His sentries and patrols were obyiously alert. Thus Lake's plan failed. He again made an attempt on the 10th, bts^ i n vain. The illusive Holkar had no intention of BAkinf • stand and giving a fight. He was a born guerilla. H« hoT«r«d round the enemy camp and made their lift ■issrabla# Vh«n t h 9 f attempted to attack he withdrew. On one oeeaaioBi Laka did manage to kill nen and captured a few prisoners; who wsra let off with a message **none but the cowai*ds treated their prisoners with cruelty.** This was a rebuka to Holkar .who had killed four or five British prisonera.

Bhawani Shankar, a Sardar of Holkar, waa woundad with a bullet in the thigh on the 13th and was sent to Deag

Idth. These harassing attacks caused minor caaoaltiaa on either side. Lake sent half his camp and aquippage to Delhi on the iSth. Thus lightened, the force now prepared It* self to pursue Holkar who was four days aarch ahaad of thea.

Lake's supply position, however, was not vary aatlafactory*

His advance was therefore delayed by a few days until he managed to collect adequate number of bullocks and grain for his army. However, since the immediate danger to Delhi had been averted by Burns and Ochterlony holding their own.

Lake was not worried. r - ?6«

zfhen Holkar realised that attacking D«lhl was futil* he changed his strate^. He now decided to deTastete British territories in the Doab and collect loot. Aa he had good teams of bullocks who could tow his guns* He also had sona trained elephants who helped the bullocks in pushing th« gm s over difficult terrain. In the last wask of Octobar * the Jumna by a ford at jawar^hat.

Lake too crossed his aray at another ford, thr«o

from Delhi on the last day of the naon^h and

suit with His Majesty's Sth, 27th and 39th s

Uraf^oons. He was accompanied by the horse artillery* Es had 1st, i*th and 6th Regiments of Natire Cavalry and a bripada of infantry under Colonal Don (who had g i r m ft v®Tf-

good account of himself in the Monson aplsoda). Laka behind all the wheeled carriages and each man carried rations on him for six days. On the 1st Norembar ha raachad Bagpat.

In the me^tntime news was recaiyed in Delhi that the Ciril

Magistrate at Sahranpur had been besiged by &he Sikhs and e

contingent of Tashwant Rao’ s army was hsading towards Saharasa- pur* Ochterlony despatched a force undar Liautanan^

Burns for his rescue. But Tashwant !

force and attacked it near Kandlah. The attack « successful but Burns took shelter in Shaall fort himself for against a siege* Unfortunately

chief of Shamli and tne people were friendly with Kolk&r they refused to supply provisions to Burn’s forc«. «©s . V « ' *; -fi' ;

■ ■ ' ■'" ' ■ 269 - - > ■ -. '■ ■’ '-'V .'.s «'* =■ . - ■■ "v, '’ thus trapped in the fort but to his good luck G«n«r&l Ltk® reached Shamil on the 3rd NoTember and dispersed Uolkar^e forces rescuing Burns.

Holkar now established contact with ths Sikhs and a contingent of 2000 Sikh Cayalrr soldisrs. When Lak«

Shamil, Holkar moved on to Thana and encaapsd «t Khat«ull«

He receired Ra. 32,000/- from Begum Sumr^o as « tok®© ©f hospitality. Begum Sumroo who always played a doable had sent a battalion to the rescue of the cirll

Sahranpur and now sent money to Holkar. Holkar then BArehed on to Hapur which is 20 miles away fron Meerut* Lake left;

Shamli on 5th and resumed the ckase of Holkar once He now advanced on to Meerut. He reached Hapur on the 9th w4ille

Holkar had moved

Captain Aitkins^s battalions and Captain Murray's Bat^reieh

Cavalry for the protection of Northern Doab.

Lake*s Battles with Holkar

f Battle of Delhi

Holkar had sent Harnath Singh, Shaikh Qudratullah and

Bapu Shinde to capture DelhiThe defences of Delhi neglected. The city wall was broken at many places and the power of the Mughal Emperor was only nominal. Colonel

Ochterlony was the British Resident at the Mufhal Court* 21'.

realised the strateric value of Je1hi and see to work. fhe

rampjart walls were repaired. //hen Oct.terlonv eot Che

Intel ■'1 pence that a Karallia force was aavancin? on Delhi he

called for relnforcerT.enta from Sahranpur, Rohtak and Panipat.

AccordinplV, Colonel Burns from Sahranpur, Captain Harriot

from Rohtak and Lieutenant Birch from Panipat moved on to Oelhii

Harnath Sinrh deployed his anr.y close to the’ city ‘wall’' .'j‘

on 7th October. Seeinp this, Ochterlony withdrew inside'tiie

citv walls. he sent o'Jt a cavulrv patrol under Lieutenant

Hunter whose task w;< to fain intelligence about the enemy’ s

sLrenfTth and dispositions. «t this time about Mewatis ' - r*' soldiers in the service of the British left and Joined Holkar’s -’-V amiv* Harnath opened the battle on the *?th by firing a

cannonade on the southeastern position of the city wall, but as the fire was returned he withdrew. However in this fire

thirtv-fortv feet of the wall was destroyed. On the 10th a mixed force of men of i’/l^th kerjiment and 150 men of

Wohtak t'arrison supported by a six pounder gun set out under lieutenant Rose. Thev attacked Holkar’ s guns and succeededT

in capttirine the battery position. Thev spiked the guns and retvirned in triumph with very little loss. The .British ,

S' now erected a battery and broueht their guns near the souths,

east bastion and started shellins harnath’s position. Harnath

Sinfrh moved out ol' rane:e and occupied a new position to the

south of the citv* Where the ground provided adequate cover

for his h e a w c’uns and infantry. Thirteenth October was -i spent in preparation b7 both aides. On the 14th, Hartaith*»

*?uns opened fire. His infantry followtd and assaulted th«

rampart walls, in the area of Lahore Gate. Ko^var tha

defenders fou(;ht back and Harnath Singh had to ratira auffar* ing heavy casualties. In the evening Hamath Singh aorad : his guns towards Kashmiri Gate and triad to aaaault that poai-

tion but Ochterlony was alert and he daployad soaa g«na

foiled the attempt of Harnath Singh. Ochtarlony placad gmia

on both A.jmeri Gate and Lahori Gate and ca u ^t tha Marathaa in the cross fire.

Although the battle of Dalhi ragad for twanty daya, Oaliii

was saved due to the judicious use of artillary by

who kept moving his guns from place to placa. Inaplt® of

Initial defection.of the Mewatls, the garrlaon ranainad

steadfast. The Junior officers set. an axaapla by t ^ i n g tb$

offansive all the time and the attack on Hamath'a artillary

booatad the morale of Ochtarlony*s forcaa. Ha diatributad

swaats to his man during the stage.

While the siege was in progress General Laka atartad his march towards Delhi. Yashwant Rao sent a warning to Bcmatb

and instructed him that if Delhi was not capturad, Hamath

• > Singh should vrithdraw in time preserving his army. Accordingly

before the morning of the 15th October, Harnath oioTad off to % Najafgad and thence to Farrukhnagar and ancampad at Rawari. General Laka was vary plaaaad with tha parforaanea of Colonel Ochterlony and the garrison. Thom in hia BCBoira 272

has remarked "Nothing could exceed the fatigues both by the officers and men but the cheerfulness Rr>d patience with which it was endured and this defsnc* of a city ten miles in circumference of nine days, against a prwpftrsidi and desperate eneci'^' could not fall to coamiand unl'wersfel admiration. 273 NOTES

(1) Wellington’ s Despatches, eiited by Lt. Col. Gurwood,

Vol. I I , p. 580.

(2) Ib id ., p. 595.

(3) Ib i d ., p. 6^1.

(i*) I b i d ., Vo. XXXV of 27th June, iSO}.

(5) Sardesai, New History of the Karathaa, Vol. Ill, p.

(6) Ibid., p. 403.

(7) Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. X, p« 127«

(^) Holkaranchya Itihasachi Sadhanen, Vol. II, p» h6»

(9) Owen, A Selection of Wellesley's Despatches, p« CX. dr') Thorn, Memoir of the ’Afar in India, p. 325.

(I]) Martin, Wellesley’s Despatches, Vol. IV, p. 10.

(12) Thorn, op.cit., pp. 332-333.

(13) Owen, op.citv, pp. 452-^*53* Thorn, p. 333*

(lU) Martin, op.cit., pp. 104-106.

(15) Ibid., p. 107.

(16) Thorn, p. 333.

(17) Sardesai, op.cit., Vol. Ill, p. 422.

(1^*) Martin, op.cit., p. Vol. IV, p. 19«

(19) Sardesai, op.cit., p. 424.

(2^') Owen, op.cit., p. 454.

(21) Thorn, op.cit., p. 327.

(22) Qanungo, 3.M., Jaswant Rao Holkar; The Golden Rogue, p.174

(23) Thorn, op.cit., p. 327.

(24) Ib i d ., p. 332.

(25) Martin, op.cit., p. ino. 27k

(26) Sutherland, J ., Sketches of the Relations Sub»i«tlnf

between the Government and the Different Nfttivs Stataa, p. 6S,

(27) MacMunn, Lt.Gen., Vignettes fron Indian Vara, p. 39.

(23) Martin, op.cit., p. 117.

(29) Ib id ., p. 332.

(30) Pearse, Memoirs of the Life and Military Sarrie^s of

Lake, p. 266: Duff, Vol. II, p. 275, Oorwood,

Despatches, Vol. Ill, p. 231.

(31) Martin, op.cit., p. 46.

(32) Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Uttar Vibhag 3.

(33) Thom, o p .c it ., pp. 337-33^.

(34) Thom, op.cit., p. 341. Pearse, op.cit., p. 270*

(35) Paarse, op.cit., p.296. % (36) Quanungo, op.cit., p. 179.

(37) Thorn, o p .cit., p. 351.

(33) Ib id ., p. 343.

(39) Ibid., p.356.

(40) Waquai Holkar as quoted by Quanungo, p. Id3.

(41) Martin, Wellesley’s Despatches, Vol. IV, p. 64.

(42) Ibid., p. 123.

(43) Ib id ., p. 67. '

(44) Ib id ., p. 346.

(45) Ib id ., p. 345.

(46) Gurwood, Wellington’s Oaspatchaa, Vol. Ill, p. 232. (47) Ib id ., p. 266. •c i '

(4^) Ibid., {.. 1]Q.

(i<9) '•'artin, o p *cit., No. XC, p. 322.

Ibia., V'o. XXXVII, p. 1^9.

(*>1 ) Owen, WplHnr’ton's Oeipetchen, p. i»25.

('2 ) Gurwoo'.l, op.cit. , p. 233«

(53) Martin, o p .c iu ., p. IPn.

(54) Hickev A'ii 1 iaiT.s, Memoirs, ed. by Alfred Spencer,

Vol. IV, p. 295.

(55) Martin, o p .c it ., p. 23o.

(56) Ibid., p. 12P.

('? ) Ourwood, o p .c it ., p. 297.

(*?») Ib id ., p. 257.

(''9) Khanna, 3.D., Monson’s Retreat in Anglo f^aratha War of

l'^03-l‘^f'5. University of Allahabad, I960, p. 15.

(60) Ib id ., p. 16. home Miscellaneous Series Nos. 491,626.

(61) Fortescue, nistorv of tkie Br-itish Hnr.v, Vol. V, p. 75.

(62) Khanna., o p .c it ., p. 16. HK3 491, p. 271.

(63) ''r'lrwood, V ., p. 3*^1.

(64) 6 26. o. 33.

(65) Khcnr.a, op.cM.- , p. 17. H.K.G. 626, p. 54.

(66) H.,i-tin, o p .c it ., V p. 2^7.

(67) Martin, Vol. IV, p. 327.

(6^^) Skinner, Menioirs, Vol. I I , p. 32.

(69) Martin, Vol. V, p, 2^f^.

(70) Martin, V., p.2^^.

(71) fodd, .Jan.es, I.t. Col., Annals of Rajasthan, Vol. II,

lf*73, p. 276

(72) Thorn, y.eir.oir of Lhe ,var In India, p. 357.

(73^ Martin, Vol. IV, p. 1 ‘*9.

(7^5 Ib id .; p. 1^3.

(75) Sardesai, New Hislorv of Lhe Karathas, Vol. Ill, p. k?.b.

(76) Mfalleson, G.b. Col., i'he Dyciaive battlea of Inciii., p.294.

(77) Qanim.eo, JasWanL Hao Holkar. The Golden Rogue, p,l?^7.

(7'») Ib id ., p.

(79) Qanunro, o p .c it ., p. 1*?^^. Mathura L&1 Sharma, Kota

Rajva Ka Ttihas, Vol. I I, p. «*91.

(J^r) Grant Duff, Hiatorv of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 279.

(?1) Sardesai, op.cit., p. U26,

(^2) Thorn, op.cit., p. 359.

(53) Pearae, H . , Memoir of the Life and Military Services of

ViscoJint Lake, p. 27^.

i'^U) Thorn, p.360 . Pearse, p. 2^r. Duff, Vol. I I , p. 2i^n.

(^5) Thorn, p. 362.

(**6) Thorn, op.cit.', p. 362.

(^7) Grant but'f, o p .c it ., p. 2<^2.

(f*?*) Qanuneo, p. 195.

(^9) Owen, o p .c it ., rn.

i9^) Thorr, o p .c it ., p. 365.

(91) Qanungo, p. 197.

(92) Thorn, o p .c it ., p. 362.

(93) Martin, op.cit., p. 2 ^1 ,

(9^») Thorn, o p .c it ., p. 366.

(95) Owen, o p .c it ., p. 5«*3.

^ ^ ^ 1“ -

273

OENLRAL LAKE’S BAirLfcB ’,VITH HOLKiiH. THa SILGfc OF

BHARATPT^R AKD PURSHir OF HOLKa R

Battle of Deep: (1?th November to 24th Deceir.ber 1^04)

As stated earlier, General Lake ^lad divided his army into a mobile cavalry brigade and a comparatively 3low aovlng infantry brieade, which escorted heavy baggage and artillery.

When Harnath 3inph retired from Delhi, Lake detailed K&jor

General Fraser to pursue him. Fras/er’s force consisted of

His Ma.iesty’s 76th Regiment, the Company’s European Ref^imsnts and six battalions of sepoys. He reached Govardhan, a place few miles from Mathura on 12th November, 1^04^ A few m iles from Govardhan,Harnath deployed his armv for battle in an area between a lar«e lake and a wide marsh. There was a fortifiod villae;e to his left flank and his rieht extended to the fort of Deeg^ (See Map 11).

Deeg was a flourishing town of considerable size situated

23 miles north west of Bharatpur. The fort was situated in the centre of the town and there was a mud wall surrounciing the village with bastions suitably located for all round dafenc^

There was a deep ditch full of water surrounding the wall. The. fort itself was verv stronelv built and had adequate gun^ plac*^ on hip’h towers which were tactically sited and overlook»?d all approaches to the fort. There was a high rocky mount known as Shah Bur.i which was incorporated in the defence dcht-nt-.

There were massive eiatewavs which cohered the enti'ances. MAP No 11 ■^7 >5 |V)

THE SIEGE OF DEEG FO U hlov-Dec-1804

FORJ

/7 V

PA U C 6

H/SHGO c:ovARi)H^ 2 H t U / ^

—^ ' A ->v'^ — "—~-i-- s»^

--- . - Z-^-uii~-’ \ •J, t Z ^ ;_- j: - c n ^ -1 A /- teh-' i — / , A ~ ^ \~r ^ I i^iV:pn~r^ ^ ---- v»/j-a —-'-v.' -A CO v C -7 ? _:VVj!£.-— - / *'/W /V T £J^ -" y f V ^ k a p -a t h a ^ \isFAMTP>Y<; IF-.''- - ■■' 'o*5 ISI •\'X

ciu ^CI ‘ -

'-J/ .vN 279

Oovardhan Hill and ar orchard sit'.xated on top of a hillock

provided f^ood looVont poaitions. Thev dominated Che approach

in between the lake and the jxamp where Harnath had taken up

a defensive position.

Harnath Sinerh had deployed his army in the following

manner. Hi a left wins- was commandej by Mirza Ashraf Beg» his

rirht winf», wiitch rested on the lake was commanded by Baryar

Sinrh, '’/oma 1i Sindhia comrranded the vanguard while Harnath Singh

located himself in the centre where he held the reserves.

The artll'>er'/ was deployed both in the front and also in the

area between tne lake and the marsh presumably to t^ive cover

to parties falling back on the fort in case the presv'jure Ki’ew,

This was alr:o the killing f^round which was dominated by artil­

lery. The Macatha horse guarded his extreme rii?ht flank.

Harnath had k!?pt the swamp to his rear. Although his position

could thus not be O’-^dssed, his own route of withdrawal was

cut off.

Major General Fraser after a careful reconnaissance

planned to deploy his forces as follows: His yiajesty’s 76 Regi­

ment in the centre and the two European Regiments, 2/l5th and l/2nd on the left, and richt flank respectively. The Native

infantry was hela in reserve in the rear, he deployed his

cavalry on the left flank thus keeping in check the Karatha

cavalry. ^As harnath*3 position could not be bypassed, Fraser

decided on a frontal attack. He however ntade use of two amall

villa/^es keeping each to either flank thus advancing in a 2^0

diac;ona] ii.anner. as he had marched in a western direction

and caii.pei at Oovardnan he hal to detoiir romid the marsh and

forni up 'loiith of his caiiip location.

rtie troopa moved into tneir concentration area at 3

on nirht 12/lith November and lormied up by first light. The

artillery opened up with erape causing heavy casualties amongat

the defenders. Harnath 3inp-h unfortunately showed cowardice

and fled awav from the battlefield and took shelter in the

bastion of the fort. He was pulled up by those inside by

tyinp a rope to his waist. The casualties started mounting

up on both sides as Maratha artillery also opened up. The

twelve and eighteen pounders thus caused navoc amongst the ranks

of the attackers. The worst blow fell when a shot took away

General Frasers le§ when he lead a charge on the enemy guns.

He had succeeded in carrvine; the first row of the guns and

was chargine: the second row when he was wounded. He was

evacuated to the rear and later died of his wounds. Colonel

y.onson now took over comiriand of the fox ce. Major Hammond who

cotiioianded the l/2nd was advancing steadily on the right.

Harnath Sino:h’ s cavalry now charged and retook the first

range of ?uns, but Captain Norford of the 76th Regiment lead

an assault and drove the cavalry away. Thus the guns again

changed hands for the second time since the morning. Colonel

Konson now moved his own artiHerv’ forward and concentrated

fire wa3 brrueht on enemy’s left flank. i’his forced the Maratli

infantx'v which was deployed south of the swamp to withdraw 231

by the only route available through the swamp.^ Some of the area was set on firp by the artillery which burnt some of the retrea'.iiiP soldiers. Once the left flank gave way, whole of the front collapsed but Colonel Monson failed to take advantap-e of thb situation and the Marathas were not pursued, .

Kohan Sinrh writes. "I f the r^nelish Sahibs had given chase they could have captured the fort of Deeg that very day.” ^

The net result was that Lake had to lay a siege and waste a whole month in reducin' the fort. As will be seen later, it was a costly affair.

Harnath s’lffered approximate'’.y two thousand caiiualt ir> accordinc- to i'horn. n larj?;e number were lost or drownwi „n the marshy area. He also lost eleven six pound«>i's and two twelve pourders, nine tumbrils and four ammunition cans which had been captured bv Holkar from Konson during the letter’s retreat. In all the British seized fifty three guns of all 7 sizes. Credit for tne victory largely goes to General Fraser who planned and executed the battle, although he was unable to see the end oi' it. ^ord Lake in his letter to Wellesley has written: "J have r^a-jjn to believe that, the action of the

13th was a very preat business. The person&l courage of Monson and others alone served it. It was a most glorious day and ft deserved everv credit possible.’’ "

Reputation of Konson Wt*s thus restored. He iiad wauhod away, at least in part, v,he dispr*, e of his retreat and he \ms lucKV to nave recovered sosne of his lost k-Tuns. It is interesuind 282

to note that the eivins and ammunition was in a serviceable condition although he had piven a false report after his re­ treat that the eiims had been spiked and the anununition destroyo

Battle of Farrukhabad

Before we studv the sie^e of D eg, it is necessary to follow General la k e ’ s movements. After the unsuccessful attempli to take Delhi, Holkar had moved to Farrukhabad. As usual spent his time in pursuit of pleasure and ignored hia military duties. On loth Nov^mbt'r, 1^04, General Lake concentrated his forces at Aiie:an.1 & p‘

Findinp his enemv off his puard General Lake decided to surprise him bv covering the distance bv a forced march o v e r n i^ t and appearing at Farrukhabad early in the morning with his cavalry.

The move was accidentalIv spotted by one of Holkar’s cavalry­ men who was P’oins' hoii.e on leave. Ke had the sense to turn back and p;allop to his master Bhawani Shankar and give him the news. The report was confirmed bv Muhammad Khan Afridi who went out on patro]. However, Yashwant Rao and Ganpatrao pro- bablv in their cups bv that time, disbelieved the report and 9 the entertainment continued. But surprise was lost, although no steps were taken to put the troops on alert.

General La’ce reached the outskirts of Farrukhabad as planned and opened up with his guns on Holkar's camp. This causrht the troops napping. As it happened, one of Lake’s artil­ lery tumbril accidentally blew up causing a big explosion, fhe