Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Subject : History

Lesson : Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Course Developers

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Prof. Lakshmi Subramaniam Professor, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Kolkata Dynamics of colonial expansion--1

and

Dynamics of colonial expansion--2: expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in Bengal, Mysore, Western India, Sindh, Awadh and the Punjab

Dr. Anirudh Deshpande Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Delhi

Language Editor: Swapna Liddle

Formating Editor: Ashutosh Kumar

1 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Table of contents

Chapter 2: Expansion and consolidation of colonial power  2.1: Expansion and consolidation of colonial power  2.2.1: Dynamics of colonial expansion - I  2.2.2: Dynamics of colonial expansion – II: expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in Bengal, Mysore, Western India, Awadh and the Punjab  Summary  Exercises  Glossary  Further readings

2 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.1: Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Introduction

The second half of the 18th century saw the formal induction of the English East India Company as a power in the Indian political system. The battle of Plassey (1757) followed by that of Buxar (1764) gave the Company access to the revenues of the subas of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and a subsequent edge in the contest for paramountcy in Hindustan. Control over revenues resulted in a gradual shift in the orientation of the Company‟s agenda – from commerce to land revenue – with important consequences. This chapter will trace the development of the Company‟s rise to power in Bengal, the articulation of commercial policies in the context of Mercantilism that developed as an informing ideology in Europe and that found limited application in India by some of the Company‟s officials. This found expression until the 1750‟s in the form of trade privileges, differential customs payments and fortifications of Company settlements all of which combined to produce an alternative nucleus of power within the late Mughal set up.

The English East India Company: origins and growth

Founded by a royal charter dated 31 December 1600, the English East India Company was a joint stock company of London merchants who took the decision to intervene in the Euro- Asian trade that had been initiated by the Portuguese and subsequently expanded by the Dutch. The impulse to control trade between Europe and Asia in spices and pepper, calicoes and textiles went back to the end of the 15th century, when the Portuguese first cut into the Italian stranglehold of the Levantine trade, and directly transported spices from Asia to Europe. The Dutch followed suit with measures that were even more draconian, to ensure complete control over supplies of spices and their carriage, although by the middle of the 17th century, there was a definite shift from the quest for spices to the craze for calicoes. The same motivation drove the English Company which, however, had only one tenth of the capital owned and mobilized by the Dutch East India Company known as the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or V.O.C. It was this lack that persuaded the English Company to turn towards India not only for its valued textiles that paid for spices but also found growing numbers of buyers in England and Europe. Over the course of a century, the Company established trading posts in western and eastern India as well as in the Coromandel. From modest beginnings in 1617, the Company extended its trading activities by the end of the 17th century, when Bombay, Madras and Calcutta emerged as major trading centres and spheres of influence.

3 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Value addition: did you know? The Levant

The Levant is the collective name for countries along the shores of the eastern Mediterranean and includes Anatolia, Syria and Egypt. The area was the principal transit point in the transit trade between the East and the west and consisted of transportation of spices and luxury goods. Traditionally the Levantine trade was dominated by the Venetian merchants who were until the 16th century the principal distributors of spice in Europe. Trade coming into the mouths of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and dominated by Asian merchants and Arabs reached the Levant where the goods were picked up by the merchants of the Italian city states. The discovery of the all sea route to Asia by the Portuguese ended the stranglehold of the Italians and directly impacted on the older trade of the Levant.

Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_Levant_3.png

In its nascent stage, the English East India Company traded in textiles and functioned within a well established trading system in India. The Company‟s servants, termed factors, advanced money to brokers who channeled these to weavers and primary producers. There was a growing expansion in the textile trade but not at India‟s expense as India received substantial consignments of bullion in return for its manufactures. In fact, the growth of the textile industry ensured the enrichment of brokers and supply merchants and in the case of Bengal even improved the bargaining capacity of weavers. There was thus no question at this stage of the Company becoming a political power even if they periodically made demands that were not considered appropriate and that even occasionally undermined the sovereign dignity of the land.

4 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

What made the Company different from other foreign merchants who came to India, settled down and traded? There were three major differences and some scholars have associated these with the play of mercantilist ideas. In the first place, the Company demanded from the ruling government, privileges that exempted them from paying customs duties even as they took over the responsibility of maritime protection to indigenous shipping. Secondly, the Company authorities fortified their centres where they had their own courts of adjudication and thereby set up a special zone of influence where Mughal writ could not run. Thirdly they felt emboldened to offer protection to fugitives from the law as part of a general policy of peopling their centres with a client population of collaborating subjects. In fact, it was precisely around these issues of privilege and exemption that the Anglo Mughal wars of 1757, 1764 and the subsequent clash with Muhammed Reza Khan occurred in Bengal. In fact the element of force used by the English East India Company especially in the 18th century lent a particular coercive edge to its profile that marked it very distinctly off from other foreign merchants including the other trading companies. This was partly due to their secure political position and also because they drew on an older system of force and „legitimate protection‟ that the Portuguese had introduced into the trading system of the Indian Ocean.

To what extent were these claims part of a larger mercantilist driven political project? To answer this we need to understand what mercantilism means and how this encouraged some Company servants even in the 17th century to confront the Grand Mughal.

Defining mercantilism

The term „mercantilism‟ refers to a corpus of economic theories espoused by states in early modern Europe and perceived as critical elements in ensuring the health of states. The objective was to control and regulate trade and ensure its proceeds and maintain the bullion reserves of the states. Put simply, it was important to prevent an unnecessary outflow of treasure from the state abroad, to curtail imports and encourage exports. Dominant between the 16th and 18th centuries, it led to some significant instances of government intervention over the economy in the form of standardization, of controlling guilds and even regulating commerce by floating chartered companies, thereby giving them monopoly over trade with certain regions and giving them sovereign political power in distant continents. All these were intended to enhance the power of the state. Implicit in mercantilism, was the assumption that wealth constituted power and that power and wealth were the proper ultimate ends of national policy.

A key tract that is universally acknowledged as a quintessential mercantile doctrine was Thomas Mun‟s „England’s Treasure by Forraign trade’. Mun was in fact a major protagonist for the English East India Company and insisted that its policies were not responsible for the deficits of specie that England faced and also that its imports could find valuable markets in Europe when re-exported. The close connections between the Company in India and the state in England certainly bear out the importance of such views, which enjoyed wide currency. This is not to say that the Company did not enjoy considerable local autonomy or that it could and did take independent policies but to make the point that the Company was not mere traders but that it acted as a vehicle for promoting public and private interest. 5 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

There is considerable evidence to indicate that from the very beginning the Company could use force to push its interests and that the Company and the state were united in realizing certain diplomatic and even financial goals. Recall for instance how the island of Bombay that Charles II had received as dowry by the Portuguese crown was transferred to the Company as its base so that it could be used in future against Portuguese settlements in western India.

Mercantilism in action: the Company settlements of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta

The Company settlements at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta began as humble trading stations that the authorities secured from local political rulers or, as in the case of Bombay, as part of a settlement with the Portuguese. These settlements were seen as regional hubs - Madras was the coordinating centre for settlements in southern India, Bombay for the western part and Calcutta for trading stations and factories in the east. It was here that the Company established and maintained its full strength, consisting of the Governor and his council, and through them, coordinated the trading operations of their servants. From the very beginning, the Company sought to fortify these stations against the local/regional authorities while simultaneously encouraging local artisans and merchants to come and take up residence in the new city. The intention was to develop the city as a special zone of influence and thereby invest it with political authority.

Within the city, there were two clearly demarcated zones – the White and Black towns whose inhabitants had occasionally to pay taxes for their protection and municipal safeguards. These occasionally created conflict of interest leading to altercations and the Company occasionally had to maneuver cautiously to maintain its primacy. However, the element of force in the Company‟s policies was never entirely absent and the image of the Company as a semi sovereign power, albeit in a restricted space, was established by the end of the 17th century. This found expression in repeated fortification measures, in altercations with local authorities, and in the case of Bombay‟s Governor Sir Josiah Child, even confrontation with the Mughal State (1688-89). Josiah Child in fact believed that the commercial success of the Dutch East India Company or VOC as it was known had been due to its political strategy and that the only way to win recognition from the Mughal Empire and the right to trade as a sovereign power was by adopting a war policy. Furthermore, Bengal was to be the testing ground for the region as it was increasingly assuming a critical place in the Company‟s trade.

6 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Bengal: the British bridgehead

By the early 18th century Bengal became a key region for the Company‟s trade in textiles, and Bengal goods came to comprise nearly 60 percent of the English imports from Asia. Even before this, the English Company had secured an important farman from Emperor Aurangzeb that gave them the right to trade without paying duties in return for a payment of 3000 rupees. The foundation of Calcutta in 1690 and its fortifications in 1696, followed by the acquisition of the villages of Kolikata, Gobindapur and Sutanuti gave the Company a convenient launching pad and with the formalization of the duty free trade farman in 1717 by the emperor Farrukhshiyar, the prospects for an expansion became even brighter. By this time, the situation in respect to both the political context as well as the trading milieu had substantially changed, emboldening the Company‟s servants to contemplate limited political projects primarily to further their commercial interests.

Bengal, as we have seen on an earlier occasion, was the one of the few provinces to have escaped the spiral of Mughal decline. Under the rule of an enterprising governor, the region enjoyed a substantial increase in productivity, the benefits of which the regional administration was able to exploit. With the collaboration of new social groups in the region – the zamindars, the mahajans or bankers and the administrative and scribal groups, the ruling aristocracy was able to enjoy substantial power and autonomy. In contrast to the attitude of the Mughal state, the regional administration resisted the demands of the European companies when they tended to be excessive, and in the process set the stage for a major round of confrontation in the future.

The bone of contention between the Company and the ruling administration in Bengal was the interpretation of the farman of 1717. Theoretically, this granted the Company the right to carry on duty free trade, to rent thirty eight villages around Calcutta and to use the royal mint. In fact however, the Company officials chose to amplify the scope of the farman by claiming exemptions for their private trade ventures as well. Murshid Quli Khan refused to consider this demand and denied permission to extend the duty free provision for private trade as well as to buy the thirty-eight villages adjacent to Calcutta. His successors continued with the policy of containment.

7 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Value addition: did you know? Private trade or country trade Country or private trade referred to the inter-Asiatic trade of the servants of the European trading companies. In an effort to compensate for low salaries, the Company authorities allowed their servants to trade in the inter-port trade of Asia. By doing this, the Company allowed an area of conflict to develop between its official and corporate objectives and the private interests of its agents. In fact by the 1730‟s in Bengal the value of British private investment in the internal and export trade of Bengal probably matched that of the Company Source: Chaudhury, K. N. 1978. The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 209-210.

Between 1740, when the war of Austrian succession broke out in Europe and involved England and France in hostilities in India, and 1757, when the fateful battle of Plassey was fought, the English East India Company steadily augmented its position by adding fortifications, running a trade in dastaks and permits and even offering fugitive subjects of the Nawab protection in the city of Calcutta that was emerging as an alternative power centre. The situation rapidly deteriorated under Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah whose actions and attempts at centralization alienated a section of the ruling class that gravitated towards the Company and sought its intervention to appoint a new Nawab instead. The formation of the anti Siraj clique in Murshidabad was sponsored by a powerful group headed by Omi Chand, the Jagat Seths, Khwaja Wajid and Mir Jafar all of whom represented the ascendancy of the commercial-administrative lobby and their links with the ruling administration. Whether the growing dissensions within the ruling administration were responsible for Plassey or whether the designs of the Company were directly instrumental in producing the conflagration is a matter of debate among historians. To examine the debate, it is necessary to comment on the relative trading position of the English East India Company in Bengal, especially in relation to its rivals, both European and Indian and thereafter to situate it in the context of the political crisis that gripped Murshidabad in the 1750‟s.

English trade in Bengal and ‘sub-imperialism’

We have already observed on a previous occasion that the Euro-Asian trade carried on by the trading companies like the English East India Company was ordered around two important staples – spices and textiles. By the end of the 17th century the share of Bengal in the total trade of the English East India Company began to increase and in 1710, was 47 per cent. Between 1728 and 1760 the high quality and expensive fabrics of Bengal accounted for 60 to 80 per cent of the total number of pieces. Textiles were procured through a contractual agreement between local merchants and the Company – the former undertaking to supply a specified number of pieces at the port of shipment by a certain date and organizing their purchase from the manufacturing districts. The system of advances entered into with the local merchants was referred to as the dadni system – the amount or 8 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

dadan given in advance was often a bone of contention. Supply merchants were primarily local merchants including Armenians who were known to purchase at prices 30 per cent below those paid by the Company. Indian intermediary merchants also performed cultural roles as they were able to negotiate with political authorities as well. Consequently, for the greater part of the first half of the 18th century, brokers and intermediaries remained an invaluable part of the investment machinery.

Official or corporate trade however, represented only one facet of the English East India Company‟s activities. It was the private trade of Company servants that emerged as a major phenomenon in the 18th century and was largely instrumental in lending an edge to the political agenda of the English Company. The policy of permitting Company servants to trade in intra-Asian trade or „country trade‟ as it was called, as a means of compensating insufficient pay, had meant that private traders had become an entrenched interest group and made sure that they continued to make fantastic profits by deploying their official privileges against the authority of the local government. Private enterprise in the first half of the 18th century provided the basis for the meteoric rise of Calcutta as the premier city, supplanting the older Mughal town of Hugli.

The expansion of English shipping was primarily at the expense of Asian shipping which had dominated the trade in the Indian Ocean. European and English private traders increased their stranglehold partly on account of the better naval protection they afforded to local merchants against piracy. Operating with larger ships with greater tonnage, the English private traders were able to dominate the freight trade as well as compete with the other merchants in the west Asian markets. Their presence and ambitions became a factor to be reckoned with and in fact provided the material basis for the Company to articulate a political agenda. Whether this was the determining factor in the breakdown of Anglo-Nawabi relations is however, a more difficult question to answer categorically. What is evident is the escalating irritation on the part of the Company authorities to two things. One was the pressures that the Company in its private and official capacity faced in getting adequate supplies because of political disruption. Maratha raids in western Bengal often interfered with the production process and the imperative to procure silk and textiles often outweighed all other considerations. On the other hand there were also the growing pretensions of English private traders who, according to some historians, were facing French competition in the 1750s and had to find a way of getting out of the impasse.

What was the nature of English private trade and how did they come to form a lobby and how did the ruling authorities respond to the challenge? There is very little doubt that the private servants of the Company amassed huge fortunes by illegal private trade and by the sale of dastaks or official permits. Company servants deliberately glossed over these acts of flagrant abuse and defiantly assumed a confrontationist position in relation to the Nawabi administration. According to historians like Sushil Chaudhuri, this was the culminating point of an earlier policy of mercantilist aggression practiced by Josiah Child and assumed more explicit overtones in the 1750s. The conflict that broke out in 1756-57 was, according to the same historian, the consequence of „sub-imperialism‟ or the aggression of private traders who plotted and planned the fateful conspiracy leading to the overthrow of the old regime.

9 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

The aggression was partly fuelled by the pressures of trade that private merchants were facing especially from French competition. The early 1750s saw a resurgence of French private trade – their fleet numbering 27 in 1754.

The road to Plassey

The French factor had more than one ramification. In addition to the challenge of private trade of the French Company servants, there was the growing presence of the French Company. Its victories against the English in southern India produced serious apprehensions among the English about the possibility of a Franco-Nawabi alignment in Bengal as well. This apprehension found expression in a frantic stepping up of fortifications of the city of Calcutta without the express permission of the new Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah. The situation deteriorated even further when the Company stepped forward to extend protection to his fugitive subjects and thereby directly challenge his sovereign authority. It may be recalled that the young and impetuous Nawab had by this time alienated a section of the old ruling class by dislodging old favourites and thereby helped foment a dissident party in his durbar. The latter, looking for outside support to precipitate a conflict and resolve it in their favour, approached the Company, which was only too willing to emerge as mediator and subsequently as de facto ruler.

The first round of confrontations occurred in 1756 with the opening shots being fired by Siraj. When the Company did not heed the Nawab‟s warnings regarding the grant of protection to Krishna Ballabh and the abuse of dastaks, he retaliated by taking over the factory at Kasimbazar. Its governor Drake refused to consider any diplomatic solution, only to face the ignonimous attack on Calcutta and its capture by Siraj on 20 June.

Value addition: did you know? The Black Hole legend of Calcutta In 1756, in course of the Anglo-Mughal war when the reigning Nawab of Bengal Siraj-ud-daulah laid siege to Calcutta and took control of the English fort, his soldiers locked up the defenders in a small cell that measured 14 feet by 18 feet and had only two small high barred windows for air. On an exceptionally hot night the prisoners choked and suffocated and barring 23 survivors, the rest died of thirst and exhaustion. The chief survivor was John Zephaniah Holwell who left behind a wildly exaggerated account of the tragedy that came to be known as the Black Hole tragedy. He claimed 123 out of 146 captives had died. Modern historians have doubted the veracity of Holwell‟s account. For British power, it was an important motif that was invoked time and again – Lord Curzon even built a memorial recalling the tragedy. A more recent work by Jan Dalley looks at why the event became so important in subsequent British narratives. Source: Dalley, Jan. 2006. The Black Hole: Money, Myth and Empire. London: Penguin

10 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.1.1: The Black Hole of Calcutta Source: http://www.allposters.com/-sp/The-Black-Hole-of-Calcutta-in-Which-Only-23-of- 146-Prisoners-are-Said-to-Have-Survived-Posters_i1861418_.htm

The capture of Calcutta and its renaming by Siraj as Alinagar constituted the second and brief phase of the Anglo-Nawab war in Bengal. For the English Company and its servants the situation was intolerable and they could hardly bear to consider losing their trade privileges and prospects. The arrival of the squadron from Madras under Robert Clive changed the equation. Astutely exploiting the support of the dissenting faction, Clive gave no quarter and now took the lead in planning the perfect coup d‟etat. Combining forces with the dissenters led by the Jagat Seth bankers, powerful zamindars and officials, a mock battle was staged on 23 June 1757 where Siraj was defeated and executed. Mir Jafar, the leader of the contingent that remained inactive in the battle was made the new Nawab but with real power effectively passing into the hands of the English Company.

What followed Plassey was the infamous plunder that saw huge transfers of money to the army and the navy, to Clive and other favorites and a free-for-all fray for the Bengal revenues. Even more serious was the ruthless exploitation that the region faced at the hands of English private traders who abused their newly acquired position to extort, trade unfairly and abuse dastaks even more indiscriminately. Private trade now moved from the periphery of the region, from principal towns and outposts to the interior, dismantling in the

11 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

process an entire political and moral dispensation. The sky was the limit as far as the private traders were concerned and the region now lay exposed to a rapacity and extortion that was unprecedented. For ruler and ryot, for merchant and manufacturer, the situation became increasingly burdensome as a new structure of exactions came to dominate Company policy between 1757 and 1765.

The regime that was cobbled together after Plassey was made unviable by the very agreements that the Company entered into with the new ruler. Mir Jafar had unwisely and rashly made extravagant financial promises in return for English support without realizing how empty the treasury actually was. Further, he was not in a position to revoke any of the trade related privileges that the English merchants enjoyed and was forced to sustain his base by mounting operations against zamindars and by squeezing local merchants. Neither of these strategies worked and when in desperation he turned against the Company by siding with the Dutch and the Mughal prince Ali Gauhar, he was displaced by Mir Qasim whose reputation in Bihar as an efficient officer had endeared him to the Company. The Company in its wisdom assumed that his appointment would stabilize their position but without realizing that their demands were bound to antagonize him in the long run. On his part Mir Qasim abided by his agreements and focused his energies on developing his base in Bihar until he ran foul of the English private traders there. A major controversy arose over the abuse of dastaks by the Company servants with a pronounced anti Mir Qasim clique emerging. When the Nawab abolished duties altogether and thereby ensured an equal playing field for Indian and European, the Company intervened and reinstated Mir Jafar on the throne.

The stage was now set for a second round of confrontation; this time under a more substantive alliance bloc consisting of Mir Qasim, the ruler of Awadh, and the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II. Historian Rajat Ray has identified this bloc as the first serious act of resistance by the Mughal ruling class to early colonial penetration. This coincided with other acts of popular resistance and social violence that reflected the extent of upheaval and erosion that the Bengal political system had been subject to.

The combined forces faced a resounding defeat in the battle of Buxar that followed in 1764. This was a decisive battle as it signaled the military superiority of the English army and subsequently inducted the Company as an actual revenue claimant in the political system. In 1765, the treaty of Allahabad gave the Company the diwani (the revenue collecting right) over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and with this an enormous revenue base that they could deploy in their bid for paramountcy. A resident was now posted at Murshidabad and his office steadily became the locus of real power in the province. The grant of the diwani to the English East India Company became the basis for dual government in which native rulers retained their titles and dignities while the Company administered the government and collected revenues through Indian officials.

12 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.1.2: Robert Clive, 1st Baron Clive of Plassey: Clive receiving the land revenues of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa Source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic-art/482290/100522/Robert-Clive- receiving-the-land-revenues-of-Bengal-Bihar-and

Post Plassey trends in Bengal – exactions and control

The most perceptible impact of Plassey and Buxar on the trading economy of Bengal lay in the realm of its trading economy. The rampant abuse of trade privileges and the phenomenal expansion of English private trade was at the expense of the local trading economy – as Mir Qasim had observed, „every village and district in the province was ruined by their trade‟. After Buxar, the Company tried to introduce a measure of regulation, putting the private traders under some pressure. At the same time, there was the flagrant use of political power by the Company to eliminate rival European competition and this was especially evident in the textile trade. Weavers and artisans came under greater control – forced to produce exclusively for the Company that enforced a monopsony on textile production. This meant that buyers were strictly forbidden to compete in the market, the opposite of monopoly where there were many buyers for one seller. The late 70s and 80s saw khatbandi regulations binding artisans to sell exclusively to the Company and denied them any bargaining powers. When these abuses were redressed by the direct agency system of Cornwallis, the British position as the largest single buyer of textiles had been ensured. The impact of monopsony on producers was reflected in deteriorating living standards. On the basis of the little data that is available for regions like Malda, a key textile 13 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

centre, wages lagged behind raw material prices and other prices. At Dacca in 1790 weavers were getting from the Company prices that were 6 to 8 per cent less than what other traders were offering. Contemporary evidence, albeit fragmentary, indicates that the Company used its dominant political position to fix terms of exchange and push down wages to subsistence levels.

While the Company‟s political supremacy made the effects of domination inevitable and visible, it also ensured the system of the Company investment would be self sufficient. Bullion imports were no longer necessary to support the Bengal trade – the revenues from the province were now available to finance the Company‟s trade to both Europe and China. The resultant bullion scarcity worsened the economic situation of the province – debasement of silver currency, shortage of specie adding to the problems of the economy. Native trading capital was subordinated to European enterprise; the process had begun as early as the abolition of the dadni system and its replacement by the gomastha system where paid Indian agents under supervision of the Company officers dominated the supply trade. Between 1770 and 80, more restrictions became visible as the agency system of 1787 -89 excluded even dalals or brokers in the textile business.

The agricultural scene fared even worse. As claimants to land revenue, the Company opted for a policy of revenue maximization and in the process endorsed dubious methods of land revenue collection through revenue farming and amils. Several old landed magnates or zamindars faced rack and ruin even as bankers and creditors expressed reluctance to advance them credit. Company servants exploited the zamindars, took over the position of shroffs or bankers and advanced money at exorbitant interest rates, thus adding to the vulnerability of the zamindars. Agriculture suffered because impoverished zamindars were not in a position to afford customary exemptions and waivers and even loans to the peasants. Other factors that added to the decline in agricultural productivity were scarcity of labour in a number of districts and over assessment through a series of land revenue collection experiments initiated by the Company. A crisis point was reached in 1769-70 when Bengal experienced a terrible famine that carried off nearly one third of its population. The failure of the rains compounded with the worst excesses of Company servants who cornered grain and set up local monopolies top produced terrible conditions of shortage and starvation.

Value addition: did you know? The Bengal famine The Bengal famine (1769-73) was a catastrophe affecting the lower Gangetic plain. A combination of drought conditions with extortionate revenue policies followed by the officers of the English East India Company created an unprecedented crisis situation leading to starvation related deaths and epidemic. Although mortality figures are not entirely reliable and historians are not unanimous about this, it is evident that the famine decimated at least one third of Bengal's population. Source: Original

14 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

The ruling government in Bengal had little power to confront the situation which was clearly a consequence of Company aggression and private greed. The overriding urge to maximize profits and to squeeze out indigenous enterprise made the situation intolerable and even if successive rulers – Mir Qasim and later Muhammed Reza Khan, the Naib Nazim of Bengal voiced their grievances and reservations, the juggernaut of Company domination could hardly be arrested. Reza Khan protested against all those exactions and illegal excesses that not only jeopardized the economy and strained merchant, manufacturer and cultivator, but he lamented the decline of an older moral economy that the power of the Company had subverted.

Conclusion

From a small trading body that prostrated before the Mughal Empire for minor trading concessions and privileges, the English East India Company had emerged as the principal political player after 1757. There is no doubt that its access to Bengal, India‟s richest province, gave it the much needed revenue to out-maneuver the other players in the contest for supremacy over the subcontinent. It could field a larger army, it could pay off its supporters and it could win the confidence of creditors and financiers to bankroll its conquests. It is tempting to see in the Company‟s meteoric rise the concrete manifestation of the policy of mercantilism. In fact however, one could suggest that complex webs of interconnections and alignments created a situation which made it possible on the one hand for the Company to be considered as an option of mediation by local powers and for the Company to consider political power as one of its options on the other. In the case of the local elite, especially the Bengal ruling class in 1757, the decision to solicit the assistance of the Company proved a costly miscalculation. The Company did not turn out to be like other mercenary mediators – instead it turned on its allies and demanded an ever-increasing share of the pie. From 1757 to 1856 it was but a matter of time when the Company would move in by hook or by crook, by force or by diplomacy to appropriate the whole of Hindustan.

2.2.1: The dynamics of expansion in the 18th century

Background and salient features

The death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 was followed by a rapid disintegration of the Mughal Empire in the first half of the 18th century. The second half of the 18th century witnessed the rise of British power in India. The 18th century was also marked by the rise of several regional powers in south Asia like the Marathas, Durranis, Sikhs, Mysore, Hyderabad, Awadh and Bengal. Close to the crumbling centre of the Empire were the Jats based in Bharatpur and Deeg, and the major Rajasthan states. Another important regional power was Rohilkhand founded by the Pathan warrior Ali Muhammad Khan after the invasion of Nadir Shah left Mughal control over the area in tatters. Some of these states, like Awadh, Bengal and Hyderabad were successor states of the Mughal empire founded by 15 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Mughal subedars (provincial governors) who became practically independent. The Marathas, Sikhs and Jats are examples of regional polities created by large scale rebellions and protracted wars against the Mughals. Haider Ali, an extremely talented and ambitious soldier, on the other hand, overthrew the Wodeyar Raja and became the sovereign of Mysore.

Value addition: did you know? Ahmad Shah Abdali vs Sadashiv Rao Bhau Ahmad Shah Abdali was the most capable commander of Nadir Shah, the ruler of Iran who plundered north India and Delhi in 1739. By 1761 Abdali was a veteran of many campaigns in Afghanistan and North-West India and had founded the Durrani Kingdom. In comparison, Sadashiv Rao Bhau, the commander of the ponderous Maratha army at Panipat was barely thirty one years old in 1761 and had no experience of warfare in the north. His victory over the Nizam at the Battle of Udgir in 1760 had, most evidently, inflated his ego to the point of rudeness against his allies like the Jats. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmad_Shah_Durrani

The Indian states of the 18th century fought frequent wars of expansion against each other. Sometimes they formed temporary alliances against common enemies. For example the Nizam and the Marathas competed for control over the Deccan with each other but often stood together against Mysore. Similarly the nawabs of Awadh and Rohilkhand formed an alliance with the Afghans against the Marathas to check their growing power in the revenue rich north Indian plains. This alliance proved fatal to the Marathas at the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761. These mutually exhausting wars gave the Europeans the opportunity to interfere in Indian political and military affairs. In the process the European trading companies extracted significant economic concessions from these states. Thus the decline of the Mughal Empire paved the way for the rise of British power in India.

Another important feature of the 18th century was the elimination of French influence in India following the Battle of Wandiwash in 1760. In a series of international conflicts and the Carnatic Wars fought in south India, Britain defeated France and became the dominant colonial power in Asia. It is worth remembering here that the Portuguese at this time were confined to their coastal possessions like Goa, Daman and Diu and posed no threat to the growing clout of the English East India Company in Indian affairs. In sum, the period from the mid 18th to the mid nineteenth century (1757-1857) was characterized by the rise and simultaneous consolidation of British colonial power in India. This power is called colonial simply because during this phase of Indian history India was converted from a collection of independent kingdoms into first a mercantile and later an industrial colony of Great Britain. India‟s economy, polity, society and culture were made subservient to the interests of Great Britain. During this century for the first time south Asia came to be ruled by a European power. Moreover Britain was also the first modern industrial capitalist country. These facts were of profound significance as far as the development of British colonial rule in India was concerned. The aim of this lesson is to see how the British accomplished this task. Our

16 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

purpose is also to examine the factors which favored the rise of British power in India. The next lesson will concentrate on the British conquest of some regions of India.

Value addition: common misconceptions The Maratha Army ‘met’ the Afghans at Panipat in 1761 It is commonly believed that the Marathas marched to Panipat and confronted the Afghans who came from the north west. In fact, Abdali was in the Ganga-Jamuna doab with his allies Najibkhan of Rohilkhand and Shuj-ud-Daulah of Awadh when the Maratha army occupied Delhi and marched towards the pilgrimage centre of Thanesar. Indeed one of the places where Abdali camped for some time while the Marathas were in Delhi in 1760 was Patparganj – a major residential area in East Delhi today ! Once the main body of the Maratha forces had moved some distance to the north-west of Delhi with the aim of collecting tribute and subduing minor Afghan garrisons, Abdali re-crossed the Jamuna with his main force, bye passed Delhi and cut off a possible Maratha retreat on the Delhi road. This left the Marathas no option but to fortify themselves in Panipat and wait for events to unfold. Ultimately it was a besieged and starving Maratha army which fought one of the most famous battles of India on 14 January, 1761. Source: Gordon, S. 1993. The Marathas, 1600-1818: The New Cambridge History of India, II.4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

The main characteristics of the colonial wars of expansion

Territorial and commercial ambitions of the Company

On the whole these wars reflected the territorial and commercial ambitions of the English East India Company (hereafter Company). From the late 17th century onwards the Company had followed an aggressive mercantilist policy in India against its European competitors and the Indian powers. The main aim of the Company‟s policies was to find a solution to its payments problem. This problem itself resulted from the fact that the Company could export a wide range of commodities from India but could give India virtually nothing in return. This trade imbalance was a continuous threat to the Company‟s solvency. Plunder and territorial acquisition hence emerged over time as the means by which the payments problem of the Company could be addressed. The Company had, in fact, declared war on Aurangzeb in the late 17th century but was defeated and pardoned by the Emperor. On the West coast of India the Company fought local powers like the Angres of Colaba well into the 18th century. On the whole the aggressive nature of mercantilist trade was evident in the systematic use of force by the Company in the 17th century itself. The Portuguese and Dutch had set good examples of using systematic force to augment their commercial enterprise. The desire to control local resources, obtain supplies of cheap goods and exclude competitors from trade pushed the Company towards territorial conquest and war. In the 17 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

light of these facts it is impossible to believe that the Company acquired an empire in India by a quirk of circumstances. It was not by accident but by a design which grew strong over time that the British rose to prominence in India.

Growing boldness of the Company

Due to the decline of Mughal power the Company became bold enough to confront weaker rulers. The history of Company officials flouting rules and misusing the special favours granted to them by Indian rulers is quite old. The case of Bengal where the Company misused the privileges granted to it by the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar was typical of such behaviour. Obviously the decline of the Mughal Empire had created an atmosphere of political uncertainty in most parts of India and the Company benefited from this. The fact that the Company officials and traders were not afraid of flouting state regulations should not be underestimated in any study of the British conquest of India.

The disunity of the Indian powers

The Indian powers of the 18th century made matters worse for themselves. In the absence of an economic transformation of the country the indigenous powers fought unending wars of expansion. This was done with the intention of acquiring more land which, in turn, would yield more revenue. These wars and the struggle for power within the courts of these kingdoms gave the Europeans the opportunity to interfere in Indian affairs. For example the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775-82) was started by Raghunath Rao „Raghoba‟ with English support. Raghoba had wanted to become the Peshwa since the days of Balaji Baji Rao. Similarly the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-05) broke out after Peshwa Baji Rao II got Jaswant Holkar‟s younger brother murdered in Pune. When Holkar retaliated by attacking and occupying Pune, the coward Peshwa fled to Bassein. There he signed the Subsidiary Alliance Treaty. In the same way after Maharaja Ranjit Singh‟s death in 1839 some factions of the Sikh court and army began to conspire with the Company against other factions at the Sikh court.

18 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.2.1.1: Portrait of Warren Hastings Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warren_Hastings

Exceptional moments of unity among the Indian powers

However, the wars of the 18th century clearly demonstrate that even as late as the 1770s the Company could not decisively defeat a strong enough combination of Indian powers. For example, during the First Anglo-Maratha war a stalemate occurred because the Maratha Sardars stood united behind Nana Phadnavis. This led to the defeat of the combined forces of Raghoba and the Company at the Battle of Wadgaon in 1779 and to the Treaty of Wadgaon. The war came to an end with the Treaty of Salbai (1782) which restored the status quo ante. Further, during the Second Anglo-Mysore war Haider Ali was successful in securing Maratha neutrality. With his rear thus secure, Haider went on to inflict a series of defeats upon the British. Unfortunately for the indigenous powers such cooperation was an exception and not the rule. Thus, when the English attacked Mysore in 1798-99 the Nizam provided them valuable military and logistical support despite the entreaties of Tipu Sultan.

19 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

The Company’s superior alliance diplomacy

Most of the Company victories in India resulted from its superior alliance diplomacy. In diplomacy no Indian power was a match for the English. For example, on the Western Coast the Company first forged alliances with the Portuguese and later the Peshwa (1756) to defeat the enemy Angre faction led by Tulajee Angre based in Vijaydurg. This secured Bombay and several other Company possessions on the west coast. In Bengal the Company officers successfully isolated Siraj-ud-daula by buying out his rivals and generals. The Company also successfully involved the Nizam of Hyderabad in the war against Tipu Sultan. In general, the Company leaders proved skillful diplomats. They made sure that a lasting alliance of Indian powers against the British never materialized. Means such as intrigue, bribes and efficient espionage were used rather efficiently by the Company in its pursuit of commercial and political ambitions.

The resources of Bengal

Bengal had been the richest province of India since the late Mughal period. Undoubtedly its trade was contested for between the various European Companies active in India. The English, French and Dutch all had well established factories in Bengal. The conquest of Bengal (1757-65) provided the English Company the money, men and material needed to conquer other regions of India. In addition the Company also exercised a naval supremacy on the Indian seas. The conquest of Bengal also gave the Company easy access to the large military labour market situated in present day Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The availability of professional soldiers in large numbers combined with the revenues of Bengal created the famous Bengal Army. This proved to be the most powerful army in India which helped the British conquer south and west India. Its battalions were active and effective in the Mysore, Maratha, Sikh and Afghan wars.

Vision, cohesion and discipline

On the whole the well trained and drilled Company troops were regularly paid in cash and were better disciplined. They were led by men of vision like General Arthur Wellesley (the victor of Waterloo and future Duke of Wellington) and his elder brother Richard Wellesley, the unabashedly imperialist Governor General. During campaigns and battles the Company commanders usually displayed superior tactical coordination in comparison with their enemies. Company officers, in general, were all English and this seemed to create social cohesion under pressure. In comparison with the indigenous powers, with the possible exception of Tipu Sultan, the Company had a long term vision. It represented a mercantile capitalist system which was fundamentally different from the feudal Indian kingdoms. Wars were taken seriously by the British because experience taught them that their hold over many parts of India could easily be challenged by rivals. Hence, the Company forces fought with a desperation unknown to the native armies. The only possible exception here was Tipu Sultan who understood what the Company stood for but his appeal to his neighbours fell on deaf ears.

20 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Insufficient modernization and institutional weaknesses of the Indian powers

Impressed by European military technology and training methods, several Indian states in the 18th century modernized their armies by hiring European military experts. Consequently, in the latter half of the 18th century almost all Indian powers had contingents of infantry, cavalry and artillery trained and led by European mercenaries at their service. However, these modernization attempts had several noticeable weaknesses. First, the Indian states generally failed to evolve a system of military finance like the Company did. This meant their troops were often paid late or not paid at all for a long time. Second, the Indian states like the Shinde state of Gwalior raised powerful battalions led by English, European and Anglo-Indian officers who were paid in the jayedad system. This meant that revenue of a particular area was marked as payment to these foreign officers. In the Shinde domain the French officers were the chief beneficiaries of these jayedads and this made the Maratha sardars serving Gwalior jealous. The regular employment of European generals and commanders increased the factionalism among the Marathas. Third, the excessive reliance on European mercenaries proved fatal in certain cases. For example, before the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-05) all the European officers of Daulat Rao Shinde defected to the Company under pressure from Lord Wellesley. After all, no European wanted to be buried in India. All of them wanted to leave India with their fortunes from ports possessed by the Company. In fact many of them had investments in the Company trade and hence opposed the idea of fighting the British. The wholesale discharge of European officers left the main body of the Maratha armies virtually leaderless during the ensuing battles. Fourth, the native rulers could not develop a corps of Indian officers because they trusted their European commanders more than their own relatives due to the constant court intrigue they faced. A combination of these factors translated into tactical superiority for the Company forces on the battlefield. On the whole the modernized infantry and artillery battalions of the Marathas and the Sikhs fought well but could not prevent the Company victories.

The alienation of the masses from the Indian rulers

Indian states fell to the advancing Company one by one during the 18th and 19th centuries due to the causes listed above. Those who were not totally wiped out became part of Wellesley‟s Subsidiary Alliance treaty system. These nominally independent states later evolved into the Princely States of the British period and were integrated either into India or Pakistan after 1947. Here it must be mentioned that none of the Indian states tried to convert their resistance to the Company into mass resistance. This could not happen simply because the Indian peasants did not sympathize with their rulers. The outcome of these wars made no immediate difference to their lives. Most Indian states of the 18th century, with the exception of Tipu‟s Mysore, did not do much to improve the conditions of their subjects. The Marathas, and the Pindaris which usually accompanied their armies as scouts and raiders, did not endear themselves to the people in many parts of India. Indeed the practice of the Maratha Bargis collecting tribute by armed force ensured for them a lasting place in the folklore of Bengal. Hence the Indian peasant watched impassively as contending

21 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

armies marched across the country. There was little to distinguish and choose between the Maratha battalions and the Company forces for him.

Main wars to remember

To place the British conquests in India in 18th and 19th century in proper chronological context we must mention the dates and regions of the decisive wars of the period:

Anglo-French Rivalry in India, 1740 – 1763 (The Carnatic Wars). These wars were fought in the Carnatic – Coromandel region of the Indian peninsula (Today‟s Tamil Nadu).

First Anglo-French War, 1744 – 1748 Second Anglo-French War, 1751- 1755 Third Anglo-French War, 1758 – 1763

The Mysore Wars, 1767 – 1799 These wars were fought in south India in the Karnataka region of today.

First Mysore War, 1767 – 1769 Second Mysore War, 1776 – 1784 Third Mysore War, 1790 – 1792 Fourth Mysore War, 1798 - 1799

Anglo- Maratha Rivalry, 1775 – 1818 These wars were fought in the Deccan region and around Delhi and Agra.

First Anglo-Maratha War, 1775 – 1782 Second Anglo-Maratha War, 1803 – 1805 Third Anglo-Maratha War, 1817- 1818

The Anglo-Sikh Rivalry 1845 - 1849 The Sikh Wars were fought in the Punjab First Anglo-Sikh War, 1845 – 1846 Second Anglo-Sikh War, 1848 – 1849

22 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.2.1.2: Richard Wellesley Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Richard_Colley_Wellesley,_Marquess_Wellesley_by_John_Phili p_Davis_(%27Pope%27_Davis).jpg

23 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Major British annexations, 1757-1857

Dates Territory Annexed Area in 1000 sq. Percentage Indian miles. land mass.

1757 - 65 Bengal and Bihar 15

1765 Carnatic 04

1766 Northern Sircars 02

1775 Benaras 01

1792 - 1799 Dindigul, Malabar, 04 Canara etc.

1801 „Ceded Districts‟ 07

1803 - 1818 Maratha Territories 19

1825 - 1842 North-East and 15 Burma

1843 Sindh 05

1848 Satara 01

1849 Punjab 10

1853 Jhansi, Nagpur and 13 Hyderabad assigned

1856 Awadh 02

Total Annexation 98 62

Indian States 59 38 Remaining

India 157 100

Source: Roy, Tirthankar. 2000. The Economic History of India 1857 – 1947. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

24 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

The Subsidiary Alliance treaty system of Richard Wellesley, Governor General of India, 1798-1805

Wellesley and Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had similar views on forming a British Empire in India. Britain had recently lost her American colonies and both these ambitious men wanted to compensate this with an Empire in India. Wellesley came to India determined to extinguish French influence in the sub-continent and destroy the power of Tipu Sultan and the Marathas. He considered himself an expert in Oriental affairs and was bent upon following a policy of British expansion in India. The Subsidiary Alliance treaty system was devised by Wellesley to subjugate the Indian powers and make the English paramount in India. Under this system, which all Indian princely states followed till 1947, the Indian kings signed a treaty of Subsidiary Alliance the provisions of which are briefly described below. By signing this treaty a native power became a subsidiary of the British and lost its sovereignty. The Peshwa signed it in 1802, the Nizam in 1798 and again in 1800, Tanjore in 1799, Mysore in 1799, Awadh in 1801 and Gwalior in 1803. Once the major powers had thus been reduced, the smaller and less significant states were left with little choice in the matter and quickly followed suit. The alternative to signing the treaty was annihilation which no Indian state was willing to risk ! Generally Wellesley is credited with having formulated the Subsidiary Alliance treaty system but treaties on similar lines had been used by Warren Hastings, the first Governor General of Bengal, to strengthen the English defense against the Marathas who threatened Bengal from central India during the 1770s. However, while Hastings, who had great respect for Indian traditions, had urged caution in exercising British intervention in the domestic affairs of the friendly Indian states, Wellesley‟s main aim was the building of a paramount British empire in India.

Provisions of the Subsidiary Alliance

1. The Indian state would have a British Resident or a Political Agent in its capital. This Resident would command a strong Subsidiary force comprising British and Indian troops stationed in the capital. The expenses of the Resident and his force would be borne by the revenues of the concerned state. 2. The Indian king / prince could not take any major foreign affairs or military decision without the approval of the Resident. 3. The Resident, his officials and the Subsidiary force were to be held almost immune to local laws. No action against any of their personnel could be initiated without the permission of the Resident. 4. The Indian king / prince would not employ foreigners, except the British, without the consent of the Resident.

25 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

The consequences of this treaty system were grave for the Indian states. They lost their sovereignty and the real power in their capital shifted to the British residency. Their armies were disbanded and they began to maintain troops generally for ceremonial and internal policing duties only. The Subsidiary force consumed large sums of money and its expenses tended to grow over time. The „protection‟ offered by the British made most of the Indian princes careless in governance. Most of them neglected the welfare of their subjects and, actively encouraged by the British, took to a life of ease and debauchery. Much of their time was spent socializing with the English, traveling abroad under British surveillance, looking after large harems which included European women and acquiring the latest goodies from Britain, Europe and America. Some of the Indian states declined due to these developments and this gave the British the excuse to annex them in the future, as was done during the tenure of Lord Dalhousie (1848-56). Dalhousie used the „Doctrine of Lapse‟ and the charge of maladministration to annex some Indian states like Awadh (1856), Jhansi and Nagpur (1854) and Satara (1848). However, the Great Revolt of 1857 was caused partly by the annexation of Awadh which was difficult for Dalhousie to justify. Following this widespread rebellion, the fear of a mass upheaval brought the policy of outright annexation to an end in 1857.

Conclusion

The Mughal Empire gave way to the rise of various regional powers in 18th century India. In the beginning the Company was also like a regional power based in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. But the political, economic and institutional system it represented was very different from the monarchical systems of the Indian regional powers. This difference was understood and its implications were appreciated by very few Indians like Tipu Sultan. From the late 18th century onwards the Company seized the political initiative in India and embarked on a conquest of South Asia. In this process it defeated almost all the Indian regional states because of the dynamics of expansion studied above. Although the Company was only a trading representative of Britain, it proved politically and militarily superior to almost all its competitors in India. Nonetheless, the defeat of the regional Indian states at the hands of the Company should not lead us to conclude that these states did not achieve anything. The works of Satish Chandra, Muzaffar Alam and Christopher Bayly, for example, speak against a generalized picture of regional stagnation and decline in the 18th century. Randolph Cooper‟s recent research on the second Anglo-Maratha war (1803-05) describes the military modernization achieved by the Shindes of Gwalior in glowing terms. The hard fought battles of Assaye and Laswari (1803) were a testimony to this modernization. It is also true that many regions, including Mysore and Kerala in the far south, recorded various degrees of prosperity and social change under their Indian rulers. Hence the growth of Indian history writing since the 1960s tells us a new story of the 18th century. The well known historical narrative highlighting only the chaos, stagnation and decline in the 18th century has thus been corrected to some extent. The regional Indian states of that century were strong enough to destroy the Mughal empire but none of them was capable of replacing it because of the reasons mentioned in this lecture. The „modernization‟ attempted by some of them retained their characteristic weaknesses. Their military strength could not hide their political disunity and court intrigues and their adoption of European military methods was combined with crucial institutional drawbacks. In the ultimate analysis, these 26 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

powers were generally led by an inward looking, tribute collecting and short-sighted feudal elite and therefore fell to the advancing Company one by one. In contrast the English were led by resolute men of vision who were inspired by notions of empire and civilization.

2.2.2: Dynamic of colonial expansion – II: expansion and consolidation of colonial rule in Bengal, Mysore, Western India, Awadh and the Punjab

Introduction

The British colonial expansion in India began in the middle of the 18th century and went on till the annexation of Awadh in 1856. During these hundred years both the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule took place in India together. The previous lesson of this unit examined the general features of colonial expansion in India. These features were common to most of the cases of British conquest in India with regional variations. The case of Awadh is perhaps different. By 1856 the revenue rich kingdom of Awadh was surrounded by British territory and its annexation was only a matter of time. Many other states like Hyderabad survived because they had completely surrendered their sovereignty to the British. Further, the Revolt of 1857 which followed the annexation of Awadh discredited the policy of outright annexation favoured by Lord Dalhousie. After 1857 the policy of treating and promoting the Indian princes as loyal friends of the British and as natural leaders of their people was followed by the British Raj. Hence the hundreds of small and large princely states, including Kashmir and Hyderabad, which survived till Indian independence and partition owed a lot to the rebels of 1857.

Bengal

The foundations of an independent Bengal were laid by Murshid Quli Khan, the last Mughal subedar of the province. Murshid Quli Khan, and his eventual successor Alivardi Khan, reorganized the administration of Bengal on the lines of independent dynastic rule. Their policies were mainly designed to augment state revenue and led to the growth of a strong group of large zamindars, merchants and financiers. The house of the Jagat Seths who were influential financiers rose to prominence and great influence during this period. Thus, from the 1730s onwards, these new rich and powerful men began to play an important role in the politics of Bengal at the expense of the declining feudal nobility. The death of Alivardi Khan in 1756 led to a conflict of succession within the Bengal court. Alivardi, who had no son, had nominated Siraj-ud-daulah, his grandson, as the successor. This was challenged by other claimants to the throne like Ghasiti Begum the aunt of Siraj, and Shaukat Jang who was his cousin and the faujdar of Purnea. These claimants were backed by powerful zamindars, merchant-financiers and ambitious court officials and commanders who began to conspire against Siraj-ud-daulah. They also received help from the Company which was unhappy with Siraj becoming the Nawab in 1756. Although the conflict between the Company and the Nawabs of Bengal had a history by then, matters were precipitated by the Company

27 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

which raised fortifications around Calcutta without the Nawab‟s permission. The Company also had a well known history of misusing its trade privileges. This had led to its conflict with Alivardi Khan in the past as well. Company officials often used these privileges for their private trade which otherwise attracted duties. Moreover, the Company gave refuge to Krishna Das, son of Raj Ballabh, who retired to Calcutta with a large treasure without the Nawab‟s consent. The dominant group in the court comprising the Jagat Seth, Amichand, Raj Ballabh, Rai Durlabh and Mir Jafar opposed the young and inexperienced Nawab and, as the turn of events soon proved, meticulously planned his downfall.

To enforce his authority Siraj-ud-daulah drove out the English from Calcutta in 1756 after they disobeyed his orders to dismantle their fortifications. Defeated by the Nawab‟s army, the English fled to Fulta, an island near the mouth of the Hooghly. Siraj-ud-daulah probably thought that his business with the Company was finished and hence did not pursue them. While the Nawab seemed to prematurely celebrate his success, the English regrouped under Robert Clive who soon arrived from Madras with reinforcements. Upon Clive‟s assumption of command events moved rapidly in the direction of Plassey where the Company defeated the army of Siraj-ud-daulah in June, 1757. The result of the Battle of Plassey (1757) had been decided well in advance and the battle itself was not a great triumph of English arms. After the battle Mir Jafar, according to plan, was proclaimed the Nawab and the Company became the effective king maker in Bengal. Almost immediately the loot of Bengal began. Clive and his followers extracted an enormous tribute from Mir Jafar who began by paying them an equivalent of Rs. 1, 750, 000 in presents and compensation. Jafar‟s unfortunate reign proved shortlived. He could not pay his army which rose in rebellion and this forced the Company to depose him. Jafar was soon replaced by his son in law Mir Qasim who also began his reign by paying hefty sums to the British. To secure his nawabship he also gave away the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong to the Company.

Value addition: common misconceptions Mir Jafar was the only traitor in Bengal In fact among those who conspired against the young assertive Nawab of Bengal in 1756-57 were many prominent Hindu merchants and bankers such as Amichand, Rai Durlabh, Mahtab Rai, Swarup Chand, Raja Janki Ram, Raja Ramnarain, Raja Manik Chand and the brothers Jagat Seths. Source: Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. 2010. From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India. Orient Blackswan.

But compared with Jafar, Mir Qasim was made of stronger material and he began to gradually distance himself from the Company. He shifted the capital from Murshidabad to Mungher in Bihar in a bid to escape the influence of the Company‟s officials. He also began to staff the bureaucracy with his chosen men besides modernizing the army. Despite these measures and his stand in favour of the Indian merchants who complained against the Company‟s malpractices, Qasim‟s rule did not last long. While his enemies, like Ram Narayan, the Deputy Governor of Bihar, conspired with the British against him, Qasim forged an alliance with the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-daulah the Nawab of Awadh. But his hope of driving out the Company from Bengal was dashed when this Indian 28 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

coalition was defeated by a highly motivated and professional Company army at the famous Battle of Buxar in 1764. Following this battle the ailing Mir Jafar was made the Nawab once again but died soon thereafter to be replaced by his minor son, a British puppet.

In 1765 Clive came back to Bengal as the Governor and completed its formal conquest. He signed an agreement with the beleaguered and compliant Emperor Shah Alam who had been a virtual prisoner of Shuja-ud-daulah since 1761 – the year in which Shuja played a conspicuous role in the Maratha defeat at Panipat. Shah Alam received Allahabad in return for a Mughal farman which made the Company the diwan of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Thus the Company gained absolute control over the revenues of India‟s richest province. These revenues, after a period of intense plunder and financial instability, were later reorganized under the Permanent Settlement system introduced by Lord Cornwallis and played an important role in the conquest of other parts of India.

Mysore

British expansion in Mysore must be understood in the context of three British imperatives. First, the Company wanted to protect its Malabar trade. Second, like Bombay, the Company was worried about the security of Madras and third, the Company was unhappy with the growing relations between Mysore and the French. The rulers of Mysore, Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, were brilliant generals who fought four wars against the Company before Mysore was finally defeated by the British in 1799. Throughout the Mysore Wars the Marathas, the nawab of Carnatic and the Nizam of Hyderabad sided with the British at various stages. During the First Mysore War (1767-1769) Haider skillfully managed to win over the Nizam and the Marathas. He followed up this diplomatic success by inflicting a series of defeats on the British. In 1769 he was dictating terms to them at the gates of Madras. Faced with the prospect of annihilation the Madras Council sued for peace and a treaty of mutual military assistance was signed with Haider Ali who wanted English support against the unreliable Marathas and the Nizam. On their part the English acceded to this treaty under pressure and to buy time. Hence, when the Marathas attacked Mysore in 1771 they did nothing to help Haider Ali.

The Second Mysore War (1776-1784) began when the Company captured Mahe, a French commercial settlement under Mysore‟s jurisdiction. During this war the British won over the Nizam and the Marathas and pushed Haider on the defensive. After suffering a defeat at Porto Novo in 1781, Haider Ali died in 1782 but his son Tipu Sultan continued the war which ended with the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784. The Third Mysore War broke out when Tipu attacked Travancore, a British ally in 1790. This time the British were led by Lord Cornwallis, a veteran of the American Wars, who came to India as the Governor-General in 1786. Cornwallis successfully isolated Tipu Sultan and the English defeated him at various places before the war came to an end with the Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792. By this treaty half of Tipu‟s kingdom passed into British hands and his sons were taken to Calcutta as hostages. Now it was only a matter of time before he was finally defeated. That task was completed by Lord Richard Wellesley who came to India in 1798 as a Governor General committed to extinguishing the Indian states wiping out what remained of the French

29 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

influence in India. Hence Wellesley offered Tipu a choice between the Subsidiary Alliance and annihilation.

A large British force backed by the Nizam and Maratha mercenaries invaded Mysore in 1798 under the leadership of Richard Wellesley‟s younger brother Arthur Wellesley. Against these overwhelming odds Tipu adroitly retreated to the fortified capital Seringapatam on the banks of the river Kaveri. Ultimately the river island town of Seringapatam fell in 1799 after a long and bitterly contested siege which demonstrated the military capabilities of Tipu Sultan. Tipu died fighting at the place where the fortress wall had been breached. Today the place is marked by a memorial and attracts hundreds of tourists and history students every day. Tipu‟s death was followed by a savage plunder of Seringapatam and Wellesley could restore discipline with great difficulty. The Nizam was given a portion of Mysore as payment for his services and the Wodeyar Raja was restored to the throne as a subsidiary. The greater part of Karnataka was annexed by the British and became part of the Madras Presidency. Its land revenue was later organized according to the Ryotwari Settlement designed by Governor Thomas Munro.

30 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.2.2.1: Tipu Sultan Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tipu_Sultan_BL.jpg

31 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.2.2.2: Vellore fort Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Vellorefort.jpg

The Marathas

Since the cause and consequence of the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775-1782) have been mentioned in the previous lesson we will focus attention on the Second and Third Maratha Wars here. While the British were busy subjugating Tipu Sultan, the internal differences among the Marathas reached a flashpoint with the occupation of Pune by Jaswant Rao Holkar (see the previous lesson for details) following the death of Nana Fadnavis. Despite all his faults Fadnavis had been successful during his career in maintaining a delicate balance between the powerful Maratha sardars like the Shinde and Holkar and the Brahmin Peshwa who was the symbolic head of the Maratha dominions. Following Holkar‟s capture of Poona, Peshwa Baji Rao II fled to Basein and, to the great joy of the Wellesley brothers, signed the Subsidiary Alliance treaty in 1802. Following this, the English reinstalled the Peshwa in Pune and issued an ultimatum to the Maratha sardars opposing him. The Company‟s campaign (1803-05) was well planned and its main aim was to defeat and subjugate Shinde whose power extended from Delhi to the Deccan and his junior ally the Bhonsale of Nagpur. The

32 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Deccan campaign was led by Arthur Wellesley who gradually captured all the important Shinde strongholds like Ahmadnagar and Gawilgarh and defeated the Marathas in the decisive battle of Assaye near Ajanta (1803). In the north a large army was fielded under General Lake. This army moved up from Aligarh and defeated the Shinde army first at the battle of Delhi which was fought on the grassland of Patparganj and later at Laswari near Agra (1803). The Maratha defeat in this war eliminated the influence which Gwalior had exercised till then on Delhi and opened the way for English expansion into north and north- west India.

Figure 2.2.2.3: Nana Phadnavis Source: http://www.kamat.com/database/pictures/5923.htm

Compared with the Second Anglo-Maratha War the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817-19) was a minor affair. The war began when the Peshwa, who grew resentful of British influence, violated the Subsidiary Alliance treaty and rallied some sardars to the cause of Maratha autonomy. This war ended in a complete rout of the so-called Maratha Confederacy. The Peshwa was pensioned off to Bithur near Kanpur while most of the Maratha territories became part of the Bombay Presidency. The Bhonsale dominions north of the Narmada were also annexed by the British. These events brought down the curtains on the once formidable Marathas whose rise can be dated to the period of Shivaji in the 17th century.

33 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.2.2.4: Battle of Assaye Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Assaye2.jpg

Sindh

Sindh was made part of the British Empire both for commercial and geo-strategic reasons. Compared with the cases of annexation observed above, the conquest of Sindh must be seen in the context of the disastrous First Afghan War (1838-42) caused by the Russophobic „forward‟ policies of Lord Auckland. These policies emerged as a response to the imperialist expansion of Tsarist Russia towards central Asia which gave rise to fears of a Russian, or a Russian supported, invasion of the north western part of India. The fear of Russia remained strong among an influential section of British statesmen, scholars and rulers in India throughout the 19th century. The annexation of Sindh should also be examined in relation to the perspectives on conquest present among men like General Sir Charles Napier. During 34 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

the 1830s the fear of a Russian invasion of India from the North-West with Iranian assistance was peaking and the British were trying their best to secure the approaches to Afghanistan. To make matters worse, the Iranians, with Russian aid, were in fact laying siege to the western Afghan city of Herat close to the Iran-Aghan border. Such events fired the imagination of the British during a period when the „great game‟ between them and the Russians was played out.

By 1838 officers of the Bombay Marine had surveyed the coast of Sindh and the Indus river for commercial and strategic reasons and the Company had established a Residency in Sindh to encourage and tap the trade on the river. In 1839 the English annexed Karachi, the principal port of Sindh, and thus acquired the bridgehead for the subjugation and conquest of the entire region which was widely perceived as the frontline of defense against invasions from the north. The capture of Karachi was accomplished with remarkable ease and paved the way for the eventual annexation of the entire province. Treaties were imposed on the several Talpur Ameers of Sindh and all sorts of concessions were extracted from them in the name of „free trade‟, „relaxation of duties and tolls‟ and „abolition of oppressive laws‟. In 1838 the ill fated Army of the Indus had marched through Sindh on its way to the Bolan Pass and Kabul and its expenses were forced upon the Ameers on the pretext of imaginary arrears they owed to Shah Shuja of Afghanistan. The Ameers protested with reference to documents signed by Shuja in 1835 giving them control of Sindh, Shikarpur and their dependencies. These protests were brushed aside by the English who were determined to make Sindh pay for their Afghan adventure. Indeed the cooperative Ameers were often accused of treachery by the British who remained ever dissatisfied with their exactions in Sindh. The British not only dealt separately with different Ameers but could easily „mediate‟ between them. Hence, a few years before its conquest, Sindh was reduced to a subsidiary client state by British policy.

In 1842 the Afghans rose against the British and drove them out of Kabul towards the snow bound passes. The British disaster which followed can be gauged from the fact that only one man from an army of 16,000 survived the Afghan counter attack and reached Jalalabad! In February 1842 Lord Ellenborough replaced Auckland as the Governor General of India. Under his leadership the winter defeat was avenged by an army of retribution which marched upon Kabul, burnt its bazaar and looted the city before marching back to India. The events of 1842 seemed to have strengthened the British resolve to annex Sindh and secure their northern frontier once and for all. In September 1842 Sir Charles Napier, a sixty year old veteran of the Peninsular War (wars fought against Napoleon in Spain and Portugal), was appointed commander of all British troops in Sindh. Napier was a tough soldier respected by his troops and “with his fantasies and his misconceptions, a sublime conviction that he was always in the right, and determination to make a name for himself, he found himself in Sindh.” (W. F. F. Napier, The History of General Sir Charles Napier’s Conquest of Scinde, (with an introduction by Hamida Khuhro, OUP, 2001 [first published 1857], p. xiii.) Napier believed in his own civilizing mission in the East and had contempt for the Ameers and local customs in general. Soon after landing in Sindh from Bombay he began to make impossible demands upon the Ameers and tested their patience beyond reasonable limits. His objectives become clear from the entries in his diary: “How is all this to end? We have no right to seize Scinde, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous and 35 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

human piece of rascality it will be.”(The History of General Sir Charles Napier’s Conquest of Scinde).

Napier‟s bullying ultimately provoked the Hyderabad Ameers into a sort of united action against the British. Realizing that the moment of reckoning had come, and that Napier was unwilling to listen to the advice given by James Outram the Resident, the Ameers gathered their troops in Hyderabad, the administrative capital of Sindh. On 14 February 1843, the Ameers‟ troops “maddened by the continued provocation of the British” attacked the British Residency in Hyderabad (not to be confused with Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam State in the Deccan). This was excuse enough for Napier who defeated the Hyderabad forces on 17 February at Miani and those of Mir Sher Mohammad of Mirpur at Dubbo on 26 March. The news of the conquest made Lord Ellenborough happy despite the fact that he had sent Napier to Sindh with the purpose of keeping the Ameers in a position of subordination to the British. Napier was made the Governor of Sindh and administered it with a free hand and full support from Calcutta till 1847. A hundred years later Sindh became a province of Pakistan.

Figure 2.2.2.5: Sir Charles Napier Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Charles_James_Napier.jpg

Awadh

The region of north India between Rohilkhand and Bihar with its centre at Lucknow is called Awadh. The rivers Ganga, Jamuna, Son and Ghagra irrigate its fertile plains which yielded a substantial revenue in the 18th century. Banaras, Allahbad, Ghazipur, Jaunpur and Faizabad were the other important towns of the region. An autonomous Awadh was founded by enterprising Shia nobles like Saadat Khan and his son in law and successor Safdar Jang in 36 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

the first half of the 18th century. Till the beginning of the 19th century Awadh was seen by the British as a buffer state between the Bengal Presidency and the rest of north India dominated by the Marathas and Sikhs. The undermining of Awadh began with the Treaty of Allahabad signed by Shuja-ud-daulah and the British after the former‟s defeat at the Battle of Buxar (1764). According to this treaty Kora and Allahbad were ceded to the Mughal Emperor for his upkeep and a war indemnity of Rs. 50,00,000 was imposed on Shuja. After signing this treaty Shuja, who was aware of the history of the Company‟s conquests in India, began to seriously modernize his army in an effort to check further English advance into his territory and assert his authority. However, the Company had its eyes on the revenues of Awadh and had other plans. Another treaty was signed between Awadh and the Company, led by Warren Hastings at the time, in 1773 according to which the Nawab agreed to pay a monthy tribute of Rs. 2,10,000 for each brigade of Company troops present in Allahabad or Awadh proper. The Company‟s strategy during this period was to fleece the isolated Nawab and drive Awadh into chronic indebtedness. This was a prelude to the full fledged Subsidiary Alliance treaty system alluded to in the previous lesson.

A serious erosion of Awadh‟s independence started during the reign of Asaf-ud-daulah (1775-97) who displaced many older nobles and promoted his supporters like Murtaza Khan who facilitated a deeper penetration of Awadh by the Company. During this period Awadh lost control over its external affairs to the Company Resident at the court. A larger subsidy was also fixed for maintaining the English forces stationed in Awadh. Due to these developments, and the fact that the Nawab‟s army had been kept in arrears of pay for a long time, Awadh was seething in discontent by the time Asaf-ud-daulah died in 1797. The English were quick to seize the moment and deposed his chosen successor Wazir Ali in favour of Saadat Ali. A formal treaty followed in 1798 which increased the annual subsidy to Rs. 76 lakhs. During Lord Wellesley‟s Governor Generalship Rohilkhand, Gorakhpur and the Doab, with a gross revenue of 1 crore and 35 lakhs, were annexed by the Company. These annexations made the Company the supreme power in the region and reduced Awadh to the status of a nominally independent state. From the beginning of the 19th century the Company Resident became the indirect ruler of Awadh. The tribute paid by the Nawabs continued to flow into the coffers of the Company till Wajid Ali Shah was deposed and exiled by Lord Dalhousie in 1856 and Awadh was formally annexed. The annexation of Awadh was deeply resented by its people and the high caste Awadhi sepoys of the Bengal Army. The result of all this was the Revolt of 1857 which, among other things, led to the abolition of the Company‟s rule in India in 1858.

Punjab

The Sikhs began to gain political independence from Mughal rule from the days of Guru Gobind Singh, the founder of the Khalsa during the last quarter of the 17th century. During the 18th century the increasing political and military disorder in Punjab, following the weakening of Mughal control, gave the various Sikh misls the opportunity to expand and consolidate their power further. The word misl has Arabic roots and means being alike. Misls were the egalitarian military-administrative Sikh units, based on the jathas led by jathedars, which arose as a consequence of the guerilla war waged against the Mughals and Afghans by the Sikhs in the Punjab during the 18th century. The Sikh brotherhood was divided into a 37 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

total of twelve misls, led and dominated by certain powerful Sikh families, which congregated at Harmandir Saheb in Amritsar twice a year for a Sarbat Khalsa on Deepavali and Holi. Taken together they comprised the Dal Khalsa, i.e., the Sikh Army which contained several thousands of committed and well trained Sikh soldiers. Records of each misl were carefully maintained at the Akal Takht and individual troopers had the freedom to leave and join misls of their choice. This was an important reason why the misls retained their social cohesion and egalitarian character because excessive domination by a leader could easily lead to legally sanctioned desertion.

While the Sikh military organization gained valuable operational mobility due to the misl sytem, in course of time these misls came to dominate designated areas of the Punjab where they built forts and collected taxes, at least theoretically, upon the authority granted to them by the Sarbat Khalsa – the general assembly of the Sikhs. During periods of invasions from the north-west mounted by the Afghans the misls often undertook joint military actions in defence of the Sikh faith but most of the time they represented a decentralized form of Sikh power in the Punjab. Please note, the Sikh misls should not be confused with the clan system of the Marathas which was neither as egalitarian nor governed by a general assembly like the Sarbat Khalsa as the misls were.

After Ahmad Shah Abdali‟s death the power of the Durrani kingdom he had founded dwindled rapidly under inferior successors. It soon became clear that the Afghans could periodically raid but never establish a lasting rule over the Punjab. Hence the post-Abdali interventions, like the invasions led by Zaman Shah in 1795, 1796 and 1798, were regional affairs which actually helped Ranjit Singh consolidate his power. It is well known that the Maratha advance into north-west India had been checked by the Afghans earlier at Panipat in 1761. After 1761 the Marathas in the north were led by Mahdav Rao Shinde (also called Mahadji) who concentrated his attention on Delhi, Agra and the Ganga-Jamuna doab. These momentous events created the conditions in which a powerful, though short lived, Sikh state based in Punjab arose.

38 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Figure 2.2.2.6: Maharaja Ranjit Singh Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ranjitsingh.gif

The architect of this state, with its capital in Lahore, was Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780- 1839), the extraordinarily gifted son of the Sukerchakia misl chief Mahan Singh. During Ranjit Singh‟s reign the Sikhs were temporarily united into a state which ruled and influenced a large part of the sub-continent stretching from Kashmir in the north to Sindh in the south and Afghanistan in the north-west to present day Haryana in the east. Though Ranjit Singh was twelve when his father died, by 1820 he was widely recognized and accepted as the ruler of a vast Sikh kingdom which included the whole of Punjab from the Sutlej to Indus, Kashmir and Multan. Further, he was a farsighted diplomat who fully understood the implications of the growing power of the Company in north India. He also knew that the European mercenaries could not be trusted during crises involving the Company. Therefore the mercenaries employed in his army never achieved the prominence which the mercenaries employed by the Marathas did. During his lifetime the English had defeated the Marathas, who had regrouped under the Shindes of Gwalior to control Delhi and Agra, and extended their empire to the frontiers of the Punjab after the debacle of 1761.

39 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Value addition: did you know? Maharaja Ranjit Singh Ranjit Singh founded the Sikh Kingdom and became the Maharaja despite monarchy not being sanctioned by the Sikh religion. The Sikh Misls were guided by the Sarbat Khalsa – the general assembly of the Sikhs. That monarchy remained an aberration to the Sikhs was proved by the swift collapse of the kingdom set up by Ranjit Singh soon after his death in 1739. Ten years after his death his son and descendant Dalip Singh formally handed over the Sikh kingdom to the British with his throne and the Kohinoor diamond which had once been worn by his illustrious father. Source: Singh, K. 1999. A History of the Sikhs. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Also see http://thesikhencyclopedia.com/

Upon the defeat of the Marathas the Company and the Sikh state became immediate neighbors. Their relations at the time were defined by the Treaty of Amritsar (1809) according to which Ranjit Singh gave up his claim over the cis-Sutlej Sikh states like Ludhiana, Ambala and Patiala. By cis-Sutlej is meant the territories on the left bank of the Sutlej river i.e the British side. In contrast trans-Sutlej would mean on the other side of the Sutlej i.e. the Sikh side. The treaty thus made the river Sutlej the boundary between the Sikhs and the English. The Treaty of Amritsar was honoured by both parties till Ranjit Singh died in 1839. The Maharaja‟s demise was followed by a conflict of succession at the Lahore durbar and, as a consequence, very soon the stability of Punjab was seriously compromised. In any case monarchy had never been sanctioned by the Sikh faith and thus could not strike deep roots among the Sikhs. Fearing that a collapse of the Sikh state would endanger their Indian possessions in north India, the English began to intervene in the internal affairs of the Sikhs along lines described earlier in this lesson. The consequence was the First Anglo- Sikh War (1845-46) which ended with the humiliating Treaty of Lahore in March, 1846.

According to this treaty the Jalandhar doab was annexed by the British and Jammu and Kashmir was sold to Raja Gulab Singh for five million rupees. Gulab Singh and his Dogra successors would rule that Muslim majority province, uninterrupted, with British support till the arrival of Indian independence and partition in 1947. The Sikh army was reduced to 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. By another treaty signed in December, 1846 the English Resident in Lahore acquired greater powers and the English troops stationed in the Punjab were paid for by the Lahore government. The English victory and capture of Lahore not only dealt the Sikh monarchy a mortal blow but reduced Punjab to the status of a British dependency. From 1846 the Lahore Darbar came under the „protection‟ of the English. The opportunity to annex the whole of Punjab was given to Lord Dalhousie by the Diwan of Multan who rose in revolt against Lahore in 1848. This revolt spread rapidly throughout Punjab with the tacit approval of the Lahore Durbar which saw in it an opportunity to get rid of British influence. Several sections, including groups of soldiers retrenched after the defeat of the Sikhs in 1846, joined the rising popular movement against the British. The British, for their part, campaigned vigorously against the revolt in 1849 and decisively defeated the Sikhs in the Second Anglo-Sikh War. To avoid such rebellions in future the whole of Punjab was annexed by the British and finally became a province of British India. The annexation of

40 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Sindh and Punjab should also be viewed in the context of general British expansion in other parts of Asia like China during the 1840s. By the mid 19th century Britain had emerged as the first modern industrial capitalist country and its steam powered industries needed markets.

41 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.1 Summary

 The English East India Company was founded by a royal charter dated 31 December 1600. It was a joint stock company of London merchants who took the decision to intervene in the Euro-Asian trade that had been initiated by the Portuguese and subsequently expanded by the Dutch.

 Over the course of a century, the Company established trading posts in western and eastern India as well as in the Coromandel.

 The Company servants engaged in private trade between the various ports of the Indian Ocean. This is often referred to as country trade.

 The emergence of the English East India Company and its policies are generally understood to have been the expression of mercantilist ideology.

 The term „mercantilism‟ refers to a corpus of economic theories espoused by states in early modern Europe that aimed at enhancing bullion reserves through the channels of foreign trade.

 The Company steadily secured its position in Bengal, which became its principal base of operations. It was in the city of Calcutta that the origins of the future Company Raj were laid down.

 The first round of confrontation came in 1757 when the Nawab of Bengal Sirajuddaulah resisted the demands of the Company and attacked Calcutta. This proved to be a crucial turning point as it directly affected the private trade interests of the Company servants. The victory at Plassey (23 June 1757) although won by treachery firmly inducted the Company into the political structure of Bengal. From here the road to expansion was only a matter of time.

42 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.2.1 Summary

 The decline and disintegration of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century led to the rise of several regional powers in India. Some of these were successor states of the Mughal empire and some were created by rebels like the Marathas and Sikhs.

 Although these states emerged during the early modern period of Indian history almost all of them were monarchies which were more feudal than early modern in orientation. With the possible exception of Mysore, none of them evolved a system capable of resisting the advancing English East India Company.

 Most of these states were similar in terms of their leadership and state organization. Many of them inherited the late Mughal military and administrative systems which were clearly pre-modern.

 These regional polities spent a considerable amount of their resources in raising and maintaining armies, often trained by European mercenaries, and waging war among themselves. Some historians call this phenomenon „military fiscalism‟ although „feudalism‟ is an equally good descriptive term for these states.

 The greater involvement of European mercenaries in the internal affairs of these states and their internecine conflicts created the grounds for the rise of European power in India.

 Ultimately the shortsightedness of the Indian elites ruling these states, insufficient modernization of the Indian state and military apparatus, inherent institutional weaknesses, Indian political disunity and economic weaknesses paved the way for the rise of British power in India.

 In the rise of British power in India the policies of two Governor Generals played a crucial role. The first was Lord Richard Wellesley the architect of the openly imperialist Subsidiary Alliance treaty system. The second was Lord Dalhousie who annexed Awadh on grounds of maladministration and used the infamous „doctrine of lapse‟ to annex smaller Indian kingdoms.

 Finally British annexations in India created conditions of widespread social and political unrest. Hence the Great Revolt of 1857 was most probably a culmination of a process of conquest, consolidation and displacement of some elites set in motion by the Company towards the end of the 18th century.

43 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.2.2 Summary

 The expansion and consolidation of British colonial power in the Indian sub-continent began in the mid 18th century and went on till 1856 when Awadh was annexed by Lord Dalhousie.

 The first part of India which fell to the British was Bengal. Bengal gave the Company crucial advantages in its wars against the Indian powers were concerned. One, it was probably the richest province of India. Two, it gave the Company access to the vast military labour market of north India which bordered on Bengal. Three, the revenues of Bengal played an important role in addressing the payments problem of the Company.

 After Bengal the Indian states of the period were defeated one by one. From the late 18th century Mysore, the Deccan and Western India and finally Punjab and Sindh came into the Company‟s hands.

 Although Mysore, the Marathas and the Sikhs fought hard against the British to retain their independence the Company triumphed over them with the aid of superior diplomacy and the resources of Bengal.

 The Marathas and Sikhs also proved hopelessly divided against themselves. At no stage did the Indian powers combine effectively against the Company.

 On the whole Company successes can be attributed to a combination of the following: (a) superior leadership (b) superior finance (c) unity in command (d) a well paid and disciplined army (e) lack of unity among and within the Indian powers (f) friendly collaborating sections of the Indian elite and finally (g) the weaknesses of the military modernization programmes initiated by the feudal Indian states.

44 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.1: Exercises

Essay questions

1) Identify the principal stages in the development of the English east India Company‟s power in Bengal between 1717 and 1765.

2) How did English private trade affect the politics of the English East India Company in the build up to Plassey?

3) What were the consequences of early Company rule on the Bengal economy?

Objective questions

Question Number Type of question LOD

1 Short answer 1

Question What is Mercantilism?

Correct Answer / Mercantilism is an economic theory that believed in Option(s) augmenting a state‟s bullion resources, in developing colonies and improving prospects for foreign trade. Advocates of mercantilism believed that a country‟s wealth was determined by a favourable balance of trade, i.e. when its exports exceeded its imports.

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

2 Short answer 1

45 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question What did the English East India Company demand from the Indian rulers in the early 18th century?

Correct Answer / The English East India Company demanded rights of duty free Option(s) trade, of fortifications and maintaining its own judicial system in the settlements they occupied.

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

3 Short answer 1

Question What do you understand by country trade?

Correct Answer / Country trade refers to the trade between the various ports in Option(s) the Indian Ocean carried on by the servants of the European East India Companies in their private capacity.

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

46 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD

4 Multiple choice question 2

Question Foundation of Calcutta took place in: a) 1650 b) 1680 c) 1690

Correct Answer / c) Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

5 Multiple choice question 2

Question Jagat Seths were: a) Bankers b) Revenue officials c) Scribes

Correct Answer / c) Option(s)

47 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

6 Multiple choice question 2

Question Where would you find Alinagar?

a) Madras

b) Delhi a) c) Calcutta

Correct Answer / c) Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The capture of Calcutta by Nawab Sirajuddaulah in 1756 was followed by the adoption of a new name – Alinagar.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

48 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.2.1: Exercises

Essay questions

1) Why and how did the decline of the Mughal Empire cause the rise of various regional powers in 18th century India?

2) Do you consider „feudalism‟ a concept sufficient to characterize the Indian polities of the 18th century?

3) In what way was the English East India Company different from its Indian and European rivals?

4) Enumerate the causes of the insufficient military modernization initiated by the Indian states in the 18th century?

5) Would you agree with the assertion that the Company represented a system which was totally different from the one represented by the Marathas, Sikhs and the Nizam?

6) Would it be correct to say that the successor states of the Mughals merely replicated the systemic errors of the late Mughal period?

7) How was the Indian states‟ excessive reliance on European mercenaries suicidal in the long run?

8) Would it be right to say that the Subsidiary Alliance Treaty System was a diplomatic masterpiece?

Objective questions

Question Number Type of question LOD

1 True or False 1

Question

The Mughal Empire declined in the 19th century.

49 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The decline of the Mughal empire began during the long reign of Aurangzeb in the late 17th century. The empire was destabilized and financially drained by the rebellions launched by the Marathas in the Deccan and the Sikhs in the Punjab. After Aurangzeb‟s death in 1707, the empire declined rapidly under a succession of incompetent rulers. Beset by court factionalism and a rising tide of rebellions led by dominant peasant groups like the Jats near Agra and Delhi the Mughal empire disintegrated under the impact of the Afghan invasions from the north- west and the Maratha raids from the south in the middle of the 18th century.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

2 True or False 1

Question

During the 18th century the French emerged as the most powerful force in India.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer French influence grew in many parts of India during the first half of the 18th century. However, in a series of wars called the Carnatic wars the English defeated the French. In the latter half of the 18th century the French presence in India was reduced to small enclaves like Pondicherry which survived because the English chose not to extinguish French presence altogether.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

50 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD 3 True or False 1

Question

The resources of Bengal played a minor role in the British conquest of India.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Since Mughal times Bengal was known as one of India‟s richest provinces. The acquisition of its revenues by the English East India Company proved crucial to the outcome of their wars of conquest in India. In addition to money, the establishment of English power in Bengal gave the Company access to the largest military labour market in India situated in the bordering Gangetic plains.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

4 True or False 1

Question

The Marathas did not try to modernize their army during the latter half of the 18th century.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer

51 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

The Marathas, led by the Sindhias of Gwalior, initiated several steps to modernize their infantry and artillery along European lines following the defeat of the Marathas at the Third Battle of Panipat (1761). Many of these measures were quite impressive and helped the Marathas fight hard during the Second Anglo- Maratha War (1803-05). However, the over-dependence of the Marathas on European mercenaries, chiefly French and English, proved unproductive in the long-run.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

5 True or False 1

Question

There was no difference between the European Companies and the Indian states of the 18th century.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Although it is tempting to say that the Company was no different from the Indian powers of the 18th century, saying so would be simplistic. There were significant differences between the Company and the Indian powers of the day. First, the Company was, as such, a joint stock company run from London. Most of its powerful shareholders were rich English merchants. Second, from the 1770s Company affairs were increasingly influenced by the British Parliament. Third, the Company, unlike the majority of its Indian competitors, was primarily a commercial organization. Finally, the affairs of the Company were run by racially white Europeans influenced by European thoughts and practices. This was unique in Indian history.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

52 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

6 True or False 1

Question

Most of the Indian rulers of the 18th century had ties of affection with their subjects.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Indian rulers of the 18th century comprised a tribute collecting feudal elite connected to the masses through a class of zamindar intermediaries. Most of them, barring a few exceptions, did not derive legitimacy for their rule from popular consent and hence could not organize the peasantry against the encroaching Company.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

7 True or False 1

Question

The outcome of the wars between the Company and the Indian states of the 18th century made no immediate difference to the people of India.

53 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Correct Answer / True Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer In general this assertion is true although in areas like Bengal the establishment of Company rule in the 1760s and 70s had a devastating impact on the regional economy. In the long run, however, the establishment of colonial rule changed India in many important ways.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

8 True or false 1

Question

The Company troops were not paid regularly in cash.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer One of the reasons why the Company troops fought well in an era devoid of national loyalties was regular cash salaries and incentives. The second Anglo- Maratha war, for instance, revealed that some of the Sindhia‟s important garrisons had not been paid in months. In contrast, rulers like Tipu Sultan were punctilious in paying their troops and thereby commanded their loyalty till the very end.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

54 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD

9 True or false 1

Question

Arthur Wellesley was the Governor General of India during the Second Anglo Maratha War (1803-05).

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Governor General of India during the Second Anglo Maratha war was Richard Wellesley, the elder brother of Arthur Wellesley.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

10 True or False 1

Question

Tipu Sultan was an unpopular ruler of Mysore.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Of all the Indian rulers of late 18th century India Tipu Sultan was, arguably, the most popular among his subjects. This enabled him to wage a personally led war against the combined forces of the Company and the Nizam in 1798-99. The difficult siege of Seringapatnam (1799) and the manner in which Tipu died clearly shows his popularity. 55 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

11 True or False 1

Question

The largest military labour market in India in the 18th century was situated in Bengal.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The largest military labour market in India was situated in the plains of present Uttar Pradesh and Bihar and comprised the upper caste, Brahman, Rajput and Bhumihar, sections of the peasantry. The bulk of the Bengal Army was formed of these men and not of the Bengalis as the name tends to suggest.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

12 True or False 1

Question

The pindaris were disliked in most parts of India.

56 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Correct Answer / True Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The pindaris were bands of irregular troops loosely attached to almost all armies operating in India during the latter half of the 18th century. They acted as mercenary advance guards, scouts and looters. Often their payments comprised what they could collect systematically from the battlefields. In general, there was no reason why such freebooters would be liked by the people.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

13 True or False 1

Question

In 1756 the Peshwa forged an alliance with the Angres against the British.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer In 1756 Peshwa Nana Saheb (Balaji Baji Rao) signed a treaty with the British against Tulajee Angre, who, like his father Kanhoji Angre, had emerged as a strong independent ruler on the Konkan Coast during the first half of the 18th century.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

57 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD

14 True or False 1

Question

The Nizam assisted the British against Tipu Sultan.

Correct Answer / True Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Nizam of Hyderabad always considered Mysore as a rival power in the Deccan. Disregarding the offer of alliance made by Tipu Sultan, the Nizam actively assisted the British in 1798-99. In fact the artillery and logistic support provided by the Nizam played a crucial role in deciding the issue with Tipu in 1799.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

15 True or False 1

Question

Nana Phadnavis could not unite the Marathas against the British.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The First Anglo Maratha War (1775-82) was caused by the ambition of Raghunath Rao who wanted to become the Peshwa after the death of his brother Nana Saheb in 1761. During this war the Maratha sardars remained united under the leadership of a Regency led by the astute Nana Phadnavis. As a consequence of 58 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

this unity the Marathas defeated the forces of Raghunath Rao and the British near Pune at the Battle of Wadgaon. The war ended with the Treaty of Salbai which restored the status quo between the Marathas and the British.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

16 True or False 1

Question

In the late 17th century the Company had defeated the army of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer In fact it was Aurangzeb who defeated the Company and later pardoned it. This defeat made it quite clear to the Directors of the Company that the Mughal State, even in decline, was too powerful for the Company forces to handle.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

59 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD

17 True or False 1

Question

The Company forces were overconfident and hence fought casually in the battles against the Indian powers.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer In fact the Company forces fought with great desperation because the officials of the Company knew that a major defeat could easily mean the end of Company influence in India during the formative years of British colonialism in India. In contrast the Indian powers generally failed to understand the true character of the Company and often approached the battlefield in a different manner.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

18 True or False 1

Question

Ahmad Shah Abdali defeated the Marathas alone at the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

60 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Abdali was assisted by his allies the Nawab of Awadh and Rohilkhand who disliked the Maratha presence in north India. Thus it was an Indo-Afghan alliance which routed the Marathas at Panipat in 1761.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

19 True or False 1

Question

The European mercenaries employed by the Indian states were professional but their loyalty could not be taken for granted.

Correct Answer / True Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer This is true because most of the French mercenaries in the service of the Marathas had invested a substantial portion of their income in the shares of the East India Company! They also knew that the English controlled the major ports of India. This meant that their return to Europe with the riches gathered in India depended upon English goodwill. Hence when the time came to fight the English almost all of them betrayed their Indian paymasters.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

61 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD

20 True or False 1

Question

Warren Hastings had a low opinion of Indian traditions.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Warren Hastings, in fact, had a high opinion of Indian traditions and learning. He promoted early Orientalism and wanted to rule India in accordance with its extant traditions. Since the main aim of Warren Hastings was the consolidation of British gains in Bengal his policies were not as expansionist as those of later Governor Generals like Wellesley and Dahousie.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

21 True or False 1

Question

The doctrine of lapse was used by William Bentinck to annex Indian states.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Doctrine of Lapse was used by Lord Dalhousie and not William Bentinck.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer 62 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

22 True or False 1

Question

The Subsidiary force proved to be a mounting drain on the resources of the princely states.

Correct Answer / True Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The expenses of the Subsidiary force tended to grow over time and hence ultimately it became a drain on the resources of its host.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

23 True or False 1

Question

The Battle of Wandiwash was fought between the Marathas and the British.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

63 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Battle of Wandiwash (1760) was fought between the English and the French as part of the Third Carnatic War (1758-1763). The French were defeated and driven behind the walls of Pondicherry which also capitulated to the English after some months. The Third Carnatic War ended in a resounding defeat of the French in south India. After this, French presence in India became non-military and the French were forbidden to fortify their settlements in India.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

24 True or False 1

Question

The Company forces were defeated at the Battle of Laswari.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Laswari is a place near Agra where a major battle between the Company forces led by General Lake and a Maratha force of Sindhia took place in 1803 as part of the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-05). By the time this battle occurred the Marathas had been deserted by their European officers. Nonetheless the Battle of Laswari was hard fought and paved the way for the expansion of Company power into north India.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

64 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.2.2: Exercises

Essay questions

9) Critically examine the British conquest of Bengal with reference to the role played in it by the native Bengali elites.

10) Do you agree that Mysore was conquered by the British primarily because of the role played by the Nizam and Marathas during the Second and Third Anglo-Mysore wars?

11) Can it be said that the decentralization of Maratha power between the various Maratha Sardars and the Brahman Peshwa was both a source of Maratha strength and weakness.

12) In Lord Wellesley, General Arthur Wellesley, Sir Charles Napier and Lord Dalhousie the Company had exemplary leaders of men. Discuss with reference to the overall British conquest of India.

13) Why did the Sikhs of Punjab fail to arrest the advance of the Company despite their formidable military prowess?

14) To what extent was „Russophobia‟ responsible for British expansion into Sindh and north-western India during the 19th century?

Objective questions

Question Number Type of question LOD

1 True or False 1

Question

Only the Muslim elites of Bengal helped the British in 1757.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Among those who helped the English against the forces of Siraj-ud-Daulah in 1757 were many prominent Hindu merchants and bankers like Amichand.

65 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

2 True or False 1

Question

Haider Ali was defeated by the Company in 1769.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer In fact, Haider Ali inflicted a series of defeats on the English prior to 1769 and dictated terms to them at the gates of Madras.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

3 True or False 1

Question

The Nizam helped Tipu Sultan in 1798-99.

Correct Answer / False Option(s) 66 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer The Nizam perceived Tipu Sultan as a great threat to his dominion based in Hyderabad and hence helped the British against him.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

4 True or False 1

Question

Lord Cornwallis ordered the annexation of Sindh.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Lord Cornwallis was the Governor General of India between 1786 and 1793 and then briefly again in 1805 whereas Sindh was annexed during the Governor Generalship of Lord Ellenborough (1842-44).

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

67 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Question Number Type of question LOD

5 True or False 1

Question

Nana Phadnavis failed to unite the Marathas during the First Anglo-Maratha War.

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Nana Phadnavis was the most astute statesman produced by the Marathas in the second half of the 18th century. Leading a regency of elders he frustrated the ambitious Raghunath Rao who wanted to usurp the throne of the Peshwas. Nana was successful in uniting the Maratha sardars during the First Anglo Maratha War.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

6 True or False 1

Question

The whole of Punjab was annexed during the times of Lord Bentinck.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer Lord William Bentinck was Governor General of India between 1828 and 1835 whereas the whole of Punjab was annexed after the Second Anglo Sikh War of 1848-49. At that time Lord Dalhousie was the Governor General of India (1848- 1856).

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

68 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Reviewer‟s Comment:

Question Number Type of question LOD

7 True or False 1

Question

The Sikh misls and the Maratha clans were similar.

Correct Answer / False Option(s)

Justification/ Feedback for the correct answer This is a common misconception. The Sikh misls were military-administrative units of the Sikhs based on more or less egalitarian Sikh jathas under the overall command of the Dal Khalsa (The Sikh Army) which in turn was commanded by the Sarbat Khalsa (General Assembly of all Sikhs). In contrast the Maratha clans were powerful family based units like the Bhonsales, Sindhias, Holkars, Nimbalkars, Jadhavs, Gaikwars, Ghatges and Ghorpades etc.

Resource/Hints/Feedback for the wrong answer

Reviewer‟s Comment:

69 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.1 Glossary

Black Town: the segregated Indian area in the port cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras Brokers:originally meant a simple mediator who brought buyers and sellers together and earned a commission on transactions. Over time, the broker became in Mughal India a key figure in the trading economy as he dealt with specific commodities, guaranteed supply of export goods and marketing of imports and even stood guarantee for cash advances made to supply merchants and primary producers. Dadni: a system of cash advances that the English Company used in procuring their annual Textile Investment. It involved a system of cash advances made to merchants who in turn channeled them to the weavers. Under the dadni system, the Company entered into a contractual agreement with local merchants who agreed to supply a specified consignment at a specified time. The Company in turn paid a proportion of the total value of goods in advance known as dadan and the rest on delivery. The risk of default by the producers was underwritten by the merchants. Farman:a royal order bearing the emperor‟s seal Zamindar:holder of revenue collecting rights. There were several categories of zamindar – primary, autonomous and intermediary.

70 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

2.2.1 Glossary

Bargi: An extremely mobile Maratha horseman usually armed with light weapons Jayedad: An assignment of land yielding revenues which were given to European officers serving the Shindes for their upkeep etc Nizam: The Shia ruler of a large state in the Deccan with its capital at Hyderabad Peshwa: Prime minister of the Maratha kingdom Pindaris: Irregular bands of troops acting as scouts, raiders and advance guard attached to almost all early modern armies operating in India Subedar: Literally head of a Subah – province; a provincial governor under the Mughals

2.2.2 Glossary

Faujdar: Area commandant Diwan: Finance/revenue minister or head of finance/revenue department Farman: Royal decree, order, permission

2.1 Further readings

Calkins, Philip. 1970. The Formation of a regionally oriented ruling group in Bengal 1700- 1740. Journal of Asian Studies Vol 29 No 4.

Chaudhury, B. B. 1982. Regional economy 1757-1857- Eastern India”. In Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai eds. Cambridge Economic History of India, 1757-1970. Vl 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chaudhury, Sushil. 1995. From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth century Bengal. Delhi: Manohar.

Mclane, John. 1993. Land and Local Kingship in 18th century Bengal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marshall, P. J. 1987. Bengal: The British Bridgehead, eastern India 1740-1828. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marshall, P. J. 1976. East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the eighteenth century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

71 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Ray, Ratnalekha. 1979. Change in Bengal Agrarian Society, 1760-1850. New Delhi: Manohar.

Ray, Rajat Kanta. 1985-86. Colonial Penetration and Initial Resistance: The Mughal Ruling Class, the English East India Company and the Struggle for Bengal 1756-1800. Indian Historical Review. Vol XII Nos 1-2.

2.2.1 Further readings

Alam, M. 1986. The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707- 1748. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Alavi, S. 1995. The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India, 1770-1830. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bayly, C. A. 1988.Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire: The New Cambridge History of India, II.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chaudhury, S. 1995. From Prosperity to Decline: 18th –Century Bengal. Delhi: Manohar.

Cooper, R. G. S. 2003. The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dalrymple, W. 2002.White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in 18th-Century India. London: Harper Collins.

Gordon, S. 1993. The Marathas, 1600-1818: The New Cambridge History of India, II.4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Colley, L. 2002. Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850. London: Cape.

Ludden, D. 2002. India and South Asia A Short History. Oxford: Oneworld.

Major, A. J. 1996.Return to Empire: Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the Mid- nineteenth Century. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.

Marshall P. J., ed. 2003. The 18th Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution? New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Metcalf, B. D. and T. Metcalf. 2002. A Concise History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

72 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Panikkar, K. M. 1986. The Evolution of British Policy Towards Indian States 1774-1858. Delhi: Mittal Publications.

Peers, M. Douglas. 2006. India under Colonial Rule 1700-1885. Harlow: Pearson.

Mansingh, S. 1998. Historical Dictionary of India. New Delhi: Vision Books.

Singh, K. 1999. A History of the Sikhs. New Delhi. Oxford University Press.

2.2.2 Further readings

Alam, M. 1986. The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707- 1748. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Alavi, S. 1995. The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India, 1770-1830. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Bayly, C. A. 1988.Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire: The New Cambridge History of India, II.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chaudhury, S. 1995. From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth –Century Bengal. Delhi: Manohar.

Cooper, R. G. S. 2003. The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gordon, S. 1993. The Marathas, 1600-1818: The New Cambridge History of India, II.4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Colley, L. 2002. Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850. London: Cape.

Ludden, D. 2002. India and South Asia A Short History. Oxford: Oneworld.

Major, A. J. 1996.Return to Empire: Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the Mid- nineteenth Century. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.

Marshall P. J., ed. 2003 The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution? New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Metcalf, B. D. and T. Metcalf. 2002. A Concise History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Panikkar, K.M. 1986. The Evolution of British Policy Towards Indian States 1774-1858. Delhi: Mittal Publications. 73 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi

Expansion and consolidation of colonial power

Peers, M. Douglas. 2006. India under Colonial Rule 1700-1885. Harlow: Pearson.

Mansingh, S. 1998. Historical Dictionary of India. New Delhi: Vision Books.

Singh, K. 1999. A History of the Sikhs. New Delhi. Oxford University Press.

Stein, Burton. 1989. Thomas Munro. Delhi. Oxford University Press.

74 Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi