WAR with 3HINDE in Thli NORTH. GENERAL L a K E’S CA^:PAIGNING and BATTLE ACCOUNTS 170
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CHAPTER FOUH WAR WITH 3HINDE IN THli NORTH. GENERAL L a K E’S CA^:PAIGNING AND BATTLE ACCOUNTS 170 Strategy of General Lake The Krand strate^ of Lord Wellesley envisaged a simulta neous advance against the combined forces of Shinde and Bhosle from the sooth and frorr. the east, liarlier it has been dis cussed how General Wellesley defeated the Maratha forces in the battles of Asai and Gawilgad. This chapter deals with the war waged by General Lake, the Comn-ander-in-Chief in the north. General Lake was a man of experience and his influence with his soldiers was unbounded, his calmness in danger, self- reliance and power of command were his sterling qualities. He had but one way of dealing with the native armies. He moved straight forward and attacked them. His brain worked better when under fire but his decision taken under calm conditions were not always sound. Although a good field general, his •* plannine was not always based on sound considerations. His bull do^ tenacity which was displayed by him in the siege of Bharatpur cost him over 3000 casualties. A more intelligent general would have changed his tactics after the first failure. He rode hard and foue^ht hard. ’^rt'ith a force at no time exceed ing S,COO men, he, between 29th August, and 1st November, l803 destroyed the thirtyone battalions which the French had trained re d u c e d and disciplined for the service of India;/a strong fortress, captured Agra, and entered as a conquerer the imperial city of Delhi, captured pieces of' cannons, and defeated the enemy in four pitched battles, the last of them, for the result it produced one of the most decisive battles ever fought.”^ 171 "The campaign in Hindustan was contemporaneous with that of the Deccan and it ir.ust, of course, be remembered that, in concluding the Treaty of SurajiAnjangaon, Wellesley was harvesting the fruits not only of his own victories, but thosa of Lake in Northern India. In one sense the campaign in the north was directed lesa against ihinde than those preat French adventurers who had raised a number of battalions and carved out principalities for themselves. De Boigne, Shinde's first military adviser had served 3hinde with great loyalty and devotion and he guardi the Maratha interests bv exercising his influence to maintain peace with the British, when he retired in 1796 he advised Shinde to disband the battalions rather than antagonise the British and risk a war with them. "He was," says Grant Duff, *» "a man of sense and prudence, a decided enemy to French revo lutionary principles."^ He regarded the idea of conquest of India entertained by some Frenchmen as Chimerical. De Boigne was succeeded by Perron. "Though an able comiriander he was altogether a smaller man than his predecessor, and far less Ll attractive in character." a s Shinde was away in the Deccan for a long period, Perron strengthened his position and took over the administration and assumed the role of a reigning sovereign. He received tributes from the Rajput states of Jodhpur and Jaipur. He had the monopoly of salt and custom duties in Hindustan. He coined money and his annual income was estimated at 1,632,000. As a contemporary writer says, 172 Perron exercised an efficient and scarcely disguised aovereif^ntv over a tract of country, perhaps, the fairest in Hindustan, he posses'^ei the important fortress of Agra, imperial Delhi, and the person of the ^reat Koghal, He occupied the richest province of the Doab. rie had established canton ments for twenty thousand men and constructed a very strong fortress at Aliead.” However Shinde himself was not likely to tolerate much longer his ascendancy to power, and Perron was looking for a French purchaser who would buy his Kingdom. Lord Wellesley foresaw at the beeinning of the war that Perron was disinclined to cross swords with the British and was looking for an opportunity to escape to -iurope vd.th his accumulated wealth. Wellesley writes to Lake "I should not be surprised if he were to be found ready to enter into terms with your Excellency, provided he could attain sufficient security for his interests.*' Lord Wellesley's appreciation of the political situation in January 1^03 was that it was improbable that 3hinde would create trouble. However in case he did, ’’our most effectual mode of controlling Scindhia must be irruption into his dominions in Hindostan, from the ceded provinces of Oude; and, in that case, the irxain and most critical effort must be made from the quarter where you are now present, ihe most important operations wil] be directed against Scindiah’s possessions to the destruction of his powers in Hindostan.”^ With this clear objective, .Wellesley informally discussed 173 hia outline plan, defining the likelv threats and the require ment of troops with General Lake who in turn eave hia de tailed ideas about the wav the militclrv task assigned to him could be carried out, not omittine the political moves which should be made to facilitate his task. Lord Wellesley kept the Secret Conmittee of Jirectors informed about the develop ments in the Deccan and in north India from time to time. As Wellesley was aware that Shinde was trying to form a coalition with Bhosle and Holkar, the plans kept this possi bility in mind. On 19th April 1 ^*03, Wellesley reported to the Secret Committee, "Oaulatrao Scindhia (notwithstanding his oriffinal application for the aid of the British Government in restoring order to the y.aratha empire) meditated an accommo dation with ileswant Rao holkar, and a confederacy with that ■» chieftain, and with the Ha.iah of berar, for the purpose of frustrating the success of the arrangements concluded between the British Government, and the Peshwa, without however in- tendinp' to desperate extremities of provoking a contest with 7 the British arms. "This shows that Wellesley did not expect a war even in April 15^03. He was aware that Holkar possessed 40,nno cavalrv, 3^,000 infantry and iSO guns. « coalition with Holkar would strengthen ScinJla’s position. He instructed General Wellesley that "If Holkar should join the confederacy, you will act towards him on the principles of the preceding instructions. It is not desirable to erect Holkar's acciden tal power into an established state of India; his reduction \7k would certainlv be tli^ r.ost advisable policy.’’ Later, Welleslev nad lo eat a niujible pie and acknowledge hollcar as a c h i e f . He defined Take’s Lask as follows: ”1.3t. i’o seize all hl3 (3cindhia*s) possessions between the Oanees and Jmnna (Uoab). 2nd. To take the person of the Moghul, 3hah A l l a m u n de r our protection. 3rd. To form alliances with the Rajpoots, and other in ferior states bevond the Jumna, for the purpose of excluding Scindhiah from the northern districts of Hindustan. k zh . To occupy Bundelkhand and thus 3tr«np;then the frontier of the Province of Benaras against Scindhia or the Raia of Berar. 5th. ihe success of such a plan of operation would exclude the Marathas altof?ether from the northern parts of Hindustan, and would, establish a powerful barrier between our frontiers, and that of Scindiah by the intervention of the Rajpoot and 9 other inferior states strengthened under our protection.” Having thus clearly defined the objectives, toe task was broken down in the, following m ilitary aims: 1st. Iinn.eiiate reduction of the forces under coiULand of M. Perron. 2nd. Capture of fortress'es and passes northwards of the Jumna, which would prevent reinforcements marching from the Deccan to Hindostan. 175 The fo r c e under terror, coi disced of about, *^000 i n f a n t r y and an eoual nun.Der of cavalrv loc^ated at, C o e l . h s s a id e a r lier, Wellesley expected i-.. Perron to quic ininde'3 s e r v ic e and seek asyluir. witn the British. Perron’s force consisted of a larper number of Indian soldiers who were discharged by the company earlier. It was expected that they would be wi31ia|j t o o u i t ihirde's service and re loin the Company’s army if an opportunitv was ofl'ered to theni. sim ilarly, >vellesley appre ciated that a larre nuir.ber of jiiUrOf^ean officers also would walk over to the B r i t i s h side if tueir career was guaranteed; rather than fif^ht aPiainst tne briti.sn a n r.y. i’hus Ferron was not expected to o f f e r a stiff reoijtance. Jispositior of lake's army prior to the commencement of 10 the operations was planned as follows: ■* 1st. i^.ain boiv wa.3 to be located between Coel and wgra. Aftur the destruction of i^erron’s forces, tne iorce was to march on to Jelhi and secure the j-er3on of oi.ah nlan,. I'he next objective was to be n'Ta wr.icn would be secured by a separate aetachrr.ent located at Shtkohabad. 2nd. n detochirent located Hi ^tawi-i- was to secure Gwalior. 3rd. n force locuteJ at nllaiiuuad wus to occupy bundel- k h a n d . The composition of the n.ain bodv was to be. Caval ry--"iritish ' Infantry--Bri ti sh ^ li ’i.t urae:oor;3 7o He -iiiient 27 li.-^ht Jra.-''oon3 Indianin d ic 29 liEht Draeoons 1/2 Hepiment 2/2 hegiment Continued/.