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The Atomic Bomb

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The Atomic Bomb Part II Session 4 “Tyranny of Distance in the Pacific” 1 “Tyranny of Distance in the Pacific” • The tyranny of distance: That is the failure to recognize the natural limits upon human endeavors imposed by geography. – G. Blainey 1968, MacMillian • This session ― how the US overcame geographical limits. • Start with the US Navy’s Plan Orange to combat the Japanese in the Pacific. 2 Navy’s Mid‐War Years [1920s‐1930s] Plan Orange Was Expanded Into Joint WW II Plan • Marine Corps to seize bases in Micronesia. • Evolution of the fast carrier groups. • Navy’s construction battalions, the Seabees. • US submarine service. • Joint/Technical innovation: Long range B‐29s. – Only the US possessed the materials and factories to build this aircraft. Material in one B‐29 equaled an entire squadron of Me‐109s [12 to 16 fighters]. • Joint/Technical innovation: Long range P‐51s. ― Deployment to Iwo Jima of P‐51s with Packard built Merlin engines and external fuel tanks permitting the 2000 mile round trip flight with the B‐29s to Japan. 3 How Does the Tyranny of Distance Fit Into Engineers of Victory? • Amphibious crafts • Fleet/Ship build‐up • Navigation and Communications over long stretches of ocean • Rapid construction during combat • Medical advances • The construction and deployment of the B‐29 and further deployment of the long range P‐51 • The Atomic Bomb 4 Japanese Contradictions • To the Japanese the major item of the WW II was the 1937 push into China. This was the Japanese Army’s echo of the Prussian tradition of holding continental land mass, as the essence of a grand strategy. • Pearl Harbor was to be a short campaign to expel the Allies [US, UK, Dutch and the French] from East Asia. • Japanese Pacific and SW Asia war expansion only lasted a short six months –Dec 1941 to June 1942. • The bulk of their Army was on the Chinese mainland. Similar to most German forces in east vs Russia. • Japanese forces the US encountered were predominantly Naval, spread thin over an outer boundary of islands. 5 Japanese Circumstances • To start: The US is self‐sufficient, Japan is not. • Geography was completely different, there was no concentrated Japanese force near outbound US convoys even in the early phase of the war. – Mid Pacific supplies went to Hawaii and followed protecting US Naval forces west and southwest. – Southwest Pacific supplies went south of Fiji on the way to Australia, beyond range of most Jap subs. • Japanese warrior mentality considered it un‐ warrior like to attack merchantman vs. attacking war ships. • USS Indianapolis • Later in the war the Japanese Army insisted the sub6 force be used to supply isolated/bypassed Army This is an early British Radar Antenna 240 feet 300 feet Receiver Transmitter Chain Home Antennas in Perspective 7 SCR‐270 [1939 design]: Similar to the model That detected the attacking Pearl Harbor planes raid about half an hour before the attack commenced. It was the Army's first operational early warning long‐distance radar and was deployed around the world, but had little operational use. The ‐270 versions were later replaced by newer microwave units after the cavity magnetron was introduced to the US during the Tizard Mission. The only early warning system of the sort to see action was the AN/CPS‐1, which was available in late 1944. 8 President Roosevelt to Congress December 9th 1941 • “…… No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory. ….. • With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph ‐‐ so help us God. ….” 9 Battlefield Midway Prelude VHS clip 10 A –From western China B –From India Burma through SE Asia C –Through Southwest Pacific D –Through the central Pacific Four Allied Counter‐Attack Options for the Route to Japan – Not Necessarily Mutually Exclusive 11 Advantages of Exercising Two Options • Options C and D had mutually beneficial effects. • They tied down a large number of Japanese Soldiers and caused the Japanese Navy to constantly move back and forth over vast distances in response to the various probes and attacks. • It protected the US supply route to Australia • Politically C gave General MacArthur a large role. He wanted a triumphal return the Philippines. Not necessarily on the road to Tokyo. 12 After WW I, When All Budgets Were Slashed, the Marine Corps Had to Explain Why It Was Needed • Marine Corps has Naval functions ― But, largest naval force is non‐hostile England. • Japan had the only Navy to compete with the US, it was the raison d'état for the Navy’s size and budget. • USMC; however, shrunk in the 1920s. In 1939 was given an specific amphibious task in Plan orange. • The Marines claim to be a special fighting force, not just a second level gendarmerie, relied upon a Japanese threat. • Given an amphibious task, how would it be accomplished? 13 Fudging the WWII Time Interval ― the Higgins Boat • The Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) or Higgins boat was a landing craft used extensively in amphibious landings in World War II. • USMC, always interested in finding better ways to get men across a beach in an amphibious landing, and frustrated that the Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair could not meet its requirements, began to express interest in 1938 in a civilian craft ‐ the Higgins boat design. • There was limited production, but, it lacked an easy way to get off the boat. • In early 1941 Navy and Marine Corps officers viewed a Japanese front ramp shallow draft boat in China. • This design was sent to Higgins and the LCVP build began.14 Higgins Landing craft Displacement: 18,000 lb Length: 36 ft 3 in Beam: 10 ft 10 in Draft: 3 ft aft , 2 ft 2 in forward Propulsion: Gray Marine diesel engine, 225 hp or Hall‐Scott gasoline engine, 250 hp Speed: 12 knots Capacity: 6,000 lb vehicle or 8,100 lb general cargo Troops: 36 troops Crew: 4 Armament: 2 × .30 cal (7.62 mm) machine guns The LVCP, LVT and the DUWK have similarities and similar and differences 15 USMC‐Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) • The LVT had its origins in a civilian rescue vehicle called the Alligator. Developed by Donald Roebling in 1935, the Alligator was intended to operate in swampy areas, inaccessible to both traditional cars and boats. In 1937 Roebling built a redesigned vehicle with greatly improved water speed. • The USMC which had been developing amphibious warfare doctrine based on the ideas of Lt. Col. Earl Hancock "Pete" Ellis and others, became interested in the machine after learning about it through an article in Life magazine and convinced Roebling to design a more seaworthy model for military use. • After more improvements, to meet Navy requirements , LVT deliveries started in 1941. A rear ramp was added in 1943 and the tracks were improved to work better over coral. • Originally intended solely as cargo carriers for ship to shore operations, they rapidly evolved into assault troop and fire support vehicles as well. Initially carried 18 troops with mods increased to 30. • 18,620 were built by FMC/Borg‐Warner. Many mods and armament variants • Initially used in Guadalcanal , then Tarawa, Marianas, Iwo Jima, Philippines 16 17 The Navy Had Something of A Jump And Large Ships were not built on an Assembly Line—Yet • President Roosevelt had a Navy background • In 1940 England had the largest Navy and was updating • The US had the second largest Navy, but stagnant for 20 years and split between two oceans • Japan had the third largest but modernized during the 1930s • 1936 US Maritime Commission bill for construction of a merchant fleet to “support” the Navy in time of war • Shipyard stimulus program. Our merchant fleet had deteriorated from the WWI build up. • Ships were huge consumers of material • In 1940, Navy begins to lay the keels for what will be 22 large Essex class carriers. • And aircraft to fly off them. • 1939 Construction of two large dry‐docks at Pearl Harbor 18 US Naval Growth • 1940 about 480 ships • 1945 about 6800 ships and boats – Including about 2500 amphibious ships and boats – Mass production techniques are used US WW II Submarine Fleet • From 1936 to 1945 the US Navy built 255 submarine in a number of classes. • Almost all were use in the Pacific against Japan. 19 Fast Carrier Groups/F6F • The sea west of Hawaii, North of New Guinea to Japan is a distance greater than from Ireland to the Ukraine. • Ordered in 1940 ‐ 24 Essex Class Carriers and Grumman F6F Hellcat aircraft, and later models, designed to operate from them. • F6F flew > 66,000 combat sorties, destroyed 5126 Japanese aircraft (75% of those downed) with a loss of 270. More than 12,274 were built. • The F6F became the predominant Navy fighter through the work of a small team of engineers at Grumman who replace the original engine, much like the P‐51 story. 20 Pacific Aircraft Demands • Reference: Earlier discussion on slow build up of B‐17 and B‐24s. • Gen. MacArthur's SW pacific campaign needed long range bomber to span the Island distances and fly over the impenetrable jungles. • These same B‐17 and B‐24s were in the AAC Air Staff’s plan to prove the validity of Strategic bombing in Europe. – The early Pacific campaign had no strategic air targets. • Only in 1945 with the Naval advance into the Marianas and the B‐29’s arrival did strategic bombing come to the Pacific.
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