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Color Realism and Color Science BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2003) 26, 3–64 Printed in the United States of America Color realism and color science Alex Byrne Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 [email protected] mit.edu/abyrne/www David R. Hilbert Department of Philosophy and Laboratory of Integrative Neuroscience, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL 60607 [email protected] www.uic.edu/~hilbert/ Abstract: The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are “subjective” or “in the mind.” The article has two other purposes: First, to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate. The first part explains the problem of color realism and makes some useful distinctions. These distinctions are then used to expose various confusions that often prevent people from seeing that the issues are genuine and difficult, and that the problem of color realism ought to be of interest to anyone working in the field of color science. The second part explains the various leading answers to the prob- lem of color realism, and (briefly) argues that all views other than our own have serious difficulties or are unmotivated. The third part explains and motivates our own view, that colors are types of reflectances and defends it against objections made in the recent literature that are often taken as fatal. Keywords: Color; color vision; comparative vision; ecological view; inverted spectrum; mental representation; perception; physicalism; qualia; realism; similarity 1. The problem of color realism In fact, the most popular opinion, at any rate among color scientists, may well be the view that nothing is colored – at Color is the subject of a vast and impressive body of empir- least not physical objects in the perceiver’s environment, ical research and theory. A lot is known about the physical like tomatoes. For example: properties of objects that are responsible for the appearance We know from psychophysical and neurophysiological investi- of color: photoreceptors in the eye; color processing in the gations that color is created somewhere in the brain, although visual system; the genetics of color vision; the various defects the exact location of this process is still unknown, and we even of color vision; the variations in color vocabulary and cate- have no idea what entities the sensations called color are.... In gories across cultures; color constancy; the variation in ap- short, colors appear only at a first naïve glance to be located in parent color with viewing conditions; color vision in animals; objects. (Backhaus & Menzel 1992, p. 28) and about the evolution of color vision.1 Unsurprisingly, the fine details are often subject to vigorous dispute, for exam- Alex Byrne is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the ple, whether or not macaque cortical area V4 is a color cen- Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has pub- ter (Heywood et al. 1995; Schiller 1996; Zeki 1990); and lished widely in the fields of philosophy of mind, meta- sometimes the fundamental assumptions of a particular sub- physics, and philosophy of language, including much field are questioned (e.g., Saunders & van Brakel 1997 on joint work with David Hilbert on color. He recently color categories). But, by and large, the field of color science edited (with Robert Stalnaker and Ralph Wedgwood) commands a broad consensus. Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Rather strikingly, however, there are some basic and im- Judith Jarvis Thomson. portant issues missing from this agreeable picture. What is redness? A physical property of some sort – for example, a David Hilbert is Associate Professor of Philosophy certain way of reflecting light? Or is it a disposition to produce and member of the Laboratory of Integrative Neuro- science at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has certain sensations in certain perceivers? Or is redness a sui worked extensively on color; recent publications in- generis property about which not much can be said? Further, clude “Color and the inverted spectrum” (with Mark do those objects like tomatoes, strawberries, and radishes that Kalderon), in Color Perception: Philosophical, Psycho- appear to have this property really have it? In other words, are logical, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives, ed. objects, like tomatoes, red? Color scientists, philosophers, S. Davis, and Readings on Color, Vols. 1,2 (edited with and other cognitive scientists with opinions on the matter Alex Byrne). strongly disagree about the answers to these questions.2 © 2003 Cambridge University Press 0140-525X/03 $12.50 3 Byrne & Hilbert: Color realism and color science And in a well-known passage, Semir Zeki writes: erty – a property that strawberries and cherries also appear The results described here . suggest that the nervous system, to have – and which we call “red” in English. The problem rather than analyze colours, takes what information there is in of color realism is posed by the following two questions. the external environment, namely, the reflectance of different First, do objects like tomatoes, strawberries, and radishes surfaces for different wavelengths of light, and transforms that really have the distinctive property that they appear to have? information to construct colours, using its own algorithms to do Second, what is this property? (Of course, there are parallel so. In other words, it constructs something which is a property questions for the other colors that objects appear to have.) of the brain, not the world outside. (Zeki 1983, p. 764, empha- It is important to emphasize that a negative answer to the sis in original) first question is a genuine theoretical option. As we all Finally, in an excellent recent textbook on vision, Stephen know, it does not follow from the fact that an object visu- Palmer claims that: ally appears to have a certain property that the object has Color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when that property. The study of visual illusions is well-estab- we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those ob- lished; a visual illusion is precisely a case where an object jects or lights. (Palmer 1999b, p. 95, emphasis in original) visually appears to have a property it does not in fact have. And: For example, in the Ponzo and Müller-Lyer illusions, lines There may be light of different wavelengths independent of an that are of the same length appear to be of different lengths. observer, but there is no color independent of an observer, be- There are also color illusions, for instance produced by cause color is a psychological phenomenon that arises only changes in illuminants, or by simultaneous contrast. An ex- within an observer. (Palmer 1999b, p. 97, emphasis in original)3 ample of the latter kind of color illusion is neon color Although contemporary color science would be quite un- spreading, in which a region that is in fact white appears recognizable to Galileo, this is one respect in which he is pink (Nakayama et al. 1990; Van Tuijl & de Weert 1979). A perfectly up to date: negative answer to the first question amounts to the view that color illusions are the rule, not the exception. This I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is con- might seem odd, but it is not incoherent. cerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness. Hence, The problem of color realism concerns various especially if the living creatures were removed, all these qualities would be salient properties that objects visually appear to have. It wiped away and annihilated. (Galileo, in Drake 1957, p. 274)4 does not concern, at least in the first instance, color lan- This target article is an attempt to make some progress guage or color concepts. The issue is not how to define the on the problem of color realism (Boghossian & Velleman words “red,” “yellow,” and so on. Neither is it about the na- 1991): Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the ture of the concept RED (where concepts are either taken colors? In particular, we defend the view that objects are to be mental representations used in thought and inference colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, [Fodor 1998], or the semantic contents of such representa- types of reflectance (Byrne & Hilbert 1997a; Hilbert 1987; tions [Peacocke 1992]). Of course, it is natural to suppose see also Armstrong 1999; Jackson 1998; Lewis 1997; that there are intimate connections between a certain Matthen 1988; Tye 1995; 2000). salient property that tomatoes appear to have, the word The article has two other purposes: First, to introduce an “red” and the concept RED; in particular, the word “red” interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosoph- refers to this property, and the concept RED is a concept ical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color re- of this property. Some scientists and philosophers would ar- gue for more intimate connections between color experi- alism and: Second, to clarify the various positions and cen- 5 tral arguments in the debate. We hope that our discussion ences and color vocabulary and concepts. But the present will at least remove some obstacles to progress in research, point is simply that the problem of color realism is primar- even if our conclusion is not accepted.
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