Fallacy: an Error in Reasoning. Formal Fallacy: an Error (Invalid Deductive

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Fallacy: An error in reasoning. Formal Fallacy: An error (invalid deductive inference) resulting from the structure of an argument. Some examples include the fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. We’ve already experienced some examples of formal fallacies: If A then B. Some A are B B Some A are C Therefore A Some A are both B & C. Informal Fallacy: An error in reasoning where the error cannot be detected except by considering the content (i.e. meaning) of the statements in the argument. Two kinds of Informal Fallacy: Fallacies of Relevance: An error in reasoning where the premise in an argument are irrelevant to the conclusion of the argument. Fallacies of Insufficient Evidence: An error in reasoning where the premises are typically relevant, but nonetheless are insufficient to support the conclusion. Relevance: A statement (e.g. a premise) is only relevant (or irrelevant) relative to another statement. For a statement to be relevant, the truth of that statement (i.e. the premise) must make a difference insofar as the truth or falsity of another statement (i.e. the conclusion). Positive Relevance: A statement is positively relevant when the truth of the statement (i.e. premise) makes some other statement (i.e. conclusion) more likely to be true. Though, this need not imply the inference is strong, namely that the conclusion is made likely, only that the conclusion is made more likely. Negative Relevance: A statement is negatively relevant when the truth of the statement (i.e. premise) makes some other statement (i.e. conclusion) less likely to be true. Irrelevance: A statement is irrelevant when the truth of the statement (i.e. premise) make no difference whatsoever to the likelihood that another statement (i.e. the conclusion) is true. Consider the claim, “Chris is a woman.” This claim is positively relevant to the claim, “Chris is a mother.” Though it is insufficient to prove that the statement is true, it does make the statement more likely than it would be if it were false that “Chris is a mother.” This claim is negatively relevant to the claim, “Chris plays linebacker for the Raiders.” This claim is irrelevant to the claim, “Chris is a graduate student.” .

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Fallacies Mini Project
Ms. Kizlyk – AP Language Fallacies Mini Project Directions: In order to familiarize ourselves a bit more with the logical fallacies that we studied in chapter 17 of your Everything’s an Argument book, you are going to divide yourselves into groups of two to teach the class about a type of fallacy using a short Google slides presentation. If there is an odd number of students, I will allow a group of three – you will have to do an additional historical or modern day example of the fallacy. You are responsible for the following items within your Google slides presentation: Title slide with name of fallacy Define the type of fallacy Modern example (one group member will be responsible for this) o Show an example of a current-day advertisement, news clip, public service announcements, political campaigns, etc. that uses this fallacy o Explain the example and how it is using/showing the fallacy Historical example (one group member will be responsible for this) o Show an example of this fallacy from the past – can be an advertisement, etc. (Hint – a lot of these have been used in propaganda for WWII or other historical events). o Explain the example and how it is using/showing the fallacy You will have 45 minutes to work on your project on 3/21 (1st & 3rd hours) or 3/22 (6th hour). The project is due on 4/13 (1st & 3rd hours) & 4/16 (6th hour). o These dates might be altered due to testing. Your group needs to share your Google slides project to me prior to your class on the due date.
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CHAPTER XXX. of Fallacies. Section 827. After Examining the Conditions on Which Correct Thoughts Depend, It Is Expedient to Clas
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334 CHAPTER 7 INFORMAL FALLACIES a Deductive Fallacy Is
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35. Logic: Common Fallacies Steve Miller Kennesaw State University, [email protected]
Kennesaw State University DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University Sexy Technical Communications Open Educational Resources 3-1-2016 35. Logic: Common Fallacies Steve Miller Kennesaw State University, [email protected] Cherie Miller Kennesaw State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/oertechcomm Part of the Technical and Professional Writing Commons Recommended Citation Miller, Steve and Miller, Cherie, "35. Logic: Common Fallacies" (2016). Sexy Technical Communications. 35. http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/oertechcomm/35 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Educational Resources at DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sexy Technical Communications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Logic: Common Fallacies Steve and Cherie Miller Sexy Technical Communication Home Logic and Logical Fallacies Taken with kind permission from the book Why Brilliant People Believe Nonsense by J. Steve Miller and Cherie K. Miller Brilliant People Believe Nonsense [because]... They Fall for Common Fallacies The dull mind, once arriving at an inference that flatters the desire, is rarely able to retain the impression that the notion from which the inference started was purely problematic. ― George Eliot, in Silas Marner In the last chapter we discussed passages where bright individuals with PhDs violated common fallacies. Even the brightest among us fall for them. As a result, we should be ever vigilant to keep our critical guard up, looking for fallacious reasoning in lectures, reading, viewing, and especially in our own writing. None of us are immune to falling for fallacies.
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Misrepresenting Or Exaggerating Someone's Argument to Make It Easier to Attack. Cherry-Picking Data Clusters to Suit an Argume
Misrepresenting or Presuming that a real or Manipulating an emotional Presuming that because a exaggerating someone’s perceived relationship response in place of a valid or claim has been poorly argued, argument to make it easier between things means that compelling argument. or a fallacy has been made, to attack. one is the cause of the other. that it is necessarily wrong. Asserting that if we allow Attacking your opponent’s Avoiding having to engage Saying that because one ﬁnds A to happen, then Z will character or personal traits with criticism by turning it something dicult to consequently happen too, instead of engaging with back on the accuser - understand that it’s therefore therefore A should not happen. their argument. answering them with criticism. not true. Moving the goalposts or Asking a question that has an Saying that the burden of proof Using double meanings making up exceptions when a assumption built into it so that lies not with the person or ambiguities of language claim is shown to be false. it can’t be answered without making the claim, but with to mislead or misrepresent appearing guilty. someone else to disprove. the truth. Believing that ‘runs’ occur to Appealing to popularity or the Using the opinion or position Assuming that what’s true Making what could be called Judging something good statistically independent fact that many people do of an authority ﬁgure, or about one part of something an appeal to purity as a way to or bad on the basis of where phenomena such as roulette something as an attempted institution of authority, in has to be applied to all, dismiss relevant criticisms or it comes from, or from wheel spins.
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