• • • '•: '·;ti IJ~ .;: ,··
STÀTÉMENT OF'SONJA BISERKO.
1~ l'pftQ..dUtJtiOU.
t.. 1 h~ve.-,bëèri. ~Md Q:Ythe 'Croafîan;Jegal'l~am t~ provide fJ. stat~ment which will be~ t:ight 'on·. tlie .Sërbiat.t. natioq~d pr~gram :whic.h· was the· màin trigger. for the war in the ror.mer Yqg~$l~via.
, 9 ..,.. "\'"~ a·nc,~ P.resld,~nt of the Helsinlci Committee for Human Rights in
2. D~fining the Problèm in Ristork-al P.ers.pective
3. 'Dèvel.opment of Serl:i ·people and .th~ir ·state during the past two centuries hàs. been murk~d ~Y a 1/l.~i.mtl'ict hetween palfriai:chy and modernity which has s1o.wed and mad~ the cultu.ràl inte&rQtlan :of Ser~s ~d·creation of a "cÇ>mplete statet' more difficult. 1 The clash be.tweeo pattiaréhy tn1d med.ernity m.iltked. t:he ~nd o.f the 40lh century, taregeJy becausb e:mat:~cip.att~.r\ ·wa~ ahv~ys. p,é.tcëjved àS à loss of identity. the f.oregoing; .r.~ulted in a: rëvtv.a:l of a. "gre.ater Sertii~'; çpnc!:!pt Wfiich drew its strengtli from the patrîarcbaJ~. êalie~tiv.fst'l.'no:clèJ .af stat~ and sQeiety nod ethniç-religious understand.ing. ef nation. Tliat-
t;0n'c~P.t d:reW- ~ditlprial strëJ]gth from thé reliance on tradition o-f. the me'dleval Serh
·emph:~.
4·, In tke· j~dgemént of Ser.b nationalists, the ·historhml climax presented the greater~
Ser.bian ~tate iqea.and· its.ndv9cà~~s:with a singula.r opportunity to cnpita.Jize on th~ brea~: up ê·(Y.ü$Qslavia aod red~:aw th~ bot~ders according to a national programme near[y two e~n,UJ,l'Ïës: old~. Thé Sera elite based its àï'IJbitions o~ severa! very impli'rtant· premises: the
1 tl1nr t!!nn· was coined by· Zor~l) bjirijdjic. ·amblemntic· of th!tt ideu is his b1Udy "Yugosla.vitt ns nn Unfîn'l!lhc 2 A ~~W ~cr.bia st~~J:. n:iJ~oY.çd lo. satnhwest, wlille. 'lt~lwing. a p 1.: •': :· ,If!~ ' .1 intel.'natimial env.immnent or vacuum which em·er.ged 'lS: a: r~.$.U:It .uf d~!} Q~I,I~p.~~ o'f comilluni.sm, Serbian supretnaéy o.\1e'r the Yùgo&lav Peapieis Arti1y", th;e Kos.pvo.,nl)'tll·f wi1Jeh mobili:z~d Serbs, and perçeptions of R,ussia. as Serl;iia's Jiatüràl a!Jy,. 5; The ·serb national programme was not unique in the.Bâlkans. Balkan nat(QtJii .thj:~.t..J:t.aYfl. live'd on the periphery of two lnrg{;ï et'npires for centttri&s '~ère :àlso:t1atir.ishin$J···iui.1ional aspirations :-and. llad nation stàtes' as th~ ir goals. The tainet~e11tl1··.~ridA:he··~~gUt~ù.t~g ofitljé twenti~t_h oenturi:és saw the ir. w~n'lM)f Iiberati.on ..àild til~ir ëffottid~ buïNLmo.de.rrtst~tes P.f tlie'ir own. The creatioM af Yugoslnvia in 1918 laid· ~he 'faunciatfon. f(it' thè rèaltzatihn· t)f. the' .Set·b· national prograhl. aut. at the "S!l01~ tin1è.. the i11.WV Yu.gQ,l;lav. .stiï,të.·ëm~~çlied· abJ:eetively dispàrate national interests and éonimdn so.utldNav ~J?ii:atîon~. ij:v.en.:a:;~· ·~hç· O.ew state· was b~ing. built. 1he proponetUS of UIÛtattiariÏsm ·artd ·j~detalism eonflict ihevitably raîsed questions about the $~1rvïvàli 9f,tlî~ Yug~$làv state. T:li,:i Sèrbs1. who w.anted to become the leac:ling nation in YugQslavia and: the Bal~Jl'~t' had .~lw.~y~ been ~trang. They be.Iieved tl:tat they ough~ to be· giVën a: v.anguarU rote. in the B.~lkan Bntente! the collective defence agreement designed. to di.scq~rage .tite con's~~1t ·ter.tito.d.ni claims 'Of\laric:ius European ·countries. 6; The adeption of the 1'974 Yl.!goslavian Con.st.itutlon \:\las nr~9J~~ed tlf éxfètis·jVêJ;îtJl>Üc de~ate throùgltO.~I~ ~hê coLlntry. At the time,. tlu:ire:wasdi,h:e·;;~(!r· di~a~(~ta~ti.en:' h1 $Çr~.i~ with the direction ln which the changes ·we'r.e di;lftih:g· S'e't.b'ia'n elites lookë~;' iîp.on the ·confedetadon ofYugosl~JVÏll as a plot to cqmp,letely brÇ~k.... iip .the Set'Qp~~p!e:âtid'àJigued. ______Serllia1s beu.11daries at the time were 'neither untiona!' n·or.hî$tprleal.1:>0J:çl~l's1 :l:)nd:th~t, -~~==-~=~=-=-==~rol"~tl1at-lnati~~=tl16-'Güt1nl:laries--&_~ween ~~=i~~ii~r~~=-~~ 1. Th~ Serbs' largely traumatic and frustraLing ex.petient;;ë With the 1914· CanstlttJUon exerted considerable influence on their late.r behav.iol:lr d1,1rit1g the disi.otegeation of 3'Thc.Bnttlll< of Kosovo topk. P. Ince in 1j 8'), nod mar~ed the lie-ghmiog of,thp ;i.·ceo~"'ry:QUemari ..sqprèinacy. Hàwë\icr;.Scrbs hav.e bëen gloryfing this hÇavy:·detènt ever.~inçe; Tlu:;.defui\t h~$ ~eêiùirilieifinto: marty.rijon:~t while Kosovo itself proclaimed "thç saut Qflbe Serbian·.n~t~on.:'i ;Ac~~rdîQgf~; iv.ithoüi:l{ôsov.o, $.èrbs will be wiP.cd o~t as .amith:m. This is wh y "ihe· Kosovo rilytii" i'inplic:S contin'uity .wfth ·tlie·.iiïëdicv.al Serbiiin !ll'nte. · 2 '.1 ,,, • ·,r,.·'·ifr·· ''!';'i1llir"'\~~1''1firJiill!~i!)k: , ... : Yugoslav1a. Mbst Serbs · bëlièVë 'tliat the Constiluti it did ~t the b~ginn;iilg orthe. oineteï::hth eetitury. 3.. S.ef.bs Mobilizc.d· Over thé National Program:me 8. 't'he AI.PatlÎan. d~!Donstra:tions·in K9~ovo tn 1981 were used as a prete.."'t for raising the Sërb· natidnal ·que~Uon .and' fom~I1tlng ·serb nationalist sentiments. The YPA pushed it's Wl:lY oi1to the po'litie"al. stage ·and. v.irtuatly oëcupied Kosovo .. 1 ___,_.:.:..9.:...~ fr,;;;_;. h=· ·e-'sttu=· ·=·· -fit~l~·far· Jeslp· BrQ~ 1!ito"s inberi~nc~ in 1980 ~tarte.d amid ~ à~p ctiish';~ ~ for whié.l1 the polîiïctd ·antl il'itêlleè.ttnd ente. and establishments had ·no answet,s, The Gotantry'''s g~n~r{ll. un.prep~f.~dness for change was lnrge.Jy exacerbatèd by Yt!goslavia's s~1l gene'fis position ·during the pr~cedittg·. fifty. yea1:s, â position based on its: ge·ouslrategic tocatîon·and tbflb:lp,biar division· ofthe world during the Soviet Union-United States Cold War. Tljj~ ;position. g~:Ve Yugoslavia special treatmellt and a !3pecial role on the ·int~n.àtion~1' pplj~jeal stag~ that was far greatèr than its reàl iinportance. The Serbs, who-se unwii.Brt~n~ss:t.o ~;td4.re,ss the. o.p.~n· l~:S.._e$ at.1d their resi?tance to chan,ge resulted h1 nàUoiilil l).pma,gëi:ii'zatioit:. any àttempt to refasltion YtlgÇJslavia undt:;r new ciroutrïstanè~s was perceived· aS~ soh~me to deprlve them of a state of their own. Serbs' ethnie identity, the· tiie11· l~adership. bas utjliz~d \.llld~r ~1e slogan . •FirstJy, the sta~e - secondly, demoèraCiy' ' bioiike'êÎ :ël~mù'ei'àtîZâtion and prevented tlle necessary plur::Hi?..ation 'of ·inl:erests. 'th:e $er-b elite, leéJ .!?.Y' Slébbdart· MiTosèviè, rèverted 'to its natiot:rar programme; . ... ' 4'V.qgoslnViiiil1stn'tesriîon w:ho l.cd·rh~r~t.~nilèc·lo·Nilti uc~;ùptlti(m d11rlng Woi'ld Wat IT, esl!tbllshcd·lnd~pçnd~ce t'roln'\1\'e. U.:S.S.R.'~t.9JJ,8),.np,!1 Il$ presidjlnt (1~.53• 1980) pursucd lhe poliuy of ''soclnllsm wil:h hum un face.'' whïlc st(èiisillg n91)·tiltw.r~Jln~:\Jrfo,rc!gn... f;iff~l.r~:ny ~~~sttengtl1 of his pcr:mon1 MIJmr-lly ll!1d polhicnlinslghl h.ctl!uitMQd to adj~~.difttlr.lng. intère5t.~· ôf'êk~Yùgôs'lo'\1 ru'p'ublici.nJid IJU'Iiiltnln th~ fcdcmtlôh./\ fiér bi:~.t.iilitth, dl.l'li!~eucies growing!y ctinic·IO light. . 3 ,~.. •J ''fo which had. been in prepal'ation. at: an ~nformaJ le.~GJ s.ihçe t:he· e~mly,. Hn.P~ -:$4 \va§ tlKticùl~tèd With 'the publ1èation in 1986 of the Acàde.t:Qy. f.et S.ciie~t~e ~lJ~l'Ar:t; ($~). .Memaranclum. 10; ·I~1·trying to lnfluem~e the outcome of the Y.ugosla~ crisis tliFot~gli:th~ .Memer{l.nqum~ tJie'.Academy. was anxipus· th at it. sbould reach those· wbose :;purv.ieW'·was the soltitien· ur cuttertt problems. The· Memorandum w~s at once ·pl·p..:Vt1g9~1.avta àn'd: ariti-Ytlg~sl~:il.i4 ln th!it it sugg~sted a transformatio11 6fthe. cou11try throU:B.fl.',it~:l!e~tl~ntrali~(lQn."rh!(!:~u~hp.rs ijf'Men'lotandulit n';gue<{ that the Serb people. col) Id. not ·lMk fo.;dl.e ÎiitOtë.'sëf.erte.ï~ :amid so.'muéb. unce•itainty. For this.. reason; the Memor:ândurn.'s authots.statë!Ji :âtl tbijtnatioils,lh Y!ùgo~lttvia.· neêded ·an 0fiportunity to stat~ theiN1s.p.ir:atkn.1s;·.!lfl.d i-nte.nti9~? R~~~À~~ü; tli~s· Irtèanl Ser\liit could1ttake its own choice and. d.ef.ine :its nanôrtâf int~rœt;/$ ln\ ~!:iell'Qe1 dt~ Mel;l.lo(alldum merely copied dowtt me .parnr.oet~rs. of th;~·.s~rb 'llàti:apài ·;ptqgrrunme from the end ofthe ninetecnth century and the begim1iog of-the t\ventietn::e.il]ling:fQt 'thé. li~eration and ~mificatimn of the ·entire Sèrb people arid the ~slaFilislu:neot ·~fa- Serb national and .stat~· community en the whole Setb'territor.y.' n. Tb~ mass support Milosevic won turned qtlickly Jnto a neltion~l roo.vf}n.wnt i.n .S!;lrbia~ Or-awi'ilg on tl1e energy of that movem·ent, Milosevic estabW~hed. ids ·auth.oritatia:n t:tile, ~vhio.h: ~nltbled him to rai se the Serb question in C~oatia qn,d B,i)sfi.ià:;;Hë.r:z~g~vlti~. ·and· pr~sertt Ît as a.state questlon. whlch COtlli:Î: 011ly bei se(if:e,ci by ·e,m:abJlshin.~: a $~f~··S~4.Î~·Îfl thçse repubf.ics precfsely in keep1~g witb the position pr6f.lletéd by: t)pbri.ct~.: ëtïsl.e• .... ~=:~Serbln~s most._p_op_ulnt~'l'l'itçrd!I1J!::.hi~ çirçt~.~ 15,~y:cc;>_l!~~f:J:l.~~t::J~~:i~·::.Ï!!lf!~f:lli!J~~~:~f~tl1~ ...... _.. _ ·- ··-·------·---··--··sero·people;1l'fl:nixhatfStlo-n-of·ttre-Yugoslav·fl•amework:;·the ·need-to-mnend-the-197. 4------Constitution,. a!ld the resutting unequal position ofSet:bia v.is:..a<:-V.·IS the 9tber:rep'!.lbJi~s~ $ M~~;,~;:~;;tl;~,"üifiJTrhû-s/\NüiYrên1oriinaillnJ:oagovarrrkrilikif(Repllès.lilici criticism); Kostu: Mlhàjlov.ic, Vnsilije-Krcstic, SANU,Belgrndc, 1995. 11 Thou.gh sl.ll f7pl'bclajnted dissident, Dobrlcn Co sic bas alwnys .becn undcdhe.- wi~1g· of pcoplè in po\ver fi:pm ;J'o~ip Broz.Tito and Miloscvic to present-day "democmtic'' len.ders.- He is.Jjoth actulil·nndintëllëi::tuiil atchitect of Serbl!ltt·natlonalism lhat ont y keeps chnnging iJ.S elothcs. His P,opulafity ànd in:tlueJi'ce arè môlitly ba:scd on the thcs'ls thrcading all.his writings, ·•serbs àre whirii!r!;"in w'arlln1e,.bu~ios~i'!Hai (1l.lflcetlme." 4 . . ,, ;\•. ~...... , 4, 'fbe P;rop~gnndn Wa.r 1'~-.. Re.vivql c,lf Set'bian nat~onalism in the 1.970s. in response to the trend of deoenu·aUsa.tien fief Yugqslav:i~ was based on the idea that Serbs were "the baokbGne o:f Yugoslavia a·nd ·me· Balkans!' SUch a.. COtivlction stemmed from fabricatecl myths~ which h~ld: that ~erb.s:l)ad til!lamt~ 'all othctr··Y.u.goslav p.eoples, hence their right te primaoy, l1!1d tb:at SaJibs p.ossess;'$tate qua:litiè~ .fur ~qpé.riér to those charàcterizing other pe0ples. The. ---t------s~~b'wn~@ttlio:à;ax-eltllr'eb-,·S~tbhmr~cm.del:ny-of-Arts-and-Scièrices-.-A;ssô.ciatlan~of'------·II-- Wri~e~' t1.f ~:er.a~a,: and. B.èlgradê UniV'ersîty contr:ibuted to ~wakening ç,f national ei~êrg.y~. SbnplH.l'ed.'ti:utb~. a.btlUt ~htuf.ië~·lon,g sacrl fiees. made by the Se rb people mobilised the entite S'er&· p-apnlus in 'Yugofi!avi~. The m.edia'~ contribution to the ~n.süing course of eventS' wa.s· ·à:lso su~stantive. They bëcatne the· principal war~generating and peoples:. lu~.ra:ssm~nt:meohani&m in Y'l.igo.Slavia in 'the prè-war period. By r~cf,llli.ng the World War li genocide o:f' Se,1;b"s iin Croa~)a and sufferi:ng of Serbs under Turks and hypîng the· terrârist4ikë «har.âcterisl:ic!rofth~ Albanîan people, the elite and media plunged Serb~ans iritO' a s~t~ qf'lif~~Y. h:i. Vl/hiëh no rational rèasoning was possible. B. The S~rb. natiol'll:tt C:}itësth~~: was r.aif;~d usîng the f~IIowing ar,guments: .çQrife'Qer~lia.m~n e:fYugos)àvia;W!Is·itn attempt todestroy the Sei'b natipq. while bordëts .()f S$!1111~ we.r~··•.•neifher· nà~i()l)a.l ri.ar bistor.ii;:al bo.rders." lt wa.s à signal: to the Ser{Js ta :figlït fur· theif: ''se'Vèr~tr jeop~di~e4 n·ational identity, and make that. aim the i'mi'itt pi:ëtéqub;ité· oftb.eir future survival.'1 The· revival of the K.osovo myU1 served tu mobilise Serbs. a!Id' evc,nt~a'Hy- he:lp b'Fi,ng· àbOut arttl-bureaucratiè revolution, which w~ in fact.a. crtJsade:·a·~ib'st' Yûgos.lavi:a-. 14. The well-thoùght-out portrayal. ofthë 'enem.y,. i.e. one•s neighbour.s ofyesterday, as iilhumru:i la!d' the. ~~oundwQ* f~:ni their destruction. The Ct•oats were rëferred: tu ëKelusi~~Jy as Ust.ashi ântl th'e· Mustims were derogatorily -referred to as 'baJije/ (S.~rb$ç~~l~i'ted- fô lS.l~!ri), Grëàter.;.Ser-bîân advocates polnted out. that 'Muslims are ~eneticai•Jy defeC'I;iV.e p~npl~· Who eonv~rt~d ta. lslani, so nowt of cou.r-s~) (hal gem~ i~. :Si:Jl1{iily ·c.énde.llsin,g from generati'on. tQ· geperati,èm. They are getting· worse àtid w<:Jrs~~ ex-press tiièmsei~es. ih sfb'tplë 1;et.U:1~ • .and dietate ~uch ~ w~y of thinkiriJJ a,n.d· bt}havtng. ) ' J \:,:_" ~~ ·li Hl i,; .. This !s a.Jready·hnp.lanted in their genës/' Pta:mi:tt!:înUeader.s anq i~t~He.cl:\l~l~.:p~;ë:JJ(;\ga.t~cJ war and ethttic cl~ànsing in ali tlleir publio uttèrnncés as Li legiti·matè mëa:ns Qf·a·ehiéving. Juat!fil:lb.le obj~ctives. Biljana Plavsic is temembered thrf thè ·fol1!)wittg .stafei:n:ëne· •.J?d t{lt.herwe cmnpletely cleansed east Bosni~ ef Muslims. $p~aKîng af çlei.ansil~g~ .J·Wqiltdn•·t Uk~ · ~fnybody ta take this Jiterally. as meaning ethnië. · cleansi~·g.: "i:rQW~v~~:, they hgv~: lmput~Q to us this .qulte na~ral p(i.ejnomenoh as ·etJ1nic cleânsiri'~: and termèd: i.b à wàr· crimè.18 Plavsic cotintecl on the great num~:~rî·cal pr~p,oiJclerancé ·of. S~i;h~ a:iid waS· certvînced that the B6snian war ·must be won by tllern because ·~-there· ar.e t;<.velve··,niUio"Q· ofus, sp eve.n if six millien are killed, the rema-iriing six mi1Üott\vill Iive:deeentlytùesic put. forward a sii'ililat thesrs back in 1990 when he sa id:! '.Eighty·tllOU$anél Serb casua.lties· W()I.Titl; be ân acc~ptable P,rice to pa y far the reulization of the··mtii~.nal pbj't::ctiV.e~.' 15. In atd~rto mobilize Serb~ throughout .. Yugosl~v.ih; eyety.il)'lëtM~; W~ u~è~ inçiûtÜfig.. tl'le, re.collection ef Bëem~d. Wodd War sri mes a-ga·in&t·S~rJ;j.a~ tTte:·re.v.iyrtJ ef·m~hs... ç~èât~d· ~t the time ofturkish occupation, and lies. The Sei'bs.' impr.e.maoyi 'statëli.op;d·~ and a.bll'tty to organize the·rr statewas continually pointed out. Hi. Mindful of the changes i.n the intematio.nal enVirontueht,:espetiaUy. the; collaps~ ·@f Communism 1 Serbian propagandists made m1,1ch of llhe f~cc·tliat Serbia had.;ai:w~·ys bèën anti-Com:munist. They ci-ted the 'collapse of.th.~ Comm.utji$.t r.egirf.n~·~nd.-Qqtnmü~i~lil 1 "îti" ~~piJort of their riew .th~sls that thè •AVNOi boundru;tes lt!'îve lQst ·à~{ f;ottndl.l~h,m in 1 9 history and p1;1ssess no regularity und er international lm·:v ·• . They· ttt$ùed tl} at: thë cfoll~pse ... --~=~•~:::--:::::of.the~sociaJ.~otderPI'I:lat~d~bytlle:..CtnnmunJst.Party:m~_@)ft·tb~.::~-çQJl~p~~J>J::.!t~LI:tJ§!~rl~!ll-:::: ------·------poliUaat·aetërntlnarlt-;i;cçtlfeAVNOJ-bounâariest~:Aron:e::-'llfftln~:rnt\ina~cliit~cts:of"the··------·· S·erbian programme, éosié also argued that the 'seri; .. people cah.'not aecept· a conl'ederation of the pr·esent repu blies because their boundariés· are iiJegitimatè both irt. a historien! sense and under ii1temationul law, for they were e).i:awn to conform tp the 1 BiJjana Phwsic (one ofthree main Bosnian lcadl}rs indictcd lor war crim~.s); Sl'et,. 6 :Septémbnr i993·. ~'Jb.id. ·9 Acronym for tl1e AnLi·fasclst Commlltec for Yug.oslavin.'s·Nati S. The. Milose.vic Advcnt 17. T:hë· idea: ôf r~~ébntralizing Yugusla'Yla galned. ÙlCI~easlng support ln. Serbi~ ln 1he poiiüc~l v~uum left a.fter Tito'!~ ·death. Milesevîc streagthened his standing \Vith tto:gma1ii·è-:-tn.emb.-~tif;-:u:t-'f:h::e~plli1:Y:-by-açcusirrg-r.eformcrs-of-~washing-tbeir-handî:r-:q. Sociali's!Jl' • .ars ·advice 1to them was to '~et out ·of the L~af!u~ 9f Cpmmun:ists and. its.· fqr.urn.s.' 18. Milosevic?s' vîsit ·tti K.Osovô. ln April 1987 made him awm·e of tbe potency of na~lonalistn ~ne! nuitked: ~ tui:ning point ln the treatment of the Kosovo problem. HaviiJ,&' W.ôn .by· bis d~(~n~e· Gf Titolsm.·the '·suppart orthe military leadership, whicb strove to preserve thè smte intact, ;Nfilasèviè pr.ëceeded to reshuffle nil editori~[ staffs, ·~specially tho.se of 'the- daily Politflr4, tb~ weekly NIN (SerbUt's two priti.cipal n~wspa.'per houses) .. ·a-nd f!~tl;'l:-l;l;ln .tel~.vis~1,:m, ~~king ~evl')Jity..:tWo editor:s. The new editorial teams bet::arne {"ârt tif-'MUasêviê's. ifinet politital.tea111. They played a key rote. in starting. the war and e'illi~~ing: tP.è· süppotC of tt)e; po_pnlar ·mâsses .. Milbsevjc could t1ot luwe ~(:)Wll into tbe Mtfonal l~~r: .h~ was· tf ,:~b~ p~d.P.le,. diss.ï!ltisfied ~d eager to 0hnnge tfie petrJ.fil~d= .feadëtsidp=p.ël'Sé'i:tifiecl b.y lYar,i Statub(!)[h~, president()fSerbia·from 198·6-81.~ had not:oeen in the rlgnt·mood. 11'le·people weJ!è.obviously ready !br a· new leader and saw Milosevic, on tbe strèilgtli qfhls:.utt!llrances In·and about.Kosovo. as the nian .fit to rule. J9. Mi.loseviëibased'his. pàliey·e~l·jilopulism. Ffis.meteoric.J'i.se to·power had not been losr on .the iilt!:}llec~ualst so thé~ went.over to his slde in the second haJf of 198·8. The n~tional pregramme of Cosic·and··hi~ gr.Ql!P finally came into the open once a political. leader had at· long lâst·been.founél :to. espousë it~ Power was in the hands of Mi'losevic) buC the tùture of Sef.bia was t:barteé.l in tbë home· df'Cosië, who WEis liaile'd by Serbs as. the archit.ect of tl.ltl prP,gral.l:micy,t. J,h sp{te f,lf thelt ro.ot~l and p'Oiitical differenées, the two workecl in 7 ; ... liatness·: Cosic pursue.d his nati'onallst geai$ and MHosevil:i, '~lle ..pr~~tic JÇg!:J~r!/.~.itJil;U'ed· bis p~lit.ical. htterests. lt was this :commetntess. ·of. pil~:po.S.éi tbat .held. th;.ln tqge,the:r.~ (l, 6. èo·ul.lp$e of Yt1g9slavi'îl 20, The· p~dod pre'cedhig the outbreak of fi'ghÜUg: ·w.~S.' ·charapteri~Cïl.d ·~y tliree pha$es: &Uemprs to prC$erve thé old system; the c.rystallizatien oftwd ëanee;pts for'reso'l\iin'f!.the :ë:ds:is, and w.ar. In the first pba;ie, shartly aftet Tito's death, roeùtbers ôf:thë pc:'.d.iti~ill. ârid intellectua] estabHfiht1t1et1t sta·ove to pr-eserve 'Î:hek posidon·s wjjliout ·ll,l;ikÎ~g·.JtiY.~CQ::~ff. 2J .. The Bighth Session of the Serbi.an Central Ctiii11niïleè.(Septe.m.ber 1'9a'l):·m~rked·tbe ::~.: ·~~==·:::Wmmg:··pQint1n·J~ffo.tl$_::1o x.~.sQJY!;l:JJl<::tY:t~goslin'.- c.d1!.\S:~m~:broughtJll;>outa:·.tUi:.~within =· --~-~------setllia.'lqroHticaJ-est~blish1net1t~T.he-ilrstâllation-;-of·Mil.~ev.iciwrd:tl~-e-pal,iticij.l 1e~~cutj9.1i·------··-·-·--·---···- · of Stambalic gave viçtory tt'l the nationalist political o.tlentati~n lcacUng to ~h~·br.~a{{uup.Qf YugosJavia. Following the Eighth Session· pa.rty co.up, l'yl.ilosev.:iç erig'ltiëer.êd:'the lat~est purge of the Pa1ty (m.uch more sweeplng ·(ban the ones f9llè'Wing, the 'Côri1i~f6rm rês6lution in· 1948' or the removal of the .lib'etals. iii 1912)' with tl1e· o~j~c.~ \,'lf'j;)Qns()tidating Serbians' power. The purge was not inerely about intrapàrtyt:oriflic.~;: it \vas.irt:tp.ôrhlllt for. the disposition of fot·ces for the upcoming showdm.Vl1 hi Yugoslavîa. The Eight·Session 11 Slavoljub Ojukfc, h:mecfiu sluL•tt i tmateme (Betwe.en the glory and'lhe àniithëi.rla). 8 ., )· ....···:··.·.·· wlt{l $ë .key .evënt in disse:Jutioti of Y.ugosla.vi~. The so~called antibureaor.atie revolution manage4· tQ lj,Qmpgenize. bqth thè thèn Serbian Communist Party and the nation.. lt brougbt dawn institutioq.s and initiated deregul.ation with the ftill support: of the army. • .Duriug Ji.dy 198& Milosevie.·tb.pple.d the Vojvodina leadership in the so ... called 'yogJnirt ·r.e.Yo:fution~ 12 a:nC:I P,J.Tô~Zeêd.e.d t'o centtalize Serbla unoer the slogan 'One people, one state; one oo:urt of law'. 22.. Th~· ~ilrt!it;,ç:i;lt;iQ~ of· Mantënëg.rô fo.l.lowecl in Ja~mary 1989 after. tbe faU of the ·r~publi~s :l~ad~~hip. lJ~â~t tf}(:)· plfé(è>.:t. éf a 'rëplenishment of cadre~",. Mitosevi~'s cr.o.tiies and ·er~~nd ·boY,$· we.re· în$Ued in. .. fe~erâ.l.posts~ Tli'è purgin.g of Vojv.odina·'s, ·Kôsovô''s ~d Moiiten.êg~îh's ·tèpt'éSetita.ti;ve.s gave Serbia a co11troUing maJority in the federàl leadership. Witli: hisf uniflcatibn of. Serbia,; Milosev..ic sirnu1tan~ously prepared a ca.t'i.ipaign .a~~i;1st Sloven'ia and ·dtoa~ia. ~$... :The sc~·n!lt:io· rO:r unmakin& Yugoshtvia was warked out in detail in advnnce. Becaus~ events .f91IQW.~ ~;~~Il other with greât spee-d; other ·republics were .unàble to r~act. FôUôWirlg · the îsolatiôli ·&f Si(')venîa:; the· B-elgrade scenario focusecl incFeas.ingly ail' Cre,~tra. wl.iJ.ëh ·rot tli~ tnast p,ârtffailt~d·;ta ;react t(') Belgrudets pr.ovacations.. lt was onl~ after-a: lbni?; p~ril:ld',nfva~iUi'Jf!On. thaï- Çr.Qatia deeided tQ resist~ so a. c.Gnti:ontaHon between Seroia and Ct.oad:a sUlllt~4. ther.e· was· an eruption of Stilrb llatldmïlisrri.; whleh BelgFàde· ,!fllqijputat~ and! skillifi.tliy. déied ·Gut ·t:hrottgh flle mediat and the Serl.:i population· w~ u~ed ,t~·org~n;ir.~ ralli~s iti Ct.9atià. 24. M'fer the àissoluti.on ofthè Le·agtte.ofCom:munists ofYugoslav:iE~ at lts Xlll Congress in .hmuary 1.990 Milo.se~ic ·anntn.lnced. to his. collaborators that 'Serbîn has to p~;epare itsèlf:ta· U':ve·without Yl.lgO.!)lavla." 17hc adoption of the new Constitution of the R'epublic of Serbiü.i'n Sèpte:inbèr 199.0 m.atk~d the·end. of the Jlrst phase of preparations to destroy Yuga~l~ia; Tl1i's Constit:ulic.iin üsûrpetl'two paramount federal functions: national defense ancf. f.ilrf!.ign.relath:lns (Arnbles'7t2'(1 B.Qd 7213) .. n deprived autonomous provincêS oftheir· ~ons.tit.utitm·at rfuuo.doas·(Articles 1'08-l! 12) ~'nd t;:xcluded Serbin from the legaJ syst~lli of 9 ' .. ..Il i .Jf../'1·. ·~j ·~ the Secialist Federa.! RepubJ.ic of YUgaslnvia (Articl~ 13:S)r ~t w~.~... ~11e fii:~t:.$ifn.;.~~~19.!Ii~t clt!Çll'ment, ~specially ·as it is quoted ih Articlé 1.3·n, Wl'iléfl'Stâtes tbil{ S.~t-pla::w~t.i ~nfqr~;:~ fe.d~ra:llegi:Sintion··only frit is uot 'contrary tl.) ils ïnter~t$~. In''t~êt, t~i~ tiftiëlë prâètiéal(Y: ·ntiiiJfied aU.-Serbiro1 obligâtiGU:s towards·the rest:otl·the.eountcy, O,tl~bë a.tbÇ.r·~~l:ltJ~,f$e•rbia ··Qo)1f,iiJ,ül;'ld to · elàîm ail tli~ rights aUottèd to it! by (li~·· ·fe.de.ral legtsiatJQn ~nï:t f~:deral Constitution. the most impod'ant: ·of which was: présèrving îts rêpiëSêritatf~ëS:· :Çth~ee: îiiëluding provirtèes) i.n the SFRY Presidenoy, Eve11 Mit~st;-y.iç. 'ln:·oti~·Qf·bi~· ~P~~éhe.s·.ori Radio Television of Serbia (15 March 1991) declar.ed ~Y.ugoslavia:· de.es .. npt, exi:st. tlJ,ty· more. j This ·Cçnstit1ttfon helped Milosevic to stay s~f.e. in· Seth la ·•wb teh was·.Jio.t·'iïl w.ar;· antl!Utd nothing to do with the evolvlng 'tragedy.' i5~ 1Having fàjled to ~port his 'anti-bureaucratic revo'lliltio.n' ta· ·other r~püblic.s, ·or to eccupy Vugds:lavia ·in one fcill swoop~ MHos~vic went:·ah~cl.w~th imp~emen.t!J1g.. il~.s plmt W.itlt· me. help' àf .his .supporters, .nam ely other. .paa;tl!;l$, wbi'q}) ll.ad w:.ev.ÎQlJ~.Jy rs~t. ..qui ~erbià~s war .ai~s: 'ill their progt·anunes, hi whiêli ·tliè :f:t0ntieiis: àf ·tbê :fu~u~· .state co.im~ided with those of Molj.~vic's 1 T~Iomogen~oüs :s~rJ;Ua/ 'J!L~~sè· :p~le~ .werê '!:hë. Serbi~ ReileWal Mavem.ent (SPO) led by Vuk Dra.sk~~ie 1·~~ lh.c:l S~tbi'E!ll· R~c!ical ~Ï:lr.ly, 14 (S~&) of Voji.~la.v Seselj 1 and tbe. Serb Nationài.ReneWal (SNO'):.party-of Mi~k.a· Jpv.{a. Allthese p~rti~s e·ffectively promoted the Chetnrk r)lôvemenhintJ:.'Qre:W,ët:t its ttadlti:ons:.15 1 " The SPQ programme looked upon the Serb entity ns indep,endc.nt 9f th.e oth,er repu& lies; ~mplied tlint Yi.tgo:;lavla wa.~ cntirely Setbln 's creation, ~nd da.olared lli~t ~nQithcr .t11e :te.r~itori.~s wh:i'otii on f·'bcc~irlher. 1918~ the dny Yugclslnvia wns cr<:nte'd, wcrc purt of the ((jngdom of Sctbïa,. ~or:·tlle pô,rls. in which .Serbs ______\V!!.f!!·J!I Ut~ m_nj()rl!Y_ bfill>r~_.t_lt~ lêt!l.ll.hil gi,ll!!l~i!l.~. n_!!!~ ~~~~(le"'fi:om.Pl~~.!liJ.~ny_yu~~.~t~vl!l:'.~r:.~~~ -· - --- ·- cônfcderatcd nt tl1c cxpense of tlie Serb people- thcsc lemtortes ;lte the mahenablo liistorical and eilin'lc ~------propert')'· ofthe ·S.erb-pcÇ>plefAs to·Groatia, ·thcprà$111fnl'ilc·was·e~tpliciit--icr.oatia:\vJthin·its·pre'sent'ooidl,l~------···· ·cn"not b~ .t:onfe:de1~ted be fore an n\ttonomous pt·ovince of Serb Krajiha is ·estnblisbed in B{if.anjil;. P.gr.ts· o.f. Slavonia, Koréluu; Lik.1, ·aanija, w1d nortltem .Dalmatio, and t5~fbr.~i'nutdnorliyds gtiatlin\i!êd ~p.. Jstrln ·ànd ~Q.rovnik •.' Sh9uld Crqatia noverUt:eless secede. fr01il Yugoslavi'rJ, ~tl'l'ci ui.ltunoil.,i:ili$ p·ro'iii~ 14 The Progiummalic Declaration plac~ spticial empltasiii i:l.li Ki;ïsé,Yp~ ·ul'gÎrig:~i)ïr'supp,r~s.si~;I,'L P.'flhc .Aibtminn .. scpnrntist rebellion by ·ull mcans' and' the takingof' ~ue 1. ·Piàii.n:in:g. ij~d :P.-r.epilrâtlôiis of. War· î:P,~ Pr~paratiQns-tbr'wâ,f· took a long t,bne and were carried out at severallevels including tl:lë··m.edia, .imnitution~~· scltaals. l,llltV~rsitles, church.es, the army and infotmat discussion groüp$:. gatliered in toffee bars and homes. Fl'Om the inception and formJdation of the pliojèÇt to· "its implementati~li, vàri.ous people were nssigned various ta~ks. the role of ~llief warmf!pger was entrust-ed to V.oJislav Sèselj, one of the m(;)st. diligent operati.ves and Milôsevic'-S'1tll~t-e-l;(o-rarttre-pre.~e4iQ·g-t;~n-y.c;:ars:-He-was-the-one-to-app1y-violence1:c:tthe ~xtèlJ~ b~s il~a$ter dee.med·· n·ecessary 'ât àny ,given moment. At: th,e san:re ti rn~, his gross IUJ;lRQ~r.\and~'fjbug~ery m~.d.e: MilQ$~v.ic ·s~e.m decent. and· acceptable in ·èompariso.n. 21·.. Pi$iilt~gt'atitui of Yuf!Os.làvia. èamiot ·be understood witi.U>tJt previous krm;\vledge of the.:împqnant rol:~·ofthcfYPA mUJe.fo~mer. YPA grew m·ore· powerful and i;t,1ftueuthd in thè 'Yügosla'\'·.a.C!iaiety ·tll ·(he 1:98'0$,. whlcb clearly indicated that its ·key i:ole iri f~ti.tre dl!vel.opm~ti$ was mévUable. 'ln view .<;Jf dtè eontinuing militarisation in Yugoslav s(:)~iet:y, i~ w$ pn'ly.1ogicàl f01t:i'he .~my 'to ·êonsider a coup d~ etat The Ai:my afld Si;;:rbJan lm:tder.s w~~ .in fuJi' agre~~l~.ni tl1at Serb~ were an integrating fa6tor in Yugoslavia.. beoàusëlliey\vere·most pm~u·lous mtd also most widely dispersed.throughout the·countcy; ·f!.inth:ermol:~~. th.ey contribute(J.'tb bOth Yugoslavias. The then prime mever:s ~Iso ~u.ggest~d· thal'. Settblan: n'âti(m.âl- ~wa.r~~ 'Q"Qgh~ to be acknowleëlged -as a counter bai ance to oth"r nationàliSitîs 'tlbt .bàs'ed on siatëhi;Jî'ld, ·:btl.t that position: was viewed with g~eat nùstrust by oth~r. t:fip.u~Uoo. ·2-s~ îo:I~&em.onfc ·eentr.aUsnl Q.f',S~rb poJiey eoiucide.d with the çentr.ali~t posï~~o.ti af t~ë Army ... Th~t:p~sltiën wa:s-- a ·siJ.Utce ·of: :Îh:SJ)iratlon ·f(jr ali futo·re YP A-ta ken actions. 'It was also t.he .Qause of'ti1~ Y.PA's() dt>wi1fall, becat1se in the process the YP A relinquished iJI) fêti.nding pr.incip'Je~. Actions w.bieh t'lti~1ately brought about the historical and moral dow.nliii.J ·of. thê YPA'w.ei:è the boycott of the. federàl parliament,. sub}ugatio~1 ·and de commi~iq~iiig ~f'Jhe 'Fêi:titbdâl'Defence Unils,. sidin'g With the Serb governn~·e11t during war.s ·in Slovl'n:ia,. Croatla and .Ba.&nia... fi'erzegovina, and mob'ilization of volunteers· ·to ~9.t·.cti.H~.Ilôt!llëJ.1··\v1th), .é.llerniks tl!me~;inf;'.a-~rQog·tmlloJ1nlisH~ mo~e;nent.nspirlng to c::r~t~·a "Gre;it~r S~i'b!a.:• Il • 1 : ... Ill' ' .. ,,, ... ,,., :' . ~r~plenish swiftiy~di.in-inishlng arn'iy rai)ks: and. fil~ .. tn 1'990~ Wb\3.1'1. t{i~ YP.A. ife/a.,et() bec;1ame:.th:e Serb am'ly, Geùeral Kadijevic deseribed the wa:r: o~îe.9.ti·Y~s ·in ·th~·..f.olh>wing fasbion; uthe Y? A shall defend the Serbs and· clefinê bdri:lets.of'fütutë Yùgoslavia." .~. ~rtte·rm~tionàl .n.~spo.nse to Y ~goslll:\ï C.riSi$ ·Ï9. With Y.Pi\\. .on its· sid~~ Serbi~ betame ~uperier ov..er· other.· Y~goslâV'l11ati:t:in'S and ·W.as ni·de: to quickly a·chieve its military ·goals ln Croati~· and: B9.silJa~ ~~:ëà.u~~ of:Y:üg!)slavia:~s· mil~tàcy silpeti'cirity;. the·intematlonal cortmi:t.111ity became. i.11:VCl)l:v~cl it:t.tbe. YtH,~Q$la:~r·ci'i,Sîs~. l"'~o.m the tiegh~•'ling, international intervenors triecl: ta,mèdintë'·'a::pea-cefu:J. JeSQI:u.tian:.te: tp,e.. \Vài'. ln 199'1 ·tlïe international community's, response to Yugo~lav wat.s :..va~ to··è0nVeJttr The l·[ngue Conference, \Vhich. was mediated by the .. EI,Irop,~an ·çpmniuilicy.The .a~m ?.·E\~· to diseuss th~· lùture of YugQslavïa. The Conference.was the last att:emP.t .to preser,ve the Y.ugtislàv·. fhune.work and fhrd a solution that w9uld. $Atis:fy. t\va~ :f'u.nd~mèlïtâl.l~ op)dosed, ·concepts of thé future arrangement of Yugoslavia, namelq' ·a. Qon:F.ed~ratloir. ~tul' 4 'f~cîlë~l.i sys~m· feâtilring a loose 'fedènition and. a str.ong central Ç'!:J.vernment:Je·~peptîv~ly. 30.-·0n.Séptemb.er j the Conférence pa$,se.d' a D~cl.m:~tÎOLl: c:m• Y\tgQSlaV.ia whiêlt lat~ dawn. the pr.i.ncipJe~ \V.hich ·v,.~ere to ~ensure the sati'sfuëtion otHhe· ~pppsin,g: J:t.s.p.fratj(l)J:!~ ~(.thé Y.a~osl~:tv peoples in a peaceful way'. Vn.derlying,princ~pfë-s wer.è that.thëre.-wc;;uitl. be.·J1o· ·iifteration: of boundaries wiih the use· or .force, that the righ(s ..of aU in: Y:~go~tâ:V.:ia .wo:old b~ protedted, and that ali legitimate interests a11d legiti'm~te aspit~tions wo!lld .be f\lllY resp~eted·. ~trategy of the Serb nationalists, the implementation .of which wa$ alrenqy ~n prO.gr:es!l on the gro~md: he requer>ted equal respect for the right to seÎf-:determîil'atibt.l of. e;.re~y Yugoslav people and. gmuantees that they could an ·eX~rëis~ that wm lt). self.. determ:ination. He supported this posHion by argui:ng th~t \1ugpshwia WflS' a çommunity Qf equal Yugos.lav peoples, nol republics. He a Iso. argued·. thal ai:ly righL to: S.ecedtf'Would téud to the eventual delimitation of new international froritiérs of Yugëtsla:vià hecause the ltitenial administrative bouttdaties did not hav~ the charac~er ofïntèhiat.ional frotit.i&?rs. At 12 the- ~i,ùne timè~:hè rài.se(f:i.tbe pr.ôblem o:f.'th~ partition of assets, l:lmnatl rignts· ~. e.~ç •. Ser.bla expet.h;:nçed tl~I}.Hù:gu!3 eonfer.entïè as~ uJtiri1atmn to herse!~ the 'aboUti011 of~ ~tate I!Jy dint af seine sUit of :t'realdsh .peJitiC;!ll englneering coupled with a flagrant· violation of infernatianal law'. After reJectlng The Hague of~fer, primarily because of the military sJ;tpre~1acy, Wlos~vic oonti;nued to Qreàte new prablems by occupy.lng Crpatia (25% of î"ts teri.itory) and Bas1~la· (75% of its .tef.!"itory) white intemati.onal commuriity struggled tp eontam Jhe r~iiltingllümanimiim dîsasteruJ·o:-.------11-- 9.. l~rcsent Situado.n :in Se•'b41 32. Hémi"ever., ·irttèrttatlamd. j:il'esen!'lê ln the regi9n and dynrut1ics in Serbia itself (the Op~i;>b.er-· 2Q.QO remo*àl df Mi1t11se:v:[ë·t the Marèh 2003 asB.assi11atioo of P!iim~ M.inister Zora!l P,jindjiç., and: tb0. anàsslv~ vietety.. of tlie. Radleals, in the Deëeinbe.: 2G0.3 early parH.â.inent'âiiy ëlij:otid..tl)'c.lealil~ illdlclilt~:that Ser:bla is· anly now·coming id grips w.tth its ~wn reà~t;y. 'Milosev.î~"~· i~gâcy iï1 difi1tM~ to deal with, including acktwwledgîng its (e:cenlcrim~llal' pas.t, whjO.h•inak!i'~ S'e;rl:Jia a mi generis case in the post~cCilmnm.lll.is~ world. 33, T.he. otitrenl situatibt1 in Sërbia :;nay. serve as a new key for und.~r.st~n.diag the .des~ntl;}gra(ion.of V~g~sJàVia. The eattly 1:990~s dominant thesis nbotlt· "th~ ci\! il wa~" and 11àcéd.lllitàbllîty: of :se~es::den.:.mimf~d·.republics•t new requit~es ·a jrash look or.. re-appraisal .. I..ack df,a,lJili.tY ô'tthe.Së.rb·eliti:H:e (lëfme.;:md ml;tinst:ream mqde~:n Serbla16·.and pll'!-ce it in a ~-onwm:PQ1:acy ·int~ÎfflàtiO.nâl cënt~xt were key reasons fer the disintegratian af the Yil.&astav t.~de~atiQt~, Wi:;; fy.rth~r iUustr.Ste"d by t~e fact that Montene.gro ànd Kosovo have b~Mifie·inâëpëiîdent iti"::tlîè·tnëaütitrte:~-s. weil. On the domestic scen~ this î$.·b..\f$P.r6flected in .ihe fjrëvaQiT-Jg. ·stund· on 'Voj:v.oâi'ila aütenomy, regloria;limtion and ntinorities as :ëxempHfred' by · the ·cqatinuol,l~ :tension$. ·rn S-anjàk and Sauth· of S"erbh1; ·total nïisi.Jnâêtstaïtding ·of contemp·orary pr:oçe.sses and trend~ jeopardiz~s Serbia proper antl nuikèsit prone tt> furtherfragmentation. r'(~ceordil'l!~·tq:Presld~nO>f.the ëon:stitlltlbllàl C~urt.of Sctbin, Slobodan Vucetic "nfl:cr Der::einber 2003· eleSliions Se~htil !Ïilinlot l:i.e a r~gi~ll11)l sla~c, ~i"ar([t iaçlarthc-experiencc .ofregionalism". 13" ii,, .. . !.. l1'. j . Ifil: .• 34;· Even after Milosevic, the vacuum G:f .authorîty ~:au.sed.' b~~· dl~putes. qvér- o~i:!J ·constitutional structures rem a ill a. continuing soutoe of inlit'abttity in. Serbi~. as w~lt d~··lh~ te~ion as n wlmlïïJ. Wi1ih. the .ba~ic situation still uilres'olvëti i.h :eaëh a'fthe eiitities .or·.s'f.âtt},s h1 tlie·region, little progress can be made in addressh~g t11e btoaae~:inâtifutfciij~.f P.fi::lbieriis in dt~ r~gi~;~n. 3.5. Acknowledging. the past is the biggest'aild most:pàinfulprobltm'dn Serbi~n ·SI,\jC'f!-'lo/> Srebian elites did not r~nouuce ·the Serbiun Mtionàl P,tosta.m ~i:l it$ as1jhï:ttians of territorial expansirn•l, though l'ecent messages tl~om the:•'lnternatiQqaJ comm~~if;Y iill:ll,~a~~ thatsuch illusioils have no prospects (Recent Agremel't.t ibëtween·Belgt:ade::and: ~.jsijt1n~) .Howcwer, ·s.erbian lef!ders stil.l kt:ep nourishing tlie.s~. itlusians ·vi~ a vis· B:asn:ia ... @nJy i.mernational cammunity can put an end to thsese aspiration~. 36;, ln the Just ten yeat·ss Serbia has itlade no eff()rt to etiter il;ito dlalo~ÙI! ·\:Vith.àtlY il)f the pill!ti~s ~6 the conflict with the object of ach·ie:ving;-recouCiU~~ion. Fê:r. Q.rie,·tJ.l'J(}f!; tliête ëân :b.~ ·.QO rç~onciliatiop with Croatia \\1hile a numbér of q.uestii:m~ atê.J~ijl.n:· u:As~lired~ 1hes.~ :question·s involve, amGng other issues~ the ~erbs ·silèiice âbôut'tfië·fate .off i,5'ùO.:m:i's-s1ng -Çt'bats. As· ~ëgards rehltions betw~en Belgr-ade aJJd Bô~J~fri, th~·statè o'f'afta[rs i.S eY.eit ·more 1.mcertain and comple.x. To begin with, the Dayton· Accords· ~sentially c~mert~ ~Qe d~féat of the victim, namely the MLislims. Dayton was fran'ied ·accétàiltg ta U1e·~ituation -· ·· --- ·- ···· ·· ·QJ~Jit.(l:::grQliJl.cl• l}(it tiQçgr 37. No attempt has been made to fnthorn the deep.er r6ots of Serb hatie.nalistn, which throughout the twenl:ieth· century threatened the survi:vf!l of' th!! 'fàrm~r Yttg()$hi\tia and fln ally was the principal cause of her break-up. histcad of 1'11nkh1g· a cl~(I.O'' break .w!th the, remnanls of Milosevi.c 1S. regime, new leaders perpet.uate: the ·sam:e po1icY, by ethe{ m-ean·~. Titey are awaiting cliffereTit internati-onal circumstanceà ainl êveti: ·a redtat-vh1& ·or: the .f?alkim map. According to Cosic, that would cre~te a:\·\'nr ror ethniè sia~es. GitizenS: nave l4 !f! .• .· .:~;·;: n.Qthing tQ lamert't, .for ·hl!rtdio/ kas crèàted an etlu1ic state; Adndttedb•, Gosic has not dei'ln~d its bpund.aries yêt. ~;~~ 'l·~ave. de~c~~~~d the hi.Stu~wat,. polttieal .and cultural èontext of the S~rbhn~ National :r-rowame and îts ·rt;tlé during the wa.r between 1991 and 1995. My firm v:iéw ls that thè Sed,.inn n.ational programl~e :was èr'uièal. for the tt'agic collapse of YugosJavia • .A.cço.tdi11gly, I b:eli:evë ·tbat it is •importa{lt to bear light on the Ser-b aspiraUons tô Yugo~la.via s.inçe its fo:ùildatii:m. 'By understanding thè nature of the Yugoslav wars ·jf. --!------..,cmfld:'-a:Js-o-b~lt.elpft~I-c.-o-8.etbta-nr.f.aÇê-[ts-owrne~ponsibilities-:and-thus-open-avenues-to•------l- ll"ermali~ath:m oflts r~lation with its neighboui'S. 39. l conclud~ my r~pPtt by co.ofirtnin.g that 1 under.stand my dutles to the ·court and tliat the ~njeptS .t;)Î~h.i.$ :r~péJ1:·-iire ba5ed Gli Li:l;y ow11 knowledge and expertise and are tr.ue to· thê !best o.P.:.m..y fhlpwledg~ an~ ben~r; . · · Stgnè-d! .(1.,.,_,""·~ ~~ . . D~ted: l.· rs ~;· . ·~ !: :.' . :. ''