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The Logic of Violence in Civil War Has Much Less to Do with Collective Emotions, Ideologies, Cultures, Or “Greed and Grievance” Than Currently Believed
P1: KAE 0521854091pre CUNY324B/Kalyvas 0 521 85409 1 March 27, 2006 20:2 This page intentionally left blank ii P1: KAE 0521854091pre CUNY324B/Kalyvas 0 521 85409 1 March 27, 2006 20:2 TheLogic of Violence in Civil War By analytically decoupling war and violence, this book explores the causes and dynamics of violence in civil war. Against prevailing views that such violence is either the product of impenetrable madness or a simple way to achieve strategic objectives, the book demonstrates that the logic of violence in civil war has much less to do with collective emotions, ideologies, cultures, or “greed and grievance” than currently believed. Stathis Kalyvas distinguishes between indis- criminate and selective violence and specifies a novel theory of selective violence: it is jointly produced by political actors seeking information and indi- vidual noncombatants trying to avoid the worst but also grabbing what oppor- tunities their predicament affords them. Violence is not a simple reflection of the optimal strategy of its users; its profoundly interactive character defeats sim- ple maximization logics while producing surprising outcomes, such as relative nonviolence in the “frontlines” of civil war. Civil war offers irresistible opportu- nities to those who are not naturally bloodthirsty and abhor direct involvement in violence. The manipulation of political organizations by local actors wishing to harm their rivals signals a process of privatization of political violence rather than the more commonly thought politicization of private life. Seen from this perspective, violence is a process taking place because of human aversion rather than a predisposition toward homicidal violence, which helps explain the para- dox of the explosion of violence in social contexts characterized by high levels of interpersonal contact, exchange, and even trust. -
West Lancashire Area (1939)]
10 May 2019 [WEST LANCASHIRE AREA (1939)] West Lancashire Area Regular Depots in the Area The South Lancashire Regiment (The Prince of Wales’s Volunteers) – Warrington The King’s Regiment (Liverpool) – Seaforth, Liverpool The Cheshire Regiment – Chester The South Staffordshire Regiment – Lichfield The North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales’s) – Lichfield Regular Troops in the Area Militia in the Area 12th Anti-Aircraft Depot – Saighton 18th Searchlight Depot – Saighton Territorial Army Troops in the Area th 6 Cavalry Brigade (1) The Cheshire Yeomanry (The Earl of Chester’s) The Staffordshire Yeomanry (Queen’s Own Royal Regiment) rd 23 Army Tank Brigade (2) 40th Royal Tank Regiment 46th Royal Tank Regiment Other Unbrigaded Units th 4 Bn. The Cheshire Regiment (3) th 5 (Earl of Chester’s) Bn. The Cheshire Regiment (4) th 6 Bn. The Cheshire Regiment (5) th 7 Bn. The Cheshire Regiment (6) th 106 Regiment (Lancashire Yeomanry), Royal Horse Artillery (7) (H.Q., 423rd (Lancashire Yeomanry) & 424th (Lancashire Yeomanry) Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery) th 149 Regiment (Lancashire Yeomanry), Royal Horse Artillery (8) (H.Q., 432nd & 433rd Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery) © w w w . B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y H istory.co.uk Page 1 10 May 2019 [WEST LANCASHIRE AREA (1939)] th nd 88 (2 West Lancashire) Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (9) (H.Q., 351st (11th West Lancashire) & 352nd (26th West Lancashire) Field Batteries, Royal Artillery) th 137 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (10) (H.Q., 349th (9th West Lancashire) & 350th (10th West -
CRETE 1941 EYEWITNESSED Anew Book by Costas Hadjipateras and Maria Fafalios
I NEW BOOKS CRETE 1941 EYEWITNESSED ANew Book by Costas Hadjipateras and Maria Fafalios By PATRICK LEIGH FERMOR In the Spectator The appearance of this book, 50 years after the outbreak of war, is very timely. The author-editors, Costas Hadjipate ras and Maria Fafalios, already well known for their records of Greece at war - Testimonies '40- '41 and Testim onies '40-'44 - have now, in Crete 1941 Eyewitnessed, brought their skillful and tar-ranging technique to bear on the great island of its title. There is something epic and unique about Crete and several things single out the German parachute invasion and its aftermath from similar sequences of episodes. One ofthese is the fact that the battle against the invaders, though it was lost in the end, was so hard-fought and destructive that it was the last as well as the first major parachute on slaught the Germans ever launched. The second feature was the spontaneous participation, in the absence on the mainland of the Fifth Cretan Division, of any Cretan of any age who could lay his hands on a gun. The grim pattern of resistance and reprisal was set from the moment the first enemy parachutist touched ground. This remarkable book is a well chosen, informal assembly of eye witness accounts, from a great array of participants: British and Greek soldiers, Australians, New Zealand and Empire troops, Cretan mountaineers, doctors, civilians and the invading Germans themselves. The best of these last are from Daedalus Returns, by Baron von der Heydte, who commanded the first parachute wave to be dropped. -
Contribution of Greece to the Victory of the Allies During Ww Ii
CONTRIBUTION OF GREECE TO THE VICTORY OF THE ALLIES DURING WW II Lt Colonel of Engineering Panayiotis Spyropoulos Historian of the History Directorate of Hellenic Army General Staff The peninsula of Greece has, since antiquity, been a point of confrontation be- tween East and West, as it constitutes an area of utmost strategic value, situated on the flanks of the main axis of operations in East-West direction and vice-versa. Who- ever occupies Greece can effortlessly with his forces harass the flanks or even the rear of troops operating along the aforementioned axis, control the sea line of com- munication from Gibraltar to Suez, and block from the west the sea route from the Black Sea to Propontis (Marmara) Sea, the Hellespont (Straits), the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The geo-strategic value of Greece has been dramatically enhanced during the XXth century, due to the rapid technological development of war equipment (as per the quote of sir Halford Mackinder on the «Heartland»). During the 2nd World War, Italy launched the attack against Greece, without informing its ally, Germany. Berlin was enraged by the Italian action and considered it «totally incoherent» and mistimed, because it was initiated just before wintertime, a season unsuitable for mountain operations, as well as just before the elections in the (still neutral) USA, providing Roosevelt with even more convincing arguments for go- ing to war. Moreover, it criticised the Italians refraining from any seaborne operation, a fact that facilitated the British in debarking on Crete and other islands, significant for their strategic importance; while they left them the margin to deploy in Thessalo- nica. -
Special Operations Executive - Wikipedia
12/23/2018 Special Operations Executive - Wikipedia Special Operations Executive The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was a British World War II Special Operations Executive organisation. It was officially formed on 22 July 1940 under Minister of Economic Warfare Hugh Dalton, from the amalgamation of three existing Active 22 July 1940 – 15 secret organisations. Its purpose was to conduct espionage, sabotage and January 1946 reconnaissance in occupied Europe (and later, also in occupied Southeast Asia) Country United against the Axis powers, and to aid local resistance movements. Kingdom Allegiance Allies One of the organisations from which SOE was created was also involved in the formation of the Auxiliary Units, a top secret "stay-behind" resistance Role Espionage; organisation, which would have been activated in the event of a German irregular warfare invasion of Britain. (especially sabotage and Few people were aware of SOE's existence. Those who were part of it or liaised raiding operations); with it are sometimes referred to as the "Baker Street Irregulars", after the special location of its London headquarters. It was also known as "Churchill's Secret reconnaissance. Army" or the "Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare". Its various branches, and Size Approximately sometimes the organisation as a whole, were concealed for security purposes 13,000 behind names such as the "Joint Technical Board" or the "Inter-Service Nickname(s) The Baker Street Research Bureau", or fictitious branches of the Air Ministry, Admiralty or War Irregulars Office. Churchill's Secret SOE operated in all territories occupied or attacked by the Axis forces, except Army where demarcation lines were agreed with Britain's principal Allies (the United Ministry of States and the Soviet Union). -
In a Rather Emotional State?' the Labour Party and British Intervention in Greece, 1944-5
ORE Open Research Exeter TITLE 'In a rather emotional state?' The Labour party and British intervention in Greece, 1944-5 AUTHORS Thorpe, Andrew JOURNAL The English Historical Review DEPOSITED IN ORE 12 February 2008 This version available at http://hdl.handle.net/10036/18097 COPYRIGHT AND REUSE Open Research Exeter makes this work available in accordance with publisher policies. A NOTE ON VERSIONS The version presented here may differ from the published version. If citing, you are advised to consult the published version for pagination, volume/issue and date of publication 1 ‘IN A RATHER EMOTIONAL STATE’? THE LABOUR PARTY AND BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1944-45* Professor Andrew Thorpe Department of History University of Exeter Exeter EX4 4RJ Tel: 01392-264396 Fax: 01392-263305 Email: [email protected] 2 ‘IN A RATHER EMOTIONAL STATE’? THE LABOUR PARTY AND BRITISH INTERVENTION IN GREECE, 1944-45 As the Second World War drew towards a close, the leader of the Labour party, Clement Attlee, was well aware of the meagre and mediocre nature of his party’s representation in the House of Lords. With the Labour leader in the Lords, Lord Addison, he hatched a plan whereby a number of worthy Labour veterans from the Commons would be elevated to the upper house in the 1945 New Years Honours List. The plan, however, was derailed at the last moment. On 19 December Attlee wrote to tell Addison that ‘it is wiser to wait a bit. We don’t want by-elections at the present time with our people in a rather emotional state on Greece – the Com[munist]s so active’. -
Explaining Irredentism: the Case of Hungary and Its Transborder Minorities in Romania and Slovakia
Explaining irredentism: the case of Hungary and its transborder minorities in Romania and Slovakia by Julianna Christa Elisabeth Fuzesi A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Government London School of Economics and Political Science University of London 2006 1 UMI Number: U615886 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615886 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 DECLARATION I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own. Signature Date ....... 2 UNIVERSITY OF LONDON Abstract of Thesis Author (full names) ..Julianna Christa Elisabeth Fiizesi...................................................................... Title of thesis ..Explaining irredentism: the case of Hungary and its transborder minorities in Romania and Slovakia............................................................................................................................. ....................................................................................... Degree..PhD in Government............... This thesis seeks to explain irredentism by identifying the set of variables that determine its occurrence. To do so it provides the necessary definition and comparative analytical framework, both lacking so far, and thus establishes irredentism as a field of study in its own right. The thesis develops a multi-variate explanatory model that is generalisable yet succinct. -
Hierarchischer Thesaurus 2018
HIERARCHISCHER THESAURUS 2018 AUTOREN VON THESAURUS: KOΟRDINATION UND REDAKTION DR. IASONAS CHANDRINOS UND DAS HISTORIKER-TEAM DR. ANTONIS ANTONIOU DR. ANNA MARIA DROUMPOUKI KERASIA MALAGIORGI BB Begrenzter Begriff AB Ausgedehnter Begriff VB Verwandter Begriff SH Bereich Hinweis AB Organisationen on1_1 VF Verwenden für BB 5/42 Evzonen Regiment on1_2 VB Nationale und Soziale Befreiung 5/42 Syntagma Evzonon (5/42 SE), militärischer Arm der SH Widerstandsorganisation EKKA. BB Jung-Adler on1_1108 VB Vereinigte Panhellenische Jugendorganisation Nationale Befreiungsfront SH Kinderorganisation der Nationalen Befreiungsfront Griechenlands (EAM). BB Antifaschistische Organisation der Armee on1_2123 Geheimorganisation, welche 1942-43 von den exilierten, griechischen Streitkräften im Nahen Osten gebildet wurde. Wurde von KKE-Funktionären geleitet und hatte tausende von Soldaten, Matrosen und Offizieren vereint, welche sich im Konflikt mit den Königstreuen befanden. Zweigstellen von ihr waren die Antifaschistische Organisation der Marine (AON) und die Antifaschistische Organisation der Luftwaffe (AOA). Wurde im April 1944, nach SH der Unterdrückung der Bewegung durch die Briten, aufgelöst. BB Jagdkommando Schubert on1_1116 VB Schubert, Fritz Paramilitärische Einheit der Wehrmacht, welche 1943-1944 auf Kreta und in Makedonien aktiv war und unter dem Befehl des Oberfeldwebels der Geheimen Feldpolizei (GFP) Fritz Schubert stand. Diese unabhängige Einheit bestand aus etwa 100 freiwilligen Griechen und ihre offizielle deutsche Bezeichnung lautete "Jagdkommando -
Military Entrepreneurship in the Shadow of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949)
JPR Men of the Gun and Men of the State: Military Entrepreneurship in the Shadow of the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) Spyros Tsoutsoumpis Abstract: The article explores the intersection between paramilitarism, organized crime, and nation-building during the Greek Civil War. Nation-building has been described in terms of a centralized state extending its writ through a process of modernisation of institutions and monopolisation of violence. Accordingly, the presence and contribution of private actors has been a sign of and a contributive factor to state-weakness. This article demonstrates a more nuanced image wherein nation-building was characterised by pervasive accommodations between, and interlacing of, state and non-state violence. This approach problematises divisions between legal (state-sanctioned) and illegal (private) violence in the making of the modern nation state and sheds new light into the complex way in which the ‘men of the gun’ interacted with the ‘men of the state’ in this process, and how these alliances impacted the nation-building process at the local and national levels. Keywords: Greece, Civil War, Paramilitaries, Organized Crime, Nation-Building Introduction n March 1945, Theodoros Sarantis, the head of the army’s intelligence bureau (A2) in north-western Greece had a clandestine meeting with Zois Padazis, a brigand-chief who operated in this area. Sarantis asked Padazis’s help in ‘cleansing’ the border area from I‘unwanted’ elements: leftists, trade-unionists, and local Muslims. In exchange he promised to provide him with political cover for his illegal activities.1 This relationship that extended well into the 1950s was often contentious. -
Tom Barnes' Greek Archive, 1942–45
Archived at the Flinders Academic Commons: http://dspace.flinders.edu.au/dspace/ This is the published version of the following article: Barnes, K 2019, 'Gorgopotamos and after: Tom Barnes' Greek archive 1942-45', Journal of Modern Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand) — Special Issue, pp. 163-185. Reproduced with permission of the publisher. © 2019 the author. Gorgopotamos and After: Tom Barnes’ Gree Are, 42–45 Katherine Barnes Cecil dward (Tom) arnes took part in the famous sabotage operation of the Gorgopotamos Bridge in November 1942 as leader of the demolition party. Remaining in Greece after the attack, he rose to become one of two Area Commanders for the Allied Military Mission in Greece. The archive he left behind at his death in 1952 includes over 1000 photos, war diaries, letters and reports, mainly relating to his experiences in Greece. This study demonstrates how these eye-witness records illuminate important aspects of these critical years in modern Greek history including the Gorgopotamos operation itself and the trek across Greece which followed, the “Animals” operation which was conducted to convince Hitler that the Allied landings would take place in Greece and distract his attention from Sicily, surrender overtures from the German commander in pirus General Hubert von Lanz), and the so-called first two rounds of Civil War in 1943 and 1944. ntrodton When Captain later Lieutenant-Colonel) “Tom” arnes was parachuted into Greece in late 194 at the age of 35 as one of three engineers for a Special Operations xecutive (SO mission against the German and Italian occupying forces, he had with him several small notebooks. -
Kriegsverbrechen Der Nazis
Kriegsverbrechen der Nazis Verbrechen der Wehrmacht (aus Wikipedia) Als Verbrechen der Wehrmacht werden Verbrechen bezeichnet, die Angehörige der Wehrmacht im Zweiten Weltkrieg begangen haben. Zu ihnen gehören Planung und Durchführung von Angriffs- und Vernichtungskrieg, Massenmorde an Zivilisten und als Partisanen Verdächtigten, Misshandlung und Ermordung von Kriegsgefangenen, Besatzungsverbrechen sowie die direkte und indirekte Teilnahme an Völkermorden, darunter dem Holocaust und dem Porajmos. Die Wehrmachtführung erliess verbrecherische Befehle, die gegen Normen des Kriegsvölkerrechts (Genfer Konventionen, Haager Landkriegsordnung und Gepflogenheiten des Krieges) verstiessen. Die juristische und politische Aufarbeitung dieser Verbrechen ist bis heute nicht abgeschlossen. In NS-Prozessen seit 1945 wurden nur wenige Verbrechen der Wehrmacht verhandelt. Sie wurden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland lange öffentlich bestritten oder verharmlost, ihre Strafverfolgung verschleppt und behindert. Wie viele einfache Soldaten an ihnen beteiligt waren, die Opferzahlen und die Motive der Täter sind bis heute umstritten. Verbrechensbereiche Verbrechen der Wehrmacht verteilen sich auf die Vorbereitung eines Angriffskriegs, der auf Vernichtung zielte, und tödliche Begleiterscheinungen und Folgen der Kriegführung. Ersteres geschah vor allem in Bezug auf Osteuropa, Letzteres geschah in und nach allen Eroberungskriegen der Wehrmacht, zuletzt auch beim Rückzug deutscher Truppen im "Altreich". Die Verbrechen erfolgten hauptsächlich in folgenden Bereichen: -
Churchill, Wavell and Greece, 1941*
Robin Higham Duty, Honor and Grand Strategy: Churchill, Wavell and Greece, 1941* In our previous works, then Capt. Harold E. Raugh and I took too limited a Mediterranean view of the background of the Greek campaign of 6-26 April 19411. Far from its being Raugh’s “disastrous mistake,” I argue that General Sir Archibald Wavell’s actions fitted both traditional British practice and the general policy worked out in London. In 1986 and 1987 I argued after long and careful thought since 1967 that Wavell went to Greece as part of a loyal deception of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, whose bellicose way at war was the antithesis of Wavell’s own professionalism. Further, whereas Raugh took the narrow military view, mine was a grand-strategic approach relating ends to means. My argument here is that a restudy of the campaign in Greece of 6-27 April 1941 utilizing the Orange Leonard ULTRA messages reconfirms my thesis that going to Greece was a deception and that far from being the miserable defeat which Raugh imagined, the withdrawal was a strategic triumph in the manner of a Wellington in Spain and Portugal or of the BEF’s in France in 1940. For this Wavell deserves full credit. In this respect, then, the so-called campaign in Greece must be seen not as an ignominious retreat in the face of superior forces, but rather as a skilful, carefully planned withdrawal and ultimate evacuation. It was a successful, though materially costly, gamble. * This paper was accepted for publication in late 2005 but delayed by the Balkan Studies financial crisis.