FILE COPY Report No. 3224-EA A Report on the International Transportation Bottlenecks Affecting Rwanda and Burundi

Public Disclosure Authorized Volume I

December 1980 Eastern Africa Projects Department Highways Division FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized

Document of the WMrid Bank

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients. only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY UNITS

Burundi - Franc Burundais (FBu) Kenya - Kenya Shilling (KSh) Rwanda - Franc Rwandais (FRw) Tanzania - Tanzania Shilling (TSh) Uganda - Uganda Shilling (USh)

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

US$1.00 = FBu 89.0 US$1.00 = KSh 8.0 US$1.00 = FRw 92.0 US$1.00 - TSh 8.0 US$1.00 = USh 7.4

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AfDB - African Development Bank AMI - Agence Maritime International CIDA - Canadian International Development Agency EARC - East Africa Railway Corporation EDF - European Development Fund EEC - European Economic Community FAC - Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation KfW - Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau ODA - Overseas Development Administration RBZ - Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire STIR - Societe des Transports Internationaux de Rwanda TRC - Tanzanian Railway Corporation UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNDP - United Nations Development Programme USAID - United States Agency for International Development FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION BOTTLENECKS AFFECTING RWANDA AND BURUNDI

Table of Contents

Page No.

Volume I

CHAPTER I: SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 1

Summary ...... 1 Specific Findings and Recommendations ...... 7

A. General Recommendation ...... 7 B. The Northern Route .. 7 C. The Southern Route ...... 9 D. Alternate Routes ...... 10

CHAPTER II: THE CURRENT EXTERNAL TRANSPORT SITUATION ...... 12

A. Background ...... 12 B. Transport Demand ...... 13 C. The Existing Transport Situation ...... 15 D. Existing Cost Structure ...... 20

CHAPTER III: ACTIONS UNDER WAY ...... 22

A. Projects to Improve Existing Routes ...... 22 B. Development of Alternate Routes ...... 24 C. Special Studies and Regional Efforts ...... 25

CHAPTER IV: RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS AND NEW CONSTRUCTION ...... 29

A. General Recommendation ...... 29 B. The Northern Route ...... 29 C. The Southern Route ...... 31 D. Air Transport ...... 32 E. Alternate Routes ...... 32 F. Benefits to Transit Countries ...... 34 G. Conclusion ...... 36

MAPS

- IBRD 14633 - Burundi Road Network - IBRD 14634 - Rwanda Road Network - IBRD 14635R1- Rwanda/Burundi International Transport Connections - IBRD 14636R2 - Rwanda/Burundi International Routes

This report was prepared by Maurice Le Blanc (Economist), Amarendra Bhattacharya (Economist) and Patricia Brereton (Writer/Editor). This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Table of Contents (Continued) Page No.

Volume II

ANNEXES

I. The Northern Route: Bujumbura-Kigali-Kampala-Nairobi-Mombasa

- Mombasa Port ...... 1 - The Road Link ...... 1

I. Road Infrastructure ...... 1

II. Traffic Handling and Road Transport ...... 3

III. Traffic Growth ...... 4

IV. Vehicle Regulations ...... 5

V. Road User Charges ...... 66......

VI. Customs Procedures ...... 6

VII. Visas ......

VIII. Actions Under Way ...... 7

A. Kenya ...... 7 B. Uganda ...... * 8 C. Rwanda/Burundi ...... 8

- The Kampala-Mombasa Rail Link ...... 8

I. Kenya Railways ...... 9

II. Uganda Railways ...... 11

III. Road/Rail Coordination for Transit Traffic ...... 11

II. The Southern Route: Bujumbura-Kigoma-Dar es Salaam .....o.... 12

- Dar es Salaam Port ...... 12 - Dar es Salaam-Kigoma Rail Line ...... 15 - Kigoma Port ...... 17 - Lake Transport ...... 18 - The Port of Bujumbura ...... 18

III. Rwanda: International Routes ...... 20

IV. The Isaka-Dar es Salaam Route ...... 24 Table of Contents (Continued)

TABLES

1. Transit Traffic as Proportion of Total Traffic 2. Rwanda - External Trade 3. Rwanda - Exports and Imports by Value: 1976-77 4. Rwanda - Volume of Exports by Country of Destination 5. Rwanda - Volume of Imports by Country of Origin 6. Rwanda - Volume of Exports by Type 7. Rwanda - Volume of Imports by Type 8. Rwanda - External Traffic by Route: 1977 9. Burundi - External Trade 10. Burundi - Exports and Imports by Value: 1975-77 11. Burundi - Volume of Exports by Country of Destination 12. Burundi - Volume of Imports by Coutry of OrigLn 13. Burundi - Volume of Exports by Type 14. Burundi - Volume of Imports by Type 15. Burundi - External Traffic by Route: 1977 16. Rwanda/Burundi - Structure of Exports 17. Rwanda/Burundi - Structure of Imports 18. Rwanda/Burundi - Origin of Imports 19. Rwanda - External Traffic Forecasts 20. Burundi - External Traffic Forecasts 21. Rwanda - Comparative Financial Costs for Transport of General Cargo Imports from Europe to Kigali 22. Burundi - Comparative Financial Costs for Transport of General Cargo Imports from Europe to Bujumbura 23. Disaggregated Financial Costs: Dar es Salaam--Bujumbura-Kigali 24. Disaggregated Financial Costs: Mombasa-Kigal:L-Bujumbura (all road) 25. Disaggregated Financial Costs: Mombasa-Kigali-Bujumbura (rail/road) 26. Charges at Indian Ocean Ports 27. Dar es Salaam Port Traffic: 1974-79 28. Mombasa Port Traffic: 1975-78 29. Kigoma Port Traffic 30. Kenya Railways: Details of the Mombasa-Nairobi-Malaba Line 31. Kenya Railways: Statistics on Equipment and Operating Performance 32. Kenya Railways: Freight Traffic 1971-78 33. Tanzania Railways: Details of the Central and Mwanza Lines 34. Tanzania Railways: Freight Traffic 1977-78 35. Northern Route: Operating Costs for 25-ton Tractor-Trailer Combination (Kigali-Mombasa-Kigali) 36. Northern Route: Road Transport Tariffs 37. Operating Costs - 707 Cargo Aircraft 38. ARNOLAC FLEET

CHAPTER I

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

1.01 Efficient and economic external transport is vital to the small landlocked countries of Rwanda and Burundi, both of which have large popula- tions in relation to their agricultural resources and limited domestic indus- trial production. They therefore must import industrial products as well as a'large proportion of their primary food requirements, while they export only about a third as much as they import.

1.02 At present, however, the transport planning capability of both countries is inadequate and has hampered the development of cohesive external transport policies. This has become a major problem since the transport corridors linking Rwanda and Burundi to the sea are subject to a wide range of problems which make transport slow and expensive. The distances involved are very long (over 1,400 km for Burundi and 1,700)km for Rwanda), and several countries must be transitted, all with different transport regulations and customs procedures. Very often, several transport modes must be used, which necessitates transshipment and results in delays. Political difficulties and border closures frequently choke off traffic altogether. But perhaps most important, the traffic generated by the two countries is currently quite low in both absolute terms (total external traffic for Burundi is about 140,000 tons and for Rwanda, 180,000 tons) and relative to the total traffic using the same routes. This means that Rwanda and Burundi can exert little influence over transport decisions made by the countries on which they rely.

1.03 Two main transport corridors currently ]ink Rwanda and Burundi to the Indian Ocean: the Bujumbura-Kigoma-Dar es Salaam southern route by lake and rail through Tanzania (1,428 km; primarily serving Burundi) and the all-road (or road/rail) northern route from Kigali. to Mombasa through Uganda and Kenya (1,740 km by road or 1,925 km by rail/road; primarily used by Rwanda). Both routes suffer from serious bottlenecks, including:

(a) on the northern route

-- the present inability to use the railway due to the deterioration of Uganda Railways and its lack of coordination with Kenya Railways;

-- the marked deterioration in the condition of the roads in Uganda and Kenya; and

-- the cumbersome and uncoordinated administrative procedures in each country for customs formalities, border charges, axle loading and vehicle licensing; - 2-

(b) on the southern route

-- the inconvenient layout of Kigoma Port and its lack of equipment;

-- the extremely poor operations of Tanzania Railways caused by weak management, poor communications and a shortage of rolling stock; and

-- the lengthy delays in handling traffic at Dar es Salaam Port.

The delays caused by these fundamental and continuing problems have been further lengthened by other developments such as the diversion of Zambian traffic to Dar es Salaam and most recently, the war between Uganda and Tanzania. As a result, supply shortages which were common in the past have become even more acute and have occasionally forced Rwanda and Burundi to rely on special airlifts for much of their imports.

Objectives of the Study

1.04 In view of these problems, there is a need to assess all external transport routes available to Rwanda and Burundi and to decide which represent the least-cost but reliable alternatives for the countries, at least in the medium term. That is the objective of the following report, which considers the condition of the routes found most economic, identifies any significant problems hampering traffic on these routes, and suggests short-, medium-, and long-term actions and policies which the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi might undertake to improve their access to ocean ports.

1.05 It must be acknowledged, however, that the present report has several limitations, the most basic of which is that it is not intended to be an all-encompassing assessment of the situation. As described in the original terms of reference, the report was only to (a) identify all transport studies which could be relevant in identifying external transportation possibilities for Rwanda and Burundi; (b) identify areas where no information is available and where additional information is needed; and (c) make recommendations to the two Governments on the steps that should be taken to alleviate the transport problem.

1.06 While the study has evolved into a more action-oriented document rather than a mere review of other studies, it still does not purport to examine all facets of the subject at'hand. That will be done in a very extensive study, now being carried out by UNCTAD, which will consider the international transport connections of Uganda and eastern Zaire as well as Rwanda and Burundi (see para. 1.21 for details). It is hoped that on comple- tion of the UNCTAD study, scheduled for late-1980, a conference of all the involved countries and the relevant donor agencies may be organized to con- sider the recommendations of both the UNCTAD and the Bank reports in order to assess possible investments in the area and to channel funds in the most effective manner. -3-

1.07 Furthermore, the lack of data in certain areas also imposed some limits on the report s scope. Since the study was carried out at the time of the Ugandan crisis, it was impossible to gather the information needed for more than a cursory discussion of Uganda's transport role. The UNCTAD study should, however, fill this gap, and its findings may modify some of the recommendations made here. There was also a lack of comprehensive data on traffic flows, operating costs on existing routes, and investment costs for proposed improvements and any new construction. Because of this, it was impossible to do a thorough benefit/cost analysis of investments on the routes; however, this is not considered a serious limitation since the Rwanda/Burundi traffic is too small to appreciably influence the economic feasibility of investments in other countries. Thus the recommendations here proposed pertain solely to the needs of Rwanda and Burundi and do not consider costs or benefits to the transitted countries. But even with these provisos, it is still possible at this time to isolate specific policy and investment needs and, with a view to improving the external transport situation of Rwanda and Burundi, to suggest actions which the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi might take to address those needs.

General Findings

1.08 All existing and potential international transport routes have been compared on the basis of cost, number of transshipinents, number of countries transitted and travel time; the completion of all required improvements or construction on the routes has been assumed. 1/ An evaluation of the com- parison reveals that the two existing surface routes now serving Rwanda and Burundi will continue to offer these countries, at least in the medium-term, the least-cost access to Indian Ocean ports. Only one alternate route, which will probably not be fully developed until 1985, would eventually provide Rwanda with a viable option to the existing northern route. The alternate route would consist of a road link (about 330 km) from Rusumo in Rwanda to the railway at Isaka in central Tanzania and thence to Dar es Salaam (982 km) by rail. Air transport to the port cities is currently competitive and will likely continue to be so until the existing surface routes are improved. However, air transport to Europe would be economic for only a small proportion of Rwanda's and Burundi's total traffic.

1.09 Of course, a major change in transport demand might alter this forecast and make other transport alternatives more competitive. But in the medium term at least, no such change is foreseen, and growth of external traffic for both countries is forecast to be moderate. Traffic levels will therefore probably remain small in both absolute and relative terms.

1/ The report does not consider routes to the Atlantic Ocean or to the south via Zambia because of the distances or costs involved which are greater than those for the routes to the Indian Ocean. The possibility of supplies originating in Zambia destined for Rwanda and Burundi via Mpulungu on Lake Tanganyika could in some cases provide an alternative to the traditional routes. A study being carried out by UNCTAD proposes to investigate this matter in greater detail. -4-

The Southern Route

1.10 Under prevailing conditions, then, the southern route should con- tinue to offer Burundi the least-cost alternative for external transport, although several major deficiencies should be corrected if this is to remain the case. The route, which consists of transport by barge from Bujumbura to Kigoma (175 km) and by rail from Kigoma to Dar es Salaam (1,255 km), handles most of Burundi's external traffic and a much smaller proportion of Rwanda's traffic (78% and 5%, respectively, in 1977). Service on the route has gener- ally been slow, but has been especially poor since 1977 when major bottlenecks developed at the Dar es Salaam Port, on the Tanzanian Railway, and to a lesser extent at the Port of Kigoma. The recent spate of problems originated with widespread congestion and prolonged delays at Dar es Salaam Port because of a doubling of Zambian traffic between 1975 and 1977. However, since mid-1978, when the situation at Dar es Salaam began to improve, the capacity of the railway weakened significantly, so that it was not able to evacuate all the transit cargo for Kigoma landed at Dar es Salaam Port. As a result, the backlog of Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire traffic at Dar es Salaam has steadily increased. Kigoma Port has also caused delays in the past because of its inconvenient layout and lack of adequate facilities, but the situation has improved somewhat because of a fall in traffic from Dar es Salaam. Thus, at present, the railway link is the main constraint to the effective capacity of the southern route.

The Northern Route

1.11 The northern route will remain important for Rwanda in the medium term, but it, too, has significant drawbacks. Passing through Uganda and Kenya to the Port of Mombasa, the route now carries about 90% of Rwanda's and 20% of Burundi's external traffic. Goods can be shipped all the way by road (1,740 km to Mombasa from Kigali; 2,025 km from Bujumbura), or partially by rail between Kampala and Mombasa (1,924 km in total between Kigali-Mombasa: 1,338 km by rail and 586 km by road).

1.12 The road/rail combination (with transshipment at Kampala or Malaba on the Ugandan border) is more economical than the all-road route and formerly carried the bulk of transit traffic, but its use declined during the de facto breakup of the East African Railways Corporation (1974-77) and the problems resulting therefrom (deterioration of the entire rail system, but especially that in Uganda; the loss of skilled personnel; and the lack of coordination between the Uganda and Kenya Railways). Since 1977, all transit traffic has gone by road.

1.13 Although longer and more expensive than the southern route for both Rwanda and Burundi, the northern all-road route has in the past been the quicker and more reliable of the two. Yet during the last two years several factors have made the route less reliable and transport costs much greater. Owing to the war in Uganda, the route was completely closed between November 1978 and May 1979, but even before the war, border closures between Uganda and Kenya were frequent and security in Uganda has been a constant problem. Furthermore, the physical condition of the entire road has deteriorated markedly, including the Kenyan portion which had previously been relatively good. This stems from an increase in traffic volumes, overloading of trucks, and inadequate maintenance and reconstruction in recent years. Finally, the transport of goods on the route involves lengthy customs and documentation procedures, expensive bonding of goods and high border tolls.

Air Transport

1.14 Because of the problems outlined above, both countries have recently been forced to place greater reliance on air transport, which at present offers the main alternative to the two dominant surface corridors. During the recent crisis in the region, both countries organized special airlifts for much of their imports. In order to secure more permanent service, Air Rwanda has purchased a Boeing-707 cargo aircraft and has begun operating 10 flights per week between Kigali and Mombasa and one weekly flight to Maastricht (Holland). To handle the increased traffic expected over the next few years, both the Kigali and Bujumbura airports will need improvement and expansion, including improvements in facilities for freight handling and strengthening of runways to handle heavier wide-bodied aircraft. In the short term and in times of crisis, air transport is the only alternative which can overcome the closure or the reduced efficiency of existing surface routes, and for both countries, an air/sea link to Europe (air link to the Indian Ocean Ports and to Europe by sea) is at present fairly cost competitive with the all-surface route, especially the northern route. However, an all-air route to Europe would be economic for only a small proportion of Rwanda's and Burundi's total traffic.

Alternate Surface Routes

1.15 In spite of the drawbacks of existing surface and air routes, only one other option, the road/rail route through Rusumo and Isaka to Dar es Salaam (1,478 km), could rival the existing routes. The proposed route would be particularly useful to Rwanda, which would gain an additional external artery involving transit through only one country. A road from Kigali to Rusumo has already been completed, and construction of 93 km of the 332 km Rusumo-Isaka road has begun. Financing will also probably be available for another 60 km, but no arrangements have been made for the remainng 179 km. Completion of the route is economically justified on the basis of Rwandese traffic alone.

1.16 The other surface routes identified would involve various combina- tions of transport across Lake Victoria to the Ports of Kisumu in Kenya or to Mwanza or Musoma in Tanzania, and thence to the Indian Ocean Ports.

1.17 Development of these routes at the present time was found inadvis- able, generally because the level of traffic for Rwanda and Burundi is too small in both absolute and relative terms to justify additional investments in transport infrastructure which would only serve to dilute the traffic using each route and render them all uneconomic. More specifically:

(a) the low level of external traffic generated by Rwanda and Burundi makes investment costs per ton very high for substantially new transport arteries;

(b) maintenance of infrastructure and operation of installations, in which transit countries have little interest, is likely to be a problem; - 6 -

(c) with investments already having been made on several routes, the marginal cost of developing yet another route is high; and

(d) the Lake Victoria link poses particular problems, including erratic weather on the Lake and uncertainties about the stability of relations between Tanzania and Kenya (borders are presently closed).

Actions Under Way

1.18 Several projects which should significantly improve the current situation are already being either prepared or implemented. On the northern route, road improvement and maintenance programs are under way in Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi, and a similar program is being prepared by Uganda. Kenya is also in the process of preparing a railway improvement project, for partial Bank Group financing, which includes construction of the much-needed trans- shipment facilities at Malaba on the Kenya-Uganda border; the relationship of the Kenya and Uganda Railways will probably be discussed in relation to this project. Furthermore, to assist the recovery of Uganda Railways the Bank will finance a short-term "critical improvement" program under a proposed Program Loan scheduled for 1980, and is also willing to help Government prepare a medium-term railway investment plan which could be the basis for a possible project to be jointly financed within the next two to three years. If arrangements to improve Uganda Railways proceed as planned, the physical condition of the northern route would generally be restored to its former level, although certain other measures would still be required, including simplification of the cumbersome road transport procedures; improvement of Rwanda's presently deficient trucking capacity; paving of the Kabale-Gatuna road (21 km) in Uganda; and establishment of customs facilities at Gatuna.

1.19 For the southern route, port projects are being prepared for both Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, while several financing agencies are assisting Tanzania to upgrade the Central Line of its railway, which will also receive Bank assistance under a project proposed for 1982. These efforts should begin to improve service on the route, but much more will be needed if real operating efficiency is to be achieved. Development of the railway will obviously require a long-term commitment, while several lesser constraints have yet to be addressed: barge service on Lake Tanganyika is hampered by obsolete equipment and poor management; coordination of transport modes at Kigoma Port is still poor; and productivity at Dar es Salaam Port is low and leads to cargo congestion at the Port. In addition, the Government of Burundi has plans to expand its international road transport capacity in order to use the northern route to a greater extent, but has not fully considered the high cost of this policy.

1.20 Assistance in developing air transport and in constructing the principal alternate surface route has also been offered. The French Govern- ment is likely to provide the financing needed to upgrade the internatLonal airports at both Kigali and Bujumbura, while the African Development Bank is helping to finance partial construction of the Rusumo-Isaka road link. - 7 -

1.21 And, in preparation for further action, several studies are being undertaken, the most relevant and comprehensive of which is the UNCTAD study on the international transport connections of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and eastern Zaire. Under the umbrella of the one study, experts in a variety of specialized transport fields are investigating a broad range of topics, such as: the effects of containerization; the role of the proposed transshipment facility at Malaba; the effect of unit trains on both the northern and southern route; and the possible effects of developing a rail/ferry service between Uganda and Tanzania. UNCTAD has also proposed providing technical assistance to the transport sector in Uganda, but no decision has yet been made on this.

Specific Findings and Recommendations

1.22 Clearly, a substantial start has already been made to defining and correcting the regional transport problems which have had such dispropor- tionate effects on Rwanda and Burundi. However, as identified in the fore- going, a number of problems have still not been acldressed, and it is to fill these gaps that the following recommendations are proposed:

A. General Recommendation

1. Improved Transport Planning: Because Rwanda and Burundi currently lack the capacity to adequately carry out transport planning and coordination, it is recommended that the Govern- ments of both countries seek technical assistance to help them set up the necessary planning units within their respec- tive transport ministries and to train local counterparts to take over responsibility for transport planning in due course. It goes without saying that this recommendation would also be directed to the transited countries where applicable.

B. The Northern Route

Short Term

1. Simplification of Procedures: In order to alleviate the problems created by overly complex and cumbersome procedures, it is recommended that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi request UNCTAD to assign a procedures expert as soon as possible for a minimum period of one year to (i) review present procedures (including customs formalities, bonding, vehicle licensing and axle loading regulations); (ii) form- ulate proposals for simplification and streamlining; and (iii) assist the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi in subsequent discussions with the Governments of the transit countries and in negotiating the necessary operating and traffic agreements.

2. International Transport Coordination: While bilateral com- mittees already exist at the official level in most of the transited countries, in order to ensure the smooth flow of goods from East African ports to their destination, it is recommended that the Government of Rwanda set up the - 8 -

necessary working level committees with the governments of transit countries to monitor and expedite the movement of goods to their final destination in Rwanda and provide the necessary follow up mechanisms required to facilitate communications when problems arise.

3. Paving of the Kabale-Gatuna Road: The 21 km Kabale-Gatuna road in Uganda is the only unpaved section of the Kampala- Kigali road. Since paving this section would help to further reduce transport costs, it is recommended that the Govern- ments of Rwanda and Burundi explore with the Government of Uganda the prospects for carrying out this work as soon as possible. A detailed design study for the road has been completed and bidding documents prepared; thus, the dis- cussion should focus on possible sources of financing, and steps should then be taken to secure financing.

4. Customs Facilities at Gatuna: In addition to the preceding, it is recommended that the Governments of Rwanda and Burundi explore with the Government of Uganda the possibility of estab- lishing customs facilities at Gatuna (in Uganda) for clearance of imports and exports and that they agree on a timetable for the construction and establishment of such facilities.

Medium Term

5. Improvement of Rwanda's International Road Transport Performance: Rwanda's most important international trucking company is the Societe des Transports Internationaux de Rwanda (STIR), which is 80% Government-owned and 20% multinationally- owned. STIR's performance is currently hampered by an obsolete fleet and a lack of managerial and operational capabilities. It is therefore recommended that the Government of Rwanda arrange for a study to be made on improving STIR's performance, which would include, inter alia, an estimate of the number and type of trucks to be purchased, identification of technical assistance needs, specification of a staff training program, and detailed cost estimates for the total package. The study could thereafter form the basis for subsequent discussions with donor countries and agencies on financing STIR's improvement program.

6. Maximize Rail System Utilization: Since the railway offers a lower cost alternative to road transport on the northern route, it is recommended that the Government of Rwanda explore with Kenyan and Ugandan officials the possibility of their negotiating the necessary operating agreements to allow through rail service between Kampala and Mombasa. However, since the rehabilitation of the Ugandan rail system may take some time, the construction of transshipment facilities at Malaba in Kenya within the very near future would offer a satisfactory intermediate solution. This construction is currently not scheduled to begin until 1982; it is therefore recommended that the Government of Rwanda discuss the possi- bility of advancing this construction with the Government of Kenya. Optimally, certain other improvements to the rail system for the benefit of Rwanda and Burundi would also be desirable, but such investments could not be justified by the traffic levels generated by the two countries.

7. Provide Adequate Warehouse Facilities: In order to ensure the most efficient modal transfer of goods for import and export traffic, it is recommended that the Government of Rwanda carry out the necessary studies to identify and prepare for the con- struction of any warehouses that may be required at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam and at intermediate points on the Northern and on the proposed Isaka routes. Where needed, these facilities should be efficiently designed to keep the handling of goods at a minimum in order to ensure an efficient flow of traffic from origin to destination.

C. The Southern Route

Short Term

1. Because of operational problems resulting from lack of coor- dination among the transport agencies using Kigoma Port, it is recommended that the Governments of Burundi and Tanzania set up a Working Committee comprising the Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC), the Agence Maritime International (AMI), and ARNOLAC, the lake transport company, to monitor and expedite the flow of traffic through the port of Kigoma, along the Central Rail line and through the port of Dar-es-Salaam. The committee would be responsible to the Bilateral official level committee already in existence and would help improve the communications on a day to day basis if and when problems occur.

Medium Term

1. The efficiency of this route is primarily constrained by poor operations on TRC's main line from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma. CIDA is currently studying TRC's operational problems, and it is recommended that the Government of Burundi liaise with the Government of Tanzania on the findings of the CIDA study with a view to identifying actions that can be taken immediately to improve the flow of Burundi goods on the rail link to Dar es Salaam.

2. Since operations of Dar es Salaam Port are still hampered by low productivity, it is recommended that the Governments of Burundi and Rwanda explore with the Government of Tanzania ways and means to correct this problem. Furthermore, to prevent the recurrence of Port congestion which largely resulted from the unpredictable fluctuations of Zambian traffic, planning of future investments or improvements for the Port should take into account the needs of transit traffic. - 10 -

3. Kigoma Port: Because of the importance of Kigoma Port as a major modal transfer point on the southern route, it is recommended that the Government of Burundi coordinate with the Government of Tanzania and the EEC to speed up the implementation of the Kigoma Port project.

4. Improving ARNOLAC's Performance: The performance of ARNOLAC is hampered by obsolete equipment and a lack of managerial and operational capabilities. It is recommended that the Government of Burundi arrange for a study to be made of measures needed to improve ARNOLAC's performance or that it can operate on a commercial basis, and investigate the possibility of obtaining financial assistance for the pur- chase of new, more efficient barges for lake transport between Kigoma and Bujumbura. However, any decision to renew all or part of the lake fleet should await the outcome of UNCTAD's study which will investigate the various alternatives and modal com- binations for the movement of goods between the two ports.

5. Because of the distance involved in road transport from Mombasa to Bujumbura and the consequently high transport costs, it is recommended that the Government of Burundi should continue to use the southern route as its principal external artery and therefore should limit the size of INTRACO (Burundi's International Road Transport Company) to its existing capacity, which is adequate. Any expansion of INTRACO could be justified only if the cost of using the northern route should significantly decline with the reopening of the northern rail link.

6. Provide Adequate Warehouse Facilities: In order to ensure efficient handling of goods and to keep losses at a minimum, it is recommended that any necessary warehouses should be planned and built in conjunction with the development of the country's major transport routes.

Long Term

1. Improvement of TRC's Central Line: Because of the major role played by the railway on the southern route, it is recommended that the Government of Burundi continue to impress on the Government of Tanzania the importance of the Central Line to Burundi's international transport and the need to continue the rehabilitation and improvement program already begun.

D. Alternative Routes

Isaka Route

1. Because of the importance of the Isaka route to Rwanda both as an alternate and a least-cost route, it is recommended that the Government of Rwanda continue Its efforts with the Government of Tanzania and donor agencies to ensure rapid completion of this economically justifiable route. Financing needed to complete the route should be sought on a priority basis.

Air Transport

1. Air Rwanda: In view of existing bottlenecks and the relatively long time required to substantially improve the southern route, it is recommended that the Government of Burundi explore with the Government of Rwanda the joint use of Air Rwanda's recently purchased B-707 in an attempt to increase the aircraft's utilization and reduce per ton costs of air freight. In addition, the Government of Rwanda should seek technical assistance to help in the management of its airline and to ensure the efficient marketing and utilization of its cargo capacity. Such technical assistance should also advise Government on the steps to be taken should it be demonstrated that the present aircraft cannot be economically operated under the existing or potential transport alternatives.

2. Emergency Transport: Because air transport is the only alter- native in the short term which can overcome the closure or reduced efficiency of existing surface routes, it is recommended that both Governments prepare contingency plans for air trans- port, to be used in times of crisis when other transport options are not available.

3. Aircraft Leasing: Air transport is competitive for only certain types of commodities, and even this level of competitiveness will probably decrease as the traditional surface routes are improved. It is therefore recommended that investment in Rwandese or Burundese carriers should be'discouraged since it would be done prudent to lease aircraft without any long-term commitments.

Benefits to Transit Countries

1.23 It has not been possible to precisely quantify the direct and indirect benefits which would accrue to transit countries from the actions recommended in this report. Still, a gross estimate of their transport- related earnings from Rwanda and Burundi (i.e., customs duties, haulage costs, etc.) indicates that in 1977 Kenya earned US$21.3 million, Uganda US$5.5 million, and Tanzania US$5.9 million. In addition, earnings to transit countries from goods exported to Rwanda and Buruncli were as follows in 1977: Kenya, US$18.5 million; Tanzania, US$9.5 million; and Uganda, US$1.2 million.

Conclusion

1.24 In summary it can be said that even in the short to tedium term, a substantial number of improvements to the two existing routes could benefit - 12 -

Rwanda and Burundi without major investments in infrastructure. In the medium term, a number of projects either recently begun or in an advanced stage of preparation will markedly improve the situation. And for the longer term, railway improvements in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania will considerably benefit Rwanda and Burundi as well. Unfortunately, implementation of these projects cannot be advanced solely for the benefit of the two countries. These findings should, of course, be viewed in conjunction with the results of the UNCTAD study expected at the end of this year. At that time, it would be appropriate to set up a conference of all interested parties to review the situation in the light of the new information available and subsequently to agree on a plan of action.

CHAPTER II

THE CURRENT EXTERNAL TRANSPORT SITUATION

A. Background

2.01 Rwanda and Burundi are extremely poor, landlocked countries situated great distances from the nearest Indian Ocean ports. Though very small in size (10,169 sq mi and 10,747 sq mi, respectively), they are the most densely populated countries in Africa, Rwanda with about 433 inhabitants per square mile in 1977 and Burundi with 391. The population growth rate has also been rather high in both countries; during 1970-77, Rwanda's population increased by 2.9% p.a. and Burundi's by 1.9% p.a.

2.02 Both economies are currently dominated by subsistence agriculture, and exports are less than a third of imports. Coffee, the principal export, comprises about 73% of Rwanda's and Burundi's total exports (see Tables 6 and 13); consequently, with the exception of the coffee season, trade flows are unbalanced, which results in higher transport costs. Virtually all exports are destined for Europe and the United States.

2.03 Imports are obtained from both regional and international sources, although even regional imports utilize international routes since they mainly originate in Mombasa, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam. Regionally imported goods, which comprise over 50% of total imports, include oil (increasingly refined at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam), food products and intermediate goods. Almost all other imports come from Europe and consist mainly of capital goods and manufactured consumer goods (Tables 7 and 14). Primary and intermediate goods account for over 80% of total imports to both countries.

2.04 Although the external trade of both countries has grown quite rapidly in recent years (13.4% p.a. in Rwanda during 1974-78, and 7.8% p.a. in Burundi during the same period, see Tables 2 and 9), total tonnage still remains small in absolute terms. During 1976-78, Rwanda's imports averaged 156,000 tons a year and exports 36,000 tons, while in Burundi imports averaged 109,000 tons a year and exports 27,000 tons. - 13 -

2.05 At present, most of this traffic is carried on either of two trans- port routes; one, a northern all-road route via Kampala to Mombasa, which is principally used by Rwanda, and the other, a southern lake/rail connection via Kigoma to Dar es Salaam, used by Burundi. The following table indicates the level of Rwanda/Burundi traffic on the various external routes.

Rwanda/Burundi - External Traffic Flows: 1977 (-000 tons)

Northern Southern Route /1 Route /1 Other /2 Total

Rwanda 151 8 12 171 (% by route) (88) (5) (7) (100)

Burundi 15 106 - 136 (% by route) (22) (78) - (100)

Traffic by route 166 114 27 307 (% of total traffic of both countries) (54) (37) (9) (100)

/1 Includes external trade with transit countries along the route. 77 Consists of air freight to Europe, intra Rwanda/Burundi trade, and external trade with Zaire and Zambia.

Note: Because of capacity problems on the southern route, the bulk of Burundi's oil imports is now coming from Nairobi, and a greater proportion of general cargo imports is also being routed through Mombasa.

B. Transport Demand

2.06 Total external trade in terms of volume grew at a rate of 9.2% in Rwanda during 1970-78 and 5.4% in Burundi during the same period (Tables 2 and 9), but most of the increase resulted since 1975 and has largely been due to an annual 12% growth in imports to both countries since that year. This reflects a significant improvement in the terms of trade, a higher level of foreign aid and some export growth in volume termEs.

2.07 In the future, however, external trade is forecast to increase at a more moderate pace than in recent years (see Tables 19 and 20). By 1990, imports to Rwanda are projected to reach about 320,000 tons and exports 73,000 tons, while for Burundi, imports are forecast to rise to about 235,000 tons and exports to 62,000 tons. Although both Governments would like to decrease the growth of imports by means of import substitution, possibilities - 14 -

for realizing this goal are limited, especially for industrial products, owing to: (a) the small size of domestic markets; (b) the countries' limited absorptive capacity due to the low level of domestic savings and lack of skilled staff; and (c) their few resource endowments.

2.08 The Governments are particularly interested in the domestic produc- tion of cement, which is now entirely imported, since external sources of supply are erratic (particularly for Burundi) and prices have doubled during the last year, reflecting acute shortages and the large increase in transport- ation costs. A cement plant is under consideration in Rwanda, but both the production timetable and the level of output remain uncertain because of problems with the quality and volume of raw material. In Burundi, a pre- liminary geological survey by UNDP has revealed some limestone deposits, but further studies are needed to determine the commercial viability of the deposits. While efforts to develop domestic cement production should continue, it is unlkely that either Rwanda or Burundi will attain self-sufficiency in the medium term.

-2.09 ' Both countries are particularly interested in developing their agricultural sectors in order to decrease imports and expand exports. Food imports excluding salt (mostly cereals and grains) now account for 15-20% of their total imports, whereas agricultural exports constitute 90% of total exports. It will not, however, be easy to change the existing situation since almost all potential agricultural land is already utilized and any increase in agricultural production would only result from improved yields and multiple cropping. Furthermore, given the rapid population growth rate, domestic agricultural production would have to increase dramatically for imports to decline.

2.10 Apart from agricultural products, the only other important exports are minerals, which have stabilized at relatively low levels in both coun- tries. No complete mineral surveys have yet been carried out, and so far the only known potentially exploitable resources are the nickel deposits in southeastern Burundi. Although a preliminary study for the development of these deposits has already been done, 1/ actual project implementation is unlikely for several years. 1

2.11 Certain regional developments could also affect Rwanda's and Burundi's demand for external transport, but again, only in the long term. Reconstruction and stabilization of the Ugandan economy would obviously be of major importance, and the rehabilitation of the cement plant at Hima in western Uganda would particularly alter current traffic flows. Similarly, the planned industrialization of Tanzania-s Lake Victoria region could be significant, especially with the development of an additional southern access route via Isaka in Tanzania (para. 3.11). But this, like the other factors already enumerated, is extremely uncertain and at best long-range. Under existing conditions, then, external traffic levels will continue to be low in both absolute and relative terms, and will continue to be highly imbalanced, with imports far exceeding exports.

1/ Ralph M. Parsons Co., "General Prefeasibility Study," Burundi Nickel Development Project, July 1978. - 15 -

C. The Existing Transport Situation

2.12 The importance of transport in the economie:3 o£ Rwanda and Burundi is not reflected in the institutions which are responsible for this sector of the economy. While both countries have fairly well organized public works ministries to deal with roadi conlstruction and mainl:enance, there is a lack of overall transport planning capability. This is due in part to the lack of suit- ably qualified local manpower and the fact that past planning efforts have been directed primarily at developing a domestic road network.

2.13 All of Rwanda's and Burundi's external traffic is now carried on two surface routes or by air transport; however, none of these alternatives is currently without major problems. The costs and obottlenecks of the exist- ing surface routes are summarized in the table on pages 16-17, and detailed descriptions of the two routes are given in Annexes I and II.

The Northern Route

2.14 The northern route through Uganda and Kenya to the Port of Mombasa at present carries about 90% of Rwanda's and 20% of Burundi's external traf- fic. Goods are shipped all the way by road (1,740 km to Mombasa fro-n Kigali; 2,025 km from Bujumbura), although a partial rail 'Link between Kampala and Mombasa also exists (rail link: 1,335 km; total K:Lgali-Mombasa; 1,924 km). The rail connection is no longer operational because of the progressive deterioration of Uganda Railways since the breakup of the EARC, the inadequate capacity (until recently) of Kenya Railways, and the lack of coordination between Uganda and Kenya Railways.

2.15 Althoutgh longer and more expensive than the southern route (for both Rwanda and Burundi), the northern link is considerably more reliable than the southern route and takes less than a thir,1 the time owing to its greater capacity. Nevertheless, certain problems constrain efficient transport and give rise to high costs, the most prominent being:

(a) the volatile situation in Uganda and poor secucity within the country;

(b) a marked deterioration in the condition of the road. In response, Kenyan authorities have imposed stricter controls on axle load limits, but in the short run this has further added to costs;

(c) complex and cumbersome procedures (including castoms formal- ities, border charges, axle-loading and vehicle licensing) which have added to costs directly, necessitated expensive forwarding overheads, and generally reduced competition in road transport;

(d) the inability of heavy traffic to use the most direct route ,between Kampala and Kigali due to the weight restrictions on the Kabale-Gatuna road (21 km) in Uganda and the lack of Ugandan customs facilities at Gatuna; and SUMMARY OF BOTTLENECKS AND COSTS ON EXISTING SURFACE ROUTES

Present Costl/ Time taken Capacity US$/ton (each way) Remarks

1. a. NORTHERN ROUrE (all road)

1. Mombasa Port 250,000 tons/month 43 2/ 1 week At present excess capacity; Rwanda/ (general cargo) (50)- Burundi traffic only 3.5% of total traffic; future capacity will depend on growth of Ugandan traffic.

2. Transshipment at Mombasa -- 42 1 week - I month Consignments organized by forwarders.

3. Forvarders' Services - 60 -- Residual imputed to forwarders.

4. Road Transport about 500 trucks opera- No capacity constraints except sometimes (Mombasa-Kigali) ting internationally 185 1 week during coffee season; some road failures (12,000 tons/month each in the past involving lengthy detours; way) Uganda borders close at dusk.

5. Weighbridges -- $108 for first ton in Currently two weighbridges operational excess of legal limit 6 hours to in Kenya; two more proposed for trunk $230 for second ton 2 days rouce; one at Malaba in Uganda rarely $270 for every sub- used. sequent ton

6. Kenya/Uganda customs -- 16 ) 125% CIF value charged by forvarders for ) 8-12 hours customs bonding,

7. Border fees/licenses -_ 25 ) Assuming Rwandeae truck; international transport licences for Uganda and Kenya have to be obtained for each truck.

8. Rvanda Customs -- 25 1 day Except for a small proportion of traffic (2-4 hours at border for Gisenyi/Ruhengeri. all traffic must post) go to the Central Customs depot at Kigali; 2% service charge.

9. Road Transport about 125 trucks operating (Kigali-Bujumbura) on this segment (3000 91 1 day Road still mostly unpaved. tons/month each way)

10. Burundi Customs 38 1 day Customs centralized at Bujumbura; 3% statistical charge.

1. b. NORTHERN ROUTE (rail/road)

All items same as above except 2 and 4

Mumbasa-Malaba 37 3 days Till now not sufficient capacity (Kenya Railways) for R/B traffic.

2- Halaba-Kampa1a 18 I day Coordination with KR (Uganda Railways) Operations of UR itself.

4- Transshipment (either at 38 Facilities exist at Kampala but unused; Malaba or Kampala) facilities planned at Halaba for 1982.

Malaba-Kigali 100 3 days

Kampala-Kigali 72 2 days (road transport)

3 1/ General cargo imports, I ton - 2m , CIF value $1250/ton 2/ For Burundi. SUMMARY OF BOTTLENECKS AND COSTS ON EXISTING SURFACE ROUTES (Continued)

Present Cost Time taken Capacity USS/ton (each way) Remarks

II. SOUTHERN ROUTE

1. Dar es Salaam Port 19,000 tons/month 13 3-6 veeks Low productivity and lack of normally equipment has been a problem; Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire traffic only 6.5% of total; effective capacity depends crucially on level of Zambian traffic.

2. AMI Handling at -- Dar Port 5 1-3 weeks Handling efficient; constrained in storage by wagon availability and if wagons limited storage space (12,000 available tons).

3. Customs -- -- procedures completed at time of No problems. loading onto vagons

4. Forwarders' Services -- 26 -- Imputed as residual. 4

5. Tanzania Railway 6,000 tons/month 42 14-21 days Locomotive availability and to some actual transit extent shortage of rolling stock time main constraints.

6. Kigoma Port 18,000 tons/month 10 3-7 days Inconvenient layout- nd inadequate equipment; interlinked with avail- ability of barges; includes traffic from Zaire (6,000 tons/month).

7. Lake Transport 5,000 dwt 10 I day Much of the fleet obsolete; must also handle occasional shipments from Zaire and Zambia

8. Port of Bujumbura 12,500 tons/month (single shift) 6 1-3 days Adequate capacity. - 18 -

(e) the inadequacies of Rwanda's major trucking company, the Societe des Transports Internationaux de Rwanda (STIR), which suffers from obsolete equipment and a lack of managerial and operational capabilities.'

The Southern Route

2.16 The southern route consists of transport by barge from Bujumbura to Kigoma (175 km) and by rail from Kigoma to Dar es Salaam (1,255 km); about 80% of Burundi's external traffic and 5% of Rwanda's traffic were handled on the route in 1977.

2.17 Service on the southern route is constrained by three bottlenecks: Dar es Salaam Port, the Tanzanian Railways, and Kigoma Port.

(a) Although the situation at Dar es Salaam Port has improved substantially with the diversion of Zambian traffic to South African ports, low 'productivity still causes lengthy delays in the handling of-traffic. Furthermore, if Zambian traffic flows were re-directed to Dar es Salaam, the Port's capacity would again be overtaxed.

(b) The most severe bottleneck on this route is the rail line spanning Tanzania. The inadequate capacity of the line has resulted from, inter alia, weak management, a shortage of rolling stock, particularly locomotives, and poor communications.

(c) Operations at Kigoma Port have suffered from the Ports layout and lack of equipment which cause periodic congestion and backups. These problems have been exacerbated by the lack of coordination among the railway, AMI (which operates the Port), and ARNOLAC, the lake transport company.

(d) Finally, and of less urgency, the performance of ARNOLAC is hampered by an obsolete barge fleet and a lack of managerial and operational capabilities.

Air Transport

2.18 Air freight transport for Rwanda and Burundi was relatively insig- nificant until the last few years when events beyond the two countries' control forced them to turn to air as an alternative to surface transport.

2.19 While the airports at Kigali and Bujumbura are now equipped to operate on a 24-hour basis, they do not yet conform to international standards in all respects. Their runways are only equipped to handle aircraft up to the B-707 type and would need widening and strengthening to handle large wide-bodied aircraft of the B-747 and DC-10 types. Cargo terminals and proper loading and unloading facilities are needed, since existing storage and handling facilities for air freight are inadequate and inefficient. Furthermore, customs procedures for goods clearance are slow and cumbersome. - 19 -

The French Government has already financed studies for the improvement of both airports and will finance about 50% of the tot:al program for each facility.

2.20 Air freight traffic for both countries is presented in the follow- ing table. Since 1974, Rwanda's total air freight has increased sevenfold, largely due to the coffee airlift to Mombasa begun in 1977. For Burundi, total traffic increased by only two and one-half times, since the southern route serving Burundi remained open while Rwanda was faced with the problems in Uganda and the very high cost of road transport on the northern route.

Air Freight Traffic (thousands of tons)

Rwanda

Exports Imports Total (% of total (% of totaL (% of.total exports) imports) traffic)

1-974 1.19 1.25 2.44 (0.3%) (0.1%) (1.83%)

1975 4.27 2.52 6.69 (.11.8*) (1.9%) (4.0%)

1976 3.91 1.82 5.73 (8.3X) (1.2%) (3.0%)

1977 9.80 2.88 12.68 (31.5%) (2.1%) (7.4%)

1978 11.33 8.00 19.33 (39.0%) (4.3%) (8.8%)

Burundi

1974 0.52 0.68 1.20 (1.95%) (0.8%) (0.1%)

1975 0.43 0.64 1.07 (1.4%) (0.8%) (0.9%)

1976 0.44 0.80 1.24 (1.6%) (0.9%) (1.1%)

1977 0.60 1.19 1.79 (2.9%) (1.0%) (1.3%)

1978 1.38 1.61 2.99 (4.3%) (1.3%) (1.9%) - 20 -

2.21 More recently (May to July 1979), due to a severe backlog of freight at Dar es Salaam Port, Burundi was also forced to use air transport in order to obtain much-needed imports. A total of 144 chartered flights brought in more than 5,000 tons of goods, returning empty to Dar es Salaam to reduce turnaround time and permit three flights per day. This operation was partly financed by the European Development Fund. Unfortunately, a shortage of funds forced the airlift to end prematurely, leaving 20,000 tons of Burundi freight still at the port.

Air Rwanda

2.22 Air Rwanda has recently purchased a Boeing-707 cargo aircraft and begun operating 10 flights per week between Kigali and Mombasa and one weekly flight to Maastricht (Holland). In'a study on the feasibility of operating this aircraft, it is clearly demonstrated that, to be economically justifiable, utilization of the aircraft must substantially exceed the present level. Since the study indicates that the viability of this aircraft is more sensi- tive to utilization than to&tariff increases, it would seem necessary for Air Rwanda to make a major marketing effort in order to attract additional traffic from neighboring countries. It is, however, doubtful whether such traffic can be secured on a regular basis. Furthermore, an unusually high proportion of the flights involve short hauls between Kigali and M4ombasa, even though the aircraft is better suited for long flights. If use of the all-cargo aircraft is to continue, it is likely that the Government will soon be faced with a decision either to subsidize the operation or sell the plane.

2.23 A recent study by UNCTAD 11 highlights the problems encountered in reconciling the operational constraints of the aircraft with the economics of air transport for Rwanda. The problem identified in the study is to find a balance between Europe-Kigali and Kigali-Mombasa flights which will optimize aircraft utilization and accommodate a mix of import and export traffic which can support air freight rates either between Europe and Kigali or a mix of surface/air freight rates between Europe-Mombasa-Kigali. The study concludes that in order to continue operations, Air Rwanda will require technical assistance, training, and a vigorous marketing effort to survive as a viable operation.

D. Existing Cost Structure

2.24 The bulk of Rwanda's and Burundi's external transport is handled by forwarding companies, the most important being AMI, TRANSINTRA and NOTCO. These companies are not transporters themselves, but coordinate the trans- portation of goods sometimes all the way from Europe, including documentation and payments at each step. The forwarders charge a comprehensive fee which

1/ UNCTAD/RAF/78/015, "The Development of Air Freight for Rwanda," J. Poutet and R. Desbiens. (A similar study for Burundi was carried out by M. Heraty and J. Poutet.) - 21 - includes the transportation of goods from their source to Kigali or Bujumbura. Their rates are based on several factors, the most important being weight and volume, but also on the class of commodity and the size of the shipment. These rates represent the financial cost of transport to Rwanda and Burundi. All costs incurred in foreign exchange, including border fees and taxes, are economic costs to Rwanda and Burundi. Thus, for both countries, the economic cost of international transport is virtually the same as the financial cost.

2.25 The following table lists the transportation costs for general cargo imports on existing surface routes and for air transport. The latter costs are based on projected operating costs of an all-cargo aircraft.

Existing Transportation Costs from Europe, General Cargo

Rwanda

Costs/ General Carto ,ITon x of Value Time Taken [Week(s)] I. ALL SURFACE ROUTES

A. Europe-Mombasa (sea) 540 10.5 6 Mombasa-Kigali (road)

B. Europe-Mombasa (sea) 465 10.7 7 Mombasa-Kigali (rail/road), J

C. Europe-Dar es Salaam (sea) 430 16.0 34 Dar es Salaam-Kigali (rail/lake/road)

II. AIR/SURFACE

Europe-Mombasa (sea) 690 5.5 5 Mombasa-Kigali (air)

III. ALL AIR

Europe-Kigali 1485 3.0 1

Burundi

I. ALL SURFACE ROUTES

A. Europe-Mombasa (sea) 635 15.0 7 Mombasa-Bujumbura (road)

B. Europe-Mombasa (sea) 560 15.0 8 Mombasa-Bujumbura (rail/road) 2/

C. Europe-Dar es Salaam (sea) 335 19.0 34 Dar es Salaam-Bujumbura (rail/lake/road)

II. AIR/SURFACE

Europe-Dar es Salaam (sea) 690 11.0 9 Dar es Salaam-Bujumbura (air)

III. ALL AIR

Europe-Bujumbura 1535 6.0 1

Note: Imputed time costs have been taken into account in a financial sense, but of course the opportunity cost of time can be considerably higher. 1/ A part of the cost is based on weight, and part on the value of the shipment. / Rail-road transshipment at Malaba (Uganda border); currently not operational. - 22 -

2.26 Although the southern route is cheaper for Rwanda on a weight basis, it is not competitive with the northern route when costs based on the value of the shipment and the poor reliability of the southern route are also taken into account. The hypothetical case involving a rail transshipment at Malaba (on the Ugandan border) is the most economical surface route, because of the relatively lower cost of rail transport. Regarding transport from Europe, the sea/air combination iB also fairly competitive, but the all-air route would apply to only a small proportion of total traffic.

2.27 For Burundi, the least-cost route by far is the existing rail/lake route from Dar es Salaam. Again, the sea/air route from Europe is fairly competitive with the all-surface route by avoiding many of the bottlenecks on the latter.

2.28 Disaggregated costs of surface transport from the Indian Ocean ports to Kigali and Bujumbura are shown in Tables 23 to 25. The differences between the comprehensive rate charged by the forwarders and the total of these dis- aggregated costs, i.e., the forwarders' imputed margin, is much larger for the northern route than for the southern route. In part, this reflects the more lengthy and complicated procedures on the northern route and the volatility in road transport charges because of the unstable situation in Uganda.

CHAPTER III

ACTIONS UNDER WAY

A. Projects to Improve Existing Routes

3.01 Measures to improve some of the transport conditions described above are already under way or are being planned. The table at the end of this chapter indicates those projects which have been identified and for which financing is totally or partially committed. Transport is also expected to benefit from proposed telecommunications projects (to be partly financed by the Bank Group) which will link Rwanda and Burundi to the inter- national satellite network. This will not only allow faster contacts along the transport arteries but should also help foster better inter-regional cooperation.

The Northern Route

3.02 For the northern route, a road improvement program is under way in Kenya which includes maintenance as well as safety and traffic enforcement sub-components. These improvements are included in the Government's Highway Sector Plan which is being partly financed under a Bank project. Other works being carried out on the route include resealing of 55 km of the Kigali-Gatuna road in Rwanda under a Bank Group project, and reconstruction and paving of 186 km of the Kigali-Bujumbura road with EEC financing. A project for the improvement and maintenance of Uganda's roads is also being prepared for Bank Group financing in 1982. - 23 -

3.03 Railway operations on the route have already benefitted by Kenya's recent purchase of a substantial number of locomotives and rolling stock, partly with financing from ODA and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Kenyan Government is also preparing a very comprehensive railway improvement project for 1980-83 which includes track upgrading; signalling and tele- communications improvements; workshops; training; and construction of trans- shipment facilities at Malaba (the latter scheduled for 1982). The Bank Group will partly finance the project.

3.04 This still leaves much to be done to improve the northern route, the most crucial need being help for Uganda Railways. The Bank Group will finance a short-term "critical improvementt' program for Uganda Rail- ways under a Program Loan approved in 1980. It would also help prepare a medium-term investment plan which could be the basis for a possible project within the next two to three years; this would be jointly financed by the Bank and other donors. The relationship between the Kenya and Uganda Railways would probably also be discussed with both countries in conjunction with the projects being prepared or proposed.

3.05 Other problems, however, are still to be addressed, including: the complex and widely varying transport procedures required by most of the countries on the route; the inability of heavy traffic to use Uganda's Kabale- Gatuna road (21 km); the need for customs facilities at Gatuna; and the need to improve the managerial and operational capability of Rwanda's major inter- national road transport carrier.

The Southern Route

3.06 For the southern route a number of actions are also under way which will affect the transport situation. Projects to improve the ports at both Dar es Salaam and Kigoma are being prepared. The Dar es Salaam project would increase capacity and improve operating conditions by providing for: channel deepening and widening, warehouses, and technical assistance and training. Financing would be furnished by the Bank Group, ODA, and other lenders. The project for the Kigoma Port includes improvement of quay and rail facilities, construction of additional storage capacity, and the provision of cargo handling equipment. The project, which is expected to start in 1980, will be financed by the EEC.

3.07 The Tanzanian Railways Corporation is also receiving much-needed assistance from several financing agencies (CIDA, ODA, KfW, and EEC), includ- ing some necessary sector and identification studies. Ongoing actions include the purchase of locomotives and rolling stock, construction of maintenance workshops, track improvement, and the provision of signalling and telecommuni- cations equipment. Although a Bank Group project proposed for 1982 will contribute to this effort, additional assistance will be required for a long-term program of continued improvements. - 24 -

3.08 In addition, several lesser constraints are still to be relieved: obsolete equipment and poor management hamper barge service on Lake Tanganyika; coordination of transport modes at Kigoma Port is still poor; and low produc- tivity at Dar es Salaam Port delays operations and results in Port congestion. Improved transport planning is probably also needed in Burundi which has plans to expand its trucking services in order to make greater use of the northern route, although the very high cost of such a policy seems not to have been considered.

Air Transport

3.09 In view of the current importance of air transport to Rwanda and Burundi, Air Rwanda has purchased a 707 freighter with partial assistance from the KfW, and two projects are being prepared to improve Kigali and Bujumbura Airports by the widening and strengthening of runways to accommodate wide-bodied aircraft and the provision of navigational aids. Both projects, involve financing by the French Government.

B. Development of Alternate Routes

3.10 Because of the many problems entailed in existing external transport arrangements, several alternative routes or, more precisely, modifications to existing routes are being considered for future use. These routes as well as the existing routes are listed in Annex III. Basically two potential options exist: a Rusumo-Isaka-Dar es Salaam route (1,478 km); and various combinations of transport across Lake Victoria to Kenya and/or Tanzanian ports and thence to ports on the Indian Ocean.

3.11 The Isaka route consists of a road link from Rwanda (or Burundi) to the railway at Isaka in central Tanzania and then by rail to Dar es Salaam (982 km). See Annex IV for a detailed discussion of the route as well as an analysis of the economic justification for its development. Availability of the route would particularly benefit Rwanda, which would gain an access route to the south involving transit through only one country. Construction of 93 km of the 332 km Rusumo (Rwanda)-Isaka road has already begun with financing from the African Development Bank, and financing for another 60 km is being discussed with the EEC and USAID. Arrangements for the rest of the road are still to be made.

3.12 The other principal option involves crossing Lake Victoria to the Ports of Kisumu (in Kenya), Mwanza or Musoma (in Tanzania) and then proceeding to the coastal ports. The feasibility of developing this type of route seems questionable. In view of the ongoing. efforts to complete the Rusumo-Isaka road, the link across the Lake to the Tanzanian Port of Mwanza would be redundant. Thus the alternatives are Kisumu to Mombasa or Musoma to Tanga, both of which would require the upgrading of road links from Rwanda and Burundi to either Bukoba or Nyamirembe on Lake Victoria, expansion of port facilities (especially at Nyamirembe) and provision of marine services. For - 25 - the Musoma route, a rail link would also have to be built from Musoma to Arusha which, given the pressing needs of Tanzania's existing railway system, would seem difficult to justify. Although the Tanzanian Government has initiated a prefeasibility study for the rail link, construction is unlikely during the next ten years.

3.13 While the viability of developing the proposed Lake Victoria connections seems remote, completion of the Isaka road/rail route would appear to offer the area a much needed option to the existing choices.

C. Special Studies and Regional Efforts

3.14 A number of studies either completed or in progress should prove very useful in planning future investments in the area. These include:

(a) two studies carried out by UNCTAD on Rwanda's and Burundi's external transport situation, specifically their air transport;

(b) a very comprehensive study also being done by UNCTAD of all international transport connections available to the four landlocked countries of Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and eastern Zaire; and

(c) as part of the United Nations Transport and Communications Decade for Africa, the identification by the Economic Commission for Africa of projects related to Rwanda's and Burundi's external transport corridors.

3.15 There are also several regional commissions whose purpose is to discuss problems of common interest: (a) the CEPGL (Commission Economique pour les Grands Lacs), which includes Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire and was created to encourage regional cooperation on a number of issues, including transportation; (b) the joint commission comprising Rwanda and Tanzania; (c) the technical commission of Burundi and Tanzania; and (d) the Kagera River Basin Regional Development Commission involving Rwanda, Burundi and the West Lake region of Tanzania. In the future, the role of these insti- tutions will have to be strengthened to meet the increasing need for regional cooperation with regard to transport, among other issues. - 26 -

Relevant Current and Proposed Projects

Implementation External Project Period Financing

NORTHERN ROUTE

A. Kenya Railways

(i) Locomotives and rolling 1978-79 KfW, ODA (rest on stock commercial terms).

(ii) Upgrading of track and ) relaying of Eldoret- ) Malaba section ) ) (iii) Signalling and telecom- ) 1979-83 To be partly financed munications ) Develop- by Bank Group; ) ment Plan scheduled for (iv) Workshops ) 1980-83. ) (v) Manpower and training )

(vi) Transshipment facilities)

B. Kenya Highway Sector Project

Part of Highway Sector Project (1979-83), and includes:

(a) Reconstruction and strength-) ening of road from Mombasa ) to Uganda ) 1980-82 Bank Group Project ) (Loan 1684-KE). (b) Maintenance program )

(c) Traffic law enforcement )

C. Kigali-Gatuna Road in Rwanda

55 km to be resealed 1980-81 Bank Group Project (Credit 769-RW).

D. Kigali-Bujumbura Road

Paving of all unpaved 1978-82 EEC sections (186 km) - 27 -

Implementation External Project Period Financing

[. SOUTHERN ROUTE

A. Dar es Salaam Port

(i) Container berth ) ) (ii) Widening and deepening) of entrance channel )

(iii) Bulk cargo handling ) facilities )

(iv) Container and general ) 1981-84 Bank Group, ODA and cargo handling equip- ) other co-financiers. ment )

(v) Warehouse for Zambian ) imports )

(vi) Maintenance facilities) ) (vii) Technical assistance ) and training programs )

B. Tanzania Railways

(i) Locomotives and rolling stock 1979-80 CIDA, ODA, KfW

(ii) Morogoro Workshop for diesel maintenance 1978-82 CIDA, KfW

(iii) Signalling and telecom- munications (Kigoma- Tabora) 1980-81 KfW

(iv) Selective track improve- ment (Kigoma-Tabora) 1980-82 EEC

(v) Relaying of track (288 km) 1980-1.984 CIDA

(vi) Sector and identification studies 1979-80 CIDA, KfW, EEC - 28 -

Implementation External Project Period Financing

(vii) Locomotives and rolling) stock )

(viii) Telecommunication ) improvement ) 1982 - Proposed Bank Project ) for 1982. (ix) Permanent Way )

(x) Workshops and equipment) ) (xi) Technical assistance )

C. Kigoma Port

(i) Levelling of Port area ) ) (ii) Construction of third ) warehouse ) 1980-81 EEC

(iii) Improvement of quay ) and rail facilities )

(iv) Cargo handling ) equipment )

III. ALTERNATE ROUTES

Rusumo-Isaka Route

(i) Rusumo-Lusahanga road (93 km) 1978-80 AfDB

(ii) Bukombe-Isaka (112 km) 1980- EEC and USAID likely to finance 60 km.

(iii) Burundi link to Rusumo-Isaka road 1980-81 Prefeasibility study financed by EEC. IV. AIR TRANSPORT

A. Air Rwanda

Purchase of B-707 Aug. 1979 Partly financed by KfW. - 29 -

Implementation External Project Period Financing

B. Kigali Airport

(i) Widening and strengthen- ing of runway to Some financing likely accommodate wide-bodied from FAC. aircraft.

(ii) Aids to navigation and airport facilities.

C. Buiumbura Airport

(i) Widening and strengthening Some financing likely of runway to accommodate from FAC. wide-bodied aircraft.

(ii) Aids to navigation and air- port facilities.

CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS AND NEW CONSTRUCTION

A. General Recommendation

4.01 In the course of assessing this problem it has become obvious that the transport policy, planning and coordinating capabilities of Rwanda and Burundi will have to be improved as part of an overall program to improve their access to the Indian Ocean. This will require assistance in the form of technical experts to set up the necessary planning units and to train local counterpart staff who would eventually be able to take over the various planning responsibilities. Assistance would also necessarily involve scholar- ships for overseas training of Rwandese and Burundese nationals.

B. The Northern Route

4.02 As indicated in the preceding Chapter, not all the constraints on this route will be removed by the projects already Ldentified. The short- and medium-term actions still needed to facilitate traffic flows are given below. Much of this will depend, of course, on developments in Uganda. - 30 -

Short-Term Measures

(a) In the short term the most important factor affecting the route is the level of maintenance provided to the road itself since any improvement in maintenance will have an impact on costs and efficiency in a relatively short time. This is especially true for the northern route, where several sections of the road are now in critical condition. However, almost 90% of the road to Mombasa is outside of Rwanda, and consequently, the improvement of the road is dependent on the actions of the Kenyan and Ugandan Governments, in particular, the timely implementation of the Highway Develop- ment Program in Kenya and the initiation of a similar program in Uganda.

(b) Working committees should be set up with transit countries to monitor and expedite the flow of goods to destination and provide the necessary mechanism to improve communications when problems arise.

(c) Standardization of customs, documentation and vehicle control procedures in all countries along the route is needed to further reduce transport costs and time.

(d) Paving of Uganda's Kabale-Gatuna road, which is now closed to heavy traffic, would allow trucks to use a shorter, higher-standard route between Kampala and Kigali than the one now taken. Establishment of customs facilities at Gatuna in Uganda would also be needed to open up this route.

Medium-Term Measures

(e) The transport companies in Rwanda, particularly STIR, would benefit from technical and/or financial assistance for management and capital improvements.

(f) Advancing the start of construction of the Malaba trans- shipment facility, now scheduled for 1982. would allow at least partial use of the railway system and thus reduce costs. This facility should be built quickly as it is hoped that, with the improvement of Uganda Railways, the justification for such a facility would be reduced over time.

(g) Additional transshipment and warehousing facilities should be provided for as existing routes are improved or new routes are constructed. - 31 -

C. The Southern Route

4.03 As listed below, certain short- and medium-term steps are still needed to correct lesser problems on the route. The railway, however, will require significant investments for some time to come if any real improvement is to result.

Short-Term Measures

(a) Working committees should be set up with transit countries to monitor and expedite the flow of goods to thin destination and provide the necessary mechanism to improve communitions when problems arise.

(b) Better coordination among the agencies using Kigoma Port would result in smoother traffic flows through the Port.

Medium-Term Measures

(c) One of the major problems with the railway has been the low availability of equipment, and in this context the provision of additional rolling stock and a further strengthening of maintenance facilities should be investigated. Other railway constraints that can be dealt with in the medium-term include manpower, track maintenance and basic communications.

(d) Although a project to improve Dar es Salaam Port is being prepared, it would also be advisable to hold inter-governmental discussions of ways and means to improve productivity at the Port and thereby further reduce congestion.

(e) The possibility of accelerating implementation of the Kigoma Port improvement project should be discussed by the governments and financing agency concerned.

(f) In view of present constraints on ARNOLAC's performance, a study should be undertaken of possible improvements to lake transport.

(g) Burundi should continue to use the southern route as its principal external artery and therefore should have no need to expand its capacity to undertake international road transport.

(h) Additional transshipment and warehouse facilities should be provided for as existing routes are improved or new routes are constructed. - 32 -

D. Air Transport

4.04 In the shortest term possible, air transport is the only alternative which can overcome the closure or reduced efficiency of existing surface routes. While air transport can now be competitive for certain commodities and on certain routes, it is not expected that this level of competitiveness can be maintained as improvements are made to the traditional routes. For this reason air transport operations by Rwandese or Burundese carriers should be discouraged since it would be more prudent to lease aircraft without any long-term commitments. However, improvements to allow the use of wide-bodied aircraft at Kigali and Bujumbura airports will permit international carriers to handle air cargo as a by-product of passenger traffic. This should prove more economic than the use of older, less efficient all-cargo aircraft.

E. Alternate Routes

4.05 In addition to improving the existing arteries, it would also be possible to open up one or more alternate routes in the medium- to long-term, if this seems justified. As described in Chapter III, two other external transport corridors for Rwanda and Burundi have been proposed, the Isaka route and the Lake Victoria routes.- To determine whether these alternatives actually offer Rwanda and Burundi viable options to the existing surface routes, a comparison of transport costs was made for all the existing and potential international arteries (see table on page 31). For the road seg- ments, costs were based on the projected operating costs of a 25-ton truck (at 1979 prices), but for the rail/lake sections, existing tariffs were used, since operating costs (either present or future) were not available. Several other factors were also taken into 'account in evaluating the alternatives, these being, number of transshipments, number of countries transitted and travel time taken. Although road user charges were incorporated into the analysis, investment costs on each of the routes were not explicitly taken into account. - 33 -

Comparison of Alternate Surface Routes To Indian Ocean Ports 1/

Rwanda

Transportation Number of Countries Time Route Cost 2/ Transshipments Transitted Taken 3/ (US$/ton) (days)

A. Kigali-Mombasa (all road) 210 0 2 4 B. Kigali-Kampala-Mombasa (road/rail) 167 1 2 5 C. Kigali-Isaka-Dar es Salaam (road/rail) 125 1 1 6 D. Kigali-Bujumbura-Kigoma- Dar es Salaam (road/lake/rail) 135 2 2 10 E. Kigali-Bukoba-Mombasa (road/lake/rail) 140 1 3 8 F. Kigali-Nyamirembe-Mombasa (road/lake/rail) 145 2 2 9

Burundi

Transportation Number of Countries Time Route Cost 2/ Transshipments Transitted Taken 3/ (US$/ton) (days)

A. Bujumbura-Kigoma- Dar es Salaam (lake/rail) 72 1 2 8 B. Bujumbura-Isaka- Dar es Salaam (road/rail) 127 1 1 6 C. Bujumbura-Nyamirembe- Mombasa (road/lake/rail) 154 2 2 9 D. Bujumbura-Mombasa (all road) 252 0 3 5 E. Bujumbura-Kampala-Mombasa (road/rail) 198 1 3 6

1/ The comparison of alternate routes does not include the lake routes via Mwanza or Musoma since the Mwanza link would duplicate the Isaka route, which is already being developed, and establishment of the Musoma link would require construction of a rail link between Musoma and Arusha, which is not envisioned within the next ten years and therefore cannot be considered a viable transport solution within the short to medium term. 2/ Based on existing cost structure, but assuming improvement of routes. 3/ Assuming normal operations. - 34 -

4.06 The results of the comparison are as follows: for Rwanda, the Isaka route would clearly be the most convenient and economical, assuming that the railway were rehabilitated and Dar es Salaam Port remains fluid. For Burundi, the Kigoma-Dar es Salaam route is likely to remain the most important despite its present difficulties since a considerable number of improvements to the route can be made within the short to medium term.

4.07 In view of the improvements already scheduled for the two existing routes and the construction under way on the Isaka route, it would currently be inadvisable to develop the Lake Victoria routes for several reasons:

(a) the low level of external traffic generated by Rwanda and Burundi makes investment costs per ton very high for a substantially new artery;

(b) maintenance of infrastructure and operation of installations, in which transit countries have little interest, is likely to be a problem;

(c) with investments already having been made on several routes, the marginal cost of developing yet another route is high; and

(d) the Lake Victoria routes pose particular problems such as erratic weather on the Lake and uncertainties about the stability of relations between Tanzania and Kenya (borders are currently closed).

4.08 In summary, the only alternative which can be considered in the medium term is the Rusumo-Isaka-Dar es Salaam route since the small volume of Rwanda/Burundi traffic does not justify major additional investments in transport infrastructure which would only serve to dilute the traffic for each route and render them all uneconomic. In case of a crisis situation, the best alternative is still the chartering of aircraft rather than any prior investment in fixed stand-by facilities. It would also probably be advisable for both countries to increase their fuel storage capacity rather than to fly in large quantities of fuel during emergencies.

F. Benefits to Transit Countries

4.09 The reliance of Rwanda and Burundi on Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania has been a recurring theme in this report, but it should also be pointed out that this relationship is not without benefit to the transit countries. Two kinds of quantifiable benefits can be identified: those related to providing transport services and those derived from supplying goods to Rwanda and Burundi. The most accurate valuation of these benefits would be the value added in the various transport and export activities. Although such value added computations were not possible because of data limitations, some idea of the nature of benefits can be obtained from examining gross benefits, i.e., the total transport and export earnings gained by the transit countries from Rwanda and Burundi. These are presented in the following table. - 35 -

Transport-Related Earnings for Transit Countries: 1977 (US$ millions) From From Rwanda Burundi Total I. KENYA Mombasa Port 1/ 4.2 0.3 4.5 Transshipment at Mombasa 2.2 0.2 2.4 Road Transport 10.2 1.8 12.0 Customs Bonding 1.5 0.1 1.6 Border fees and licenses 2/ 0.6 - 0.6 Air landing charges 0.2 - 0.2

II. UGANDA Road Transport 1.6 0.5 2.1 Border fees and licenses 2/ 1.9 0.2 2.1 Customs Bonding 1.2 0.1 1.3

III. TANZANIA Dar es Salaam Port 1/ 1.1 0.1 1.2 Railway 0.3 3.5 3.8 Kigoma Port 0.8 0.1 0.9 1/ Includes all handling charges, but not shipping and pilotage fees. 2/ International only.

Export Earnings for Transit Countries: 1977 (US$ millions)

From From Rwanda Burundi Total

I. KENYA

Exports: Petroleum 5.8 0.6 6.4 Cement 0.8 0.1 0.9 Other 7.5 3.7 11.2 Total 14.1 4.4 18.5 (% of total exports) (1.2%) (0.4%) (1.6%)

Re-exports 1.6 0.3 1.9

II. TANZANIA

Exports: Total 1.3 8.2 9.5 (% of total exports) (0.3%) (1.6%) (1.9%)

III. UGANDA

Exports: Total 0.5 0.7 1.2 (% of total exports) (--) (--) (0.2%) - 36 -

4.10 With regard toiearnings7from transport activities, in 1977 the principal source of revenue for Kenya was from road transport and for Uganda from both border fees-and road transport. Since then, there has been an 80% increase in,road tran'sport tariffs on the northern route, and a significant portion of the increased revenues has been captured by Kenya since over 65% of the traffic to Rwanda and Burundi is carried by Kenyan trucks. The benefits of providing road services on the northern route (border fees, licenses and taxes on transport inputs) must of course be offset against the cost of providing such.services, i.e., road maintenance and reconstruction. On the southern route, the railway provided Tanzania with its largest portion of the revenues from transit traffic.

4.11 Exports to Rwanda and Burundi from the three transit countries are only a small proportion of their,total exports, and if petroleum is excluded (only part of which is processed in Kenya, and Tanzania) the proportion is even smaller. However, the potential for further increase, especially for Uganda, is substantidf.

C. Conclusion

4.12 Thisir,evi-ew-of actions and studies already under way as well as the measures still required indicates that a number of projects which should significantly improve the existing external routes are already being prepared or implemented, while.a variety-of short- to medium-term measures are still required but should not necessitate any major investment. The most costly and lengthy improvements involve the railways, and even here preparation or actual work has already begun.

December 1980 IBRD1d633 NOVE.BER1979 30'00' Zt30' 2P'10V t.0]O

BLRUNDI R W A D A ROAD NETWORK

hAMo,Roods. PnPowd-d

- $nscdrol, Rood,jspood 1- Not,-.[ Cop"oII .t Pso-oc'IcCot.hols e

wnv--l - - onc Bovndr a, 0OttOv , o r ,\ ~~~~~~~~-- PseotnllI BtlCC,Eonm KrundoG /-. 7roesroao W , ~~~~~~~-- A,rcondrsemerst Boundorse,

v 1 XX^r ~~~~~~g=0t Xg r ) / -

5.q /

;; X<\( ~~1 / -

X t j Av> \ A6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~MUYogoJ

)01~ ~ ~

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A N Z A N IA <[ t {,> : ; <

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~4

4 oo /pg Gl;fi > >\ f 2;_t SRulot j \+rg Um

4- 00-'{ %>\Rumoll6n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,

A r AZ N IAr BUJLIR9BA ) soie ) t 4o

5 29T00'23 0 _ r A S A A IBRD14634- 1 3 Abao,a,. a KnpOail NOVEMBER 1979

RWANDA | U G A N D A Kki-eb ROAD NETWORK

-Poved Roads R.tshur( iMoim Gravel and Earth Roods TANZANIA * National Capital o Cities and rowns REPUBL I :Rivers and Lakes ZAIRE -*- Intemational Boundaries

,Ruhengeri e\Kr -,l

%s/ *X t.o- > J \ \ A % A 2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AK A G -E R A

2- ;<~~~~~~G

B,nptt 'hik tt to aitanko. '.

fit. dwtOsvanattoanvsed and rheIrrr 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 bfoondan shownnn th,smGapI1 ?VI a

W te oBmt an l yn o rd r amf ile ast am ant t ym .tJ d 1 2 D. < 7 i ,

nyacboryrra9uaat soc knontor i , JnY e. I~~~~~~itoraaP- \hd0 to z BLOEhB

>8X \ 8\ ? ( 0// I o lo zo o 40 t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oeo t0 eo

ZAIRE \\':t % raIL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tES . o9; 1la. 30° 320 36-

..- (akeMobft,Sese Seko

IAFR IC~~~~~A I o00

Cyanika atnoo- Rutshu bal K it ab

Ruhengeri n\ Bukoo -Msm

KIGALW Rusumo WddDA

L Buk hBangugu -MPVED OAD

ZAMBIA AVE RASsNDRSTD a .~~~~~~t~' ~ c0 40 e6080u0kS 00 20Imbe4-- AIW Y MILES WATERWAYS~~~~~~~~?

LLI oIn a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Moon - 0100 50 iSO 210 250 300 550~bor40a

______CE E T P A T

co LAKE~~ILMTRSOL EINRE 280 32-~ 400

RWANDA / BURUNDI INTERNATIONAL ROUTES

/-MALABA \1 253 Tronsport Mode:

g 4 KAMPALA2 G==< - < Rail

KASESE |,_- Lake 280 lsu ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Road

00 Proposed Road 00

ttil KBARARA 2 _ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . - -- -Troc k

IGALUA

LU~

UMBURA 4 ARUSHAG < <--A

ffi < s ~~~~~~~~ISAKA \< E l

/ s//s ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~Tis lo~sos boo, pressdb rh,o Worldse ossA,oio.lyft rscalel are,k insf too

/~~~~~~~~~~~~bsdro oho,bkgAIUBon_2 sThis map, di,,s,,prmlys o intendetofshow ordiB sdtance

,KIGOMA 403

320 ^i 3-6360 - - 0