<<

The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis) Mark Balaguer California State , Los Angeles

It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the of decision-making processes-for example, the question of whether or not have free -except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two questions- namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what is and the question that asks which kinds of are required for -are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human .

[Compatibilism] is a wretched subterfuge ... and ... a petty word- jugglery.

[Compatibilism] is a quagmire of evasion under which issue of has been entirely smothered .... No what the soft determinist mean by ['freedom'],... there is a problem, an issue of fact and not of words.

Mark Balaguer is Professor of Philosophy at California State Univ&-sity, Los Angeles. His areas of interest are , philosophy of , , free will, and metaethics. He is the author of and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 1998), as well as numerous journal articles. freedom?;and dothey have Frankfurtian freedom?;and so on.3 (Actually,to be more precise, we can formulate this question The recent literature on the problem of free will has been as asking which kinds of"freedom"humans have, since some dominated by the debate about whether compatibilism is true. I or all ofthe kinds of"freedom"we're asking about here might think this is unfortunate because I think the question of fail to be free will, accordingto the correct answer to the what- whether compatibilism is true is essentially irrelevant to is-free-willquestion.) metaphysical questions about human free will-that is, about the or nature of the freedom inherent in human If we could answer these two questions, then (I will argue) we decision-making processes. This view of the compatibilism could also answer the compatibilism question and the do-we- debate is metaphysically similar to the views of Kant and have-free-will question. In , I will argue that (i) the James, but I should say here that I would not go along with the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question, dismissiveness of their remarks. I think the question of whether and (ii) the do-we-have-free-will question collapses into the compatibilism is true is interesting in its own right, and as will what-is-free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do- become clear below, I think it may be worth caring about for we-have question. that go beyond our purely theoretical interests. I will argue point (i) below,in section 5, but point (ii) is more Moreover, I think there has been a lot of good philosophical or less obvious and can be motivated right here in just a few work on this question that is both interesting and important. words: if we could answer the what-is-free-will question and the But I also think that upon reflection, it turns out that the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion, then we could also compatibilism question is independent of metaphysical questions answer the do-we-have-free-will question, because we would about the nature of human decision-making processes, except in know what free will is and whether we have it. Of course, we a trivial way. In particular, I will argue that would also know more than this-in particular, we would know whether we possess various kinds of pseudo-freedom-but this The compatibilism question: Is free will compatible with doesn't undermine the claim that the do-we-have-free-will ?1 question is subsumed by the what-is-free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion. The main thing I want to argue, however,is this:

The do-we-have-free-will question: Dohuman beings have free (ill)While the what-is-free-willquestion is clearly relevant to will? the do-we-have-free-willquestion in a certain way, it is not relevant to that question in any nontrivial or metaphysically I will do this by arguing for a few different theses. To begin interesting way; indeed, the what-is-free-will question is not with, I will argue that the two questions listed here-that is, relevant to any substantive questionabout the nature ofhuman decision-makingprocesses,except in a trivial way. the compatibilism question and the do-we-have-free-will question-reduce to two other questions that can be of as more fundamental, namely, I will argue this point in sections 3 and 4. And if we combine thesis (iii) with thesis (i)-which, again, I'll argue in section 5- The what-is-free-will question: What is free will?(Wecan take we obtain the result that the compatibilism question is also this as equivalent to the question 'What is the correct essentially irrelevant to substantive questions about the nature analysis of the of free will?' and also to the question of human decision-making processes, for instance, the do-we- 'What is the correct definition ofthe term "freewill"?'But we have-free-will question. Moreover, as we'll see, my argument cannot assume without argument that these questions are points to a more general result, namely, that conceptual analysis solely about folk , or ordinary-language usage and is essentially irrelevant to metaphysics. ; I will discuss this issue below.) If my arguments are correct, then what we might think of as the semantic component of the problem of free will (namely, the what~is-free-will question) is essentially irrelevant to the metaphysical component of the problem (e.g., the do-we-have- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question: Whichkinds free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have offreedom do humans have? That is, do they have libertarian question). But this isn't all there is to the problem of free will. freedom(or for short, L-freedom2)?; and dothey have Humean There is also a moral component to the problem, for we also want to know which kinds of freedom are required for moral reliably track about ordinary-language meaning, it's not responsibility. But I will argue in section 4 that however impor- very plausible to suppose that they reliably track other kinds of tant this question is to moral issues, it is-like the compati- facts. bilism question and the what-is-free-will question-essentially By the way, I should say that the OL View is neutral on the irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human question of whether, in trying to answer the what-is-free-will decision-making processes, for example, the do-we-have-free-will question, we should be doing real empirical studies on folk question. . According to one traditional view,we don't need to do this, because we are ourselves native speakers of ordinary 2. What Determines Whether language, and so we can use our own intuitions. But there is an Answer to the another view that's growing in prominence (see, e.g., Nichols What-Is-Free-Will Question Is Correct? 2006 and Nahmias, et al. 2005) that holds that our answers to questions like the what-is-free-will question should be based on Before I my main argument (in sections 3-5), I need real empirical data about the intuitions of ordinary folk, in to discuss an important question: What determines whether a particular, nonphilosophers. The OL View is consistent with given answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct? There both of these methodological views, and the issue here will not are numerous views one might adopt here. Here's one very be relevant to what I will be arguing. simple view: In any , it seems to me that the OL View is at least initially plausible, and it might even be the right view. But on The OL V~w: An answer to the what-is-free-willquestion is the other hand, it might not be, for there are other views one correct iff it captures the ordinary-language meaning(s)of the might endorse here. For instance, one might maintain that expression'freewill'-that is,what this expressionmeansamong while it is important to uncover the facts about what ordinary ordinaryfolk.(Ofcourse,it doesn'tfollowfromthis that ordinary folk mean by the term 'free will', this isn't all there is to usage of 'free will' picks out a unique, well-defined ; arriving at a fully acceptable answer to the what-is-free-will proponents of the OL View can allow that there might be question. One might think that other issues need to be con- vaguenesses, inconsistencies,ambiguities, and so on built into sidered as well, for example, issues having to do with the our usage here; but they would say that if the ordinary term coherence of ordinary-language conceptions of freedom, or with 'free will' is indeed vague or ambiguous,then a completeand the kinds of freedom that are required for moral responsibility, correct answer to the what-is-free-willquestion would tell us or with the kinds of freedom that are actually at work when about this.) human beings have the of acting and choosing freely. Here's what I'm going to do: in section 3, I will assume that This view is at least initially plausible. One point that counts in the OL View is correct, and based on that assumption, I will its favor is that (a) it makes the what-is-free-will question argue that the what-is-free-will question is essentially factual (it is undeniable, I think, that there are facts about how irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question. Then in section ordinary folk use expressions like 'free will', 'can', 'could have 4, I will argue that even if we drop the assumption that the OL done otherwise', and so on); and (b) it's not obvious that any View is correct, we still get the same conclusion about the other plausible view does this. A second point that counts in metaphysical irrelevance of the what-is-free-will question. favor of the OL View is that it fits very well with the metho- Indeed, I will argue that we get this result no matter what view dology that actually use when they try to answer we adopt of the correctness conditions of answers to the what- questions like 'What is free will?', "What is ?', and so is-free-will question-that is, no matter what we say about on. One of the main things philosophers do here is use ordinary- what determines whether an answer to the what-is-free-will language intuitions (about the applicability of our in question is correct. real and imagined scenarios) to confirm and falsify theories; for instance, if a given theory of free will-that is, a given answer to the what-is-free-will question-flies in the face of our 3. Why the What-Is-Free-Will Question intuitions about when the concept of free will does and doesn't Is Irrelevant to the Do-We-Have-Free-Will Question, apply, this is seen as falsifying . But it seems to me . Assuming the OL View Is Correct that this would make little sense if we weren't at least partially engaged in trying to uncover ordinary-language In this section, I will assume that the OL View is correct and meaning. For while it's plausible to suppose that our intuitions argue for the followingthesis: (iii)While the what-is-free-willquestion is clearly relevant to that an answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct iff it the do-we-have-free-willquestion in a certain way,it is not captures the ordinary-language meaning(s) of 'free will'. relevant to that question in any nontrivial or metaphysically Let me begin here by changing the example and showing interesting way; indeed, the what-is-free-will question is how awkward the line of thought in the above objection would essentially irrelevant to all substantive questions about the be if we employed it in other settings. To this end, suppose that nature ofhuman decision-makingprocesses. Carstairs and Caruthers are linguists (or sociologists or psychologists or whatever) who specialize in trying to figure out Before giving my argument, I want to say what I mean by the precise meanings of scientific terms, as they're actually 'metaphysically interesting'. In the present context, I'm using used by working scientists (and perhaps ordinary folk); and 'metaphysical' to mean something like about the ; thus, suppose in particular that Carstairs and Caruthers have since the topic here is human decision-making processes and competing theories of the ordinary-discourse meaning of the human freedom,'metaphysical' is being used to mean something word 'planet'. Finally, suppose that the dispute between like about human beings or human decision-making processes. Carstairs and Caruthers has implications for the values Thus, if I say that a question is not relevant to the do-we-have- of various astronomical sentences. For example, suppose that free-will question in any metaphysically interesting way,what I astronomers have discovered an , call it Wilma, that's mean is essentially that it's not relevant to that question in a orbiting the sun beyond Pluto and that counts as a planet if way that's substantively relevant to the goal of discovering the Carstairs's theory of the meaning of 'planet' is right but doesn't nature of human beings and, in particular, human decision- count as a planet if Caruthers's theory is right, so that the making processes.And note that I'm not claiming here that this truth of the sentence 'There is a tenth planet in our solar is what anyone else means by 'metaphysically interesting'. I'm system' depends on whether Carstairs or Caruthers is right (of just specifying what I mean. Thus, if someone were to respond course, if you don't think Pluto counts as a planet, then the that, on their view, conceptual analysis is a part of metaphysics question would be whether there's a ninth planet in the solar and, hence, that it's obviously metaphysically interesting, my system, but let's ignore this complication). Now,if we take the response would be to give them the expression 'metaphysically style of thinking inherent in the above objection and apply it interesting'. I would just rephrase my thesis in terms of rele- in the present case, we seem to obtain the result that when vance to the goal of discoveringthe nature of human beings and Carstairs and Caruthers are debating what the ordinary human decision-makingprocesses. meaning of 'planet' is, they're doing . But, of course, I want to begin my argument for (iii) by saying why someone they're not doing astronomy; they're doing empirical semantics. might want to reject it. Thus, consider the following counter- Their investigation isn't relevant in any nontrivial way to an argument or objectionto (iii): into the nature of the solar system. If astronomers know that Wilma is there, and if they know how big Wilma is, Until we determine what free will is, we can't determine and what it's made of, and what it's orbital path is like, and so whether humans have free will because we won't even know on and so forth, then their work is done. It would be a bizarre, what we're talking about, or looking for.Thus, the what-is- misleading representation of the situation to claim that free-willquestion is obviouslyrelevant to the do-we-have-free- Carstairs and Caruthers were disputing an open astronomical will question, and moreover,philosopherswho are engagedin question, that is, a question about the nature of the solar trying to answer the what-is-free-will question are doing system, and that they were trying to settle this question by metaphysics because they're doingsomething that's centrally studying the ordinary usage of astronomers. important to the task of answering the do-we-have-free-will Similar remarks, it seems, can be made about free will. question, which is clearly a metaphysical question about the Philosophers involved in trying to answer the what-is-free-will nature ofhuman beings. question are not engaged in a genuine inquiry into the nature of human-decision making processes, and indeed, their I think the central claims in this objection are essentially right, investigations are not relevant to such in any but I also think they overlook an important point, and it's for nontrivial way. Like Carstairs and Caruthers, what these this that thesis (iii) contains a proviso about metaphysical phj.losophersare doing is empirical semantics; they're engaged interestingness. What I want to argue here is that when we in an investigation of ordinary-language usage and intentions. take this proviso seriously,we see that thesis (iii) is importantly Let's change the example now. Let's suppose it's an open correct.More precisely,I want to argue this point on the assump- astronomical question whether Wilma exists. For instance, we tion that the OL View is correct-that is, on the assumption can suppose that some astronomer has discovered some pertur- bations in Pluto's orbital path and hypothesized Wilma's goal of discovering the nature of human decision-making existence to explain these perturbations but that, as of yet, no processes-this is clearly a trivial sort of relevance. When we one has actually found Wilma. And let's suppose that a dispute ask the do-we-have-free-willquestion, we are presumably trying has arisen over this issue and that people characterize this to learn something about the nature of human decision-making dispute by saying that there's a controversy among astronomers processes; but the what-is-free-will question is relevant to that over the following: goal in at most a trivial way, for how the expression 'free will' happens to be used in ordinary discourse doesn't tell us anything The tenth-planet question: Is there a tenth planet in our solar important or nontrivial about the nature of human decision- system(ora ninth planet, ifyouthink.that Plutoisn't a planet)? making processes. Therefore, once again, it seems fair to say that while the what-is-free-will question is obviouslyrelevant to Now suppose that Caruthers announces that he has discovered the do-we-have-free-will question in a certain way, it is not the answer to the tenth-planet question; he argues that Wilma relevant to that question-or indeed to any question about the mayor may not exist-he has no about this-but that it nature of human decision making-in any nontrivial way.And doesn't matter because even if Wilma does exist, it is not a again, the point here is not that the what-is-free-will question is planet, and so the answer to the tenth-planet question is 'No'. itself trivial or uninteresting; the point is that it is not a question Finally, suppose that Carstairs argues that Caruthers is about human beings, or human decision making, except in a mistaken; he says that if Wilma exists then it is a planet, and trivial way; it is rather about the semantics of a certain so, he says, we have to determine whether Wilma exists in order expression. to answer the tenth-planet question. Now,what I want to ask is There's another parallel between the planet case and the this: Is the Carstairs-Caruthers debate relevant to the tenth- free will case that's worth commenting on. If what I'm arguing planet question? Well,there is obviouslya sort of relevance here is correct, then the metaphysically interesting issue behind the because Caruthers's semantic thesis (together with various do-we-have-free-willquestion is captured by the which-kinds-of- theses about the solar system that we're assuming are endorsed freedom-do-we-have question, which is entirely independent of by all the parties to the dispute) entails that the answer to the the what-is-free-will question (indeed, this question was pur- tenth-planet question is 'No'. But from an astronomical point of posely formulated in a way that would make it independent of view-that is, from the point of view of the goal of discovering the ordinary-language meaning of 'free will'). If we could fully the nature of the solar system-this is clearly a trivial sort of answer the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question, then relevance. When we ask the tenth-planet question, we are we would have all the relevant facts about the nature of human presumably trying to learn something about the nature of the decision-makingprocessesthat we might need in order to answer solar system; but the Carstairs-Caruthers debate is relevant to the do-we-have-free-will question; we still might not know the that goal in at most a trivial way, for how the word 'planet' answer to the do-we-have-free-willquestion, but that wouldjust happens to be used in ordinary discourse doesn't tell us any- be a function of our not knowing the ordinary-language meaning thing important or nontrivial about the nature of the solar of the term 'free will'; it would not signify any substantive system. Therefore, it seems fair to say that while the Carstairs- ignorance about the nature of human beings. Likewise, it seems Caruthers debate is obviously relevant to the tenth-planet that the astronomically interesting issue behind the tenth- question in a certain sort of way, it is not relevant to that planet question is captured by a question that's entirely inde- question-or indeed to any question about the nature of the pendent of the Carstairs-Caruthers debate, namely,the question solar system-in any nontrivial or astronomically interesting 'Is there any such thing as Wilma?' If we could answer this way.(This, of course, is not to say that the Carstairs-Caruthers question, we would know all the relevant facts about the nature debate is itself trivial or uninteresting; it's just to say that it's of the solar system; we still might not know the answer to the not an astronomical debate, i.e., a debate about the nature of tenth-planet question, but that would just be a function of our the solar system, except in a very trivial way.) not knowing what 'planet' means; it would not signify any Likewise, if we ask whether the what-is-free-will question is substantive ignorance about the nature of the solar system.4 relevant to the do-we-have-free-will question, we can say that The point here can be generalized. Whenever you're trying to there is obviouslya sort of relevance here, because, for example, discover something about the nature of , you can Hume's answer to the what-is-free-will question (together with always proceed straight to the point at hand, without having to other theses that just about all of us accept) entails that the determine the meaning of some folk expression, by simply answer to the do-we-have-free-willquestion is 'Yes'.But from a introducing some theoretical terms and defining them by stipu- metaphysical point of view-that is, the point of view of the lation. Thus, for example, if you just want to know what the solar system is like, you can forget about folk terms like 'planet' point, I assumed the OL View; that is, I assumed that an and introduce some new terms with clearly defined meanings. answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct iff it captures And if you just want to know what human decision-making the ordinary-language meaning(s) of 'free will'. I now want to processes are like, you can simply use terms of art like 'Humean argue that even if we reject the OL View,we still get the result freedom' and 'L-freedom' and so on and proceed straight to the that the what-is-free-will question is essentially irrelevant to point at hand, trying to determine which of the various kinds of the do-we-have-free-willquestion. freedom (or "freedom") human beings actually possess without If the OL View is wrong, then we can't answer the what-is- first determining the ordinary-language meaning of the folk free-will question by looking only at facts about ordinary- term 'free will'. And if you're in a situation where you already language meaning; we need to look at other kinds of facts as know all the relevant metaphysical facts but don't know what well (or instead, as the case may be). Indeed, one might think some folk term means, then you can describe the metaphysical that in order to adequately answer the what-is-free-will facts using technical terms with stipulated definitions, and so question, we need to take a variety of different issues into your lack of knowledge of the meaning of the folk term shouldn't account. One way to motivate this stance would be to endorse be treated as a genuine ignorance of (nonsemantic) - something like the followingview: physical facts. (Another way to appreciate the generality of the issue here is to note that behind every question about the The Hybrid View: It's true that part of what we're doing in nature of the world, there are semantic questions about the trying to answer the what-is-free-will question is trying to meanings of the words in the given about-the-world question, figure out what ordinary folk mean by 'free will'. But that's and these semantic questions are, in some sense, logically prior not all we're doing. We're also trying to improve upon folk to the question about the nature of the world; but insofar as one usage, or supplement it, or some such thing. In doing this, we is interested in discovering the nature of the world when one is might need to consider a number of different issues. For asking the about-the-world question, and not in discovering the instance, we might want to eliminate some incoherence or meanings of the words in that question, there is no need to imprecision from the ordinary folk notion of free will. Or, trouble oneself with the semantic questions before addressing the second,we might want to take into account the issue ofwhat's issue about the nature of the world.) worth wanting; in other words, in order to determine what Before going on, I want to draw a distinction between two free will is,we might need to figure out which kinds offreedom different aspects of conceptual analysis and acknowledge that are valuable; in particular, we might need to figure out which one of them is in fact relevant to metaphysical questions about kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility, or human beings (but in a way that doesn't undermine my ,or dignity,or other things we might value. Or,third, here). The distinction I have in is between (a) the articu- we might want to take into account the kinds offreedom that lation of concepts, or conceptual analyses, and (b) arguments for humans actually have, for one might think that what free and against the correctness of the various analyses that have will is is at least partially determined by the kinds offreedom been offered. The former is definitely relevant to metaphysical that are actually at work when people have the experience of questions about the nature of human decision-making processes: acting and choosing freely. every someone comes up with a new analysis of free will, it generates a new subquestion of the which-kinds-of-freedom-do- Regardless of whether the Hybrid View,as its stated here, is the we-have question, and so this can lead to the discovery of new best alternative to the OL View,it seems that the sorts of consi- and interesting facts about humans. What I'm claiming is not derations mentioned in the Hybrid View-most notably, those relevant (in any nontrivial way) to metaphysical questions about having to do with coherence,moral responsibility, and the nature human beings is the question of which of the many analyses of of actual human freedom-are the most plausible candidates for free will that people have articulated are correct. And this, of what might be relevant to the what-is-free-will question, if that course, is just what the what-is-free-will question asks. question isn't simply about ordinary-language meaning. Thus, it 4. Why the What-Is-Free-Will Question seems to me that if we reject the OL View,we're going to wind up saying that questions like the following are relevant to the Is Irrelevant to the Do-We-Have-Free-Will Question, what-is-free-will question: Even If the OL View Isn't Correct The which-kinds-offreedom-do-we-have question (see section 1 I just argued that the what-is-free-will question is essentially for a formulation). irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question. In arguing this The coherence question: Whichkinds offreedom (or"freedom") freedom-do-we-have question and the what-is-free-will question, are coherent, or conceptually possible? and (b) the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion contains that's metaphysically interesting here, so that the The moral responsibility question: Which kinds offreedom (or what-is-free-will question doesn't add anything of metaphysical "freedom")are required for moral responsibility? interest. Now, if it turns out that the which-kinds-of-freedom- do-we-havequestion is relevant to the what-is-free-will question, Now, I think there are potential problems with the view that then the latter question is obviously a metaphysically inter- questions like these are relevant to the what-is-free-will esting question. But it's not metaphysically interesting in any question-for instance, one might argue that the OL View is the new way. For the metaphysically interesting facts that would be best view after all-but I don't want to pursue this issue here. relevant to the what-is-free-will question in this scenario are Instead, I want to argue that even if we assume that questions the very same facts that are relevant to the which-kinds-of- like these are relevant to the what-is-free-will question, we still freedom-do-we-have question, and so they're the same facts that get the result that the what-is-free-will question is essentially are already relevant to the do-we-have-free-willquestion. irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question (and, indeed, to In short, the point is this: even if we assume that the which- other questions about the nature of human decision-making kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question is relevant to the what- processes). I will argue this point in connection with the three is-free-will question, we still get the result that if we could questions listed above in sections 4.1-4.3. Then in section 4.4, I answer the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question, we will construct a more general argument, one that motivates the would have all the relevant metaphysically interesting infor- idea that no matter what we say about the kinds of facts and mation we would need in order to answer the do-we-have-free- questions that might be relevant to the what-is-free-will will question-and so we still get the result that the what-is- question, we still get the result that that question is essentially free-will question adds nothing here that's metaphysically irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-willquestion. interesting. In other words, we still get the result that if we could already answer the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have 4.1 The Which-Kinds-of-Freedom-Do- We-Have question, then by moving on and answering the what-is-free- Question will question, we would not be learning anything new about the nature of human beings or human decision-making processes. There are a few different reasons one might give for thinking And so our situation here isn't changed at all by assuming that the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion is relevant that the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion is relevant to the what-is-free-will question. For instance, one might think to the what-is-free-will question. that our predicates should be interpreted in ways that enable Another way to put the point here is in terms of direction of them to "carve nature at its joints," and given this, one might relevance: if the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question argue that we ought to take 'free will' to refer to a kind of free- were relevant to the what-is-free-will question, this wouldn't dom that humans actually have-that is, a kind that's actually give us the result that the what-is-free-will question was rele- present when people have the experience of acting and choosing vant to metaphysical questions about human decision making; freely. Or alternatively, one might argue that 'free ' is a rather, it would give us the opposite result-that is, that meta- kind term, or a -case term, and one might infer from physical questions about human decision making were relevant this that 'free will' refers to the kind of freedom that's inherent to the what-is-free-will question. In this scenario, we could in ordinary human ,whatever that turns out to be. I have independently discover facts about humans that turned out to serious doubts about both of these views, and more generally, I be relevant to determining what free will is, but we could not have doubts about the claim that the which-kinds-of-freedom- independently discover what free will is in a way that would do-we-have question is relevant to the what-is-free-will ques- make this relevant to figuring out which sorts of freedom human tion. But again, I don't want to pursue this here.5 Instead, I beings actually possess, for in this scenario, in order to figure want to argue that even if the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we- out what free will is, we would first have to figure out which have question is relevant to the what-is-free-will question, this sorts of freedom humans actually have. doesn't undermine my claim that the what-is-free-will question is essentially irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question. The argument for this, as we'll presently see, is very simple. The view I've been advancing here is that (a) the do-we- A very similar argument can be used in connection with the have-free-will question decomposes into the which-kinds-of- coherence question. Now, I want to admit that the coherence question is itself a metaphysically relevant question. After all, if Suppose we knew which kinds of freedom (or "freedom") a kind of freedom is incoherent, or conceptually impossible, then humans possessedbut didn't knowwhichofthemwererequired it follows that humans do not possess that kind of freedom. for moral responsibility. Then we wouldn't know whether Thus, the coherence question is directly relevant to the which- humans were morally responsible for their actions, and so by kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion, and so it is a metaphysi- answeringthe moral responsibilityquestion,wecoulddiscover cally relevant question. But the coherence question is not a fact about humans-namely, whether they were morally metaphysically relevant in any way that undermines my responsible for their actions. position here. Recall my thesis: (a) if we could answer the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question, then we would I have two responses to this argument. First, even if the moral have all the relevant metaphysically interesting we responsibility question is relevant to a question about humans would need in order to answer the do-we-have-free-willquestion, (namely, the question of whether humans are morally respon- and (b) by going on and answering the what-is-free-will ques- sible for their actions), in the present context, this isn't the tion, we wouldn't be learning anything that was both new and right kind of metaphysical relevance. In order to undermine my metaphysically interesting-that is, we wouldn't be learning position, we would need the result that the moral responsibility anything new about the nature of human decision-making question is relevant to questions about the nature of human processes. But this will be true even if we assume that the decision-making processes, and it's hard to believe that this is coherence question is relevant to the what-is-free-will ques- true. If the moral responsibility question is relevant to the tion. For, in short, the metaphysically relevant features of the what-is-free-will question, then we might get the result that the coherence question are already relevant to the which-kinds-of- what-is-free-will question is relevant to questions about the freedom-do-we-havequestion (and, hence, to the do-we-have-free- moral status of humans. But we don't get the result that it's will question). If we could already answer the which-kinds- relevant to questions about the metaphysical nature of human of-freedom-do-we-have question, and if some specific kind of decision-making processes; for, again, by answering the moral freedom F were conceptually impossible, or incoherent, then we responsibility question and, hence, the what-is-free-will would already know that we didn't possess F. Thus, even if we question, we wouldn't be learning anything new about the nature could use this information about F in answering the what-is- of our decision-making processes, in particular, about the kinds free-will question-for example, even if we could use it to deter- of freedom (or "freedom")that we actually have. mine that free will isn't F-in doing this, we wouldn't be learning The second response to the above argument is that, perhaps anything new about human beings or human decision making. surprisingly, the moral responsibility question is in fact not For, again, we would already know all the relevant metaphysi- relevant (in any metaphysically interesting way) to the question cally interesting facts. Thus, again, even if we assume that the of whether human beings are morally responsible for their coherence question is relevant to the what-is-free-will question, actions. To argue this point, let me assume, for the sake of we still get the result that the what-is-free-will question adds simplifying things, that (a) aside from the issue of the kinds of nothing of metaphysical interest to the which-kinds-of-freedom- freedom that are required for moral responsibility, we know do-we-havequestion. roughly what moral responsibility is, and (b) we also know that humans do satisfy all the requirements for moral responsibility except possibly for the freedom requirement. (Of course, we don't really know these things, but I won't be begging any ques- Once again, I have serious doubts about the thesis that the moral tions by assuming them here. Indeed, it's easy to see that if responsibility question is substantively relevant to the what-is- humans fail to satisfy some other requirement for moral respon- free-will question, but again, I don't want to pursue this here. sibility-that is, some nonfreedom requirement-then the above Instead, I want to argue that even if we assume that the moral objection to my view completely falls apart because we would responsibility question is relevant to the what-is-free-will ques- already know,independently of the free will issue, that humans tion, it doesn't matter (in the present context) because the moral aren't responsible for their actions.) In any event, given these responsibility question is itself essentially irrelevant to meta- assumptions, let's suppose that we already knew the answer to physical questions about the nature of human decision-making the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question but didn't processes. know the answer to the moral responsibility question, and One might argue that the moral responsibility question is hence, didn't know whether we had free will or moral responsi- relevant to metaphysical questions about humans by saying bility, because we didn't know what free will or moral respon- something like this: sibility were. Then we could define a series of kinds of moral responsibility (or "moral responsibility," as the case may be) of responsibility is fair iff it would be fair to hold someone corresponding to the different kinds of freedom (or "freedom"). morally responsible because they had that kind of responsi- For instance, if we had named the various kinds of freedom Fl' bility). But it's hard to believe that we could make any

F2, and so on, then R1 would be a kind of moral responsibility here by appealing to the notion of fairness because, presumably, that required F 1 (and no other kind of freedom); R2 would be a each kind of responsibility brings with it its own kind of kind of moral responsibility that required F2 (and no other kind fairness. Now,of course, we might try to determine which kinds of freedom); R712 would be a kind of moral responsibility that of responsibility are really fair, but it seems to me that this required F7 and F12 (and no other kind of freedom); and so on. It could only be a question about the ordinary notion of fairness, follows from everything we're assuming here that in this and so this would put us right back in the business of deter- scenario, we would already know which of these kinds of respon- mining ordinary-language meaning. So, again, it seems to me sibility we possessed and which we didn't. So we would already that there's no way to get the result that the moral responsi- know all the responsibility facts about humans. We might not bility question is relevant, in a metaphysically interesting way, know the truth value of the sentence 'Humans are morally to questions about the nature of human beings. responsible for their actions', but that wouldn't be a function of any lack of knowledge about humans. It would simply be because we didn't know what moral responsibility was, or what 'moral responsibility' meant, or some such thing. Thus, it seems I now want to construct a general argument for thinking that to me that the moral responsibility question isn't relevant, in no matter what we say about the kinds of facts that might be any metaphysically interesting way, to the question of whether relevant to the what-is-free-will question-that is, the kinds of humans are morally responsible for their actions-or, indeed, to facts that might determine which answer to the what-is-free- any question about humans. will question is correct-we still get the result that the what-is- To give a concrete example here, my claim is this: suppose free-will question is essentially irrelevant to the do-we-have- that (a) we already knew that humans were Hume-responsible free-will question (and, indeed, to all questions about the nature but not libertarian-responsible, but (b) we didn't know whether of human decision-making processes). There are two sorts of moral responsibility was Hume-responsibility or libertarian- facts that one might think relevant to the what-is-free-will responsibility (although we can assume that we had figured out question, namely, (i) facts that are relevant to the which-kinds- that it was one of the two and not some third kind of respon- of-freedom-do-we-have question, and (ii) facts that aren't rele- sibility); then we wouldn't be lacking any knowledge here about vant to that question, for example, facts about ordinary-language humans, in any interesting sense; we would simply be lacking meaning. But as we saw in section 4.1, type-(i) facts aren't knowledge of what moral responsibility is. relevant in any new way to the do-we-have-free-will question, What sort of knowledge is this that we would be lacking? because we already have to answer the which-kinds-of-freedom- Well,one view is that it's essentially just knowledge of ordinary- do-we-havequestion in order to answer the do-we-have-free-will language meaning. On this view, to say that moral responsi- question. And, second, it's hard to see how type-(ii) facts could bility is, for example, libertarian-responsibility is to make a be relevant, in any metaphysically interesting way, to the do- claim about the ordinary concept of moral responsibility, that is, we-have-free-will question. For the which-kinds-of-freedom-do- about the way that ordinary folk use the term 'moral respon- we-have question seems to capture all the metaphysically sibility'. On this view, for all the reasons given in section 3, the interesting facts that might be relevant to the do-we-have-free- moral responsibility question is not relevant in any metaphysi- will question. In other words, once the which-kinds-of-freedom- cally interesting way to any questions about humans. do-we-have question has been answered, there are simply no What other sort of question might the moral responsibility facts left to discover that are both relevant to the do-we-have- question be, if not a question about ordinary-language meaning? free-will question and metaphysically interesting in the sense of Well, the only other plausible view, I think, is that it's partially being about the nature of human beings. Thus, the conclusion I about capturing ordinary-language meaning and partially about want to draw is that no matter what we say about the kinds of improving on ordinary-language meaning. One way to improve facts that might be relevant to the what-is-free-will question, on ordinary meaning would be to eliminate incoherences, but I that question is not relevant in any metaphysically interesting could presumably take the same line here that I took on this way to the do-we-have-free-will question. The only really issue in section 4.2. Another way to improve on the ordinary metaphysically important question here is the which-kinds-of- usage of 'moral responsibility' would be to figure out which of freedom-do-we-havequestion. the various kinds of moral responsibility are fair (where a kind 5. Why the Compatibilism Question Reduces Of course, in the , someone could come up with a new to the What-Is-Free-Will Question kind of freedom that generated a pure compatibility question that was controversial; this would be a purely logical question- I have now argued that the what-is-free-will question is irrele- it would be of the form 'Is the concept of X-freedom compatible vant to the do-we-have-free-will question in all but a very with determinism?' But as of right now,there are no such ques- trivial way. But I also want to argue that the compatibilism tions that are controversial, and so we can say that, relative to question is irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will question. To the current state of the debate, the compatibilism question establish this, I will argue in the present section that the reduces to the what-is-free-will question. compatibilismquestion reduces to the what-is-free-willquestion. It's important to note that the point I'm arguing here-that The argument for this is very simple. The first point to note the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will is this: just as we found that the do-we-have-free-will question question-does not constitute an objection to any important reduces to, or is subsumed by,the what-is-free-will question and part of the literature on the compatibilism question. Indeed, it the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion, so too it seems seems to me that when we look closely at this literature, we that the compatibilism question reduces to, or is subsumed by, find that it fits very nicely with my thesis. We can divide the the what-is-free-will question and what might be called the literature on the compatibilism question into four main strands, which -k inds- 0f- freedo m -are -compati ble -wit h - te rmi n is m namely, (i) the literature on the Humean conditional analysis of question. The second point to be made here is this: prima facie,it free will; (ii) the literature regarding recent compatibilist seems that all of the subquestions of the which-kinds-of-freedom- attempts to construct an acceptable analysis of the notion of are-compatible-with-determinism question-for example, 'Is free will; (iii) the Literature on the consequence argument for Humean freedom compatible with determinism?', 'Is L-freedom ; and (iv) the literature on the Frankfurt-case compatible with determinism?', and so on-are trivial and argument for compatibilism (actually, the Frankfurt-case obvious. In other words, it seems that all of the analyses of free argument is more often brought up in connection with the issue will in the literature are either obviously compatible with of the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, determinism or obviously incompatible with it. For instance, L- but all the arguments here can be reproduced in connection freedom is obviously incompatible with determinism because it with the issue of the compatibility of determinism and free will- is by definition indeterministic (see note 2). And Humean though, of course, one might doubt that the corresponding argu- freedom is obviously compatible with determinism because it's ments always stand or fall together7).8 I think it can be argued essentially just the ability to act and choose in accordance with that in all four of these strands, the really controversial issues your desires, and it could be that our desires are causally deter- boil down to semantic questions about the meanings of various mined by prior events and that these desires determine our terms (not just 'free will' but related expressions like 'can', decisions,which in turn determine our actions.And Frankfurtian 'could have done otherwise', and so on). This is more or less freedom is obviously compatible with determinism because it's obvious in connection with strands (i) and (ii). It is perhaps a just the ability to control, with second-order attitudes, which of bit less obvious in connection with strand (iv), but not much. your first-order desires will your behavior, and it could be The issues there center around various thought that we are causally determined to have (and act on) second- and intuitions, and this alone suggests that conceptual analysis order desires of this sort. And the same point can be made about is what's at issue. The question is not whether some clearly all the different compatibilist analyses that have been put defined concept is compatible with couldn't-have-done- forward, for example, the proposals of people like Watson (1975), otherwise; rather, it's whether we should interpret the term Dworkin (1988), Wolf (1990), Double (1991), Fischer (1994), 'moral respon-sibility' (or 'free will') as expressing a certain sort Fischer and Ravizza (1998),Mele (1995),and Bok (1998),to name of concept-in particular, one that's compatible with couldn't- just a few. In sum, there are no mainstream analyses of free have-done-otherwise.Finally, the point is probably least obvious will-or at any rate, none that I know of-that generate sub- in connectionwith strand (iii),that is, the consequenceargument, stantive, nonobvious compatibility questions.6 Thus, it seems because on the surface, the issue there doesn't seem to be one of tha t the which- kinds-of-freedom -are-com patible-wi th -deter- meaning or conceptual analysis. But upon reflection, it becomes minism question just disappears. And so the only controversial clear that this is precisely what's at issue. I cannot argue this part of the compatibilism question is the what-is-free-will point in detail, but the main idea behind the argument is as question-which is just to say that the compatibilism question follows: (a) every version of the consequence argument is reduces to the what-is-free-will question. couched in terms of some crucial expression like 'has a choice about'; and (b) if we interpret these expressions along incom- patibilist lines, the argument is clearly sound; and (c) if we Finally, it's worth noting that the point I have argued in this interpret them along compatibilist lines, the argument is clearly paper-that the compatibilism question and the what-is-free- unsound; and so (d) the issue boils down to a question about how will question are irrelevant to the do-we-have-free-will ques- these expressions ought to be interpreted. tion-is a special case of a more general point, namely, that So, again, the arguments of this paper are not supposed to conceptual analysis is essentially irrelevant to metaphysics. I pro-vide objections to any of the central arguments or positions cannot argue this here, but the main idea should be clear: we in the literature on compatibilism. Moreover, I am not claiming cannot make any nontrivial progress toward discovering the (and I wouldn't claim) that the compatibilism question-or the nature of the world (or at any rate, the nonsemantic part of the what-is-free-will question or the moral responsibility question- world) by analyzing a concept, that is, by figuring out what are unimportant. Everything I've said here is perfectly consistent some word means or should mean. Now,of course, if we already with the claim that these questions are extremely important. My knew what some part of the world was like but didn't know claim is simply that they aren't relevant in any nontrivial way to what some folk term meant, then a conceptual analysis could the do-we-have-free-willquestion-or, more generally, to investi- tell us that certain about-the-world sentences were true; but in gations into the nature of human decision-makingprocesses. this case, we wouldn't be learning anything nontrivial about the Before concluding, let me make a few final points. First, if nature of the (nonsemantic part of the) world. the arguments of this paper are correct, then the metaphysical component of the problem of free will essentially boils down to the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question. But notice that most of the subquestions of this question are pretty trivial. I would like to thank Robert Kane, Timothy O'Connor, Carl Ginet, In particular, it seems more or less obvious that we do possess Kadri Vihvelin, , David Widerker, Robert Jones, most of the standard compatibilist kinds of freedom, for example, Manyul 1m,and David Pitt for commenting on earlier versions of this Humean freedom, Frankfurtian freedom, and so on. There paper. Also, versions of this paper were read at the University of might be a few kinds of compatibilist freedom that are slightly Oakland and the University of California, Riverside, and I would like to thank the members of both of those audiences for some very helpful controversial; for example, kinds of freedom that require reasons feedback. Finally, the writing of this paper was partially supported by responsiveness (see, e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998 on this a fellowship from the National for the and topic) might be somewhat problematic because one might think also by a research grant from California State University, LosAngeles; that the literature on things like situationism and confabula- I would like to express my gratitude to both of these institutions. tion suggests that we're less reasons responsive than we might lOne might wonder why philosophers are still worried about have thought; but even if this is true, it seems pretty obvious determinism given that the of has that lots of our decisions are at least significantly influenced by undermined any reasons we might have had for believing that our reasons. In any event, it seems to me that the main contro- determinism is true. There are two answers to this question. First, versial subquestion of the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have while it's true that we don't have any good reason to believe that question is the libertarian question, that is, the question of determinism is true, we also don't have any good reason to believe that it's false, and so, for all we know, it might still be true. Second, whether we're L-free. If this is right, then it's a consequence of even if determinism is false, there's a related thesis that one might this paper that the metaphysical component of the problem of still reasonably believe and that seems to generate a very similar free will boils down largely, though perhaps not entirely, to the problem for free will. The thesis in question-which might be called libertarian question. (Of course, one might think we've already FE-determinism-is that there are no freedom-enhancing indeter- got good reasons to doubt that we're L-free, but I think it can be minacies in human decision-making processes. Given that this might argued that this is false.9) be true, one might wonder whether it's compatible with free will. But Another consequence of this paper is that the answers to the it turns out that free will is compatible with FE-determinism iff it's what-is-free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do- compatible with determinism. Thus, even if determinism is false, the we-have question might be very different. For instance, it may compatibilism question might still be philosophicallyimportant. be that (a) human beings do possess L-freedom so that meta- 2 We can say that a person is libertarian free, or L-free, iff she makes at least some decisions that are such that (a) they are both physical is true, but that (b) compatibilism is undetermined (i.e., not causally determined by prior events) and also true because the ordinary term 'free will' denotes some appropriately nonrandom, and (b) the indeterminacy here is relevant compatibilist kind of freedom and not L-freedom. There is no to the appropriate nonrandomness in the sense that it generates it, or incompatibility between these two theses-indeed, there's not procures it, or enhances it, or increases it, or some such thing. Now, even any tension between them-and so there is no goodreason much needs to be said about what appropriate nonrandomness consists for thinking that one shouldn't endorse them together. in, but we needn't bother with this here. Sufficeit to say that the main requirement is a kind of agent-involvedness that consists (most importantly, but not entirely) in the given agent having authorship and control over which option is chosen. See my 2004 and my forth- Aune, B. 1967. Hypotheticals and 'can': Another look.Analysis 27:191- coming for more on this. 95. S See Hume (1748)and Frankfurt (1971)for their notions of free will. Austin, J. L. 1961. Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers, ed. J. O. 4 Parfit (1995) endorses a view similar to this in connection with Urmson and G.Warnock, 153-80. Oxford:Clarendon Press. the issue of personal . Balaguer, M. 2004. A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation 5 Actually, let me say just a few words about the vie,,; t~at 'free of libertarian free will. 38:379-406. will' is a kind term that picks out the sort of freedom that s mherent --. Forthcoming.Free will as an open scientific problem. Cambridge, in normal human choices, whatever that turns out to be. To see how MA:MIT Press. implausible this view is, notice how different 'free will' is from kind Berofsky, B. 2002. Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues. In Kane 2002, terms like 'water'. 'Water' denotes the stuff in our lakes and pipes and 181-201. so on, whatever that stuff turns out to be. So if we discovered (in this Bok, H. 1998.Freedom and responsibility. Princeton: Princeton Univer- world) that that stuff isn't H20, that it's really XYZ, then it would sity Press. follow that water is XYZ;it certainly wouldn't follow that there is no Chisholm, R. 1964.J. L. Austin's philosophical papers. Mind 73:20-25. such thing as water. But 'free will' doesn't work like this. Suppose we Double, R. 1991. The non- offree will. Oxford:Oxford University discovered that all our choices were controlled by Martians via remote Press. control. If 'free will' were a kind term, it would follow that free will Dworkin, G. 1988. The theory and practice of autonomy. Cambridge: consists in being controlled by Martians. But, of course, that's wrong. Cambridge University Press. If we discovered that Martians were controlling all our choices, that Fischer, J. M. 1994. The metaphysics of free will: A study of control, would be a discovery that we don't have free will. Oxford:Blackwell. 6 This is perhaps not quite right. Consider, e.g., the view that £:ee ---.2002. Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism. In will is the ability to do otherwise; if this were right, then the questIon Kane 2002, 281-308. of whether free will is compatible with determinism would be Fischer, J. M., and M. Ravizza. 1998. Responsibility and control: A controversial. But this is just because this definition is so thin and theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University underdeveloped. In particular, we aren't told here what the ability to Press. do otherwise is. Now,the question of what the ability to do otherwise Frankfurt, H. 1969. Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. is is obviously a controversial question. But, of course, it's not a Journal of Philosophy 66:829-39. compatibility question; it's a conceptual-analysis question and, indeed, --. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. Journal on the view that free will is the ability to do otherwise, it's part of the of Philosophy 68:5-20. what-is-free-will question. Thus, even if we have here a counter- Ginet, C. 1980.The conditional analysis of freedom. In Time and cause, example to the claim that there are no controversial subquestions of ed. P. van Inwagen, 171-86. Dordrecht: Reidel. the which-kinds-of-freedom-are-compatible-with-determinism question, --. 1996. In defense of the of alternative possibilities: we don't have a good objection to my overall stance because we don't Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing. Philosophical have a good objection to my claim that the compatibilism question Perspectives 10:403-17. reduces to the what-is-free-will question. For if we assume that free Haji, 1.2002. Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility.In Kane will is the ability to do otherwise, then the compatibilism question 2002, 202-28. seems to turn on the question of what the ability to do otherwise is, Hume, D. 1955 [1748].An inquiry concerning human . and again, according to the view that free will is the abil~ty to do Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. otherwise, this question is a part of the what-is-free-will questIOn. James, W. 1956 [1884]. The dilemma of determinism. In The will to 7 For instance, Fischer (1994) thinks the argument shows that believe; Human immortality. New York:Dover Publications, 145-83. moral responsibility is compatible with determinism but not that free Kane, R. 1985. Free will and values. Albany: State University of New will is compatible with determinism. York Press. 8 All four of these strands are enormous, but let me give just a few --. 1996. The significance of free will. Oxford: Oxford University references here. In connection with (i), aside from Hume 1748,see, e.g., Press. Austin 1961 Chisholm 1964, Lehrer 1966, 1968, Aune 1967, and --. 2002. The Oxford handbook of free will. Oxford: Oxford Univer- Berofsky 2002. In connection with (ii), see, e.g., Watson 1975, Dworkin sity Press. 1988 Wolf 1990, Double 1991, Mele 1995, Bok 1998, and Haji 2002. In Kant, 1. 1927 [1788].The critique of . Trans. T.K Abbott. conn~ctionwith (iii), see van Inwagen 1975,Wiggins 1973, Lamb 1977, New York:Longman, Green, and Company. Ginet 1980, and Kapitan 2002. In connection with (iv), see Frankfurt Kapitan, T. 2002. A master argument for incompatibilism? In Kane 1969 and Fischer 2002, and for some responses to the Frankfurt-~ase 2002, 127-57. argument, see, e.g., Widerker 1995a, 1995b, Kane 1985, 1996, Gmet Lamb, J. 1977. On a of incompatibilism. Philosophical Review 1996, and Wyma 1997. 86:20-35. 9 See, e.g., my 2004 and my forthcoming. Lehrer, K. 1966. An empirical disproof of determinism. In Freedom and determinism, ed. K. Lehrer, 175-202. New York:Random House. --. 1968. Cans without ifs. Analysis 29:29-32. Mele, A. 1995. Autonomous agents: From self-control to autonomy. New York: Oxford University Press. Nahmias, E., S. Morris, T. Nadelhoffer, and J. Turner. 2005. Surveying freedom: Folk intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. Philosophical 18:561-84. Nichols, S. 2006. Folk intuitions on free will. Journal of and Culture 6:57-86. Parfit, D. 1995. The unimportance of identity. In Identity, ed. H. Harris, 13-45. Oxford: Clarendon Press. van Inwagen, P. 1982 [1975).The incompatibility of free will and deter- minism. In Free will, ed. G. Watson, 46-58. Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press. Watson, G. 1975. Free . Journal of Philosophy 72:205-20. Widerker, D. 1995a. Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. Philosophical Review 104:247- 61. --. 1995b. Libertarian freedom and the avoidability of decisions. Faith and Philosophy 12:113-18. Wiggins, D. 1973. Towards a reasonable libertarianism. In Essays on freedom of , ed. T. Honderich, 31-61. London: and Kegan Paul. Wolf, S. 1990. Freedom within reason. New York: Oxford University Press. Wyma, K. 1997. Moral responsibility and the leeway for action. Ameri- can Philosophical Quarterly 34:57-70.