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The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (And, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis) Mark Balaguer California State University, Los Angeles

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The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (And, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis) Mark Balaguer California State University, Los Angeles The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis) Mark Balaguer California State University, Los Angeles It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision-making processes-for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will-except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions- namely, the conceptual-analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility-are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings. [Compatibilism] is a wretched subterfuge ... and ... a petty word- jugglery. [Compatibilism] is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered .... No matter what the soft determinist mean by ['freedom'],... there is a problem, an issue of fact and not of words. Mark Balaguer is Professor of Philosophy at California State Univ&-sity, Los Angeles. His areas of interest are metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, free will, and metaethics. He is the author of Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics (Oxford University Press, 1998), as well as numerous journal articles. freedom?;and dothey have Frankfurtian freedom?;and so on.3 (Actually,to be more precise, we can formulate this question The recent literature on the problem of free will has been as asking which kinds of"freedom"humans have, since some dominated by the debate about whether compatibilism is true. I or all ofthe kinds of"freedom"we're asking about here might think this is unfortunate because I think the question of fail to be free will, accordingto the correct answer to the what- whether compatibilism is true is essentially irrelevant to is-free-willquestion.) metaphysical questions about human free will-that is, about the existence or nature of the freedom inherent in human If we could answer these two questions, then (I will argue) we decision-making processes. This view of the compatibilism could also answer the compatibilism question and the do-we- debate is metaphysically similar to the views of Kant and have-free-will question. In particular, I will argue that (i) the James, but I should say here that I would not go along with the compatibilism question reduces to the what-is-free-will question, dismissiveness of their remarks. I think the question of whether and (ii) the do-we-have-free-will question collapses into the compatibilism is true is interesting in its own right, and as will what-is-free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do- become clear below, I think it may be worth caring about for we-have question. reasons that go beyond our purely theoretical interests. I will argue point (i) below,in section 5, but point (ii) is more Moreover, I think there has been a lot of good philosophical or less obvious and can be motivated right here in just a few work on this question that is both interesting and important. words: if we could answer the what-is-free-will question and the But I also think that upon reflection, it turns out that the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion, then we could also compatibilism question is independent of metaphysical questions answer the do-we-have-free-will question, because we would about the nature of human decision-making processes, except in know what free will is and whether we have it. Of course, we a trivial way. In particular, I will argue that would also know more than this-in particular, we would know whether we possess various kinds of pseudo-freedom-but this The compatibilism question: Is free will compatible with doesn't undermine the claim that the do-we-have-free-will determinism?1 question is subsumed by the what-is-free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-havequestion. The main thing I want to argue, however,is this: The do-we-have-free-will question: Dohuman beings have free (ill)While the what-is-free-willquestion is clearly relevant to will? the do-we-have-free-willquestion in a certain way, it is not relevant to that question in any nontrivial or metaphysically I will do this by arguing for a few different theses. To begin interesting way; indeed, the what-is-free-will question is not with, I will argue that the two questions listed here-that is, relevant to any substantive questionabout the nature ofhuman decision-makingprocesses,except in a trivial way. the compatibilism question and the do-we-have-free-will question-reduce to two other questions that can be thought of as more fundamental, namely, I will argue this point in sections 3 and 4. And if we combine thesis (iii) with thesis (i)-which, again, I'll argue in section 5- The what-is-free-will question: What is free will?(Wecan take we obtain the result that the compatibilism question is also this as being equivalent to the question 'What is the correct essentially irrelevant to substantive questions about the nature analysis of the notion of free will?' and also to the question of human decision-making processes, for instance, the do-we- 'What is the correct definition ofthe term "freewill"?'But we have-free-will question. Moreover, as we'll see, my argument cannot assume without argument that these questions are points to a more general result, namely, that conceptual analysis solely about folk meaning, or ordinary-language usage and is essentially irrelevant to metaphysics. intentions; I will discuss this issue below.) If my arguments are correct, then what we might think of as the semantic component of the problem of free will (namely, the what~is-free-will question) is essentially irrelevant to the metaphysical component of the problem (e.g., the do-we-have- The which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have question: Whichkinds free-will question and the which-kinds-of-freedom-do-we-have offreedom do humans have? That is, do they have libertarian question). But this isn't all there is to the problem of free will. freedom(or for short, L-freedom2)?; and dothey have Humean There is also a moral component to the problem, for we also want to know which kinds of freedom are required for moral reliably track facts about ordinary-language meaning, it's not responsibility. But I will argue in section 4 that however impor- very plausible to suppose that they reliably track other kinds of tant this question is to moral issues, it is-like the compati- facts. bilism question and the what-is-free-will question-essentially By the way, I should say that the OL View is neutral on the irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human question of whether, in trying to answer the what-is-free-will decision-making processes, for example, the do-we-have-free-will question, we should be doing real empirical studies on folk question. intuitions. According to one traditional view,we don't need to do this, because we are ourselves native speakers of ordinary 2. What Determines Whether language, and so we can use our own intuitions. But there is an Answer to the another view that's growing in prominence (see, e.g., Nichols What-Is-Free-Will Question Is Correct? 2006 and Nahmias, et al. 2005) that holds that our answers to questions like the what-is-free-will question should be based on Before I construct my main argument (in sections 3-5), I need real empirical data about the intuitions of ordinary folk, in to discuss an important question: What determines whether a particular, nonphilosophers. The OL View is consistent with given answer to the what-is-free-will question is correct? There both of these methodological views, and the issue here will not are numerous views one might adopt here. Here's one very be relevant to what I will be arguing. simple view: In any event, it seems to me that the OL View is at least initially plausible, and it might even be the right view. But on The OL V~w: An answer to the what-is-free-willquestion is the other hand, it might not be, for there are other views one correct iff it captures the ordinary-language meaning(s)of the might endorse here. For instance, one might maintain that expression'freewill'-that is,what this expressionmeansamong while it is important to uncover the facts about what ordinary ordinaryfolk.(Ofcourse,it doesn'tfollowfromthis that ordinary folk mean by the term 'free will', this isn't all there is to usage of 'free will' picks out a unique, well-defined concept; arriving at a fully acceptable answer to the what-is-free-will proponents of the OL View can allow that there might be question. One might think that other issues need to be con- vaguenesses, inconsistencies,ambiguities, and so on built into sidered as well, for example, issues having to do with the our usage here; but they would say that if the ordinary term coherence of ordinary-language conceptions of freedom, or with 'free will' is indeed vague or ambiguous,then a completeand the kinds of freedom that are required for moral responsibility, correct answer to the what-is-free-willquestion would tell us or with the kinds of freedom that are actually at work when about this.) human beings have the experience of acting and choosing freely. Here's what I'm going to do: in section 3, I will assume that This view is at least initially plausible.
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